Personnel Appeals Board; Procedural Regulations

Federal RegisterJul 6, 1995

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SUMMARY: The General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals Board is

issuing final regulations to govern appeals filed by employees of the

Architect of the Capitol alleging discrimination based on race, color,

sex, national origin, religion, age or disability. The regulations

implement the Board's authority under Sec. 312(e) of the Architect of

the Capitol Human Resources Act.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 6, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Lipsky, Attorney, Personnel

Appeals Board, 202-512-6137.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 22, 1994, the Architect of the

Capitol Human Resources Act (ACHRA), Pub. L. 103-283, Sec. 312, 108

Stat. 1443, was signed into law. ACHRA requires the Architect of the

Capitol to establish a personnel management system incorporating the

fundamental principles that exist in other modern personnel systems.

Section 312(e) of ACHRA prohibits employment discrimination against

Architect of the Capitol employees based on race, color, sex, national

origin, religion, age or disability. It also bans intimidation of or

reprisal against employees who exercise their rights under the act. In

order to ensure enforcement of these rights, ACHRA permits employees of

the Architect of the Capitol to file charges of discrimination or

retaliation with the General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals Board

(``PAB'' or ``Board'').

On November 16, 1994, the PAB adopted interim regulations to

implement its new authority under ACHRA. See, 59 FR 59103 (Nov. 16,

1994). Congress, however, significantly changed the enforcement scheme

applicable to employees of the Architect of the Capitol when it enacted

the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), Pub. L. 104-1, 109

Stat. 3 (Jan. 23, 1995). This statute makes 11 civil rights and worker

protection laws applicable to employees of Congress and legislative

branch agencies. It also creates a new Office of Compliance within the

legislative branch to adjudicate complaints of violations of these

laws. The CAA repeals Sec. 312(e) of ACHRA, which is the section that

prohibits discrimination against employees of the Architect of the

Capitol and permits those employees to file appeals with the PAB. See,

CAA, Sec. 504(c), 109 Stat. 41. Effective January 23, 1996, Architect

of the Capitol employees will be covered by the new non-discrimination

provisions of the CAA and may file complaints with the new Office of

Compliance.

The PAB will, however, continue for a transitional period to have a

role in adjudicating claims from Architect of the Capitol employees.

The provisions of the CAA will not apply to Architect of the Capitol

employees until January 23, 1996. Until that date, the PAB will

continue to have jurisdiction over discrimination claims from Architect

of the Capitol employees. Even after that date, employees of the

Architect of the Capitol may file charges with the Board if their

claims arose before January 23, 1996. In such cases, the provisions of

Sec. 312(e) of ACHRA will remain in effect and provide the exclusive

procedure for that case until its completion. See, Sec. 506(b)(1) of

the CAA, 109 Stat. 43. The PAB may also have a further role to play if

the opening of the new Office of Compliance is delayed for any reason.

If a claim arises after the effective date of the CAA but before the

opening of the new Office of Compliance, the employee is first to

exhaust administrative procedures before the Architect of the Capitol.

If the Office of Compliance still has not opened after that exhaustion,

then the employee has the choice of either filing a charge with the PAB

or filing suit in court. If the employee elects to file with the PAB,

then he or she must proceed exclusively under the provisions of

Sec. 312(e) of ACHRA. The provisions of Sec. 312(e) remain in effect

for that case until the case is completed. See, Sec. 506(b)(2) of the

CAA, 109 Stat. 43.

In view of this continuing role for the PAB, the Board deems it

necessary to finalize its interim regulations, even though it

recognizes that its relationship with the Office of the Architect of

the Capitol and its employees will be a relatively brief one.

Brief Summary of the Interim Regulations

The interim regulations published by the Board on November 16,

1994, contained a new part, 4 CFR part 29, establishing the procedures

that the Board will follow in receiving and adjudicating cases brought

by Architect of the Capitol employees. See, 59 FR 59103 (Nov. 16,

1994). The interim regulations also included some conforming amendments

to the procedures applicable to charges filed by employees of the

General Accounting Office (GAO). See, changes to 4 CFR part 28, 59 FR

59105. The most significant change for GAO employees is that the time

in which they may file a charge with the Board has been expanded. GAO

employees now have 30 days following the relevant action by GAO in

which to file a charge with the Board's General Counsel. See,

amendments to 4 CFR 28.11 and 28.98, 59 FR 59106. Finally, the Board's

regulations concerning judicial review of Board decisions were amended

in light of Ramey v. Bowsher, 9 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In that

case, the court held that an employee's only recourse following a final

decision of the Board on a complaint of discrimination is to seek

appellate review before the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit. The Board deleted 4 CFR 28.100, which contained

contrary provisions, from its regulations. See, 59 FR 59106. The

preamble to the interim regulations contained a detailed summary of the

significant features of the regulations and an explanation of the

choices made by the Board in drafting the regulations. This material

will not be repeated here.

History of Rulemaking Proceedings

The regulations were made effective on an interim basis because of

the need to have some procedures in place to govern any charges of

discrimination received from Architect of the Capitol employees. The

PAB invited comments from the public and stated that it would

[[Page 35116]]

carefully consider such comments before the regulations were adopted in

final form. See, 59 FR 59103. The original Federal Register notice

announced that comments would be received through February 24, 1995.

Id. This deadline was later extended to March 15, 1995. See, 60 FR 9773

(Feb. 22, 1995). In addition to publishing the interim regulations in

the Federal Register, the PAB also prepared a four-page ``plain

English'' summary of the regulations and distributed this summary to

every employee of the Architect of the Capitol. The summary contained

information on how to submit comments to the Board. The Board stated

that it would receive comments either in writing or orally, on a

special voice-mail line. GAO employees were provided notice of the

rulemaking proceedings through two notices published in the ``GAO

Management News.'' See, GAO Management News, Vol. 22, No. 9 (Week of

Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1994); Vol. 22, No. 20 (Week of Feb. 20-24, 1995).

Copies of the Federal Register notice concerning the regulatory changes

were also sent to representatives of the GAO employee councils.

The Board received two comments concerning the interim regulations.

One comment, apparently from an Architect of the Capitol employee,

praised the regulations. The employee stated that: ``I'm particularly

pleased * * * that a person can remain anonymous when reporting an

alleged illegal personnel practice * * * .'' The employee also stressed

the importance of follow-up investigations by the Board's General

Counsel to ensure that required changes are taking place. The other

comment received by the Board was from Mr. George M. White, the

Architect of the Capitol. Mr. White objected to certain provisions of

the interim regulations, arguing that they went beyond the statutory

authority of the Board.

After carefully considering the comments received, the Board has

adopted several modifications to the interim regulations. The Board

has, however, decided to retain three elements of the regulations that

were challenged by the Architect of the Capitol. The Board will discuss

below the primary concerns raised by the Architect and the Board's

views on those matters. Each change to the interim regulations will

also be explained.

Response to Comments Received from the Architect of the Capitol

The Architect of the Capitol argues that the Board lacks statutory

authority for three provisions of the interim regulations: (1) The

provision requiring that all charges be filed with and investigated by

the PAB General Counsel, prior to being considered by the Board; (2)

the provision defining ``exhaustion'' of administrative proceedings

before the Architect and stating that an employee may file a charge

with the Board if the Architect fails to issue a final decision on his

or her EEO complaint within 120 days; and (3) the provision permitting

Architect employees to file charges with the Board seeking class-wide

relief, even if such relief had not been sought from the Architect.

Each of these provisions will be discussed below.

1. Role of the PAB General Counsel

The Architect expresses concern about the role assigned to the PAB

General Counsel by the interim regulations. Under the interim

regulations, the PAB General Counsel has the same role with respect to

charges filed by employees of the Architect of the Capitol as he does

with respect to those of GAO employees. A charge of discrimination is

initially filed with the General Counsel. See, 4 CFR 29.8(a), 59 FR

59108. The General Counsel investigates the charge and determines

whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the charge is true. Id.

at Sec. 29.9. When the General Counsel's investigation is complete, he

sends the employee a Right to Appeal Letter, which includes a

confidential letter to the employee explaining the General Counsel's

conclusions on the merits of the case. Id. at Sec. 29.9(c). Where he

concludes that the charge has merit, the General Counsel offers to

represent the employee before the Board. Id. at Sec. 29.9(d).

Regardless of the findings of the General Counsel, the employee is free

to file an appeal with the PAB within 30 days of service of the Right

to Appeal Letter. Id. at Sec. 29.10(a) and (b).

The Architect asserts that there is no statutory basis for the

duties assigned to the PAB General Counsel in the interim regulations.

He argues that ACHRA only provides for the filing of appeals with the

PAB and makes no mention of any role for the General Counsel. The Board

has carefully considered this argument and concludes that there is a

firm statutory basis for the duties assigned to the General Counsel and

that the enforcement scheme adopted by the Board is supported by sound

policy considerations.

ACHRA states that any employee of the Architect of the Capitol

alleging employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, national

origin, religion, age or disability ``may file a charge with the

General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals Board in accordance with

the General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980 (31 U.S.C. 751-

55).'' Section 312(e)(3)(A) of ACHRA, 108 Stat. 1445 (emphasis added).

Thus, ACHRA expressly states that charges by employees of the Architect

of the Capitol will be governed by the terms of the General Accounting

Office Personnel Act (GAOPA) contained in 31 U.S.C. 751-755.

Sections 751 through 755 of Title 31, U.S.C., establish both the

PAB and its General Counsel, and assign duties to each. The PAB is to

hear and adjudicate claims relating to certain enumerated personnel

matters. 31 U.S.C. 753. The Board also has the authority to issue

procedural regulations. Id. at 753(d). The duties of the General

Counsel are to:

(A) Investigate an allegation about a prohibited personnel

practice under 732(b)(3) of this title to decide if there are

reasonable grounds to believe the practice has occurred, exists, or

will be taken by an officer or employee of the General Accounting

Office;

(B) Investigate an allegation about a prohibited political

activity under 732(b)(3) of this title;

(C) Investigate a matter under the jurisdiction of the Board if

the Board or a member of the Board requests; and

(D) Help the Board carry out its duties and powers.

31 U.S.C. 752(b)(3). Thus, the GAOPA gives the General Counsel broad

authority to investigate any matter within the Board's jurisdiction, if

requested to do so by the Board. ACHRA amended the jurisdictional grant

to the Board, contained in 31 U.S.C. 753, to include actions involving

discrimination prohibited by ACHRA. See, ACHRA, Sec. 312(e)(4)(B), 108

Stat. 1446. As a result, discrimination claims by Architect of the

Capitol employees are ``matters under the jurisdiction of the Board''

and the Board may ask the General Counsel to investigate such claims.

This is precisely what the Board has done in its interim regulations,

which require the General Counsel to investigate every discrimination

claim filed by an employee of the Architect of the Capitol.

An almost identical question concerning the Board's authority was

raised in General Accounting Office v. General Accounting Office

Personnel Appeals Board, 698 F.2d 516 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In that case,

the General Accounting Office challenged the authority of the PAB to

authorize the PAB General Counsel to prosecute appeals concerning

adverse actions on behalf of GAO employees. The District of Columbia

Circuit held that ``investigate'' as used in 31 U.S.C. 752

[[Page 35117]]

included both the investigation of claims and the prosecution of those

claims before the Board. The court further held that the Board's broad

authority to issue procedural regulations included the power to issue a

regulation requiring the General Counsel to investigate and to

prosecute any category of case within the Board's jurisdiction. The

court reasoned:

[T]he open-ended language of 4(g)(4) and 4(m) [of the original

text of the GAOPA] supports the conclusion that, within the bounds

of law and reason, the GAOPA authorizes whatever sort of advocacy

role for the General Counsel the Board determines to be appropriate.

Section 4(g)(4) provides that the General Counsel shall ``help the

Board carry out its duties and powers,'' and section 4(m) grants the

Board power to promulgate regulations ``providing for officer and

employee appeals consistent with sections 7701 and 7702 of title 5.*

* *'' These provisions give the Board broad discretion to design

appropriate procedures for appeals cases and to include in that

design whatever role for the General Counsel it deems helpful in

discharging its duties and powers. Consistent with the discretion

thereby granted, the PAB has concluded that the role created for the

General Counsel under 4 C.F.R. Sec. 28.17(d) ``helps'' the Board

carry out its duties and powers by facilitating an efficient

adjudicative procedure for all petitions filed with the Board,

including adverse action petitions. We think that conclusion is both

consistent with the statute and entirely rational and, therefore, we

decline to disturb it.

General Accounting Office v. General Accounting Office Personnel

Appeals Board, 698 F.2d at 529-30 (emphasis in original; footnotes

deleted). Because discrimination charges by Architect of the Capitol

employees are now within the Board's jurisdiction, and ACHRA states

that such charges are to be filed in accordance with the GAOPA, the

reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit indicates that the Board

may assign a similar role to the PAB General Counsel with respect to

this new class of cases.

The Board believes that the above analysis answers the Architect's

objection that there is no statutory basis for the duties assigned to

the General Counsel. Moreover, the Board believes that there are sound

policy reasons for the enforcement role assigned to the General Counsel

by the regulations. By requiring that all charges be investigated by

the General Counsel, the Board ensures that all cases come to it with

well-defined issues and a fully developed factual record. The Board

appreciates that the Architect will have investigated these cases as

well. However, that investigation (by the agency charged with the

discrimination) may not be as impartial or as thorough as one

undertaken by a third-party such as the General Counsel. The General

Counsel's investigation also serves a screening function, because an

employee may choose not to pursue a case if an impartial investigator

such as the General Counsel concludes that his or her claim lacks

merit. Finally, the General Counsel's representation of employees adds

to the integrity of the adjudicatory process by ensuring that employees

with credible claims have a fair chance to have their cases presented

to the Board and do not have to proceed pro se against an agency

represented by skilled legal counsel.

For these reasons, the Board has decided to retain the basic role

of the PAB General Counsel as proposed in the interim regulations. The

Board has, however, decided to make one change in the duties of the

General Counsel. The Architect of the Capitol raised concerns about a

provision of the interim regulations that permitted the General Counsel

to initiate his own investigations, even in the absence of the filing

of a charge by an Architect employee. See, 4 CFR 29.12, 59 FR 59109.

This provision mirrored a provision applicable to GAO employees in the

Board's current regulations and was based on the statutory role of the

General Counsel under the GAOPA. However, after the adoption of the

interim regulations, Congress enacted the CAA. This new law transfers

responsibility for adjudicating claims of discrimination by employees

of the Architect of the Capitol to the new Office of Compliance,

beginning either in January 1996 or at a later date if the opening of

the Office is delayed. See, CAA, Sec. 506(b), 109 Stat. 43. The PAB

will thus only be hearing claims from the Architect of the Capitol for

a transitional period. Because of the Board's limited role following

the CAA, the Board has decided that it would not be feasible or

appropriate for its General Counsel to conduct any self-initiated

investigations and it has decided to drop this provision from its

regulations. The Board is mindful that the one Architect employee who

submitted a comment praised this provision and stated that it is

important for employees to be able to provide information to the

General Counsel anonymously, without filing a charge of discrimination.

Nonetheless, the Board concludes that, in light of its more limited

role following the passage of the CAA, the provision for self-initiated

investigations is no longer appropriate. The Board is therefore

deleting 4 CFR 29.12 (entitled ``Proceedings brought by the General

Counsel seeking corrective action, disciplinary action or a stay''),

which appeared in the interim regulations. References to the General

Counsel's authority to bring self-initiated cases have also been

deleted from 4 CFR 29.3 (``Jurisdiction of the Board'').

2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Before the Architect of the

Capitol

The interim regulations permit an employee to file a charge with

the PAB at any time after the passage of 120 days, if the Architect

fails to issue a final decision on the employee's internal complaint of

discrimination by that date. See, 4 CFR 29.6(a), 59 FR 59107. The

Architect of the Capitol objected to this provision, taking the

position that a charge cannot be filed with the PAB until a final

decision is issued by the Architect, regardless of how long it takes to

issue that decision.

For the reasons set forth below, the Board rejects the Architect's

argument. However, after reviewing the material submitted by the

Architect, the Board has decided to lengthen to 150 days the time

period that an employee must wait before filing a charge with the

Board. The Board recognizes that the Architect has adopted a detailed

procedure for considering claims of discrimination. Because those

procedures may in some instances take as long as 140 days to complete,

the Board concludes that an expansion of the time period in its

regulations is warranted. See change to 4 CFR 29.6(a), set forth below.

ACHRA requires that employees of the Architect of the Capitol

exhaust the administrative remedies for discrimination within their own

agency before filing a charge with the PAB. The act states:

Such a charge may be filed [with the PAB] only after the

employee has filed a complaint with the Architect of the Capitol in

accordance with requirements prescribed by the Architect of the

Capitol and has exhausted all remedies pursuant to such

requirements.

ACHRA, Sec. 312(e)(3)(A), 108 Stat. 1445-46. Although ACHRA states that

employees must exhaust their internal administrative remedies before

filing a charge with the Board, the statute does not define when such

remedies will be considered ``exhausted.'' The Board's regulations

merely supply a reasonable definition of ``exhaustion.'' The

regulations, as amended below, state that administrative remedies will

be considered exhausted when either of the following occurs:

(1) The employee receives a final decision by the Architect of

the Capitol on his or her complaint of discrimination or

retaliation; or

[[Page 35118]]

(2) 150 days have passed after the filing of an internal

complaint of discrimination or retaliation and the Architect of the

Capitol has not issued a final decision on the complaint.

See, 4 CFR 29.6(a), as amended below.

Such a definition of ``exhaustion'' is extremely important. If an

employee had to await a final decision by the employing agency in all

cases, the agency effectively could deny employees access to the Board

by delaying the issuance of a decision indefinitely. Moreover, for the

right to appeal to the Board to be meaningful, an employee needs to be

able to file his or her charge when witness memories are still fresh

and effective relief can still be fashioned.

Although the statutory language and legislative history for ACHRA

are remarkably brief, two important policies are evident on the face of

the statute. On the one hand, Congress clearly intended that Architect

of the Capitol employees have a meaningful right to have their

complaints heard by an impartial adjudicatory body outside the control

of the Architect. On the other hand, Congress also wished to give the

Architect the first chance to investigate and rectify any improprieties

in his own personnel practices. The Board's definition of exhaustion

gives effect to both of these statutory policies. The regulations give

the Architect an exclusive period of time in which to investigate and

act on employee complaints. But they also ensure that employees will be

able to obtain an independent review by the PAB if their employer

withholds action on their complaints for an unreasonable period of

time.

ACHRA needs to be read against the background of the discrimination

complaint procedures that are in effect throughout the federal

government. In every other discrimination complaint process within the

federal government, employees are permitted to take an appeal to an

external adjudicatory body if their own agency fails to act on their

complaint within some specified period of time. See, 4 CFR 28.98(b)(2)

(GAO employees may file with the PAB if GAO fails to issue decision

within 120 days); 5 CFR 1201.154(b)(2) (in ``mixed cases'', executive

branch employees may file a discrimination appeal with the MSPB if

their agency fails to decide their internal EEO complaints within 120

days); 29 CFR 1614.108(e) and (f) (executive branch employees may

request hearing before EEOC administrative judge if agency does not

complete its investigation within 180 days). In adopting ACHRA,

Congress was essentially extending the protection of nondiscrimination

laws to employees of the Architect of the Capitol and stating that

those protections should be enforced in accordance with the procedures

of the GAOPA. It is thus reasonable to assume that Congress intended

the Board to interpret ``exhaustion of administrative remedies'' in a

manner consistent with other federal civil rights laws and with the

Board's longstanding regulations.

For these reasons, the Board concludes that it has a sound legal

basis for adopting its definition of exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

The interim regulations also included a special rule, permitting

the Architect of the Capitol an additional 60 days to investigate

charges filed with the Board's General Counsel prior to March 1, 1995.

As noted in the preamble to the interim regulations, this provision was

intended as an interim measure only. It has already expired and now is

deleted from the final regulations. See, deletion of 4 CFR 29.6(d), set

forth below.

3. Class Actions

The interim regulations permit an employee of the Architect of the

Capitol to file a charge with the PAB as the representative of a class

of employees. See, 4 CFR 29.8(a) and 29.10(f), 59 FR 59108. The

regulations further require that such an employee first file an

internal complaint of discrimination with the Architect of the Capitol

and exhaust administrative remedies on that complaint. 4 CFR 29.6(b).

The regulations do not require, however, that such a complaint be filed

with the Architect of the Capitol as a class action, or treated by the

Architect of the Capitol as a class action, in order to meet the

requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Architect of the Capitol opposes these provisions concerning

class actions. He argues that the PAB has no authority to entertain any

claim or issue that was not raised before his office. However, his

letter also makes clear that the procedures adopted by his office do

not permit the filing of class actions. Thus, his argument in effect is

that employees of the Architect of the Capitol have no avenue for

seeking relief on a class-wide basis.

The PAB disagrees with the Architect's interpretation of ACHRA and

has decided to retain these provisions of its regulations. ACHRA

prohibits the Architect of the Capitol from engaging in employment

discrimination that would be unlawful under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act and other nondiscrimination statutes. See, ACHRA,

Sec. 312(e)(2), 108 Stat. 1445. It has long been recognized that the

kind of discrimination prohibited by Title VII is often class-wide in

nature and that class actions are critical to effective enforcement of

the statute. See, e.g., discussion in Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d

108, 152, n.177 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In interpreting Title VII's

prohibition of discrimination by the federal government, the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that executive

branch agencies must accept class complaints of discrimination filed by

their employees and must afford class-wide relief in appropriate

circumstances. Barrett v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 69 F.R.D. 544,

549-552 (D.D.C. 1975). Thus, the PAB concludes that it has an

obligation to permit the filing of class actions in proceedings before

it.

In determining what exhaustion of administrative remedies is

necessary before an Architect employee may file a class action with the

Board, the PAB followed well-established Title VII case law. Under

Title VII, a class action may be pursued in court so long as the named

representative of the class filed an individual administrative

complaint of discrimination. It is not necessary that each class member

have filed an administrative complaint or that remedies were sought at

the administrative level on behalf of the class members. Chisholm v.

U.S. Postal Service, 665 F.2d 482, 490 (4th Cir. 1981); Bowe v.

Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); see also,

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414-15, n.8 (1975). In

light of the Architect's own representations that he will not permit

the filing of class complaints in his internal EEO complaint process,

it is particularly important that Architect employees be permitted to

pursue class remedies before the Board after having filed an individual

complaint with the Architect.

Applicability of Part 29

In addition to the changes discussed above that respond to the

public comments, the Board has also revised the final section of part

29, Sec. 29.13, entitled ``Applicability of this part.'' Following the

adoption of the interim regulations, Congress enacted the CAA. As

discussed above, that statute terminates the Board's jurisdiction over

claims by employees of the Architect of the Capitol, after a

transitional period. The CAA generally limits the Board's jurisdiction

to cases arising before January 23, 1996, except in certain cases where

the opening of the new Office of Compliance is delayed. The revised

text of Sec. 29.13 makes reference to these new

[[Page 35119]]

limitations on the Board's jurisdiction contained in the CAA.

Interim Regulations Concerning GAO Employees

As noted above, the interim regulations contained a few changes to

4 CFR part 28 concerning charges brought by employees of GAO. Because

no comments were received from either GAO or its employees on these

provisions, the Board now adopts them in final form, without change.

List of Subjects

4 CFR Part 28

Administrative practice and procedure, Equal employment

opportunity, Government employees, Labor-management relations.

4 CFR Part 29

Administrative practice and procedure, Equal employment

opportunity, Government employees.

Accordingly, the interim rule amending Title 4, Chapter I,

Subchapter B, Code of Federal Regulations, which was published at 59 FR

59103 on November 16, 1994, is adopted as a final rule with the

following changes:

PART 29--GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD;

PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO CLAIMS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AT

THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

1. The authority citation for Part 29 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 31 U.S.C. 753.

2. Section 29.3 is amended by removing paragraph (c).

3. Section 29.6 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2) and

removing paragraph (d) to read as follows:

Sec. 29.6 Requirement for exhaustion of internal administrative

remedies provided by the Architect of the Capitol.

(a) * * *

(2) 150 days have passed after the filing of an internal complaint

of discrimination or retaliation and the Architect of the Capitol has

not issued a final decision on the complaint.

* * * * *

3. Section 29.8 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2) as follows:

Sec. 29.8 Filing a charge with the General Counsel.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(2) At any time after the passage of 150 days following the filing

of an internal complaint of discrimination or retaliation, if the

Architect of the Capitol has not yet issued a final decision on the

internal complaint.

* * * * *

Sec. 29.12 [Removed and reserved]

4. Section 29.12 is removed and reserved.

5. Section 29.13 is amended by revising the section heading,

removing paragraph (a), redesignating paragraph (b) as paragraph (a),

and adding a new paragraph (b) to read as follows:

Sec. 29.13 Applicability of this part.

* * * * *

(b) The regulations in this part apply to all charges filed with

the Board prior to January 23, 1996, the effective date of Sec. 201 of

the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), Pub. L. 104-1, 109

Stat. 3 (January 23, 1995). They also apply to any charge filed after

that date pursuant to the terms of Sec. 506(b) of the CAA.

Nancy A. McBride,

Chair, Personnel Appeals Board, U.S. General Accounting Office.

[FR Doc. 95-16475 Filed 7-5-95; 8:45 am]

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