Power Brake Regulations; Proposed Rule DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

SUMMARY: FRA proposes revisions to regulations governing train and

locomotive power braking systems. The proposed revisions are designed

to achieve safety by better adapting the regulations to the needs of

contemporary railroad operations and better facilitating the

introduction and use of advanced technologies. These proposed revisions

are being issued in order to comply with recently enacted legislation,

to respond to petitions for rulemaking, and to address areas of concern

derived from experience in the application of existing standards.

DATES: Written Comments: Written comments must be received by December

31, 1994. Comments received after that date will be considered to the

extent possible without incurring additional expenses or delay.

Public Hearings: A series of public hearings will be held on the

dates and at the locations listed below to provide interested parties

the opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions contained in the

NPRM.

The dates of the public hearings are as follows:

Monday, October 24 and Tuesday, October 25, 1994 at 9 a.m. in

Washington, DC.

Tuesday, November 1 and Wednesday, November 2, 1994 at 9 a.m. in

Chicago, Illinois.

Friday, November 4, 1994 at 9 a.m. in Newark, New Jersey.

Wednesday, November 9, 1994 at 9 a.m. in Sacramento, California.

Any person wishing to participate in a public hearing should notify

the Docket Clerk at the address provided below at least five working

days prior to the date of the hearing. This notification should

identify the hearing in which the person wishes to participate, the

party the person represents, and the particular subject matter(s) the

person plans to address. The notification should also provide the

Docket Clerk with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the

right to limit participation in the hearings of persons who fail to

provide such notification.

ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Address comments to the Docket Clerk,

Office of Chief Counsel, RCC-30, Federal Railroad Administration, 400

Seventh Street SW., Room 8201, Washington, DC 20590. Comments should

identify the docket and notice number, and five copies should be

submitted. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their

comments should include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The Docket

Clerk will indicate on the postcard the date on which the comments were

received and will return the card to the addressee. The dockets are

housed in Room 8201 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20590. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours

of 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.

(2) Public Hearings: Hearings to discuss particular issues will be

held at these locations:

Washington, DC: Nassif Building, Conference Room 2230, 400 Seventh

Street SW., Washington, DC.

Topics: Issues relevant to all operations.

Chicago: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 12th Floor Conference Room,

111 North Canal Street, Chicago, Illinois

Topics: Issues relevant specifically to freight operations.

Newark: Peter W. Rodino Federal Building, Conference Room 204-205,

970 Broadway, Newark, New Jersey

Topics: Issues relevant specifically to passenger and commuter

operations.

Sacramento: Clarion Hotel, 700 16th Street, Sacramento, California

Tel: (800) 443-0880

Topics: Issues relevant to all operations.

Persons desiring to participate in any of the hearings should

notify the Docket Clerk by writing to: Docket Clerk, Office of Chief

Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Chief, Motive

Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA,

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-366-4094 or

202-366-9186), or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief

Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone

202-366-0628).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

INTRODUCTION

Background

49 U.S.C. Sec. 20141 (formerly contained in Section 7 of the Rail

Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No. 102-365

(September 3, 1992), amending Section 202 of the Federal Railroad

Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et

seq.), by adding a new subsection related to power brake safety which

states:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.--(1) The Secretary shall conduct a review

of the Department of Transportation's rules with respect to railroad

power brakes, and not later than December 31, 1993, shall revise such

rules based on such safety data as may be presented during that review.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, where

applicable, prescribe standards regarding dynamic brake equipment.

(3)(A) The Secretary shall require 2-way end of train devices (or

devices able to perform the same function) on road trains other than

locals, road switchers, or work trains to enable the initiation of

emergency braking from the rear of the train. The Secretary shall

promulgate rules as soon as possible, but not later than December 31,

1993, requiring such 2-way end of train devices. Such rules shall at a

minimum--

(i) set standards for such devices based on performance;

(ii) prohibit any railroad, on or after the date that is one year

after promulgation of such rules, from acquiring any end of train

device for use on trains which is not a 2-way device meeting the

standards set under clause (i);

(iii) require that such trains be equipped with 2-way end of train

devices meeting such standards not later than 4 years after

promulgation of such rules; and

(iv) provide that any 2-way end of train device acquired for use on

trains before such promulgation shall be deemed to meet such standards.

(B) The Secretary may consider petitions to amend the rules

promulgated under subparagraph (A) to allow the use of alternative

technologies which meet the same basic performance requirements

established by such rules.

(C) In developing the rules required by subparagraph (A), the

Secretary shall consider data presented under paragraph (1).

(4) The Secretary may exclude from the rules required by paragraphs

(1), (2), and (3) any category of trains or rail operations if the

Secretary determines that such an exclusion is in the public interest

and is consistent with railroad safety. The Secretary shall make public

the reasons for granting any such exclusion. The Secretary shall at a

minimum exclude from the requirements of paragraph (3)--

(A) trains that have manned cabooses;

(B) passenger trains with emergency brakes;

(C) trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of

the general railroad system;

(D) trains that do not exceed 30 miles per hour and do not operate

on heavy grades, except for any categories of such trains specifically

designated by the Secretary; and

(E) trains that operate in a push mode. Pub. L. No. 102-365,

Sec. 7; 45 U.S.C. 431(r).

On December 31, 1992, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the possible revision of the power brake

regulations (57 FR 62546). The ANPRM provided background information

and presented questions on various subjects including: the use and

design of end-of-train (EOT) telemetry devices; the air flow method of

train brake testing; the additional testing of train air brakes during

extremely cold weather; the training of employees to perform train

brake tests and inspections; computer-assisted braking systems; the

operation of dynamic brakes on locomotives; and other miscellaneous

subjects relating to conventional brake systems as well as information

regarding high speed passenger train brakes. The questions presented in

the ANPRM on the various topics were intended as fact-finding tools and

were intended to elicit the views of those persons outside FRA charged

with ensuring compliance with the power brake regulations on a day-to-

day basis.

Following publication of the ANPRM, FRA conducted four days of

technical workshops in early 1993 to elicit information and views.

Workshops were conducted in Kansas City, Missouri on February 17; in

Chicago, Illinois on March 2 and 3; and in Newark, New Jersey on March

9. These workshops were attended by at least seventeen railroads, three

organizations representing railroads, four labor organizations and

various individual members of the organizations, four manufacturers of

train brake-related equipment, and several governmental agencies.

Written comments were received from most of these parties or their

individual members. In addition to the written comments received from

the parties that attended the workshops, written comments were also

received from one other railroad, one state public utilities

commission, one state transit authority, and one private citizen.

FRA has carefully considered all of the oral and written comments

offered by the various parties. The resulting Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM) is based on these comments as well as FRA's

experience with enforcing the current power brake regulations.

Prologue

FRA's institutional experience in locomotive and train braking

safety extends backwards in time to creation of the Department of

Transportation in 1967 (at which time the Bureau of Railroad Safety and

its functions were transferred from the Interstate Commerce

Commission), to the passage of the Power or Train Brakes Safety

Appliance Act of 1958, and ultimately to the passage of the original

Safety Appliance Act 100 years ago. Current FRA personnel have, during

prior years, served in a variety of capacities on every major railroad.

Each of them has been exposed--in their combined Federal and private

sector careers--to a vastly richer panorama of American railroading

than most railroad employees will enjoy in a lifetime. These railroad

safety inspectors, supervisors, and managers contribute daily to the

rulemaking judgments ultimately expressed by the Federal Railroad

Administrator, and the agency has made a special effort in this

proceeding to tap the knowledge that these individuals possess to

ascertain the means by which public and employee safety may be secured.

The experience of the agency yields the following broad findings.

These finding are based upon hundreds of accident investigations, tens

of thousands of days of inspection activity, and hundreds of thousands

of contacts with railroad employees, supervisors, and managers, as well

as the comments to this docket:

In general, locomotive and train brake safety is good.

Investments in improved technology offer the possibility of further

progress in the future.

However, exceptions to this rule are numerous and

persistent.

Exceptions often derive from railroads' attempts to speed

the provision of efficient transportation services.

The current structure of the regulations tends to impede

efficient provision of transportation services, while creating

incentives to evade the regulations and imposing certain requirements

that are not effective in practice.

Accordingly, continuation of the current regulatory

structure--which with every passing year becomes less well adapted to

the current realities of the industry--is likely to erode safety over

time.

Train Brake Inspections

The principal problems addressed in this notice concern the safety

of conventional freight trains. In particular, the current regulations

focus great attention on intensive and often repetitive train brake

inspections conducted at departure from major terminals and at fixed

intervals en route. Under these circumstances, tremendous incentives

exist to ``overlook'' or fail to inspect rigorously for what may be

viewed as minor defects on individual cars. In some cases, personnel

have been instructed to disregard defective conditions in order to move

trains, after which FRA has often been required to resolve (or attempt

to resolve) disputed claims of responsibility in the context of

enforcement actions.

This system encourages railroads to assign inspection duties to

train crews who--while notably competent and alert in their normal

duties--have often received little training in inspection of

increasingly diverse power brake arrangements and other safety-critical

components of freight equipment. As a result of this and other

factors,1 the number of qualified mechanical personnel employed by

the railroads and the number of locations at which such personnel are

deployed have declined rapidly. In a system that ensures minimum

economies of scale, repair trucks equipped with an increasing array of

equipment are then used to provide spot-repair capability at outlying

points in cases where cars cannot be moved safely prior to repair (or

where, as in the case of the statutory power brake requirements,

movement is prohibited by law). Although this process of consolidation

and adaptation may have been both necessary and healthy in its earlier

stages, it now threatens to leave the railroads short of qualified

mechanical forces and excessively dependent on contract repair

facilities.

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\1\FRA is intimately familiar with other factors that complicate

this analysis. In particular, the competitive environment fostered

by deregulation of the motor carrier and railroad industries has led

to intensive cost cutting through rationalization of plant, more

effective utilization of equipment, substitution of automated

information systems for manual systems, and reduction of payrolls

through reductions in force and contracting out of work previously

performed by railroad employees. For the railroads, reducing

employment has become an imperative that threatens to drive itself

out of control. For instance, the Railroad Retirement System depends

upon employer contributions on behalf of less than 275,000 employees

to support over 372,000 retirees. With every employee removed from

the rolls, the likelihood increases that further increases in

Railroad Retirement Taxes will be required--creating further

perceived incentives to reduce employment.

A long-term shift in car ownership has also affected railroad

employment decisions. Approximately 40 percent of the freight car

fleet is now privately owned, including virtually all tank cars used

in revenue service.

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Adequate deployment of mechanical employees will remain necessary

for the foreseeable future, both to foster power brake safety and to

ensure that other components of locomotives and cars are adequately

inspected and maintained. Federal regulations should encourage this

process through reasonably structured incentives while avoiding any

attempt at micromanagement of business decisions. This notice embodies

a strategy to achieve safety in the short term--train by train--while

encouraging adequate deployment of mechanical personnel to provide the

eyes, hands and minds necessary for effective maintenance of railroad

rolling stock.

General Revision of Standards for Freight and Passenger Service

Commenters in this proceeding have noted, and FRA agrees, that the

current regulations fail to adequately delineate between requirements

for conventional freight braking systems and the more diverse systems

for various categories of passenger service. FRA also agrees that the

regulations should be updated to recognize contemporary electronic

systems that are used to control elements of power brake systems.

Finally, FRA has learned over years since passage of the Power or Train

Brakes Safety Appliance Act of 1958, which required adoption of the

Association of American Railroads' (AAR) recommended practices as

regulatory text, that improvements in clarity are badly needed.

Accordingly, FRA proposes a comprehensive revision of the

regulations that preserves useful elements of the current system in the

framework of an entirely new document.

The resulting proposed changes balance the concerns of rail labor

and management and would increase the effectiveness of the regulations.

The NPRM includes significant incentives to the railroads to encourage

the use of qualified mechanical forces to conduct train brake system

tests at major terminals where long-haul trains originate. The NPRM

also proposes requirements to check abuses in the single car test

program. The overall regulatory proposal focuses on safety performance

rather than micromanagement of the railroads.

In developing this proposal FRA engaged in a systems approach to

the power brake regulations. FRA considered all aspects of a railroad

operation and the effects that the entire operation has on the train

and locomotive power braking systems. Therefore, these proposed

requirements not only address specific brake equipment and inspection

requirements, but also attempt to encompass other aspects of a

railroad's operation which directly affect the quality and performance

of the braking system, such as: personnel qualifications; maintenance

requirements; written procedures governing operation, maintenance, and

inspection; record keeping requirements; and the development and

integration of new technologies. Consequently, FRA views this proposal

as an organic whole, with any one of its individual requirements being

necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the others.

As an additional aspect of this systems approach, FRA considered

the role that shortline railroads have in today's freight industry. FRA

believes that the current marketplace requires Class I railroads and

shortline railroads to operate as an integrated system. Many of today's

shortlines rely on Class I railroads for the training of their

employees and the maintenance of their equipment. In addition, many

shortline railroads and Class I railroads interchange and operate each

others equipment. Therefore, except in limited circumstances, it is

impossible, from a regulatory standpoint, to separate shortline

railroads from Class I railroads. Therefore, in order to ensure the

safety and quality of train and locomotive power braking systems

throughout the entire freight industry, this proposal generally imposes

a consistent set of requirements on shortline and Class I railroads as

a group. Although FRA recognizes that many of the operational benefits

created by this proposal are not available to most shortline

operations, FRA feels that the integrated nature of the freight

industry requires that universally consistent requirements be imposed

on both shortline and Class I railroads.

The proposed rule is justified on the basis of operating cost

savings to the industry as a whole. Cost savings due to accident/

incident prevention were quantified to some extent but were not

included in the cost impact analysis. See 49 CFR Sec. 225.5. Although

significant accident/incident reduction will occur due to the proposed

rule, the benefits were not fully quantified because of the need to

proceed with satisfaction of the statutory mandate, the already

positive benefit to cost ratio, and the difficulty associated with

quantifying the effectiveness of some of the proposals prior to further

public comment. A detailed discussion regarding the quantifying of

benefits derived from accident/incident reduction is provided in the

Regulatory Impact section of the preamble and in the Appendix to the

Regulatory Analysis.

FRA recognizes that some of the provisions contained in this

proposal may affect other FRA regulations currently in existence. For

example, the provisions regarding Special Notices for Repair for

freight cars and locomotives contained at Part 216 of this chapter do

not address nonconformity with the requirements proposed in this part.

Other FRA regulations that may be affected by these proposed

requirements are the Freight Car Safety Standards, the signal

inspection standards, and the Locomotive Engineer Qualification

Standards contained at Parts 215, 236, and 240 of this chapter

respectively. Consequently, after issuance of a final rule, FRA will

make whatever conforming or clarifying changes to FRA's other

regulations that are deemed necessary.

Discussion of Comments and General FRA Conclusions

For purposes of discussion, the comments may be grouped in four

categories by origin: (1) Railroad labor organizations and their

individual members, (2) railroad management representatives, (3)

manufacturers of train brake equipment, and (4) other commenters. FRA

noted both the common themes expressed by members of these groups and

the many variations on, and exceptions to, those themes. Discussions

follow with respect to the primary issues addressed by the commenters.

I. EOT Telemetry Devices

Since the advent of EOT devices, technological advances have been

made to incorporate ``two-way communication'' into the system. The two-

way EOT device, in addition to the features of the one-way EOT device,

has the ability of transmitting from the controlling locomotive an

emergency brake application that begins at the rear of the train. This

is a desirable feature in event of a blockage in the brake pipe that

would prevent the pneumatic transmission of the emergency brake

application throughout the entire train. In 1986, FRA concluded that

mandating the installation of two-way EOT devices was not warranted.

However, at that time FRA made a public commitment to monitor

developments in EOT device technology and to review the subject

periodically. 51 FR 17300, 17301 (May 9, 1986).

Since 1986, significant advances have been made in the development

of two-way EOT devices, and they are now commercially available in the

market place from two manufacturers. In addition, FRA has received

recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

and petitions from the United Transportation Union, the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, the Oregon Public Utilities Commission, the

Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and the Montana

Public Service Commission to require two-way EOT devices on all

cabooseless trains operating in certain territories. Furthermore, 49

U.S.C. Sec. 20141, formerly contained at Section 7 of the RSERA, which

amends the FRSA by adding a new subsection dealing with power brakes,

mandates that the Secretary of Transportation promulgate rules

requiring two-way EOT devices. Section 20141, formerly Section 7 of the

RSERA, sets out various minimum requirements that any promulgated rule

must contain. Consequently, based upon the advances in technology, the

recommendations and petitions received, and the statutory mandate, FRA

requested comments from interested parties regarding the exception of

certain operations from any two-way EOT device requirements, the

operational characteristics of the devices, the en route failure of the

devices, and the costs associated with equipping trains with the

devices. 57 FR 62546, 62550-62551 (Dec. 31, 1992).

A. Exceptions and Definitions

The AAR and several individual railroads recommended that remote

control operations and operations with helper locomotives located near

the end of the train be excepted from any two-way EOT device

requirements. The commenters contended that in these types of

operations the purpose of the two-way EOT device, to initiate an

emergency brake application commencing at the rear of the train,

disappears since either a crew has control of the brakes or the

locomotive placed near the end of the train is able to initiate a brake

application from other than the head end of the train. Union Pacific

Railroad Company also recommended an exception for all empty trains,

loaded trains used in short turnaround service of sixty miles where

grade is not a factor, and trains with less than 4,000 trailing tons.

One commenter also sought an exception for trains equipped with

secondary, fully independent brake systems that would require the

development of a unique EOT device to initiate an emergency application

from the rear of the train. One railroad suggested that no exception

should be given to any trains currently using one-way devices and that

all trains except those operating with an occupied caboose should be

equipped with two-way EOT devices.

In defining ``mountain grade'' The American Short Line Railroad

Association (ASLRA) and other commenters recommended that the

definition should be based on a variety of factors including tonnage,

length of grade, speed, percent of grade, and grade distance. The ASLRA

felt that a definition based on these factors would be consistent with

the intent of Congress not to require every small railroad to fall

under the legislation. Several other railroad representatives

recommended that the definition of mountain grade be based on both the

gradient and distance. Many of the railroad commenters proposed

definitions of 1.5-2 percent grades for a distance of five miles. Two

commenters addressed the definition of ``heavy tonnage,'' stating that

it should be defined as any train weighing over 100 tons per operative

brake.

Railroad representatives suggested that the effective date of any

regulation requiring the use of two-way devices should be extended for

the full four years permitted under the Act. The commenters felt that

the later the effective date, the fewer the number of one-way devices

that would have to be discarded and the longer the time for railroads

to spread out the costs of the new two-way devices. Railroad commenters

also recommended a grandfather clause for any two-way equipment

purchased prior to the issuance of a final rule.

Labor representatives recommended that two-way devices should be

required on all cabooseless trains that are not specifically excepted

in the RSERA. However, these commenters also admitted that grade

situations are probably the area where the devices are most useful. Two

labor representatives suggested requiring the use of the devices on

grades of one percent or greater. The Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers (BLE) wanted ``mountain grades'' defined as areas with one

percent grades for two miles. One individual conductor felt that two-

way devices should be mandatory on all trains in which the rear is

unoccupied, with a weight in excess of 2,000 tons, and a length of

greater than 3,000 feet.

FRA Conclusions. Based on consideration of Congress' purpose in

enacting Sec. 7 of the RSERA and after review of the comments received

and the accidents relied on for support of the use of two-way EOT

devices, FRA feels that the devices should be required on trains that

operate at speeds in excess of 30 mph and on trains that operate in

mountain grade territories. However, FRA believes that certain

operations, other than those specifically listed in Sec. 7 of the

RSERA, should also be excepted from the requirements regarding two-way

EOT devices. FRA recognizes that the safety concerns for requiring two-

way EOT devices are less prevalent in operations (i) of trains having

the ability to initiate a brake application from other than the front

end and (ii) of trains equipped with fully independent secondary

braking systems. FRA further agrees with several of the commenters that

the definition of ``mountain grade'' must be based on some formula that

takes into account not only the percent of grade but also the length of

grade and the speed of the train. FRA thinks that a definition based on

these factors would sufficiently limit the number of areas covered by

the definition, so as not to be overly burdensome to the industry, and

yet would include those areas that would most benefit from the added

safety provided by the two-way devices. Furthermore, in order to

provide the industry time to acquire a sufficient number of two-way EOT

devices and to ease the economic impact of acquiring the devices, FRA

proposes to mandate compliance with any final regulation requiring the

use of two-way EOT devices as of January 1, 1997. Requiring earlier

compliance is not warranted by the marginal safety benefits, and later

compliance would not be consistent with the spirit of the RSERA (even

if, as is possible, FRA is unable to issue a final rule by December 31,

1993).

B. Operational Characteristics

Burlington Northern Railroad (BN) reported that it has used two-way

EOT devices for seven years and has had no reports of an emergency

being initiated from the front end. Although BN experienced some

problems with undesired emergencies in the beginning, they were due to

start-up problems. CP Rail Systems reported that it has about 700 two-

way devices in service since 1989 and has had no undesired emergencies

due to faulty operation of the equipment, nor has it had occasion to

use the devices.

Several railroads that currently use either one-way or two-way EOT

devices stated that they have experienced effective communication

between the head and rear units in trains as long as 1.5 and 2 miles.

However, these railroads also reported that they have experienced

communication problems in several circumstances, such as the following:

when trains are split by an overpass or viaduct; when trains operate in

some mountain or tunnel locations; and when trains are in a major yard

where bridges, power lines, towers, and industrial structures are more

prevalent.

Other railroads that have some experience with the devices stated

that the current two-way EOT devices have many optional features to

provide information from the rear to the front units, such as the

distance from front to rear units, monitoring of end- car brake-pipe

pressure, motion status, marker light status, battery status, loss-of-

communication alarm, automatic and manual communication test, and rear-

of-train emergency braking. The AAR as well as seven of its railroad

members commented that these additional features should not be

required, but that each individual railroad should be allowed to

determine which options are best suited for its particular operations.

These parties also stated that the statute merely requires that the

rear end of a train be able to initiate an emergency brake application

when activated from the front and that there is no evidence available

to support the need of requiring the transmission of other information.

Several railroads expressed concern over requiring these additional

features noting that such features reduce the battery life of the

device, create additional enroute failure problems, add to the cost of

the device, and may be eliminated or relocated as technology advances.

One railroad recommended that failure of any optional feature, other

than the ability to initiate an emergency brake application, should not

be treated as an enroute failure. This same railroad also recommended

that FRA consider replacing the ``flashing lights on EOT devices'' with

retro-reflectorized material such as that used in Canada. The railroad

suggested that such a change could significantly alter the cost of two-

way devices, reduce battery requirements, and reduce failure rates. One

railroad commented on the battery life of current two-way devices,

indicating that it is about 80 percent that of one-way devices. This

party also indicated that inspection of the battery must be made at

initial terminal brake inspections. The AAR commented that the

telemetry battery life of EOT devices operating in conditions from 40

degrees below zero to 150 degrees above zero is about 100 hours for

one-way devices and 80 hours for two-way devices. The AAR also stated

that the light flasher battery life is about 50 hours.

Several railroad representatives commented that two-way EOT devices

need to be ``secured system'' types, which means that an emergency

application should be obtainable only by someone in the cab of the

locomotive on that train. These commenters stated that current devices

are designed so that the front and rear units can be linked together by

use of a specific code which prevents outside tampering. Once the two

units are linked, no other front unit will communicate with the rear

unit. One commenter stated that it would require 38 hours of constant

contact to get the proper code needed to obtain access to the device.

Individual members of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen (BRC)

commented that the current one-way devices are unreliable and are not

receiving proper maintenance. These individuals stated that the gauges

used to calibrate the devices need to be tested. Several carmen

commented that transmissions from current one-way devices have been

affected by high tension wires, bridges, and foggy conditions. Labor

representatives as well as individual members stated that they would

like to see as many of the additional features now available with two-

way devices required. These commenters felt that any additional

information that could be made available to train crews regarding the

condition of the train would be beneficial. One individual conductor

suggested that the batteries on EOT devices should be checked at all

brake tests and at all crew change points. This individual also felt it

should be required that batteries have at least a 75-percent charge

before the train departs a terminal and that the devices be operational

at all crew change points.

A conductor for BN provided information on a new safety device

invention that would address the problem of trainline blockage and

turned angle cocks and would be used in connection with EOT devices.

The device is coupled to the end of the brake pipe and would

continuously exhaust air at a predetermined rate, which would be

compensated for by the locomotive air source. Thus, if the trainline is

blocked, the locomotive air source will not replenish the depleted air,

and a brake application will take place. The engineer will be warned of

the loss in pressure at the rear of the train by the EOT device and

will be able to take corrective action. One manufacturer of EOT devices

commented that the EOT devices are limited to two watts of power by the

Federal Communications Commission and that depending on the site, such

as when a train is half in a tunnel and half out of a tunnel, trains

may experience brownouts or complete blackouts. The manufacturer stated

that many of these problems can be eliminated with installation of a

repeater feature that continuously repeats the transmitted message

every few seconds. In addition, the manufacturer noted that when an

emergency application is requested the transmission signal is increased

to 8 watts, which probably will overcome any site interference. Another

manufacturer of the devices commented that it did not know of any

interference due to power lines, but stated that it has received

comments about losing transmissions in mountainous areas.

FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizes the benefits provided to the train

crew by the additional features currently available on two-way EOT

devices and highly recommends that railroads obtain as many of these

optional features as they can when purchasing the devices. However, as

long as the devices meet the minimum operating standards required to

initiate an emergency brake application from the rear of the train, FRA

believes that each individual railroad is in the best position to

determine the type of optional features that are best suited for their

operations. In addition, FRA does not want to prevent any technological

advancements which might improve or modify many of the optional

features currently available.

Several parties commented on the loss of transmission between the

front and rear units at various locations. Based on the comments and

information provided by the manufacturers of the devices, FRA believes

that railroads should be required to automatically check the

communication status between the two units on a periodic basis in order

to alert train crews of any transmission problem. FRA suggests that

those railroads that experience transmission problems consider the

installation of a repeater feature recommended by the manufacturers,

which continuously repeats the transmitted message every few seconds.

FRA also notes, as one manufacturer commented, that the transmission

signal requesting an emergency brake application is sent at a higher

wattage than normal transmissions and should be sufficient to overcome

any site interference. Furthermore, in order to prevent vandalism and

avoid the possibility of a train accidentally being placed in emergency

by an outside transmission, FRA believes that the front and rear units

should be linked together so that the rear unit will only respond to an

emergency command from its associated front unit.

FRA elects not to comment, at this time, on one railroad's

suggestion that reflectorized material be allowed to be used in place

of the flashing lights on EOT devices, since this issue would be more

appropriately addressed under a revision of 49 CFR Part 221 regarding

rear end markers.2 FRA also finds that the use of the safety

device, introduced by an individual conductor for Burlington Northern,

designed to detect blocked trainlines is not feasible at this time

based on current operating and train handling procedures; however, FRA

encourages continued testing and development of the device.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\Retroreflective panels do not satisfy performance criteria

for rear end marking devices because of track curvature's effect on

the projection of the light source.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. En route Failures

The AAR and several of its member railroads commented that a train

that experiences enroute failure of its two-way EOT device should be

allowed to continue without delay and without imposition of a speed

limit. These parties base this position on the fact that little data

exists that shows the preventive effect of the devices and no railroads

currently using the devices have reported an incident where the device

was used. Some railroad commenters suggested that trains that

experience en route failure should be allowed to continue to

destination, whereas other railroads suggested that the trains be

allowed to continue to the next forward point for repairs or

replacement, just as any other enroute failure. Several railroads also

contended that if a speed limit were imposed on trains with en route

failures the cost to the industry would be devastating and would hurt

the industry's competitiveness due to multiple train delays, missed

deliveries, and loss of business. Several commenters also suggested

that imposing speed limits for en route failures would actually

increase safety risks due to undesirable speed differentials with

trailing trains and because these slower trains would have to take to

sidings to let faster trains pass and, thus, the likelihood of

vandalism is increased. CP Rail Systems noted that Canada requires

speed to be reduced to 30 mph when failure of the devices occurs en

route. This commenter also noted that two-way devices have a low

failure rate, only about 1 in every 400 crew starts. One railroad

suggested that a 30 mph speed limit be applied only to trains departing

from an initial terminal with inoperative device.

FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that, if a train equipped with a two-

way EOT device has an en route failure that causes the train to lose

the ability to initiate an emergency brake application from the rear of

the train, the speed of that train should be limited. FRA recognizes

the railroads' concerns that a speed limitation may cause train delays,

missed deliveries, and a possible increase in safety risks; however,

FRA believes that the railroads are overstating these problems. The

railroads themselves conceded that the EOT devices are very reliable

and can operate for two to three years without a problem. In fact, two

railroads commented on the low failure rate of the devices, indicating

a failure rate of less than one percent. One railroad also mentioned

that Canada requires speed to be reduced to 30 mph on trains which

experience enroute failure of the two-way device; however, this

commenter did not contend that Canada's requirement has produced the

problems cited by the railroads. Thus, FRA feels the concerns raised by

the railroads regarding a speed limitation for en route failures of the

devices are not justified. Furthermore, allowing trains to continue

with inoperative two-way EOT devices, at speeds that FRA feels require

the added safety benefits provided by the devices, would expose both

railroad employees and the public to potential harm that might be

averted if this relatively new technology is available to the train

crews. FRA also believes that attaching a material operational

limitation to a failure of the device will materially increase the

likelihood that such failures will be prevented through improved design

and maintenance.

D. Costs and Maintenance

Both railroad and labor organizations agreed that the cost of new

two-way EOT devices will be approximately $7,000 per unit, which

includes both the front and rear units. The AAR and several railroads

also stated that the cost of current one-way units is approximately

$3,700 per unit. The AAR estimates that the total cost to the industry

to replace currently used one-way devices with devices that have two-

way capabilities will be approximately $150 million. Railroad

representatives stated that existing rear units of one-way devices

could not be upgraded to two-way capabilities, and although the front

units of the one-way devices could be upgraded it was not cost

effective. However, one railroad did state that it could retrofit its

1,500 existing front-end radio units at a cost of $740 each, for a

total cost of $1.1 million, but stated that retrofitting the rear units

was not feasible. Various railroad commenters provided approximate

figures for equipping their fleets with two-way devices: Union Pacific

estimated initial costs at $21 million and $2.4 million per year for

replacement units; BN estimated the cost to replace its 1,400 one-way

devices at $15 million; CSX Transportation estimated a cost of $17

million to acquire approximately 1,867 rear units and 2,687 front end

receivers; Conrail estimated the cost to replace its 1,100 existing

one-way devices at $10 million; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe estimated

the cost to upgrade front units and replace 650 rear one-way units at

$5.6 million; and Norfolk Southern estimated its cost to convert to

two-way devices at $2.7 million.

The AAR estimated the maintenance costs of two-way devices to be

twice the costs of maintenance on current one-way devices. Based on

figures presented by one railroad, the AAR stated that in 1989

maintenance costs of one-way devices were approximately $2,000 annually

per device; thus, expected maintenance costs for two-way devices will

be about $4,000 per year per device. The AAR as well as seven railroads

commented that current regulations regarding one-way EOT devices are

adequate except that the current calibration period of 92 days is based

on outdated technology. All of these commenters stated that they have

used the devices for years and have had little if any problems with

them. One commenter stated that the most frequent cause of failure of

these devices is battery failure during periods of extreme cold, which

could be cured by replacing the batteries at initial terminals. The

commenters stated that they have rarely, if ever, found one of the

devices out of calibration within the 92-day period and believe that an

annual calibration requirement would be more realistic, with all

related tests being performed at that time. Several railroads also

commented that based on the performance of current one-way devices

there is no reason to require calibration of the two-way devices every

92 days. These commenters believed that the 92-day calibration

requirement for one-way devices was based on the fact that there was

little experience with their operation at the time. Since that time,

experience with the devices has shown that a calibration period of one

year is more than adequate. One railroad stated that its current one-

way devices operate for two to three years without a problem, and that

in 1992 it replaced only about 20 of its 1,400 units.

Several members of the BRC commented on the need to have

interchangeable battery packs for all the different types of two-way

devices currently available because at present some railroads are

unable to charge the devices that come onto their lines from other

railroads. Various carmen also presented written comments reiterating

their concerns that the current one-way devices are unreliable, that

maintenance is not being performed, and that the gauges used to

calibrate them need to be tested.

FRA Conclusions. FRA generally agrees with the cost figures

presented by the commenters. FRA also believes that the 92-day

calibration period currently imposed on one-way EOT devices is

outdated. FRA agrees with several of the commenters that the 92-day

requirement was established at a time when there was little experience

with these types of devices. Since that time, FRA has received no

evidence indicating that calibration of the devices is difficult to

maintain. Furthermore, several railroads attested to the reliability of

the one-way and two-way devices stating that they rarely find the

devices out of calibration after 92 days and that the failure rates of

the devices are very low. Consequently, FRA believes that the

calibration period for all EOT devices could be extended to one year.

FRA further believes that one of the major factors affecting the

reliability of two-way EOT devices is the failure of the batteries on

the devices while a train is enroute. As several commenters stated,

battery failure is often the result of a failure to inspect the battery

charge prior to departure or the inability of one railroad to charge

the batteries of the devices belonging to another railroad which are

used on its line. Consequently, in order to ensure that the batteries

on a two-way EOT device are sufficiently charged to operate the device

throughout a train's movement and to encourage the development and use

of interchangeable batteries or battery chargers, FRA proposes to

prohibit a train equipped with a two-way EOT device from departing from

a point of origin with the batteries of such device charged to less

than 75 percent of watt-hour capacity.

II. Air Flow Method

The air flow method (AFM) of train air brake testing monitors the

rate of air flow through the automatic brake valve to the brake pipe by

the means of a brake pipe flow indicator. The AFM of brake testing is a

more comprehensive test than the present leakage test. The leakage

method only measures the amount of leakage from the brake and branch

pipes, whereas the AFM tests the entire brake system including the

reservoirs and control valves. In addition, the leakage method does not

test the capability of the pressure-maintaining feature of the 26L

brake equipment. The AFM, on the other hand, tests the brake system

just as it is operated, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in.

The AFM of qualifying train air brake systems has been allowed in

Canada as an alternative to the leakage test since 1984. In addition,

several railroads in the United States have been using the AFM since

1989 when the AAR's petition for a waiver of compliance was granted

allowing the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test. In order to

determine if the AFM of train air brake testing should be included as

an alternative to the leakage test, FRA in the ANPRM (57 FR 62552)

requested comments from interested parties regarding the operating

history of the AFM.

The AAR and several railroads commented on the operating experience

of using the AFM. These commenters reported that the AFM is an

effective and reliable method of qualifying train brakes and that the

greatest benefit of the method is the information it provides to the

train crew. CP Rail reported that testing on the AFM started in Canada

in 1975 and became an alternate method of qualifying train brakes in

1984. CP Rail as well as several other railroads stated that they have

experienced no problems with the method. Conrail commented that,

although it initially experienced problems with sticking pointers,

defective check valves, and protruding screws on the air flow meters,

these problems have been eliminated. Conrail also stated that use of

the AFM has indicated a slight reduction in undesired emergencies.

Several railroads commented that the AFM provides information to the

train crew regarding the brake pipe that is not provided by the leakage

test. Two railroads responded that in all the years they have used the

AFM they have experienced no instance where a train had to stop because

the air flow could not be maintained. The AAR maintained that the

failure rate of the air flow indicators is less than 1 percent. In

fact, Conrail stated that it performed 9,000 air flow indicator

calibrations in 1992 and found only 90 defective indicators. Several

railroads commented that they currently calibrate the air flow meters

on a 60-day to 92-day basis and have no problem with current

calibration procedures. Two railroads noted that they initially had

problems calibrating the devices due to orifice sizes but have since

cured this problem. One railroad mentioned that it had problems

calibrating the devices in extremely cold weather until it applied

condition eight of FRA's waiver to the calibration of the gauge on the

locomotive as well as the test orifices. (``The air flow indicator

calibration test orifice shall be calibrated at temperatures of not

more than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.'')

Railroad representatives unanimously opposed any requirement that

would make using the AFM mandatory or the sole method of qualifying

brake systems. All railroad commenters supported the adoption of the

AFM as an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying braking

systems. Most of these commenters suggested that the use of either

method is an economical or operational decision that should be made by

each individual railroad. One railroad recommended that trains

qualified under the AFM should be requalified with the leakage test if

the air flow indicator fails enroute. The cost figures presented by the

AAR and several railroads for equipping locomotives with air flow

meters range from $350 to $1,450 per unit.

Amtrak and two other passenger and commuter railroads commented

that due to the short length of passenger trains the AFM is not a

beneficial means of qualifying the braking systems. They felt that the

flow rate of 60 cubic feet per minute (CFM) was inappropriate for

passenger trains because it would allow these shorter trains to operate

with excessive brake pipe leakage since the AFM measures the ability to

maintain pressure, not brake pipe leakage. However, these commenters

did support the use of the AFM as an alternative to the leakage test

for freight operations.

Both the Railway Labor Executives' Association (RLEA) and the BRC

as well as several individual carmen opposed the adoption of the AFM as

an alternative method of qualifying brake systems. The parties felt

that the leakage test is the only reliable method for determining the

integrity of the air brake system and for identifying leaks. These

commenters stated that the AFM only determines whether the brake pipe

is compensating for existing leaks and does not identify the severity

of the leak, and thus, trains would be allowed to operate with leaks

over 5-psi, which is dangerous especially in cold weather and could

result in an emergency application or derailment.

Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) responded stating that both

the leakage test and the AFM combined with the 15-psi gradient

restriction are effective and acceptable methods of qualifying braking

systems. WABCO commented that the 60-CFM limit required by the AFM and

the 5-psi limit required by the leakage test are both conservative

figures in view of today's braking system capabilities, and that the 5-

psi limit was derived long before today's pressure maintaining feature

which is an integral part of all locomotive brake valves. WABCO stated

that front-to-rear gradient is the most important element of braking

performance and that long trains with a 15-psi gradient can be operated

with no problem. This commenter also mentioned that the 60-CFM limit of

the AFM would allow higher leakage on shorter trains but nothing that

would cause a problem in brake operations if the 15-psi gradient is

maintained.

FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that if a train contains a locomotive

equipped with 26L freight locomotive brake equipment and the train is

equipped with an EOT device, that train should be allowed to be

qualified using the AFM. FRA also agrees with several commenters that

the AFM should not be permitted as a means of qualifying braking

systems on commuter and passenger trains. Due to the shorter length of

these types of trains the use of the AFM to qualify their brake systems

might allow these trains to operate with excessive brake pipe leakage.

The AFM would be an alternative to the leakage test for qualifying

properly equipped freight train brake systems. FRA recognizes the

concerns of several labor organization commenters opposing the adoption

of the AFM; however, FRA believes these commenters' apprehension is

based on their unfamiliarity with the method. As FRA pointed out in the

ANPRM (57 FR 62551) and as several commenters confirmed, the AFM is a

much more comprehensive test than the leakage test. The AFM tests the

entire brake system just as it is used, with the pressure-maintaining

feature cut in. The method has been allowed in Canada since 1984

without any problems. Based on the comments from several railroads and

information obtained during the method's testing from 1981 to 1988, FRA

feels the AFM is an effective and reliable alternative method of

qualifying train brakes. Although FRA is not mandating the use of the

AFM, FRA does encourage railroads to use the method on all trains, not

necessarily for qualifying the brake systems, but as a means of

providing additional information regarding the brake system to the

train crew. FRA further believes that calibration of the air flow

indicators should be performed at least every 92 days, based on the

fact that it is the calibration period required by the current FRA

waiver granted to the AAR and because most railroads stated that they

already calibrate the air flow indicators every 60 to 92 days and gave

no indication that the period should be altered. See 54 FR 5195 (Feb.

1, 1989).

III. Testing in Cold Weather and on Steep Grades

FRA has received a recommendation from the NTSB and petitions from

the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the United Transportation

Union, and the Montana Joint Rail Labor Legislative Council to require

additional train air brake system testing in extremely cold weather and

mountain grade territory. These parties cite concerns regarding

existing practices of some railroads in these areas and the general

problem of assuring sufficient brake pipe pressure during train

operations in extremely cold weather and on steep, descending grades.

In the ANPRM (57 FR 62553), FRA sought comments from interested parties

regarding the need for additional testing of train air brakes in these

circumstances and the type of additional testing required.

The AAR and a variety of other railroads opposed the mandating of

additional testing in cold weather or in mountain grade territory. They

stated that the accidents that have occurred in cold weather and on

heavy grades are due to failure of individuals to comply with existing

procedures and not due to inadequate testing, procedures, or equipment.

These commenters felt that current brake tests and operating procedures

are sufficient as long as they are followed and performed properly.

Several railroads commented that they have installed air dryers on

their locomotives in order to eliminate the use of alcohol in cold

weather, which is very detrimental to the rubber components of the

braking system. In addition, several railroads contended that improved

equipment, such as welded fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses, have

negated the effects of cold weather on leakage and braking. Several

railroads also suggested that running tests should not be required in

mountain grade territory since the performance of such tests only

results in the depletion of the reserve air supply, and thus,

jeopardizes the effectiveness of the brake system by requiring a train

to approach a grade with less than a fully charged brake system.

In addressing the issues of ``feed valve braking'' and use of the

``Passenger'' position of the 26C brake valve in freight service, the

AAR stated that the individual railroads have operating rules that

address these forms of braking and since no safety issue has arisen

regarding their use there is no justification for removing the

railroad's discretion in establishing rules appropriate for their

operations. At least four railroads stated that use of the

``Passenger'' position in freight service can be performed safely and

may be needed and wanted in certain circumstances, and that there

should be no regulation prohibiting its use. Although several railroads

stated that they do not allow or recommend ``feed valve braking,'' they

all believed that the current operating rules of the individual

railroads sufficiently address the issue.

Two labor organizations and several of their members commented that

additional tests are not required but that good initial and

intermediate terminal brake tests are needed. Counsel for the TCU

suggested that the railroads should consider placing a carman on each

train. The BRC and several of its carmen commented on the widespread

use of alcohol and methanol in the trainline during cold weather and

mentioned the degenerative effect it has on the rubber components of

the brake system. These commenters felt that the use of these materials

in the trainline should be addressed by FRA. The Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers (BLE) suggested that the allowable front-to-rear

gradient be reduced in cold weather from 15-psi to 10-psi. One

organization recommended a regulation requiring locomotive engineers to

test the brake pipe pressure prior to passing the summit on a mountain

grade. The BLE stated that the burden of establishing the safety of

``feed valve braking'' and the use of the ``Passenger'' position of the

brake valve should be borne by the railroads rather than using BLE

members as test pilots. However, one individual engineer felt that both

methods should continue to be allowed in limited circumstances to

address unusual conditions that arise from either undesired emergencies

or faulty maintaining features of the 26C or 30A-CDW brake valves.

Two brake equipment manufacturers commented that no additional

testing requirements are needed. They stated that the industry has

taken dramatic steps to reduce leakage in cold weather by installing

and using welded pipe fittings, wide lip hose couplings, and ferrule

clamps. These commenters felt that if brake equipment is properly

maintained and good terminal brake tests are performed, there is no

need for additional regulations.

The NTSB commented that cold weather operations impose additional

problems regarding brake system leakage due to shrinkage of the brake

components in extreme cold. This commenter stated that it would like to

see some type of additional testing to assure that excessive leakage is

not occurring. The Board acknowledged that, since the original

recommendation, the railroads have added equipment that performs better

in cold weather conditions.

FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizes that few, if any, of the commenters

supported the mandating of additional testing in cold weather or in

mountain grade territory. FRA agrees that the development and use of

welded pipe fittings, wide lip hose couplings, and ferrule clamps has

greatly reduced the effects of cold weather on the air brake system.

However, FRA believes that there are several extreme operating

conditions that involve added safety risks and that need to be further

addressed by the railroads. These include cold weather and mountain

territory operations as well as the operation of long and heavy trains.

FRA feels that each railroad needs to develop detailed operating

procedures for these types of operations, tailored to the equipment and

territory of each railroad. Furthermore, FRA believes that the use of

chemicals in the trainline must be eliminated in order to prevent

untimely damage and wear to the brake system components. Therefore, FRA

feels that most trains operating in cold weather should be equipped

with air dryers. Several railroads commented that they have already

equipped their locomotives with these devices in order to curb the use

of alcohol and other foreign substances in the trainlines.

IV. Training of Test and Inspection Personnel

Currently, the regulations require that the initial terminal test

and inspection be performed by a qualified employee but does not

provide any guidance as to what type of knowledge these individuals

should possess. See 49 CFR Sec. 232.12(a)(1). An increasing number of

train brake tests and inspections are being conducted by train crews

and FRA has concerns whether or not all personnel performing these

duties are truly qualified. Consequently, FRA sought comments and

information from interested parties regarding the type of training that

is currently provided to individuals charged with inspecting and

testing train brake systems, and suggestions on the type of training

these individuals should receive. See 57 FR 62553.

The AAR and several railroads commented that employees performing

air brake tests and inspections are adequately trained to perform these

tasks. However, many of the railroads admitted that they could do a

better job of training their employees. Several railroads presented

information regarding their individual training programs. The training

provided by these commenters ranged from several days to several weeks,

a portion of which is dedicated to air brake tests and inspections.

Most of the major railroads stated that their training includes annual

testing of the employees upon completion of the formal training classes

and that employees must pass these tests with scores of 85-90 percent.

Several railroads also mentioned that their training involves a certain

amount of on-the-job training in addition to the formal classroom

training and that unannounced site checks are conducted by their

supervisory personnel. The ASLRA commented that most shortline

railroads engage in cross-training of their employees so they can

perform all functions of the operations and that these railroads rely

heavily on the Class I railroads' training facilities and video tapes.

Several railroads stated that some type of list of those employees that

are considered qualified to perform tests and inspections is maintained

either in the form of a formal list or a list of employees who have

received the necessary training.

The AAR and all the other railroads providing comments believed

that there is no need for FRA to impose training or certification

requirements. These commenters felt that training is the responsibility

of the carriers and that carriers are in best position to determine the

type of training needed for their operation. The AAR contended that the

decline in train accidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over

the last ten years is a testament to the adequacy of current training

provided by the railroads. The AAR and several railroads also insisted

that there is no reason to require those employees performing air brake

tests and inspections to be as highly trained as a carman and that

something more reasonable is sufficient. These parties also felt that

merely being a member of a particular craft should not automatically

make a person qualified, and the AAR added that any reference contained

in the regulations designating a particular craft to perform the

inspections should be eliminated. Many of these commenters also stated

that there is no need for FRA to certify qualified persons and that

such a scheme would merely increase the costs to railroads without

improving the performance of those individuals conducting the tests and

inspections.

Several labor organizations commented that the current training

provided by the railroads to the individuals performing the air brake

tests and inspections is insufficient. The BLE and various members of

the United Transportation Union (UTU) stated that the training they

have received is inadequate to prepare them for making the air brake

tests and inspections they are currently required to perform.

Representatives of the BRC and several of its individual members stated

that train crews lacked the experience and training necessary to

perform inspections and tests of the air brakes. These individuals also

contended that only carmen are qualified by training and experience to

perform these tasks based on the fact that they have completed two- to

three-year apprenticeships and have completed numerous written exams.

These commenters stated that elimination of various tests and

inspections, such as the elimination of cleaning, oiling, testing, and

stencilling (COT&S) requirements and run-through inspections, and the

increase of permissible piston travel have placed primary importance on

the initial terminal inspection, which is not being performed properly

because train crews are not qualified to perform the tasks. Several

members of the BRC recommended that carriers be required to have carmen

perform all initial and intermediate inspections and any other tests or

inspections required by the FRA.

Every commenting labor organization and several of their individual

members recommended that FRA designate qualified inspectors by

specifying the experience and training that are required for these

individuals rather than leaving these matters in the railroad's

discretion. Most of these commenters also suggested that FRA certify

those employees that are deemed to be qualified to perform these tests

and inspections. Two labor organizations also suggested that FRA

require railroads to maintain a list of those individuals deemed

qualified in order to assure compliance with the regulations.

FRA Conclusions. FRA believes that the current training provided to

the individuals charged with performing the required brake tests and

inspections should be improved in order to ensure that these tests and

inspections are performed properly. Several labor organizations and

their individual members explicitly commented that they are not

sufficiently trained to perform the inspections and tests required of

them. In addition, several railroads affirmed that the training they

currently provide could be improved. Increasing reliance on train crews

to conduct train air brake tests, as a result of the consolidation of

mechanical forces, means that it is more important than ever before

that each person responsible for power brake safety be thoroughly

trained in the functions which that person is called upon to perform.

FRA recognizes that many railroads are attempting to improve their

training programs; however, FRA thinks that minimum training and

experience guidelines need to be established to assure that brake

inspections and tests are being properly performed in order to protect

both the public and railroad employees from the operation of equipment

not meeting FRA requirements. Although there has been a decline in the

number of train accidents, derailments, fatalities, and injuries over

the last ten years, FRA believes that the number of these incidents

will be further reduced if inspections and tests of the brake system

are performed by individuals who have been instructed in accordance

with these minimum training and experience guidelines.

Consequently, FRA proposes broad performance-based qualification

requirements for individuals that perform brake system inspections and

tests; individuals that inspect, test, and maintain the electronic and

mechanical parts of the brake system; and individuals that supervise

the work of the aforementioned personnel. FRA will supplement these

performance-based qualification standards by issuing minimum training

and experience guidelines that will aid the railroads in developing

training programs sufficient to ensure that individuals are capable of

meeting the performance-based qualification standards. FRA believes

that each railroad should be allowed to develop and implement a program

to train, qualify, and issue credentials to these individuals in

accordance with these minimum requirements based on each railroad's own

unique operating conditions and equipment. Furthermore, in order to

insure that quality inspections, tests, and maintenance are continually

being performed, FRA believes that periodic spot checks of inspections

and maintenance should be performed by qualified supervisory personnel.

V. Electronic Brake Systems

Railroad power brake systems are moving into the computer age, and

recently, several innovative electronic brake systems have been adopted

into train service. These electronic brake systems include blended

brakes, locomotive speed limiters, and microprocessor-controlled

brakes. Although these braking systems meet present Federal

regulations, the regulations may be silent in certain areas that need

to be addressed in order to ensure that braking systems which

incorporate versions of this new technology maintain the same level of

safety as conventional power brakes. In order to determine the type of

regulation that might be needed to assure the ``fail-safe'' nature of

these types of braking systems FRA requested comments from experienced

parties regarding the operation of electronic braking systems, the

sensors utilized by the systems, and the maintenance requirements of

such systems. See 57 FR 62554.

A number of passenger and commuter railroads, one State transit

authority, and several freight carriers commented that technology for

electronic braking systems is advancing quickly and that performance

standards need to be developed to address these types of systems.

Several commenters stated that a power failure in these electronic

braking types of systems will result in a full service brake

application being applied through the entire train, with the emergency

brake valve available to initiate an emergency application at any time.

The AAR and several railroads discussed the sensors that are, or

may be, used with these types of systems. Amtrak felt that the

reliability of the sensors is a key issue for these systems because

nothing is gained if they fail as often as the equipment being

monitored. These parties stated that sensors currently manufactured are

fairly reliable, with advertised reliability rates of 14.6 years or

failure rates of once every 35-38 million miles of operation. One

commenter stated that sensors have not yet been developed that would

indicate when disc brake pads are worn to condemning limits. Commenters

also contended that sensors that could be used to assist in brake tests

to determine proper piston travel or whether brakes are applied would

be very expensive at this time and difficult to install and maintain.

One commenter suggested that the only way to monitor whether brakes are

applied would be to install a sensor on every brake head, which would

be very impractical.

Several commenters stated that the computer software used with

these systems is designed to continually self-test not only the

software controlling the brake system but also the hardware every time

it is used. Therefore, the parties contend that there is no need to

require daily testing since the system will identify any defects or

reduction in performance each time it is used. These commenters also

suggested that the need for time based COT&S with these systems is

unnecessary since the computer will indicate when attention is needed.

Two railroads stated that complete air brake tests should be performed

when a system component is replaced, whereas other railroads

recommended following the manufacturer's recommended practice or at a

minimum running a normal system check to verify the repair.

Two manufacturers of brake equipment suggested that whatever

regulations are developed they need to allow for technological

development. They stated that systems are being developed that will be

able to monitor all sorts of things and will eliminate the need for

time-based maintenance and cleaning of brake equipment. These parties

believed that in the next five years systems will be available that can

be self-diagnostic and able to report on their operational

capabilities. Expected future capabilities are: advanced train control

system (ATCS) compatibility, distributed power, simplicity of design,

maintainability, accuracy of pressure control, and adaptability to

complete electronic or radio control throughout freight train

operation.

FRA Conclusions. In order to allow for and encourage the

development of new technology, FRA proposes to provide guidelines

regarding the tests and procedures required for introducing new brake

system technology. These guidelines would require the submission of

design and test plans as well as subsequent operational plans for the

introduction of new technology. Parties would also be allowed to

petition the FRA to convert some of the brake system design and

maintenance requirements into performance-based standards to

accommodate the use of electronic braking systems.

VI. Dynamic Brakes

As the result of the Southern Pacific Transportation Company

accident at San Bernardino, California on May 25, 1989, the NTSB made

the following two recommendations to FRA concerning dynamic brakes:

1. Study, in conjunction with the AAR, the feasibility of

developing a positive method to indicate to the operating engineer in

the cab of the controlling locomotive unit the condition of the dynamic

brakes on all units in the train.

2. Revise regulations to require that if a locomotive unit is

equipped with dynamic brakes that the dynamic brakes function.

Dynamic brakes were developed as a ``free'' by-product of the

diesel-electric drive train. By engaging the dynamic brake, the

normally powered traction motors on each axle are changed to

generators, and the power generated is dissipated through resistance

grids. The effect is similar to that of shifting an automobile to a

lower gear when descending a steep grade. The additional hardware

needed to outfit a locomotive with dynamic brakes includes the grids

and the controls and switches.

The primary selling point of dynamic brakes has been to save on

freight car brake shoe wear. The dynamic brake is also useful in

controlling train slack in lieu of using the locomotive independent

brake. Furthermore, use of the dynamic brake in controlling train speed

in lieu of power braking, where the train brake is applied with the

locomotive under power, is a major factor in fuel savings. Due to these

benefits, railroads currently emphasize and encourage the use of

dynamic brakes. In order to determine the types of requirements or

standards that should be developed regarding the design and use of

dynamic brakes, FRA requested comments from interested parties

regarding the reliability, testing, and cost of dynamic brakes as well

as the types of information that are or could be provided to the

engineer regarding the availability and operation of the devices. See

57 FR 62555.

The AAR and a number of railroads commented that dynamic brakes are

not safety devices but are economical devices and their operation

should be governed by the railroads' operating rules and not federal

regulations. Every railroad commenting on dynamic brakes stated that

they are not the primary brake and are not used to stop a train. The

parties considered the devices optional features used to save fuel and

reduce wear and tear on brake equipment. Therefore, the commenters felt

that any decision to equip a locomotive with dynamic brakes and any

specific handling instructions as to their use should be left to each

individual railroad since their installation and use must be based on

an individual economic analysis. Several commuter and passenger

railroads commented that they operate with blended brakes on MU cars

and, thus, feel that any regulations regarding dynamic brakes need to

separate these types of operations from conventional freight service.

Several commenters also stated that dynamic brakes do not have a

fail-safe feature and can fail at any time. The most common failures

reported by these parties occur in brake resistors, traction motors,

grid systems, blowers, and control modules and contactors. However, the

railroads reported that dynamic brakes are relatively dependable and

trouble free. Two railroads stated that they had failure rates of less

than three percent.

Several commenters stated that the reliability of dynamic brakes is

influenced by the degree of maintenance they receive. Several railroads

reported that they perform routine preventive maintenance every 92

days. One railroad stated that their routine maintenance includes

visual inspection of equipment, inspection of grid blower brushes,

verification of trainline continuity, check of MU jumper cable wiring,

check of main generator voltage regulation, and verification of

previous dynamic brake operation via recording system playback. This

railroad and one other carrier also stated that at major servicing

facilities set up of the dynamic brakes is verified. In addition, these

railroads commented that dynamic brakes are part of the daily

inspection and that if enroute failure of dynamic brakes occurs the

train crew is to complete a form, contained in the locomotive,

detailing the problem. With regard to pre-departure testing of the

dynamic brakes, the AAR and several railroads stated that, due to the

operating efficiency of dynamic brakes, a standing test of the devices

would merely let the engineer know if the dynamic brakes set up, but

would not inform him as to whether they will work, and that in order to

completely test the devices the train must be moving. However, these

commenters also discouraged the use of running tests since such a test

would require at least a 10-mph speed, whereas most facilities have 5

mph speed limits and because creation of slack in a train is

inadvisable at some locations.

The AAR and a number of railroads commented that there is no

equipment available today to monitor the dynamic brakes on trailing

locomotives. These parties also stated that the monitoring of trailing

units is really rather useless due to the fact that dynamic brakes can

fail at any time. One railroad commented that a prototype device

capable of monitoring the dynamic brakes on trailing locomotives has

been developed but no production model is available and the cost of the

device would be $10,000-$15,000 per locomotive. The AAR also provided

an approximate figure of $100,000 as the cost to retrofit an individual

locomotive with dynamic brakes.

The RLEA recommended that dynamic brakes be employed on all trains,

be in working order, and be tested before all departures and that

training be provided on their usage. The RLEA would also like mandatory

installation of a device that would monitor the dynamic effort on

trailing locomotives. The BLE and BRC did not think that dynamic brakes

could be monitored and felt that even if they could, it would probably

not be that effective since dynamic brakes tend to fail while in use.

The BLE did recommend that railroads be required to maintain the

equipment. In addition, the BRC and BLE recommended that if dynamic

brakes are present a running test should be required, even if performed

at less than 10 mph since such a test would at least indicate whether

the dynamic brakes are functioning.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) commented that the

railroads are improperly describing dynamic brakes as a luxury. The

NTSB stated that railroads preach and encourage the use of the dynamic

brake and, thus, should ensure at least from the initial terminal that

the system will work.

FRA Conclusion. The RSERA requires FRA to issue standards for

locomotive dynamic brakes, ``where applicable.'' It is clear from this

qualification and the history of the legislation that it imposes no

requirement that locomotives be equipped with dynamic brakes. Nor do we

understand the RSERA to supersede the Act of March 2, 1893, which

forbids a railroad to ``run any train * * * that has not a sufficient

number of cars in it * * * equipped with power or train brakes that the

engineer on the locomotive drawing such train can control its speed

without requiring brakemen to use the common hand brake for that

purpose.'' This provision clearly requires that the train brake system

(which, after 100 years is still pneumatically operated in the case of

conventional freight equipment) bear the burden of providing a sound

and serviceable first-order safety system capable of controlling train

speed and arresting the movement when required.

It is pertinent to ask why, against this background, FRA is now

required to address the issue of locomotive dynamic brakes. The mandate

for dynamic brake safety standards emanated from the investigation, by

the National Transportation Safety Board, of an accident in which

normal precautions for use of the primary train air brake system were

cast to the wind. In brief, excessive tonnage and excessive speed

cresting the grade led to a train out of control. This, together with

the disastrous consequences, resulted in examination by the Board of

whether the availability of fully operational dynamic braking, as a

secondary safety system, might have saved the day. Report No. RAR-90-02

(National Transportation Safety Board, 1990).

It is conceded by most serious observers that locomotive dynamic

brakes do not offer the technical capability to serve as a primary

train braking system, since--

(a) they provide braking force only on powered locomotive axles and

are incapable of controlling in-train forces in the same manner as the

automatic braking system;

(b) they are effective only within a narrow speed range and have no

capability to actually stop a train;

(c) they can fail without prior warning; and

(d) their failure mode is characterized by loss of braking force

(as opposed to the automatic brake, which, properly employed, initiates

an emergency brake application upon loss of system integrity).

FRA thus views as unfortunate, and potentially reckless, the

increasing number of train handling and power brake instructions issued

by freight railroads that emphasize use of dynamic brakes without

including prominent warnings that such systems may not be relied upon

to provide the margin of safety necessary to stop short of obstructions

and control points or to avoid overspeed operation. Such instructions,

while not yet affirmatively misleading to seasoned locomotive

engineers, threaten to overcome the good judgment of safety critics and

regulators by leading to excessive reliance upon these systems.

While FRA is not persuaded that dynamic brakes warrant emphasis as

the primary safety system, the agency recognizes that the statute

communicates a valid safety concern, properly construed. That is, to

the extent significant emphasis is placed on dynamic brakes--either by

the railroads as a legitimate means of limiting fuel consumption,

undesired emergency brake applications, and wear to freight car

components, or by safety critics who do not foresee that hazard of

reliance on such systems--engineers may in fact be encouraged to make

errors in judgment that take them beyond prudent safety margins. At

such a critical point, proper functioning of any secondary safety

system--however subject to failure--is greatly to be wished. Further,

dynamic brakes offer a redundant safety feature should the engineer

make a mistake in judgment leading to excessive speed under the

prevailing conditions of grade, tonnage, and weather.

FRA believes that dynamic brakes have become, de facto, a second-

order safety system where employed. While from the point of view of

logical priorities, dynamic brakes ``back up'' the automatic train

brake system, in sequence of operational procedures the priority is

reversed. Stated differently, either the proper functioning of these

systems, or the provision of reliable information concerning degraded

functioning of these systems, should prevent locomotive engineers from

operating trains in a manner that might make recovery through use of

the automatic brake impossible. As between these two alternatives,

proper functioning is marginally preferred, since communication,

perception, and comprehension of information is not a uniformly

successful enterprise.

To summarize, although FRA will not require that locomotives be

equipped with dynamic brakes, FRA does believe that Congress, in

Sec. 20141 (formerly Sec. 7 of the RSERA), intended for FRA to develop

meaningful and enforceable standards regarding the safe use and

operation of dynamic brakes. Furthermore, FRA believes that if the

devices are available, they should be maintained, and engineers should

be informed on their safe and proper use and be provided with

information regarding the amount of dynamic braking effort that they

have available. Further, FRA believes that railroads operating braking

systems that include dynamic brakes should have written operating

rules, tailored to the specific equipment and territory of each

railroad, governing the safe handling procedures for the use of dynamic

brakes under all operating conditions, including procedures covering

the loss of dynamic brakes. FRA also proposes to require railroads to

inform engineers of the total dynamic brake retarding force available

on all outbound trains equipped with dynamic brakes. As several

commenters stated, in order to completely test dynamic brakes the train

must be moving. Thus, FRA believes that running tests of the dynamic

brake should be performed whenever the motive power or engine crew is

changed so that the availability, or lack of availability, of the

device can be rechecked.

Currently, the operating rules of most railroads contain limits on

the amount of dynamic braking force that may safely be used depending

on the dimensions of the train involved. Most railroad operating rules

express these limits in terms of the number of axles that engine

consists are permitted to use in dynamic braking. Railroads generally

will cut out the dynamic brakes on trailing locomotives, when the train

is made up, in order to avoid the possibility of excessive dynamic

braking force being applied, which could result in the buckling of the

train. However, some operating rules also express dynamic braking

limits for operating through turnouts, crossovers, and curves in terms

of dynamic brake amperes, yet, there is currently no way for engineers

to know the amount of dynamic brake amperage on their train or the

amperage they are using. Furthermore, although running tests of dynamic

brakes, as proposed by FRA, provide information to the locomotive

engineer regarding the availability of dynamic brakes, such tests are

limited to the specific moment they are performed. Thus, running tests

do not provide continuous information on the current status of the

dynamic brakes to the locomotive engineer. Because dynamic brakes could

fail at any time, FRA feels there should be some way for engineers to

continuously monitor the operation of their available dynamic brakes.

Consequently, based on Congress' mandate contained in Sec. 20141

(formerly Sec. 7 of the RSERA), requiring meaningful standards to

address the safe use of dynamic brakes, FRA believes that locomotives

built after January 1, 1996, and equipped with dynamic brakes, should

be able to (i) test the electrical integrity of the dynamic brake at

rest and (ii) display the total train dynamic brake retarding force, at

certain speed increments, in the cab of the controlling locomotive.

In the ANPRM (57 FR 62555), FRA requested comments from the

industry on possible methods of providing information regarding the

status of dynamic brakes to the engineer in the cab of the controlling

locomotive. The only workable option presented to FRA in the comments

received was the equipping of locomotives with a dynamic brake display.

Although FRA recognizes that the technology for dynamic brake displays

with the ability to provide the type of information sought by FRA is

not readily available today, several commenters suggested that it is

currently being developed. FRA believes that the benefits of such an

indicator would be to alert engineers that they have diminished or

excessive dynamic capabilities, thus permitting the engineer to control

the braking of their train in the safest possible manner. However, in

order to fully evaluate the viability of this proposal, FRA seeks

comments from all interested parties regarding the following specific

issues:

(1) What is the status on the future availability of dynamic brake

indicators capable of providing the information required by this

proposal?

(2) Are FRA's cost estimates regarding this proposal accurate?

(3) What quantitative and/or qualitative operational or safety

benefits can be derived from the use of these devices?

(4) What alternative methods are available for providing the same

information that a dynamic brake indicator would provide to a

locomotive engineer?

VII. Miscellaneous Issues

A. Brake Pipe Reduction

Present regulations require brake-pipe reductions of either 15

pounds, 20 pounds, or full service depending on which of the required

train air brake test is being performed. 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13. In the

ANPRM (57 FR 62556), FRA sought comments from interested parties to

determine if it is feasible and beneficial for FRA to establish one

standard brake-pipe reduction for all required train air brake tests.

The AAR and several railroads recommended that some type of

performance standard be established so that each railroad could

determine the amount of reduction that best suits its operation. The

AAR also suggested that if the reduction amounts were left in the

discretion of the individual railroads, it would be receptive to a

requirement that the railroad indicate what reduction rates it would

use at different locations. Several railroads commented that one

standard reduction should be required for all tests and inspections and

that the standard should not require an increase to a full service

reduction because such a practice could cause undesired releases. These

commenters also noted that one standardized reduction for all tests

would simplify air brake tests and make it easier for the railroads to

train and instruct their employees. Most of the commenting railroads

suggested a 20-psi reduction if a specific amount were established. Two

commuter railroads stated that they are unable to comply with 49 CFR

232.12 as currently written because they are unable to make a service

rate reduction on some of their equipment.

Two labor organizations recommended that one standard reduction be

established by FRA rather than allowing each individual railroad to

determine their own reductions. This recommendation was based on the

commenters' concern that varying reduction standards among the

railroads would cause confusion for train crews since many railroads

swap trains and operate crews over each other's lines. These commenters

also felt that one standardized reduction would make training easier.

FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees with many of the commenters that a

standardized brake pipe reduction of 20 psi is sufficient for the

performance of all required brake inspections and tests. FRA believes

that the adoption of one standard reduction will simplify both the

performance of the required inspections and the training of employees

charged with performing these inspections. Under the proposal FRA would

no longer require full service reductions for any of required

inspections in order to avoid the possibility of undesired releases.

FRA feels that the suggestion of several commenters to allow each

railroad to determine its own brake pipe reduction is not viable. It is

not uncommon to find train crews operating in several different

locations or to find the train crew of one railroad operating the

equipment belonging to another railroad or operating over the lines of

another railroad. Thus, if various reductions were established by

different railroads or by one railroad in different locations, it would

merely cause further confusion in both the performance of the

inspections and the training of personnel.

B. Performance of Brake Inspections

To determine whether regulations should be developed specifying how

certain brake inspections should be performed and whether certain

currently required inspections are necessary, FRA requested comments

from interested parties regarding the current methods of performing the

various required brake inspections and sought comments on how current

inspections could be improved or eliminated. See 57 FR 62556.

The AAR and a number of railroads recommended that the specific

method of performing the various required inspections should be left to

the discretion of each railroad since the type of inspection required

depends on the equipment involved and the operating conditions existing

at various locations. Many of these commenters stated that experience

has shown that vehicle inspections do not detract from inspections and

that such inspections are adequate depending on the location performed.

These parties also stated that their employees are instructed to get

off their vehicle if they are unable to see the brake equipment from

the vehicle. Several commenters also endorsed the use of roll-by

inspections at least to determine release of the brakes. Most of the

commenters also recommended that inspection of five-pack equipment

(articulated cars) needs to be looked at since this equipment utilizes

several different types of braking systems, many of which cannot be

viewed from one side of the car. Several railroads stated that they

were in the process of developing specific training for the inspection

of five-pack equipment. One commenter suggested that if the brakes fail

to apply on one of the sets of brake equipment contained on multi-

platform cars with multiple brake systems, the car should be considered

operable and permitted to continue to the first terminal where repairs

could be made.

Amtrak commented that the use of package, or unit, brake actuators

on most modern passenger trains requires an inspection of both sides of

the train. This commenter also stated that the enshrouding of brake

actuators, the existence of high-level platforms, and the presence of

wayside electric power systems make inspection of brake systems on

passenger trains dangerous. Amtrak recommended an alternative to the

initial terminal inspection that would allow passenger trains making

multiple turns in a 24-hour interval to perform a set and release after

a leakage test is performed at all subsequent departures after a

complete initial terminal brake inspection if the train remains charged

and the consist is not broken. The AAR and one railroad stated that the

use of carside indicators is a reliable method for determining the

condition of brakes when brake equipment is enshrouded or mounted in-

board or when a train is next to a high-level platform or other

obstruction. Two other passenger railroads suggested that FRA develop a

list of parameters that each initial terminal test must address and

then allow each passenger railroad to submit its test procedures, based

on its individual operations, to FRA for approval. A number of

passenger and commuter railroads also commented that many of the

current inspection requirements contained in the regulations are not

applicable to multiple unit (MU) cars, specifically noting the leakage

test requirement, the piston travel regulations, and the requirement to

keep equipment charged when adding cars. These parties recommended that

provisions regarding MU cars be separated from provisions on freight

locomotives and cars.

The AAR and a number of railroads provided comments on specific

inspections currently required and on specific elements of various

inspections. Several of these commenters suggested that the inbound

brake equipment inspection contained at Sec. 232.14 be eliminated.

These commenters stated that this inspection requires the ``bottling of

air'' (the angle cock to be closed following a 20-psi reduction), which

is contrary to most railroads' operating rule requiring the brake pipe

to be left open on standing cars. The parties felt that the current

requirement could result in the train being put in emergency, which

wastes time because then the train must be recharged, and is

potentially dangerous because it could cause a train to roll away due

to a brake release.

Several parties also mentioned that current piston travel

requirements are no longer necessary due to the use of automatic slack

adjusters, which are designed to keep piston travel within certain

tolerances. Some commenters felt that if slack adjusters were required,

noting that most cars operating today are already equipped with them,

the need to constantly measure piston travel would be eliminated.

Several commenters also suggested that railroads have the option of

performing a thorough inbound inspection together with a set-and-

release departure inspection in lieu of performing an initial terminal

inspection, since initial terminal inspections can be an obstacle to

moving goods quickly because the removal of bad ordered cars once the

train is assembled can cost considerable time. These parties also

recommended that cars found with sticking brakes during the departure

inspection be cut out and tagged and allowed to continue to destination

as long as the tonnage per operable brakes did not exceed a specified

amount. One railroad also requested revision Sec. 232.12(i) to allow

the yard test device to be placed at any location in the train, rather

than at the end of the train nearest the hauling road locomotive, since

the results of such a test are not affected by location of the device.

The AAR and several railroads also suggested that the 85 percent

requirement contained at Sec. 232.1 should be changed to a performance

standard based on tonnage per operative brakes. These parties stated

that it is almost impossible to remake a train while enroute to

disassociate those cars with inoperative brakes from the rest of the

train. However, none of these commenters had any major problem with the

85 percent requirement, and all of them stated that retaining the

standard is acceptable.

One air brake manufacturer agreed with the railroads that the

problem of excessive piston travel has been addressed by the

development of slack adjusters. This commenter stated that slack

adjusters automatically adjust piston travel to prevent excessive

travel and that if slack adjusters are reliable there is no need to

measure for piston travel. The commenter suggested that new technology

is being developed to monitor the brake cylinder and that any new

regulation needs to allow for technology that may do away with

measuring piston travel.

Labor organization representatives and several individual members

believed that FRA should specify how inspections are to be performed.

Several members of the BRC commented that the only proper inspection is

a walking inspection on both sides of the train with a set and release.

However, these commenters suggested that if a walking inspection is

performed on both sides of a train during a set, then a roll-by

inspection for the release would be acceptable. Several commenters

stated that on some cars an adequate inspection could be made from one

side of the train but that on other cars such as multilevel stack cars

only 50 percent of the brake equipment can be observed from any one

side of the cars. Members of both the BRC and the UTU strenuously

recommended that inspection of five-pack cars not be performed from

moving vehicles because it is very difficult to observe the brake

equipment on these cars. A BRC representative also stated that if slack

adjusters have eliminated the need to measure piston travel then the

railroads should have no problem complying with a seven-to nine-inch

piston travel limit. This commenter also stated that unless there are

regulations governing the proper setting and operation of slack

adjusters, piston travel must continue to be monitored and measured.

Several labor organizations and their individual members stated

that train crews are not qualified to perform initial terminal

inspections. Various individual carmen commented that many of the

initial terminal inspections that are currently being performed are

inadequate because the employees performing the inspections are not

adequately trained. The BRC maintained that the initial terminal

inspection could not be separated from the pre-departure inspection

required under Part 215 and both must be performed by carmen. The BRC

also mentioned that because the initial terminal inspections are not

being performed by qualified individuals trains are departing without

100 percent operable brakes, and thus, believes that the 85 percent

rule contained at 232.1 should be increased to 90 or 100 percent. This

party also supported an increase in the 85 percent requirement based on

the fact that heavier and longer trains are being run today, and

therefore, better braking is needed. The BLE commented that they do not

see a problem on today's railroads regarding inoperative brakes and

felt that unless there was some technical evidence that the requirement

should be reduced, the 85 percent requirement should remain.

FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees with several of the railroad commenters

that it would be practically impossible and far too intrusive for FRA

to mandate the specific methods for performing various inspections on

various equipment. FRA feels that each individual railroad is in the

best position to determine the best method for performing the various

required inspections based on their operating conditions and equipment.

However, the method of inspection that is chosen by a railroad should

ensure that all required equipment is properly inspected and is

functioning as required by the regulations. FRA will continue to allow

the use of roll-by inspections of the brake release if train speed does

not exceed 10 mph. FRA feels that roll-by inspections made at greater

speeds would not permit sufficient visual inspection of the brake

equipment.

FRA recognizes the unique characteristics of some commuter and

passenger trains that repeat the same trip several times a day without

breaking up the consist. Because the trains in these types of

operations are not broken up and remain connected to an air supply

continuously, it is unlikely that their air brake equipment would

deteriorate beyond federal requirements in one day if they were in

proper working order at the beginning of the day. Thus, FRA believes

that trains that repeat the same trip more than once a day need only be

required to have an initial terminal brake test, performed by a

qualified individual, prior to the first departure for that train each

calendar day.

FRA also agrees with several commenters that the MU equipment,

currently used by many commuter operations, is unable to conform to

many of the standards established for freight operations. Consequently,

FRA believes that commuter railroads operating MU equipment should

develop and enforce written inspection, maintenance, and test

procedures for this equipment to ensure the systems will operate as

intended.

FRA further recognizes that the inbound inspection required

pursuant to Sec. 232.14, which requires the bottling of air, is

contrary to most railroads' operating procedures requiring the brake

pipe to be left open on standing cars. FRA feels that this requirement

is unnecessary in present-day operations and could actually cause a

train to roll away due to a brake release.

Although several parties commented that piston travel requirements

are no longer necessary due to the development and use of automatic

slack adjusters, FRA believes that piston travel still is an important

component that must be kept within certain operating limits. If

automatic slack adjusters function properly, then the railroads should

have no problem maintaining piston travel within the required limits.

Currently, the only way to ensure that a slack adjuster is working

correctly is to measure the component it is adjusting. If a device is

developed that can reliably monitor the brake cylinder, as one

manufacturer indicated, then parties can petition the FRA for a change

in the standards at that time.

FRA will continue to require 100-percent functional train brake

systems at initial terminals. As there were no major objections raised,

FRA proposes to retain the ``85-percent'' requirement previously

contained at Sec. 232.1. The BRC was the only party which requested

that the percentage be increased, based on their contention that

initial terminal inspections were not being performed by qualified

individuals. However, FRA believes that the qualification standards

proposed below, adequately address this party's concern. Furthermore,

as previously stated, FRA does not feel railroads are currently

performing initial terminal inspections as well as they should be and,

thus, we do not believe it would be appropriate, at this time, to allow

alternatives to the initial terminal inspections as requested by

several commentators.

C. COT&S Requirements

Prior to January 1, 1992, railroads and car owners were required to

maintain freight brake equipment in accordance with a periodic clean,

oil, test, and stencil (COT&S) schedule. This schedule varied from 10

to 16 years, depending on type of brake control valve. At the

conclusion of the equipment changeout, a single car test was performed

to verify the integrity of the entire brake system.

Prior to 1982, this same single car test was required on each car

when on a shop or repair track and the date of test so stencilled on

the car. This was known as an ``In Date Test'' or IDT. Cars which had

been last tested in less than 90 days were excluded from the test

requirement. In 1982 the IDT was abolished, and only a simple

application and release test of the brakes was required when on the

shop or repair track. Certain brake (sticking, inoperative, etc.) and

wheel defects (overheated, built-up tread, etc.) did require the single

car test.

In 1990, several improvements were made in test procedures to

reduce the incidence of undesired emergency brake applications and

leakage which could cause wheel damage. These improvements were

incorporated into the full single car test and in a new abbreviated

test, identified as a ``Repair Track Air Brake Test.'' At that time the

repair track test was required each time a car was on a shop or repair

track. The full single car test is required when the brake control

valves are replaced. As these comprehensive tests were phased in, the

COT&S requirements were abolished. The effectiveness of these new tests

was evident by the increased replacement of brake components which were

determined to be defective. Leakage at angle cocks and cutout cocks was

the primary source of problems. In order to determine whether there is

a need for time-based COT&S requirements, FRA sought comments, in the

ANPRM (57 FR 62556), from interested parties regarding the problems

associated with the elimination of the COT&S requirements for freight

equipment and whether COT&S requirements are necessary for passenger

equipment or are alternatives available.

The AAR and several of its member railroads contended that the new

single car test is much better than the old time-based COT&S and turns

up many more defects due to the increase in air pressure to 90 pounds.

The AAR stated that their studies show that a car is on the repair

track 1.7 times a year and, thus, on average every car will receive a

single car or repair track test at least one to two times a year. The

AAR also stated that in 1992 1.1 to 1.4 million single car or repair

track tests were performed by the railroads and that three times as

many brake valves were changed out in 1992 as compared to 1991. In

addition, the AAR reported that the railroads spent in excess of $7.5

million to upgrade their equipment to perform the enhanced single car

test. Several railroads provided figures on the number of cars in their

fleets receiving single car and repair track tests, and provided data

comparing the number of brake components that were changed out in 1992

with the number of components changed out in 1991 under the old COT&S

requirements. In all cases the data showed an increase in the number of

components changed out, which the railroads attributed to the

improvement of the single car test and were presented as support for

their contention that the improved single car and repair track tests

are more effective than the old, time-based COT&S requirements. Several

railroads also commented that there is no need for FRA to establish

brake maintenance requirements separate from those established by the

AAR. These commenters stated that significant improvements in brake

maintenance have been made by the AAR without increased regulation.

These parties also noted that the AAR has its own engineering staff and

laboratories and has expertise of all the railroads and, thus, is in

the best position to determine the best practices for maintaining the

brake systems.

Amtrak and two other passenger and commuter railroads provided

comments regarding COT&S requirements for passenger cars. These

commenters felt that the brake equipment on passenger cars can be

maintained by criteria other than time-based COT&S. The parties

proposed the possibility of requiring that a single car test be

performed each time a car is on the repair track or each time the car

comes in for preventive maintenance, about every 120 days. These

parties would prefer to conduct periodic testing rather than changing

out valves on a periodic basis. These commenters felt that the current

three-year COT&S requirement on 26C-based systems is too restrictive.

Amtrak also commented that the six-year COT&S requirement it employs

for freight-type brake valves on its passenger cars should be

considered an internal Amtrak policy.

The BRC and several of its individual members admitted that the new

single car test may be very valuable, but contended that the railroads

are circumventing its use. These commenters stated that railroads are

eliminating repair tracks all over the nation in order to avoid

performing these single car tests. Several individuals presented

examples of how the single car test and repair track test are being

circumvented, such as making repairs in the field or moving cars to

expediter tracks for repairs rather than to repair tracks. Therefore,

the BRC recommended that some type of in-date testing or attention must

be reinstated, preferably somewhere in the seven- to eight-year range.

The RLEA also recommended that periodic attention be reinstated,

contending that acceptance of AAR's unilateral change in the

maintenance requirements allows the AAR to establish regulations

without public comment. The BRC and several of its members also

commented on the three-year COT&S requirement for passenger cars,

contending that the requirement should be maintained due to

condensation building up in the trainlines and the fact that

compressors are not being maintained. The BRC also recommended that any

change made by the AAR in their recommended maintenance practices

should be approved by FRA.

One manufacturer strongly endorsed the new single car test and

repair track test as the most comprehensive tests ever performed. This

commenter felt that these tests will ensure more effective brake

maintenance than the previous application-and-release test and the 16-

year COT&S requirement.

FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that the new single car test, which has

been used industry-wide since January of 1992, is a much better and

more comprehensive method of detecting and eliminating defective brake

equipment and components than the old, time-based COT&S requirements.

FRA believes that performance of the single car test will significantly

reduce the number of defective components currently found and will

dramatically increase the reliability of brake equipment. Thus, use of

the single car test will greatly improve the safety of both railroad

employees and the general public since brake equipment will be in

better and safer condition. However, in order to fully benefit from the

advantages of the single car test, cars must receive the test. Several

labor commenters admitted that the new test was very valuable, but

stated that the test is being circumvented by the railroads. These

commenters provided various examples of how the tests are being

avoided. Therefore, in order to ensure that all cars receive the new

single car test, FRA proposes to require the performance of the test on

a timely basis.

FRA feels that the single car test should be conducted on any car

that is on a repair or shop track for various wheel or brake equipment

defects and that at a minimum freight service equipment should receive

the test every one or two years depending on whether the equipment is

high-utilization or non-high-utilization equipment, as defined below,

and that commuter and passenger service equipment should receive the

test at least every six months. Freight railroad representatives

reported that on average a car is currently on the repair track 1.7

times a year and, thus, receives a full single car or repair track test

at that time. Commuter and passenger railroad representatives reported

that their cars are on a shop or repair track every 120 days.

Therefore, FRA does not feel that requiring the single car test to be

performed at the proposed time periods would be overly burdensome on

the industry since, by its own admission, most cars will be on a repair

or shop track within these time limits. Furthermore, parties would be

allowed to request a change in the time interval for performing the

single car test by monitoring their single car tests and conducting a

statistical analysis of the results. The procedure for requesting a

change in the time interval is further discussed in the section-by-

section analysis.

In order to ensure that the single car tests are properly

performed, FRA believes that only qualified brake system inspectors

should conduct the tests and that the single car testing devices should

be tested at least once a day and receive maintenance at least every 92

days. Furthermore, in order to ensure proper maintenance of brake

equipment, FRA believes that each railroad should develop and enforce

written maintenance procedures for all types of brake systems it

operates which meet or exceed current industry standards and all

federal train brake system safety requirements. The maintenance

required by these procedures should only be performed by individuals

qualified as mechanical or electronic brake system inspectors. Spot

checks of both the single car tests and the maintenance procedures

should be conducted by qualified supervisory personnel to make sure the

procedures are being followed and the tests are properly performed.

D. Charging of Air Brake System.

Present regulations for air brake testing basically require that

cars that have previously been tested in accordance with the

regulations either ``be kept charged until road motive power is

attached'' or be retested. 49 CFR 232.12(i). Based on longstanding

administrative interpretation and practice, FRA presumes that a brake

system is no longer adequately charged if disconnected from the

charging device (supply of pressurized air) for more than two hours

before coupling of locomotives; otherwise, retesting is required. In

the ANPRM (57 FR 62556), FRA requested comments from interested parties

regarding the viability of this interpretation and sought information

for developing alternative procedures that would not jeopardize safety.

The AAR and several railroads stated that there is no reason to

assume that once a train is charged and tested and then left standing

without being provided with a source of compressed air that the brake

system would become defective. These parties suggested that leakage on

standing trains has been greatly reduced through the use of welded

brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses. These

commenters felt that FRA's interpretation of allowing trains to sit

without air for only two hours is from an era when this new equipment

was not used. They also stated that FRA's current interpretation costs

the industry money, fuel, and time and creates pollution because trains

must be either reinspected or left with a locomotive attached and

idling in order to avoid performing a full initial terminal test.

Several railroads suggested that trains could be off air indefinitely

if the consist is not altered, or at least as long as 24 hours, and

remain in the same condition. Several commenters recommended that if a

set of cars is off air for an extended period, all that should be

required is a set-and-release test to assure the continuity of the

brake pipe. CP Rail Services mentioned that there is no such two-hour

rule in Canada and stated that in Canada if cars are off air for any

length of time a set-and-release continuity test is required. Every

commenting railroad felt the current two-hour interpretation is onerous

and unrealistic.

The BLE, BRC, and several individual carmen felt that the current

interpretation is reasonable. Most of these commenters expressed

concern for the integrity of the brake system if a consist were left

standing for longer than two hours. These concerns were aimed at the

effect that climate might have on the equipment and the increased

possibility of vandalism to the equipment if consists sat without air

for longer periods. One conductor recommended returning to a four-hour

limit as a minimum.

FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that our longstanding administrative

interpretation, that requires the retesting of cars disconnected from a

charging device for longer than two hours, was established prior to the

development of new equipment that has greatly reduced leakage problems,

such as welded brake piping and fittings and ferrule-clamped air hoses.

However, contrary to several railroads' assertions FRA does not believe

that cars should be allowed to be off air for extended periods of time

without being retested. FRA believes that the longer cars sit without

air attached the greater the chances are that the integrity of the

brake system will be compromised. The longer cars sit the more

susceptible they may be to weather conditions or even vandalism, as

some commenters suggested. Consequently, based on today's equipment,

operating practices, and overriding safety concerns, FRA feels that

cars should not be disconnected from a supply of pressurized air for

longer than four hours without being retested.

E. Specifications for Power Brake Systems for Freight Service

Currently, Appendix B of Part 232, entitled ``Specifications and

Requirements for Power Brakes and Appliances for Operating Power-Brake

Systems for Freight Service'', contains the specifications for AB

valves, as were adopted in the early 1930's, and has not been modified

since, although several deviations have been permitted. No improvements

or new features, as reflected in present-day control valves, have been

added to the appendix. Consequently, FRA sought comments from

interested parties as to how the specifications and requirements

contained in Appendix B could be updated and changed. See 57 FR 62556.

The AAR and several railroads recommended that Appendix B be

eliminated and a reference made to the appropriate AAR specifications.

These parties felt that the AAR specifications are far more stringent

than those contained in Appendix B. One railroad suggested that if

Appendix B were to be rewritten it should encompass operating

parameters of brake performance, such as transmission speed of service

and emergency reductions and time periods in which control valves

should respond to these signals.

New York Air Brake Company (NYAB) also recommended that Appendix B

be deleted and reference made to the appropriate AAR specifications,

which require performance that is far above that contained in the

appendix. Westinghouse Air Brake Company felt that Appendix B as

currently written is too restrictive and detailed to allow for

technological development. This commenter stated that newer valves are

being developed which are above and beyond the specifications contained

in the appendix and suggested that more flexibility be incorporated

into the specifications to allow for the development of new equipment.

The BRC recommended the possibility of adding some type of addendum

to Appendix B regarding new technology without eliminating the minimum

requirements contained in the appendix.

FRA Conclusions. Contrary to several commenters' views, FRA feels

that many of the requirements contained in Appendix B for power brake

systems are still necessary. FRA does recognize that some of the

requirements are outdated and should be eliminated. Consequently, FRA

proposes to eliminate Appendix B and incorporate those requirements

that it feels are still relevant to today's equipment directly into

various sections of the revised regulation. Furthermore, in order to

address the concerns of several parties that the requirements contained

in Appendix B are too restrictive to allow the development of new

technology, FRA proposes to permit parties to petition the FRA to

convert some of the train brake system specification and design

requirements into performance-based safety requirements.

F. The 1,000-Mile Inspection

FRA's current regulations require intermediate brake inspections at

points not more than 1,000 miles apart. These inspections are far more

limited than the currently required initial terminal inspections in

that the railroad is required only to determine that brake pipe leakage

is not excessive, the brakes apply on each car, and the brake rigging

is secure and does not bind or foul. 49 CFR 232.12(b). In the 1982

revisions to the power brake rules, FRA extended the distance between

such inspections from 500 miles to 1,000 miles. The industry now

suggests that modern freight trains can operate at least 5,000 miles

without a brake test. Consequently, in order to determine whether a

change in the current 1,000-mile inspection requirement should be

adopted, FRA requested comments from interested parties regarding

evidence to support any increase in the current requirement, the costs

and delays involved with performing these inspections, and any safety

concerns inherent in increasing the distance beyond what is currently

permitted. See 57 FR 62556. Several railroads, together with the AAR,

commented that the current 1,000-mile inspection interval should be

increased to as much as 5,000 miles. (See Sec. 232.12(b).) These

parties relied on several factors in recommending such an increase,

which include the new technology and improved equipment since 1982, the

1985 study conducted by the AAR, which they contended establishes that

trains receiving proper initial terminal tests could be operated within

regulation limits for over 5,000 miles, and the fact that since 1982

the number of brake-related accidents and derailments and the failure

rates of brake equipment have declined dramatically. The majority of

these commenters also stated that the key to increasing the limit is

quality initial terminal inspections. One railroad commented that in

Canada en route inspections are required at 1,500-mile intervals and

felt that these en route inspections do not enhance safety. This

railroad also stated, based on a small sampling, that only one-half of

a percent of its cars receiving intermediate inspections are found with

defective brakes. The AAR also commented that the statistics presented

by labor organizations, regarding the number of defects they are

finding at various locations, are meaningless unless presented in terms

of their effect on safety.

The AAR and several railroads also provided information regarding

the costs of performing these inspections. These parties estimated that

the current 1,000-mile inspection requires the industry to perform

these inspections on 15 percent of the total number of road trains,

which amounts to about 240,000 intermediate inspections annually. They

estimated the total cost of performing these inspections at

approximately $90-$130 million. One railroad estimated the cost at $550

per inspection. Another railroad estimated that if the distance

required for these inspections were increased to 2,000 miles the

industry would save $47 million. Several railroads also commented that

if FRA reinstated a 500-mile inspection their costs and the industry's

cost of performing intermediate inspections would at least double.

Labor organizations and individual members opposed any increase in

the 1,000-mile intermediate inspection interval and argued that FRA

should reinstate the 500-mile requirement. The RLEA stated that labor's

agreement to extend the intermediate test to 1,000 miles in 1982 was

based upon a promise by the railroads that complete and perfect initial

terminal tests would be performed. The RLEA contends that the

performance of initial terminal inspections has been terrible and that

they are being performed by unqualified operating crews. The BRC, the

UTU, the BLE, and several individual carmen reiterated RLEA's

contention that proper initial terminal inspections are not being

performed. These parties also stated that the inspections being

performed at 1,000 miles are also inadequate. They stated that many of

these inspections are being performed by train crews that are not

qualified to conduct these inspections properly. The BRC and several of

its individual members contended that numerous defects are being found

at the 1,000-mile inspections and that the main reason for this is that

quality initial terminal inspections are not being performed. These

commenters also provided statistics as to the number of defects being

found at various 1,000-mile inspection points. They claim that their

members have found approximately 50,000 defects per year at these

locations and that the statistics used by the carriers to support an

increase to 5,000 miles are faulty. These parties feel that independent

data needs to be developed before any increase in the distance is

considered.

FRA Conclusions. In 1982, when FRA extended the 500-mile inspection

interval to 1,000 miles, FRA intended that quality initial terminal

brake inspections would be performed by the railroads. FRA feels that

railroads have not conducted the excellent initial terminal inspections

that were contemplated in 1982. Furthermore, contrary to the railroads'

contention, FRA feels that many initial terminal brake inspections are

being performed by individuals who are not sufficiently qualified or

trained. FRA recognizes that since 1982 new technology and improved

equipment have been developed that allow trains to operate for longer

distances with fewer defects. However, the key to achieving this

improved capability is to ensure the proper operation and condition of

the equipment at initial terminals. The best way of ensuring the proper

operation and condition of equipment is to perform quality initial

terminal brake inspections and to conduct proper equipment maintenance.

Consequently, in order to ensure that a train is in safe and proper

condition to travel a prescribed distance without further inspection,

FRA believes that a sliding-scale approach should be adopted that bases

the allowable distance a train may travel on a variety of factors

including the quality of the initial terminal brake inspection, the

maintenance practices of the railroad, and the type of equipment

operated and installed on the train.

FRA proposes to establish a power brake inspection scheme in which

various stated factors determine the distance that a freight or

passenger train is allowed to travel without additional inspection.

These factors include: the qualifications of the employee performing

the initial terminal brake inspection; the extent of performance of

supervisory spot checks of maintenance and inspection activity; the

presence or absence of a single car test program on the railroad; the

power brake defect ratio on outbound trains for the railroad; and the

type of equipment used and installed on the train. Based on the

conditions that are satisfied by the railroad, a train may be allowed

to travel anywhere between 500 and 3,500 miles from the point of

initial terminal without additional power brake tests or inspections.

Furthermore, in order to ensure that initial terminal brake tests are

being performed, FRA proposes to require railroads to maintain a record

of all initial terminal tests that shall contain the name of the person

who conducted the test, when appropriate. The factors and mileage

limits mentioned above will be discussed in more detail below.

VIII. High Speed Passenger Train Brakes

High speed passenger trains (up to 200 mph) require braking systems

which far exceed the capabilities of those presently installed on North

American trains. The energy required to be dissipated in a stop from

200 mph is well over one billion foot-pounds. To achieve this braking

capability, more advanced methods of train braking must be utilized;

such as, electro-pneumatic braking systems, microprocessor-controlled

braking, or advanced train speed control systems. In the ANPRM (57 FR

62557), FRA requested comments, information, and suggestions regarding

the operation of these types of advanced braking systems, the equipment

required for their operation, and the kinds of regulatory requirements

that are needed to ensure the safe operation of trains equipped with

these advanced braking systems.

The AAR and several passenger railroads provided information

regarding high speed passenger operations. These commenters suggested

that any specifications developed for these types of operations need to

be performance standards based on stopping distances for specified

speeds. Amtrak stated that the hardware exists today that can probably

be used at speeds of 150 mph or below, such as a combination of disc,

tread, and blended brakes. Amtrak also mentioned that in order to

operate at speeds in excess of 180 mph a regenerative-type braking

system is probably required combined with a friction-type system. This

commenter also suggested that operations of over 150 mph need to be

dedicated systems where the train and track are designed as a unit.

Amtrak said it would like to form a committee to work with FRA to

develop regulations and specifications for these types of systems.

Another railroad recommended that any passenger service operating over

90 mph should operate on separate dedicated rights of way, physically

removed from any freight service traffic.

The AAR and two commuter railroads suggested that if economical and

reliable sensors can be developed they will be essential in monitoring

these systems, but should not be applied in high shock areas that would

make them vulnerable to failure. These commenters also stated that

diagnostic programs incorporated into computer software must be used to

monitor the braking systems. They also stated that these programs would

eliminate the need for time-based maintenance since they would

continuously monitor the system's components and store information on

any operating defects occurring while a train is in use. These

commenters also felt that back-up or stand-by computers were

unnecessary because the systems are designed to stop the train if a

failure occurs and a mechanical override would be sufficient to allow

movement of the consist.

FRA Conclusions. FRA feels that passenger trains that operate at

speeds in excess of 125 mph should be classified as high speed

operations. FRA recognizes the unique designs and features that the

braking systems of these types of operations may incorporate. FRA

agrees with several of the commenters that the types of train brake

systems used by these operations should be controlled by some type of

automated computer system. These computer systems should be able to run

diagnostic programs capable of self-testing the brake system and

detecting faults in the system and should have the ability of either

alerting the engineer of these faults or taking automatic corrective

action. In addition, the computer software of these systems should be

analyzed to determine the safety impacts of software failures and to

ensure the software is fail-safe and functions as intended. FRA also

believes that if these types of trains are equipped with on-tread

brakes they should be designed to prevent application of the tread

brakes at speeds greater than 80 mph. Furthermore, in order to allow

technological advances in this area of train braking, railroads may

petition FRA to convert some of the train brake system design and

maintenance requirements into performance-based safety requirements.

Due to the unique characteristics of brake systems for these types

of trains, FRA believes that operators of high speed passenger trains

should develop train brake system inspection, maintenance, and test

plans tailored to the specific train brake systems they use. These

plans would become part of the safety standards for the operation of

the trains and equipment to which the plans apply and would be

enforceable by FRA. Due to the complex designs and operations of these

types of brake systems, FRA feels that all maintenance and that initial

terminal train brake tests should be conducted by qualified mechanical

and electrical train brake inspectors. FRA also believes that the

various designs of these pieces of equipment may require inspectors to

occupy dangerous positions in order to inspect them directly. If that

is the case, FRA feels that the brake systems should be equipped with

sensors that give a reliable indication of the application and release

of the brakes, visible to an inspector on the platform or along the

side of the track.

Section-by-Section Analysis

FRA contemplates dividing this rule into subparts, each of which

would contain multiple sections. This proposal contains all of the

anticipated subparts, including those that are being reserved for

future proposals.

Subpart A

This subpart of the proposal contains the general provisions of the

rule.

Section 232.1. This section contains a formal statement of the

proposed rules' purpose and scope. FRA intends the rules to cover all

brake system requirements, including those relevant to non-steam

locomotives previously contained in Part 229 of this chapter.

Section 232.3. As a general matter, FRA proposes that these rules

apply to all railroads that operate on the general railroad system of

transportation. In addition, FRA proposes that many of these rules

apply to non-insular passenger railroads operating outside the general

railroad system of transportation. Consequently, FRA proposes that many

of these proposed regulations apply to non-insular tourist, excursion,

and scenic railroads.

FRA's regulatory authority permits it to amend the current

applicability sections of its various regulations so as to expand or

contract the populations of railroads covered by a particular set of

regulations. FRA has had jurisdiction over all railroads since the

Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 was enacted. There is a very wide

range of operations that could be considered tourist, excursion, or

scenic railroads under the broadest reading of the term ``railroad.''

Tourist, excursion, and scenic railroads have written several letters

to members of Congress questioning the basis for FRA's assertion of

jurisdiction. Additionally, FRA recently received a petition from the

Berkshire Scenic Railway Museum, Incorporated on behalf of tourist,

excursion, and scenic railroads requesting the need for legislative and

regulatory action for new regulations tailored specifically to the

tourist rail industry. Pursuant to FRA's letter of September 28, 1993,

in response to that petition, FRA has considered the suggestions made

by those parties to the extent they pertained to power brakes in

drafting these proposed regulations.

In an effort to clarify the proper extent of the exercise of FRA's

jurisdiction, FRA recently settled on several principles that will be

used as current FRA guidelines. FRA will exercise jurisdiction over all

tourist, excursion, and scenic railroads, whether or not they operate

over the general railroad system, except those that are (1) less than

24 inches in gage and/or (2) insular.

To determine insularity, FRA looks at various criteria that measure

the likelihood that a railroad's operations might affect a member of

the public. FRA has concluded that a tourist, excursion, or scenic

railroad is insular if its operations are limited to a separate enclave

in such a way that there is no reasonable expectation that the safety

of any member of the public (except a business guest, a licensee of the

tourist operation or an affiliated entity, or a trespasser) would be

affected by the operation. A railroad is not considered insular if one

or more of the following exists on its line: (a) A public highway-rail

crossing that is in use; (b) an at-grade rail crossing that is in use;

(c) a bridge over a public road or waters used for commercial

navigation; or (d) a common corridor with a railroad, i.e., its

operations are within 30 feet of those of any railroad.

Thus, the mere fact that the trackage of a railroad is not

connected to the general system does not make the railroad insular

under these criteria. While these criteria tend to sort out the insular

theme parks and museums, a need to do case-by-case analysis in certain

close situations still exists.

Therefore, FRA has concluded that the requirements contained in

this part should apply to a non-general system, non-insular passenger

railroad that confines its operations to an installation that is not

part of the general system (i.e., it is a stand-alone with no freight

traffic but has one or more features that preclude its being considered

insular).

In Sec. 232.3(b), FRA proposes to except various train operations

from the requirements of this part. These exceptions are taken directly

from Sec. 6 of the Safety Appliance Acts (45 U.S.C. Sec. 6, recodified

at 49 U.S.C. Secs. 20301, 21302, and 21304). It is noted that the word

``freight'' has been added to the exceptions in order to remain

consistent with Congress' intent when the statutory exceptions were

created. At the time Congress provided an exception from the

requirements of the Acts, Congress did not and could not envision that

the equipment used in these operations would be modified for the

purposes of hauling passengers, which FRA has discovered with regard to

four-wheel coal cars. Consequently, FRA will only except freight

operations which employ the types of equipment contained in this

paragraph.

Section 232.5. This section contains an extensive set of

definitions to introduce the regulations. FRA intends these definitions

to clarify the meaning of important terms as they are used in the text

of the proposed rule. The proposed definitions are carefully worded in

an attempt to minimize the potential for misinterpretation of the rule.

Several of the definitions introduce new concepts or new terminologies

which require further discussion.

The proposed definitions classify trains by their maximum operating

speed. Trains with a maximum operating speed of 79 mph or less are

defined as ``conventional trains.'' Trains with a maximum operating

speed of more than 79 mph but less than or equal to 125 mph are defined

as ``intermediate speed trains.'' Trains with a maximum operating speed

greater than 125 mph but less than or equal to 160 mph are defined as

``high speed trains.'' FRA proposes these definitions because as the

operating speed of a train increases a greater variety of safety-

related conditions and equipment need to be addressed.

The definition of ``excursion train'' is intended to encompass

those trains operated by what are referred to in the industry as

``tourist,'' ``excursion,'' and ``scenic'' railroads. When the term

``excursion train'' is used in these proposed rules, it is intended to

refer to those non-insular tourist, excursion, and scenic railroads as

explained in the discussion of Sec. 232.3. For purposes of these

proposed rules, FRA feels that the trains operated by these types of

railroads can be sufficiently dealt with as a group. FRA defines

``train brake system'' to encompass any and all of the components

involved to apply a retarding force to decelerate a train. This

definition is a key to FRA's approach to treat train brakes as a

complex system of inter-related components that must function in

harmony to safely slow and stop a train. The definition clearly

includes computer programs or other forms of software used to control

or test braking functions as part of the train brake system.

The definition of ``train brake information system'' introduces a

new concept. FRA proposes to require railroads to develop and implement

a set of procedures to ensure that as train crews take responsibility

for a train they have accurate and timely information on board the

train, which includes the recent brake test history of the train and

the current status of the brakes on all locomotives and cars comprising

the train. FRA feels that this information is necessary to allow trains

to proceed for greater distances between required train brake system

tests. FRA concludes that this information is essential in order for

railroads to know if their trains are in compliance with federal safety

regulations. Furthermore, placing the information in the hands of the

train crew increases railroad safety because the train crews are in the

best position to make decisions based on the information to eliminate

or reduce brake-related safety problems.

The definition of ``train brake system monitoring'' also introduces

a new concept. FRA proposes to require railroads to develop and

implement procedures to be used by the engineer to monitor the en route

performance and status of the train brake system. FRA believes that

these procedures will encourage railroads to take advantage of new

sensor technology that can both increase safety and reduce operating

costs.

The definition of ``power brake defect'' is critical to a

railroad's ability to take advantage of the incentives allowing trains

to travel greater distances between required train brake system tests.

For purposes of Sec. 232.311 ``power brake defect'' is intended to be

any condition of equipment not in compliance with this Part that could

cause the retarding force applied by the power brake system of the

train to be reduced that is found by FRA or state inspectors on a train

declared ready for departure by the operating railroad. Power brake

defects include:

(a) Brake rigging that binds or fouls;

(b) A brake that does not apply or does not release;

(c) Piston travel that is outside limits;

(d) A brake shoe or pad that is worn past limits;

(e) A brake shoe or pad that is damaged or missing;

(f) A brake shoe or pad that is over-ridden;

(g) An end-of-train device that is not installed or not functioning

correctly;

(h) A car that is past due for a scheduled periodic freight brake

test or single car test; and

(i) A failure to perform a Class 1 or Class 2 brake test when

required. One defect for each car on which the test was not performed.

Understanding the way FRA defines ``power brake defect ratio'' for

the purpose of these proposed rules is crucial to railroads wishing to

take advantage of the proposed incentives to allow trains to travel

greater distances between required train brake system tests. The

testimony provided by the railroads reflected a strong plea to FRA to

develop train brake system performance requirements. However, this

appeal was invariably general. No railroad proposed specific

performance requirements for train brake systems. The definition of

``power brake defect ratio'' forms the basis for a strong performance-

related incentive to the railroads. If railroads can limit their power

brake defect ratio to specified levels, they may be allowed to operate

trains greater distances between required train brake system tests. FRA

proposes that a movement of the train need not take place for the power

brake defect to be counted against the power brake defect ratio used to

qualify the railroad to operate trains longer distances between

required brake system tests.

The definition of ``mountain grade territory'' attempts to address

the opinions of several commenters that mountain grade is a function of

both grade percentage and grade distance. In addition, FRA believes

that the definition of ``mountain grade territory'' should become more

stringent as the speed of the train increases. Thus, FRA developed an

empirical relationship to define mountain grade territory, which takes

into account all three factors. An explanation of the formula to be

used in determining mountain grade territory and a graph illustrating

its application are contained in Appendix C.

The definitions of ``Class 1'' and ``Class 2 train brake system

tests'' introduce new terminology. The FRA proposes the Class 1 test to

fulfill the intent of the existing initial terminal test and the Class

2 test to fulfill the intent of the existing intermediate terminal

test. See 49 CFR 232.12, 232.13. This proposed new terminology attempts

to eliminate controversy over what is an initial or intermediate

terminal. The new terminology allows the tests to be easily imposed at

points other than terminal points.

Minimum qualifications for supervisors, mechanical and electronic

forces, and train crew members responsible for safe operation of train

brake systems are another key feature of FRA's proposal. The

definitions offered for qualified personnel introduce this important

requirement.

Section 232.7. This section sets forth the procedures for seeking

waivers of compliance with the requirements of this rule. Requests for

such waivers can be filed by any interested party. In reviewing such

requests, FRA conducts investigations to determine if a deviation from

the general criteria can be made without compromising or diminishing

rail safety.

Section 232.9. General compliance and recordkeeping requirements

are stated in this section. In accordance with the ``use or haul''

language contained in the Safety Appliance Acts and with FRA's general

rulemaking authority under the FRSA, FRA proposes that a train,

railroad car, or locomotive will be considered ``in use'' prior to

departure but after it receives or should have received the necessary

tests and inspections required for movement. FRA would no longer

necessarily wait for a piece of equipment with a power brake defect to

be hauled before issuing a violation, a practice frequently criticized

by the railroads. FRA believes that this approach will increase FRA's

ability to prevent the movement of defective equipment that creates a

potential safety hazard to both the public and railroad employees. FRA

does not feel that this approach increases the railroads' burden since

equipment should not be operated if it is found in defective condition

in the pre-departure tests and inspections, unless permitted by the

regulations.

This section also clarifies FRA's position that the requirements

contained in the proposed rules are applicable to any ``person,'' as

broadly defined in Sec. 232.11, that performs any function required by

the proposed rules. Although various sections of the proposed rule

address the duties of a railroad, FRA intends that any person who

performs any action on behalf of a railroad or any person who performs

any action covered by the proposed rule is required to perform that

action in the same manner as required of a railroad or be subject to

FRA enforcement action. For example, private car owners and contract

shippers that perform duties covered by these proposed regulations

would be required to perform those duties in the same manner as

required by a railroad.

Section 232.11. This section contains the penalty provisions of the

proposed rule, stating that all persons who violate the standards of

the proposed rule or cause the violation of such standards are subject

to a civil penalty, and explains the circumstances under which an

individual may be assessed a penalty. The definition of ``person''

incorporates the expanded language contained in section 9 of the Rail

Safety Enforcement and Review Act, which amended the definition of

``person'' contained in the Safety Appliance Acts and the FRSA. The

clarified definition of ``person'' includes, but is not limited to,

such entities as manufacturers and lessors of railroad equipment and

independent contractors. Congress' purpose in amending the definition

of ``person'' was to clarify the Secretary's existing power over

entities whose activities relate to rail safety by explicitly defining

that authority. See 1992 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 879.

Congress made it clear that the included list of ``persons'' subject to

the Secretary's authority was intended to be illustrative and not

exhaustive.

Section 232.13. This section contains a general provision

concerning the preemptive effect of the proposed rule. The provision is

based on the preemption clause contained in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20106,

formerly codified in the FRSA at 45 U.S.C. Sec. 434.

Section 232.15. This section contains general requirements that are

applicable to all train brake systems. FRA proposes to specifically

include basic train brake system practices and procedures that form the

foundation for the safe operation of all types of trains. Some of these

basic principles are so obvious that they have not been specifically

included in past rules. The most basic safety requirements for all

train brake systems include the ability to stop a train within signal

spacing, establishing an integral train brake communication line, and

having the train brake system respond as intended to signals from the

brake communication line. Several of the general requirements contained

in this section are addressed in later sections of this proposed rule

and will be discussed in further detail in those sections.

FRA proposes to continue the requirement that prior to departure

from an initial terminal point all trains shall have 100 percent

functional train brake systems. Although a few commenters suggested the

departure of trains from initial terminals with less than 100 percent

functional brakes, based on a standard of tons per operative brake,

none of the commenters provided any further guidance for developing

such a standard. Furthermore, FRA and most of the commenters agree that

having 100 percent functional brakes at initial terminal points is

necessary for allowing trains to travel long distances between brake

system tests. Since FRA is proposing incentives to allow railroads to

increase the distances trains may travel between train brake system

tests, this basic requirement takes on even greater importance in the

proposed new rule. Requiring 100 percent functional brakes prior to

departure from an initial terminal point sets the proper tone for the

quality and thoroughness FRA expects from the industry on train brake

system inspections, maintenance, and tests.

FRA proposes a clear and absolute prohibition on train movement if

more than 15 percent of the cars in a train have their brakes cut out

or have otherwise defective brakes. This has long been an industry

interpretation of the hauling-for-repair provision of 45 U.S.C. 13,

recodified at 49 U.S.C. Secs. 20303, 21302, and 21304, and has

withstood the test of time. No major objections to this limitation on

the hauling of cars with power brake defects for repair were raised by

any of the commenters.

FRA also intends to prohibit the movement of cars with cut-out or

ineffective brakes beyond points where repairs to the defective

condition could be made. FRA will consider a car's brakes ineffective

if the piston travel exceeds 1.5 inches less than the total possible

piston travel for that car.

FRA plans to require each railroad to develop a formal program to

train and to qualify personnel, including contract personnel,

responsible for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of train brake

systems. The detailed requirements are stated in Subpart C of the rule

text. The contemplated program is similar to programs being instituted

voluntarily by several of the major railroads. The vast majority of the

comments and the experience of FRA inspectors support the contention

that many of the people inspecting and testing train brake systems do

not have the training and background to understand what they are doing

and why they are doing it. As part of these programs, railroads will be

required to notify employees and contractors of their current

qualification status and to require periodic requalification. Railroads

will be expected to update their training programs as they introduce

new train brake system technology.

FRA proposes that first-line supervisors should be required to

perform frequent and random spot checks of train brake system

inspections, maintenance, and tests. FRA intends to get supervisors out

of the office on to the shop floor, outside to repair tracks and repair

points, and off site to locations where train brake system inspections

are performed. Only by active involvement can these supervisors improve

the quality and effectiveness of their railroad's train brake system

inspection, maintenance, and test program. Performing and keeping

records of these spot checks are required if a railroad wishes to take

advantage of the flexibility built into the proposed rule to allow

trains to travel much greater distances between train brake system

tests. Requiring spot checks is a means that FRA will use to ensure

supervisors are jointly responsible with the employees they supervise

for the correct performance of safety critical train brake system

inspection, test, and maintenance tasks.

Based on FRA experience and the statements of several commenters,

it is evident that the use of chemicals in the trainline causes

untimely wear and tear to brake system components and has a long-term

detrimental effect on train air brakes. Comments provided to FRA

indicate that air dryers on locomotives are very effective in improving

the performance of train brake systems particularly under cold weather

conditions and generally eliminate the need to use alcohol and other

foreign substances in the trainline. Several railroads commented that

they have already equipped their locomotives with air dryers in order

to curb the use of chemicals in the trainline. Furthermore, several

railroads frequently operating under extreme cold weather conditions

commented that they have prohibited chemicals from being placed in

brake air systems to prevent freeze-up. These railroads stated that

they have been able to operate trains in cold weather without resorting

to chemicals, such as alcohol.

Based on these comments and experiences, FRA intends to ban the use

of anti-freeze chemicals in train air brake systems. In addition, FRA

proposes that all new and rebuilt locomotives be equipped with air

dryers with a capacity that can be achieved by current commercially

available equipment, unless the new or rebuilt locomotive will not be

operated in cold weather conditions, will power only trains limited to

30 mph or less, or will power only trains of 20 cars or less. FRA

believes that exception from the requirement to equip new and rebuilt

locomotives with air dryers for these types of operations is warranted

based on the comments received and on FRA's experience that moisture in

the brakeline in these types of operations has never been a problem.

Comments received by FRA heavily favored the single car test as an

effective tool for ensuring the safe operation of railroad equipment.

Rail labor representatives acknowledged the value of the single car

test, but suggested that railroads are establishing special expediter

or light repair tracks in place of repair tracks to avoid the current

requirement to perform single car tests. The experience of FRA

inspectors in the field supports this contention. Consequently, FRA

proposes to require single car tests whenever any one of a specific

list of components of the air brake system on a car is removed,

repaired, or replaced. FRA also plans to require periodic freight brake

tests and single car tests at calendar intervals. These requirements

are independent of the type track or facility where the cars are worked

on.

Experience of FRA indicates a proliferation of equipment with other

than standard ten-inch brake cylinders. As a result, mechanical forces

and train crew members performing brake system inspections often do not

know the acceptable range of brake piston travel for this non-standard

equipment. In an attempt to improve this situation, FRA intends to

require badge plates or stencilling of cars with the acceptable range

of piston travel.

Section 232.17. These proposed conditions for the movement of

equipment with defective brakes without civil penalty liability

incorporate the stringent conditions stated in the proviso to Sec. 13

of the Safety Appliance Acts (45 U.S.C. 13, recodified at 49 U.S.C.

Secs. 20302, 20303, 21302, and 21304). Except for cars or locomotives

having their brakes cut out en route and except for defective

locomotives moving lite or dead within a yard at less than 10 mph, FRA

proposes that all cars or locomotives found with defective braking

equipment be required to be tagged as bad ordered and determined safe

for movement by a qualified person. An important clarification has been

made in an attempt to eliminate misinterpretation of the regulation.

FRA clearly states that equipment with defective brakes shall not pass

a location where repairs to the defective condition can be made.

Consequently, if a car or locomotive is found with defective brakes

during a Class 1 or Class 2 inspection and that inspection is performed

at a location where repairs of the type that are needed can be

performed, that car or locomotive may not be moved from that location

until such repairs are performed. However, if repairs to the defective

condition cannot be performed at the location where the defect is

discovered, or should have bee

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