Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 73

RIN 3150-AE81

Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power

Plants

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Action: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its

physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors.

The amendments modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage

to include use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting

personnel and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital

areas and to include a land vehicle bomb. The amendments also require

reactor licensees to install vehicle control measures, including

vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the malevolent use of a

land vehicle. The Commission believes this action is prudent based on

an evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island (TMI)

nuclear power station and a bombing of the World Trade Center. The

objective of this final rule is to enhance reactor safety by protecting

against the use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital

areas. Further, the amendments will enhance reactor safety by

protecting vital equipment from damage by detonation of a large

explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 31, 1994.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Phillip F. McKee, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,

telephone (301) 504-2933.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On November 4, 1993 (58 FR 58804), the Commission published a

proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment that presented

amendments to the physical protection requirements for operating

commercial nuclear power reactors. The amendments proposed to modify

the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a

land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried

equipment, and/or explosives. A total of 35 letters of public comment

were received from respondents representing more than 160 individual

comments. Comments received in association with a public meeting

conducted by the NRC on May 10, 1993, on this same topic have also been

analyzed as part of this final rulemaking. An additional 11 comments

were received as a result of the meeting, representing an additional 38

individual comments. Written comments received from the Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and public comments made at a

February 10, 1994, meeting of the ACRS are also addressed under the

following analysis. Copies of the public comments received on this

proposed rule are available for inspection and copying for a fee at the

NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington,

DC.

Public Comment Analysis

General

Public comment on the rule was received from 25 licensees that

operate commercial nuclear power reactors; two industry groups, the

Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the Nuclear

Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG); two public citizens and

one citizen's group, Ohio Citizen's for Responsible Energy; two

advocacy groups, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) and the Committee

to Bridge the Gap; one State nuclear safety agency; and two vendors.

Additional comments were received as a result of an NRC-sponsored

public meeting of May 10, 1993. Comments were received from eight

private citizens (the letter from one enclosed a petition signed by 40

individuals); two utilities; and one public interest group, Ohio

Citizens for Responsible Energy. The proposed rule indicated that

comments regarding malevolent use of vehicles submitted in association

with the meeting would be treated under this final rule and that

duplicate comments need not be submitted. Many of these respondents

recommended strengthening the design basis threat to cover the maximum

credible threat and increasing the number of security force members at

power reactor sites as the best method to counter a terrorist vehicle

bomb attack. The aforementioned petition, submitted to the Chairman of

the NRC, indicated, among other things, that Congress should strengthen

safeguards at nuclear facilities and should legislate the use of

Federal guards at NRC-licensed sites. Comments received from 2

utilities that operate commercial nuclear power reactors either

indicated support for the then-developing NUMARC comments or were

similar to comments received on the proposed rule.

A variety of general comments were received on the proposed rule

and supporting documentation. Several strongly supported the rulemaking

as proposed and expressed the view that rulemaking on this topic was

the proper, proactive approach. A number of comments strongly supported

a belief that vehicle intrusion and vehicle bomb threats exist. These

comments refer to the Three Mile Island intrusion event and the World

Trade Center bombing event as evidence of these threats. The NCI

commented that the rule was long overdue. Some of those that supported

the rule offered more detailed comments proposing further expansion of

the design basis threat and placing more rigid controls on licensee

actions to implement the rule.

NUMARC provided detailed comments on behalf of the industry.

Fourteen utilities confirmed their support or agreement with NUMARC's

comments. NUMARC commented that industry believes that it is important

to deter unauthorized land vehicle penetration challenges to a

licensee's protected area and that industry recognizes that facilities

must be able to shut down safely in the unlikely event of the

detonation of an explosive device outside the protected area. NUMARC

considers these actions to be prudent for the protection of its

employees, investment, and public confidence. NUMARC commented that

because the NRC (as expressed in the proposed rule) and NUMARC agree in

principle, the issue should be addressed in an integrated manner using

a reasonable and realistic approach without imposing unnecessary

conservatism. The details of NUMARC's comments identified areas where

they considered the proposed rule took too conservative an approach.

NUMARC also expressed general concerns about the backfit justification

for the rule and the schedule for implementation.

NUBARG, whose members include 15 nuclear utilities, provided

comments that generally challenge the backfitting and regulatory

analyses based on their concerns that the analyses did not provide a

sufficient quantified basis for finding the requisite ``substantial

increase'' in safety under the NRC's backfitting rule. Two of the

comment letters provided by utilities confirmed their support or

agreement with NUBARG's comments.

Several comments expressed the view that the proposed rule could

not be substantiated based on the current threat. As support for this

position, comments referred to conclusions reached by the NRC in denial

of a 1991 petition for rulemaking to require licensees to protect

against truck bombs. Other comments indicated that two isolated events

(the Three Mile Island intrusion event and World Trade Center bombing)

did not justify rulemaking, particularly in light of the fact that the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by their account, does not

support the position that the threat of malevolent use of vehicles has

increased and the NRC position is that no actual vehicle bomb threat

against power reactors exists.

Several comments opposed the proposed rule because they considered

that it did not provide a substantial increase in protection of public

health and safety or common defense and security at a justifiable cost.

Other comments indicated that the rule was extreme and unnecessarily

burdensome with little if any safety benefit and that contingency plans

for vehicle bombs currently in place adequately addressed the threat of

malevolent use of vehicles.

The NRC staff presented the proposed rulemaking package to the

Security Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

(ACRS) on November 3, 1993, and the full committee on November 4, 1993.

The full committee was briefed on December 10, 1993, in a closed

session, by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards. Following these briefings, ACRS's December 10, 1993 letter

to the Chairman raised concerns about the rulemaking, particularly the

justification for the rule, the lack of a quantitative risk assessment

to support it, and the expedited nature of the rulemaking. A minority

of four members of the ACRS expressed a view that the proposed rule

represents a prudent and effective step toward enhancing public health

and safety. On February 10, 1994, the ACRS heard presentations on the

rulemaking from the NUMARC, the NCI, one public citizen, and the NRC

staff members. On April 7, 1994, the staff briefed the ACRS in a closed

session regarding additional, quantitative evaluations that supported

this rulemaking. Issues raised by the ACRS in their December 10, 1993,

letter are encompassed by issues raised by the public and are addressed

in the following responses.

Like the ACRS, NUMARC, NUBARG, and numerous utilities expressed

concern that the safety benefit was not adequately justified or

quantified. They challenged the validity of the regulatory and backfit

analyses because of lack of quantification of the threat. They

contended that the analyses contain no quantified risk data or safety

goal evaluation to support the conclusion that the proposed regulations

result in a substantial increase in public health and safety. Another

comment, while acknowledging the potential difficulty in quantification

of the threat, stated that the analyses were no more than

``conclusionary'' and fall short of demonstrating the requisite

substantial increase in radiological safety.

The Commission notes that the use of probabilistic risk assessment

(PRA) as a tool for estimating risk is sound when based on results from

demonstrable, repeatable events and test data--for example,

establishing the probability of failure and the mean time to failure

for aircraft wing root structures due to metal fatigue or for valve

failures due to water hammer or corrosion, etc. The NRC has examined

the use of PRA to predict sabotage as an initiating event and concluded

that to do so would not be credible or valid because terrorist attacks,

by their very nature, may not be quantified. Past attempts to apply PRA

techniques to acts of sabotage have resulted in similar findings. For

example, in 1978, NUREG/CR-0400, the ``Risk Assessment Review Group

Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission'' stated, ``it was

recognized that the probability of sabotage of a nuclear power plant

cannot be estimated with any confidence.'' For this same reason,

according to this report, consideration of risk of sabotage was

deliberately omitted in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).

In the ``Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of

Nuclear Power Plants'' published on March 14, 1983 (48 FR 10772), the

Commission stated:

The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear

materials is not presently included in the safety goal. At present

there is no basis on which to provide a measure of the risk of these

matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is

needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low,

level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will

continue to be successful. With these exceptions it is our intent

that the risk from all various initiating mechanisms be taken into

account to the best of the capability of the current evaluation

techniques.

In the 1983 Indian Point licensing hearings, the NRC staff

testified that PRA is unable to predict the probability of sabotage as

an initiating event. Also, in a June 11, 1991, petition to institute an

individual plant examination program for threats beyond the design

basis, the NCI stated a position similar to the NRC's by recognizing

that PRA-type methods cannot be used to analyze for core damage

frequency since one cannot quantify the likelihood of a terrorist

attack.

The Commission continues to believe that arbitrary selection of

numbers to ``quantify'' threat probability without demonstrable,

actual, supporting event data would yield misleading results at best.

Knowledgeable terrorism analysts recognize the danger and are unwilling

to quantify the risk. Over the past several years, a number of National

Intelligence Estimates have been produced addressing the likelihood of

nuclear terrorism. The analyses and conclusions are not presented in

terms of quantified probability but recognize the unpredictable nature

of terrorist activity in terms of likelihood. The NRC continues to

believe that, although in many cases considerations of probabilities

can provide insights into the relative risk of an event, in some cases

it is not possible, with current knowledge and methods, to usefully

quantify the probability of a specific vulnerability threat.

The NRC notes that, although not quantified, its regulatory

analysis recognizes the importance of the perception of the likelihood

of an attempt to create radiological sabotage in assessing whether to

redefine adequate protection. The NRC's assessment that there is no

indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial

nuclear industry was an important consideration in concluding that

neither the Three Mile Island intrusion nor the World Trade Center

bombing demonstrated a need to redefine adequate protection.

The NRC does not agree that quantifying the probability of an

actual attack is necessary to a judgment of a substantial increase in

overall protection of the public health and safety (a less stringent

test of the justification for a rule change). Inherent in the NRC's

current regulations is a policy decision that the threat, although not

quantified, is likely in a range that warrants protection against a

violent external assault as a matter of prudence.

The potential threat posed by malevolent use of vehicles as part of

a violent external assault and the need to protect against it have been

the subject of detailed consideration and reconsideration by the

Commission for more than fifteen years. The original requirements for

physical security at power reactor sites proposed in the mid-1970s

included a requirement for barriers to prevent ready access to vital

areas by ground vehicles. The Commission decided not to include the

requirement at that time.

The Commission reexamined the vehicle issue in great detail in the

1980s. In 1986, the Commission concluded that, even though perimeter

chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion, the requirement

for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired weapons would

limit actions of intruders. In reconsidering the risk from use of a

vehicle to gain proximity to vital areas, the NRC's regulatory analysis

does not suggest that the likelihood of a violent external assault has

increased. Rather, the staff focussed its regulatory analysis on

whether a vehicle could provide an advantage to an adversary with the

characteristics of the design basis threat.

The NRC assessed lessons learned from the TMI intrusion and

concluded that a vehicle could provide advantages to an adversary not

previously considered. In SECY-86-101, ``Design Basis Threat--Options

for Consideration,'' March 31, 1986, the NRC concluded that, even

though perimeter chain link fences would not prevent vehicle intrusion,

the requirement for prompt response by guards armed with shoulder-fired

weapons would limit actions of intruders. Accordingly, in 1986, the NRC

concluded that the installation of vehicle barriers might not

constitute a substantial overall increase in the protection of public

health and safety. More recently, the NRC has analyzed the capability

of existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent

external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation.

These new analyses support the NRC's conclusions in the regulatory

analysis for the proposed rulemaking. The NRC believes that the vehicle

intrusion issue alone warrants the installation of vehicle barriers at

nuclear power plants.

In the 1980s, the NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies,

including the National Security Council, regarding the use of vehicle

bombs in the Middle East and their possible impact on the domestic

threat situation. In June 1988, the NRC decided that it would not be

necessary to change the design basis threat for radiological sabotage

(10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)) nor to require long-range planning by power reactor

licensees for permanent protection against land vehicle bombs. However,

as a matter of prudence, it directed development of NRC and licensee

contingency plans for dealing with a possible land vehicle bomb threat

to power reactors, should one arise.

On June 11, 1991 (56 FR 26782), the Commission denied a petition

for rulemaking to revise the design basis threat to include explosive-

laden vehicles (PRN-73-9). In denying that petition, the NRC noted that

the decision was based, in part, on the fact that only one truck bomb

attack (1970) had occurred in the United States; there had been no

other vehicle bomb attacks in the Western Hemisphere; there had been

none outside areas of civil unrest; and there had been none directed

against a nuclear activity. The vehicle bomb attack on the World Trade

Center represented a significant change to the domestic threat

environment that changed many of the points used in denying the

petition and eroded the basis for concluding that vehicle bombs could

be excluded from any consideration of the domestic threat environment.

For the first time in the United States, a conspiracy with ties to

Middle East extremists clearly demonstrated the capability and

motivation to organize, plan, and successfully conduct a major vehicle

bomb attack. Regardless of the motivations or connections of the

conspirators, it is significant that the bombing was organized within

the United States and implemented with materials obtained on the open

market in the United States. Accordingly, the Commission believes that

the threat characterized in the final rule is appropriate.

As a result of the World Trade Center bombing, the NRC believes

that the construction of a vehicle bomb is more likely to develop

without advance indications. The NRC does not believe that it can

quantify the likelihood of vehicle bomb attack. However, it has

performed a conditional probabilistic risk analysis for an existing

power reactor site, assuming an attempt to damage a nuclear power plant

with a design basis vehicle bomb placed at locations within the

protected area that would create the greatest risk to public health and

safety. The analysis indicated that the contribution to core damage

frequency could be high.

Barriers installed to protect against vehicle intrusion into

protected areas would also protect, to varying degrees, against vehicle

bombs. The NRC believes that adjusting the location of barriers where

necessary to ensure a capability of protecting vital equipment against

a design basis vehicle bomb would provide an additional, substantial

increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety.

Further, the NRC believes that the incremental costs to licensees to

analyze the degree of protection against a vehicle bomb and to make

adjustments in vehicle control measures in limited cases are justified,

particularly considering the provisions in the rule allowing licensees

to propose alternative measures if a site-specific analysis indicates

that the costs of fully meeting the rule's design goals and criteria

are not justified by the added protection that would be provided. The

NRC's additional deterministic evaluations and limited probabilistic

assessments have supported the NRC's earlier findings that protecting

against vehicle intrusion and a vehicle bomb would substantially

increase the overall protection of public health and safety. The NRC

has updated the regulatory analysis to include these evaluations.

Additional issues raised and the NRC response to these issues are

provided in the sections listed below that follow:

I. Threat Considerations

A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat

B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive

C. ``Margin of Prudence''

D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation

E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13

F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program

II. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses

A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems

B. Peer Review of Analyses

C. Clarification

III. Rule Implementation

A. Schedule

B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals

C. Vehicle Barriers

D. Passive Vehicle Barriers

E. Active Vehicle Barriers

F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives

IV. NRC Inspection

V. Miscellaneous

A. Research Reactors

B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement

I. Threat Considerations

A. Coupling Vehicle Intrusion and Vehicle Bomb Threat

Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the proposed

rule unnecessarily linked vehicle intrusion with a vehicle bomb. NUMARC

commented that the proposed rule contemplates that the intruding

vehicle would be fully loaded with personnel, equipment, and a large

explosive device. NUMARC also commented that any considerations of a

vehicle bomb should be for a stationary vehicle. NUMARC stated that

coupling the vehicle intrusion event and vehicle bomb event added

unnecessary conservatism. For example, to protect against a moving

vehicle, bomb barriers would, in some cases, need to be more

substantial to stop penetration of vehicle. NUMARC proposed that the

revised design basis threat should include either a land vehicle

intrusion or a detonation of explosives outside the protected area, but

not a combination of the two. Along this same line, one comment

expressed the opinion that the proposed language implies the need to

protect against a vehicle used for transport, not for breaching a

barrier or for use as a truck bomb.

Another comment expressed a concern that a major defect in the rule

is the lack of the assumption that the adversary could blast away a

fence if a licensee were to choose to use, for example, cabling in the

fence as the means to stop a vehicle. The respondent proposed that any

barrier should be a heavy mass which would be resistant to destruction.

Response. The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment that the

proposed rule could be read to imply that licensees would be required

to provide protection against an intrusion by adversaries using a

vehicle for transportation coincident with a vehicle bomb. This was not

the intent and the rule wording has been revised to clarify this point.

Commission deliberations on the rule have considered use of the vehicle

as transportation for an adversary and a vehicle bomb as separate

threats to be protected against. Any coupling of adversary tactics

associated with the rule was intended to allow for more efficient and

cost effective protection against either a vehicle intrusion to gain

rapid access to vital areas, as a single act, or against a vehicle

bomb.

Meeting the requirements of the final rule will result in

substantial protection from a vehicle bomb whether it is moving or

stationary. The NRC's regulatory analysis indicated that, because of

the short distances between vital areas and portions of some protected

area boundaries, protection against a vehicle at those boundaries would

be inconsistent with NUMARC's stated goal of being able to safely shut

down a plant following the detonation of an explosive device outside

the protected area.

Regarding the comment that the rule should include the assumption

that adversaries may use devices to destroy less substantial barriers

and then gain access, the Commission does not agree that this

assumption should be included in the rule. The NRC assessment of the

threat environment does not support this assumption. Further, use of

such a technique by an adversary would tend to diminish one of the

major advantages of use of a vehicle--the element of surprise.

B. Characteristics of Design Basis Vehicle/Explosive

Comment. NUMARC provided a detailed proposal for characteristics of

a design basis vehicle that could be used to attempt penetration of a

nuclear power plant protected area and a design basis bomb that could

be used in an attempt to damage plant equipment. Other comments

indicated that vehicle speed should take into consideration terrain and

seasonal conditions and that the proposed vehicle explosive device size

was excessive and not justified by historical experience, particularly

that in the United States.

Response. The Commission notes that it has relied on analogous

historical data when enumerating the attributes of a design basis

threat because there has never been a terrorist attack on an NRC-

licensed power reactor facility or a credible threat of an attack. This

was the methodology used in formulating the original design basis

threat statements in the late 1970s, and it was used in defining the

proposed design basis vehicle threat. The design basis vehicle was

defined after examining several hundred actual vehicle bombing attacks

occurring worldwide during approximately the past decade. Historical

data indicates that vehicle bombs, similar to the design basis vehicle,

have been used in the past and their use can reasonably be expected to

continue to occur in the future. The Commission has made some changes

in the detailed characteristics of the design basis vehicle. The

revised characteristics will require licensees to provide substantial

protection against a moving vehicle bomb. In addition, the NRC's

implementation guidance discusses how the design of barrier systems can

account for site-specific limits on the speed that a vehicle could

attain because of factors such as terrain.

Comment. One comment expressed confusion over reference to the

design basis vehicle as a ``4-wheel drive vehicle'' in that this could

imply that non 4-wheel drive vehicles would not have to be protected

against. The comment recommended that the final rule language be

changed to require protection against all land vehicles.

Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``4-wheel drive

vehicle'' needs clarification. It reasons that protection against

intrusion by a 4-wheel drive vehicle encompasses protection against a

land vehicle with less than 4-wheel drive.

Comment. Other comments noted that the regulatory language should

be changed to remove reference to equipment and explosives capable of

being hand-carried, as opposed to that which the vehicle could carry.

Response. As stated previously, this issue is being clarified by a

revision of the design basis threat statement to separate the threat of

intrusion versus vehicle bomb. In an intrusion event, the vehicle is

obviously capable of transporting the equipment and explosives proposed

to be hand-carried by an adversary. While the vehicle could carry more

equipment than can be carried by the persons being transported, it is

unlikely that this additional equipment would be of use to the

adversaries. The vehicle is essentially a means of transport for the

adversaries, and it is unlikely that once adversaries have left the

vehicle they would be able to return to obtain additional equipment or

explosives.

Comment. One utility provided specific questions regarding several

assumptions associated with the vehicle bomb. These included whether:

The vehicle is under control by adversaries up to the point of

detonation;

The vehicle bomb automatically detonates when the adversary loses

control of the vehicle or after a pre-defined time period;

The vehicle is used in combination with a secondary external event,

e.g., loss of offsite power; and,

Point of detonation, i.e., crash point or at a later point as

vehicle rolls towards a facility.

Response. With respect to a vehicle bomb, for analysis purposes the

device would be considered to detonate at the point where the vehicle

impacted the vehicle barrier system. Whether adversaries still have

control of the vehicle or whether the detonation of the device is

delayed should have little impact on the analysis of the effect of the

explosive blast. Because the barrier system is intended to protect

against vehicles gaining proximity to vital areas, the barrier system

should not allow a vehicle to fully penetrate it and continue to roll

towards a facility.

With respect to a secondary external event, power reactor licensees

must protect against all capabilities and attributes described by the

design basis threat for radiological sabotage. This would not include

protection against other natural events, such as damage from a

hurricane, coincident with a sabotage threat. However, with respect to

loss of off-site power, licensees should consider its loss, if vital

equipment is assumed damaged, in their analysis of the effects of a

vehicle bomb. This consideration is compatible with the basic premise

that equipment not designated and protected as vital is vulnerable to

damage and is not available.

C. ``Margin of Prudence''

Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented on NRC's use of the

term ``margin of prudence'' as the basis for support of the proposed

rulemaking. NUMARC commented that it is inappropriate to use such an

undefined concept as a basis for rulemaking. These comments indicated

that NRC expansion into matters of prudence is unwarranted and would

result in expansion of the NRC's sphere of regulatory influence beyond

plant safety.

Response. Use of the term ``margin of prudence'' must be put in

perspective as used by the NRC in this rulemaking. The NRC requires an

established level of security at nuclear power reactor sites as a

provision against possible security contingencies that might arise. The

NRC has concluded that a satisfactory level of security is one that is

designed and implemented to protect against a hypothetical threat

(design basis threat) that contains certain adversary attributes. These

attributes have been selected based on Commission analyses of actual

terrorist attributes and on judgment. The term ``margin of prudence''

was used in recent Commission deliberations to suggest that the World

Trade Center bombing and the Three Mile Island intrusion had caused a

change in the domestic threat environment or in the NRC's understanding

of the sabotage threat that was not satisfactorily addressed by the

existing design basis threat. Further, the term was used to suggest

that a modification of the design basis threat was necessary to

reestablish a level of security commensurate with the nature of

security contingencies that might arise. Its use was illustrative only

of the relationship between an actual threat and the hypothetical

design basis threat and the change in that relationship caused by the

World Trade Center and Three Mile Island events. The NRC intended no

wider or expanded use of the term.

D. Design Basis Threat Re-Evaluation

Comment. NUMARC and several utilities commented that the revision

to the design basis threat to address malevolent use of vehicles should

be addressed in an integrated manner so that rulemaking on this topic

would not be impacted after completion of an ongoing, more

comprehensive review of the design basis threat. Other comments

expressed concerns about deficiencies in the design basis threat that

need to be addressed. Deficiencies identified by these comments

included: protection against more than one insider, protection against

a larger number of external attackers, capability of attackers to

operate as more than one team, and use of aquatic vehicles. One comment

was made that ongoing considerations for reductions in the insider

requirements should be part of the overall reconsideration of the

design basis threat.

Response. The Commission notes that use of a vehicle by adversaries

was addressed under Phase I of a re-evaluation of the design basis

threat which the NRC began in the Spring of 1993. This phase of the re-

evaluation has been completed. Other attributes associated with the

design basis threat, such as those characterized in comments on the

proposed rule, have been reviewed and considered as part of Phase II of

the re-evaluation. NRC staff recommendations on this part of the re-

evaluation were provided to the Commission in a classified paper on

March 15, 1994.

E. Applicability of 10 CFR 50.13

Comment. NUMARC, NUBARG, and several utilities stated that the

proposed change in the design basis threat to include malevolent use of

a vehicle amounts to escalation of the threat to efforts by an enemy of

the United States. The comments contended that the proposed changes to

the design basis threat are, therefore, in conflict with 10 CFR 50.13,

which specifies that licensees are not required to provide for design

features to protect against attacks and destructive acts by an enemy of

the United States. One comment recommended that NRC should re-evaluate

the design basis threat assumption to now include foreign enemies of

the United States.

Response. In 10 CFR 50.13, which was promulgated on September 26,

1967 (32 FR 13445), the regulations provide that applicants for

construction permits, operating licenses, or amendments thereto, need

not provide for design features or other measures to protect against

the attacks or destructive acts, including sabotage, by an enemy of the

United States. The issue raised in a contested application for a power

reactor construction permit, which led to the promulgation of 10 CFR

50.13, was whether the reactor should be constructed to withstand a

missile attack from Cuba. There is a significant difference in the

practicality of defending against a missile attack and constructing a

vehicle barrier at a safe standoff distance from vital areas.

The statement of considerations for 10 CFR 50.13 makes it clear

that the scope of that regulation is to relieve applicants of the need

to provide protective measures that are the assigned responsibility of

the nation's defense establishment. The Atomic Energy Commission

recognized that it was not practical for the licensees of civilian

nuclear power reactors to provide design features that could protect

against the full range of the modern arsenal of weapons. The statement

concluded with the observation that assessing whether another nation

would use force against a nuclear power plant was speculative in the

extreme and, in any case, would involve the use of sensitive

information regarding both the capabilities of the United States'

defense establishment and diplomatic relations.

The new rule, with its addition to the design basis threat and

added performance requirements, is in response to a clearly

demonstrated domestic capability for acts of extreme violence directed

at civilian structures. The participation or sponsorship of a foreign

state in the use of an explosives-laden vehicle is not necessary. The

vehicle, explosives, and know-how are all readily available in a purely

domestic context. It is simply not the case that a vehicle bomb attack

on a nuclear power plant would almost certainly represent an attack by

an enemy of the United States, within the meaning of that phrase in 10

CFR 50.13.

Further, characterizing the threat as ``para-military'' adds little

to the understanding of the intent of 10 CFR 50.13. ``Para-military''

suggests an armed, trained group acting outside of a legally

constituted military organization. In that sense, the design basis

threat prior to this amendment already described a ``para-military''

group. ``Para-military'' groups of entirely domestic origin exist.

Accordingly, the amended regulation and supporting analyses need not

address 10 CFR 50.13, either on the grounds that a vehicle bomb attack

is an attack by an enemy of the United States or the action of a

``paramilitary'' group. That regulation is irrelevant to the present

rulemaking.

The implication of the comments regarding 10 CFR 50.13 is that the

simple addition of a vehicle bomb to the design basis threat should

shift the function of providing physical security for nuclear power

plants from the licensee to the Federal Government. The respondents

present no real evidence or persuasive arguments for such a radical

change in the regulatory environment.

F. ``Threat'' or ``Alert'' Program

Comment. One comment suggested that the NRC develop and implement a

``threat or alert'' program similar to the Department of Defense's

Defense Condition ``DEFCON'' program. It was recommended that, under

such a program, the NRC would immediately notify the industry when

information is received from the intelligence community of an impending

security alert and provide a recommended level of action. Licensees, in

turn, would be required to develop security response plans based on

NRC-established threat levels.

Response. The Commission believes that its current Information

Assessment Team approach for notifying licensees of significant events

has been effective in disseminating and coordinating such information.

The Information Assessment Team (IAT) assesses in a timely manner

reported threats to NRC-licensed facilities, materials, and activities

to determine credibility and make recommendations to NRC management.

The IAT is composed of experienced Headquarter's and Regional staff who

are on-call 24 hours a day and bring a variety of expertise to the

assessment process, such as reactor systems, site specific information,

and liaison with other Federal agencies, including close coordination

with the Department of Energy on threat advisories to the utility

industry and NRC licensees. The IAT was established in 1976, and since

that time has supported NRC decision makers responding to a range of

threats, from bomb threats against reactors to times of international

tension during Operation Desert Shield and Storm. For example,

coordinated threat advisories related to the latter were issued by the

IAT on August 24, 1990, January 9, 1991, and April 2, 1991. However,

the NRC does not believe that the IAT is an adequate alternative to

vehicles barriers at nuclear power plants.

II. Regulatory and Backfit Analysis

A. Redundant Engineered Safeguards Systems

Comment. One comment indicated that the proposed rule did not

adequately take into consideration the existing engineered safeguards

systems installed at nuclear power plants. The comment was made that

unauthorized access and possible damage to any one vital area does not

necessarily prevent the safe shut down of the nuclear reactor.

Response. The Commission agrees that consideration should be given

to engineered safeguards systems and believes that flexibility has been

built into the rule to allow for consideration of such existing

systems. The redundancy and diversity of existing engineered safeguards

systems was considered in the NRC analysis of the capability of

existing licensee security measures to protect against a violent

external assault that includes a vehicle as a mode of transportation.

Specific plant equipment layout can be a factor in protective

considerations against a vehicle bomb. Equipment that is redundant or

provides backup to equipment assumed to be damaged by a vehicle bomb

may be considered in the analysis for determining whether protective

measures established to protect against vehicle intrusion fully meet

the design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle

bomb.

B. Peer Review of Analysis

Comment. One comment recommended that any research results, risk

analyses, cost calculations and other work by the NRC should be subject

to peer review.

Response. The NRC believes that its work is subject to various

types of review and, in a sense, is subject to peer review. Portions of

the risk analyses were conducted by groups with appropriate expertise,

including threat assessment, physical security system performance

evaluation, critical target set analysis, safety system inspections,

probabilistic risk analysis, vehicle barrier design, and vehicle bomb

analysis. In addition, the types of efforts mentioned by the comment

are often the subject of multiple office review within the NRC. Several

technical review groups, both within and external to the NRC, provide

further consideration of NRC staff work. Finally, with respect to

rulemaking, analyses are the subject of public comment.

C. Clarification

Comment. One comment noted that the wording associated with the

backfit analysis in the proposed Federal Register notice did not

precisely coincide with that found under 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(3).

Response. The Commission notes that the wording in the notice is

wording that is used for most NRC rules that are subject to

backfitting. The Commission considers that this wording is consistent

with the requirement cited.

III. Rule Implementation

A. Schedule

Comment. A large number of comments were received on the schedules

associated with the proposed rule. Some indicated that the proposed

schedule to submit a summary description of the barrier system and

results of vehicle bomb comparison within 90 days was not long enough.

One comment was received supporting the proposed schedule. Those

commenting that the schedule was too tight expressed concern that 90

days did not provide sufficient time to perform a thorough design

analysis, particularly if alternative measures were to be proposed.

NUMARC, and several other respondents, recommended that licensees be

provided 180 days after issuance of the rule to provide a summary

description of the barrier system.

A number of comments were also received stating that the proposed

schedule to confirm implementation within 360 days after issuance of

the rule was not long enough. Those commenting that the schedule for

completion of installation was too tight expressed concern that the

schedule did not adequately account for material procurement and

availability, outage schedules, and weather circumstances. NUMARC and

several other respondents recommended that licensees be provided 18

months after issuance of the rule to complete installation of measures

to meet the rule. A few comments were received that recommended that

implementation schedules be established on a case-by-case basis.

Response. The Commission agrees that an extension to the schedule

is reasonable based on the fact that this is a new program for power

reactor sites, that there may be some difficulty in procurement of

active vehicle barrier systems, and that possible deleterious effects

on scheduling may result from the weather or planned outages.

Accordingly, the time period for submission of the summary required by

10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) is extended from 90 to 180 days from the

effective date of the rule. The implementation period required under 10

CFR 73.55 (c)(9)(ii) is extended from 360 days to 18 months from the

rule's effective date.

B. NRC Review and Approval of Submittals

Comment. Three comments recommended that the NRC should review and

approve all licensee submittals, including the summary description of

the proposed measures to protect against vehicle intrusion, the results

of the vehicle bomb comparison, and, for applicable licensees,

alternative measures to protect against an explosive device.

Response. The NRC believes that approval of all summaries submitted

under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) would unnecessarily delay expeditious

implementation of this rule. All licensees are required to amend their

physical security plans to commit to the implementation and use of the

vehicle barrier system described by the regulations. These commitments

are fully inspectable and enforceable by the NRC. The NRC would review

and approve the limited number of requests expected to use alternative

measures that might not fully meet the design goals and criteria for

protection against a vehicle bomb. The final rule has been changed to

clarify that proposals for alternative measures be submitted in

accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.

C. Vehicle Barriers

Comment. NUMARC and several other respondents expressed concern

that barrier systems would be required to be ``nuclear grade'' and that

this would unnecessarily escalate costs. Another comment expressed the

opinion that, instead of licensees certifying to the NRC that vehicle

barriers meet requirements, they be able to choose barriers from some

pre-approved list. NUMARC commented that design and certification

needed to utilize existing technology and barrier device test results,

or costs would unnecessarily escalate. NUMARC also requested that the

discussion in the Regulatory Guide be expanded to describe flexibility

available to licensees in designing and installing barriers.

Response. The NRC is unaware of any requirement for ``nuclear grade

equipment'' and notes that the expression does not appear in the

proposed rule or supporting guidance. The NRC agrees with the industry

comment that commercially available materials suffice for the

construction of the vehicle barrier if the barrier is capable of

countering the design basis vehicle threat. As suggested by many

respondents, the NRC recommends that affected licensees take advantage

of available information on vehicle barrier testing, much of which has

been conducted by Federal laboratories and agencies.

With respect to the use of ``pre-approved barriers,'' the

Commission believes that most vendors of commercial vehicle barrier

systems know what the ``stopping powers'' of their barriers are.

Licensees should use this as a resource in determining what barrier can

counter the attributes of the Commission's design basis vehicle most

cost effectively. In addition, the NRC has provided information on

performance levels of several types of barriers to affected licensees.

The Commission agrees with the NUMARC comment concerning expansion of

the discussion on the flexibility of designing and installing barriers

in the regulatory guide supporting the rule. The regulatory guide now

reflects this.

Comment. NUMARC expressed the view that compensatory measures, not

explicitly addressed in the proposed rule or regulatory guide, for

maintenance or repair of barriers should be determined by the licensee.

Another comment stated that compensatory measures required if a barrier

is temporarily inoperable, as with maintenance, need to be addressed at

an early stage.

Response. The NRC anticipates that vehicle barriers, particularly

passive barriers, will infrequently become non-functional once

installed. For those infrequent cases, any compensatory measures should

take into consideration the type and cause of the problem and the time

the barrier will be non-functional. For example, for short term

problems with active or passive barriers, compensatory measures would

not be expected to be extensive. In cases where barriers are non-

functional for longer periods, compensatory measures may include

placement of heavy vehicular equipment, concrete highway median

barriers arranged in a serpentine fashion, installation of strands of

airplane arresting wires, or the positioning of an officer armed with a

high power contingency weapon may be appropriate. The regulatory guide

issued in support of this rulemaking has been revised to include

guidance regarding compensatory measures.

D. Passive Vehicle Barriers

Comment. One comment was directed at the guidance that specified

measures should be established to periodically verify the integrity of

passive barriers outside the protected area. It was commented that

passive barriers by their nature (ditches, berms, concrete filled

embedded poles, etc.) do not require inspection, or if so, the period

for inspecting should be on the order of several years. If licensees

were to install a unique passive barrier that should need periodic

inspection, it should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Response. The Commission agrees that the components of many passive

barrier systems do not need to be inspected on a weekly or monthly

basis due to the nature of their construction. Observations by routine

security patrols should be sufficient to detect any degradation in the

barrier. Some types of barriers may be more susceptible to

deterioration, damage, or tampering and therefore should be subject to

more frequent observation by security patrols or, in some cases,

periodic inspection. Given the large variation in components of passive

barriers, the Commission considers it appropriate to provide licensees

with flexibility on how to assure the continued integrity of barrier

components. If the barrier system is damaged, the Commission expects

that such damage would be identified in a reasonable period and actions

would be taken promptly to repair the damage.

E. Active Vehicle Barriers

Comment. Two comments were received requesting that the wording in

the proposed regulatory guidance clarify that only one active barrier

is needed to deny access. Also, one utility commented that the

provision in the regulatory guide that specified vehicles and their

operators be authorized for entry before being permitted access inside

the vehicle barrier system would preclude their current practice of

searching the vehicle after entry inside the active barrier.

Response. The NRC agrees with these comments and the guidance in

the regulatory guide supporting the rule has been changed.

Comment. Another comment recommended that specific kinetic energy

be identified for use in design of active barriers with documented

performance satisfying specific energy requirements because this

approach would help avoid costly independent testing to demonstrate

performance.

Response. Guidance previously forwarded to licensees, designated as

Safeguards Information, defines the kinetic energy associated with the

design basis vehicle. As previously stated, the NRC has provided

information to affected licensees on performance levels of several

types of barriers to help avoid costly independent testing.

F. Alternative Measures to Protect Against Explosives

Comment. One comment objected to the rule's provisions that would

allow some licensees to provide only ``substantial protection'' and not

equivalent protection to fully meet the Commission's design goals and

criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. One comment indicated

that the NRC should not be considering costs in determining the

acceptability of alternative measures because costs should not be

considered relative to enforcing adequate protection. NUMARC commented

that it was reasonable for licensees to have the option to propose

alternative measures for Commission review when the design goals and

criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb cannot be met without a

significant resource burden.

Response. The NRC's regulatory analysis concluded that neither the

Three Mile Island or World Trade Center events demonstrated a need to

redefine adequate protection. The NRC's basis for the backfit being

implemented by this rulemaking was a determination that it would result

in a substantial increase in protection of the public health and

safety. Paragraph 50.109(a)(3) of Title 10, Code of Federal

Regulations, authorizes such a backfit only if the costs of

implementation are justified in view of the increased protection. The

NRC concluded that the estimated costs for all licensees to provide

barriers to protect against vehicle intrusion were justified. However,

at some sites, the location of barriers to protect against vehicle

intrusion could provide substantial protection against a vehicle bomb

without fully meeting the NRC's design goals and criteria for

protection against an explosive device. For these licensees, the

incremental costs for placing barriers further from vital areas or for

providing additional protective measures to fully meet the design goal

and criteria may not be justified by the incremental protection beyond

the substantial level.

Comment. NUMARC objected to the provision that licensees proposing

alternative measures must compare their costs with the costs of

measures needed to fully meet the design goals and criteria for

protection against a vehicle bomb and must provide an assessment

supporting a finding that the additional costs are not justified by the

added protection that would be provided. NUMARC asserted that the NRC

was requiring licensees to perform analyses beyond what the NRC staff

has done in support of the proposed rule.

NUBARG similarly asserted that the NRC was requiring licensees to

prove that alternative measures substantially increase safety, which is

unfair. NUBARG asserts that this requires licensees to perform a

backfit analysis on why they should not install a proposed modification

(one that would fully meet the design goals and criteria) and that this

runs counter to the backfit principle of the NRC providing the

analysis.

Several respondents stated that they understood that the rule and

regulatory guidance specified that those licensees proposing

alternative measures would need to submit to the NRC a quantitative

analysis to justify that the cost of plant specific measures are not

justified by the added protection afforded. The comments indicated

that, based on this understanding, such a task would be difficult, if

not impossible.

A public interest group expressed the opinion that contingency

planning as part of alternative measures is unacceptable when compared

to a permanent vehicle control system.

Response. The optional licensee analysis provided for in the

revised regulations is intended to be similar in approach to that

performed by the NRC in the development of the regulatory analysis for

the rulemaking. The Commission recognizes the difficulties with respect

to quantification of the protection provided (see general discussion)

and would expect licensees to provide a more deterministic analysis in

comparing the relative protection provided by alternative measures

taken by the licensee that don't fully meet the Commission design goal

and criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb. The Commission did

not intend to require its licensees to do more of an analysis or a

different type of analysis than that performed by the NRC. The

quantitative aspects of the analysis required by the regulation only

apply to cost considerations, particularly the comparison of costs

needed to fully meet the Commission's design goals and criteria for

protection against a vehicle bomb with the cost of alternative

measures.

The comment that contingency planning would be an unacceptable

alternative to permanent vehicle barriers does not recognize the

provision in the rule that specifies that all licensees are required to

establish a vehicle barrier system to protect against use of a land

vehicle as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to

vital areas. Licensees may not substitute contingency plans for vehicle

barriers. Rather, contingency plans were identified as one possible

option for licensees (those few where it may be practical for them to

propose alternative measures to protect against explosives) to

supplement protection provided by the licensee's vehicle barrier system

for protection against a vehicle bomb.

IV. NRC Inspection

Comment. One comment indicated that the NRC should establish

procedures to assure licensee compliance with the rule.

Response. The NRC plans to inspect licensee implementation of the

rule as part of the ongoing reactor inspection program. Most likely the

inspection will be accomplished using a temporary inspection procedure,

which is planned to be prepared after publication of the rule but

before the required implementation date.

As previously stated, all affected licensees are required to amend

their physical security plans in response to this rule. All commitments

in physical security plans are fully inspectable and enforceable by the

NRC.

V. Miscellaneous

A. Research Reactors

Comment. One comment recommended that, in light of the upcoming

1996 Olympics, all reactor fuel, heavy water, and kilocuries of Co and

Cs be removed immediately from the Georgia Tech campus.

Response. While research reactors do not fall within the scope of

this rulemaking, the Commission notes that its threat assessment

activities are performed on a continuing basis, in close liaison with

the intelligence community. Should the level of domestic threat change

at any time, appropriate action will be taken by the NRC. Specifically,

the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI has established liaison with all

Federal agencies in Georgia, including the NRC, relative to the

Olympics. The FBI is the lead law enforcement agency in charge of the

Olympics and, to date, has not indicated that there is any threat to

NRC-licensed facilities or materials relative to the Olympics.

B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

Comment. NUMARC commented that independent spent fuel storage

installations (ISFSIs) should be clearly exempted from the rule.

Response. The NRC did not intend for ISFSIs to be subject to this

regulation because of the lower consequences associated with storage of

irradiated fuel removed from a power reactor core, particularly since

spent fuel stored at ISFSIs must be aged for at least one year. The NRC

is currently preparing a proposed rule to clarify physical protection

requirements for ISFSIs. The lessons learned from the TMI intrusion

will be considered in that rulemaking. In addition, the NRC is

attempting to quantify the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in

the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist in

making a determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed

at ISFSIs. In the interim, the staff believes that the inherent nature

of the fuel, along with the degree of protection provided by the

approved storage means for spent fuel, provides adequate protection

against a vehicle bomb.

C. Office of Management and Budget Supporting Statement

Comment. One comment identified that the NRC-estimated financial

burden to licensees did not include capital costs for modifications.

Response. The NRC notes that the financial burden cited by the

comment was derived from the Office of Management and Budget Supporting

Statement, required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. This statement

deals solely with the licensee recordkeeping and reporting burden

resulting from the new rule, i.e., the paperwork burden. Actual

construction costs are considered in the regulatory analysis that

supports the rule.

Summary of Changes Made to Rule

The following changes have been made as a result of public comment

analysis:

1. The design basis threat statement for radiological sabotage has

been clarified to separate the threat of a land vehicle used for

intrusion with that of a land vehicle used as a vehicle bomb.

2. ISFSIs have been specifically exempted from the rule.

3. Clarification of what is meant by ``the Commission's design

goals and criteria'' has been added to the regulatory text.

4. The appropriate means for submitting alternative measures has

been clarified under 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9)(i) by adding the phrase ``in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.''

5. Summary and implementation schedules have been revised--from 90

to 180 days for summary submittals, and from 360 to 540 days (18

months) for completion of implementation. Both time periods are from

the effective date of the rule which is 1 month from the date of

publication in the Federal Register.

Availability of Supporting Guidance

Two guidance documents are being developed by the NRC in support of

this rule and are expected to be distributed to affected licensees

before the effective date of the rule. These documents are: (1)

Regulatory Guide 5.68, ``Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles

at Nuclear Power Plants'' and (2) NUREG/CR 6190, ``Protection Against

Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.''

Regulatory Guide 5.68 will be available for inspection and copying

for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW.

(Lower Level), Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased

from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price.

Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box

37082, Washington, DC 20013-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased

from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order

basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5825

Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Copies of NUREG/CR-6190 may be purchased from the Superintendent of

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington,

DC 20013-7082. Copies also will be available from the National

Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA

22161. A copy also will be available for inspection and copying for a

fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level),

Washington, DC.

Electronic Submittals

Required paperwork may be submitted, in addition to an original

paper copy, in electronic format on a DOS-formatted (IBM compatible)

5.25 or 3.5 inch computer diskette. Text files should be provided in

WordPerfect format or unformatted ASCII code. The format and version

should be identified on the diskette's external label.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

The Commission has determined under the National Environmental

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in

Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal

action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment

and, therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The

rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power

reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to

determine whether they provide acceptable protection against a land

vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the

Commission.

Implementation of these amendments will not involve release of or

exposure to radioactivity from the site. Construction activities

associated with passive vehicle barriers will involve some earth

movement, either for excavation or development of berms, and possible

destruction of trees and shrubbery. Since most active vehicle barriers

are hydraulically operated, there may on occasion be leakage of this

fluid to the environment. The activities required to implement these

amendments involve no significant environmental impact.

The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact

on which this determination is based are available for inspection at

the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level),

Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and

finding of no significant impact are available from: Carrie Brown, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-

2382.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This final rule amends information collection requirements that are

subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et

seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and

Budget approval number 3150-0002.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is

estimated to average 500 hours per response, including the time for

reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the

collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate

or any other aspect of this collection of information, including

suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records

Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150-0002), Office of

Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Regulatory Analysis

The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this

regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the

alternatives considered by the Commission. Interested persons may

examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document

Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of

the analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power

reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power reactors do not

fall within the scope of the definition ``small entities'' as given in

the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards

promulgated in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration

(13 CFR Part 121).

Backfit Analysis

As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a

backfit analysis for the final rule. The Commission has determined,

based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the

requirements of this final rule provides a substantial increase in

protection to public health and safety or the common defense and

security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The

backfit analysis on which this determination is based reads as follows.

I. Statement of the specific objectives that the proposed action is

designated to achieve.

To publish a rule in response to direction from the Commission in a

staff requirements memorandum dated June 29, 1993. The Commissioners'

decision to proceed with expedited rulemaking was the result of two

events. On February 7, 1993, there was a forced vehicle entry into the

protected area (PA) at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1. On February 25,

1993, a van bomb, containing between 500 and 1,500 pounds of TNT

equivalent, was detonated at the World Trade Center in New York City.

In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff

concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat

against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. Nonetheless, in light

of the vehicle intrusion at TMI and the World Trade Center vehicle

bombing, the NRC staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb

threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the

future. The objective of the rulemaking is to enhance reactor safety by

maintaining a prudent margin between what is the current threat

estimate (low) and the design basis threat for radiological sabotage

specified in 10 CFR 73.1(a) (higher).

II. General description of the activity that would be required by

the licensee or applicant in order to complete the proposed action.

The rule requires each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear

power plant to establish vehicle control measures to protect against

the use of a design basis land vehicle as a means of transportation to

gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas. This provides two benefits.

First, it enhances a licensee's ability to interdict an adversary

attempting to use a vehicle as an aid to reach critical safety

equipment. Second, it provides protection against a land vehicle bomb.

The rule requires licensees to evaluate the effectiveness of their

vehicle control measures with respect to the protection they provide

against a land vehicle bomb. Licensees are required to confirm to the

Commission that the vehicle control measures to protect against vehicle

intrusion, alone or in combination with additional measures, fully meet

the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a

vehicle bomb. Licensees that can show that the additional costs for

measures required to fully meet the Commission's design goals and

criteria for protection against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the

added protection that would be provided have the option to propose

alternative measures to the Commission. These licensees will not be

relieved of the requirement to protect the facility against vehicle

intrusion.

Licensees that propose alternative measures are required to

describe the level of protection that these measures would provide

against a land vehicle bomb and compare the costs of the alternative

measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the

criteria. The NRC will approve the alternative measures if the measures

provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and if the

licensee demonstrates by an analysis, using the essential elements of

the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures

needed to protect against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added

protection provided.

III. Potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental

offsite release of radioactive material.

The potential change in the risk to the public from the accidental

offsite release of radioactive material is discussed in detail in pages

4 through 7 and 10 through 14 of the regulatory analysis that supports

the rulemaking. Failure to protect against attempted radiological

sabotage could result in reactor core damage and large radiological

releases. Based on its assessment, the NRC concludes that amending its

regulations to protect against malevolent use of a vehicle against a

nuclear power plant provides a substantial increase in overall

protection of the public health and safety.

In summary, the TMI event demonstrated some aspects regarding use

of a vehicle by a potential adversary that could present some

challenges not previously considered by staff and licensees. The NRC

considers that providing vehicle intrusion protection provides

substantial enhancement against such a threat. Enhancements to protect

against the vehicle intrusion threat also provide, to varying degrees

dependent on site characteristics, enhancement for protection against

vehicle bombs.

The World Trade Center event demonstrated a capability within the

United States to construct a truck bomb undetected. This recently

demonstrated capability indicates that although a vehicle bomb attack

at a nuclear power plant is not reasonably to be expected, it is

somewhat more likely to develop without advance indications than the

NRC previously believed. Therefore, the NRC considers that providing

permanently installed vehicle bomb protection provides substantial

enhancement against such a threat.

IV. Potential impact on radiological exposure of facility employees

and other onsite workers.

By enhancing protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle,

the rule decreases the potential for radiological exposure of facility

employees and other onsite workers. Although the threat of a

determined, violent attack at a nuclear power plant is considered to be

low, the rule also decreases the risk that onsite workers could be

injured by weapons fire or an explosion.

V. Installation and continuing costs associated with the action,

including the cost of facility downtime or the cost of construction

delay.

Estimates of installation costs are discussed in detail on pages 7

through 10 and 14 of the regulatory analysis. Ranges in cost estimates

for three vehicle types illustrate the strong influence of vehicle

characteristics. In addition, site-specific characteristics influence

costs, including the need at some sites to extend the vehicle exclusion

area beyond portions of the current PA boundary or providing a more

substantial passive barrier.

The NRC staff estimates that about 80 to 90 percent of the sites

will provide safe standoff distances against a vehicle bomb by

providing a vehicle barrier in proximity to the present PA boundary.

For these sites, cost estimates range from $290K for protecting the

smallest protected area against a passenger vehicle to $2,955K for

protecting the largest protected area against a large truck. (The

characteristics of the design basis vehicle used to establish

protection goals are described in a Safeguards Information document

provided separately to affected licensees.) For the remaining 10 to 20

percent of the sites, cost estimates range from $440K to $3,655K.

An important consideration in assessing costs for the 10 to 20

percent of the sites that may have to protect beyond the existing

protected areas is that the only definitive requirement for all

licensees is that they provide measures to protect against the use of a

land vehicle as a means of transportation to gain proximity to vital

areas and that they assess any incremental measures, if necessary, to

meet the design goal for a land vehicle bomb. The NRC will accept

alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection

against a land vehicle bomb and if the licensee demonstrates by an

analysis, using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR

50.109, that the costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect

against a vehicle bomb are not justified by the added protection

provided.

Continuing costs to maintain barriers should be small.

Implementation of the rule will not require facility downtime or

construction delay.

VI. The potential safety impact of changes in plant or operational

complexity, including the relationship to proposed and existing

regulatory requirements and NRC staff positions.

There should be no adverse safety impact from the rule.

Construction of barriers will be near or beyond existing protected area

perimeters and should not delay authorized access to the protected

area.

VII. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the

action and the availability of such resources.

There should be no new resource burden on the NRC. There will be no

NRC staff licensing review of licensees' vehicle control measures

before implementation. Licensees will be required to retain their

analyses on site for NRC staff review during routine inspections.

Inspection of the approximately 67 total sites for explosive protection

will be about 1 FTE. Reviewing licensee proposals for alternative

measures and 10 CFR 50.109 type analyses will require approximately 1

FTE and 40K of technical assistance from the United States Army Corps

of Engineers.

VIII. The potential impact of differences in facility type, design,

or age on the relevancy and practicality of the proposed action.

The action is relevant for all nuclear power reactors. The action

should also be practical at most sites. If a barrier stopped a vehicle

at the PA perimeter with little or no further penetration, about 90

percent of the sites would provide significant protection against the

design basis vehicle bomb.

In those cases where licensees determine additional security

measures may be needed to protect safe shutdown capability, the rule

permits licensees to either implement the additional security measures

or develop alternative protection strategies. The licensee may propose

alternative measures if the measures provide substantial protection

against a land vehicle bomb and if they demonstrate by an analysis,

using the essential elements of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.109, that the

costs of fully meeting measures needed to protect against a vehicle

bomb are not justified by the added protection provided. The NRC staff

will review licensee's alternative proposals and make an acceptability

determination. The Commission will be notified of such NRC staff

action.

NRC staff's analysis also indicates that there is a high likelihood

that all sites will be capable of achieving and maintaining safe

shutdown if a design basis bomb were detonated at any land accessible

location of a nuclear power plant outside of the owner controlled area.

IX. Whether the proposed action is interim or final, and if

interim, the justification for imposing the proposed action on an

interim basis.

The action is to promulgate a final rule. The rulemaking does not

involve interim actions.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73

Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear

materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of

the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is

adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended,

sec.147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as

amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841,

5844).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96

Stat. 2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also

issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841

note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100

Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

2. In Sec. 73.1, the introductory text of paragraph (a) and the

text of (a)(1)(ii) are revised and new paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(E) and

(a)(1)(iii) are added to read as follow:

Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the

establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which

will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material

at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear

material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced

in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards

systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent

the theft of special nuclear material. Licensees subject to the

provisions of Sec. 72.182, Sec. 72.212, Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.50, and

Sec. 73.60 are exempt from Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and

Sec. 73.1(a)(1)(iii).

(1) * * *

(i) * * *

(E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for transporting personnel

and their hand-carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas, and

(ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in

any position), and

(iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb.

* * * * *

3. In Sec. 73.21, a new paragraph (b)(1)(xiii) is added to read as

follows:

Sec. 73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(1) * * *

(xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR

73.55 (c) (8) and (9).

* * * * *

4. In Sec. 73.55, new paragraphs (c) (7), (8), (9), and (10) are

added to read as follow:

Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities

in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems,

must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as

specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain

unauthorized proximity to vital areas.

(8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures

established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) to the Commission's

design goals (i.e., to protect equipment, systems, devices, or

material, the failure of which could directly or indirectly endanger

public health and safety by exposure to radiation) and criteria for

protection against a land vehicle bomb. Each licensee shall either:

(i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures

meet the design goals and criteria specified; or

(ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures

established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7), describe the level

of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle

bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs

of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The

Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they

provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb, and it is

determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR

50.109, that the costs of fully meeting the design goals and criteria

are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor

shall:

(i) By February 28, 1995 submit to the Commission a summary

description of the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10

CFR 73.55 (c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as

required by 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose

alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8), the

proposal must be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and include

the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives.

(ii) By February 29, 1996 fully implement the required vehicle

control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as

approved by the Commission.

(iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by

the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c) (8) and (9).

(iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and

analyses prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55 (c) (7) and (8).

(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power

reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22, whose application

was submitted prior to August 31, 1994, shall incorporate the required

vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan and

implement it by the date of receipt of the operating license.

* * * * *

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of July 1994.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John C. Hoyle,

Acting Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 94-18638 Filed 7-29-94; 8:45 am]

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