Proposed Finding of No Significant Impact; Proposed Tokamak Physics Experiment, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Proposed Finding of No Significant Impact; Proposed Tokamak

Physics Experiment, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Proposed finding of no significant impact.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this Proposed

Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) on its proposal to construct

and operate the proposed Tokamak Physics Experiment. This proposed

finding is based on the DOE Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor Decontamination

and Decommissioning Project and Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX)

Environmental Assessment (EA), DOE/EA-0813, August 1994, which

evaluates the environmental effects of using the existing Tokamak

Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) systems and accessory facilities in the

proposed construction and operation of the TPX. The purpose of the TPX

is to develop fusion energy to compensate for dwindling supplies of

fossil fuels and the eventual depletion of fissionable uranium used in

present-day nuclear reactors. Proceeding with the TPX is contingent on

use of existing TFTR systems and appurtenant facilities.

Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is an integral part of

the scope of the proposed TPX; therefore both projects are evaluated in

this EA.

Based on the analyses in the EA, the DOE believes that the proposed

action is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.

Therefore, the DOE is issuing a Proposed FONSI pursuant to the Council

on Environmental Quality regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts

1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulations (10 CFR Part

1021). DOE will consider comments received in making a final

determination on whether to issue a FONSI or to prepare an

environmental impact statement.

DATES: Comments on the proposed FONSI should be postmarked November 4,

1994, to ensure consideration. Comments postmarked after that date will

be considered to the extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the proposed FONSI and requests for

copies of the TPX EA should be directed to: Dr. W.S. White, U.S.

Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, Illinois 60439,

(708) 252-2101.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Requests for further information on the proposed project should be sent

to: Milton D. Johnson, Manager, Princeton Area Office, U.S. Department

of Energy, P.O. Box 102, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609) 243-3700.

For general information on the DOE NEPA review process, contact:

Carol M. Borgstrom, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of NEPA Oversight

(EH-25), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202)

586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Proposed Action

The proposed action is to use the existing TFTR systems and

accessory facilities in the construction and operation of TPX, which

would be primarily located inside the existing TFTR Test Cell. The TPX

would require dismantlement and removal of all TFTR activated systems

within the TFTR Test Cell Complex. Dismantlement and removal of

nonradioactive and low activation components in areas such as the Test

Cell Basement and the Hot Cell, would start immediately after the

conclusion of the TFTR deuterium-tritium experiment, which is expected

to conclude in Fiscal Year 1995. Cool-down of the Tokamak in the test

cell will commence at that time.

The TPX is being proposed as a national facility for fusion energy

research to be built at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL).

Its primary mission is to develop the scientific basis for an

economical, more compact, and continuously operating Tokamak in support

of the design of an attractive demonstration fusion power plant.

Waste from decontamination and decommissioning would include

stainless steel and aluminum structures, piping, copper coils, graphite

tiles, solidified radioactive liquids, anti-contamination materials,

and concrete rubble. Waste would be packaged into Department of

Transportation (DOT) approved containers and transported to the DOE

Hanford site in Richland, Washington, as are current PPPL wastes.

Approximately 950 m3 (33,500 ft3) of waste weighing

approximately 2270 metric tonnes (2500 tons) would also be disposed.

Construction of a radioactive waste storage building for temporary

storage of radioactive waste and final preparation of some radioactive

waste shipments would be required. This facility would be approximately

560 m2 (6000 ft2) in size, and would be constructed within

the existing TFTR facility fence. A second storm water detention basin

similar to and west of the existing detention basin would also be

constructed.

Decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR Test Cell could be

completed in approximately 1.5 years, after a 2-year cool-down period.

TPX construction would minimally overlap decontamination and

decommissioning of TFTR facilities. The TFTR Test Cell Complex would

then be available for the TPX approximately 3.5 years after termination

of TFTR deuterium-tritium experiments. The total cost for the

decontamination and decommissioning of the TFTR is estimated to be $86

million.

The construction and operation of the TPX would take place within

the existing TFTR facility at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

(PPPL), with construction scheduled to begin in early FY-1998. The TPX

conceptual design is based on the use of deuterium fuel, but does not

preclude the potential upgrade and use of tritium fuel in the final

year of operation. Existing TFTR facilities would be adapted and used

by the TPX, including TFTR Test Cell Complex; ventilation exhaust vent

and intake shafts; mockup building; tritium cleanup/waste handling

area; field coil power conversion building; neutral beam power

conversion building; radioactive waste systems space; office and

technical support space; and miscellaneous PPPL support facilities. In

addition to providing space for the TPX, the TFTR Test Cell Complex

would provide shielding (via concrete walls, roof, and floor), and

provide for confinement and handling of tritium-contaminated and/or

radioactive components.

The cost for construction of the TPX is estimated at $500M (FY-93),

with the construction period 1997 to 2000. New facilities to be

constructed include TFTR Test Cell building modifications, a new

Cryogenic Equipment building, tank yards for water cooling and

cryogenic tanks, and a new electrical substation. The Test Cell

building modifications would be internal and would not increase the

existing external dimensions of the building. The Cryogenic Equipment

building would be constructed as a standard industrial single-story

building, totaling about 1000 m2 (10,800 ft2) in area. The

tank yard construction would include approximately 2,130 m2

(22,950 ft2) of new tank yard areas for new gaseous helium tanks,

liquid nitrogen storage tanks, water storage tanks, and truck-trailer

access. This construction would take place on existing open space. The

electrical substation construction would involve installation of a new

138 kV transmission line between the existing substation and the new

substation. The new substation would be for transforming 138 kV power

to 13.8 kV. A new electric power line would be constructed entirely on

PPPL property.

Machine assembly would be scheduled for 1998, with the first

operations during 2000. The TPX would be fueled with hydrogen and

deuterium plasmas for 10 years; radiation generation would not be

significant in terms of neutron activation of components or

radiological doses. In deuterium operation, the peak fusion power would

not exceed 140 kW. During long pulse deuterium operation, neutrons with

energies of 2.45 mega electron volts (MeV) would be the primary

neutrons produced, and annual production of these neutrons would be

limited to 6.0 x 1021 neutrons. A smaller number of 14.1 MeV

neutrons would be produced from deuterium-tritium fusion reactions with

tritium produced from the deuterium-deuterium fusion reactions. The

number of 14.1 MeV neutrons produced during deuterium operations would

be approximately 2% of the number of 2.45 MeV neutrons produced.

The TPX facility would be capable of operating with deuterium-

tritium plasmas during the last year of TPX operation. During

deuterium-tritium operation, a fully-formed deuterium plasma would be

developed (requiring up to roughly 1,000 seconds), into which tritium

would be injected. Once tritium has been injected, the device would

operate for 2 seconds with a peak fusion power of 15 MW, after which

the plasma would be terminated. During the 2 seconds of deuterium-

tritium operation, both 2.45 MeV neutrons and 14.1 MeV neutrons would

be produced, from deuterium-deuterium and deuterium-tritium fusion

reactions, respectively. Production of 2.45 MeV neutrons during

deuterium-tritium operation would be approximately 1% of the 14.1 MeV

neutron production rate. Operation of the Tokamak would be controlled

to limit annual neutron production so that the site boundary dose

restriction adopted by the project would not be exceeded. The

deuterium-tritium phase (if used) would be limited to the last year of

TPX operation. Small amounts of tritium, and air activation products

would be released, and minor amounts of direct radiation would result

from fusion neutrons and activated structural components of TPX.

Low-level solid radioactive wastes generated during TPX operations

would consist of contaminated items (e.g., protective clothing) and

solidified liquid wastes (tritiated water absorbed on desiccant and

solidified liquid waste from the decontamination area). The volume of

waste would be similar to that generated by TFTR operations, which was

appropriated 7.4 m3 per year for deuterium-deuterium operations,

and is projected to increase during deuterium-tritium operations to

28.3 m3 per year (1000 ft3 per year). Wastes generated during

TPX operations would be packaged to comply with applicable DOE and DOT

requirements and is expected to be shipped to the DOE Hanford

Reservation in Washington for disposal, as are current PPPL wastes.

Alternatives

Three alternatives were considered: (1) The proposed action, use of

the TFTR facilities for the proposed construction and operation of the

TPX at PPPL, (2) proposed construction and operation of the TPX at the

Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and (3) no action. Location of the

TPX at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, near Knoxville,

Tennessee, would require construction of new support facilities

including a new test cell, hot cell, waste handling and storage areas,

field coil power conversion building, and cryogenic facilities. The

additional cost and time would jeopardize the U.S. fusion program and

make the TPX project infeasible. Under the no action alternative,

decontamination and decommission of TFTR facilities would occur under

current management practices, but may involve a longer delay between

safe shutdown activities and commencement of decontamination and

decommissioning activities. The longer delay would not fit within the

current schedule to meet the construction of the TPX. This delay may in

turn be followed by a 2-3 year period of delay, during which the TFTR

facility would be in a state of protective custody. The TPX would not

proceed under the no action alternative.

Environmental Impacts

The Environmental Assessment analyzed the impacts of the TFTR

decontamination and decomissioning and TPX construction and operation

on the environment and on the health and safety of workers and the

public. Both routine operations and off-normal or accident scenarios

were assessed. The Environmental Assessment considered impacts to air

quality, noise, water quality and quantity, aquatic and terrestrial

ecology, threatened and endangered species, the visual environment,

land use, historical and archaeological resources, socioeconomic

environment, radiological conditions, and impacts of potential

accidents. No significant environmental impacts associated with the

proposed action are anticipated.

Activities associated with decontamination and decommissioning of

the TFTR would not present any long-term or adverse nonradiological

impacts to the public or the environment. It would result in minor

impacts, consisting primarily of commitment of a small area of onsite

land for the radioactive waste storage building and the second storm

water detention basin. Construction of the radioactive waste storage

building and storm water detention basin may result in a temporary

small increase of effluent to Bee Brook, but would not exceed PPPL New

Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit or other State or

federal regulatory requirements.

Potential radiological impacts of TFTR decontamination and

decommissioning would not represent potential impacts greater than

those from current PPPL operations, which have had no significant

consequences. Decontamination and decommissioning activities would

result in a dose of less than the adopted design objective of 10 mrem

per year to any member of the public from all project sources. It would

result in minor releases of activated metal and tritium to the

atmosphere and sewer system. The maximum calculated individual public

dose would be 2.3 mrem per year, and the increased probability of

incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure from this

dose would be 1.1 chances in 1,000,000. This very low calculated effect

means insignificant risk to the public. Occupational doses would not

exceed the PPPL administrative limit of 1 rem per year, which is less

than the DOE limit of 5 rem per year.

Operational occurrences during decontamination and decommissioning

that could result in the accidental release of tritium, activated

gases, or solids consist primarily of component failures and human

error, and any releases would be limited by inventories within the

components. The largest calculated dose to the public from

decontamination and decommissioning accident scenarios, including

beyond design basis accidents, is 390 mrem to a maximally exposed

member of the public. The increased probability of incremental lifetime

cancer risk associated with exposure from this dose would be 195

chances in 1,000,000.

The TPX would not present long-term or adverse nonradiological

impacts to the public or the environment at the PPPL site. Other TPX

nonradiological impacts would be temporary, except for the commitment

of a small parcel of land for construction of new TPX facilities.

Construction impacts due to test cell modifications and construction of

the cryogenic equipment building, tank yards, and electric substation

would be minor. All construction would be built on land already

committed to DOE operations. This construction would all be within the

current land use restrictions governing PPPL site agreements with the

DOE. For a construction project of this scope, the potential exists for

2.5 lost workday cases (work related injuries that require time-off

from work) over the construction period. Also there would be a 10%

increase in the current amount of site traffic, which would increase

the potential for on-site vehicular accidents slightly.

Radiological impacts from the TPX would not exceed current impacts

from PPPL operations, which has not been shown to cause incremental

lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure. Potential environmental,

safety, and health radiological impacts were evaluated for both

deuterium and possible future tritium operations. Atmospheric releases

of tritium and activation products constitute the potential sources of

radiological exposure to members of the public. Maximum projected

atmospheric releases would result in annual effective dose equivalents

of 1.2 mrem and 4.6 mrem to a hypothetical maximally-exposed individual

at the site boundary during deuterium and tritium operations,

respectively, with a maximum increased probability of incremental

lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure of 2.3 chances in

1,000,000. These conservatively-calculated dose equivalents are less

than the most restrictive limit for public doses caused by airborne

releases (the EPA limit of 10 mrem per year). Direct radiation from the

TPX would be mitigated with shielding to keep the total effective dose

equivalent from all sources at the site boundary within the project

design objective of less than or equal to 10 mrem per year. This design

objective effective dose equivalent is well below the DOE limit of 100

mrem per year to members of the public from routine DOE operations.

Normal TPX deuterium-tritium operations would result in total

estimated collective effective dose equivalents of 7.5 person-rem per

year and 24 person-rem per year to the projected population within the

80 km (50 mi) radius area surrounding PPPL during deuterium and tritium

operations, respectively. These doses amount to an average effective

dose equivalent of less than 0.002 mrem per year to each individual in

the assessment area and would result in less than 1 health effect in

the exposed population. On the basis of the collective effective dose

equivalent, incremental lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure

attributable to TPX operations are not expected to occur. A collective

effective dose equivalent of 24 person-rem per year represents

approximately .002% of the collective effective dose equivalent from

natural background radiation in the area (exclusive of radon).

Occupational doses to workers during TPX operations would result from

direct radiation and small releases of tritium and activated gases.

Operational procedures, administrative controls and monitoring would

ensure that occupational doses are kept below regulatory limits and as

low as reasonably achievable.

Accidental releases of radioactive material could hypothetically

result from (a) Natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes), (b) accidents

with external origin (e.g., airplane crashes), (c) shipping accidents

(i.e., accidents involving the transportation of radioactive material),

and (d) operational occurrences (e.g., tritium leaks). All TPX

confinement boundaries would be capable of maintaining integrity for

design basis natural phenomenon, and therefore a release due to a

natural phenomena event is extremely unlikely.

Accidents with external origins and transportation accidents

involving small quantities of radioactive material would present little

risk to the public and the environment. Transportation accidents

involving larger quantities of radioactive material, form example

tritium, could occur; however, the accidental release of significant

quantities of radionuclides has a very low probability because of the

demonstrated integrity of the approved containers that would be used.

TPX operational occurrences that could result in the accidental

release of tritium, activated gases, or solids consist primarily of

component failures and human error. Releases associated with these

occurrences would be limited by component inventories. The maximum

calculated individual dose from accident scenarios is 390 mrem, which

is well below the DOE siting guideline limit of 25 rem. Incremental

lifetime cancer risk associated with exposure resulting from the

collective doses would represent a negligible increase in the total

number of such health effects in the exposed population from all

natural background radiation doses. The largest potential radiological

impacts to the public from TPX accidents, including beyond design basis

accidents, are below regulatory limits.

After TPX operation has ended, a proper NEPA review would be

conducted for the decontamination and decommissioning of the facility.

It is expected that the waste material resulting from decontamination

and decommissioning activities would qualify as low-level radioactive

waste and would be disposed of at an appropriate DOE waste disposal

facility.

TFTR operations would be discontinued prior to TFTR decontamination

and decommissioning. Cumulative effects would be minor and would

represent a continuation of, rather than a change in, any impacts

(negative and positive) associated with TFTR operations. Commitment of

560 m\2\ (6,000 ft\2\) of land for the construction of the radioactive

waste storage building and 1,300 m\2\ (14,000 ft\2\) for construction

of a second storm water detention basin would represent a long-term

commitment of land use. Environmental releases of small amounts of

residual tritium during decontamination and decommissioning would not

add measurably to current low levels.

No adverse long-term environmental effects are expected from normal

operations of the TPX. Tritium releases during normal operations would

not constitute a measurable contribution to background radiation

levels, because of the small amount of tritium to be released, its

relatively short half-life (12.3 years), and rapid dispersion in the

environment. There are currently no measurable cumulative impacts

occurring between PPPL and other facilities in the region, and none

would be expected for the proposed TPX. Releases of radionuclides to

the atmosphere by commercial operations (such as hospitals and research

laboratories) near PPPL are not detectable in environmental samples

collected around PPPL; analyses show no radionuclide concentrations

above background levels.

Invitation To Comment

DOE invites the public, including states which host DOE facilities

and any Indian tribe that might be affected by the proposed action, to

comment on this proposed FONSI. Please direct any comments to Dr. W.S.

White at the address presented in the previous section.

In accordance with 40 CFR 1501.4(a)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 1021.322(d),

DOE is making this proposed FONSI available for public review for 30

days. Copies of the EA are available upon request at the address given

below. DOE will also make public comments received on this proposed

FONSI available to the public. The EA and other material pertaining to

this proposal are available for public review at the DOE public reading

rooms listed below.

New Jersey, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Library, James

Forrestal Campus, Route 1, Princeton, New Jersey 08542, (609) 243-3565.

District of Columbia, U.S. Department of Energy, Freedom of Information

Reading Room, Forrestal Building, Room 1E-90, 1000 Independence Avenue,

SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-6020.

For information on the availability of specific documents and hours

of operation, please contact reading rooms at the telephone numbers

provided.

Proposed Determination

Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, the DOE

believes that the proposed action at the PPPL is not a major Federal

action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment

within the meaning of the NEPA, and that an environmental impact

statement is not required. DOE will make its final determination on

whether to issue a FONSI or prepare an environmental impact statement

after the 30-day public review period.

Issued in Argonne, Illinois, this 21st day of September, 1994.

John P. Kennedy,

Assistant Manager for Safety and Technical Support, Chicago Operations

Office.

[FR Doc. 94-24580 Filed 10-4-94; 8:45 am]

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