Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 213

[Docket No. RST-94-3, Notice No. 1]

Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Interim statement of policy.

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SUMMARY: FRA issues an interim statement of policy for the safety of

railroad bridges. FRA establishes suggested criteria for railroads to

use to ensure the structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad

tracks. FRA will subsequently make the interim statement of policy part

of the final rule amending 49 CFR part 213 (See 57 FR 54038, November

16, 1992). This final rule will reflect any changes that appear

necessary following public comment on the interim statement of policy.

DATES: Effective Date: The interim statement of policy is effective May

30, 1995. Written comments must be received no later than June 26,

1995. Comments received after that date will be considered to the

extent possible without incurring additional delay or expense.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on this policy should be submitted to the

Docket Clerk (RCC-30), Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Persons desiring to be notified that

their written comments have been received by FRA should submit a

stamped, self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk

will indicate on the postcard the date the comments were received and

return the postcard to the addressee. Written comments will be

available for examination, both before and after the closing date for

comments, during regular business hours in Room 8201 of the Nassif

Building at the above address.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge

Engineer, Office of Safety Enforcement, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590,

(Telephone: 202-366-0507), or Nancy Lummen Lewis, Trial Attorney,

Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, (Telephone 202-366-0635).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning in 1991, FRA conducted a review of

the safety of railroad bridges. The review was prompted by the agency's

perception that the bridge population was aging, traffic density and

loads were increasing on many routes, and the consequences of a bridge

failure could be catastrophic.

I. Bridge Safety Survey

FRA counted the approximate number of bridges that carry railroad

track in the United States, and then surveyed the safety of those

bridges. The count revealed that

a. Approximately 100,700 bridges carried railroad tracks in 1991,

b. Approximately 10 bridges exist for every 14 miles of railroad,

and

c. Approximately 120 feet of track per mile is located on a bridge.

The safety survey accomplished several objectives. It determined

whether the condition of railroad bridges posed a significant hazard to

the safety of the public. It documented the methods used by the

railroad industry for the inspection, management and assurance of

safety of those bridges. It provided information with which FRA could

evaluate the need for federal action to improve the safety of railroad

bridges.

The survey assessed the policies and practices used by 80 railroads

to ensure the integrity of their bridges. The railroads surveyed

included 21 major railroads (including 14 class I railroads and seven

major passenger or commuter railroads), 20 class II regional railroads,

and 39 class III shortline railroads. The 21 class I and passenger

railroads are termed ``major railroads'' because they own most of the

railroad bridges and handle the majority of freight and passenger

traffic. In the course of the survey, FRA inspectors observed railroad

inspections of more than 8,000 bridges.

The survey showed that all of the 21 major railroads have conducted

comprehensive, effective bridge inspection programs for several

decades. The survey demonstrated that these railroads are acting to

safeguard the integrity of their bridges. The railroad managers know

the condition of their bridges, and they are taking appropriate action

to prevent structural failure. The findings for the 20 regional

railroads were similar to those of the major railroads.

The survey showed the major and regional railroads use a variety of

methods to inspect and manage their bridges. The degree to which

inspectors are supervised, the levels at which certain decisions are

made, and the methods used to record and report inspections vary

considerably among railroads. Nevertheless, these programs share

certain basic principles that characterize effective bridge management

practices.

The consistency of findings among the Class I and II railroads,

passenger operators, and many smaller railroads indicates that

railroads are following a course of action that corresponds with the

public interest in prevention of bridge failures. The railroads'

actions are driven by a need to prevent the significant economic harm

that result from the loss of a valuable bridge and the cost of

associated casualties.

On shortline railroads, however, FRA found considerable variation

in the quality of bridge management programs and bridge conditions.

Many shortlines have exemplary programs, well-suited to their size and

the nature of their structures and traffic. A few, however, did not

address all of their responsibilities for the safety of their bridges.

These smaller railroads with minimal bridge management programs

typically move low levels of traffic over a small number of bridges.

Nevertheless, the consequences of a bridge failure on one of these

railroads could be as severe as a failure occurring anywhere. The risk

of human casualty or environmental damage would be the same for each,

and the cost of the failure could be ruinous to a railroad with limited

resources. This finding indicates a situation that FRA must address.

[[Page 20655]]

II. The Safety Record of Railroad Bridges

During the past five decades, not one fatality has been caused by

the structural failure of a railroad bridge. Train accidents caused by

the structural failure of railroad bridges have been extremely rare.

Although the average construction date of railroad bridges predates

most highway bridges by several decades, the older railroad bridges

were designed to carry heavy steam locomotives. Design factors were

generally conservative, and the bridges' functional designs permit

repairs and reinforcements when necessary to maintain their viability.

Railroad bridges are most often privately, rather than publicly,

owned. Their owners seem to recognize the economic consequences of

neglecting important maintenance. Private ownership enables the

railroads to control the loads that operate over their bridges. Cars

and locomotives exceeding the nominal capacity of a bridge are not

operated without permission from the responsible bridge engineers, and

then only under restrictions and conditions that protect the integrity

of the bridge.

Many railroad bridges display superficial signs of deterioration

but still retain the capacity to safely carry their loads. Corrosion on

a bridge is not a safety issue unless a critical area sees significant

loss of material. Routine inspections are prescribed to detect this

condition, but determination of its effect requires a detailed

inspection and analysis of the bridge. In general, timber bridges

continue to function safely, and masonry structures built as early as

the 1830's remain functional and safe for their traffic.

Of the few train accidents that involved bridges, most have not

been caused by structural failure. FRA accident records for 1982

through 1993 show 15 train accidents that were caused by bridge

structural failures, including three that involved improper repair

procedures. These accidents caused no reportable injuries and a

reported $856,046 damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.

During the same period, 29 train accidents on or near bridges were

caused by track conditions on the bridge or its approaches. These

accidents caused no reportable injuries, and a reported $4,596,733

damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.

The same time period saw 19 train accidents on bridges caused by

external damage to the bridge, including three fires, 11 floods or

washouts, four bridges struck by motor vehicles, and one bridge struck

by a marine vessel. The accident at Mobile, Alabama on September 22,

1993 alone caused 47 fatalities, 102 non-fatal injuries, and over

$10,000,000 in property damage. The losses from these 19 accidents

totaled 47 fatalities, 124 non-fatal injuries, and $22,150,865 damage

to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.

IV. Bridge Safety Policy

The severity of a train accident is usually compounded when a

bridge is involved, regardless of the cause of the accident. FRA must

retain its capability to deal effectively with any safety problems

involving the structural integrity of railroad bridges. At the same

time, FRA must assure that private and public resources are not

diverted unnecessarily from other programs that are also critical to

railroad safety.

At one extreme, FRA could respond to bridge issues only when

accidents occur or when someone contacts the agency about particular

concerns. However, such a reactive policy would inhibit FRA's ability

to detect impending problems with railroad bridges. At the other

extreme, FRA could regulate all aspects of railroad bridge management,

including inspection, rating, construction and maintenance. The expense

to the railroad industry of such a policy is not justified by the

findings of the safety survey.

Because the industry has no apparent systemic bridge safety

problem, FRA chooses to adopt a policy, rather than issue regulations,

to carry out its responsibility of protecting bridge safety. The policy

includes non-regulatory guidelines to inform railroad managers and all

concerned about current good practices related to bridge inspection and

management. The guidelines accommodate a wide variety of effective

bridge inspection and management methods.

Even without specific bridge safety regulations, FRA maintains

authority under 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq. (formerly the Federal Railroad

Safety Act of 1970) to inspect any railroad facility that affects

safety and, if necessary, to remove it from service. The guidelines

represent the general criteria against which FRA will evaluate each

railroad's bridge inspection and management program.

FRA does not expect that its policy will unnecessarily divert

resources away from the functional work of bridge management by forcing

railroads to change effective bridge management programs. Likewise, the

policy should not require FRA to divert public resources to employ a

large staff of bridge specialists.

FRA will revise the guidelines as necessary to accomplish the

objectives of the bridge safety program. To that end, FRA will continue

to monitor and evaluate the railroads' bridge inspection and management

programs to guarantee that those responsible for the safety of bridges

continue to meet their responsibilities. FRA will make its findings

available to the public upon request, excluding any proprietary

information received and identified as such. Should FRA find through

its monitoring that widespread bridge structural problems have

developed, it may use the information it has gathered to commence a

rulemaking proceeding.

Effect of This Interim Statement of Policy

The purpose of this notice is to issue an interim statement of

policy containing guidelines for the proper maintenance of bridge

structures. It is meant to be advisory in nature; it does not have the

force of regulations under which FRA ordinarily issues violations and

assesses civil penalties.

However, FRA maintains emergency authority to issue emergency,

compliance, and disqualification orders, as well as authority to seek

injunctive relief in federal district court, under 49 U.S.C. 20104

(formerly known as the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970) and 49 CFR part

209. FRA will exercise this authority when an unsafe condition or

improper maintenance of a railroad bridge creates an imminent hazard of

death or injury to persons. Furthermore, should FRA, in the future,

find the need to address bridge integrity in a regulatory proceeding,

it will do so.

Following the comment period, FRA will issue any necessary changes

to the interim statement of policy. The notice of changes will appear

simultaneously with the Notice of Final Rule for the proceeding

amending the track safety standards in 49 CFR part 213, begun in

November, 1992. (See 57 FR 54038, November 16, 1992.) Except as

modified in response to the comments, this interim statement of policy

will become a final statement of policy at that time.

Public Participation

Because the interim statement of policy is advisory in nature,

notice and public participation are not required. However, the public

is invited to submit comments within 30 days following its publication.

FRA would appreciate comments about its plan to issue a statement

of policy rather than regulations governing railroad bridge

maintenance. FRA would also welcome comments about the value of

permanently placing the [[Page 20656]] statement of policy in a new

appendix to 49 CFR part 213. Finally, FRA would like comments about the

guidelines themselves and their value as criteria in deciding whether

stronger enforcement action on particular railroad bridges is

warranted.

Comments received after the 30-day deadline will be considered if

it is possible to do so without incurring additional delay or expense.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies

This interim statement of policy has been evaluated in accordance

with existing regulatory policies. The regulatory document is

considered to be a nonsignificant regulatory action under E.O. 12866

and is a nonsignificant rule under section 5(a)(4) of DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures (44 FR. 11034, February 26, 1979) because it is

advisory only and does not carry with it the force of law or

regulation. For nonsignificant rules, the DOT Regulatory Policies and

Procedures ordinarily require an economic evaluation to be placed in

the public docket. This evaluation should include an analysis of the

economic consequences of the rule, including (if possible) an

estimation of the cost and benefits of the rule to the private sector,

consumers, and all levels of government. However, such an evaluation is

not required if the expected impact of a rule is deemed minimal.

Because this interim statement of policy offers only guidelines to be

followed and does not mandate any actions or establish any

recordkeeping requirements, the need for a regulatory evaluation is not

indicated.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)

requires a review of rules to assess their impact on small entities. In

reviewing the economic impact of this interim statement of policy, FRA

concluded that it will not have any measurable impact on small

entities. There are no direct or indirect economic impacts for small

units of government, businesses, or other organizations. Therefore, it

is certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact

on a very substantial number of small entities under the provisions of

the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Paperwork Reduction Act

There are no information collection requirements contained in this

interim statement of policy.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this interim statement of policy in accordance

with its procedures for ensuring full consideration of the potential

environmental impacts of FRA actions, as required by the National

Environmental Policy Act and related directives. This notice meets the

criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental

purposes.

Federalism Implications

Implementation of this interim statement of policy could result in

a judicial determination that it constitutes FRA's occupation of the

field of railroad bridge safety regulation. Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, a

state may enforce its own statute or regulation related to railroad

safety until the Secretary of Transportation issues an order or

regulation ``covering the subject matter'' of the state's law. A state

may adopt or enforce a more stringent law relevant to the subject

matter as long as it ``(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce a local

safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order

of the United States Government; and (3) does not unreasonably burden

interstate commerce.''

At this time, FRA is aware of only one state that could be affected

by a court's determination that the Secretary of Transportation,

through FRA, has covered the subject matter of railroad bridge safety

by issuing this policy statement. FRA has prepared a Federalism

Assessment, pursuant to Executive Order 12612 and placed it in the

docket reserved for this proceeding, to address the federalism

implications this interim policy could have on that state or any other

state seeking to regulate railroad bridge safety.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 213

Penalties, Railroad safety, Railroads.

Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Railroad

Administration issues the following:

Interim Statement of Agency Policy on the Structural Integrity of

Railroad Bridges

The structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad tracks is

important to the safety of railroad employees and that the public. The

responsibility for the safety of railroad bridges rests with the owner

of the track carried by the bridge, together with any other party to

whom that responsibility has been assigned by the track owner.

The capacity of a bridge to safely support its traffic can only be

determined by intelligent application of engineering principles and the

laws of physics. Bridge owners should use, as FRA will, those

principles to assess the integrity of railroad bridges.

The long term ability of a structure to perform its function is an

economic issue beyond the intent of this policy. In assessing a

bridge's structural condition, FRA will focus on the present safety of

the structure, rather than its appearance or long term usefulness.

FRA inspectors will conduct regular evaluations of railroad bridge

inspection and management practices. The objective of these evaluations

will be to document the practices of the evaluated railroad and to

disclose any program weaknesses that could affect the safety of the

public. Should problems be disclosed, FRA will seek a cooperative

resolution. If public safety is jeopardized by failure to resolve a

problem, or by the incompetence or dishonorable intentions of any

bridge owner, FRA will use available legal means, including issuance of

emergency orders, to protect the safety of railroad employees and the

public.

This policy statement addresses the integrity of bridges that carry

railroad tracks. It does not address the integrity of other types of

structures on railroad property, i.e., tunnels, or bridges carrying

highways or other features over railroads, except to the extent that

position and condition of these structures affects the safe passage of

trains. Likewise, this policy statement extends its reach beyond the

narrow issue of bridges carrying railroad tracks only where it is

necessary to do so for the protection of highway users, pedestrians and

others lawfully occupying the space under a railroad bridge.

The guidelines published in this statement are advisory, rather

than regulatory, in nature. They indicate those elements FRA deems

essential to successful bridge management programs. FRA will use the

guidelines when evaluating bridge inspection and management practices.

Guidelines

1. Responsibility for safety of bridges.

(a) Track owner. The owner of the track carried by a bridge is

responsible for ensuring that the bridge will safely support the trains

which operate over it and the loads imposed upon it.

(b) Operating railroad. The operating railroad that authorizes

train movements over a bridge should take whatever steps are necessary

to verify that the maintenance responsibility for the bridge is being

fulfilled so as to safeguard trains operated under its authority.

[[Page 20657]]

(c) Assignment of responsibility. The owner of the track carried by

a bridge may assign responsibility for maintenance of the bridge to

another party as long as the assignment ensures that responsibility for

the safety of the bridge is not diminished.

2. Capacity of bridges.

(a) Determination. The safe capacity of bridges should be

determined by competent engineers using accepted principles of

structural design and analysis.

(b) Analysis. Proper analysis of a bridge requires knowledge of the

actual dimensions, materials and properties of the structural members

of the bridge, their condition, and the stresses imposed in those

members by the service loads.

(c) Rating. The factors which were used for the design of a bridge

can generally be used to determine and rate the load capacity of a

bridge provided:

(i) The condition of the bridge has not changed significantly, and

(ii) The stresses resulting from the service loads can be

correlated to the stresses for which the bridge was designed or rated.

3. Bridge loads.

(a) Control of loads. The operating instructions for each railroad

operating over bridges should include provisions to restrict the

movement of cars and locomotives whose weight or configuration exceed

the nominal capacity of the bridges.

(b) Authority for exceptions. Equipment exceeding the nominal

weight restriction on a bridge should be operated only under conditions

determined by a competent engineer who has properly analyzed the

stresses resulting from the proposed loads.

(c) Operating conditions. Operating conditions for exceptional

loads may include speed restrictions, restriction of traffic from

adjacent multiple tracks, and weight limitations on adjacent cars in

the same train.

4. Bridge records.

(a) The organization responsible for the safety of a bridge should

keep design, construction, maintenance and repair records readily

accessible to permit the determination of safe loads. Having design or

rating drawings and calculations that conform to the actual structure

greatly simplifies the process of making accurate determinations of

safe bridge loads.

(b) Organizations acquiring railroad property should obtain

original or usable copies of all bridge records and drawings, and

protect or maintain knowledge of the location of the original records.

5. Specifications for design and rating.

(a) The recommended specifications for the design and rating of

bridges are those found in the ``Manual for Railway Engineering''

published by the American Railway Engineering Association (AREA). These

specifications incorporate recognized principles of structural design

and analysis. They are continually reviewed and revised by committees

of competent engineers. Other specifications for design and rating,

however, have been successfully used by some railroads and may also be

suitable now.

(b) A bridge can be rated for capacity according to current

specifications regardless of the specification to which it was

originally designed.

6. Periodic inspections.

(a) Periodic bridge inspections by competent inspectors are

necessary to determine whether a structure conforms to its design or

rating condition and, if not, or the degree of nonconformity.

(b) The prevailing practice throughout the railroad industry is to

inspect railroad bridges at least annually. Inspections at more

frequent intervals may be indicated by the nature or condition of a

structure or intensive traffic levels.

7. Underwater inspections.

(a) Inspections of bridges should include measuring and recording

the condition of substructure support at locations subject to erosion

from moving water.

(b) Stream beds are often not visible to the inspector. Indirect

measurements by sounding, probing, or any other appropriate means are

necessary in those cases. A series of records of those readings will

provide the best information should unexpected changes suddenly occur.

Where such indirect measurements do not provide the necessary assurance

of foundation integrity, diving inspections should be performed as

prescribed by a competent engineer.

8. Special inspections.

(a) A special bridge inspection should be performed after an

occurrence that might have reduced the capacity of the bridge, such as

a flood, a derailment, or an unusual impact.

(b) When a railroad learns that a bridge might have suffered damage

through an unusual occurrence, it should restrict train operation over

the bridge until the bridge can be inspected and evaluated.

9. Inspection records.

(a) Bridge inspections should be recorded. Records should identify

the structure inspected, the date of the inspection, the name of the

inspector, the components inspected, and their condition.

(b) Information from bridge inspection reports should be

incorporated into a bridge management program to ensure that exceptions

on the reports are corrected or accounted for. A series of inspection

reports over time should be maintained so as to provide a valuable

record of trends and rates of degradation of bridge components. The

reports should be structured to promote comprehensive inspections and

effective communication between an inspector and an engineer who

performs an analysis of a bridge.

(c) An inspection report should be comprehensible to a competent

person without interpretation by the reporting inspector.

10. Bridge inspectors and engineers.

(a) Bridge inspections should be performed by technicians whose

training and experience enable them to detect and record indications of

distress on a bridge. Inspectors must provide accurate measurements and

other information about the condition of the bridge in enough detail

for an engineer to make a proper evaluation of the safety of the

bridge.

(b) Accurate information about the condition of a bridge should be

evaluated by an engineer who is competent to determine the capacity of

the bridge. The inspector and the evaluator are often not the same

individual. The quality of the bridge evaluation depends on the quality

of the communication between them.

11. Scheduling inspections.

(a) A bridge management program should include a means to ensure

that each bridge under the program is inspected at the frequency

prescribed for that bridge by a competent engineer.

(b) Bridge inspections should be scheduled from an accurate bridge

inventory list that includes the due date of the next inspection.

12. Special considerations for railroad bridges.

Railroad bridges differ from other types of bridges in the types of

loads they carry, in their modes of failure and indications of

distress, and in their construction details and components. Proper

inspection and analysis of railroad bridges requires familiarity with

the loads, details and indications of distress that are unique to this

class of structure.

Issued at Washington, DC., on April 21, 1995.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 95-10323 Filed 4-26-95; 8:45 am]

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