Northeast Utilities; Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-213, 50-245, 50-336, 50-423]

Northeast Utilities; Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10

CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated March 3,

1994, by Mr. Ronald Gavensky (Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206).

The Petition pertains to the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.

In the Petition, Petitioner, a quality control receipt inspector

raises, numerous concerns regarding receipt inspection activities by

Northeast Utilities at both the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear

Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Petitioner alleges violations of 10

CFR Part 50, Appendix B, by Northeast Utilities in the receipt

inspection area. Petitioner alleges that parts represented as having

been inspected and accepted for use were in fact deficient. Petitioner

alleges that adequate training, skilled personnel, and necessary tools

were not available to perform adequate receipt inspections. Petitioner

alleges that he observed unethical and incorrect methods of receipt

inspection, and that he sought to identify quality problems within his

own department, along with recommendations and solutions, but was not

permitted to do so. Finally, Petitioner accuses Northeast Utilities of

``white washing'' his concerns in the receipt inspection area.

Petitioner alleges that, on two occasions, Northeast Utilities'

management hired investigators to pursue concerns raised by Petitioner

only to conclude that there were no problems. Petitioner requests that

the licenses of Northeast Utilities be temporarily revoked until after

the NRC conducts an investigation of Petitioner's allegations.

The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

determined to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are

explained in the ``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-

95-11), the complete text of which follows this notice, and is

available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC, and at

the local public document rooms located at the Russell Library, 123

Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06457 for the Haddam Neck Plant, and at

the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical

College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT

06360, for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.

A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the

Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commissions regulations. As provided by this

regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission on

its own motion institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of May 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

I. Introduction

On March 3, 1994, Mr. Ronald Gavensky (Petitioner) filed a Petition

with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR

2.206. In the Petition, the Petitioner, a Northeast Utilities (NU)

quality control inspector raised concerns regarding receipt inspection

activities by NU at the Haddam Neck Plant and the Millstone Nuclear

Power Station.\1\

\1\ Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone licensee), an

electric operating subsidiary of Northeast Utilities (NU), holds

licenses for the operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units

1, 2, and 3. The Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (Haddam

Neck licensee), an electric operating company owned in part by NU,

holds the license for the Haddam Neck Plant. Reference in the

Petition to the ``license of Northeast Utilities'' refers to the

licenses of the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power

Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.

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The Petitioner alleged violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, by

NU in the receipt inspection area. He alleged that parts represented as

having been inspected and accepted for use were in [[Page 29897]] fact

deficient; that adequate training, skilled personnel, and necessary

tools were not available to perform adequate receipt inspections; and

that he had observed unethical and incorrect methods of receipt

inspection, and that he had sought to identify quality problems within

his own department, along with recommendations and solutions, but had

not been permitted to do so. Finally, the Petitioner accused NU of

``whitewashing'' his concerns. Specifically, the Petitioner alleged

that on two occasions NU's management had hired investigators to

investigate concerns he had raised only to conclude that there were no

problems. The Petitioner requested that the ``license of Northeast

Utilities'' be temporarily revoked until after the NRC investigates his

allegations.

On May 9, 1994, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition had

been referred to my office for preparation of a Director's Decision. I

further informed the Petitioner that his issues were not considered

immediate safety concerns and, therefore, did not warrant immediate

shutdown of the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station,

Units 1, 2, and 3. I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would

take appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific

concerns raised in the Petition. By letter dated November 28, 1994,

following a telephone conversation with the Petitioner of November 15,

1994, this office provided him portions of NRC Inspection Reports that

relate to his concerns and a copy of a Brookhaven National Laboratory

Associated Universities, Inc. report of an evaluation of 30 bolts

chosen at random from the Millstone Warehouse in November 1993. This

office also provided the Petitioner status reports of the Director's

Decision concerning his Petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of March 3,

1994, by letters dated February 23, and May 9, 1995.

NU voluntarily submitted a response to the NRC on July 26, 1994 (NU

response), regarding the issues raised in the Petition. The Petitioner

voluntarily submitted a response dated August 16, 1994, regarding the

issues raised in the NU response. Based on a review of the issues

raised by Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that no

substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would

require the initiation of formal enforcement action.

II. Discussion

In the Petition, the Petitioner raised numerous concerns regarding

receipt inspection activities by NU at the Haddam Neck Plant and

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The issues raised

in the Petition are summarized and evaluated below.

A. Adequacy of the NU Receipt Inspection Program

The Petitioner alleged that NU did not have skilled personnel or

the necessary tools or equipment to perform adequate receipt inspection

until 1990 for the Haddam Neck Plant and could not have had a properly

executed receipt inspection department until 1989 for the Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. He alleged that at the

present time there are only two skilled mechanical receipt inspectors

at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Also, all current receipt

inspectors are qualified at Level 2 to ANSI/ASME Standard N45.2.6-1972.

However, most lacked the actual experience in mechanical receipt

inspection required by the standard to which NU is committed.

The Petitioner alleged that, when he was first employed by NU 16

years ago, he found parts still packed in the original containers

unopened but green tagged (acceptable for use). He also found cracked

parts, bent parts, mismatched parts, all of which were green tagged,

and many bad parts accepted for use by the architect-engineer, Stone

and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) and wrongly installed.

The Petitioner also claimed that he had observed unethical and

incorrect methods of receipt inspection and that he was prevented from

raising quality problems either by his supervisor or the Director of

Quality.

Most of the specific concerns raised by the Petitioner appear to

relate to NU procurement activities before 1990. At that time, NU, as

indicated in the NU response to the Petition, maintained an approved-

suppliers list and relied heavily, like most utilities, on vendor

audits and certifications to ensure the adequacy of procured parts.

Because of extensive use of an approved-suppliers list, NU stated that

its internal programs, including elements for ensuring independently

the quality of procured parts, were not relied on to the same extent as

they are now. NU considered this approach appropriate at the time,

given the number of vendors who maintained 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B

quality assurance programs.

As the number of vendors maintaining Appendix B programs declined

and the instances of counterfeit and fraudulent products increased, the

nuclear industry, including NU, found it necessary to develop more

sophisticated internal programs to qualify commercial-grade parts

procured for nuclear safety-related applications. Generic Letter 89-02,

``Actions To Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently

Marketed Products,'' dated March 21, 1989, describes these emerging

procurement issues. To address these issues, Generic Letter 89-02

conditionally endorsed Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report

NP-5662, ``Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade Items in

Nuclear Safety Related Applications (NCIG-07),'' dated June 1988. On

June 28, 1990, the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC)

board of directors directed licenses to adhere to the guidance in EPRI

Report NP-5652 and to review and strengthen their procurement programs

in accordance with specific guidance in NUMARC 90-13, ``Nuclear

Procurement Program Improvements.'' The procurement programs for the

Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 were significantly

upgraded in response to Generic Letter 89-02 and the NUMARC

initiatives.

In February 1989, the vendor interface and procurement programs at

Haddam Neck were inspected (see NRC Inspection 50-213/89-200 dated May

25, 1989) as part of an initial group of 13 team inspections conducted

by the NRC to evaluate licensee procurement and commercial-grade

dedication programs. That inspection identified several deficiencies

including weaknesses in the procurement and dedication of commercial

grade items for safety-related applications at the Haddam Neck Plant.

Upgraded procurement programs have been implemented at the Haddam

Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The

programs at the Millstone units were inspected by the NRC (NRC

Inspection Reports 50-245/91/-201, 50-336/91-201, and 50-423/92-201

dated November 5, 1991). The upgraded program at the Haddam Neck Plant,

while not inspected by the NRC in the level of detail as Millstone, was

reviewed in part during the resolution of the identified deficiencies

from NRC Inspection 89-200 as well as the 1990 Maintenance Team

Inspection. The inspection at Millstone found that, before June 1987,

commercial-grade items were purchased and receipt inspected with

acceptance criteria primarily based on verification of the correct part

number. Between 1988 and 1990, NU upgraded its procedures to upgrade

its procurement inspection services. The NRC assessment team noted that

NU had made a significant effort to strengthen the commercial-grade

dedication program and that its [[Page 29898]] overall program

description was generally consistent with the dedication approaches

described in EPRI Report NP 5652. The team found that receipt

inspection capabilities at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2,

and 3 had undergone several improvements. The Millstone Nuclear Power

Station receipt inspectors had a new enclosed facility. The facility's

equipment was being enhanced and included micrometers, gage blocks, a

metal sorter, a shadow graph, and a variety of electronic devices. The

improved receipt inspection facility and improved testing and

inspection equipment had enhanced the capability of the receipt

inspection process to detect misrepresented parts, equipment, and

material. The procurement inspection services consisted of 12

inspectors and 1 supervisor. The receipt inspectors were certified

under requirement established by procedures. The assessment team

identified several procedural weakness and implementation weaknesses

involving the improper identification of design criteria, safety

function(s), critical characteristics, and methods for verifying the

critical characteristics. The assessment team found strengths and

potential strengths in such areas as receipt inspection testing

capabilities at the Metallurgy Laboratory Facilities in Berlin,

Connecticut, and at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station site, self

assessments of the commercial-grade dedication program, the 4-day

procurement and commercial-grade dedication training course, the review

project of previous commercial-grade inspections at Millstone Nuclear

Power Station and the general consistency of the program with the

dedication approaches of EPRI NP-5652. In addition, the quality,

attitude, and dedication of the licensee's personnel were evident. The

team concluded that, with appropriate modifications to address the

weaknesses, the program, if properly implemented, would provide

adequate control over the commercial-grade procurement process.

Additional inspections of the procurement programs for the Haddam

Neck Plant and Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 have been conducted by the

NRC (NRC Inspection Reports 50-423/92-11 dated May 30, 1992, 50-213/92-

14 dated August 12, 1992, 50-423/92-24 dated January 12, 1993, 50-423/

93-26 dated January 14, 1994, and 50-336/94-21 dated August 31, 1994).

In 1992, after its inspection of the Haddam Neck Plant, the NRC staff

concluded that adequate measures were in place to ensure that the level

of quality of procured items was commensurate with their safety-related

application. In 1993, the NRC staff reported that NU's receipt

inspection program at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and

3 was deliberate, controlled, and consistent in the choice of

attributes required to be inspected and the documentation of results.

After its inspection of NU's procurement program late in 1993, the NRC

staff found no significant safety issues. In 1994, the NRC staff

reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-336/94-21 that NU's procurement

inspection services inspections were performed by personnel certified

under NU's Quality Services Department Procedures QSD 1.08,

``Department Indoctrination, Training and Qualification,'' and QSD

2.08, ``Selection, Training, Qualification and Certification of

Inspection, Examination and Testing Personnel.'' The Quality Department

Inspector Training Program served as the basis of the training required

for certification. The program emphasized technical knowledge, skill

development, and problem solving. The procurement inspection personnel

were well trained, with 10 of 12 inspectors certified to a Level 2 in

at least two disciplines. In addition, refresher training was provided

to maintain proficiency and certification of personnel. Also in 1994

(NRC Inspection Report 50-336/94-21), the NRC staff reported that NU's

procurement inspection services maintained an inventory of over 500

tools for measuring and testing and that appropriate inspectors were

trained and certified in the use of these tools. Such tools are typical

of many nuclear power plants' inventory. NU also stocked some

exceptional tools such as an optical comparitor shadowgraph, an Ames

hardness tester and an alloy analyzer. In summary, during these post-

1990 inspections, the NRC staff noted procurement program upgrades and

found no significant safety issues in the procurement area.

B. Quality of Fasteners Installed at Northeast Utilities Facilities

Petitioner has an extensive background in the area of receipt

inspection of fasteners of NU nuclear facilities and has raised a

number of specific concerns regarding the quality of fasteners. The

focus of the NRC evaluation of the Petitioner's concerns is receipt

inspection of fasteners and assurance that fasteners will perform their

intended function. NU acknowledged in its response of July 26, 1994,

the Petitioner's efforts in raising and aggressively pursuing valid

issues. NU acknowledged that, in March 1992, the Petitioner had issued

six nonconformance reports (NCRs) based on his visual inspection of

various surplus fasteners procured in 1983 for use at Millstone Unit 3.

Later, he issued an additional NCR, citing potential programmatic

deficiencies by SWEC, concerning procurement of various other materials

installed at Millstone Unit 3.

The concerns of the Petitioner were verified in NRC Inspection

Report 50-423/92-11 dated May 30, 1992. In the report, the staff noted

that an inspection in 1992 by NU of 6 of the 43 items obtained from

SWEC stock that were designated for transfer to the Millstone Nuclear

Power Station stores resulted in an initial rejection of all 6 items.

An item was defined as all of a specific type of bolt or fastener

material, e.g., 600 5/16'' x 4\1/2\'' bolts were classified as one

item. Six NCR reports were written concerning these findings and

indicated that all of the material constituting the 6 items was

scrapped.

Also, the staff noted that 32 of 48 items that had been transferred

from SWEC stock and introduced into Millstone Nuclear Power Station

stores in 1990 were receipt inspected and green tagged without proper

dedication. These items were considered acceptable for use as safety-

related material for installation in the three Millstone Units 1, 2,

and 3. An NCR report was written concerning this finding. Further, NU

identified work orders indicating that fastener material (bolts, nuts,

washers) from the 32 items had been used in Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3

during the previous 2 years. The bolts were used principally in the

mounting of electrical components (relays, terminal boards, etc.),

fans, ventilation housing, and cable trays. The materials were also

used on various safety-related systems, such as Millstone Unit 1

reactor protection system bypass switches, Millstone Unit 2 containment

air recirculation fans, and Millstone Unit 3 shutdown margin monitor.

In NRC Inspection Report 50-423/92-11, the staff noted that NU had

tested 6 bolts from the lots of the 32 items and had found that the

chemical properties and tests to determine tensile properties were

acceptable. A Corrective Action Request (CAR) that was initiated on

April 27, 1992, as a result of the NCRs, indicated that these 6 bolts

were the poorest appearing bolts of the lots. Thus, NU determined that

the bolts were functionally acceptable. In NRC Inspection Report 50-

423/92-16 dated September 3, 1992, the staff reported that, as a result

of its questions about whether the 6 tested fasteners adequately

represented the population of fasteners installed, NU tested an

[[Page 29899]] additional 30 fasteners randomly selected from the

warehouse and one sample chosen by the NRC staff that had linear

indications running from the body into the head of the fastener. NU

determined that all the fasteners met specification requirements for

material and mechanical properties. The NRC staff raised a second

concern, that is, that the sample did not represent all the fasteners

because all the manufacturers were not represented. NU then took

another sample of 30 fasteners from each of 3 manufacturers. The

testing of these bolts showed that all the fasteners, except for one

cap screw, were acceptable. The one cap screw had a tensile strength of

only 121.3 ksi rather than the specified strength of 125 ksi. However,

the cap screw did have an acceptable yield strength. The licensee

performed a statistical analysis on the results of the testing and

determined that the probability of an installed bolt from the 32 items

failing to perform its safety function is extremely small (in the order

of 1 chance in 345,000). The NRC staff concluded in NRC Inspection

Report 50-423/92-24 dated January 12, 1993, that the results for all

the fasteners tested except one were acceptable and that the

nonconforming conditions, including some visual deficiencies, would not

have impaired the capability of the fasteners to perform their

functions, and that NU's current inspection program was deliberate and

controlled.

NU initially indicated that the remaining fasteners transferred

from SWEC to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station stores would be

scrapped. However, it did install some of the fasteners in the units

after performing additional inspections and dedicating the fasteners

before they were installed.

Finally, a random sample of 30 bolts of various sizes was taken

from the Millstone Nuclear Power Station warehouse bins during November

1993 for laboratory tests. They were tested by the Brookhaven National

Laboratory Associated Universities, Inc., and 26 of the 30 met

specification requirements for chemical, mechanical, and dimensional

properties. Four bolts did not pass the thread fit inspection with a

``Go'' gage. However, the discrepancies would not have prevented the

bolts from performing their function. (See letter dated May 2, 1994,

from Brookhaven National Laboratory Associated Universities, Inc., to

Mr. James A. Davis, NRC, which is available in the NRC's Public

Document Room). In summary, on the basis of the extensive tests of

samples of fasteners taken from the warehouse bins, the NRC staff

concludes that materials in the bins are acceptable for use.

The possibility of nonconforming fasteners already installed in

safety-related applications was addressed in an NU letter to the NRC

staff dated September 22, 1994. NU concluded that this issue did not

warrant action for the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units 1, 2, and

3. NU indicated that periodic testing and inspection are performed on

installed fastener components. Further, safety-related plant equipment

is periodically tested to ensure that fasteners have not degraded.

Piping systems and valves are pressure tested periodically and

fasteners are visually inspected. Other components, such as pumps, are

tested and key fasteners are checked for tightness and degradation.

These inspections ensure that components remain fastened. Loose

components, when found, are evaluated for generic implications, such as

installation errors or defective materials, and are repaired or

replaced as necessary. Plant walkdowns are performed in accessible

areas at least three times a day by trained individuals able to

identify abnormal conditions. Components that have degraded because of

fastener problems are more likely to leak initially than suffer a

catastrophic failure and are, therefore, likely to be identified and

repaired. In addition, the NRC staff notes that fastener installations

typically provide for large safety margins in application. Also,

fastener inspection continues through the installation phase and

nonconforming conditions, particularly visual defects, are likely to be

identified and corrected. On the basis of these considerations, the NRC

staff concludes that the possibility of installed nonconforming

fasteners is not a significant safety issue.

C. Alleged ``Whitewashing'' of Petitioner's Concerns

The Petitioner alleged that the procurement inspection services

supervisor and his manager had performed perfunctory investigations

into his concerns related to the adequacy of NU's receipt inspection

program and the Millstone Unit 3 construction.

The first investigation was one commissioned by the NU Nuclear

Safety Concerns Program (NSCP) and was performed between May 18 and May

29, 1992, by an independent review team (IRT) composed of outside

consultants. The IRT investigated five areas of concern identified by

the Petitioner. These areas included NU's control and oversight of the

SWEC Quality Assurance Program, NU control of vendor activities,

adequacy of NU receipt inspection program in the areas of training and

adequacy of tools, adequacy of the NCR process in the receipt

inspection area, and adequacy of the transfer of materials with respect

to ``visual damage'' inspection. In addition, the IRT interviewed the

Petitioner and most, if not all, of the members of the Procurement

Inspection Services Department.

In NRC Inspection Report 50-423/92-16 dated September 3, 1992, the

NRC staff presented the results of its review of the first

investigation. The staff found that the IRT review was cursory in

nature in two areas and that the IRT had not supported its conclusions

in these areas. Specifically, (1) the IRT had not reviewed, in detail,

the SWEC lower tier procedures and procurement documents pertaining to

the fasteners transferred from SWEC to the Millstone Nuclear Power

Station stores, and (2) the IRT concluded that NU's oversight of SWEC's

quality assurance program was satisfactory without determining how the

nonconforming fasteners were accepted and placed in stock and whether a

programmatic problem existed that allowed the acceptance of the

discrepant fasteners.

The NRC staff made an additional observation regarding the IRT

review of the concern regarding guidance for inspecting for visual

damage. The concern submitted by the Petitioner to the NSCP was the

lack of guidance for performing inspections for visual damage during

receipt inspection. On the basis of its review, the IRT concluded that

damage would be identified. However, the examples chosen to support the

claim that instruction was given on identifying visual damage were

examples for inservice inspection, not receipt inspection. The Quality

Services Director committed to review the definition of visual damage

and revise its as necessary for use in receipt inspection.

Although the IRT report may have been cursory in two areas, it was

comprehensive in the other areas investigated: the Combustion

Engineering reactor head studs inspection, the A&G Engineering Inc.

bolting, that tools available for use, and the training received by

those performing receipt inspection. In addition, the IRT conducted a

substantial number of interviews to support the investigation. During

its inspection regarding the adequacy of the IRT report, the NRC staff

could find no information that suggested a deliberate effort on the

part of NU to color the results of the investigation.

[[Page 29900]] ``Whitewash'' implies a deliberate act to conceal a

fault or defect in an effort to exonerate or give the appearance of

soundness. Although the NRC staff found that the IRT investigation and

report were not complete in two areas and in regard to the definition

of ``visual damage,'' the NRC did not find evidence of a deliberate

effort on the part of NU to conceal a defect or falsify records. Thus

the NRC does not consider the IRT report as a ``whitewash.''

NRC Inspection Report 50-423/92-24 dated January 12, 1993,

discusses the second investigation. This investigation evolved as a

result of the NRC inspection findings on the IRT report concerning the

effectiveness of NU's and SWEC's receipt inspection programs. It also

was a result of a CAR initiated on April 27, 1992, as a result of

several NCRs issued by the Petitioner. The CAR was initiated because a

significant amount of bolting material had been transferred from SWEC

quality assurance stock to NU and green tagged without proper receipt

inspection and because there was a question about the SWEC receipt

inspection program. NUNU initiated the CAR to resolve these concerns.

The purpose of the CAR was to provide reasonable assurance that, under

SWEC's quality assurance program for Category I, non-engineered items,

nonconforming items were identified and were prevented from being

installed at Millstone Unit 3. To accomplish this, UN reviewed SWEC's

program for establishing purchase order and receipt inspections

requirements. NU concluded that appropriate procedures existed to

ensure the quality of Category I, non-engineered items. To review the

implementation of the procedures, NU reviewed approximately 4500

receipt inspection reports (RIRs) and selected for detailed review 1000

that identified nonconforming conditions. From this review, NU

concluded in closeout documents that SWEC's program was effective in

ensuring the quality of Category I items.

The NRC staff reviewed a sample of RIRs and identified a small

number of fasteners that were not inspected for specific attributes,

such as the fabrication attribute or coating/preservatives, as required

by Quality Assurance Directive (QAD) 7.7, ``Receiving Inspection--

General.'' With the exception of these discrepant bolts, there were no

other accepted nonengineered items which have subsequently been found

to be nonconforming. Therefore, it appeared that the SWEC's receipt

inspection program had been effective.

The staff did note that NU had closed the CAR without adequately

justifying that SWEC receipt inspections had been conducted in

accordance with quality assurance program requirements. The licensee's

review of these concerns identified that SWEC inspections for non-

engineered items relied heavily on the experience of the inspector and

did not strictly follow QAD 7.7. Specifically, the receipt inspector

would decide what needed to be inspected by review of procurement

documents. The inspector conducted the inspections and documented the

results on a generic checklist. Therefore, any required attribute could

have been inspected and documented in another attribute of the

inspector's choice.

Considering the extensive effort by NU to resolve this issue and in

spite of the deficiencies noted during the NRC inspection, the NRC

staff could find no information that suggested a deliberate effort on

the part of NU to conceal a defect or falsify records. Thus, the NRC

staff does not consider the closeout of the CAR as a ``whitewash.''

III. Conclusion

The institution of proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is

appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been

raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 1,

2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public Power

Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899, 924

(1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns

raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by

the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.

On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no

substantial health and safety issues have been raised regarding the

Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and

3 that would require initiation of formal enforcement action. In

particular, safety issues related to the Petitioner's allegations

concerning discrepant fasteners were resolved by either removing those

fasteners from stores or determining that they were functionally

adequate. Therefore, no enforcement action is being taken in this

matter.

Although the concerns raised did not warrant the action requested

in the Petition, the Petitioner's initiative has led to improvements in

the procurement receipt inspection program for the Haddam Neck Plant

and the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.

Current inspection plans call for continued NRC inspection effort

in this programmatic area for the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units

1, 2, and 3 to ensure compliance with current requirements.

The Petitioner's request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is

denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be

filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.

This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25

days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,

institutes review of the Decision in that time.

Dated at Rockville Maryland, this 31st day of May 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95-13766 Filed 6-5-95; 8:45 am]

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