Highway Safety Programs; Determination of Effectiveness

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Federal Highway Administration

23 CFR Part 1205

[NHTSA Docket No. 93-20; Notice 2]

RIN 2127-AE89

Highway Safety Programs; Determination of Effectiveness

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Department of Transportation

(DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Section 2002(a) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) required that the Secretary of

Transportation either designate six key areas as priority highway

safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons

for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the six

program areas had already been designated as priority programs by the

Secretary. This final rule adds Speed Control, but not School Bus

Safety, to the list of priority programs.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this final rule are effective

January 12, 1995.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: In NHTSA: Ms. Marlene Markison, Office

of Regional Operations, NRO-01, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590, telephone:

(202) 366-2121; or Ms. Heidi L. Coleman, Office of Chief Counsel,

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, telephone: (202) 366-

1834. In FHWA: Ms. Julie Cirillo, HHS-10, Federal Highway

Administration, telephone: (202) 366-2170.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The State and Community Highway Safety Grant Program (section 402

program) was established under the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23

U.S.C. 402. The Act required the establishment of Uniform Standards for

State Highway Safety Programs to assist the States and local

communities in organizing their highway safety programs. Eighteen such

standards were established and have been administered at the Federal

level by FHWA and NHTSA. NHTSA is responsible for developing and

implementing highway safety programs relating to the vehicle and

driver; FHWA has similar responsibilities in program areas involving

the roadway. The FHWA is also responsible for implementing programs

relating to commercial motor vehicle safety. These programs include

measures related to speed control.

Until 1976, the 402 program was principally directed towards

achieving State and local compliance with the 18 Highway Safety Program

Standards, which were considered mandatory requirements with financial

sanctions for non-compliance. Under the Highway Safety Act of 1976,

Congress provided for a more flexible implementation of the program so

the Secretary would not have to require State compliance with every

uniform standard or with each element of every uniform standard. As a

result, the standards became more like guidelines for use by the

States, and management of the program shifted from enforcing standards

to one of problem identification and countermeasure development and

evaluation, using the standards as a framework for the State programs.

In 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of

1981, Pub. L. 97-35, revising the section 402 program. The Act directed

the agencies to conduct rulemaking to determine those State and local

highway safety programs most effective in reducing accidents, injuries,

and fatalities.

On April 1, 1982, NHTSA and FHWA issued a joint final rule (47 FR

15116) identifying six National Priority program areas which the

agencies then considered to be the most effective highway safety

programs. The six program areas included one FHWA program area, Safety

Construction and Operational Improvements, and the following NHTSA

Program Areas: Occupant Protection, Alcohol Countermeasures, Police

Traffic Services, Emergency Medical Services, and Traffic Records.

The April 1982 final rule provided that these National Priority

program areas would be eligible for Federal funding using an expedited

procedure under the 402 program. 23 CFR 1205.4. It also established a

mechanism by which other, nonpriority programs identified by a State

may be eligible for Federal funding. 23 CFR 1205.5(a) and (b).

Periodic Review and Determination of Priority Programs

On April 2, 1987, the enactment of the Surface Transportation and

Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-17) revised

23 U.S.C. 402. The changes provided for a periodic review of the

effectiveness of the various programs eligible for funding under

section 402 in reducing crashes, injuries and fatalities. The periodic

review procedure was enacted to ensure the continued relevance of the

section 402 program to changing circumstances and traffic safety needs

and to ensure that Federal funds continue to be used for the most

effective programs.

The legislation also provided that the standards promulgated under

section 402 and codified in 23 CFR Part 1204 be changed to guidelines.

The purpose of this amendment was to conform the language of section

402 and Part 1204 to the current implementation of the programs.

Pursuant to these amendments, NHTSA and FHWA conducted a rulemaking

action to review those programs most effective in reducing crashes,

injuries and fatalities. In a final rule issued on April 6, 1988 (53 FR

1255), the agencies determined that the National Priority program areas

should continue to include the one FHWA program area, Roadway Safety

(formerly, Safety Construction and Operational Improvements), and the

five NHTSA program areas that had been identified in 1982. In addition,

the agencies determined that a sixth NHTSA area, Motorcycle Safety,

should be added.

On May 3, 1991, NHTSA and FHWA published a joint NPRM (56 FR 20387)

proposing to add Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety as one of the National

Priority program areas. The public comments supported that proposal and

the area of Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety was added to the list of

National Priority program areas eligible for the expedited funding

process on October 4, 1991 (56 FR 50250).

As a result of these rulemaking actions, the National Priority

program areas included the following:

1. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures

2. Police Traffic Services

3. Occupant Protection

4. Traffic Records

5. Emergency Medical Services

6. Motorcycle Safety

7. Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety

8. Roadway Safety

ISTEA Requirements

On December 18, 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) was signed into law. Section 2002(a) of

ISTEA required that the Secretary of Transportation either designate

six key areas as priority highway safety programs or submit a report to

Congress describing the reasons for not establishing these programs as

priorities. The six program areas listed in ISTEA included programs:

(1) To reduce injuries and deaths resulting from motor vehicles

being driven in excess of posted speed limits (Speed Control), (2)

to encourage the proper use of occupant protection devices

(including the use of safety belts and child restraint systems) by

occupants of motor vehicles and to increase public awareness of the

benefit of motor vehicles equipped with air bags (Use of Occupant

Protection Devices), (3) to reduce deaths and injuries resulting

from persons driving motor vehicles while impaired by alcohol or a

controlled substance (Driving While Impaired), (4) to reduce deaths

and injuries resulting from accidents involving motor vehicles and

motorcycles (Motorcycle Safety), (5) to reduce injuries and deaths

resulting from accidents involving school buses (School Bus Safety)

and (6) to improve law enforcement services in motor vehicle

accident prevention, traffic supervision, and post-accident

procedures (Police Traffic Services).

The Secretary had already designated four of these six program

areas as priority programs, but not Speed Control or School Bus Safety.

Accordingly, on January 14, 1994, NHTSA and FHWA published a notice

of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register requesting

comments from the public on whether to expand the list of National

Priority program areas.

The agencies explained that they apply three criteria to determine

whether a program area should be identified as a National Priority

program under 23 CFR Part 1205:

Whether the problem is of national concern (including the

relative magnitude of the problem);

Whether effective countermeasures have been developed in

this area which address this concern; and

Whether State programs in the area appear to be among the

most effective in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities as

compared to other traffic safety program areas.

The NPRM proposed to expand the list of National Priority program

areas to include Speed Control, and requested comments on the agencies'

preliminary determination that School Bus Safety should not be added as

a National Priority program area at this time.

Comments Received

The agencies received 34 comments to the docket in response to the

NPRM, including comments from 22 State agencies (with responsibility

for transportation/highway safety, law enforcement and education); a

local PTA Council; a county health department; a private bus operator;

and nine national organizations. The national organizations represent

highway safety interests (National Association of Governors' Highway

Safety Representatives, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety and the Center for Auto Safety);

law enforcement organizations (International Association of Chiefs of

Police and National Sheriffs' Association); and pupil transportation

interests (National Association for Pupil Transportation, National

Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services and

National School Transportation Association).

Based on our review of the comments received and other available

information, NHTSA and FHWA have decided to adopt the proposal

published in the NPRM. For the reasons set forth below, the agencies

have decided to add Speed Control to the list of National Priority

program areas, and not to add School Bus Safety to the list at this

time.

Speed Control

Is Speeding a Problem of National Concern?

NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM that speeding is a

problem of national concern, based on a number of considerations.

The agencies explained in the NPRM that speeding is defined as not

only exceeding the posted speed limit, but also driving too fast for

conditions. While the agencies recognized that reliable data on travel

speeds are relatively limited and often difficult to compare, NHTSA and

FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM, based on the most reliable data

available, that the travel speeds of motorists have increased in recent

years.

The NPRM explained that NHTSA studies suggest that most drivers

recognize that speeding is a violation of the law, but few regard the

violation as a serious offense. This led the agency to conclude that

the public does not view speeding per se as an immediate safety risk.

However, as NHTSA and FHWA pointed out in the NPRM, speeding is one

of the most prevalent reported factors associated with crashes, and

studies identify correlations between speeding and other factors often

associated with crashes, including alcohol involvement, young drivers,

male drivers, motorcyclists and nighttime driving.

The agencies reported in the NPRM that speeding is cited as a

contributing factor in approximately 11 percent of all police-reported

crashes and in approximately 34 percent of all fatal crashes (NHTSA,

Fatal Accident Reporting System, 1991). The agencies estimated that in

1991, 13,909 fatalities and 77,000 moderate to critical injuries

occurred in speed-related crashes, resulting in an economic cost for

all speed-related crashes (including all injury levels) of over $19

billion.

As explained in the NPRM, excessive speed contributes to motor

vehicle crashes in a number of ways. Drivers have less time to react

when travelling at higher speeds since speed increases the distance a

vehicle travels during the time it takes for a driver to react to a

perceived danger; speed increases the total stopping distance necessary

to halt a vehicle; and speed reduces a driver's ability to steer safely

around curves on highways or objects in the roadway.

Speed variance, the difference in speed among vehicles in the

traffic stream, also contributes to motor vehicle crashes. As speed

variance increases, vehicles come close to each other more frequently,

which leads to more frequent lane changes and passing maneuvers as the

faster drivers seek to avoid slower-moving vehicles. Research studies

have shown that motor vehicle crashes are more likely where speed

variance is greater, and data have shown that a speed variance of 20

mph from the average speed can result in a crash risk 11 times greater

than those travelling at the average speed.

Finally, increased speeds result in reduced margins for error and

increased severity for those vehicles involved in crashes. As the speed

of a car increases from 20 mph to 80 mph, a factor of four, the energy

of the impact delivered in a collision with a fixed object goes up by a

factor of sixteen, increasing dramatically the chance of death or

serious injury.

Citing a recent FHWA study entitled Assessment of Current Speed

Zoning Criteria, the NPRM indicated that: (1) On average, seven out of

ten motorists exceeded posted limits; (2) average speeds ran

approximately two to six mph above posted limits; and (3) prevailing

85th percentile speeds ran approximately eight to twelve mph above

posted limits.

One commenter, the West Virginia Division of Highways, questioned

the agencies' tentative conclusion that speeding is a problem of

national concern. The State asserted that the agencies' comparison

between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit indicates a

problem with speed zones (which, according to West Virginia, are set

through public pressure rather than by engineering principles), not

with speeding. West Virginia further suggested that, as drivers have

gained additional experience driving faster than 55 (following the

speed limit's being raised to 65 on certain rural Interstates), ``it is

to be anticipated that speeds would gradually increase.''

The agencies accept West Virginia's explanation that, as drivers

gain additional experience driving faster, their speeds tend to

increase. We disagree, however, that this supports a conclusion that

the difference between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit

indicates a problem with speed zones, not with speeding. In fact, if

West Virginia's explanation is correct, the agencies believe that, if

speed limits were increased to match the 85th percentile, speeds are

likely to gradually increase even further, as drivers adjust to the

higher speed limits.

All other comments received in response to the NPRM supported the

agencies' conclusion that speeding is a problem of national concern.

New Mexico, for example, reported that it continues to suffer among the

highest rates of motor vehicle deaths in the nation, and some 25% of

their crash fatalities involve excessive speed. Michigan reported that

in 1991 excessive speed accounted for 43% of the total crashes, 44% of

fatal crashes, 52% of injury crashes and 41% of property damage crashes

in that State.

Alaska commented that traveling at unsafe speeds is the leading

cause of the State's motor vehicle crashes and is a contributing factor

in 27% of its fatal crashes. North Carolina stated that in 1992 speed

was noted as a contributing factor in 32% of all crashes and 39.8% of

fatal crashes.

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) provided data

supporting the agencies' conclusion that travel speeds are increasing.

In addition, IIHS stated that fatalities have increased along with

travel speeds. According to IIHS:

In the 40 States that increased their speed limits to 65 mph on

rural interstates during 1987 and 1988, deaths on these roads were

17 percent higher in 1992, compared with the average number of

deaths on the same roads during 1982-86. In contrast, deaths on

rural interstates where the 55 mph limit was retained were 28

percent lower in 1992 compared with 1982-86. In the 40 States that

raised their rural interstate speed limit, the urban interstate

limit speed remained unchanged and on those highways, deaths in 1992

were 8 percent lower than in 1982-86 (IIHS, 1993b).

The agencies continue to conclude that speeding is a problem of

national concern.

Have Effective Speed Control Countermeasures Been Developed?

The agencies identified, in the NPRM, a number of speed control

countermeasures that they consider to be effective. They indicated that

NHTSA has identified and evaluated, and is currently demonstrating in

the law enforcement community a number of new law enforcement

technologies to further advance speed control efforts, including radar,

VASCAR, laser speed measuring devices, aerial speed measurement, photo

radar and electronic signing.

The NPRM stated that NHTSA studies show that one of the best

methods for obtaining compliance with speed limits is to combine an

aggressive enforcement campaign with a vigorous public information and

education effort. It also cited other effective countermeasures, such

as saturation patrols and multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional

enforcement efforts.

In the areas of highway design and traffic control, the agencies

explained that freeway design, culminating in the Interstate System,

has eliminated at-grade intersections and provided for free flow

traffic, which has resulted in a significant reduction in speed

variance and the promotion of uniform operating speed.

Other effective countermeasures were also mentioned. For example,

the NPRM indicated that variable message speed signs have been

developed to control speed for varying conditions and that real time

regulatory variable speed limits are now being tested in the State of

Washington. The NPRM indicated that these efforts can be further

enhanced through the development of comprehensive speed control

programs.

The commenters cited many of the same countermeasures and

technologies in their responses to the NPRM, and indicated they

considered them to be effective. IIHS, for example, indicated it

believes VASCAR and laser technologies can be effective at increasing

the proportion of speeders cited for violations since they are not

detectable by radar detectors. IIHS recommended also the use of radar

detector detectors (RDDs) as an effective countermeasure for

identifying individuals who are likely to be ``professional speeders.''

No commenters suggested that no effective speed control

countermeasures have been developed, and the agencies continue to

conclude that effective countermeasures have been developed.

Do State Speed Control Programs Appear To Be Among the Most Effective

in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities?

NHTSA and FHWA stated in the NPRM that state programs that have

been conducted to date demonstrate that speed control countermeasures

are extremely effective in reducing deaths and injuries, and cited a

number of examples. (For details, interested persons should read the

NPRM.)

The California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) interpreted this

statement to mean that the agencies were placing more importance on

State, rather than local, programs. NHTSA and FHWA did not intend to

give this impression. In fact, the agencies recognize that many

countermeasures in the Speed Control area can be carried out most

effectively at the local level. The agencies' reference to ``State

programs'' was intended to cover programs conducted at either the State

or local level within a State. California OTS went on to indicate that

many countermeasures have been employed successfully throughout the

State to address the speeding problem.

The Department of California Highway Patrol (CHP) stated that

effective countermeasures exist only for localized speed control. CHP

claimed that the success of these programs is almost always localized

and/or temporary. The agencies agree that localized enforcement efforts

alone generally result in only localized, short-term impacts. However,

it has long been established that enforcement efforts, when combined

with a vigorous public information and education campaign, have much

more long-lasting effects. (See, ``Evaluation of the New York State

Police 55 MPH Speed Enforcement Project,'' August 1969, by the

Institute for Traffic Safety Management and Research.)

Commenters, such as IIHS and Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety,

supported this view. Advocates further commented, ``A national effort

[which provides a greater level of public information and awareness

regarding the safety dangers associated with speeding] will establish

the safety context for state and local speed control efforts under the

402 Program and provide those efforts with added credibility.''

West Virginia questioned the validity of the examples cited in the

NPRM. The State argued that ``the reductions in speed [experienced in

South Carolina and St. Louis] were minuscule'' and ``the sample [used

in California] was very small.'' West Virginia continued, ``the Notice

states a belief that the programs were effective but it gives no

measures of statistical significance or indications of necessary

seasonal adjustments or other information to back up this conclusion.''

The agencies disagree with West Virginia's comments. The success of

the South Carolina study, for example, was not measured by reductions

in speed, but rather using other factors. As stated in the NPRM, there

were 12,472 fewer crashes (a 10% decrease), 2,331 fewer injuries (a 7%

decrease) and 106 fewer fatalities in 1991 in South Carolina as

compared to 1989 (an 11% decrease). The vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in

South Carolina increased from 32,780 million to 34,456 million (a 5%

increase) during this period of time. The agencies believe the State's

rural initiative contributed to these reductions and that these

reductions are significant.

The agencies agree that the reduction in average speed (from 62 mph

to 61 mph) experienced in the first year of the St. Louis enforcement

operation (Operation Gateway) was not a significant reduction. However,

the NPRM stated that the St. Louis program was continuing and was

expected to result in further speed decreases, and further results have

in fact been achieved. The Missouri Division of Highway Safety did not

report the reduction in average speed as part of the second phase of

Operation Gateway. The State did report, however, that, prior to the

kickoff of the operation, the average speed of vehicles stopped for

speeding on I-270 was 78.3 mph, and the average speed of vehicles

stopped during the Operation Gateway kickoff was 74.3 mph. This

represents a 5% reduction in speed. The agencies believe this reduction

is significant.

With regard to the California study, the sample used may have

appeared small, as compared with the general motor vehicle population,

but the study's focus was on commercial motor vehicles, and the study

used as its sample a census of all crashes where the commercial motor

vehicle was at fault. As the agencies explained in the NPRM, speed

control efforts targeted commercial motor vehicles, and the data

revealed that the number of crashes where commercial motor vehicles

were at fault decreased by 3.5% (from 810 in 1986 to 782 in 1987). The

number of crashes caused by commercial motor vehicles which resulted in

injuries also declined, by 11.2% (from 259 in 1986 to 230 in 1987).

Seasonal adjustments were not made for the studies referenced in

the NPRM because they were not considered to be necessary. Seasonal

adjustments are not considered to be necessary, for example, for

studies in which data is to be collected during a brief period of time

involving no seasonal changes or for studies in which data is to be

collected during comparable time periods. Data was collected for the

South Carolina study during the same four months in 1990 and 1991. Data

was collected for the St. Louis effort during a brief period of time

before and during the kickoff of Operation Gateway, so seasonal changes

were not a factor in that study.

Most of the commenters agreed with the conclusion in the NPRM that

Speed Control Programs appear to be among the most effective in

reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities, and they provided examples

demonstrating the effectiveness of speed control countermeasures.

IIHS indicated that, in South Carolina, police issued 41 tickets

per 1,000 vehicles using lasers, as compared with 33 per 1,000 using

conventional radar.

New York State reported that it experienced the lowest fatality

rate on record in 1992 (1.65 deaths per hundred million vehicle miles

traveled), ``due in large part to the Division's strict [comprehensive

speed] enforcement program.'' According to New York, the fatality rate

of 1.65 was 29 percent lower than 2.33 in 1987 (when the State started

its program) and equates to 520 fewer lives lost on the highways of

that State. The program included a saturation strategy that not only

led to the apprehension of specific motorists, but also established a

visible presence and generated publicity which raised the perception of

risk among all motorists within the State.

Based on available information and the comments received in

response to the NPRM, the agencies continue to conclude that Speed

Control Programs are among the most effective in reducing crashes,

injuries, and fatalities.

Other Comments Received About Speed Control

The State of Illinois agreed that Speed Control should be

designated a priority program, but commented that there should be no

earmarking of funds for Speed Control (or any other program) and

monetary sanctions should not be imposed on States for failing to meet

compliance levels. Congress enacted the National Maximum Speed Limit

law, which established monetary sanctions for noncompliance and has,

from time to time, imposed earmarking or set-aside requirements in

appropriations legislation. NHTSA and FHWA are bound to implement these

congressional requirements. However, the designation of Speed Control

as a priority program under section 402 in this final rule will not

create any additional earmarking requirements or monetary sanctions.

Most comments strongly supported the designation of Speed Control

as a National Priority program area, particularly at this time. New

Mexico, for example, expressed its view that:

Speed control is ready to mature as a significant injury

prevention tool, following the cycle of public attitude change,

institutional preparation, and coordinated operational programming

that has worked well in * * * other areas. * * * [S]tate programs in

the coming * * * years for speed control could be among the most

productive injury control measures available to the safety world.

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety stated:

Speeding and excessive highway speeds have reached epidemic

proportions and must be treated as a national public health problem.

* * * It is incumbent on the agencies to develop a high profile

national program against speeding that provides a greater level of

public information and awareness regarding the safety dangers

associated with speeding.

NAGHSR concurred with the designation of Speed Control as a

National Priority, but expressed concern about the ``proliferation of

402 priorities'' and the ``possible overlap and duplication'' between

the Speed Control and Police Traffic Services (PTS) programs. NAGHSR

suggested that the agencies consider instead combining these two

programs in a way that emphasizes the importance of speed compliance

activities.

Three other commenters also recommended that Speed Control be

included under PTS, but for different reasons. California OTS expressed

concern that a separate Speed Control program area could ``result in

the redirection of efforts into `speed only' projects and dilute the

accomplishments made in highlighting speed as a major problem in all

traffic safety ventures.'' CHP stated that Speed Control already

receives considerable attention, and argued that including Speed

Control under PTS would allow individual States to better balance their

overall approach to traffic safety. West Virginia expressed its opinion

that ``public acceptance is likely to be higher if the Speed Control

function is part of a well-reasoned and balanced enforcement program

rather than as a stand-alone effort which can be interpreted as a

revenue enhancement measure.''

The agencies agree with the commenters that Speed Control programs

should continue to be included as part of broader traffic safety

programs. However, the designation of Speed Control as a priority

program does not require that States establish ``stand-alone'' efforts.

States have the ability and, in fact, are encouraged by the agencies to

continue to include Speed Control messages in their other traffic

safety programs. It is the agencies' hope that the program's

designation as a National Priority program area will result in the

inclusion of Speed Control messages in more traffic safety programs

than before.

NHTSA and FHWA have considered the comments cited above, and

decided not to include Speed Control as part of PTS. The agencies

recognize that there will be some overlap between the areas of Speed

Control and PTS, since law enforcement activity is an important

component in any Speed Control program. (There is a similar level of

overlap between the areas of PTS and other priority programs, such as

Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant Protection, to the extent that

police agencies enforce laws designed to address these issues.)

However, the agencies believe it is important to list the Speed

Control program (as well as Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant

Protection) separately, to reflect non-law enforcement activities that

are equally important components of these programs. In the area of

Speed Control, these components include, for example, the development

and enactment of speed-related laws, the use of new technologies,

public information and education activities, and the reexamination of

speed zoning criteria to ensure that posted speed limits are

appropriate for conditions.

Speed Control Determination

The agencies conclude that speeding does represent a significant

traffic safety problem throughout the country, and that numerous

countermeasures have been developed that have proven to be most

effective in addressing this problem. Accordingly, NHTSA and FHWA have

decided to designate Speed Control as a separate National Priority

program area. Speed Control will be administered jointly by both

agencies.

School Bus Safety

Is School Bus Safety a Problem of National Concern?

NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that the safety of children in

school buses has been a primary concern of parents and school systems

ever since buses began to be used to transport children and that this

concern has helped develop school buses into the safest form of

transportation in the country. The NPRM reported that, according to the

National Safety Council's ``Accident Facts'' (1991), during the 1989-90

school year, an estimated 380,000 buses were used to transport 22

million pupils approximately 3.8 billion miles (21 million miles per

school day) and that occupant fatality rates per hundred million

passenger miles in 1989 were 1.12 for passenger cars and 0.04 for

school buses.

The agencies recognized in the NPRM that school bus crashes, as

compared with automobile crashes, have a much different effect on the

population as a whole. When a child is fatally injured in a school bus

crash, there is a greater sense of loss and a greater sense of tragedy.

For this reason, school bus fatalities and crashes often receive a high

degree of public attention and draw an immediate and passionate

response from the community.

However, the number of fatalities in school bus crashes is small,

particularly when considering exposure and when compared to the number

of fatalities related to other priority programs. In 1991, passenger

cars were involved in 86.4 percent of all traffic crashes and 67.9

percent of all fatal crashes; whereas school buses were involved in

only 0.4 percent of all traffic crashes and in 0.3 percent of all fatal

crashes. These data demonstrate that the safety problem related to

school buses is not great when compared to that of other types of

vehicles.

Based on these findings, NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in

the NPRM that School Bus Safety is not a problem that merits

designation as a National Priority program area.

Two commenters argued that any number of school bus fatalities

above zero is too high a fatality rate and, therefore, justifies

designating School Bus Safety as a Priority program. According to the

California Department of Education, ``school bus safety must be a

priority issue for both the State and Federal Government for as long as

our accident statistics show one `1' pupil passenger or one `1' pupil

pedestrian fatality. Zero `0', tolerance of pupil passenger and

pedestrian fatalities must be our goal.'' Similarly, the Center for

Auto Safety argued that ``the only way DOT could reject school bus

safety as a Priority Program would be to find that such a designation

would not reduce injuries and deaths in school buses at all.''

The agencies disagree, and while other commenters sought to have

the agencies designate School Bus Safety as a priority program area,

they did not suggest that School Bus Safety represents a significant

national problem. In fact, the Superintendent of Public Instruction for

Washington State said, ``We cannot disagree with [the statistics] you

have published [and w]e can not provide any additional statistics that

disagree with what you have already stated regarding Pupil

Transportation as the safest means of travel in the highway safety

system.''

Most commenters fully agreed with the agencies' conclusion that

School Bus Safety does not represent a serious problem when compared to

safety in other types of vehicles. The Oregon Department of

Transportation, for example, stated ``Oregon has had one serious school

bus accident in the last seventeen years. And, even though safety of

our children is a major concern, I do not believe school busses should

be a NHTSA priority. * * * School busses are probably the safest place

for students to be. We do not need to concentrate extraordinary effort

on school bus safety.'' The North Carolina Department of Transportation

commented, ``In North Carolina, as in the rest of the nation, school

buses remain the safest mode of transportation. * * * While the safety

of our children is still paramount, it will be extremely difficult for

any further school bus safety initiatives to be cost effective.''

New Mexico provided data which supported the agencies' conclusion.

The State's comments indicated, ``95 percent of school children in

serious crashes during school hours were in conventional passenger

vehicles--passenger cars, pickups, and vans.'' Only one percent of New

Mexico's school children in serious crashes during school hours were in

buses. The remaining 4 percent were pedestrians, on motorcycles, on

pedalcycles, and others, at one percent each. New Mexico's comments

continued, ``It is fair to say that non-use of safety belts in private

vehicles is the largest part of New Mexico's schoolchild safety

problem. * * * Indeed, the only deaths involving school buses in the

past decade have occurred outside the bus, or while entering or

leaving.''

Based on the comments received and the information available to the

agencies, NHTSA and FHWA continue to find that School Bus Safety does

not represent a serious problem that warrants its designation as a

National Priority program area.

Have Effective School Bus Safety Measures Been Developed?

NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that, although statistics

demonstrate that school buses already provide a remarkably safe form of

transportation, steps have been taken to further improve School Bus

Safety. These steps included providing set-aside funds in 1990 and 1991

to assist States in implementing ``effective'' and ``most effective''

school bus safety measures and publishing a number of rulemaking

actions, such as a final rule requiring new school buses to be equipped

with a stop signal arm, a final rule revising the minimum requirements

for school bus emergency exits and improving access to school bus

emergency doors and a final rule requiring that school buses enable

drivers to see either directly or through mirrors certain specified

areas in front of and along both sides of the vehicle. For a full

discussion of these and other actions, interested individuals are

encouraged to read the NPRM (59 FR 2341-42).

NHTSA has taken a number of additional steps that were not listed

in the NPRM to improve School Bus Safety. For example, to improve the

lateral stability and control of medium and heavy vehicles (including

school buses) during braking, NHTSA issued an NPRM proposing to require

that these vehicles be equipped with an antilock brake system (58 F.R.

50738). NHTSA also published a School Bus Safety Report and an annual

publication entitled ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993--School Buses.''

In addition, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to

undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on a school bus/pedestrian

safety educational program, developed recently by NHTSA for children in

grades K-6. This program is currently being modified into a product

that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates reaching over seven

million people in its initial marketing effort.

NHTSA has also taken steps to improve communications with the Pupil

Transportation community. The Department issued a press release

concerning school bus safety in August 1994, just prior to the

beginning of the new school year and, on August 18, 1994, NHTSA

conducted a National Meeting on Transporting Pre-Kindergarten Children

on School Buses. The meeting brought together, for the first time,

school bus manufacturers, child safety seat manufacturers, pupil

transportation officials, child safety seat trainers, injury control

professionals and Federal officials to discuss this emerging

transportation issue.

NHTSA and FHWA will continue to engage in appropriate activities

that improve the safety of school buses.

Do State School Bus Safety Measures Appear To Be Among the Most

Effective in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities?

As stated previously, school buses already provide the safest form

of transportation in our country. Since the number of fatalities that

are school bus-related is already so small, it is difficult to quantify

the benefits of the actions that have been taken. The agencies believe,

however, that these actions (described above), are the ones most likely

to reduce or eliminate fatal and serious injuries.

Other Comments Received About School Bus Safety

Fourteen commenters supported the agencies' tentative conclusion

not to designate School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area.

These commenters included three national highway safety organizations,

ten State highway safety/transportation agencies and one State highway

patrol. Twelve commenters urged the agencies to reconsider their

tentative conclusion. These commenters included one national highway

safety organization, one national police organization, three national

pupil transportation organizations, five State departments of

education, one local PTA council and one private bus operator.

Several commenters supported the designation of School Bus Safety

as a National Priority program area based on specific safety concerns

they face. Three commenters, for example, expressed concern over recent

increases in the number of incidents involving misbehavior and violence

on school buses, and one commenter expressed concern about crashes

involving buses and heavy trucks. While these problems may be of

concern in particular communities, the comments did not reveal and our

data do not indicate that these are problems of great magnitude

throughout the nation.

The section 402 program provides States with a mechanism for

funding programs that address State or local concerns, by providing

justification that includes information on the identified problem and

the activities or projects that are planned. Accordingly, these States

and communities have the ability, if they so choose and can provide the

justification, to develop programs to address the problems identified

in their comments. Moreover, the existence of these local problems does

not support a decision to designate School Bus Safety as a National

Priority program area for the entire nation.

A number of commenters supported the agencies' view. The

Massachusetts Governor's Highway Safety Bureau, for example, stated,

``School bus safety deserves a place within the 402 program, however

each state should identify the need for funding, within the framework

of the existing 402 guidelines.'' The Michigan Department of State

Police commented, ``[school bus safety] is an important element of any

state's highway safety program but should be based upon the identified

need in a particular state.'' The Arizona Governor's Office of Highway

Safety reported that it was able to support a school bus driver/

instructor training and certification program using section 402 dollars

using the current funding procedures. Arizona commented, ``There was no

program priority for school bus safety at that time, and we were still

able to address the issue by utilizing the current U.S. Department of

Transportation 402 program management procedures already in place.''

The comments of the National Association of Governors' Highway

Safety Representatives (NAGHSR) were most comprehensive, and

represented the views expressed by many of the other commenters. NAGHSR

stated:

We * * * concur that school bus safety should not be designated

a National Program Priority. NAGHSR is very supportive of the need

for protecting the safety of school children. However, state crash

statistics indicate that the problem is not of sufficient magnitude

to warrant a priority designation. Furthermore, we are concerned

that the designation of school bus safety will divert scarce 402

resources away from critical highway safety areas such as impaired

driving, occupant protection, and speed control. States currently

have the flexibility to spend 402 funds on school bus safety if the

needs exist and can be documented. This flexibility is sufficient to

address whatever school bus safety needs may exist.

Many commenters that urged the agencies to designate School Bus

Safety as a National Priority program area did so not based on a

perceived current safety problem or concern, but rather based on a need

for continued funding to maintain their positive safety record. As

explained previously, however, this is not a valid criterion for

designating a program to be a National Priority area.

The agencies are not attempting, as suggested by the National

School Transportation Association, to ``[p]enaliz[e] the industry for

doing a good job.'' In fact, we applaud the industry for its dedication

and continued excellent record of service and safety. Rather, we are

simply making our best efforts to ensure that scarce 402 resources are

used where they can have the greatest positive effect.

Most of the commenters agreed with this approach. The North

Carolina Department of Transportation, for example, stated, ``By not

including school bus safety as a priority program NHTSA and FHWA will

allow limited resources to be utilized where they can be most

effective.'' New Mexico commented that it supports the agencies'

decision to ``leav[e] school bus safety in its current status as an

important area of state efforts to protect children, but without

elevating it to a higher status as a national priority program area.''

The agencies understand the concern of many of the commenters who

are fearful that funds currently available may be discontinued. The

agencies do not intend for the decision not to include School Bus

Safety as a National Priority program to create an implication that

resources currently devoted to School Bus Safety should be reduced or

redirected.

A number of commenters noted that many more school children die or

are injured as pedestrians or bicyclists than as school bus occupants.

The National School Transportation Association stated, ``Outside the

bus, in the loading/unloading zone area, has been and is still the

problem area.'' According to NHTSA's ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993--

School Buses,'' of the people who lost their lives in school bus-

related crashes from 1983 through 1993, 59 percent were occupants of

other vehicles involved in the crash, 30 percent were non-occupants

(pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) and only 11 percent were occupants of

school buses.

Some of these commenters were hopeful that problems related to the

loading and unloading of school children can be addressed through the

Pedestrian Safety program area, which was designated a National

Priority area in 1991. Within this context, some commenters requested

additional emphasis and attention from the agencies with regard to

pedestrian safety issues, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction

in Washington State cautioned that ``the emphasis of [pedestrian safety

programs] usually has little to do with school bus stops.''

NHTSA has already taken steps to address this concern, which is

shared by the agencies. In September 1992, NHTSA started a research and

development effort relating to elementary school-age pedestrians who

are school bus riders. Under this effort, which was completed in the

spring of 1994, the agency reviewed existing training materials and

national crash data relating to school bus pedestrian safety for

elementary school-age children; developed a school bus/pedestrian

safety educational program for children in grades K-6, which includes

teacher's guides, a poster and a video for grades K-3, videos and

brochures for parents and bus drivers, and promotional materials;

selected a school district to assess the program's effectiveness in

reducing crash-related behaviors; implemented and evaluated the program

in that district and modified the program, as warranted. A report

regarding this effort is expected to be published in the spring of

1995.

As stated earlier, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to

undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on the school bus/

pedestrian safety educational program. This program is currently being

modified into a product that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates

reaching over seven million people in its initial marketing effort.

The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) objected to the agencies' decision

by arguing that Congress ``mandated'' in ISTEA that School Bus Safety

must be a priority program. CAS asserted that, since Congress was aware

when it enacted ISTEA that there were lower fatality rates for school

buses, ``The only way for DOT to overturn the Congressional mandate in

ISTEA that school bus safety shall be a Priority Program is for DOT to

find that a Priority Program cannot reduce deaths and injuries in

school bus accidents.'' According to CAS, ``DOT cannot substitute its

judgment for that of Congress which has determined that saving even a

few lives from school bus accidents is as important a priority as

saving thousands of lives lost due to excess speeds.''

The agencies strongly disagree with CAS' comments. We have no

reason to believe, and CAS cites no basis for its assertions, that

Congress mandated that School Bus Safety must be designated a priority

program if the program has the potential to save just a single life or

that Congress believes that the thousands of lives lost due to excess

speeds (many of whom are children) are somehow less important than the

few children whose lives are lost in school buses.

In fact, the legislative history shows quite the contrary. The

House version of ISTEA identified eight required and seven optional

highway safety programs. Speeding was identified in the House

legislation as a required program; school bus safety was identified as

an optional program. (The Senate version of ISTEA had no comparable

provision.) The final ISTEA legislation, which was developed in

conference, listed just six program areas and eliminated the separate

categories. However, it specifically provided the agencies with the

option of choosing not to designate one or more of these six programs

as National Priorities by reporting to Congress the reasons for not

establishing the programs as priority areas. (CAS acknowledged this

option in its comments.) Moreover, there is no suggestion anywhere in

the legislative history that School Bus Safety (or any of the highway

safety programs, for that matter) should meet criteria other than those

normally applied by the agencies when they determine what programs

should be designated as National Priority areas.

CAS also questioned the agencies' reliance on data from FARS,

``Accident Facts'' and the National Safety Council. CAS argued that the

agencies should not rely on these data because they under-report school

crashes, deaths and injuries. Another commenter, Advocates for Highway

and Auto Safety, also pointed out that school bus crashes, injuries and

fatalities may be under-reported, and suggested that the agencies

investigate this issue. This commenter, however, fully supported the

agencies' preliminary conclusions.

The agencies acknowledge that there may be some under-reporting of

school bus crashes, deaths and injuries, and we are taking steps to

improve these data. Currently, pursuant to section 2002(a) of ISTEA,

the Department is in the process of developing minimum reporting

criteria for States regarding deaths and injuries resulting from school

bus crashes, as well as deaths and injuries involving other

circumstances. While it may be possible to improve the data, it is

clear from the data currently available (including those contained in

comments received in response to the NPRM) that the numbers of school

bus crashes, injuries and fatalities are extremely low.

School Bus Safety Determination

The safety of children in school buses is an important concern,

since any crash, particularly one resulting in fatalities or serious

injury to children, is so tragic.

However, the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities involving

school buses is small, particularly when considering exposure and when

compared to the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities related to

other priority programs.

The agencies believe significant attention has been devoted to

School Bus Safety and steps have been taken to improve the already

excellent safety record of this mode of transportation.

Furthermore, the states already have the ability under the Section

402 program to address school bus and other highway safety programs,

and are proficient in allocating existing resources as they deem

necessary to achieve maximum safety benefits. In addition, the States

are able to address the majority of school bus-related fatalities,

which occur while children are boarding or exiting, not riding the bus,

under the Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety program, which is a designated

National Priority area.

For these reasons, and based on a review of the comments and other

information currently available, the agencies conclude that there is

not sufficient justification for designating School Bus Safety as a

National Priority program area.

Therefore, the agencies have not included School Bus Safety as a

National Priority program at this time. The agencies wish to stress

that this decision should not be construed to imply that the current

resources focused upon School Bus Safety should be reduced or

redirected. NHTSA and FHWA believe that all existing efforts in this

area should be continued to maintain the impressive safety record

associated with school bus transportation.

Other Comments

One commenter, a local health department in Reno, Nevada, urged the

agencies to reinstate Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as a priority

program under section 402. As mentioned earlier in this notice, EMS was

designated as a priority program on April 1, 1982. It has not been

removed from the list of priorities. In fact, every program that has

been designated by the agencies as a priority program remains on the

list.

As explained above, ISTEA required that the Secretary of

Transportation either designate six program areas as priority highway

safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons

for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the programs

that NHTSA and FHWA had previously designated as priority areas

(Traffic Records, Emergency Medical Services, Pedestrian and Bicycle

Safety and Roadway Safety) were not listed in ISTEA. ISTEA continued to

provide the agencies with authority, however, to include additional

programs or maintain existing programs on the list of priority areas.

Accordingly, these four programs continue to be included on the list of

National Priority program areas.

The National Sheriffs' Association recommended that the following

be considered priority programs: (1) Speed Control; (2) Occupant

Protection/Child Safety Protection; (3) DWI/DUI Detection and

Standardized Field Sobriety Programs for law enforcement officers/

deputies; (4) Conspicuity Markings at Railway/Railroad/Mass Transit

Crossings and (5) Drug Evaluation, Classification, Drug Recognition

Expert (DRE), and the Drug Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for

law enforcement officers/deputies.

As explained above, this final rule designates Speed Control as a

National Priority program area. Occupant Protection has been a National

Priority area since 1982. It includes activities designed to protect

occupants who are children. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures has

also been a National Priority since 1982. States and communities may

conduct DWI/DUI Detection, Standardized Field Sobriety, Drug Evaluation

and Classification (DEC), Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), and Drug

Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for law enforcement officers/

deputies under this program area. The agencies do not see a need to

emphasize these programs as separate priorities. Finally, States and

communities can conduct certain activities to improve the conspicuity

of markings at railway, railroad and mass transit crossings under

Roadway Safety, a FHWA National Priority program. In addition, there

are other sources of Federal assistance available from FHWA to improve

safety in this area. FHWA does not believe there is reason to designate

these activities as a separate priority program.

Economic and Other Effects

The agencies have considered the impacts associated with this

action, and determined that it is not significant within the meaning of

Executive Order 12866 and the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures.

The rulemaking does not affect the level of funding available in the

highway safety program or otherwise have a significant economic impact.

Accordingly, this rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O.

12866.

Small Entity Impact

In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the agencies

have evaluated the effects of this action on small entities. Based on

the evaluation, we certify that this rule will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. States are

the recipients of any funds awarded under the section 402 program.

Accordingly, the preparation of a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is

unnecessary.

Environmental Impacts

The agencies have also analyzed this action for the purpose of the

National Environmental Policy Act. The agencies have determined that

this action will not have any effect on the human environment.

Federalism Assessment

This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and it has been determined

that it has no federalism implication that warrants the preparation of

a federalism assessment.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The requirement relating to this regulation, that each State must

submit a highway safety plan to receive section 402 grant funds, is

considered to be an information collection requirement, as that term is

defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 5 CFR part

1320. Accordingly, these requirements have been submitted to and

approved by OMB, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.

Sec. 3501 et seq.). These requirements have been approved through 11/

30/95; OMB No. 2127-0501. This final rule establishes no new

information collection requirement, as that term is defined by the OMB

in 5 CFR part 1320.

List of Subjects in 23 CFR Part 1205

Grant programs, Highway safety.

In consideration of the foregoing, the agencies amend 23 CFR Part

1205 as follows:

PART 1205--[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for Part 1205 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 23 U.S.C. 402; delegations of authority at 49 CFR

1.48 and 1.50.

2. In Sec. 1205.3, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 1205.3 Identification of National Priority Program Areas.

* * * * *

(c) Under statutory provisions jointly administered by NHTSA and

FHWA, the following highway safety program areas, jointly administered

by NHTSA and FHWA, have been identified as encompassing a major highway

safety problem which is of national concern, and for which effective

countermeasures have been identified. Programs developed in such areas

are eligible for Federal funding, pursuant to guidelines issued by

NHTSA and FHWA and the review procedures set forth in Sec. 1205.4:

(1) Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety

(2) Speed Control

Issued on: December 7, 1994.

Rodney E. Slater,

Administrator, Federal Highway Administration.

Ricardo Martinez,

Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

[FR Doc. 94-30514 Filed 12-12-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-59-P