Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS)

Federal RegisterJun 22, 1995

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 72

RIN 3150-AE17

Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent

Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage

Facilities (MRS)

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its

regulations, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,

for the emergency planning licensing requirements for Independent Spent

Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage

Facilities (MRS). The amendments are necessary to ensure that local

authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they

may take appropriate action. The regulation will provide a level of

preparedness at these facilities that is consistent with NRC's defense-

in-depth philosophy.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 20, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301-415-6534).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On May 27, 1986 (51 FR 19106), following Commission approval, the

proposed revision to 10 CFR part 72 relating to licensing requirements

for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored

Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS), including requirements for

emergency planning, was published in the Federal Register for comment.

On November 30, 1988 (53 FR 31651), the Commission published the

final rule outlining the licensing requirements for ISFSI and MRS but

reserved the emergency planning licensing requirements for a later

date.

On May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), the Commission published for public

comment the proposed emergency planning licensing requirements for

ISFSI and MRS. This final rule codifies the emergency planning

licensing requirements.

Discussion

On April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051), the Commission published in the

Federal Register the final regulations relating to Emergency

Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees

(10 CFR parts 30, 40, and 70).

These regulations require certain NRC fuel cycle and other

radioactive materials licensees that engage in activities that may have

the potential for a significant accidental release of NRC licensed

materials to establish and maintain approved emergency plans for

responding to such accidents.

Although applicable to those licensed under different parts of the

Commission's regulations, the requirements for emergency plans in parts

30, 40, and 70 contain similar provisions because they are designed to

protect the public against similar radiological hazards. The proposed

revision of 10 CFR part 72 as published for comment on May 24, 1993 (58

FR 29795), would also require applicants for an ISFSI and MRS license

to submit an emergency plan. Although the texts of the Fuel Cycle final

emergency planning requirements and the parallel provisions of the

proposed Emergency Preparedness licensing requirements for ISFSI and

MRS are not identical, these provisions have the same purpose and use

the same approach. In both cases, the proposed regulations require

onsite emergency planning with provisions for offsite emergency

response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite

authorities and the public. It is therefore appropriate that in both

cases these requirements should be expressed in the same manner.

The Commission has determined that the emergency planning licensing

requirements for 10 CFR part 72 licensees should be similar to those

requirements already codified in Sec. 70.22 for part 70 licensees.

Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to establish unique provisions in

the emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities (and certain

more complex ISFSIs) versus typical ISFSI facilities. The Commission

anticipates a potential need for enhanced emergency planning

requirements appropriate to the entire range of operations which may be

conducted at an MRS facility (or ISFSI that may be repackaging or

handling spent fuel). The Commission acknowledges that, to date,

accidents that have been postulated and analyzed for either an ISFSI or

MRS would result in similar offsite doses. The analysis of potential

onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with

the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1140. This evaluation

shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an

accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem

effective dose equivalent, which is within the EPA Protective Action

Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical

toxicity).

Thus, the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI

located on a reactor site would be inconsequential when compared to

those involving the reactor itself. Therefore, current reactor

emergency plans cover all at- or near-reactor ISFSI's. An ISFSI that is

to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an emergency plan

established in accordance with the requirements in this rulemaking.

NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving

an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and

safety. Therefore, the final requirements to be imposed on most ISFSI

licensees reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite

components to their onsite emergency plans.

Similarly, the Commission has conducted an analysis of potential

onsite and offsite consequences of accidental release associated with

the operation of an MRS. The analysis is contained in NUREG-1092. This

evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public

offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would

likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the

EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble

uranium (due to chemical toxicity).

In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the

handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,1 it is stated

that

[[Page 32431]] \1\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and

Accident Considerations.

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* * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general

public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and

dispersed offsite. For this to happen:

The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form

There must be a mechanism available for the release of

such materials from the facility, and

There must be a mechanism available for offsite

dispersion of such released material.

Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000

MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or

more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no

mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in

significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism

available for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.

Furthermore, NRC has conducted Safety Evaluations on many different

storage systems. Those studies included evaluations of the effects of

corrosion, handling accidents such as cask drops and tipovers,

explosions, fires, floods, earthquakes, and severe weather conditions.

As documented in each of those Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), NRC was

not able to identify any design basis accident that would result in the

failure of a confinement boundary. However, to provide a conservative

bounding analysis of the threat to the public health and safety, the

failure of the confinement barrier was postulated. As discussed in each

of the SERs and again in the response to Issue 48 the consequences of

this postulated failure do not result in an increased risk to the

public health and safety.

In the environmental assessment for 10 CFR Part 72,2 the

accident judged the most severe was the failure of a packaged fuel

element. In this analysis, the accident involves the failure of a

storage system containing 1.7 MTHM. The postulated individual doses are

presented in Table 1.3

\2\ NUREG-1092 Environmental Assessment for Part 72 ``Licensing

Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive

Waste.''

\3\ NUREG-1092 Table 2.2.4-2

[[Page 32432]]

Table 1.--Total Dose to an Individual as a Result of a Fuel Canister Failure Accident at a Surface Storage

Installation (mrem)

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Pathway Skin Total Body Thyroid Lung

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Air Submersion.......................... 1.0 x 10-\1\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.1 x 10-\3\

Inhalation.............................. 1.2 x 10-\5\ 1.1 x 10-\2\ 7.3 x 10-\5\

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Total............................. 1.0 x 10-\1\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.2 x 10-\2\ 1.1 x 10-\3\

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Note: The maximum individual is defined as a permanent resident at a location 1600 meters southeast of the stack

with a time-integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient (E/Q of 1.5 x 10-4 sec/m\3\). The accident involves

failure of a fuel canister containing approximately 1.7 MTHM.

Since the time these calculations were performed, the storage

canisters have increased in capacity, and today the capacity of the

largest approved design is approximately 9 MTHM. However, because dose

varies directly with inventory, when the totals are increased by a

factor of ten, they are still a very small fraction of the 300 mrem/yr

4 an individual receives from natural background radiation, and is

below the EPA protective action guides.

\4\ NRCP Report No. 94.

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Nonetheless, the Commission believes it appropriate to require

enhanced offsite emergency planning at an MRS (as well as any ISFSI

that conducts similar operations) because of the broader scope of

activities which could be performed at such a facility.

In addition to the handling and repackaging for storage of large

numbers of individual fuel bundles, which involves the receipt,

inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport casks, MRS

operations may also encompass the consolidation of the stored fuel into

casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage. At this

time, a final MRS design has not been selected. The MRS may be a large

industrial facility equipped to handle the loading, unloading, and

decontaminating of a large number of spent fuel shipping containers

arriving by both truck and rail. It could also include facilities to

disassemble the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special

storage/transport containers, and facilities to handle solidified high-

level waste. These facilities would require the equipment necessary to

process low- and high-level waste that would be associated with the

above operations. It is also possible, however, for an MRS facility to

serve primarily as a warehouse operation, limited solely to accepting,

sorting and later transhipping a large number of multi-purpose canister

(MPC) systems of the type being considered by DOE.

The Multi-Purpose-Canister (MPC) being considered by the DOE would

be used to store and transport spent fuel. The MPC system provides a

sealed canister into which spent fuel would be loaded. After loading,

the MPC is evacuated, backfilled with an inert gas, and then

permanently sealed. At this point the MPC concept offers several

options: the sealed canister could be placed into a storage overpack at

the reactor site, or it could be placed in a transportation overpack

for movement to an ISFSI or MRS. After arriving at the ISFSI or MRS the

MPC would most likely be placed in the storage configuration awaiting

transport to the geological repository. When the repository is ready to

accept fuel, several options would exist. The canisters could be placed

into the transport overpack for movement to the geological repository.

Once there, the canister could be transferred directly into the

disposal overpack for emplacement into the repository. An option to

repackage the spent fuel into disposal canisters allowing the optimum

configuration required at the repository remains possible. This could

take place at either the repository or MRS. Because the canister may

only be opened once during its entire storage life and individual fuel

elements only handled under a controlled environment, the MPC concept

appears to reduce the overall risk to public health and safety.

Given the uncertainties in the design and operation of an MRS, the

Commission believes it prudent to plan and provide for an enhanced

level of emergency planning to include some offsite preparedness should

operation of a MRS (or any ISFSI conducting similar operations) present

accident risks that exceed those analyzed in NUREGs 1140 and 1092.

Because the level of risk to the public health and safety from such an

MRS (or ISFSI) may exceed that from a typical ISFSI, the relevant

emergency planning requirements should be enhanced to include an

offsite component. To achieve this goal, the final enhanced emergency

plan requirements are modeled after 10 CFR 50.47(d). The intent of 10

CFR 50.47(d) was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response

capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations.

This same level of response capability is considered appropriate to MRS

(and any comparable ISFSI) operations. Because much of the language

needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been

codified in 10 CFR Part 50, similar language is included within the

final emergency planning requirements for an MRS (and ISFSI) (10 CFR

72.32(b)(15)(i-vi)).

The Commission notes that, for both types of facilities, this

rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety and may

not be justified based solely on a comparison of the anticipated costs

of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and

safety. Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified in terms

of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to

assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event

of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions. The NRC feels

that such preparedness is prudent and consistent with the NRC's

philosophy of defense-in-depth.

Public Comments

The NRC received a total of 25 comment letters. Five were from

utilities, two were from organizations representing utilities, eight

were from State and/or local emergency management agencies, three were

from the Mescalero Indian Tribe, five were from environmental/

intervener groups, one was from a private citizen, and one was from the

Department of Energy.

One of the letters that opposed the proposed regulation came from a

member of the Mescalero Indian Tribe and included the signatures of 40

other tribal members who agreed with opposition to the proposed rule

change. Opposition also came from the private citizen, all of the

intervener/environmental groups, and a local governmental official.

Letters that were generally in agreement with the proposed rule

change were submitted by the Mescalero Tribal MRS Program Manager, the

Department of Energy, all of the utilities, all of the State

governmental [[Page 32433]] agencies, and from the industry groups

(though the industry group letters expressed a preference for deferring

the MRS portion of the regulation (10 CFR 72.32(b)) because the

industry groups considered it premature).

The comment letters that were received provided many thought-

provoking and constructive comments. The Commission's evaluation of and

response to these comments is presented in the following section.

Issue 1. The frequency for conducting offsite communication checks

(quarterly) and onsite exercises (annually) for MRS should not be more

conservative than for ISFSI communications checks (semiannually) and

onsite exercises (biennially). The increase in frequency is not

justified by experience or analysis.

Response. The Commission agrees that the onsite exercise

requirements should be biennial rather than annual. Nonetheless, the

quarterly communication checks will remain unchanged due to the obvious

importance of reliable communications capabilities.

Issue 2. The proposed rule, 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) states that the

review shall include certain ``arrangements'' and ``other

organizations.'' Those items are not listed as specific elements to be

included in the plan. It is inferred that they do not need to be

addressed other than in the information regarding offsite interface

activities required by paragraphs (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10),

(a)(12), and (a)(14). As written, the paragraph imposes a review

requirement upon the NRC and is merely informational to the applicant.

Response. The Commission agrees and has rewritten

Secs. 72.32(a)(15) and 72.32(b)(15) in the final regulations.

Issue 3. The discussion section and the proposed rule regarding the

frequency of communications checks should be consistent. The discussion

section indicates quarterly checks (page 29796, Section xii) and the

proposed rule in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i) indicates semiannual checks.

Semiannual checks are appropriate.

Response. The Commission disagrees. The discussion section referred

to relates to a Final Rulemaking for Fuel Cycle and Material licensees

published on April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051). The requirement for quarterly

communication checks is identical to that requirement for an MRS (and

comparable ISFSI). The semiannual communication checks are for a

typical, storage only ISFSI. There is no inconsistency.

Issue 4. At a site where the affected ISFSI site could be

contiguous to a Part 50 licensed site, the 10 CFR 50.47 emergency plans

should apply automatically. This would preclude the unnecessary

expenditure of limited utility, State, local and Federal resources;

avoid duplication in emergency preparedness; and minimize confusion

offsite. In order to limit confusion, change the existing proposed

first sentence of 10 CFR 72.32(a) to read: ``For an ISFSI that is

located on (or immediately adjacent to) the site of a nuclear power

reactor * * *''

Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this concept

into the final regulation by referencing the exclusion area as defined

in 10 CFR part 100.

Issue 5. The following areas of the proposed rule introduce

inconsistencies that require clarification: Paragraphs (a)(1) through

(a)(13) of 10 CFR 72.32 list specific information to be included in the

emergency plan. Paragraph (a)(16) also appears to list specific

information to be included. However, it is unclear whether paragraphs

(a)(14) and (a)(15) are intended to be specific information included in

the emergency plan or review and comment requirements related to the

submittal of the emergency plan which do not have to be included as

specific information in the plan. The discussion contained in the

supplementary information section of the Federal Register notice

implies that these paragraphs are review and comment requirements only.

``* * * the proposed requirements to be imposed on ISFSI licensee * * *

do not mandate formal offsite components to their onsite emergency

plans.'' (58 FR 29797, May 24, 1993.)

Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified paragraphs

(a)(14) and (a)(15).

Issue 6. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15), Offsite Arrangement: The wording ``*

* * arrangements to accommodate State local staff at the licensee's

near-site emergency facility have been made, * * *,'' should be deleted

from Sec. 72.32(a)(15). The nature of potential emergency events at

ISFSIs do not require personnel from State and local governments to

respond in a staff capacity, and do not require near-site emergency

facilities to be available. The proposed rule already requires that the

emergency facilities at the site, and the emergency response staff for

the facility, be adequate for emergency planning purposes.

Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this comment

in the final regulation.

Issue 7. 10 CFR 72.32(b)(14), Offsite Review: The request for the

offsite response organization to comment as to whether an offsite

component to emergency preparedness at an MRS is reasonable,

appropriate, or premature at this time. We believe that it is, in fact,

premature at this time. The analyses that have already been done

undoubtedly contain a considerable amount of conservatism. It is far

easier to add requirements later, should they be found to be

recommended, than to remove them when they are confirmed to be

excessive later.

Response. See Commission Response to Issue 18.

Issue 8. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(13), Hazardous Chemicals: The

certification deals with hazardous materials at the facility. The last

phrase of the statement does not clearly convey this message. To

clarify, the commenters suggest replacing the phase, ``if applicable to

the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of special

nuclear material,'' with ``with respect to hazardous materials at the

facility.''

Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified the final rule

accordingly.

Issue 9. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14), Offsite Review: The proposed rule

should only require the 60-day comment period for offsite response

organizations prior to the initial plan submittal to the NRC.

Subsequent plan changes should not have this 60-day time restriction

built into the submittal process unless the plan changes involve

offsite response organizations.

Response. The Commission agrees and has changed the final rule

accordingly.

Issue 10. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)ii, Offsite Participation:

``Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial

exercises, although recommended, is not required,'' sends a message to

State and local agencies that they may need extensive planning to

accommodate the facility. There is nothing unique to a potential

release from an ISFSI that is not enveloped by the utility and

associated State and local emergency plans to support an operating

plant or one with a possession only license. State and local agencies

should be provided a copy of the facility's plan and be asked to take

part in ``table-top'' exercises to help them understand their role.

Response. The Commission disagrees, because offsite response

organizations should also become familiar with the facility.

Issue 11. 10 CFR 73.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: The listed drills are

capitalized, creating the impression that they are specific types of

drills, such as those described in NUREG-0654, for the conduct of

similar type drills for [[Page 32434]] operating power reactors.

Furthermore, ISFSIs, in view of the relatively passive nature of the

facility and the potential consequence of a release as compared to

operating power reactors, do not warrant this frequency. Drills should

be held biennially.

Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 12. Additionally,

the frequency of these drills have been changed from semiannual to

annual.

Issue 12. It is recommended that the existing wording, ``* * *

Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills should be

conducted semiannually * * *,'' be reworded in a manner similar to 10

CFR 50.47(b)(14) as follows: ``Periodic drills shall be conducted to

develop and maintain key skills.''

Response. The Commission disagrees because it believes that it is

beneficial to specify the types of drills necessary.

Issue 13. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: Semiannual fire drills

may not be appropriate for an ISFSI because there are no flammable

materials associated with the facility.

Response. The frequency of these drills has been changed and will

be required annually.

Issue 14. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The

means to promptly notify offsite response organizations should be

limited to using commercial telephones. Ring-down systems should not be

necessary to meet this requirement.

Response. Ring-down systems are not mentioned in the proposed or

final regulations.

Issue 15. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(6), Assessment of Releases: Extensive

dose assessment methodology is not necessary to implement the emergency

plans.

Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final

regulation does not require ``Extensive'' dose assessment.

Issue 16. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The

Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) provides for the automated

transmission of a limited data set of selected onsite parameters (e.g.,

system pressure, temperature, radiation monitoring). The activation of

the ERDS does not apply to nuclear power facilities that are shut down

permanently or indefinitely. The activation of ERDS should not apply to

ISFSI incidents even located at operating plant sites.

Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final

regulation does not require the use of ERDS.

Issue 17. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), Classification Requirements: The

implementation guidance for the rule should provide for the simplest

and easiest understood classification, notification, and reporting

system for non-emergency events. NUREG-1140 ``A Regulatory Analysis on

Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material

Licenses,'' August 1991 Section 2.27 (Spent Fuel Storage) supports the

discussion that EPA's protective action guides would not be exceeded

during an accident. Therefore, both classifications for a site and

general emergency should not be considered. Redundant classifications,

notifications and reports for non-emergency events, such as

Notifications of Unusual Events (NOUEs), 1-hour non-emergency event

reports, and four-hour non-emergency event reports used for operating

reactors, should not apply to ISFSIs and MRSs. These conclusions are

based on the magnitude, duration, and energy involved in an incident

involving spent fuel storage facilities. These analyses have been

docketed as part of submittals to the NRC to license individual ISFSIs.

For actual ISFSI and MRS emergencies, the emergency classification,

``Alert,'' should be sufficient. A ``NOUE'' classification for ISFSI

and MRS emergency planning should not be necessary.

Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final

regulation does not require the use of notification of unusual events

``NOUE'' or ``general'' emergency classification.

Issue 18. EEI/WASTE supports adoption of proposed Sec. 72.32(a)

that would establish emergency planning requirements for ISFSI. EEI/

WASTE recommends that NRC defer proposed Sec. 72.32(b) that would

establish emergency planning requirements for MRSs. Because no final

design for MRS facilities has been selected, there is no rational basis

to determine the level of radiological hazards for which emergency

planning requirements are designed. It is therefore premature for the

NRC to establish emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities.

Response. The Commission disagrees. The proposed emergency planning

licensing requirements for an MRS as published in the Federal Register

on May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), have provided to the public some insight

as to what the Commission now feels would be appropriate and reasonable

emergency planning licensing requirements for an MRS. One comment

stated that, ``We have concluded that minimum requirements, such as

those currently proposed by the NRC rulemaking process, should serve as

guidance for the starting point from which Emergency Planning and

Licensing Requirements can be fully developed.'' Also, the Department

of Energy stated that it ``* * * intends to work closely with the host

community to develop a comprehensive emergency response plan with

offsite components that will not only encompass the requirements

contained in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15), but likely will exceed them.''

Issue 19. The proposed rule does not require MRS operators to

notify local residents of any increased exposure, nor does it require

MRS operators to develop a plan for evacuation. This rule is an unfair

burden on local emergency responders with little or no training for

these type of emergencies. There is specialized training and equipment

for radiation accidents and exposure; therefore, the proposed rules

should provide for the training and obtaining equipment for the local

responders.

Response. The Commission disagrees. The emergency planning

regulations specifically require in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(8), ``Notification

and coordination. A commitment to and a brief description of the means

to promptly notify offsite response organizations * * *'' In 10 CFR

72.32(b)(9), (10), and (12), the licensee is required to provide:

Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types

of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and

recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite

response organizations and to the NRC. ``Training. A brief

description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how

to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and

orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical

and other emergency personnel.'' * * * The licensee shall invite

offsite response organizations to participate in the annual

exercises.

Additionally, in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15) and (b)(16) the licensee is

required to identify:

(ii) Provisions that exist for prompt communications among

principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who

would be responding onsite.

(iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the

emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.

(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and

monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological

emergency condition are available.

(v) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated

and injured onsite individuals.

(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made

available to those off site who may be called to assist in an

emergency on site. [[Page 32435]]

(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.

Issue 20. Although it is true that emergency plans for ISFSI and

MRS need not be equivalent to emergency plans for reactors due to the

relatively passive natures of the ISFSI and MRS, offsite emergency

planning should not be eliminated for either type of facility. The

proposed rule indicates that the maximum offsite dose due to an

accidental release of radioactive material from either type of facility

would probably not exceed 1 rem. However, 1 rem is within the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides of 1-5

rem whole body, and it is the lower limit of these guides which is to

be used as the basis for taking protective actions in emergency

response. The commenter would also question whether worst-case

scenarios have been considered in the evaluation of potential offsite

doses. Worst-case scenarios would include acts of radiological

sabotage, such as terrorist attacks employing explosives. Offsite

emergency planning is a prudent measure to take against such

uncertainties. Offsite plans may not be needed for a 10-mile radius, as

is the case for power reactors, but they should not be eliminated for

ISFSI and MRS. Reducing the radius of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)

(perhaps to 1-5 miles, as appropriate) is the proper response to the

reduced hazard posed by the ISFSI and MRS. A reduced zone will provide

the basis and flexibility for an enhanced offsite response in those

events where this is necessary.

Response. Emergency planning requirements for power reactors, fuel

cycle facilities, ISFSIs and MRSs are all based on a spectrum of

accidents, including worst-case severe accidents. Emergency planning

focuses on the detection of accidents and the mitigation of their

consequences. Emergency planning does not focus on the initiating

events. Therefore, based on the potential inventory of radioactive

material, potential driving forces for distributing that amount of

radioactive material, and the probability of the initiation of these

events, the Commission concludes that the offsite consequences of

potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing

Emergency Planning Zones.

Issue 21. In the interest of protecting public health and safety,

appropriate offsite agencies should be notified immediately of any

classifiable accident at an ISFSI or MRS. Section 72.32(a)8 should

specify that the agency(ies) with responsibility to respond to

accidents receive the notifications. In Illinois, IDNS should be

notified of all such accidents. Consequently, we request that any

licensee submitting a plan for approval under 10 CFR part 72 for an

ISFSI or MRS in Illinois specifically provide in its emergency plan for

timely notifications to IDNS. The notifications are important to ensure

that emergency response actions are not unduly or unnecessarily

delayed.

Response. The Commission agrees. This comment focuses on the

rationale that was used in proposing the following requirements:

A commitment to, and a brief description of, the means to

promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite

assistance, including medical and ``The licensee shall allow the

offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an

accident 60 days to comment on the initial submittal of the

license's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.'' * * * The

licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to

the NRC with the emergency plan.

Issue 22. The requirements for exercises are appropriate for the

facilities involved. We do believe, however, that offsite participation

in these exercises should be an integral, not perfunctory, part of the

exercise process. Invitations to participate should be both timely and

informative, maximizing the opportunity for productive interaction

between licensee and offsite personnel. The rule should require that

licensees document timely invitations to offsite agencies to

participate in annual or biennial exercises, and offsite participation

actually resulting from these invitations.

Response. The Commission does not believe that it is necessary for

the rule to require licensees to document timely invitations for

offsite participation in exercises. NRC expects licensees will do so on

their own initiative. Experience has shown that cooperative

interactions between licensee and offsite authorities generally are

quite productive.

Issue 23. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) and (b)(12)(ii):

Participation of offsite response organizations in exercises should be

required.

Response. The Commission believes that this requirement would be

unnecessary in that experience shows almost all offsite authorities

that are invited to participate in exercises do participate without

being required to do so.

Issue 24. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i): For the ISFSI,

communications checks with offsite response organizations should be

conducted quarterly, not semiannually, and onsite exercises conducted

annually, not biennially.

Response. The Commission disagrees due to the very low probability

of offsite consequences resulting from potential accidents at these

facilities in conjunction with the low probability of a significant

accident occurring.

Issue 25. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3) and (b)(3): These provisions

limit the accident classification levels to an alert for the ISFSI and

a site area emergency for the MRS. For both facilities, the accident

classification system should include the general emergency. This might

be necessary in cases of radiological sabotage.

Response. The Commission disagrees. An essential element of a

General Emergency is that ``A release can be reasonably expected to

exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for

more than the immediate site area.'' As previously discussed, NRC

studies have concluded that the maximum offsite dose would be less than

1 rem which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides.

Issue 26. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) and (b)(8): Time limits ought

to be established for notifying offsite response organizations and the

NRC. An appropriate time limit is 15 minutes.

Response. The Commission has established a reasonable time limit

for notification which has proven to be adequate in the past. ``The

licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center

immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response

organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares

an emergency.''

Issue 27. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) and (b)(15)(i): The phrase,

``and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite

response have been identified'' should be modified to include the

requirement that arrangements should be made (such as letters of

agreement) with any organizations so identified.

Response. The Commission believes that offsite response

organizations will respond in the event of an actual emergency in order

to protect the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the

Commission does not believe that this requirement would be necessary.

Issue 28. On page 29797 of the proposed rule, first column, the

statement is made: ``As a result of the above evaluation, the

Commission is proposing that the emergency planning licensing

requirements for part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements

already codified in 10 CFR 70.22 for other part 70 licensees.'' Should

this statement also include 10 [[Page 32436]] CFR 70.24 (Criticality

Accident requirements)? Because the racking arrangement of spent fuel

storage is changing in a manner that places spent fuel assemblies

closer than in the past because of storage space needs, criticality

accidents possibilities might increase, especially in the dry cell

storage.

Response. The Commission disagrees. Criticality is only a concern

during a wet loading and unloading evolution. Additionally, such

activities would not be expected to occur under a 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI

license and, therefore, there is no basis to change 10 CFR part 72

criticality requirements.

Issue 29. Because 10 CFR part 72 contains no language that

parallels 10 CFR 50.54(x), we recommend that something similar to it be

considered as part of this rulemaking. During the operating life of an

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility or Monitored Retrievable

Storage Facility, it is possible that an unanticipated situation may

arise where the most correct action would be one that is not allowed by

the license or technical specifications. The writers of 10 CFR part 50

foresaw this eventuality and allowed a licensee to:

Take reasonable action that departs from license condition or a

technical specification in an emergency when this action is

immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no

action consistent with license conditions and technical

specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is

immediately apparent.

Although we never expect to invoke this option, prudence dictates

that we should thoughtfully plan and develop procedures that allow for

the possibility of low probability events where deviating from a

technical specification or any other license condition is the most

correct action. Adding this provision to the part 72 rule gives us a

legal basis to include it in our procedures. As a licensee under both

10 CFR parts 50 and 72, we feel that similar language has been useful

under 10 CFR part 50 for developing procedures, and that it would be

equally useful under 10 CFR part 72.

Response. The Commission agrees. The final rule reflects this

comment.

Issue 30. In Sec. 72.32(a)(12)(ii), the proposed rule states that

the licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having

direct implementation responsibility for the plan. We disagree with

this provision since it excludes our emergency planning (EP) staff from

the critique. The individuals who develop the plans are EP experts.

These are exactly the individuals that should critique the exercises.

As the rule is written, we would have to maintain an EP expert on staff

whose only EP job function would be to critique exercises. At all other

times, this individual would have to remain at arms length from the EP

program. A better use of resources would be to allow individuals from

the EP staff to be a part of the team that critiques exercises.

Response. The Commission agrees and has modified the final

regulation to state ``the licensee shall critique each exercise using

individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for

conducting the exercise.''

Issue 31. In Sec. 72.32(a)(14), NRC has proposed that an applicant

for an ISFSI submit the proposed emergency plan to offsite response

organizations (which are expected to respond in case of an onsite

accident) 60 days in advance of submittal to NRC. Comments would then

be forwarded to the NRC upon submittal of the ISFSI application. This

requirement should be deleted as the current licensing process for

review and approval of an ISFSI license affords all parties a

sufficient amount of time to review and comment on the licensee's

entire application to include the emergency plan. Furthermore,

licensees have gained sufficient experience from the operating nuclear

power plant environment to recognize the benefits of working with the

offsite authorities in order to ensure adequacy of an emergency plan

and its implementation. A requirement to instruct applications to do as

much is unnecessary.

Response. The Commission disagrees. The Commission believes that

requiring participation by offsite organizations in the development of

the emergency plan significantly helps establish coordination and

working relationships between the principals.

Issue 32. In Sec. 72.32(a)(15), NRC proposed to require that the

licensee of an ISFSI provide for a ``near-site emergency facility'' for

State and local staff. This requirement should be deleted as it implies

that an offsite emergency response facility is needed, when in fact

NRC's own studies in NUREG-1140 demonstrate that the consequences of an

accident at an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of the public health

and safety. Furthermore, NRC has generally affirmed this conclusion

through its evaluation of Defueled Emergency Plans for nuclear power

plants which are permanently defueled but continue to store spent fuel

on site (Possession Only License). The emergency plans for these

facilities are appropriately focused on the onsite aspects of emergency

response, while maintaining the ability to notify offsite authorities

such as the fire, police, and medical personnel who play a role in

addressing onsite emergency response. No licensee-provided ``near-

site'' facility is needed for such offsite authorities to implement

their onsite emergency planning responsibilities.

Response. The Commission agrees. This change is incorporated in the

final regulation.

Issue 33. Mitigation of consequences (Sec. 72.32(a)(5)): The NRC

proposes that the licensee describe those actions which would be taken

to mitigate the consequences of each type of accident. This requirement

should be revised to require that the licensee describe the response

actions for each classification of emergency.

Response. The regulation already requires, ``Information to be

communicated. A brief description of the types of information on

facility status; radioactive releases; and recommended protective

actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations

and to the NRC.''

Issue 34. Responsibilities (Sec. 72.32(a)(7)): The term ``offsite

response organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities''

in recognition of the findings of NUREG-1140, i.e., the consequences of

accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI would not

exceed the EPA Protective Action Guidelines. The term ``offsite

response organizations'' connotes a need for formal offsite components

to the onsite emergency plan and thus, an offsite emergency response

plan. This interpretation would be inconsistent with the conclusions of

NUREG-1140 which postulated the worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI

and found that the consequences were insignificant in terms of public

health and safety. To preclude misinterpretation, the term ``offsite

authorities'' should be used.

Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``offsite response

organizations'' connotes the need for ``formal offsite components'' to

the onsite emergency plan. The term simply refers to those offsite

organizations that may be needed to respond to an emergency (medical,

fire department, police, etc.)

Issue 35. Information to be communicated (Sec. 72.32(a)(9)): As

concluded by the NRC in NUREG-1140, the consequences of the postulated

worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of

public health and safety. Therefore, because no offsite protective

actions are needed, this requirement should be revised to require that

the licensee communicate [[Page 32437]] only onsite facility status to

offsite authorities.

Response. The Commission disagrees with the suggestion to delete

the requirement that licensees notify offsite organizations of

recommended protective actions. The Commission acknowledges that the

consequences of a postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are

insignificant in terms of public health and safety. Nonetheless, the

Commission also recognizes the need for offsite organizations to be

informed by licensees so that, in the event of an accident, protective

actions may or may not need to be taken.

Issue 36. Notification and coordination (Sec. 72.32(a)(8)): As

recommended for Sec. 72.32(a)(7), the term ``offsite response

organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities.''

Response. See Commission Response to Issue 34.

Issue 37. Types of accident (Sec. 72.32(a)(2): The NRC has proposed

that the licensee identify the ``types of accidents'' that could occur

at an ISFSI installation ``for which protective actions may be

needed.'' This requirement should be deleted because the analysis of

potential accidents and their consequences, as documented in NUREG-

1140, demonstrates that there are no accidents for which protective

actions for the public may be needed. Furthermore, even if there were

such accidents, the emergency plan is not the appropriate document for

a description of the types of accidents that could occur. As is

similarly done for operating reactors, any discussion on types of

accidents is contained in the ISFSI Safety Analysis Report that

supports the license application. Therefore, the licensee should be

required only to identify the classification of accidents in 10 CFR

72.32(a)(3) and, in general, response to those classifications, as is

similarly required for operating plants.

Response. The Commission agrees to delete the words ``* * * for

which protective action may be needed.'' Nonetheless, the Commission

believes that licensees should identify the types of accidents in the

emergency plan in the same manner as part 30, 40, and 70 licensees have

done since 1989.

Issue 38. At a minimum, NRC should revise the term ``protective

actions'' to ``protective measures.'' The term ``protective actions,''

as used by operating reactors, connotes the need for an offsite

emergency response plan. In the case of an ISFSI, there is no need for

an offsite emergency response plan because the consequences of

potential accidents which can occur will not exceed the EPA Protective

Action Guidelines. Furthermore, the term ``protective measures'' is now

commonly used by Possession Only License holders to distinguish between

onsite and offsite needs. Therefore, to preclude misinterpretation, we

recommend that the term ``protective measures'' be used.

Response. The Commission disagrees. There is nothing in the

emergency planning licensing regulations for ISFSI that requires,

implies, specifies or connotes the need for a formal offsite emergency

response plan.

Issue 39. Changing the proposed 10 CFR part 72 to require local

involvement in the creation of the emergency response plan and require

funding of local emergency planning and preparedness activities

directly attributable to the additional and above ordinary risk of

Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored Retrievable Storage

Facilities is appropriate, given the above ordinary risk such

facilities present to the local government units in their vicinity.

Response. In view of the requirements in this rule, regarding the

potential involvement by local governments, a licensee may have an

incentive based on its own self-interest to assist in providing

manpower, items of equipment, or other resources that the local

governments may need but are themselves unable to provide. The

Commission believes that the question of whether the NRC should or

could require a licensee to contribute to the expenses incurred by

local governments in assisting in emergency planning and preparedness

is beyond the scope of the rule.

Issue 40. Provisions should be included in the proposed rule to

exempt Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) with very

limited radionuclide inventories from the emergency planning

requirements. This is best accomplished by establishing certain

threshold values for the radiological consequences of potential

accidents below which exemption can be granted.

Response. The Commission does not agree. An ISFSI is licensed to

store specific inventories of radionuclides. The requirements focus on

the emergency planning licensing requirements of an ISFSI, not the

amount of fuel that may or may not be stored in an individual ISFSI

during a specific time period.

Issue 41. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) specifies that the licensee

critique each exercise using individuals not having direct

responsibility for the plan. This regulation, while well intentioned,

is burdensome, costly, and does not allow the personnel with emergency

preparedness knowledge to identify and correct potential weaknesses.

This statement seems to satisfy the requirements for independent

review, not exercise performance (i.e., similar to Sec. 50.54(t)).

Response. See Commission Response to Issue 30.

Issue 42. 10 CFR 72.32(a) does not define the term, ``site of a

nuclear power reactor.'' Does the term mean the owner controlled area,

the site boundary, or protected area? Based on the definition of the

term, the regulations could require some licensees that build ISFSI

near their nuclear power plants but not on the site to have two

emergency plans established. Consideration should be given to

clarifying terms in order to avoid this problem especially since

nuclear power plant emergency plans are substantially more extensive

than ISFSI emergency plans.

Response. The Commission agrees. The final regulations states ``not

located within the exclusion areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 100 of a

nuclear power reactor.''

Issue 43. The 10 CFR Part 70 emergency planning requirements

(Sec. 70.22), which served as the model for the proposed rule, includes

a provision for relief based on potential radioactive consequences. It

contains the option of demonstrating that the consequences of an

accidental release are below certain levels and thereby eliminated the

need for emergency preparedness. We recommend that a parallel provision

be included in the proposed rule for the ISFSI. This would enable ISFSI

with minimal radioactive sources to avoid the substantial costs

associated with emergency preparedness which would far outweigh the

negligible benefit to the safety of the public.

Response. See Commission Response to Issue 40.

Issue 44. Unfortunately, the public is not very reassured by the

idea that the only offsite emergency planning that the discussion on

the MRS cites is that the operators of the facility should have current

phone numbers of offsite emergency services. Nor is the public very

reassured that the NRC asserts that the maximum off-site exposure from

an MRS would be 1 rem. If this were true, there is a legitimate concern

about being subjected to radiation equivalent to 50 additional chest x-

rays--presumably without any notification or disclosure, let alone

opportunity to avoid such irradiation. However, it does not seem

credible that one could gather together the highest concentration of

radioactivity on the planet and assert that there will be virtually no

risk of exposure. This overlooks, at the very least, the potential for

malicious attack on the facility from the air, such as the United

States has engaged in wiping out ``strategic targets'' in other

countries.

Response. A more accurate characterization of the offsite emergency

planning component for an MRS is as follows: ``(7) Responsibilities. A

brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should

an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible

for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and the NRC;''

and ``(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the

types of information on facility status; radioactive release; and

recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite

response organizations and to the NRC.'' and ``(10) * * * special

instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire,

police, medical and other emergency personnel;'' and ``(12) * * * The

licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in

the annual exercises.''

Additionally, the offsite emergency planning component for an MRS

includes:

(i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite

assistance on site have been made.

(ii) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal

response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be

responding onsite.

(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and

monitoring actual potential consequence of a radiological emergency

condition are available.

(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made

available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an

emergency onsite.

(16) Arrangements made to provide information to the public.

Also, see the Commission's response to Issue 46.

Issue 45. The discussion of MRS emergency planning indicates the

dependence upon offsite emergency responders. The fact that individuals

would be called upon to respond to radiological crises without any

special training, without protective gear and equipment is deeply

disturbing to local community officials with whom we have reviewed this

proposal. The full liability for dealing with emergency situations

should reside with the operators of such a facility and those who are

specially trained and understand that they are at risk, and are

compensated on that basis. Dependence upon untrained local responders

in a true emergency would amount to human sacrifice, and is not

acceptable.

Response. The regulations allow for extensive coordination,

communication, and training of offsite response organizations. (See

Commission Response to Issue 19.)

Issue 46. Although the MRS will represent the largest concentration

of irradiated fuel, to date, in one location, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission has recently proposed a rule that would waive any

offsite emergency planning or evacuation, in direct contradiction to

the promises of safety to prospective host communities.

Response. In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement

on the handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,5 it is

stated that [[Page 32438]]

\5\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and Accident

Considerations.

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* * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general

public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and

dispersed offsite. For this to happen:

The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form

There must be a mechanism available for the release of

such materials from the facility, and

There must be a mechanism available for offsite

dispersion of such released material.

Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000

MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or

more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no

mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in

significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism available

for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.