Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend

its regulations to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear

fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel

storage installations, power reactors that have permanently ceased

reactor operations, monitored retrievable storage installations, and

geologic repository operations areas. This rule would allow general

licensees the option of implementing the proposed safeguards

requirements for spent nuclear fuel stored in approved casks at

operating power reactor sites. This action is necessary to reduce the

regulatory uncertainty regarding the safeguards requirements for the

storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste without

reducing the level of protection for public health and safety.

DATES: Comment period expires November 13, 1995. Comments received

after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the

Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received

on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attn: Docketing and

Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or

Wordperfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC

Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FEDWORLD. The bulletin board may be

accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly

available communications software packages. Background documents on the

rulemaking are also available for downloading and viewing on the

bulletin board.

The NRC rulemaking subsystem on FEDWORLD can be accessed directly

by dialing the toll free number: 1-800-303-9672. Communication software

parameters should be set as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8,

and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation,

the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the

``Rules Menu'' option from the ``NRC Main Menu.'' For further

information about options available for NRC at FEDWORLD consult the

``Help-Information Center'' from the ``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find

the ``FEDWORLD Online User's Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC

subsystems and databases also have a ``Help-Information Center'' option

that is tailored to the particular subsystem.

The NRC subsystem on FEDWORLD also can be accessed by a direct dial

phone number for the main FEDWORLD BBS: 703-321-3339. If you access NRC

this way, then you may return to FEDWORLD by selecting the ``Return to

FEDWORLD'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access

NRC at FEDWORLD by using NRC's toll-free number, then you will have

full access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the

main FEDWORLD system. For more information on NRC bulletin boards

contact Mr. Arthur Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,

telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected].

Documents related to this rulemaking, including comments received,

may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.

(Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be viewed

and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board

established by NRC for rulemaking as indicated above under the

ADDRESSES heading.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. John L. Telford (301) 415-6229 or

e-mail [email protected], or Dr. Sandra D. Frattali (301) 415-6261 or e-mail

[email protected], Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, or Ms. Priscilla A.

Dwyer (301) 415-8110 or e-mail [email protected], Office of Nuclear Material

Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Commission's regulations addressing the storage of spent

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), 10 CFR part 72,

``Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear

Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,'' refer the applicant or

licensee to `` * * * applicable requirements of part 73 * * * '' for

requirements for physical protection. However, part 73 does not

identify any safeguards requirements that are specific to the storage

of spent nuclear fuel or HLW. In practice, the NRC has imposed specific

safeguards requirements on affected facilities through license

conditions using selected portions of 10 CFR 73.50 and 73.55 and

interim licensing criteria as guidance.

The Commission's regulations for disposal of spent nuclear fuel or

HLW by DOE at a geologic repository operations area (GROA) take a

different approach. Instead of specifying applicable requirements to

protect the common defense and security, they call for DOE to certify

that it will provide `` * * * such safeguards as it requires at

comparable surface facilities * * * '' of DOE. They also require DOE to

describe a physical security plan for protection against radiological

sabotage, but the contents of that plan are not specified.

The only physical protection requirements in NRC regulations that

are specific to the storage of spent nuclear fuel are those that apply

to spent nuclear fuel stored in certified casks under a general license

at operating nuclear power reactors. These requirements are found in

Sec. 72.212(b)(5).

The Commission is proposing regulations to codify existing practice

for the safeguarding of stored spent nuclear fuel or HLW. The proposed

amendments would provide a set of physical protection and material

control and accounting requirements directed at the storage of spent

nuclear fuel or HLW, whether at an independent spent

[[Page 42080]]

fuel storage installation (ISFSI), a monitored retrievable storage

installation (MRS), a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor

operations, or a geological repository. In addition, these proposed

amendments are consistent with safeguards requirements for spent

nuclear fuel storage under a general license at operating power

reactors. Because the proposed amendments codify the existing

regulatory practice there would not be any additional burden placed

upon current licensees.

These amendments would make minor changes to existing regulatory

language to clarify the meaning of the requirements. These amendments

would also make the requirements of 10 CFR part 75 (pertaining to

international safeguards) applicable to the GROA. This change is needed

because the Terms of Reference, dated August 1, 1994, for the Subgroup

on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S., part of the Subcommittee on

International Safeguards and Monitoring of the IAEA Steering Committee,

states that NRC shall be the U.S. agency responsible for maintaining

necessary regulations for implementing the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

at NRC licensed or certified facilities, including the promulgation of

regulations, incorporation of appropriate amendments in NRC licenses,

and the issuance of such orders as may be necessary to assure

compliance. These Terms of Reference regarding the agreement between

the U.S. and the IAEA are available for inspection in the NRC's public

document room.

These proposed amendments do not require specific protection

against the malevolent use of a vehicle. As stated in the final rule

``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power

Plants'' (59 FR 38889, August 1, 1994), the NRC staff, with contractor

assistance, is studying this issue and attempting to quantify the

consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the vicinity of an ISFSI.

The results of this study will assist the staff in making a

determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed for

ISFSIs. Also, if any significant safety issues are identified in this

study, those issues would be resolved by an appropriate regulatory

action, which could include rulemaking. In the interim, the staff

believes that the inherent nature of the spent nuclear fuel or HLW,

along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage

means, provides adequate protection against the malevolent use of a

vehicle.

Regulatory Approach

The proposed requirements would amend 10 CFR parts 60, 72, 73, and

75. For part 60, the Commission is proposing that the regulatory

approach for safeguarding a GROA be the same as that which applies to

spent nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under part 72. The basic

reason for this proposal is that the GROA operations, at least insofar

as they are expected to be conducted in surface facilities, appear to

present the same kinds of potential risks that are characteristic of

the storage of spent nuclear fuel. And the safeguards that would thus

be required are deemed to be sufficient as well to protect against acts

affecting the underground facility that might be inimical to the common

defense and security. This regulatory approach is predicated on

maintaining the physical integrity of the spent nuclear fuel rods. If

their physical integrity is not maintained, additional license

conditions might be found to be necessary and would then be

incorporated in the license.

The current proposal represents a departure from the Commission's

prior position, as explained in the statement of considerations

accompanying its promulgation of 10 CFR part 60 (46 FR 13971, 13975,

February 25, 1981). The prior view was that ``DOE, as a Federal agency

operating under the Atomic Energy Act, has its own obligation to

promote the common defense and security. Indeed, DOE is responsible

under the Atomic Energy Act for protection of materials and facilities

far more sensitive from a safeguards standpoint than nuclear waste

materials in a geologic repository. Therefore, the rule provides that a

DOE certification that its repository operations area safeguards are

equal to those at comparable DOE surface facilities shall constitute a

rebuttable presumption on the question of inimicality to the common

defense and security.''

Implementation of the current rule has proved to be difficult for

two reasons. The first has been the identification of DOE surface

facilities that are ``comparable,'' so that the protective measures are

neither too burdensome nor too lax. The second reason concerns the

indefiniteness of the ``rebuttable presumption'' language. Neither DOE

nor the NRC staff nor any other potential party can be certain about

the level of detail that might be necessary to support the

certification or to rebut the presumption of noninimicality. It appears

likely to the Commission that the specification of reasonable

safeguards requirements, as it is here proposing, will enable DOE to

discharge its common defense and security obligations more efficiently

than would be the case under the existing language. And there would be

the added benefit of ensuring that similar operations (i.e., at a GROA

as well as at spent nuclear fuel storage facilities) are addressed in a

consistent manner. Moreover, by defining the requirements more clearly

in advance of the submission of a license application, opportunities

for timely public review and comment may be enhanced.

The proposed amendments would replace existing Sec. 60.21(b)(3)

with a requirement for DOE to submit a detailed plan to provide

physical protection for the storage of HLW at a GROA in accordance with

a new Sec. 73.51. Also, the proposed amendment would replace existing

Sec. 60.21(b)(4) with a requirement for DOE to comply with a new

Sec. 60.78, which requires DOE to provide a description of a program to

meet the requirements of existing Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78.

The rationale for these changes is, as discussed above, to ensure that

the safeguards for similar facilities are addressed in a consistent

manner. In addition, because these specific requirements are being

provided, the general requirement for DOE to provide ``* * * such

safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facilities * * *''

would also be removed from Secs. 60.31, 60.41, and 72.24(o), because it

would not be needed. Also, all of the requirements of Sec. 73.51 would

be applicable to surface operations including the entry points to the

underground facility, and the earth cover together with the remoteness

of the facility would provide additional protection of the public

against a significant offsite release from the underground facility.

Therefore, only the more general performance objectives set out in

paragraph 73.51(b) would be applicable to the underground facility.

Surveillance and detection measures would be required for surface

operations and access would be controlled at entry points to the

underground facility; within the underground facility itself, however,

no further measures would need to be implemented for purposes of this

regulation.

An additional revision to Part 60 relates to the nuclear material

control and accounting program that is referred to in

Sec. 60.21(c)(10). To the extent that this program relates to

safeguards issues, it is more properly addressed as ``general

information'' under Sec. 60.21(b) rather than as part of the Safety

Analysis Report under Sec. 60.21(c). The proposed rule will accomplish

this. However, existing Sec. 60.21(c)(10) has a broader

[[Page 42081]]

purpose that does implicate safety issues. There is a need for DOE to

describe the materials inventory and recordkeeping program that is

designed to assure protection of public health and safety during

operations of the GROA and after permanent closure. Such information is

important, for example, for purposes of performance confirmation,

potential retrieval, and archival documentation. Section 60.21(c) would

accordingly be revised to reflect this focus.

The proposed amendment to Sec. 72.180 would provide requirements

for the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW under a specific license

by referring applicants to the same new section, Sec. 73.51. The

proposed amendment to Sec. 72.212 would allow the licensee or applicant

the option of either using Sec. 73.51 for the storage of spent nuclear

fuel under a general license or continuing to use Sec. 73.55 with the

additional conditions and exceptions provided in Sec. 72.212(b)(5).

In licensing the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW at an ISFSI

or a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor operations, the

NRC staff has had to sort through the many safeguards requirements of

Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements, and impose those

requirements through license conditions. As a result of this

experience, however, a set of principles has evolved that reflects both

the nature of potential threats and the hazardous radioactive

characteristics of the materials. Accordingly, the proposed amendments

in Sec. 73.51 would codify safeguards requirements currently imposed on

spent nuclear fuel storage licensees and would provide a consistent set

of requirements for future licensing. Specifically, this new section

would have the objective of ensuring that the following basic physical

protection performance capabilities are met:

(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW is stored only within a protected

area;

(2) Only authorized individuals are granted access to the protected

area;

(3) Unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected

area are detected and assessed;

(4) Communication with a designated response force, whenever

necessary, is conducted in a timely fashion; and

(5) The physical security organization is managed properly.

These amendments would not apply to spent nuclear fuel storage

pools at operating nuclear power plants. In addition, because these

proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory

practice, there would not be any additional burden placed on current

licensees. Further, the industry would benefit from a reduction of

current regulatory uncertainties. The public would benefit from a

greater level of assurance that appropriate safeguards requirements are

being imposed on spent nuclear fuel and HLW storage licensees through

public review and comment on the proposed rule. The DOE would benefit

from the proposed amendments by having a clear statement of the

safeguards measures the Commission plans to require at the GROA. Also,

NRC would benefit as a result of a more efficient licensing process.

In addition, the current reporting requirements in Sec. 73.71 would

be amended to specifically include facilities that are subject to this

rulemaking. However, because the amended reporting requirements are

equivalent to current practice, no additional burden will be placed on

current licensees as a result of these amended reporting requirements.

Specific Considerations

Comments with supporting rationale are particularly requested on

the following questions:

1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional

costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what

is now incurred for that purpose?

2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to

differ substantially from those of current licensees?

3. Are the cost estimates in Table III of the Draft Regulatory

Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there

significant costs that have not been included in the table?

4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded

by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford

essentially the same benefits, but be more cost effective?

5. Are the proposed amendments in 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an

MRS or geologic repository operated by the U.S. Department of Energy?

Criminal Penalties

The Commission notes that these proposed amendments are issued

under Sections 161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Therefore, violation of these regulations may subject a person to

criminal sanctions under Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion

The Commission has determined that this regulation is the type of

action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(3)(i)

and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an

environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information

collection requirement that is subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act

of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved

by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0002, -

0127, and -0132.

Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspects

of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing

the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (T6F33),

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to

the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-

0132), NEOB-10202, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC

20503.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this

proposed rule. The draft analysis examines the benefits and impacts of

the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft regulatory

analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room,

2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the

analysis may be obtained from Dr. Sandra D. Frattali, Division of

Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. The draft

regulatory analysis also is available for viewing and downloading from

the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board as discussed above under ADDRESSES.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the

Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This proposed rule would affect operators of ISFSIs, power reactors

that have permanently ceased operation, and DOE as the operator of the

MRS and GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of

the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in Section 601(3) of

[[Page 42082]]

the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards

set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act,

13 CFR part 121.

Backfit Analysis

The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR

50.109 does not apply to this proposed rule because these proposed

amendments do not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50

licensees. Also, the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR 72.62 do not

apply because these proposed amendments neither impose new requirements

nor modify procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSIs.

Therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for this proposed rule.

List of Subjects

10 CFR Part 60

Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and

reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,

Waste treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 72

Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety

and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security

measures, Spent fuel.

10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export,

Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

10 CFR Part 75

Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials,

Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the Commission is proposing

to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75.

PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC

REPOSITORIES

1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.

929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,

2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88

Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.

95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.

91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-

425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141) and

Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are

revised to read as follows:

Sec. 60.21 Content of application.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high-level

radioactive waste in accordance with Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. This

plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's

safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel

training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections,

audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such

requirements.

(4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of

Sec. 60.78.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the

records described in Secs. 60.71 and 60.72.

* * * * *

3. In Sec. 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 60.31 Construction authorization.

* * * * *

(b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance

that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to

the common defense and security.

* * * * *

4. In Sec. 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 60.41 Standards for issuance of a license.

* * * * *

(c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common

defense and security and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to

the health and safety of the public.

* * * * *

5. A new Sec. 60.78 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 60.78 Material control and accounting records and reports.

DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting

(and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that

specified in Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, 72.78 of this chapter.

PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

6. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,

184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,

954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,

2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.

688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88

Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);

Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102,

Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133,

135, 137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec.

148, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152,

10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).

Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148 (c),

(d), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C.

10162(b), 10168 (c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189,

68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat.

2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec.

145(g), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)).

Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a),

141(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42

U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also issued

under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96

Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198).

7. In Sec. 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 72.24 Contents of application: Technical information.

* * * * *

(o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical

protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart

H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a

description of the physical security plan for protection against

radiological sabotage as required by subpart H of this part.

* * * * *

8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 72.180 Physical security plan.

The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan

for physical protection as described in Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. The

licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the

Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were

developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the

superseded

[[Page 42083]]

material for 3 years after each change or until termination of the

license. This plan must describe how the applicant will meet the

requirements of Sec. 73.51 of this chapter and provide physical

protection during on-site transportation to and from the proposed ISFSI

or MRS including the design for physical protection, the licensee's

safeguards contingency plan, and the security organization personnel

training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections,

audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such

requirements.

9. In Sec. 72.212, paragraph (b)(1)(iv) is added and (b)(5) is

revised to read as follows:

Sec. 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under Sec. 72.210.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(1) * * *

(iv) Notify the NRC as to whether they will implement Sec. 73.51 or

of this chapter their approved physical security plan pursuant to

Sec. 73.55 of this chapter. If a licensee implements Sec. 73.51 of this

chapter, its approved physical security plan must be modified to

clearly indicate that Sec. 73.51 of this chapter will be followed for

safeguarding spent nuclear fuel. For those persons who have not begun

use of the general license, this notice must be included in the 90-day

letter required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section. For those

persons who have begun use of the general license, this notice must be

provided no later than 30 days after implementation of Sec. 73.51 of

this chapter to the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission regional

office listed in Appendix D to part 20 of this chapter.

* * * * *

(5) Protect the spent nuclear fuel against the design basis threat

of radiological sabotage in accordance with either Sec. 73.51 of this

chapter or the same provisions and requirements as are set forth in the

licensee's physical security plan pursuant to Sec. 73.55 of this

chapter with the following additional conditions and exceptions.

* * * * *

PART 73-- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

10. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.

147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as

amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat.

2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,

96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also

issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841

note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100

Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

11. In Sec. 73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection

of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored in either

an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored

retrievable storage installation (MRS) licensed under part 72 of this

chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed

under part 60 of this chapter.

* * * * *

12. The introductory text of Sec. 73.50 is revised to read as

follows:

Sec. 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed

activities.

Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. 73.51, but who possesses,

uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear

material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material

and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100

rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface

without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility

licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter shall comply with the

following:

* * * * *

13. A new Sec. 73.51 is added to read as follows:

Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent

nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste.

(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Secs. 73.20,

73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section

apply to each licensee who stores:

(1) Spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste (HLW) under

a specific license issued pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter:

(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI);

(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or

(iii) At a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased

reactor operations licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter;

(2) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW at a geologic repository operations

area (GROA) licensed pursuant to Part 60 of this chapter; or

(3) Spent nuclear fuel under a general license issued pursuant to

Part 72 of this chapter and has exercised the option provided by

Sec. 72.212(b)(5) of this chapter to use the provisions of Sec. 73.51

for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) General performance objectives.

(1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and

maintain a physical protection system with the objective of providing

high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material do

not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this

section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following

performance capabilities:

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel or HLW only within a protected area;

(ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are

authorized to enter the protected area;

(iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of or activities

within the protected area;

(iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force

whenever the response force is called upon to act; and

(v) Manage the physical security organization in a manner that

maintains its effectiveness.

(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect

against radiological sabotage.

(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall

retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for

3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures

were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3

years after each change or until termination of the license.

(d) Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and

procedures. To meet the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of

this section, a physical protection system must include, but is not

necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (d)(1)

through (d)(14) of this section. The Commission may require alternate

or additional measures necessary to meet the performance objectives of

paragraph (b)(1) of this section. The Commission may also authorize

other necessary protection measures.

(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW must be stored only within a

protected area so that access to this material requires passage through

or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter

of the protected area and one

[[Page 42084]]

barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical

barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in

Sec. 73.2. Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides

of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier

offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an

approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or

fuel storage building. Other suitable measures to provide the barrier

may be acceptable, if approved by the NRC on a case by case basis.

(2) A means of illumination must be provided sufficient to permit

assessment of unauthorized penetration of or activities within the

protected area and associated isolation zones.

(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to

continual surveillance and be protected by an intrusion detection

system with provisions for redundant monitoring of the system. The

detection and surveillance systems must be monitored in a continuously

staffed alarm station, not necessarily located within the protected

area, and in one redundant location.

(4) The protected area must be monitored by random patrols of a

frequency not less than once every 8 hours.

(5) A security organization, with written procedures, must be

established. The security organization must include a minimum of two

watchmen per shift to provide for monitoring of detection and

surveillance systems and for communications with a designated response

force or local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) in the event of

detection of unauthorized penetration or activities. Members of the

security organization shall be trained, equipped, and qualified in

accordance with the applicable provisions of appendix B to this part.

(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or LLEA

must be established to permit response to unauthorized penetration or

activities.

(7) Screening must be conducted before granting an individual

unescorted access to the protected area to obtain information on which

to base a decision to permit such access. Screening should typically

include a criminal history check, a previous employment check, and two

personal reference checks.

(8) A controlled personnel identification and lock system must be

established and maintained to limit access to the protected area to

individuals authorized unescorted access or escorted individuals who

have been approved for such access.

(9) All escorted individuals to the protected area must be under

the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized unescorted

access to the protected area.

(10) Redundant communications capability must be provided between

the security organization and designated response force or LLEA.

(11) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering

the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and

searched for explosives before entry.

(12) Written response procedures must be established and maintained

for addressing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the

protected area including Category 5, Procedures, of appendix C to part

73. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a

record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the

procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be

retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the

license.

(13) All detection and surveillance systems and supporting

subsystems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be

maintained in operable condition. Compensatory measures must be taken

during periods of inoperability.

(14) The security program must be reviewed once every 24 months by

individuals independent of both security program management and

personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the

security program. The security program review must include an

evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system and a

verification of the liaison established with the designated response

force or LLEA.

(15) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3

years after the record is made or until termination of the license.

Duplicate records to those required under Sec. 73.71 need not be

retained under the requirements of this section:

(i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;

(ii) Screening records of individuals granted unescorted access to

the protected area;

(iii) A log of routine patrols;

(iv) A record of each alarm received identifying the type of alarm,

location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm;

and

(v) The security program review reports.

(e) Exception. The physical protection system for the underground

facility of a geologic repository operations area must meet the

performance capabilities of paragraph (b) of this section, but need not

include the specific measures set out in paragraph (d) of this section

provided that access is controlled at the underground facility entry

points.

14. In Sec. 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and (c)(1) are revised to read

as follows:

Sec. 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.

* * * * *

(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20,

73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC

Operations Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events

described in paragraph I(a)(1) of appendix G to this part. Licensees

subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55,

73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material

(SSNM) and subject to Sec. 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations

Center within 1 hour after the discovery of the safeguards events

described in paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of appendix G to

this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37,

73.50, 73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center

within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in

paragraph I(d) of appendix G to this part.

* * * * *

(c)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20,

73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and

subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log

and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b)

of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery by a licensee

employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization.

The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section

as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or

until termination of the license.

* * * * *

PART 75--SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA

AGREEMENT

15. The authority citation for part 75 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932,

936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134,

2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,

96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).

[[Page 42085]]

16. In Sec. 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 75.4 Definitions.

* * * * *

(k) * * *

(5) Any location where the possession of more than one effective

kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to parts 40, 60, or

70 of this chapter, or pursuant to an Agreement State license.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day of August, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Andrew L. Bates,

Acting Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 95-20035 Filed 8-14-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P