Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) Georgia Tech Research Reactor; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-160]

Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) Georgia Tech

Research Reactor; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR

2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a

Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 regarding the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor in response to a Petition received from Ms.

Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (Petitioner), dated October 23, 1994. The

Partial Director's Decision also considered subsequent letters from the

Petitioner dated November 12, and December 4, 1994, February 21,

February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27, and July 18,

1995.

On October 23, 1994, the Petitioner requested (1) the shutdown and

decontamination of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech)

Research Reactor, (2) the revocation of liquid radioactive material

release authority to all licensees, (3) the revocation of licenses that

use the principle of as low as reasonably achievable, (4) the

termination of transportation of radioactive material by mail, and (5)

the modification to posting requirements for radioactive material. With

regard to request (1), the enclosed Partial Director's Decision

addressed the Petitioner's issues which are not currently being

considered as part of a license renewal proceeding. The remaining

Petitioner's issues relating to request (1) will be addressed under

separate cover upon completion of the ongoing adjudicatory proceedings

and NRC staff review. The Partial Director's Decision also addresses

requests (2) through (5). The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation found that the Petitioner's concerns, addressed to date, do

not raise a substantial health and safety concern warranting the

requested actions. The reasons for this denial are explained in the

``Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-15), the

complete text of which follows this notice, and which is available for

public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the

Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c). As provided in that regulation, the Decision will constitute

the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the

issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Appendix

Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On October 23, 1994, Ms. Pamela Blockey-O'Brien (the Petitioner)

filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, that requested that the NRC staff

revoke the license of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia

Tech) Research Reactor, shut down this research reactor and its support

facilities, and remove all radioactive material and contamination

offsite to a government created ``National Sacrifice [A]rea'' such as

the Savannah River or Oak Ridge facilities. In addition, the Petitioner

requested that the NRC staff withdraw all license authority nationwide

involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive

material to all the sewers or waters in the United States or oceans of

the world, and withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities,

including nuclear power plants (NPPs), which operate under as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles. Finally, the Petitioner

requested both that the NRC staff modify every license issued to

transporters of radioactive materials and builders of NPPs so that

these parties must put two foot high letters on everything transported

or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in smaller letters ``there

is no safe level of radiation, any exposure can [a]ffect health,'' and

prohibit the transportation of radioactive material by mail. The NRC

staff received additional letters dated November 12, December 4, 1994,

February 21, February 23, March 6, March 28, April 19, May 18, June 27,

and July 18, 1995, from the Petitioner and also considered these

letters in this Partial Director's Decision. All letters related to

this Petition have been placed in the Public Document Room and docketed

under the Georgia Tech Research Reactor Docket No. 50-160, in

accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10

CFR 2.206 Petitions.''

As bases for the request to shut down and decontaminate the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor, the Petitioner asserted that (1) a water flume

comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the reactor and the ground in

some way;'' (2) ``(r)adiation levels in soil and vegetation climb

markedly in GA EPD documents'' around the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor; (3) there is no record of air monitoring ever having been

done; (4) heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and

drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus,

as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and

welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off; (5) radioactive

contaminants have been routinely discharged into the sanitary sewer

from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water holding tank and

contamination spread by backup of the sewage system; (6) should the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further destabilized, the reactor and

the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break apart,'' causing radioactive

contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/down sewers/into the runoff

ditch;'' (7) the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake

[[Page 40391]]

zone; (8) there is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor operating; (9) security at the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor is extremely lax; and (10) in case of an accident or terrorist

attack, evacuation of the campus and downtown Atlanta would be

impossible both now and during the Olympics.1

\1\ Issue (8) includes concerns that substantial management

deficiencies persist. Issue (9) involves concerns on general

security and, particularly, security during the period of the 1996

Olympics. Issue (10) includes concerns on evacuation in case of a

terrorist attack. Since these concerns are the subject of an ongoing

license renewal proceeding before an Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board, these concerns will be addressed in a Final Director's

Decision at an appropriate time after considering the decisions

reached in the license renewal process. All other issues related to

this 2.206 Petition were considered in this Partial Director's

Decision.

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As the bases for the request to withdraw all license authority

nationwide involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of

radioactive material to all the sewers or waters in the United States,

to withdraw all licenses for all nuclear facilities, including NPPs,

which operate under ALARA principles, and to change labeling

requirements for radioactive material, the Petitioner asserted that

there is no safe level of radiation, that storage and disposal of

radioactive waste is inadequate, and that the NRC's new sewage dumping

guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner also asserted that

the request to restrict mailing of radioactive materials relates to the

occurrence of transportation accidents.

II. Discussion

A. Revocation of Georgia Tech Research Reactor License

The following discussion relates to the request that the NRC staff

revoke the license of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, shut down this

research reactor and its support facilities, and remove all radioactive

materials and contamination offsite. This Partial Director's Decision

addresses NRC licensed activities.2

\2\ The 10 CFR 2.206 Petition included some mention of the

cobalt-60 irradiation facility which is not licensed by the NRC and

is, therefore, not covered in this discussion except as it may

affect research reactor safety. The 2.206 Petition and this Partial

Director's Decision have been transmitted to the State of Georgia,

the licensing authority for the cobalt-60 facility and for other

state licensed material also mentioned in the Petition.

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(1) A water flume comes out of the ground ``destabilizing the

reactor and the ground in some way.'' The Petitioner stated that

``(d)etailed maps show that a water flume comes out of the ground

directly next to and west of the reactor.'' On request, the Petitioner

identified the ``detailed maps'' as City of Atlanta, Department of

Public Works (DPW) Sheets I-11 and H-11, which show ``flumes'' or

``storm drain inventory.''

The NRC staff reviewed these drawings. Drawing I-11 did not show a

flume indication. Drawing H-11 does indicate a ``flume'' to the west of

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff discussed this drawing

and indication of a ``flume'' with DPW, the agency responsible for the

sewer system and the drawings. The DPW indicated that the word

``flume'' in the drawing means a surface drainage path. Physical onsite

examination of this location showed a surface drainage path consisting

of a concrete lined channel extending along the back retaining wall of

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility site, approximately where

the ``flume'' was indicated on the drawing.

Furthermore, physical examination of the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor facility and site have found no evidence of an underground

water flume or destabilization of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

facility or ground. Additional factors related to stability of the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor are addressed under issues (4), (6), and

(7).

The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that there is an

underground water flume destabilizing the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

and surrounding ground. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude

otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's

concerns do not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting

the action requested by the Petitioner.

(2) ``Radiation levels in soil and vegetation climb markedly in GA

EPD documents'' around the reactor. The State of Georgia (GA)

Environmental Protection Division (EPD) provided the NRC staff with its

environmental radiation monitoring results as compiled on November 23,

1994. These results included data from environmental monitoring for

radioactivity with thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), and from soil

and vegetation sampling around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

The NRC staff discussed the results with EPD. EPD stated that its

monitoring found no evidence of release of radioactive material from

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. EPD further indicated that the

values and variations in monitored radiation exposures and

concentrations were typical of environmental monitoring results and

showed no increasing trend.

The NRC staff has concluded based on the types, quantities and

relative concentrations of the isotopes measured by EPD that they are

not from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Some of the isotopes

measured by EPD are naturally occurring. Specifically, beryllium-7 is

from reactions of cosmic rays with air, potassium-40 is from primordial

sources, radium-226 is from the decay of naturally occurring uranium-

238, and radium-228 is from decay of naturally occurring thorium-

232.3 Additionally, radiation monitoring of effluents from the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor and of areas within the research reactor

containment by Georgia Tech, as required by the Technical

Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b, provided further evidence that the

measurements by EPD of other isotopes (i.e., cesium-137, cerium-141,

cerium-144, ruthenium-103, zirconium-95, and niobium-95) were not from

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Rather, EPD indicated that the

radioisotopes were from other sources, such as fallout from nuclear

weapons testing around the world. Furthermore, as measured by EPD,

there is no indication of other radioisotopes, which would be expected

if the radioactivity were from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

\3\ Kathren, R. L., ``Radioactivity in the Environment: Sources,

Distribution, and Surveillance.''

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The conclusion, that there is no evidence that the release of

radioactive material from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has

contributed to the monitored radiation levels in the soil and

vegetation, is also corroborated by the Georgia Tech environmental

monitoring program. This environmental monitoring program has used film

badges, and currently uses TLDs, at various locations around the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The film badges were provided by a

National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certified vendor.

The TLDs meet American National Standards Institute Standards. One

monitored location in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor stack measured

the direct radiation for airborne releases from operation of the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This monitor has indicated airborne

effluent releases generally below detectable levels and always well

below the limits of 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against

Radiation,'' as verified most recently in NRC staff Inspection Report

Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 4. These results

are consistent with the EPD data and further confirmed the conclusions

of the State of Georgia EPD that its monitoring

[[Page 40392]]

found no evidence of release of radioactive material from the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor which has contributed to the monitored radiation

levels in soil and vegetation.

\4\ These, and the other inspection reports referenced in this

Partial Director's Decision are available from the NRC's Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW, Washington,

DC 20037.

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The NRC staff evaluation of the data confirmed the EPD conclusion

that the EPD data showed no increasing trend in radiation levels around

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The values and variations of all

monitored locations around the Georgia Tech Research Reactor were

typical of environmental monitoring results at other locations, were

attributable to non-reactor sources, and showed no record of an

increasing trend. Further corroboration of this conclusion was provided

in the discussion addressing issues (3) and (5) in this Partial

Director's Decision in that releases of radioactive isotopes from the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor are well within NRC regulatory limits and

do not correspond to the radioisotopes found in the soil or vegetation

samples.

The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor is contributing to radiation levels in soil or

vegetation. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's concern does

not present a substantial health or safety issue warranting the action

requested by the Petitioner.

(3) There is no record of air monitoring ever having been done. The

Petitioner asserted that monitoring for airborne radioactive releases

from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is inadequate. However, in

addition to the environmental monitoring programs previously discussed,

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is required by its Technical

Specifications 3.2.a and 3.5.b to monitor and restrict radioactive

releases, including airborne releases. The monitoring system includes

instruments to monitor gaseous and particulate radioactivity and to

initiate safety related functions (e.g., containment isolation). All

radioactive releases are required to be within the limits established

in 10 CFR Part 20. NRC staff inspections, as documented most recently

in Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02

related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, have found that the

effluent releases have been within 10 CFR Part 20 limits. Therefore,

there is neither a technical need nor a regulatory requirement for

additional monitoring of air samples outside the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor, since all releases are controlled, as required by Technical

Specifications and in accordance with NRC regulations.

The Petitioner also raised a concern related to the storage of

waste at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The concern is that there

is a large amount of waste material stored at the facility and this

storage is generally unsafe. Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-

160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02 have verified that storage of radioactive

waste has been maintained in accordance with applicable regulatory

requirements (10 CFR part 20) at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

The Petitioner also raised concerns about various health effects

around the Atlanta area and in other localities (e.g., around the Three

Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), but did

not provide correlation to conditions related to the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor. Therefore, the Petitioner did not provide bases for

further action based on these concerns. Further, the data and

information from EPD, the licensee, the Oak Ridge Institute for Science

and Education (ORISE) and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

(INEL), as evaluated by the NRC staff in this issue and on issues (2)

and (5), indicate little potential for the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor to have contributed to such health effects.

The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor radiation monitoring program is unacceptable. The

Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise or bases to conclude

that additional monitoring should be required. Therefore, the NRC staff

concludes that the Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial

health or safety issue warranting the action requested by the

Petitioner.

(4) Heavy rainfall causes water to back up in the sewer and

drainage lines causing flooding of the reactor parking lot and campus,

as well as causing sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' on campus ground, and

welded-shut manhole covers to be blown off. The Petitioner indicated

that a major sinkhole of the Orme Street line (a major sewer line in

the area) caused a backup and flooding in 1993 on the Georgia Tech

Campus at the North parking lot at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

facility site. This flooding had no effect on the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor, since the research reactor structures, systems and components

are isolated from the sewer by a series of valves. Further, the

containment steel-reinforced concrete floor is approximately 8 feet

thick.5 This structure supports containment internals and provides

weight to protect against the buoyancy of ground water. The structure

is designed to withstand the effects of buoyancy due to ground water

which has been found on test borings at levels ranging from 11 to 40

feet.6 Further, DPW stated that the work that is being done on the

Orme Street line and related construction activities minimize the

potential for such future flooding or other problems associated to that

line.

\5\ ``Safety Analysis Report for the 5 MW Georgia Tech Research

Reactor,'' Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332-

0425, April 1994 (hereinafter SAR), Section 4.3, Description of

Reactor Containment Building, page 43.

\6\ SAR, Section 2.3, Hydrology and Geology, page 23.

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As also indicated by the Petitioner, there is a 72 inch diameter

storm drain/sanitary sewer line that could be a potential source of

flooding or a sinkhole near the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. This

sewer line is approximately 100 feet from the containment.7 By

letter,8 DPW confirmed that the line had been inspected to ensure

integrity and was found in ``very good condition'' on a May 24, 1994,

walk-through. The DPW was ``not aware of any problems with this storm

sewer'' and did not ``anticipate any problem with the maintenance or

operation of this sewer in the foreseeable future.'' This conclusion

was reverified with DPW, including consideration of the construction

(e.g., blocks and concrete pipe) and configuration (e.g., on old

drainage paths) of the sewer. DPW also indicated that this drain line

is considered to be a private sewer and is not part of the City system,

although DPW also indicated that they have been involved in the

inspection and maintenance of such lines and there is no plan to

discontinue that practice.

\7\ SAR, Figure 4.3, page 30.

\8\ Letter dated January 9, 1995, from L. Chambers of the

Department of Public Works for the City of Atlanta to R. Karam of

Georgia Tech.

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The Petitioner raised related issues on the structural capability

of the foundation bearing material and water intrusion around the

containment foundation potentially causing destabilization of the

structure. This concern referenced three Georgia Geologic Survey

documents.9 The Georgia Geologic Survey was requested to evaluate

the Petitioner's references to these reports with respect to the

geology and seismology related to the Georgia

[[Page 40393]]

Tech Research Reactor. By letter dated May 11, 1995, the State

Geologist responded to the NRC staff.10 The letter stated, in

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part, that:

\9\ ``Geology of the Greater Atlanta Area'' McConnell and

Abrams, Georgia Geologic Survey Bulletin 96, ``Groundwater in the

Greater Atlanta Region'' by Cressler, Thurmond and Hester, Georgia

Geologic Survey, Bulletin Information Circular 63 and ``Geology and

Groundwater Resources of the Atlanta Area, Georgia,'' Herrick and

Legrand, Georgia Geological Survey Bulletin 55.

\10\ Letter from William H. McLemore, State Geologist, Georgia

Department of Natural Resources, to Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC Staff,

May 11, 1995.

I have reviewed the letters from a petition to shut down the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The letters suggest (1) that the

reactor overlies the Wahoo Creek Formation, which is not a suitable

nor a stable foundation material; (2) that there is an earthquake

risk, particularly from the Brevard Zone; (3) that unique geologic

fractures, particularly horizontal fractures, might cause large

quantities of ground water to seep into the reactor and cause

problems. My review indicates that the petition's suggestions are

specious.

The Wahoo Creek formation is one of many geologic formations of

the Piedmont Physiographic Province. The fact that the Wahoo Creek

Formation weathers into ``slabs'' is not relevant; in situ, it is a

competent rock adequate to provide suitable foundation for the

reactor. Comparison of the foundation characteristics of weathered

and in situ rock material is not reasonable nor appropriate.

Georgia is a relatively aseismic state and earthquakes are rare.

The Brevard Zone should not be considered as an ``earthquake

fault''.

The proximity of the Brevard Zone to the reactor is not

relevant. Fractured rock, which is ubiquitous to the Piedmont,

underlies the reactor. There are no data to suggest that horizontal

fractures having high water yielding characteristics underlie or are

even near the reactor. From a hydrogeological point of view, there

are no known unique features of the reactor site to suggest that

ground water would affect reactor safety.

The Piedmont extends from Alabama to New Jersey and occupies

many tens of thousands of square miles. The comments made in the

petition would apply at virtually any location in the Piedmont. In

addition, the petition cites several reports published by the

Geologic Survey Branch of The Georgia Environmental Protection

Division. The reports cited were prepared under my direction; I

personally reviewed and approved them. There are no data in these

reports that indicate the reactor at Georgia Tech is not safe or

poses an environmental threat.

These findings confirm the NRC staff geologic and seismic

conclusions presented in issue (7), and further support the related

data and design for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor as discussed

under this issue. These findings confirm that further analysis or

testing is not needed for hydrogeological conditions at the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor.

The Petitioner also indicated that ``* * * a sinkhole appeared next

to the reactor years ago and was filled in. A [w]itness to that is

still very much alive.'' The Petitioner provided the NRC staff with

information to contact the witness. This individual said that while he

and two other individuals were walking from the facility, one of the

individuals fell into a sinkhole to the armpits or so, and the two

other individuals helped him get out. This individual also stated that

the sinkhole was near the waste storage tank facility and that the time

frame was somewhere between the late 1960s and middle 1970s. The area

near the waste storage tank facility was physically examined while

going over the area on foot at about 3 feet intervals. No sinkhole was

observed.

In addition, the NRC staff questioned several members of the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor staff. One of these Georgia Tech Research

Reactor staff members recalled the sinkhole referred to by the

Petitioner. However, none of the questioned Georgia Tech staff members

recalled any other sinkholes at the research reactor facility. This was

further confirmed by discussions with selected NRC staff members with

experience related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These NRC

staff members were not aware of any sinkholes at the facility other

than the one of concern to the Petitioner.

Additionally, drawings of the research reactor site 11 and

physical examination of the research reactor facility and site showed

no major drainage paths (other than the 72 inch storm drain line

previously discussed) that could impact the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor.

\11\ SAR, Figures 4.2 and 4.3, pages 29 and 30.

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Construction drawings and records 12 were also reviewed and

selected portions of the installation examined by the NRC staff to

determine the vulnerability of the foundation structure for the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor to the phenomena that were raised in the

Petition. The drawings showed the bottom of the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor containment building steel shell about 25 feet below finished

grade. The drawings indicated that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

containment building is anchored by bolts to a steel-reinforced

concrete pad about 1 foot thick and to a ring foundation that extends

approximately another 12 feet down under the concrete pad. Further,

examination of selected portions of the foundation and containment

structure found the structure consistent with the construction and

drawing details. Construction test boring records also showed that the

pad and ring foundation rest on material that meets or exceeds

construction specifications for safe bearing capacity. The construction

test boring records showed the material at the bottom of the foundation

ring to be moderately hard to hard gray gneiss. As previously discussed

in issue (4) and in this issue, no information has been provided by the

Petitioner or is known to the NRC staff to suggest that this foundation

and support structure are not as designed or are not acceptable.

\12\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to D. M. Collins,

U.S.N.R.C., dated October 22, 1993.

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Sinkholes develop in soils or in limestone as solution cavities.

Although sinkholes could develop in the soil fill material surrounding

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility, there is no credible source

for sinkhole development. Sinkholes cannot develop in or significantly

affect gneiss such as that on which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

foundation is built. Therefore, the development of sinkholes near or

underneath the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not a credible event.

Even in the unlikely event of failures of the 72 inch storm drain

line or the Orme Street line previously mentioned, erosion or sinkhole

effects could not be expected to affect the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor, since the lines are far from the research reactor containment

relative to these potential effects, and the design of the reactor

facility is such that it would not be impacted by such phenomena. The

72 inch storm drain is about 100 feet from the reactor containment and

passes below the northwest corner of the laboratory and office building

which is adjacent to the containment building. The footings for the

office building, which measures approximately 90 by 130 feet, were

founded on the partially weathered rock. Assuming the 72 inch line did

collapse where it passes under the building, approximately a 20 feet

square section of the northwest corner of the building could be

affected. This section of the building houses laboratories, offices,

and storage areas. Radioactive materials are not stored in this area.

The remaining portion of the facility, particularly the research

reactor containment building, would not be affected because of the

design characteristics of the foundation and support material as

previously discussed.

DPW verified that the Orme Street line is 10 to 12 feet in diameter

and is about 1200 feet from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The

sinkhole that resulted from the failure of the Orme Street line was a

sinkhole approximately 50 feet in radius, which is at the upper limit

of sinkhole size in the Atlanta area based on DPW experience. Based on

this experience

[[Page 40394]]

(which is consistent with NRC staff information on such phenomena) it

is not credible to consider that a sinkhole from the Orme Street line,

at a distance of 1200 feet, could affect the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor.

The containment foundation for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is

considered to be impervious to the effects of sinkholes as the

foundation rests on relatively hard material to depths and distances

well beyond the credible influence of any potential source for a

sinkhole.

Puff-ups are heaves, or upward expansion, which occur when locked-

in stress in soil, usually clay, exceeds the load above it. The most

common occurrence of puff-ups is in regions that were overlain by

glaciers and the soils beneath (till, lake beds, etc.) were over-

consolidated. When the glaciers melted there was still enough material

over these clays to lock-in the stress. Removal of some of this

overlying material, either by erosion or excavation, allows the clays

to expand. Puff-ups can occur in unglaciated regions generally soon

after either erosion or excavation removes the overlying material.

Research reactor construction was completed in the 1960s, and

considering this time interval, occurrence of a puff-up at the facility

is highly unlikely. Further, puff-ups are near surface, soil

deformation phenomena. As discussed above, the relatively hard,

relatively deep foundation structure and gray gneiss bearing material

of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor could not be expected to be

affected by the geologic phenomenon of puff-ups.

With regard to the welded manhole covers that were thrown up to 8

feet as alleged by the Petitioner by sewer backup problems, the

distance from the containment to the nearest manhole cover has been

verified by physical examination of the site to be greater than 50

feet. This physical examination found no other potential impact point

related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor that was closer than 50

feet. The Petitioner has neither provided nor does the NRC staff

possess any information or experience which would suggest that a

manhole cover could be thrown the distance and have the force necessary

to damage the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Therefore, the potential

for damage to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor due to this asserted

phenomenon is not credible.

Based on the above, these design features and conditions provide

assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not be adversely

affected by flooding, sinkholes, ``puff-ups'' or thrown welded manhole

covers. These phenomena could not be expected to affect the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor given the design and configuration of the

facility. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's

concern does not present a substantial health or safety issue

warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.

(5) Radioactive contaminants have been routinely discharged into

the sanitary sewer from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor's waste water

holding tank and contamination spread by backup of the sewage system.

Radioactive materials can be released to the sanitary sewer system from

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor in accordance with 10 CFR

20.2003.13 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor licensee monitors

releases to the sewage system, and NRC staff inspections (e.g.,

Inspection Report Nos. 50-160/95-01, 50-160/94-02, and 50-160/93-02)

have confirmed that the radioactive releases (primarily cobalt-60 and

tritium) to the sanitary sewer have met NRC discharge limits.14

\13\ Radioactive releases to the sanitary sewer was previously

permitted in accordance with 10 CFR 20.303, which was superseded by

10 CFR 20.2003 on January 1, 1994.

\14\ It should also be noted that revisions to the NRC's

regulations with regard to release to sewage systems are under

consideration (Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ``Disposal of

Radioactive Material by Release Into Sanitary Sewer Systems,'' 59 FR

9146, February 25, 1994).

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The Petitioner expressed a concern that the release to the sanitary

sewer system could expose individuals, including sewer workers, to

radiation. The releases from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to the

sanitary sewer have generally been several orders of magnitude less

than NRC regulatory limits. Further, the assumption in the regulation

of ingestion directly at the point of release from the campus provides

considerable conservatism to ensure that individuals, such as sewer

workers or other individuals, would be exposed to a lesser degree even

in the event of a potential backup of the sewer system with large

quantities of water.

Furthermore, in response to a request from the State of Georgia,

the NRC staff had ORISE perform an independent analysis for

radioisotopes in process sludge and ash samples from the City of

Atlanta's R. M. Clayton sewer treatment facility. The samples were

taken from the sewer treatment facility on March 13, 1995. This

analysis detected naturally occurring and accelerator produced

radioisotopes (used primarily for medical diagnostic and therapeutic

treatments). There were no detected radioisotopes from the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor. Similarly, the NRC staff had an independent analysis

performed by INEL of liquid waste samples from the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor. This analysis found no indication of the

contamination suggested by the Petitioner (e.g., plutonium or uranium).

Georgia EPD and Georgia Tech analysis on waste water are consistent

with these results. This sampling and analysis verified that a

relatively small amount of radioactive material has been released from

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor facility to the sanitary sewer

system, and any material that has been released is well within NRC

regulatory limits. These facts, and the regulatory conservatism and

monitoring results, as previously discussed, establish that no further

sampling of the sewer releases or system is necessary to ensure that

the health and safety of the public is protected.

An issue was also raised by the Petitioner regarding the need for

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor to have a sewer discharge permit from

the City of Atlanta. The City of Atlanta does not deal with

radiological health and safety issues over which NRC has regulatory

authority (See 10 CFR 8.4). The City of Atlanta is responsible for the

release of materials to the sanitary sewer system for other than

radiological health and safety reasons. With regard to the concern

about compliance with city ordinances, the City of Atlanta is the

appropriate regulatory body to deal with the implementation of its

requirements.

Since there is no evidence of the spread of unacceptable

contamination from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor effluents to the

sewage system, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that

unacceptable radioactive contamination was released or could be spread

by the backup of the sewage system. The Petitioner provided no facts to

conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the

Petitioner's concern does not present a substantial health or safety

issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.

(6) Should the Georgia Tech Research Reactor be further

destabilized, the reactor and the tank holding cobalt-60 could ``break

apart,'' causing radioactive contaminants to ``drain into groundwater/

down sewers/into the runoff ditch.'' 15 From the evaluations and

inspections to date, there is no evidence that the Georgia Tech

Research

[[Page 40395]]

Reactor has been ``destabilized'' in any manner. The Georgia Tech

Research Reactor is designed to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the

consequences of uncontrolled releases of radiation. For example, the

design and configuration features as discussed for issue (4) provides

considerable assurance that the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has not

and will not be ``destabilized'' due to the previously postulated

concerns expressed by the Petitioner.

\15\ ``Destabilized'' in the context of this Petition issue has

been defined as some condition that would result in the uncontrolled

release of radioactive material.

A recent safety evaluation of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor by

the NRC staff is associated with the Order to Convert from High

Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).16 The

associated safety evaluation considered all potential safety analyses

that are effected by the change out of the fuel, including potential

design basis accident scenarios. This safety evaluation was issued on

the bases that the pertinent reactor design features (1) continue to

acceptably ensure that the health and safety of the public is protected

for the HEU fuel and (2) have also been demonstrated to be acceptable

for the LEU fuel.

\16\ ``Georgia Institute of Technology, (Georgia Tech Research

Reactor); Order Modifying Facility Operating License No. R-97,'' 60

FR 32516, June 22, 1995.

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The Petitioner raised concerns on various structures, systems and

components at the research reactor. First, the ability of the

containment building steel structure at the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor to control releases of radioactive material was questioned. In

this regard, the containment leak rate is tested, in accordance with

Technical Specification 4.3.b, for at least 2.0 pounds per square inch

gauge (psig), which is the design basis pressure. Technical

Specification 4.3.b requires that leakage from the containment building

shall not exceed 1.0 percent of the building air volume in 24 hours at

2.0 psig over-pressure. Actual test results show that leakage is about

one-half of that value. Containment building structural requirements

based on expected external pressures have been estimated capable of

withstanding internal pressures of at least 7.5 psig.17 This

leakage integrity, and the testing and design margin, provide assurance

that radioactive materials will not be released in an uncontrolled

manner from the Georgia Tech Research Reactor containment.

\17\ SAR, Section 4.3.2, Provisions for Insuring Leak-Tightness,

page 49.

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The design function of the shield and crane support wall to

mitigate potential radiation exposures was also questioned by the

Petitioner. The steel-reinforced concrete wall inside the containment

extends about 34 feet above the outside ground level. A safety function

of the steel-reinforced concrete wall is shielding during potential

design basis accident conditions.18 The design calculations for

this shielding function have been reviewed and independently verified.

This review finds that the calculations conservatively modeled

radioactive source terms and containment configuration.

\18\ SAR, Section 4.3 Description of Reactor Containment

Building, Section 4.3.1 General Layout, pages 42-9.

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The Petitioner also raised an issue of a potential ``runaway chain

reaction.'' The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is designed with two

independent and diverse shut down systems: the reactor scram system and

the top reflector drain system. These systems have significant shut

down capability and have been shown, both analytically and

experimentally, capable of withstanding any excess reactivity

condition.19 These analyses show that the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor can meet (with substantial margin) the Technical Specification

3.1.a requirements to be shut down (i.e., subcritical by at least 1.0

percent delta k/k with both the highest reactivity worth shim-safety

blade and the regulating rod fully withdrawn). Further, specific design

features of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor prevent or mitigate

reactivity and power increase conditions. Analyses 20 show that

both the HEU and LEU fuels are designed to withstand maximum credible

reactivity worth/power excursion conditions without damage, including

maximum reactivity addition conditions. As indicated in SAR, this

analysis technique has been verified by test data.21 This degree

of shut down capability and provisions for mitigation of design basis

accidents is consistent with other U.S. research reactor designs, has

been verified by data and NRC staff review, and provides assurance that

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor can be safely shut down for any

credible condition, including analyzed accident conditions.

\19\ SAR, Section 5.6, Shutdown Margins.

\20\ SAR, Section 5.10, Accident Analyses, page 139-144.

\21\ SAR, Section 5.9.1 Comparison of Calculations with SPERT-II

Experiments, pages 137-8.

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The Petitioner also raised concern that a previous accident

analysis assumed a fuel loading accident that was considered

``incredible'' and no analysis of this scenario was performed in the

current SAR.22 The SAR states: During refueling operations, all

control elements are required to be fully inserted and the top D2O

reflector drained to storage. Following the refueling operation, the

reactor startup will be accomplished with standard practice. Under

these conditions, a sudden introduction of reactivity is impossible.''

23 Although the NRC staff agrees with the licensee that this

accident is not credible, the NRC staff did verify that the results

would be acceptable in the unlikely event of such an accident.

Specifically, in the safety evaluation for the Order to Convert from

HEU to LEU,24 the NRC staff found that (1) the previous safety

evaluation 25 remained valid in that the HEU fuel would not be

damaged by the fuel loading accident and (2) the reactivity

characteristics of the LEU compared to the HEU fuel are such that the

maximum fuel temperatures of the LEU fuel would be less than the

temperature for the HEU fuel during the potential fuel loading

accident. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that, although the fuel

loading accident analysis was not and need not be performed in the

current SAR for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the potential

results, if the analysis were to be performed in the current SAR, would

remain acceptable for both fuel types.

\22\ SAR, Section 5.10.3 Fuel Loading Accident.

\23\ SAR, Section 8.4.2 Fuel Loading Accidents.

\24\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,

Georgia Institute of Technology, ``Issuance of Order Modifying

License No. R-97 to Convert from High- to Low-Enriched Uranium--

Georgia Institute of Technology (TAC No. M85896),'' Enclosure 3

Safety Evaluation, Section 2.14.5 Fuel Loading Accident.

\25\ U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Safety Evaluation by the

Directorate of Licensing, Docket No. 50-160, Georgia Institute of

Technology, Section 6.0 Accident Analysis, page 12, dated December

19, 1972.

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The Petitioner also raised a concern regarding the emergency

cooling capabilities at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The research

reactor is designed with an emergency cooling system.26 The

system, as required by Technical Specification 3.7, consists of a

passive tank capable of providing cooling for 30 minutes, and two

separate long term supplies, only one of which is required for a total

of 12 hours of cooling. (It should be noted that in the SAR the

licensee assumed that (1) the long term cooling supply connections are

prevented or interrupted, (2) a complete core meltdown and conservative

fission product release occurred, and (3) conservative radiological

exposure conditions existed. These assumptions were used in a

calculation to demonstrate

[[Page 40396]]

acceptable design bases for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

containment, that is leakage rate and shielding functions, as

previously discussed.) The Petitioner's concern relates to the time

required to make the manual connections to the backup water supplies

and potential radiation exposures during this process. These

connections are made outside the containment structure. The 30 minutes

cooling period flow is designed to be provided by gravity flow from the

previously mentioned passive tank through two redundant fast acting,

fail safe valves. This cooling ensures no fuel damage or radiation

release effect in the event of the loss of coolant accident in that 30

minute time period. The NRC staff concludes, based on a walk through

with the licensee, that 30 minutes continues to be an acceptable time

to make the connections. The long term emergency cooling connections

could be accomplished within the 30 minute time period and there would

be no increased radiation exposure while making these connections.

Therefore, the previous NRC staff conclusion in licensing the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor remains valid, that is, there will be acceptable

emergency cooling of the core in the event of the loss of coolant

accident.

\26\ SAR, Section 4.4.8.3, Emergency Cooling System, pages 87-

90.

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The Petitioner also raised a concern on the reduction in shielding

for the cobalt-60 storage pool, caused by the use of water from this

storage pool to provide one of the two alternate long term water

supplies for emergency cooling of the research reactor. The emergency

cooling function effect on radiation levels from the cobalt-60 pool was

reviewed and independently verified. This evaluation has found that the

reduction in water above the cobalt-60 sources for the long term

reactor emergency cooling function would not significantly affect the

shielding of the cobalt-60 source, i.e., there will remain sufficient

water for shielding. This was confirmed with the Georgia EPD, the

licensing authority for the cobalt-60 source, and the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor licensee. Therefore, the use of the cobalt-60 pool for

emergency cooling of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor would not

adversely impact that function or radiation safety.

The Petitioner raised a concern regarding the use of hot channel

factors and engineering uncertainty factors. The SAR analyzed the fuel

design to establish safety limits considering power peaking conditions

(hot channel factors) and conservative fuel manufacturing tolerance

(engineering uncertainty factors). Consistent with research reactor

regulatory policy, the SAR verified that these safety limits would not

be exceeded or even approached, so that no fuel damage would

occur.27 The NRC staff finds that these conclusions remain valid

for both the current HEU fuel and for the LEU fuel as documented in the

Order to convert from HEU fuel.28

\27\ SAR, Section 5.7, Thermal--Hydraulic Safety Parameters,

pages 127-135.

\28\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,

Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation,

Section 2.11 Thermal-Hydraulics.

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The Petitioner also had a concern related to the reasonableness of

assuming a scram after pump failures in the SAR. The SAR paragraph in

question states: ``The loss of the primary D2O pump or the

secondary cooling water pump can result in undesirable reactor

operating conditions. These systems are therefore provided with high

temperature and low flow interlocks with the reactor scram circuitry.

Of the two pump failures, the loss of the D2O pump is the more

serious. Two independent low D2O flow scram interlocks, and loss

of electrical power interlocks have been provided in the reactor safety

instrumentation. It is therefore acceptable to assume that the reactor

will scram because of low flow shortly after an electrical power

failure or the more serious case of pump seizure.'' 29 These

interlocks provide redundant and diverse scram functions for the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The NRC staff concludes that in the

unlikely event that one of the independent low D2O flow scram

interlocks were to fail or be inoperable, the other low D2O flow

scram interlock would scram the reactor. These redundant scram

interlocks are required by Technical Specification 3.2.a. Additionally,

the high D2O temperature and loss of electrical power scram

interlocks provide additional assurance that the reactor will scram on

potential pump failure events. Based on the redundancy of the low

D2O flow scram interlocks and the additional redundancy from

diverse scram interlocks such as the high D2O temperature scram

interlocks, the NRC staff concludes that it is acceptable to assume

that the reactor will scram for the potential pump failure analysis.

\29\ SAR, Section 8.2.2 Pump Failures

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The Petitioner also asserted that plutonium and cesium-137 were not

included in the core burnout analysis. For the core burnout analysis,

data show that the assumed release fractions from the fuel of isotopes

in the SAR are conservative and that plutonium, cesium, or other

particulate isotopes would not be released.30 Furthermore, page

196 of the SAR states that the source term includes daughter products

of the released volatile fission products, which would include cesium-

137 as a daughter product of released isotopes. Based on the above

quoted data and consideration of volatile fission product decay

daughters, the release assumptions are acceptable.

\30\ SAR, page 196 and Reference B.1.

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The Petitioner also indicated that there were errors in the Georgia

Tech Research Reactor SAR. These alleged errors include the following:

That the half-life of iodine-131 was incorrectly specified; that the

geologic data are inadequate; that population data are outdated; that

the radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to

estimate design basis accident radiological doses are outdated; that

incorrect names were used for State of Georgia organizations; and that

a 30 year wind rose was needed.

Regarding the half-life of iodine-131, there was a typographical

error where 1.92 hours was typed instead of 192 hours. This has been

corrected by the licensee in a January 1995 SAR revision.

The geologic data presented by the licensee in the SAR, along with

other data and information that were provided by the Petitioner, DPW,

the Georgia Geologic Survey and the licensee, have been evaluated and

discussed by the NRC staff in issues (4) and (7) of this Partial

Director's Decision. Based on these evaluations by the NRC staff, the

geologic data do not change the previous staff conclusions in licensing

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor and the NRC staff does not possess

any information which would suggest that the geologic information for

the research reactor is not acceptable.

The population data presented by the licensee were from the 1990

census rather than from current City of Atlanta or other estimates on

population as stated by the Petitioner. The use of the 1990 census data

are acceptable because it is the latest official U.S. census data. The

use of such data as implemented in the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

SAR and the Technical Specifications is consistent with reactor

licensing practices for restricted area, exclusion area and low

population zones.

The radiation exposure calculational technique and data used to

estimate design basis accident radiological doses (SAR Appendices B and

C) were reviewed and found to be conservative and therefore acceptable

for use.

Regarding the use of incorrect names for State of Georgia

organizations, this was a failure of the licensee to

[[Page 40397]]

completely update its SAR and will be corrected in the license renewal

process.

Finally, the use of a 5 year wind rose, rather than a 30 year wind

rose, is not significant to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor safety

analysis or emergency planning because, conservative assumptions, which

are independent of the wind rose data, are used for dose assessments in

the SAR.31 In addition, the Georgia Tech emergency preparedness

plan uses actual measurements, rather than wind rose assumptions, to

determine necessary protective actions.32 Also, as previously

discussed in issues (2) and (3), the environmental, effluent, and area

radiation monitoring for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, provides

acceptable verification of compliance to Technical Specification and 10

CFR Part 20 requirements, and further wind direction data or wind rose

accuracy for environmental monitoring is not required.

\31\ SAR, Appendix B.

\32\ Letter from R. A. Karam, Georgia Tech, to U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, dated April 19, 1994, Attachment 6, Emergency

Preparedness Plan.

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The design and analysis features, as documented in the SAR and

appropriately required and verified in the Technical Specifications for

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, reduce the potential for or mitigate

the consequences of design basis accidents and provide acceptable

assurance that there will be no uncontrolled release of radioactive

material. Therefore, the NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the

radioactive contaminants would be spread by any credible event or

condition at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided

no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that

the Petitioner's concern does not raise a substantial health or safety

issue warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.

(7) The Georgia Tech Research Reactor is in an earthquake zone. The

NRC staff has continued to closely follow the seismic and geologic

developments in the tectonic province in which the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor is located. The site is located in the southeastern

Piedmont, which, along with the Blue Ridge, comprises the southern

portion of the broad region designated by the NRC staff as the ``New

England-Piedmont Tectonic Province.'' The New England-Piedmont Province

is bounded on the northwest by the Southern Valley and Ridge Tectonic

Province and on the southeast by the Coastal Plain Tectonic Province.

The NRC staff has extensively reviewed the geology and seismology

of this region (e.g., the Safety Analysis Reports for McGuire, Catawba,

North Anna, Shearon Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants).

These studies include considerations of the New Madrid, Charleston,

east Tennessee, and Brevard seismic zones that were mentioned in the

Petition. These evaluations by the NRC staff, as documented in the

safety evaluations for the McGuire, Catawba, North Anna, Shearon

Harris, Vogtle, and Summer Nuclear Power Plants, and other, nuclear and

non-nuclear-related evaluations during the last two decades, have

identified no capable faults 33 in this region.

\33\ Capable faults are defined in 10 CFR Part 100, ``Seismic

and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Appendix A,

Section III ``Definitions.''

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The NRC also has supported regional seismic networks in the

southeast.34 In 1990, the NRC began to transfer support from these

regional networks to the National Seismic Network operated by the

United States Geological Survey. The NRC staff continues to review the

results from these networks, and finds no new information which would

change previous conclusions on the seismicity of the southeastern

Piedmont (i.e., there are no capable faults and the potential for a

damaging earthquake is very remote).

\34\ These Networks include, the Charleston network, first

operated in 1973 by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Others were

added during the mid and late 1970's and early 1980's, which were

operated by Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Central

Virginia and Giles County Seismic Zones), the University of Memphis

(Southern Appalachians and New Madrid Seismic Zones), Georgia

Institute of Technology (Georgia and Alabama), and St. Louis

University (New Madrid Seismic Zone).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Seismology has been considered in the licensing of the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor. The New Madrid, Missouri and the Charleston, South

Carolina earthquakes (that were mentioned in this Petition issue) were

considered, as were lesser magnitude earthquakes in and near Georgia.

The Petitioner has presented no new seismic information for the region.

The NRC staff evaluation continues to support the conclusion that the

seismology for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor has been acceptably

considered in the licensing of this facility.

A study of seismic hazards has been performed for Georgia Tech and

referenced in the Petition.35 This study reviewed seismic history,

performed probabilistic and deterministic seismic ground motion

studies, and made estimates of potential ground motion. The report

validated Standard Building Code seismic coefficient requirements for

the Georgia Tech campus, and did not change the conclusion on the

acceptability of the Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

\35\ ``Seismic Hazard Study for the Georgia Institute of

Technology Campus, Atlanta, Georgia,'' Law Engineering Project No.

57704495.01, March 16, 1993.

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The above conclusions, as previously discussed in issue (4), are

further supported by the Georgia State Geologist in a letter dated May

11, 1995.

The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the seismic

characteristics for the site are unacceptable for the Georgia Tech

Research Reactor. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude

otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the Petitioner's

concern does not raise a substantial health or safety issue warranting

the action requested by the Petitioner.

(8) There is absolutely no reason to keep the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor operating. The license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

was issued in accordance with all applicable requirements. The licensee

programs in education, research and development are consistent with the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor license. Specifically, the Georgia Tech

license renewal request dated April 19, 1994, discussed activities at

the research reactor, including nuclear education in nuclear

engineering and health physics. It also discussed contributions to the

community, such as plant irradiation experiments for high school

science classes and use by the Boy Scouts of America for nuclear merit

badges at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The Georgia Tech Research

Reactor has capability for bio-medical irradiation research and

development, isotope production, neutron diffraction, and activation

analysis. The license renewal request specified programs evaluating

radiation decomposition of chemicals, characterizing neutron absorbing

materials, and characterizing soil samples.

The Petitioner also raised concerns on the monitoring and

calibration of neutron beams for medical therapy. At this time, the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not authorized to conduct medical

therapy,36 so the specific concern is not applicable.

\36\ The Georgia Tech Research Reactor cannot perform medical

therapy without specific authorization under the provisions of the

Atomic Energy Act Section 104(a). Georgia Tech may perform

experiments, such as the characterization of irradiation conditions

for potential, future medical therapy as long as the experiments and

research reactor are within the provisions of the current license

and other NRC regulatory requirements. In order to perform medical

therapy at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor, an associated license

under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.21(a) would be required, as well

as associated modifications to the Technical Specifications from the

NRC.

[[Page 40398]]

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The Petitioner has asserted that substantial management

deficiencies persist, including concerns on the problems related to the

1987/1988 time frame. This concern on the persistence of substantial

management deficiencies may be addressed in the pending license renewal

proceeding. As previously outlined in the Introduction to this Partial

Director's Decision, the Final Director's Decision will take into

account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding at

an appropriate time after completion of the NRC staff review.

The NRC staff finds no reason at this time to conclude that the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not continuing to conduct research and

development activities in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act and NRC

regulations. The Petitioner provided no facts to conclude otherwise.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that no information has been

provided on this issue to conclude that a substantial health or safety

issue exists warranting the action requested by the Petitioner.

(9) Security at the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is extremely lax.

The concerns on security issues, as previously outlined in the

Introduction to this Partial Director's Decision, may be addressed in a

pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will be addressed in a

Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time after taking into

account any relevant findings from this license renewal proceeding and

after completion of the NRC staff reviews.

(10) In case of an accident or terrorist attack, evacuation of the

campus and downtown Atlanta would be impossible both now and during the

Olympics.37 With respect to potential accident conditions for the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor, the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), the

area within which predetermined protective actions are established, is

a 100 meters radius from the facility. This EPZ is in accordance with

NRC emergency preparedness guidance applicable to research

reactors.38 The Georgia Tech Research Reactor accident analyses

39 demonstrates that this 100 meter EPZ is conservative for the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor. These analyses have been found

acceptable most recently in the safety evaluation for the Order to

convert from HEU fuel.40 These analyses demonstrate that the

potential need for protective actions outside the EPZ is highly

unlikely. The specification of emergency classifications (e.g., no

general emergency classification) for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

has also been reviewed by the NRC staff and found to be consistent with

the NUREG-0849 guidance. The Georgia Tech Research Reactor emergency

plan has been previously verified by the NRC staff to be acceptable in

accordance with this regulatory guidance and applicable regulations.

\37\ That portion of the issue that deals with potential

terrorist attacks will be included in issue (9) on security.

\38\ ``Standard Review Plan for Review and Evaluation of

Emergency Plans for Research and Test Reactors,'' NUREG-0849,

Appendix II.

\39\ SAR, Section 5.10 Accident Analyses, pages 139-144 and

Section 8, Reactor Hazards Evaluation, and Appendices A, B, and C,

pages 176-214.

\40\ Letter from Marvin M. Mendonca, NRC, to Dr. Ratib A. Karam,

Georgia Institute of Technology, Enclosure 3 Safety Evaluation,

Section 2.14 Potential Accident Scenarios.

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The Georgia Tech Research Reactor has conducted emergency response

drills in accordance with its emergency plan (the last three drills

were on October 19, 1994, November 4, 1993, and November 9, 1992). The

drills have included involvement of onsite or offsite agencies, such as

the Georgia Tech Police Department, the Atlanta Fire Department, the

Atlanta/Fulton County Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia

Emergency Management Agency, the Georgia Environmental Protection

Division, and the Grady Memorial Hospital. Training, equipment, and

contingency planning for onsite and offsite personnel have been

acceptably in accordance with emergency plan requirements, as verified

most recently in NRC staff Inspection Reports 50-160/94-04, 50-160/93-

03, and 50-160/92-04. Police, fire, and medical personnel have been

observed by NRC staff to acceptably perform their responsibilities.

Other recent discussions with these emergency response organizations

demonstrate that they acceptably understand and feel capable of

discharging their responsibilities under emergency conditions at the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

With regard to emergency preparedness during the Olympics,41

the NRC staff and the licensee have been discussing the necessary steps

to take for reactor safety during this event for some time before this

Petition was raised. The licensee has decided to not operate the

research reactor during the 1996 Olympics and to remove the spent fuel

from the facility prior to the Olympics.42 This would eliminate

the potential for radiological releases during the Olympics related to

the presence of such fuel onsite, and would reduce the potential for

any emergency response to be taken due to radiological conditions for

the Georgia Tech Research Reactor during the Olympics.

\41\ As previously noted, the implications of terrorist acts

during the Olympics relative to emergency preparedness may be

addressed in a pending license renewal proceeding. These issues will

be addressed in a Final Director's Decision at an appropriate time

after taking into account any relevant findings from this license

renewal proceeding and after completion of the NRC staff reviews.

\42\ Georgia Institute of Technology's Response to Commission's

Order Issuing Housekeeping Stay, dated June 21, 1995, and letter

from Patricia Guilday, Assistant Attorney General, State of Georgia,

Department of Law, to the Secretary of the NRC dated July 25, 1995.

Georgia Tech has indicated that there are no events or additional

resident population that are planned to be within the EPZ, and that the

entire campus is to be controlled for access such that increased

transient population through the EPZ is not expected. Further,

supplemental emergency provisions for the Olympics are being planned by

Georgia Tech in coordination with the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic

Games, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, the Georgia State Patrol, Georgia Department of

Transportation, City of Atlanta Police, and City of Atlanta Fire

Department.

Additionally, the Petitioner in her July 18, 1995 letter, raised a

concern on emergency preparedness for power reactor licenses, including

emergency preparedness during the Olympics. NRC regulations require the

development of emergency preparedness plans for all reactor licenses.

The Petitioner presented no information and the NRC staff does not know

of any information which would suggest that reactor emergency

preparedness is not acceptable, including emergency preparedness during

the Olympics.

The Petitioner also raised an issue addressing the location of the

emergency command center within the Georgia Tech Research Reactor

building. However, the emergency command center is outside the

containment structure in which the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is

housed. The emergency command center is isolated from the containment

structure, which, as previously discussed on issue (6), is capable of

withstanding pressures greater than would result from any analyzed

accident. The discussions on

[[Page 40399]]

the preceding issues also demonstrate that there is little likelihood

that the emergency command center could be affected by a radiological

event related to the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. The emergency

command center is monitored for radiation so that in the unlikely event

of an indication of unacceptable radiation in the emergency command

center, or if it were to otherwise become unavailable, alternative

actions could be taken (e.g., relocation of emergency response

personnel). The above is consistent with the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor emergency plan and previous NRC acceptance of the emergency

plan, continues to acceptably implement the requirements of NUREG-0849,

and, therefore, provides acceptable emergency preparedness for the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor.

Based on the above, the 100 meter EPZ at the Georgia Tech Research

Reactor is acceptable as a planning basis to ensure the protection of

the public health and safety both now and during the Olympics, and the

likelihood of evacuation or other protective action beyond the EPZ is

acceptably low. During the Olympics, Georgia Tech's plans to not

operate and to remove spent fuel ensure that there will be minimal

potential of radiological related emergencies arising in connection

with the NRC license for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor. Further,

during the Olympics, the conditions around the research reactor, access

controls to the campus, and planning for supplementary emergency

provisions ensure that the provisions of the emergency plan will not be

adversely affected by the Olympics.

The NRC staff finds no reason to conclude that the emergency

planning zone for the Georgia Tech Research Reactor is not acceptable,

including during the time period of the Olympics. The Petitioner

provided no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, the NRC staff

concludes that no information has been presented to conclude that a

substantial health or safety issue exists warranting the action

requested by the Petitioner.

B. Revocation of Liquid Radioactive Material Release Authority;

Revocation of Licenses Using the Principle of As Low As Reasonably

Achievable; Prohibition of Transportation of Radioactive Material by

Mail; and Modification to Posting Requirements for Radioactive Material

The following are general requests by the Petitioner for actions

related to various categories of licenses:

1. The request to withdraw all license authority nationwide

involving the discharging or dumping of any quantity of radioactive

material to all the sewers or waters in the United States;

2. The request to withdraw all licenses to all nuclear facilities,

including nuclear power plants, which operate under as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles;

3. The request that the NRC staff prohibit the transportation of

radioactive material by mail; and

4. The request that the NRC staff modify every license issued to

transporters of radioactive materials and builders of nuclear power

plants so that these parties must put two-foot high letters on

everything transported or built stating ``DANGER-RADIOACTIVE'' and in

slightly smaller letters ``there is no safe level of radiation, any

exposure can [a]ffect health.''

The bases for these requests are that there is no safe level of

radiation, that storage and disposal of radioactive waste is

inadequate, and that the NRC sewage discharge guidelines are totally

inadequate. The Petitioner has also indicated that the basis for the

request related to transportation by mail is that accidents have

occurred while transporting radioactive materials. The issues

enumerated by the Petitioner are broadly framed requests to take

actions to prohibit discharging all radioactive material into sewers

and waters of the U.S., to create a zero release limit of radioactive

material, and to modify the transportation regulations under 10 CFR

part 71.\43\ The Petitioner also raises concerns over the adequacy of

current NRC regulations related to radiation protection.\44\ Finally,

the Petitioner questions the adequacy of NRC and Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on allowed radioisotopes in the

environment.

\43\ The NRC's packaging and transportation regulations in 10

CFR part 71 are part of a broad regulatory scheme for the packaging

and transportation of radioactive materials. The packaging and

transportation of radioactive materials are also subject to the

regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S.

Postal Service. See 10 CFR 71.0(b).

\44\ These concerns include that the release limits to the sewer

systems is established as a monthly concentration and allows release

of soluble material, that the brain and ovaries are not specifically

mentioned in the organ dose weighting factors, that an individual is

not considered a member of the public any time in which the

individual receives an occupational dose, that special exposures

should not be allowed, that no dose be allowed to the embryo/fetus

whether the woman is declared pregnant or not, and that radiological

release limits are established assuming a ``Reference Man.''

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For each of the Petitioner's concerns cited directly above, the

Petitioner has provided no specific information or basis which would

support taking action on the Petitioner's four requests cited in this

section. The Petitioner's request to withdraw all license authority for

the discharging of any quantity of radioactive materials to all sewers

and waters is based on a general assertion that the NRC's sewer dumping

guidelines are totally inadequate. The Petitioner offers no support for

this assertion. In addition, the Petitioner's stated bases for the

request to withdraw all licenses which operate under ALARA principles

(i.e., there is no safe level of radiation and the storage and disposal

of radioactive materials, as well as the regulations, are inadequate)

have not been substantiated by any data or references in the Petition.

Finally, no information was provided that transportation accidents had

not been evaluated and issues resolved under the provision of current

regulations or that present regulations regarding the use of mail to

transport radioactive material is not acceptable. Because these stated

concerns are general and are not supported by additional information in

the Petition, these concerns do not provide the basis for taking

enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.206.

No specific information was provided to support the Petitioner's

general statements on the inadequacy of NRC regulations. The Petitioner

has provided no information that would lead to a conclusion that the

packaging and transportation regulations in 10 CFR part 71, the

radiation protection regulations in 10 CFR part 20, and the NRC's and

EPA's environmental protection regulations, are not providing

acceptable protection to the public health and safety, as well as to

the environment. Since the Petitioner has not submitted any relevant

technical, scientific or other data to support any of the general

requests for the actions enumerated in this section, or raised a

substantial health and safety concern based on these issues, the

Petitioner's general requests for such actions are denied. However,

should this Petitioner, or anyone, wish to provide relevant technical,

scientific or other data and grounds to support any change to NRC

regulations, a Petition for Rulemaking can be submitted in accordance

with 10 CFR 2.802.

III. Conclusion

The institution of proceedings pursuant to Section 2.206 is

appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been

raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1,

2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975); Washington Public Power

Supply

[[Page 40400]]

System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 924 (1984).

This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns raised by

the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by the

Petitioner is warranted.

With regard to the requests made by the Petitioner discussed

herein, the NRC staff finds no basis for taking such actions. Rather,

as explained above, the NRC staff concludes that no substantial health

and safety issues have been raised by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the

Petitioner's requests for action, pursuant to Section 2.206 on the

Georgia Tech Research Reactor, are denied on issues A(1) through A(8)

and A(10), insofar as the issues on A(8) do not relate to the

Petitioner's concerns on the persistence of substantial management

deficiencies and the issues on A(10) do not relate to the Petitioner's

security issues. As previously noted in the Introduction and Discussion

to this Partial Director's Decision, the issue related to the

persistence of management problems [part of A(8)] and the issue related

to security [A(9) and part of A(10)] will be decided after taking into

account the results of the licensing proceeding on the license renewal

application. In addition, the Petitioner's requests on general license

and authority revocation, as discussed in Section B of this Partial

Director's Decision, are denied.

A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary for the

Commission as provided by 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's

regulations. The Decision will become the final action of the

Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-19510 Filed 8-7-95; 8:45 am]

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