Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456 and STN 50-457]

Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance

of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.

NPF-37, NPF-66, NPF-72 and NPF-77, issued to the Commonwealth Edison

Company (the licensee) for operation of the Byron Station, Units 1 and

2, located in Ogle County, Illinois, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1

and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.

The proposed amendments would revise the Byron Station, Unit 1 and

2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS)

Section 3/4.7.6 concerning the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System.

These changes are consistent with the revised Standard Technical

Specifications for Westinghouse Plants. Specifically, the allowed

outage time for one train of the system would be changed from 7 to 30

days, if the train was declared inoperable only due to an inoperable

chiller unit. An alternative action would also be added to TS 3.7.6.a,

requiring the cessation of all core alterations, reactivity, additions,

and spent fuel movement if one train of the system is inoperable during

refueling operations. By letter dated July 19, 1994, the licensee

responded to the Commission staff's comments and proposed to revise TS

3/4.7.6 by adding a surveillance requirement to demonstrate the control

room ventilation heat load removal capability every 18 months.

Revisions to associated Bases and minor editorial changes would also be

made for the purpose of updating and clarifying the TS.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

A. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the allowed outage time

(AOT) for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1

through 4. The thirty day AOT is based on the low probability of an

event requiring control room isolation concurrent with failure of

the redundant train of VC. Therefore, one train of VC will always be

available to remove normal and accident heat loads and provide

control room isolation. Consequently, this change will not result in

an increase to offsite dose rates or the exposure of control room

operators.

Increasing the AOT will allow for more extensive maintenance and

should increase overall availability of the VC chillers. This

provides additional assurance that a chiller will be operable on at

least one train of VC. In the unlikely event that both VC chillers

became inoperable, alternate non-safety related means to maintain

control room temperature are available. Based on the above, the

proposed increase to the AOT will not increase the probability or

consequences of any previously analyzed accident.

The proposed change to the Action a for Modes 5 and 6 adds an

alternative to placing the remaining operable VC train in the makeup

mode. The alternative would allow the option to suspend CORE

ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated

fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an

event that would require control room isolation. The change will

have no impact on the consequences of an accident since the

remaining train of VC would be capable of isolating the control room

on a high radiation signal and providing the necessary temperature

control. Based on this review, the proposed Action will not result

in an increase in the probability or consequences of a previously

analyzed accident.

As noted above, the proposed amendment adds a restriction to

suspend movement of irradiated fuel. This change reduces the

probability of the occurrence of a fuel handling accident and has no

impact on the consequences of any accident. In addition, the wording

in Action b was revised to be consistent with the wording in Action

a. This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no impact on

the probability or consequences of an accident.

The proposed changes to Section 3/4.7.6 are requested to ensure

that surveillances are performed to verify that the Control Room

Ventilation System remains capable of performing its design

function. Operability of the Control Room Chillers ensures that the

ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature

for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation

cooled by the Control Room Ventilation System. The ability of the

Control Room Ventilation System to limit the radiation exposure to

personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or

its equivalent, is not affected by the addition of this surveillance

requirement. The proposed changes do not affect any accident

initiators or precursors and do not change or alter the design

assumptions for the systems or components used to mitigate the

consequences of an accident. Consequently, the changes do not impact

any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

B. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the AOT for a VC chiller

from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. During the time

one chiller is inoperable, the redundant train is capable of

handling the heat loads during normal operation and during all

accident scenarios. No new operating conditions are created by this

change. Therefore, this change will not result in any new or

different accident from those previously analyzed.

The proposed change to the Action for Modes 5 and 6 adds an

alternative to allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS,

positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In

Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that

would require control room isolation. Also, the remaining train of

VC would still be [[Page 4933]] capable of temperature control and

isolating the control room on a high radiation signal. This change

will not create any new plant operating conditions. Based on this

review, the proposed Action will not result in a new or different

kind of accident.

The additional restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel in

Modes 5 and 6 will not create any new condition which has not been

previously analyzed. In addition, for consistency with the wording

in Action a, the word ``changes'' was replaced by the word

``additions.'' This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has

no potential to create a new kind of accident.

The proposed changes to add a surveillance requirement to

Section 3/4.7.6 do not affect the design or operation of any system,

structure, or component in the plant. There are no changes to

parameters governing plant operation; no new or different type of

equipment will be installed. The proposed changes ensure that

equipment remains capable of performing its design function.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of

a new or different type of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The basis for the VC Technical Specification to ensure that the

temperature in the control room does not exceed maximum allowable

for the equipment and instrumentation inside. The VC system is also

required to limit radiation exposure to control room personnel

following an accident. Either of the two redundant trains can

perform both of these functions. As long as one train of VC is

available, the margin of safety assumed in the bases for this

specification is maintained.

Increasing the AOT for one VC chiller unit has no impact on the

redundant train of VC. Although one train of VC may be inoperable

for a longer period of time, the redundant train can perform all

normal and accident functions. The length of the AOT is sufficiently

short to assure that a scenario involving an accident requiring

control room isolation concurrent with the failure of the redundant

train is not credible. Therefore, one train of VC will remain

available and no reduction is made to the margin of safety.

The second change involves adding an alternative Action in Modes

5 and 6 that would restrict CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity

additions, and movement of irradiated fuel. The existing Action

requires that the operable train of VC be placed in the makeup mode

of operation. This Action ensures that any failures are readily

detected. The alternate Action reduces the potential of an event

that would require control room isolation while maintaining one

train of VC operable. In both cases, the Actions assure that one

train of VC is available for normal and emergency use. Therefore,

the proposed change maintains the margin of safety.

Another proposed change involves the condition with no VC trains

operable in Modes 5 and 6. Since VC is not available, alternative

means must be used to maintain control room temperature. Since the

primary alternative involves utilization of outside air, the most

appropriate action is to reduce the probability of an event that

would require control room isolation. The proposed additional

restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel provides added

assurance that such an event will not occur. Therefore, the margin

of safety is maintained. Also, for consistency with the wording in

Action a, the word ``changes'' was replaced by the word

``additions.'' This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has

no impact on the margin of safety.

The final proposed change to add a surveillance requirement does

not affect the margin of safety for any Technical Specification. The

initial conditions and methodologies used in the accident analyses

remain unchanged, therefore, accident analysis results are not

impacted. The addition of a Technical Specification surveillance

provides further assurance that the Control Room Ventilation System

is operable and capable of maintaining the ambient air temperature

below the allowable temperature for the continuous duty rating of

the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. These

changes also provides consistency with Standard Technical

Specifications.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a reduction in

the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public and State comments received.

Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal

Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing

after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this

action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page

number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be

delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By February 24, 1995, the licensee may file a request for a hearing

with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility

operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public

document rooms located at the Byron Public Library, 109 N. Franklin,

P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois 61010 for the Byron Station; for

Braidwood, the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee

Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481. If a request for a hearing or

petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or

the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of

hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the [[Page 4934]] nature

and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest

in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may

be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references

to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those

facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information

to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material

issue of law or fact. Contention shall be limited to matters within the

scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one

which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner

who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements

with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services

Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above

date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice

period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the

Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800)

248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator

should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following

message addressed to Robert A. Capra: petitioner's name and telephone

number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and

page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition

should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Michael I. Miller,

Esquire; Sidley and Austin, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois

60690, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendments dated August 31, 1993, as supplemented July

19, 1994, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's

Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the

Bryon Public Library, 109 N. Franklin, P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois

61010 for the Byron Station; for Braidwood, the Wilmington Township

Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ramin R. Assa,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor

Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-1813 Filed 1-24-95; 8:45 am]

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