Air Pollution Control; Preemption of State Regulation for Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Standards

Federal RegisterJul 20, 1994

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 85

[AMS-FRL-5011-9]

Air Pollution Control; Preemption of State Regulation for Nonroad

Engine and Vehicle Standards

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: EPA is promulgating a final rule that sets forth requirements

and procedures for EPA authorization of California enforcement of

standards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions

from new nonroad vehicles or engines under section 209(e) of the Clean

Air Act (Act), as amended.

The rule includes definitions of the categories of new nonroad

engines and vehicles that the Act specifies as preempted from state

regulation. These definitions of ``farm equipment'', ``construction

equipment'', and ``locomotive'' clarify which nonroad engines and

vehicles may be subject to state regulation because such regulation is

not preempted. The definition of ``new'' in this rulemaking applies to

all new nonroad engines and vehicles with the exception of locomotives

and engines used in locomotives. This rule also provides procedures by

which EPA may authorize California to enforce standards and provides

guidance for states that adopt California standards. Finally, the rule

discusses the criteria to be used by EPA in its analysis of California

authorization requests. The rule will provide guidance to California,

other states, and vehicle and engine manufacturers regarding new

nonroad engine and vehicle preemption.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This regulation becomes effective August 19, 1994.

ADDRESSES: Copies of material relevant to this rulemaking have been

placed in Docket A-91-18 and are available for public inspection

between the working hours of 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday,

at: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Air and Radiation Docket and

Information Center, Room M1500, First Floor Waterside Mall, 401 M

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20460 (Telephone (202) 260-7548). A

reasonable fee will be charged by EPA for copying docket material.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Dickinson, Attorney Advisor,

Manufacturers Operations Division (6405-J), U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Washington, DC 20460, Telephone: (202) 233-9256.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Statutory Authority and Background

II. Discussion of Final Rule and Comments Received

A. Changes to Proposed Rule for Final Rule

B. Nonroad Engines and Vehicles

C. Definitions of ``new'' as used in ``new nonroad engine'' and

``new nonroad vehicle''

D. Definition of ``farm equipment''

E. Definition of ``construction equipment''

F. Definition of ``locomotive''

G. Application of Definitions; Primary Use Test

H. Labeling Requirement

I. Authorization Criteria and Procedures

J. State Adoption of California Standards and Test Procedures

K. Rulemaking Procedure

L. Executive Order 12291

M. Paperwork Reduction Act

N. Regulatory Flexibility Act

I. Statutory Authority and Background

EPA is required under section 209(e) of the Clean Air Act (Act), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. 7543, to ``issue regulations to implement''

subsection (e). Section 209(e) of the Act addresses the state adoption

of emission standards for new nonroad vehicles and engines.

Under section 209(e), all states are preempted from adopting

emissions standards for ``[n]ew engines which are used in construction

equipment or vehicles or used in farm equipment or vehicles and which

are smaller than 175 horsepower'' or for ``[n]ew locomotives or new

engines used in locomotives''. In this final rule, EPA defines these

preempted categories, except that EPA does not define the term ``new''

with respect to locomotives and engines used in locomotives. For new

nonroad engines and vehicles not included in the preempted categories,

EPA is directed to authorize California, after notice and opportunity

for public hearing, to enforce such standards and other requirements as

California adopts for the regulation of such engines and vehicles, if

these regulations meet the criteria set forth in the Act. Several of

the criteria to be used for nonroad engine and vehicle authorizations

are similar to the requirements applicable to waivers of Federal

preemption of emission standards for new motor vehicles under section

209(b). Section 209(a) prohibits state adoption of emission standards

for new motor vehicles and engines. Section 209(b) directs EPA to waive

this prohibition for California if certain criteria are met. Other

states may adopt California nonroad vehicle or engine emission

standards under section 209(e) if they comply with several

requirements.

This rule was proposed at 56 FR 45866, Sept. 6, 1991. A public

hearing was held on September 20, 1991. Many industries presented

comments through an association or individually. Represented in the

comments presented at the hearing and submitted in writing are the

following: engine manufacturers; manufacturers and dealers of various

types of equipment including agricultural, construction, mining,

utility, and lawn and garden; manufacturers of emission controls;

railroads; manufacturers of industrial trucks; the San Diego County Air

Pollution Control District; and the State of California.

II. Discussion of Final Rule and Comments Received

A. Changes to Proposed Rule for Final Rule

After reviewing the comments received, EPA has made the following

changes to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the final rule.

First, the final rule establishes one definition of ``new'' that

applies equally to domestically manufactured and imported vehicles and

engines. Second, the definition of ``new'' applies to all nonroad

engines other than locomotives and engines used in locomotives. EPA

will define ``new'' locomotives and ``new'' engines used in locomotives

in its locomotive standards promulgated under section 213 of the Act.

Third, in the final rule EPA defines the word ``commercial,'' as used

in the definitions of ``farm equipment'' and ``construction

equipment.'' Fourth, EPA makes minor modifications to the definitions

of ``construction equipment'' and ``locomotive.'' Fifth, the proposed

federal labeling requirement is deleted. Sixth, EPA changes its

interpretation of section 209(e) so that California may adopt, but not

enforce, nonroad standards prior to EPA authorization. Seventh, EPA

changes the standard of review of California's primary use

determination to a preponderance of the evidence standard. Finally, EPA

changes its interpretation of ``consistent with this section'' in

section 209(e)(2)(A)(iii) to include section 209(b)(1)(C).

B. Nonroad Engines and Vehicles

In the NPRM, EPA acknowledged that at some point it would be

necessary to clarify whether certain internal combustion engines, such

as those used in movable pumps, generators, and compressors, are

stationary sources and therefore subject to regulations under Title I

of the Act or are mobile sources and therefore potentially subject to

nonroad regulations under Title II of the Act. The issue is complex.

The definitions of ``stationary source'' in sections 111(3) and 302(z)

of the Act and of ``nonroad engine'' in section 216(10) of the Act do

not make clear under which Title certain internal combustion engines

belong. The engines in question are those used in equipment for reasons

other than propulsion.

Ingersoll-Rand, the Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA), and the

Equipment Manufacturers Institute (EMI), among others, commented that

EPA should determine in this rulemaking that both self-propelled and

transportable equipment are mobile sources. This would clarify to

manufacturers that transportable farm and construction equipment are

exempted from state regulation for purposes of control of emissions.

EPA agrees that the above issue needs to be addressed and has

resolved this issue in a rulemaking implementing section 213 of the

Act.\1\ Section 213 requires EPA to ``conduct a study of emissions from

nonroad engines and nonroad vehicles to determine if such emissions

cause, or significantly contribute to, air pollution which may

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'' The

section further provides that if the Administrator determines that

nonroad emissions are ``significant contributors'' in more than one

ozone or carbon monoxide (CO) nonattainment area, the Administrator

shall promulgate standards for such nonroad engines.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\On June 17, 1994 a final rule was published (59 FR 31306) for

nonroad engines 37 kilowatts (50 horsepower) which provides a

definition of nonroad engine.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA studied nonroad emissions and issued a report in November

1991.\2\ In the June 17, 1994 rulemaking EPA determined, based on the

study data and the docket of the rulemaking (A-91-24), that emissions

from nonroad sources are significant contributors to ozone and CO in

more than one nonattainment area. EPA's final rule also includes

regulations that set forth emission standards for CO, hydrocarbon (HC),

oxides of nitrogen (NOX) and smoke emissions from large new

nonroad compression-ignition engines at or above 37 kilowatts in power,

with the exclusion for certain types of engines.\3\ Within EPA's 37

kilowatt and above nonroad rule a definition of nonroad engine is

provided. Section 89.2 of the 37 kilowatt and above rule provides the

following definition:

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Emission Study, EPA publication

number 21A-2001, November, 1991. Available in EPA docket A-91-24 or

from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).

\3\59 FR 31306, June 17, 1994.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nonroad engine means:

(1) Except as discussed in (2) below, a nonroad engine is any

internal combustion engine:

(i) in or on a piece of equipment that is self-propelled or serves

a dual purpose by both propelling itself and performing another

function (such as garden tractors, off-highway mobile cranes and

bulldozers); or

(ii) in or on a piece of equipment that is intended to be propelled

while performing its function (such as lawnmowers and string trimmers);

or

(iii) that, by itself or in or on a piece of equipment, is portable

or transportable, meaning designed to be and capable of being carried

or moved from one location to another. Indicia of transportability

include, but are not limited to, wheels, skids, carrying handles,

dolly, trailer, or platform.

(2) An internal combustion engine is not a nonroad engine if:

(i) the engine is used to propel a motor vehicle or a vehicle used

solely for competition, or is subject to standards promulgated under

section 202 of the Act; or

(ii) the engine is regulated by a federal New Source Performance

Standard promulgated under section 111 of the Act; or

(iii) the engine otherwise included in (1)(iii) remains or will

remain at a location for more than 12 consecutive months or a shorter

period of time for an engine located at a seasonal source. A location

is any single site at a building, structure, facility, or installation.

Any engine (or engines) that replaces an engine at a location and that

is intended to perform the same or similar function as the engine

replaced will be included in calculating the consecutive time period.

An engine located at a seasonal source is an engine that remains at a

seasonal source during the full annual operating period of the seasonal

source. A seasonal source is a stationary source that remains in a

single location on a permanent basis (i.e., at least two years) and

that operates at that single location approximately three ( or more)

each year. This paragraph does not apply to an engine after the engine

is removed from the location.

For purposes of consistency with section 213, and the reasons set

forth in the 37 kilowatt and above regulation,\4\ EPA has decided to

adopt and apply this definition to today's section 209(e) rulemaking.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\EPA incorporates by reference the 37 kilowatt and above

nonroad regulation at 59 FR 31306, June 17, 1994.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The California Air Resources Board's (CARB) utility engine

regulation (the California Utility Rule) affects only engines smaller

than 25 horsepower. EPA believes that equipment that uses such small

engines is intended to be mobile. For example, equipment that uses

engines smaller than 25 horsepower includes hand-held and portable

equipment, which EPA believes are clearly nonroad, mobile sources.

C. Definition of ``New'' as Used in ``New Nonroad Engine,'' and ``New

Nonroad Vehicle''

In the NPRM, EPA defined ``new nonroad engine'' and ``new nonroad

vehicle'' to mean a nonroad engine or a nonroad vehicle the equitable

or legal title to which has never been transferred to an ultimate

purchaser. Ultimate purchaser was proposed to be defined as the first

person who in good faith purchases such a new nonroad vehicle or

nonroad engine for purposes other than resale. Additionally, with

respect to imported nonroad engines, EPA proposed to define ``new''

nonroad engine to be a nonroad engine manufactured after the effective

date of a regulation issued under section 213 which would be applicable

to such engine had it been manufactured for importation into the United

States. These definitions also applied to ``new locomotives'' and ``new

engines used in locomotives.''

Comments on EPA's proposed definition of ``new'' were several.

First, CARB, the San Diego Air Pollution Control Board (SDAPCB), and

the Manufacturers of Emissions Controls Association (MECA) supported

EPA's definition. CARB asked that EPA clarify which regulatory

activities states may perform; for example, whether states may require

in-use testing and impose add-on or retrofit requirements. On the other

hand, many commenters, including U.S. Representative Terry Bruce, the

Equipment Manufacturers Institute (EMI), the Engine Manufacturers

Association (EMA), and the Portable Power Equipment Manufacturers

Association (PPEMA), opposed EPA's proposed definition and proposed

that ``new'' should mean manufactured after either the effective date

of the Clean Air Act Amendments, November 15, 1990, or after federal

regulations take effect. These commenters believe that Congress

intended an ``absolute'' preemption. That is, the nonroad engines and

vehicles in the preempted categories manufactured after November 15,

1990 would never be subject to any kind of state emission regulation.

EMA commented that if EPA does not accept the latter definition, it

should expand its proposed definition so that engines remain ``new''

until they have exceeded their useful life.

Commenters in the railroad industry also supported a definition of

``new'' as ``manufactured after November 1990'' and stated further that

the railroad industry has traditionally been preempted from state

regulation, such as in the area of safety. The same commenters

indicated that they believe that state control of locomotive emissions

or state enforcement of federal standards would interfere with

interstate commerce. Railroad commenters also stated that any standards

for rebuilt or remanufactured engines or locomotives should be uniform

federal standards--not state standards. Furthermore, if remanufactured

engines were rebuilt to comply with such federal standards, they should

be considered ``new''.

Commenters also opposed the proposed definition regarding imported

vehicles and engines because the definition of ``new'' was different

depending upon whether the nonroad engine was produced domestically or

abroad.

These proposed definitions for ``new nonroad vehicles'' and ``new

nonroad engines'' parallel the definitions of ``new motor vehicles''

and ``new motor vehicle engines'' in section 216 of the Clean Air Act.

The definition of ``new'' proposed for imported nonroad engines was

intended to address nonconforming engines which may become subject to

federal emission requirements at the time the engine or vehicle is

imported into the United States. The Agency has decided to delete this

definition of ``new'' for imported engines. EPA agrees with the

commenters that imports and domestic products should generally be

treated alike for regulatory purposes. The Agency has addressed the

importation of nonroad engines which do not conform to federal emission

standards at the time of importation.5 Today's rule, in any event,

treats domestic and imported nonroad engines the same way for purposes

of determining whether they are preempted from state regulation.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\See 59 FR 31306, June 17, 1994, which sets forth CO, HC,

particulate matter, NOx and smoke opacity standards for 50 hp

and above nonroad engines and vehicles. EPA is imposed certain

restrictions on the importation of nonconforming nonroad engines

based on existing regulations for the importation of nonconforming

motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This final rule establishes a definition for all domestically

manufactured and imported ``new nonroad engines,'' ``new nonroad

vehicles,'' other than ``new locomotives'' and ``new engines used in a

locomotive.''6 New nonroad engines and new nonroad vehicles are

defined as engines and vehicles the equitable or legal title to which

has not been transferred to an ultimate purchaser. The ultimate

purchaser is defined as the first person who in good faith purchases

such engine or vehicle for purposes other than resale. For some engines

or vehicles the passage of title in the United States may not formally

occur or manufacturers may retain title and lease the engines or

equipment. In these cases, a domestic or imported nonroad engine or

nonroad vehicle will retain its status as ``new'' until such engine or

vehicle is ``placed into service.'' An engine or vehicle is considered

``placed into service'' when the engine or vehicle is used for its

functional purposes. EPA believes that the definition of new should

include the ``placed into service'' addition to the motor vehicle

definition of new found in section 216 of the Act because of the nature

of the nonroad market. Nonroad engines and nonroad vehicles are often

leased and maintained by the manufacturer well into the useful life of

the nonroad equipment. A piece of equipment, the title of which has

passed to the ultimate purchaser, should not be treated differently

than a piece of equipment which is being used but has not yet passed to

an ultimate purchaser.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\As discussed below, EPA is deferring its definitions of

``new'' locomotives and ``new'' engines used in a locomotive for the

purpose of this regulation. EPA shall define these terms in a later

rulemaking, under section 213 of the Act, specifically regulating

locomotives.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Agency believes that this definition of ``new'' comports with

the language, intent and structure of the Clean Air Act and the

definition of ``new'' contained in the 37 kilowatt and above regulation

and is therefore a permissible construction of the statute. Contrary to

the assertion of some commenters, EPA's definition of ``new'' is

consistent with the dictionary definition of the word as ``having

existed or been made but a short time.'' Webster's Ninth New Collegiate

Dictionary, 1990. Generally speaking, manufactured products are sold

soon after they are made and are considered new until they are sold or

used. The commenters' definition of new--anything manufactured after

the Clean Air Act Amendments' enactment or an applicable regulation's

promulgation--would mean, by contrast, that any engine manufactured

after a certain date would be new forever. This is certainly not the

plain meaning of ``new.'' Congress could have stated that the federal

preemption applied to certain equipment manufactured after a certain

date, but Congress did not do so. Elsewhere in Title II, Congress

specified that a provision only applied to products manufactured after

a certain date (see, section 218 requiring a ban on engines

manufactured after the 1992 model year that require leaded gasoline) or

first introduced into commerce after a certain date (see, section

211(f) regarding prohibition on fuels that are not substantially

similar to fuels used to certify vehicles as meeting emission

standards). The lack of such a date here further supports that Congress

intended ``new'' to mean newly manufactured and not yet sold.

The legislative record also shows Congressional intent that ``new''

should refer to newly manufactured products. In his colloquy with

Senator Wilson explaining the final version of section 209(e), Senator

Chafee notes that ``because the preemption is limited to new engine

standards only, States can continue to require existing and in-use

nonroad engines to reduce emissions . . .'' [Emphasis added] 136 Cong.

Rec. S17237 (October 26, 1990). This language is echoed by similar

language from Senator Baucus in his report to the Senate on the

conference bill. 136 Cong. Rec. S16976 (October 27, 1990). If Congress

intended the definition of new nonroad engines or equipment, and as a

result the preemption, to apply to an engine for its entire life, then

it would appear that there would be no distinction between new and in-

use nonroad engines, as an engine manufactured after a certain date

would always be new. Yet the statements of Senator Chafee and Senator

Baucus clearly contemplate such a distinction.

The Agency's definition of new is also consistent with the way the

Act approaches motor vehicle emission control. As noted earlier,

section 216 defines new in the context of motor vehicles as ``a motor

vehicle the equitable or legal title to which has never been

transferred to an ultimate purchaser.'' The Act applies federal

emissions standards to ``new'' vehicles. These federal standards are

enforced through certification, assembly line, and recall testing.

States, on the other hand, have a role in motor vehicle emission

control through inspection/maintenance programs and are not restricted

from controlling used vehicles. The section 209(a) prohibition of state

regulation of motor vehicles addresses only ``new'' motor vehicles and

engines and prohibits state regulation that occurs before sale,

titling, or registration of the vehicle.7

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\Section 209(a) provides, in part, ``. . . No State shall

require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to

the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor

vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial retail sale,

titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor

vehicle engine, or equipment.''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 take a parallel approach to

nonroad standards and enforcement. Section 213 provides EPA with

authority to set standards for ``new'' engines and provides for federal

enforcement of such standards in the same manner as motor vehicle

enforcement. Furthermore, nothing on the face of section 209(e) or

section 213 indicates that Congress intended ``new'' to be interpreted

differently in the nonroad and motor vehicle contexts. Given that the

preemption provisions for new motor vehicles and new nonroad engines

appear in the same section of the Clean Air Act, it is reasonable to

believe that Congress did not intend for the word ``new'' to be defined

differently within the same section without stating this intent

explicitly.8

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\EPA recognizes that regulation of locomotives presents unique

circumstances, including questions regarding interstate commerce,

that require special attention. EPA is therefore deferring its

definition of ``new locomotive'' and ``new engine used in a

locomotive'' until a later rulemaking dealing specifically with

regulation of locomotives.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is not a compelling policy or factual justification for

defining new differently in the nonroad and motor vehicle contexts.

State regulation of nonroad engines does not generally present any

greater degree of disruption of the movement of products, engines or

equipment between states than does regulation of motor vehicles. The

comments provide little if any justification, in terms of relevant

distinctions between motor vehicles and nonroad engines, to justify

such a significant departure from EPA's established practice for

regulating mobile sources.

The Agency's definition of new is also consistent with case law. In

Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York,9 the court held that where

the exercise of local police power serves the purpose of a federal

act--the Clean Air Act in that case--the preemptive effect of the act

should be narrowly construed. In keeping with that principle, EPA

believes that section 209(e) should be construed narrowly in order to

protect states' rights, particularly in an area such as public health

in which states traditionally exercise control. California's nonroad

regulations will serve the purpose of the federal act by improving air

quality.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120

(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In Allway Taxi, the court discussed the federal preemption of new

motor vehicles and interpreted the meaning of new motor vehicle as

defined in Section 216 of the Act. The court noted that this definition

``reveals a clear congressional intent to preclude states and

localities from setting their own exhaust emission control standards

only with respect to the manufacture and distribution of new

automobiles.''10 The court stated further that the narrow purpose

in the definition is reinforced by prohibiting states and localities

from setting emission standards before the initial sale or registration

of an automobile. Congress specifically declared that section 209 did

not preempt states from regulation of the use or movement of motor

vehicles after they have reached their ultimate purchasers.11

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\0Id. at 1124.

\1\1Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA believes that the further a state requirement is removed in

time from the manufacture and distribution of new engines, the less

interstate commerce is likely to be burdened. Furthermore, the legality

of particular regulatory controls that a state may impose on nonroad

vehicles or engines that are no longer new will depend upon the burden

that such controls place on interstate commerce. In fact, the court in

Allway Taxi stated that a state or locality is not free to impose its

own emission control measures the moment after a new car is bought and

registered. ``That would be an obvious circumvention of the Clean Air

Act and would defeat the congressional purpose of preventing

obstruction to interstate commerce.''\12\ The court further stated that

federal preemption does not, however, preclude a state from imposing

its own exhaust emission control standards upon the resale or

reregistration of the automobile. Furthermore, states are not precluded

from setting standards for licensing of vehicles for commercial use.

These types of regulations, which are more removed, ``would cause only

minimal interference with interstate commerce, since they would be

directed primarily to intrastate activities and the burden of

compliance would be on individual owners and in-state users and not on

manufacturers and distributors.''\13\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\Id.

\13\Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA expects that the principles articulated in Allway Taxi will be

applied by the courts to any State adoption of in-use controls. For

example, manufacturers have voiced a concern that California would

attempt to impose in-use emission control measures that would apply

immediately after a new vehicle or engine were purchased. As the Allway

Taxi court said, such standards applied to almost-new vehicles would be

an attempt to circumvent section 209 preemption and would obstruct

interstate commerce.\14\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\Id. EPA expects the reasoning and policy outlined above in

the Allway Taxi discussion to apply to locomotives although its

implementation is dependent upon the ultimate definition of new

locomotive.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

It should be noted that section 209(e)(2) of the Act does not

prevent California or other states from regulating nonroad engines and

vehicles in use.15 EPA believes that the requirements of section

209(e)(2) apply only to new nonroad engines and vehicles. The

requirements of section 209(e)(2) are only required for nonroad engines

and vehicles the regulation of which has been preempted. The language

of section 209(e)(2) does not state any clear preemption, either for

new or in use vehicles. The only clear preemption of state regulation

of nonroad engines occurs in section 209(e)(1) and section

209(a).16 Both of these subsections are limited to new engines and

vehicles. Given the general legal presumption against reading a

preemption more broadly than explicitly required, as discussed in

Allway Taxi, a preemption of state regulation of nonroad engines and

vehicles in use should not be readily implied.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\5In-use testing and recall programs of the type set forth in

section 207 ensure compliance with standards required to be met by

manufacturers at the time of certification of the engine. Because

these in-use standards relate to the original manufacture of the

engine and place the burden of compliance upon the manufacturer,

they are deemed to be standards affecting a new motor vehicle or a

new nonroad engine and thus require a waiver under the criteria of

section 209(b) or 209(e)(2) respectively.

\1\6Section 209(a) applies to nonroad vehicles because of the

language of section 213(d) of the Act, which specifically requires

that EPA's standards regulating nonroad engines and vehicles be

subject to sections 206, 207, 208 and 209 of the Act, with such

modifications of the applicable regulations as the Administrator

deems appropriate. Thus, Congress clearly anticipated that all of

section 209 would be applicable to nonroad engines. Subsections (a)

through (d) of section 209 do not specifically reference nonroad

engines, nor do sections 206, 207 or 208. However, the language of

section 213(d) clearly is intended to apply such provisions to

nonroad engines. Further indication of Congress' intent is the

language of the last sentence of section 209(e)(1) , which states

that subsection 209(b) does not apply for purposes of subsection

(e)(1). (Section 209(b) provides the procedure under which

California can receive a waiver of section 209(a) preemption for

motor vehicles.) This sentence would not have been necessary unless

subsection 209(a) through (d) otherwise applied.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another indication that section 209(e)(2) was not intended to apply

to most in-use regulations of nonroad engines is the fact that neither

the Senate nor the House version of the 1990 Act amendments would have

preempted state regulation of anything but new nonroad engines. Neither

version would have expressly preempted regulation in use. It would be

unusual for a bill to come out of conference with a broader preemption

than existed in either house and without any mention in the legislative

history that such broader preemption had been mandated. In fact, both

Senators Chafee and Baucus believed that the scope of the preemption

had been narrowed from the House bill, not widened.17

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\7Both Senators declare that state preemption is limited to

new locomotives and new small farm and construction equipment. Both

mention that states may still regulate other new nonroad equipment,

presumedly after receiving EPA approval. Finally, each declare that

states also fully retain existing authority to regulate emissions

from all types of existing or in-use nonroad engines by specifying

fuel quality specifications, operational modes or characteristics or

measures that limit the use of nonroad engines or equipment.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In fact, as the legislative history indicates, it appears that

Congress intended the preemption provisions of section 209, as applied

to nonroad engines, to be analogous to the preemption provisions as

applied to motor vehicles, except that California cannot request any

waiver of the Federal preemption of state regulation of new small farm

and construction equipment and locomotives.

Further indication that section 209(e)(2) was not intended to apply

to in-use regulations is the fact that, if the subsection were applied

to in-use regulations, then California would be the only government

(local, state or federal) that could directly set regulations for

nonroad engines in use. EPA's mandate under section 213 applies only to

new engines. Therefore, EPA will not promulgate standards for in-use

regulation of nonroad engines under section 213, beyond in-use

regulations normally associated with new certified engines (e.g. in-use

testing and recall requirements under section 207). States other than

California would not be able to regulate nonroad engines in use (e.g.

operation controls under section 209(d)) until California regulates

them and could only regulate them in a manner identical to California's

regulations. Nothing in the legislative history indicates such a

dramatic departure from the current ability of states and local

authorities to regulate emissions of mobile sources in use. Therefore,

if section 209(e)(2) is determined to apply to in-use regulations, the

entire United States regulatory scheme for regulation of nonroad

engines in use would be dependent on the actions of one state,

California. Congress could not have meant to grant such plenary power

to a single state.

This is especially true given the location-specific nature of in-

use regulations. In-use regulations, such as time of use or place of

use restrictions (e.g. high occupancy vehicle lanes) are typically very

site specific. An in-use regulation suitable for California, or in part

of California, may have little or no relevance or practicality to the

type of in-use regulation suitable for another area. Such regulations

which primarily effect local users are more appropriately controlled

and implemented by local and state governments.

Moreover, section 209(d) of the Act clearly limits the preemption

of state regulation in use. It states that ``nothing in this part shall

preclude or deny to any other State or political subdivision thereof

the right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use,

operation or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.'' As

was stated above, section 209 as a whole applies equally to nonroad

engines. Thus, section 209(d) should be interpreted to mean that,

unless state regulation of use of nonroad engines is specifically

preempted, section 209 should not be interpreted to grant any implicit

preemption, except within the framework of Allway Taxi.

Given the language of section 209 and the lack of any express

preemption, the legislative history of these provisions, and the

general presumption against providing broad preemption where such

preemption is not made explicit, EPA believes that it is clear that

section 209(e)(2) does not apply to in use regulation of nonroad

engines.

While EPA recognizes the important principle of narrowly construing

the preemptive effect of the Act as explained in Allway Taxi, EPA also

notes that certain state regulations that may be characterized as ``in-

use'' regulations may be preempted because they are effectively

regulations on the design of new engines rather than on the use of

``in-use'' engines. Industry has expressed concern that states might

impose retrofit requirements on nonroad engines and vehicles as soon as

they are introduced into commerce, or when such engines are being

rebuilt, or at a date after which nonroad engines are typically

rebuilt.18 EPA recognizes that CARB does not envision a retrofit

requirement and that, because of the nature of the nonroad market, it

is unlikely that other states would adopt such a requirement.19

However, given EPA's definition of new and the scope of the definition

within this rulemaking, this issue could arise when other states plan

their in-use emission strategy. In such a case, EPA believes that a

retrofit requirement mandating a retrofit of a nonroad engine

immediately after the engine is no longer new is adverse to the

Congressional intent of section 209(e) and the principles laid out in

Allway Taxi. Therefore, in this scenario, such a retrofit requirement

would be deemed an in-use emission standard relating back to the

original design of the new engine by the original engine manufacturer

(OEM) and would be subject to the waiver criteria of section 209(e)(2).

Within this same scenario, only California could adopt such a

requirement and other states could only adopt California's requirement

if California subsequently was granted a waiver. However, after a

reasonable amount of time has passed and the engine is no longer new

(most likely when an engine is being rebuilt), modest retrofit

requirements would most likely not be deemed to significantly affect

the OEM and thus such requirements would not be subject to subsection

209(e)(2). In this second scenario, the modest retrofit requirements

would still be subject to challenge in court under the Allway Taxi

criteria.20

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\8See Oral Statement of the Engine Manufacturers Association,

Docket entry IV-F-7, which states ``The ultimate purchaser must have

the assurance that the engine . . . she might purchase, and which

properly meets EPA requirements--is `good' until that engine is

ready to be rebuilt. No state should be allowed to impose retrofit

standards on engines which otherwise conform to EPA requirements.''

\1\9See Letter from Mr. Cackette, CARB to Mr. Mandel, EMA, dated

July 20, 1993, Docket entry IV-I-55.

\2\0EPA's definition of ``new'' does not present a problem for

engines or equipment that do not sell relatively quickly (e.g.,

within a year of being made) in California. If California's

regulation set standards applicable to ``new'' engines, i.e, as of

the date title passed, regardless of when the engine was produced,

then an engine manufactured in 1990 but not sold until 1994 would be

subject to 1994 emission standards. This problem is avoided since

California's Utility Engine Rule ties the date of manufacture to the

standard, therefore a 1990 engine would be subject to a 1990

standard and a 1994 engine subject to a 1994 standard.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Therefore, the Agency has determined that nonroad engines and

nonroad vehicles will be ``new'' for purposes of the Act until the

equitable or legal title passes to the ultimate purchaser, or if title

passage does not occur, then the engine or vehicle will be new until

placed into service.

D. Definition of Farm Equipment

The NPRM defined ``farm equipment'' to mean any internal combustion

engine-powered machine primarily used in the commercial production and/

or harvesting of food, fiber, wood, or commercial organic products.

Several manufacturers and trade groups were concerned that the

definition was too narrow. These commenters thought it necessary to

change the words ``primarily used in'' to ``designed for use in''. They

asserted that the designer is the only one who knows what tasks a

particular machine was meant to perform. They also thought that the

definition should include engines used in post-harvest processing and

storage that take place on the farm (the U.S. Department of Agriculture

had a similar comment) and transportation which takes place on the

farm. Caterpillar, Inc., PPEMA, EMI and others were concerned that the

word ``commercial'' might exclude equipment used in the public sector

(e.g., state agricultural programs) or on cooperative or communal

farms.

CARB, SDAPCB, and MECA, on the other hand, thought the definition

was too broad. CARB and SDAPCB believed that the word ``commercial''

was not only necessary but needed to be defined. Suggestions for the

definition were supplied. MECA suggested that the definition should be

site and use specific. CARB also thought the wording should be changed

to ``production and harvesting'' in place of ``and/or''. CARB provided

their characterization of typical farm equipment (self-propelled and

operated independent of other equipment) and a partial list of pieces

of equipment that should not be included under the definition of farm

equipment (utility vehicles used by a farmer to check his crops or

portable power units used to generate electricity for another piece of

equipment).

EPA does not believe that ``designed for use in'' should be added

to the definition of nonroad engine. While a machine's designer may

have designed the machine with certain tasks in mind, EPA believes that

the intention of the designer is less important than the actual use to

which the equipment is put. A machine may have been designed to assist

farmers in some process, but if more than 50 percent of these machines

are now used by homeowners, it may fairly be considered other than farm

equipment. Requiring that equipment ``be designed for use'' on a farm

would also leave the categorization of farm equipment entirely up to

the manufacturers who might, in turn, choose to categorize products as

farm equipment merely to avoid state regulation. Additionally, although

requested, commenters have not provided examples of where the absence

of ``designed for'' in the definition would make a difference in the

preemption of some engines.

EPA also did not agree with CARB's description of farm and non-farm

equipment because it did not address the machines which are likely to

be used in both situations. Classifying equipment that is uniquely farm

or non-farm related is straightforward. The more difficult equipment to

characterize is multiple use equipment. Whether and when such equipment

is preempted from state regulation is addressed under Section G--the

Application of Definitions, Primary Use Test section of this rule.

CARB's further comment, that EPA should require that equipment be

involved in both production and harvesting in order to be considered

farm equipment, does not account for the specialization of farm

machinery. Most farm equipment is used for a specific job: cultivating,

planting, harvesting, etc., rather than for tasks involving both

production and harvesting. The impetus for CARB's comment is the desire

to separate the harvest of tree farms from that of natural forests

which might contain no element of production and to ensure that

landscaping and groundskeeping are not considered farming.

Under EPA's definition, however, harvesting trees from a natural

forest is considered farming. Plant nurseries would also be considered

farming, as plants are a product that is grown and gathered. The

American Association of Nurserymen supported the proposed definition.

At the same time, CARB's concern that landscaping and groundskeeping

might be considered farming is alleviated. Although cutting and

trimming are involved in these operations, production and harvesting

are not, so equipment used would not be farm equipment unless used

primarily on farms. (See Scope of Preemption section)

MECA suggested that the definition be changed to ``. . . used on a

farm . . .'' to require site specificity. While most of the preempted

equipment is operated on farms, EPA has not included this suggestion

out of concern that it may create ambiguity for some operations, like

plant nurseries.

The SDAPCB was also concerned that the phrase ``commercial organic

products'' would allow some chemical and man-made products to be

considered farm produce and thus their associated processing equipment

to be considered farm equipment. The list of acceptable farm products

is broad and may include items not generally considered farm products.

However, the equipment used in any processing after the harvest is not

considered farm equipment. Thus, equipment used to make chemical or

man-made products would not be considered farm equipment.

As noted in the NPRM, EPA intended harvesting to be the last

operation in the farming process to be considered ``farming'' and,

therefore, equipment that performed any function later in the process,

i.e., processing or storing, would not be preempted. However, the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA) commented that all activities

associated with planting, harvesting and on-farm processing of

agricultural products for use on the farm should be considered farm

activities. The Nisei Farmers League had similar comments with respect

to on-farm activities although they did not limit the operations to

those preparing products for further use on the farm. Therefore, EPA

decided that equipment used in certain post-harvesting operations will

be accepted within the preemption category when they relate directly to

the continued operation of the farm. Those activities include such

things as grinding, drying, and storage operations of products usually

used in the future on the farm. Examples of crops subject to these

activities are hay, silage, and other animal feed. For less traditional

agricultural operations such as nurseries, equipment used in similar

operations will also be considered farm equipment. Machinery that is

used on crops for continued use in that agricultural operation, such as

conveyors (hay bale loaders) and ensiles, will be considered farm

equipment. Post-harvest processing of crops in preparation for sale

will not be considered farm operations.

SDAPCB expressed the concern that the definition is so broad that

it could limit the state's ability to regulate stationary equipment

used in the refining, handling, cleaning or processing of food

products. We believe that the above discussion of what post-harvesting

processing may still be considered farming should alleviate that

concern.

EMI supplied EPA with a proposed definition which many others

supported.21 EPA's definition is nearly as inclusive as EMI's

definition. One of the differences between the two was the inclusion in

the EMI definition of storage and processing activities of the

harvested product. EPA's resolution of how such activities should be

treated is discussed above. Another difference was EMI's inclusion of

off-road transportation. We do not believe that such nonroad vehicles

should usually be considered farm equipment as they are primarily used

to transport persons or property on or off farms and are not unique to

farms. EMI's definition also could include vehicles which are

frequently used for property maintenance of a sort which is also not

unique to farms. EMI noted at the public hearing that under its

definition such equipment as lawn mowers would be included.22 Such

a definition of farm equipment is overly broad.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\1EMI proposed that ``farm equipment or vehicle'' means any

engine-powered machine, device, apparatus, or movable stationary

source which is self-propelled or transportable and which is

designed by the manufacturer for use, or is used, to supply

mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic or electric power, for: preparation

for production, production, harvesting, processing, storage or off-

road transportation of food, fiber, animal feed, other organic

material or any other agricultural product or commodity, or any

product used in an agricultural operation; handling of products or

water related to the care of animals; movement of animals; or

operation or maintenance of a farmstead, ranch or logging operation.

\2\2 See Transcript of Sept. 20,1991 Public Hearing regarding

Authorization of Nonroad Standards in California at page 139, line

5.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA has decided to define ``commercial'' in the final rule as ``an

activity engaged in as a vocation.'' Farming does not have to be the

sole or primary vocation. If a person engages in vocations in addition

to farming, farming would still be a vocation. EPA believes that a

dollar threshold would not serve the purpose of distinguishing

residential from commercial use. EPA defined farm equipment as

equipment used for ``commercial'' purposes to prevent the inclusion of

such activities as backyard gardening in the definition of farming.

There is no reason to believe that Congress meant to include equipment

used in these operations which are not conventionally considered to be

farms. Thus, equipment used on an agricultural school farm would fall

under this definition of commercial because it is equipment used to

educate students to farm as a vocation. Also, equipment used on farms

that grow crops only for livestock would be considered to be farm

equipment. Finally, equipment would be farm equipment if found on

``subsistence'' farms, defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

as farming that provides all or almost all the goods required by the

farm family usually without any significant surplus for sale. EMA and

PPEMA's suggestion that any piece of equipment that is used on a farm

is farm equipment would preclude from potential CARB regulation many

types of machines that are incidental to living on a farm and not used

in operations normally associated with growing or harvesting

agricultural products. An example would be the lawn mowers that EMI

said should be deemed farm equipment.

In the final rule, farm equipment is defined as any internal

combustion engine-powered machine primarily used in the commercial

production and/or harvesting of food, fiber, wood, or commercial

organic products or for the processing of such products for further use

on the farm.

E. Definition of Construction Equipment

The NPRM stated that ``construction equipment'' means any internal

combustion engine-powered machine primarily used on commercial

construction sites.

Many of the comments concerning this definition were similar to

those comments provided regarding the definition of farm equipment.

Several manufacturers and trade groups were concerned that the

definition was too narrow. They thought it necessary to change the

words ``primarily used in'' to ``designed for use in.'' Caterpillar,

the Construction Industry Manufacturer's Association (CIMA) and others

were concerned that the word ``commercial'' might exclude equipment

used on public works projects or in residential construction. The EPA

exclusion of mining equipment from this preempted category drew

unfavorable comments from EMA, EMI, CIMA, and the American Mining

Congress (AMC). The American Association of Nurserymen (AAN) requested

that EPA explicitly recognize that landscape contracting involves

earthmoving and is thus construction.

CARB, SDAPCB and MECA, on the other hand, thought the definition

was too broad. CARB and SDAPCB recommended that all auxiliary equipment

such as compressors and pumps be excluded from preemption. Both

believed that the phrase ``commercial construction sites'' be defined.

MECA suggested that the definition should be site and use specific.

Both CARB and SDAPCB approved of our mining equipment exclusion.

EPA's response to the comments that the phrase ``designed for''

should be part of the construction equipment definition is identical to

the Agency's response to the same comments under the Definition of

``farm equipment'' section of this rule. Please refer to that section

for further discussion.

The comments on the use of the word ``commercial'' may be

approached in a manner similar to the way they were addressed under the

definition of ``farm equipment.'' EPA believes that defining

``commercial'' in the final rule as ``an activity engaged in as a

vocation'' is as appropriate in the context of construction equipment

as it is in the context of farm equipment. ``Commercial'' in the

construction equipment definition is meant to distinguish equipment

that homeowners typically use to perform repairs on their own property

from equipment typically used by contractors. Construction of public

works projects is ``commercial'' under this definition.

MECA suggested that the definition be changed to ``. . . used in

construction and located on . . .'' to specify the activity involved.

This is a reasonable suggestion. EPA believes that including these

recommended words in the definition will make it clear that the

function of machinery is as important as its location on a site on

which construction occurs.

EMA, EMI, CIMA, AMC and others pointed out that mining operations

(surface mining) share with construction sites the use of many of the

same machines. While this may be true, Congress expressed no intent to

preempt from state regulation equipment used in mining operations.

According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971

unabridged) construction is ``the act of putting parts together to form

a complete integrated object.'' Although EPA's definition includes

operations such as demolition and painting which take place outside the

actual structural fabrication, the definition still would not include

mining, which Webster's defines as ``getting ore, metals, coal or

precious stones out of the earth.'' These are not construction

activities. Additionally, underground mining usually employs uniquely

designed equipment unlike equipment found on a construction site.

Surface mining, while sharing some equipment, is a separate activity

not associated with construction. The regulation of equipment, however,

that is used in surface mining and is also primarily used in

construction activities, as defined in this rule, would be preempted.

As discussed in the NPRM, a number of diverse activities take place

on a construction site. Earthmoving is one such activity, and thus,

landscape contracting could use construction equipment as AAN notes.

AAN made no mention of the specific earthmoving equipment in question;

thus, the primary use test (See Scope of Preemption section) must be

applied to such machinery. Groundskeeping is not a construction

activity. AAN did state its support of EPA's definition of construction

equipment.

Ingersoll-Rand thought that the words ``commercial'' and ``primary

use'' should be deleted and that the definitions of farm and

construction equipment should be broadened to include any machine that

includes an engine belonging to an engine family which is used in

construction equipment. The issue of commercial is considered above.

Ingersoll-Rand's use of the engine family concept is addressed, as is

the primary use issue, in the Application of Definitions, Primary Use

Test section.

SDAPCB and CARB thought that the definition should exclude

ancillary equipment such as electrical generators and air compressors.

CARB argued that these machines are not specifically construction

machines in that they perform the same functions in other types of

applications. While this is true, such equipment may be employed in

construction activity; the question then becomes one of primary use,

which is discussed in the Application of Definitions, Primary Use Test

section.

For the reasons discussed above, construction equipment is defined

in the final rule as any internal combustion engine-powered machine

primarily used in construction and located on commercial construction

sites.

F. Definition of Locomotive

The NPRM defined locomotive as a self-propelled piece of on-track

equipment (other than equipment designed for operation both on highways

and rails, specialized maintenance equipment, and other similar

equipment) designed for moving other equipment or carrying freight or

passenger traffic or both.

EMA noted a difference between the NPRM definition and the

definition given in the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) upon which the

EPA definition was based, but did not recommend EPA use the LIA

definition in the definition EMA provided. The only difference between

the EPA definition and the LIA definition is that the LIA definition of

locomotive includes a piece of equipment without propelling motors but

with one or more control stands. This item was not included by EPA

since if it has no propelling motors it will not be of concern for

purposes of engine emissions regulations. It is noted that neither the

Association of American Railroads (AAR) nor any railroad companies that

commented on the NPRM, such as Union Pacific and Southern Pacific, had

any specific comments on the definition of locomotive.

EMA provided definitions for ``locomotive'' and ``locomotive

engine.''\23\ Under this definition, the regulation of any engine

mounted on a locomotive (such as an engine driving a crane or winch)

would be preempted. The dictionary definition of ``locomotive'' is a

``self-propelled vehicle, usually diesel or electric, that travels on

rails and moves railroad cars.''\24\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\23\EMA recommended the following definitions: ``Locomotive''

means a self-propelled piece of on-track railroad equipment (other

than equipment designed for operation both on-highway and on-track)

and ``Locomotive engine'' means an engine included in a locomotive.

See Statement of Engine Manufacturers Association, Docket entry IV-

G-19.

\24\Websters II, New Riverside University Dictionary, 1988.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EMA's definition of locomotive engine goes beyond the specific

purpose of locomotion to include any other engine that might be placed

on a locomotive. EPA believes that the term ``locomotive engine'' is

limited to the engine used to propel the locomotive and other railroad

cars. However, EPA does believe that the term ``engines used in

locomotives,'' as found in section 209(e)(1)(B), can be defined to

include other engines which are mounted on a locomotive regardless of

whether they are used for purposes of self-propulsion. EPA notes that

under this definitional framework the ``locomotive'' is only that piece

of on-track equipment which is self-propelling and is designed for

moving other cars containing equipment, freight, or passengers.

``Engines used in locomotives'' thus includes an engine placed in the

locomotive to propel the train and also includes other engines mounted

on the locomotive for auxiliary power generation for the train, but

does not include engines mounted on the train elsewhere than the

locomotive. An engine providing power for a crane or winch, for

example, would only be considered preempted from state regulation (if

it otherwise met the requirements for ``new'') as ``an engine used in

[a] locomotive'' if such engine were mounted on the locomotive. EPA

believes these definitions reflect the intent of Congress to reduce the

burden on interstate commerce for the railroad industry, and address

EMA's concerns regarding auxiliary engines.\25\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\See Letter from Glenn Keller, EMA to Joanne Goldhand, EPA,

Docket entry IV-I-54.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regulation of auxiliary engines whose primary function are not for

propulsion is addressed by EPA in its final regulation for nonroad

engines 37 kilowatt (50 hp) and above under section 213 of the Act.\26\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\26\59 FR 31306, June 17, 1994.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA has stricken the word ``carrying'' from the definition of

locomotive. This was done to avoid implying that any persons or

property that were moved by the engine had to be located directly on

the locomotive. The word ``moving'' in the definition is all that is

needed to give the correct meaning.

For the final rule, EPA has decided that a ``locomotive'' means a

self-propelled piece of on-track equipment (other than equipment

designed for operation both on highways and rails, specialized

maintenance equipment, and other similar equipment) designed for moving

other equipment, freight or passenger traffic. EPA has also decided

that the term ``engines used in locomotives'' means either an engine

placed in the locomotive to move other equipment, freight, or passenger

traffic, or an engine mounted on the locomotive to provide auxiliary

power.

G. Application of Definitions; Primary Use Test

1. Introduction

EPA is defining farm equipment as any internal combustion engine-

powered machine primarily used in the commercial production and/or

harvesting of food, fiber, wood, or commercial organic products or for

the processing of such products for further use on the farm. EPA is

defining construction equipment as any internal combustion engine-

powered machine primarily used in construction and located on

commercial construction sites. Many types of equipment are used almost

exclusively for farming and construction (e.g., tractors and

bulldozers). In the case of such equipment, the applicability of EPA's

definition is clear: they are farm or construction equipment and thus

preempted from state regulation. Other types of equipment, however, are

used not only for farming or construction, but for other purposes as

well (e.g., pumps used for irrigation and swimming pools). The issue

thus arises whether or not such multi-purpose equipment should be

considered farm or construction equipment and thus preempted from state

regulation.

2. EPA's Proposal

In the NPRM, EPA proposed a ``primary use'' test to assess whether

state regulation of multiple use equipment would be preempted. EPA

proposed that in order for state regulation to be preempted, equipment

must be ``primarily used''--used 51 percent--as farm or construction

equipment. Under this test, for example, a compressor used 51 percent

in farming or construction applications would be preempted from state

regulation. EPA proposed 51 percent as a reasonable use cut-off point

because it corresponds to a bare ``majority''. EPA believed that the

preempted category would be unreasonably expanded if state regulation

could be preempted simply because a small fraction of such equipment

was used in farm or construction applications.

3. Comments on and Alternatives to EPA's Proposal

During the comment period following the hearing EPA received

comments from industry and CARB opposing the primary use test. EMI,

EMA, PPEMA, Industrial Truck Association (ITA), Construction Industry

Air Quality Coalition (CIAQC), and Ingersoll-Rand Company stated that

the primary use test is unauthorized and should not be employed. They

stated that the plain meaning of the preemption provision does not

permit EPA to apply a percentage test to determine if equipment is farm

or construction equipment. Congress, they contended, meant to preempt

state regulation of all nonroad engines used in farm or construction

equipment, even if only a small fraction of the equipment is

represented in these preempted categories. CIMA commented that the

proposed test would be unworkable because the data on which to base a

primary use finding are unavailable, and Deere and Company and others

similarly stated that accurate data cannot be obtained, in part because

of the rental market.

On the other side of the issue, CARB argued that the 51 percent

primary use test is contrary to Congressional intent. CARB noted that

it is unlikely that Congress intended to so limit California's

authority to control emissions from nonroad sources given the broad

waiver of federal preemption it provides California in the area of

motor vehicle emission control.

CARB initially supported a position that equipment should be

defined as farm or construction equipment only if more than 75 percent

of the equipment is used in farming or construction. CARB noted, in its

comments supporting a 75 percent cutoff, that this would ensure that

state regulation would be preempted only for equipment primarily used

on farm or construction sites. Commenters submitted alternative

proposals.

EMA and the Outdoor Power Equipment Institute (OPEI) proposed that

EPA should define the scope of preemption in terms of the primary use

of the engine family, not the equipment. EMA proposed that the Agency

consider preempting for state regulation any engine line ``used in''

farm or construction equipment regardless of the extent which the

engine line is used in other types of equipment. CARB and MECA both

commented that only regulation of the individual engines actually used

in farm or construction equipment should be preempted. CARB also

proposed that preemption apply only to regulation of engines

exclusively designed for and used in the farm and construction

industries. Failing that, both CARB and MECA believed that the 51

percent test for determining how equipment was primarily used was too

low. CARB recommended that state regulation of multiple-use equipment

be preempted only if more than 75 percent of the equipment is used in

farming or construction. CARB noted that this would ensure that any

preempted equipment was primarily used on farms or at construction

sites.

PPEMA proposed that EPA use a different test to determine whether

multi-use equipment should be considered farm or construction equipment

for purposes of determining the scope of federal preemption. This test

would be that federal preemption applies whenever equipment is used in

more than de minimis amounts for farming or construction, and such

equipment is necessary to perform farming and construction activities.

PPEMA did not state any criteria to be used in determining such a ``de

minimis'' amount or determining what ``necessary'' is. PPEMA supported

this proposal with several arguments.

First, PPEMA argued that a de minimis test follows the plain

language of the statute. PPEMA argued that the ``plain language'' of

the statute does not include modifiers such as ``primarily'' or

``predominantly'' and thus does not in any way imply that Congress

intended for EPA to apply a percentage test to determine if equipment

was used for farming or construction. PPEMA contended that Congress

intended to preempt state regulation of all nonroad engines used in

farm and construction equipment.

Second, PPEMA argued that Congress explicitly limited the scope of

preemption by specifying that preemption would apply to regulation of

engines used in farm and construction equipment smaller than 175

horsepower. Thus, according to PPEMA, there is no need for EPA to

clarify the scope of preemption further.

PPEMA's final argument is that a de minimis test would not unduly

expand the scope of federal preemption. Equipment would be preempted

only if it were found in more than de minimis amounts and were

necessary to the performance of farm and construction operations.

4. Response to Comments

a. Primary Use Test

EPA has decided to apply the primary use test to determine which

multiple-use equipment will be considered farm or construction

equipment and thus preempted from state regulation. As explained in the

NPRM, the ``primary use'' test is the most appropriate method for

classifying (as farm or construction, or other) multiple use equipment.

Industry commenters who believe EPA must consider multiple-use

equipment to be farm or construction equipment beg the question of what

is farm and construction equipment. Some industry commenters stated

that EPA could not use the primary use test because the language of

section 209(e)(1) refers to new engines which are used in construction

or farm equipment or vehicles, not to engines which are ``primarily''

used in construction of farm equipment or vehicles. These comments miss

the point of the primary use test. The test is not used to define

``used in'', but is used to define ``construction equipment'' and

``farm equipment''. In order to identify an engine used in farm or

construction equipment, EPA must first determine whether a piece of

equipment is farm or construction equipment. Equipment used only

incidentally (perhaps 10 percent) in farm or construction applications

is not fairly considered to be farm or construction equipment. A type

of equipment such as a pump, for example, is not farm equipment merely

because it is used on a handful of farms and otherwise used exclusively

in residential settings. Therefore, the engine used in this type of

equipment is not an engine used in farm or construction equipment and,

therefore, regulation of that engine type is not preempted.

EPA believes that the terms ``farm equipment'' and ``construction

equipment'' are best identified by referring to the general use of the

equipment. EPA does not believe that the de minimis approach suggested

by PPEMA is an appropriate approach to defining these terms. EPA does

not believe that a piece of equipment primarily used in non-

construction or non-farming activities should be defined as

construction or farm equipment merely because it is or could be used

for some farm or construction applications. Such a definition would

inappropriately expand the preempted categories.

Similarly, EPA does not agree with CARB's initial proposal that

equipment should be defined as farm and construction equipment only if

more than 75 percent of the equipment is used in farm or construction.

EPA believes that the 51 percent cutoff is a better measure of whether

or not a piece of equipment is farm or construction equipment,

especially given Congress's apparent intent to protect new farm and

construction equipment from state regulation. If equipment is used more

than half the time in farm or construction applications, then it should

be considered farm or construction equipment even if it has some

applications outside of the farm or construction area. A 75 percent

threshold would be inappropriate because equipment that may be used

regularly and predominantly in farm and construction applications could

still be used enough in other applications to prevent a 75 percent

threshold to be met. EPA believes its final decision on this issue will

not unduly limit California's authority to control emissions from

nonroad sources.

Thus, EPA has decided to retain the 51 percent criterion for the

primary use determination. It believes this criterion is in keeping

with Congress's implicit goal of striking a balance between the

competing interests of national uniformity of regulatory requirements

and state control over sources of in-state pollution. This test still

permits California to regulate new engines that are installed in

machines used in farms or at construction sites if most of such engines

are in equipment not used in those situations.

Since the frequency with which multiple use equipment is used on

farms or at construction sites ranges from ``almost never'' to ``every

day'', it is clear that a line must be drawn somewhere along this

continuum. Many comments were received addressing the selection of 51

percent as the primary use cut-off point. EPA selected it because it

corresponds to a bare ``majority''.

As noted previously, PPEMA would like to see this limit lowered to

de minimis amounts. This would mean that equipment used more often than

this small amount in preempted categories would be judged farm or

construction equipment and thus its regulation would be preempted.

Therefore, under such a limit, items such as lawn mowers and hedge

trimmers could be judged farm or construction equipment. EPA believes

that this result, and such a low threshold by which a lawn mower could

be considered a piece of farm or construction equipment, is not

consistent with Congressional intent of preempting state regulation of

new farm and construction equipment.

No matter what number is chosen as the cutoff there will always be

some categories of equipment that fall just above or just below the

line. No commenter has made a strong case for why EPA should select a

cut-off point other than the 51 percent cut-off. EPA notes CARB's most

recent submittal, dated July 20, 1993,27 (see discussion below)

which recognizes the use of a primary use test by EPA.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\7See Letter from Tom Cackette, CARB to Richard Wilson, EPA,

Docket entry IV-I-52. This letter discusses an agreement between

CARB and certain industry representatives regarding whether certain

equipment types should or should not be considered farm or

construction equipment, subject to EPA's review.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA believes the primary use test is in keeping with Congress'

implicit goal of striking a balance between the competing interests of

national uniformity of regulatory requirements and state control over

sources of in-state pollution. Under this test, equipment used for a

majority of the time in farming and construction is preempted from

California regulation. Conversely, equipment used primarily by

consumers and in consumer settings would more than likely be subject to

California regulation since their use in farming or construction would

most likely not meet the primary use test. This test, therefore,

preempts California from regulating new engines that are installed in

any equipment which is primarily used in the commercial production and/

or harvesting of food, fiber, wood, or commercial organic products or

for the processing of such products for further use on the farm. This

test also preempts California from regulating new engines that are

installed in equipment which is primarily used in construction and

located on commercial construction sites.

EPA's application of the primary use test in this rule is similar

to the proposed application of the 51 percent primary use test found in

the notice of proposed rulemaking. That is, EPA believes that it is

appropriate for CARB to make a preliminary determination of primary use

for multiple-use equipment that is in question in a CARB regulation

such as the Utility Engine Rule. (EPA's discussion of CARB's role in

such determinations is found below in Section K). CARB will be required

to come forward with evidence, data, agreements with industry, and

analysis to support a finding that a category or subcategory of

equipment is primarily not used in farm or construction applications

and is thus subject to state regulation.

CARB and the major industry commenters had a series of meetings

during which they discussed whether various types of equipment should

fall into a preempted category or a non-preempted category should EPA

adopt its proposed primary use test based on 51 percent usage. As a

result, on July 20, 1993, EPA received a letter from CARB explaining

the process by which it and major industry commenters28 reached

agreement on lists of equipment which would or would not be considered

as farm or construction equipment based on the primary use test as set

out in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for this section 209(e)

rule.29 CARB noted that EMI had not reached agreement with the

primary use test but apparently was in agreement with the categorized

lists of equipment and this seems to be supported by EMI's letter to

CARB during this time period.30

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\8The major industry groups that met with CARB included the

Engine Manufacturers Association, the Portable Power Equipment

Manufacturers Association, the Industrial Truck Association, the

Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, the Construction Industry

Manufacturers Association, and the Equipment Manufacturers Institute

(EMI).

\2\9See Letter from Tom Cackette, CARB to Richard Wilson, EPA,

Docket entry IV-I-52.

\3\0See Letter from Gary Baise, Counsel to EMI to Mike Kenny,

CARB, Docket entry IV-I-53.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

EPA recognizes the significance of these lists for several reasons.

The lists are intended to be exhaustive of all equipment currently in

existence, according to CARB, and eliminates uncertainty regarding the

categorization, as farm or construction or other, of any equipment

currently in production. For any currently existing equipment under 25

horsepower that is not considered on the list, EPA believes

manufacturers will have the ability to petition CARB for the

appropriate categorization. Further, the lists of equipment are generic

such that any modifications to existing equipment types would fall into

existing categories, with appropriate review by CARB, and thereby

reduce any burden on manufacturers to produce large amounts of new

information to support their position that such modified equipment is

farm or construction.

For newly developed equipment, which is not a modification of

existing equipment or included on the lists, CARB and manufacturers

will classify it as preempted or non-preempted based upon, among other

things, a description of the equipment, its intended application, and

projected sales market. EPA believes the classification process will be

clear and predictable and will not require substantial new information.

It is anticipated that CARB and the manufacturers will continue to work

together to minimize the information gathering burden for the small

number of newly developed types of equipment.

The existence of these lists is noted here merely as an example of

how CARB and industry foresee the future categorization of nonroad

equipment. As CARB noted in its July 20, 1993 letter, EPA maintains its

independent authority under section 209(e) to review each separate CARB

nonroad authorization request and to determine, by examining data as

explained in section II(K) of this preamble, whether such equipment is

indeed farm or construction equipment.

b. Subcategorization

The USDA commented that some of California's suggested categories

might be too inclusive because they were not subcategorized as to

professional or non-professional use, particularly chain saws.

As noted in the NPRM, unless there is a very clear delineation of

types of equipment within a category, all similar pieces of equipment

could remain together in one group rather than being split into

multiple sub-groups. Not every product may be susceptible to

subcategorization because there may not be clear delineations defining

types of equipment. However, in cases when subcategories of equipment

can be identified they should be separately grouped and not subjected

to state regulation. It would be inappropriate for California to

regulate a subcategory of multiple-use equipment which is primarily

used as farm or construction equipment. In preparing its use

determination California should look carefully at whether there are

subcategories of equipment that are primarily used on farms or

construction sites. California should not aggregate a group of

equipment that can be subcategorized that is primarily used as farm or

construction equipment with subcategories that are not used as farm or

construction equipment in order to extend its reach into federally

preempted categories. When commenters bring to EPA's attention a

product that is primarily used as farm or construction equipment but is

also used in other applications, EPA will carefully review California's

categorization determination as part of its authorization process.

c. Data for use determination

The preamble to the NPRM provided that in determining primary use

California would consider national sales data to demonstrate whether

CARB's various equipment categories were or were not preempted. PPEMA,

ITA and others commented that sales data do not correlate with actual

use and that hours-of-use would be a better measure. EMI, CIMA and

others were concerned with the year-to-year variability of sales, while

OPEI and Caterpillar stated that accurate sales data were not

available.

CARB suggested that, if a primary use test were used, it be

permitted to apply the best data available in making its determination

and requested that national sales data, mentioned in the NPRM, not be

mandated. EPA agrees that California should employ the most relevant

information and data at hand to make its determination of primary use.

The classes of equipment in the Utility Engine Rule regulation and in

any potential future California regulations that may employ a usage

test are so varied and unique that EPA is not in a position to specify

the type of data to be used. Therefore, EPA is not mandating CARB to

use any specific type of data, e.g. national sales data; however,

California should select the appropriate data base keeping in mind that

EPA will review any use determination as part of an authorization

request by California under the preponderance of the evidence standard

of review. (See discussion in Section K below regarding this standard

of proof.)

d. Equipment versus engine line

The primary use test described in the NPRM is based upon an

assessment of whether multiple use equipment is primarily used as farm

or construction equipment. Several commenters suggested that the

preemption should be based instead on a primary use test of an engine

manufacturer's engine line. (An engine line is all the engines produced

by a manufacturer with many common characteristics such as number of

cylinders, displacement, calibration, etc.) Two rules would be followed

under their suggested system: (1) state regulation of all engines used

in farm and construction equipment would be preempted, and (2) state

regulation of all engines from an engine line which is primarily used

in farm and construction equipment (no matter what else they are

installed in) would be preempted.

Primary use would mean 51% under the engine line test also. Under

this suggested system, in a situation in which 70 percent of an engine

line went to farm and construction equipment and 30 percent went to

other equipment, regulation of the entire engine line would be

preempted. Thus state control of the 30 percent fraction of the engines

would be preempted even though they would be installed in equipment

that could not be considered farm or construction equipment and that

Congress intended the state be allowed to regulate. If the fractions

were reversed, state control of the 30 percent fraction would be

preempted since it was used in farm and construction equipment while

state regulation of the 70 percent fraction would not be preempted and

would be subject to state requirements.

The commenters suggest that the engine-line test is preferable

because engines are generally designed by engine-line, not by

equipment. Under the equipment-based test, engine manufacturers would

have to divide their engine lines based on the use of the engines in

equipment. Thus, the exact same engines might have to be divided into

two families.

In the equipment application method, if an engine manufacturer has

an engine line where 70 percent of the engines go to farm and

construction equipment (and their regulation would therefore be

preempted) and 30 percent go to other equipment (and state regulation

would not be preempted), the manufacturer must decide whether to split

the engine line and manufacture the 30 percent portion of the engines

to meet California's standards (and label them as such) or discontinue

the production of those engines for California.31 If the example

is reversed with 70 percent of the engines going into other equipment

and 30 percent going into farm and construction, the manufacturer could

decide to produce and certify its entire line to meet California's

standards or to split its engine line into two separate engine types--

one certified for sale in California and one not. Therefore, under the

equipment-based test, equipment manufacturers would have to maintain an

awareness of their California and non-California markets and specify

the number of engines of each type they will need.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\1This discussion presumes that California will actually

promulgate regulations for the engine line in question.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

However, engine manufacturers may also have to divide their engine

lines under their proposed engine-line approach. If 30 percent of an

engine line is used in farm and construction equipment and the

remainder is used in non-preempted equipment, then under the

commenters' plan, the engine line would be split, because 30 percent of

the engine line would be preempted but the remainder would be subject

to state regulation. Therefore, the problem the commenters sought to

avoid would not be avoided.

On the other hand, there are several advantages of an equipment-

based determination. The only requirement of an equipment-based

determination would be to develop two lists--one of farm and

construction equipment and one of other equipment (non-farm and non-

construction equipment). With these two lists the equipment

manufacturer knows the type of engine it needs in each piece of

equipment produced--either a preempted (farm or construction) engine or

an engine that complies with California emission requirements if

California has such requirements.

Enforcement under the equipment-based method would be relatively

simple. An inspector would only have to determine whether a piece of

equipment was farm or construction equipment, or an other type of

equipment. If it is farm or construction equipment, nothing more need

be done, as the piece of equipment would not be subject to state

regulation. If it is not farm or construction equipment, the inspector

need only look for the required CARB label if there are California

standards for that type of equipment. Enforcement would require

additional steps if an engine line based system were used: for example,

the inspector would have to determine whether a non-preempted piece of

equipment contained an engine from a manufacturer who claimed its

entire engine line as preempt from state regulation.

If the primary use determination were based on an engine line, EPA

would have several concerns. As with the equipment based method, two

equipment lists would still be developed, but additionally each engine

line for every engine manufacturer must be determined to be preempted

or not after gathering data on whether the engines were now installed

in farm or construction equipment. This would add another layer of

calculations to the process. According to many of those who commented

at the public hearing, engine destination data are difficult to obtain.

In a case where most engines in an engine line are used in non-

preempted equipment, the engine line would be split, causing the same

burden as manufacturers stated would occur in the equipment-based

method and which they wanted to avoid. Additionally, this method would

give a competitive advantage to manufacturers who now make engine lines

which are primarily used in farm and construction equipment. Such

manufacturers, who have engines for which state regulation is

preempted, would enjoy an advantage over a manufacturer whose engines

are not preempted and therefore must meet California's emission

standards. Ford Motor Company recognized this issue and expressed its

concerns and disagreement with EMA on this issue.

EPA is also concerned that the commenters' method would be contrary

to section 209 in that it is overinclusive and inconsistent in its

definition of farm and construction equipment. Under the commenters'

method, if 70 percent of the engines in an engine line were used in

farm and construction equipment and 30 percent were used in other

equipment, the entire engine line would be preempted. Thus, the

regulation of some engines would be preempted even though they are not

used in farm or construction equipment. This would create a preemption

greater than that contemplated by the statute. Moreover, the method is

inconsistent in application: if 70 percent of the engines in an engine

line were used in non-preempted equipment but the remainder were used

in farm or construction equipment, California could only regulate 70

percent of the engines, not 100 percent. Therefore, the method gives

engine manufacturers the benefit of full preemption when the majority

of the engines are preempted, but it does not allow full California

regulation if the majority of the engines are not preempted. This

inconsistency appears arbitrary and could result in higher emissions

(as noted by Ford Motor Company) because California would be precluded

from regulating engines that it would otherwise be able to regulate

under a more evenhanded approach.

Furthermore, this approach does not solve the question that is at

the heart of the ``primary use'' issue: i.e., when should a multiple

use piece of equipment be defined as farm and/or construction

equipment? In order to determine whether an engine line is being used

30 percent in farm and construction equipment or 70 percent in farm or

construction equipment, one still must know what is meant by farm and

construction equipment. This approach, taken by itself, does not

provide an answer. Finally, manufacturers did not explain how a newly

developed engine line would be judged (preempted or non-preempted)

since there would be no existing data upon which to base a

determination.

EMA stated that the equipment-based method would result in higher

certification costs than the engine-line method. EPA believes that

under both methods, engine manufacturers could face additional costs

for any engine they wished to certify for sale in California. These

costs would include research and development expenses to develop a

cleaner engine, and administrative and testing expenses associated with

the state certification process. Those engine manufacturers who chose

to compete in the California market would face higher certification

costs than those who did not, but there should be little difference in

certification costs between the two methods.

In the final rule, rather than use the engine-line method, EPA is

requiring a primary use test that preempts California from regulating

new engines that are installed in equipment that is primarily used in

farming or construction settings.

H. Labeling Requirement

The NPRM would require engine manufacturers to label new engines

which are used in construction equipment or vehicles or used in farm

equipment or vehicles and which are smaller than 175 horsepower. The

label would state to which standard or standards (California, Federal,

or both) the engine is certified.

Most commenters opposed the labeling requirement. CARB stated that

it intended to require labels on engines that comply with California

emission regulations. CARB, EMI, and EMA agreed that a federal labeling

requirement was not appropriate until EPA determined under section 213

whether federal standards were necessary. In fact, EMI argued that

authority for labeling lies in section 213, not section 209(e).

EPA has decided to not implement a labeling requirement under

section 209(e). It should be noted that the regulation setting forth

federal nonroad standards under section 213 contains a labeling

requirement.32

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\2See 59 FR 31306, June 17, 1994, specifically 40 CFR Part 89,

Subpart B, Sec. 89.110-96.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Authorization Criteria and Procedures

In the NPRM, EPA noted that sections 209(b) and (e) are in many

respects alike and in those respects should be similarly interpreted.

One difference between the two provisions that the Agency identified,

however, was an apparent difference in the sequence of California and

EPA actions. In this regard, EPA focused on the following language of

section 209(b):

(b)(1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for

public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which

has adopted standards . . . for the control of emissions from new motor

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

EPA interpreted the phrase ``has adopted'' to mean that the

Administrator could waive the prohibition of section 209(a) after a

state has adopted standards. By contrast, section 209(e)(2) provides

that ``the Administrator shall . . . authorize California to adopt and

enforce motor vehicle emission standards.'' EPA concluded that the

difference in language indicated that California must receive

authorization from EPA before it can adopt any nonroad standards or

requirements.

CARB took issue with EPA's interpretation of section 209(e)(2) as

requiring California to obtain authorization before adopting

regulations. It believed that for several reasons, EPA could and should

follow the same process under section 209(e) as it follows in granting

motor vehicle waivers under section 209(b). First, CARB argued that

although section 209(e) states that ``the Administrator shall . . .

authorize California to adopt and enforce standards . . . ,'' sections

209(a) and (b) could be similarly construed when read together. Section

209(a) states that ``no state . . . shall adopt or attempt to enforce.

. . .'' The only exception to the prohibition is if the Administrator

grants a waiver under section 209(b). Thus, considered together,

sections 209(a) and (b) could be construed to preclude prior adoption

of a regulation by a state unless a waiver is granted.

CARB noted that despite this language, EPA has consistently

interpreted sections 209(a) and (b) to provide that the waiver process

commences after state regulatory adoption. EPA's rationale has been

that the Administrator should consider a ``final'' regulation when

making a determination to waive federal preemption of state regulations

that may differ from federal regulations. Between the time CARB holds a

hearing on a proposed regulation and submission of the final regulation

to the California Office of Administrative Law (OAL), significant

changes could be made to the regulation. Under the California

procedures for adopting regulations, CARB releases a ``Staff Proposal:

Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking'' along with a

Notice for Public Comment. The comment period is forty-five days. A

Board hearing takes place at the end of this forty-five day period.

CARB makes modifications to the regulation after the hearing. These

modifications are made available for public comment for fifteen days.

CARB then prepares a ``Final Statement of Reasons for Rulemaking'' in

which it addresses changes made to the regulation and summarizes and

responds to all comments received during the public comment period.

This document is submitted to the Executive Officer, who signs an

Executive Order which formally adopts the final version of the

regulations. Then CARB is required to submit the final regulation to

OAL, which reviews regulations adopted by state agencies. OAL has

thirty days to review and either approve or disapprove. It has

authority to disapprove if (1) the regulation is inconsistent with

California law or (2) improper procedure has been followed. If OAL

disapproves, CARB has 120 days to modify the regulation, re-adopt, and

re-submit the regulation to OAL.33

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\3Cal. Admin. Code tit. 2, Secs. 11340-11356 (1989).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thus, significant changes could be made to a regulation between the

CARB hearing and adoption as well as after CARB adoption due to the

review by OAL. If significant changes were to occur, the waiver

California received would be insufficient to cover the regulations as

adopted and California would be forced to reapply for a waiver of a now

final regulation.

EPA finds California's argument persuasive. As an initial matter,

the Agency no longer believes that the difference in language between

sections 209(b) and (e) was intended to delineate a difference in the

sequence of events surrounding adoption and authorization. The use of

the past tense in section 209(b) (``has adopted'') was merely intended

to identify the states that could obtain a waiver for motor vehicle

standards. (In fact, California alone had adopted such standards prior

to March 30, 1966, and therefore, all other states have been prohibited

from adopting emission control standards for new motor vehicles except

as provided under section 177.) EPA also acknowledges that sections

209(a) and (b) could be read to require California to obtain a waiver

prior to adopting motor vehicle standards, but the Agency has not so

interpreted these provisions. Therefore, sections 209(b) and (e) need

not be interpreted as requiring different adoption and authorization

processes.

Moreover, EPA believes section 209(e) should be interpreted to

allow a process like that established under section 209(b) for the same

reasons EPA construed 209(b) to permit California to seek a waiver

after it has adopted motor vehicle standards. It is inefficient for EPA

to rule on a waiver or authorization request for what amounts to a

regulatory recommendation. Until California adopts its program, neither

California nor EPA can be sure that the program for which a waiver or

authorization is requested is the program that the responsible official

will sign into law. If there is a difference between the program

submitted to EPA by California and the program California eventually

adopts, any waiver or authorization granted may be insufficient to

cover the enacted program.

In fact, EPA received comments that illustrate the confusion that

would result if California were required to receive EPA authorization

before it could adopt final regulations. Several commenters were

concerned that CARB had modified its proposed Utility Engine Rule twice

since CARB had requested EPA authorization in December 1990. The

commenters requested that EPA clarify that it will grant authorization

based on the most recent version it has received from CARB and that if

any changes are made after an authorization is granted, California must

resubmit its authorization request. EPA believes that today's change

allowing California to adopt before receiving EPA authorization

resolves this confusion and inefficiency.34

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\4 EPA notes, however, that as with motor vehicle waivers

under section 209(b), if CARB substantively amends a rule, EPA would

expect CARB to request a new authorization.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

At the same time, EPA does not believe that section 209(e) may be

interpreted to permit California to enforce any nonroad regulations

before receiving authorization. Were California to enforce its

regulations before it receives authorization, it would defeat the

protection section 209(e) was established to provide--that California's

nonroad program only go forward if EPA authorizes it in accordance with

the provisions of that section. Thus, EPA believes that while

California may adopt nonroad regulations before receiving EPA

authorization, its adoption must be conditioned upon EPA's authorizing

those regulations under 209(e). In short, California may adopt, but not

enforce, nonroad standards prior to EPA authorization.

Regarding the authorization criteria, EPA proposed that the first

two criteria be interpreted the same as for section 209(b). These

criteria are first, that no waiver or authorization shall be granted if

EPA finds that California's determination that its standards will be,

in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare

as applicable Federal standards is arbitrary and capricious. Second, no

waiver or authorization shall be granted if California does not need

such standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.

The language of the third criterion, however, was not as clearly

similar to section 209(b). Section 209(e)(2)(A)(iii) stated that no

authorization shall be granted if ``California standards and

accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with this

section.'' EPA proposed that ``this section'' be interpreted to mean

consistent with sections 209(a) and 209(e)(1).

Commenters disagreed with EPA's proposed interpretation of

``consistent with this section,'' stating that ``consistent with

section 209'' should mean all of section 209, particularly section

209(b). Some commenters also proposed that ``consistent with this

section'' should include section 213.

EPA has determined that, given the plain language of section

209(e), interpreting ``consistent with this section'' to mean

``consistent with section 213'' is not a reasonable statutory

interpretation. The phrase ``consistent with this section'' clearly

refers to section 209, not section 213. EMA proposed to interpret this

phrase to refer to section 222 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.

This would require consistency with both sections 209 and 213 of the

Act. Absent any legislative history to explain the intent of

``consistent with this section'', however, this interpretation would

give to the phrase a meaning clearly different than its plain meaning

in light of its placement in section 209 alone.

The Agency has decided, however, that it is reasonable and effects

Congressional intent to interpret ``consistent with this section'' to

include all of section 209, including section 209(b)(1)(C). Hence, EPA

believes that it should review nonroad authorization requests under the

same ``consistency'' criterion that it reviews motor vehicle waiver

requests.

Under section 209(b)(1)(C), the Administrator shall not grant

California a motor vehicle waiver if she finds that California

standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent

with section 202(a) of the Act. EPA has interpreted this criterion in

previous motor vehicle waiver decisions. First, California's standards

are not consistent with section 202(a) if there is inadequate lead time

to permit the development of technology necessary to meet those

requirements, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of

compliance within that time frame. Second, California's accompanying

enforcement procedures would be inconsistent with section 202(a) if the

federal and California test procedures were inconsistent, that is,

manufacturers would be unable to meet both the state and the federal

test requirements with one test vehicle or engine.

EPA's review of nonroad authorization requests will include the

following. First, CARB must request EPA authorization of its adopted

nonroad standards. Second, EPA shall not grant an authorization if (1)

EPA determines that CARB's ``in the aggregate'' determination is

arbitrary and capricious; (2) California does not need such standards

to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions; and (3) if

California's nonroad standards are not consistent with section 209,

i.e., that they not be inconsistent with section 209(a), section

209(e), and section 209(b), as EPA has interpreted that subsection in

the context of motor vehicle waivers.

J. State Adoption of California Standards and Test Procedures

EPA received comments on several aspects regarding how other states

may adopt California nonroad standards and test procedures. First, both

EMA and EMI argued that other states that decide to adopt California

standards should be subject to the same process as California. However,

the Act neither requires that states obtain EPA authorization to impose

California's nonroad engine standards nor authorizes the Agency to

require that states do so. Under section 209(e)(2)(B), any state which

has plan provisions approved under part D of Title I of the Act

(generally states within ozone nonattainment areas) may adopt and

enforce, ``after notice to the Administrator,'' California standards.

Language requiring that other states request and receive authorization

from EPA is noticeably absent. Indeed, the statutory text reads as

authorizing states to adopt California standards on their own volition.

In contrast, section 209(e)(2)(A) clearly states that California must

receive authorization from EPA. Moreover, the language of section

209(e)(2)(B) is nearly identical to section 177 which provides that

``any state which has plan provisions approved under this part may

adopt and enforce'' California motor vehicle emission standards. Under

section 177 New York, Massachusetts and Maine have adopted California

standards, and other states are considering following suit. These

States did not ask for EPA authorization before they adopted the

California standards, nor did EPA or the automobile industry suggest

that they needed such authorization.\35\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\35\Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Several commenters stated that section 209(e)(2)(B) required that

California be subject to a two-year lead time requirement. EPA does not

agree with this interpretation. Section 209(e)(2)(A) requires EPA to

authorize California regulation of nonroad engines unless the

Administrator makes certain findings, including that California's

standards are ``not consistent with this section.'' As discussed

earlier, EPA interprets that phrase as requiring that California's

standards are technologically feasible in the available lead time.

Since California is thus required to provide adequate lead time under

section 209(e)(2)(A), it would not make sense to interpret section

209(e)(2)(B) as independently requiring at least two years of lead

time. Instead, EPA interprets section 209(e)(2)(B)'s reference to two

years of lead time in the same way it interprets the virtually

identical provision in section 177: that an adopting state must provide

two years of lead time before the California standards take effect in

the adopting state and California must have adopted standards two years

before commencement of the period for which the standards take effect

in the adopting state, but California may adopt standards having less

than two years of lead time in California.

K. Rulemaking Procedure

In the NPRM, EPA proposed definitions for the new engines used in

the preempted categories: farm equipment, construction equipment, and

locomotives. For equipment types that are used in a variety of

applications, EPA also proposed a primary use test to assess whether

such equipment is primarily used as farm or construction equipment. New

engines used primarily in this equipment would be preempted from state

regulation. EPA proposed that in determining ``primary use'', CARB

would use sales data to show that an equipment type was or was not

primarily used in farming or construction. When CARB requested EPA to

authorize its proposed regulations, EPA would review California's

determination regarding the primary use of particular equipment.

In the Proposed Authorization Decision, 53 FR 45876, September 6,

1991, EPA proposed to review the decision California made regarding the

primary use of nonroad equipment under an arbitrary and capricious

standard of review, the standard of review that section 209(e)(2)

requires that the Administrator use in reviewing California's

determination that its standards ``will be, in the aggregate, at least

as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal

standards.''

Several commenters, including EMA, EMI, PPEMA, and the Railway

Engineering-Maintenance Suppliers Association, Inc. (REMSA) stated that

EPA's proposed approach to determining the primary use of nonroad

engines and equipment inappropriately relinquished authority to

California. They pointed out that the primary use determination goes to

the scope of the federal preemption accorded by section 209(e)(1), and

argued that such a threshold determination should be made by EPA, not

California. To the extent that California did have a role in

determining primary use, they urged that EPA apply a clear and

compelling evidence standard of review instead of the less strict

arbitrary and capricious test in reviewing California's determinations.

EPA believes these commenters are essentially correct in that the

scope of federal preemption is not for California to decide and that

EPA should have a greater role in making that determination than the

Agency's proposal would have required. At the same time, EPA sees

nothing wrong with having California make a preliminary determination

as to the use of nonroad engines and equipment. California's coming

forward with the evidence and analysis to support such a determination

is in keeping with the role California has with regard to other aspects

of the waiver and authorization requests it makes under section 209.

Notably, sections 209(b) and (e) expressly place the burden of

coming forward on California only with regard to the determination of

the aggregate protectiveness of California's program. Nevertheless,

under section 209(b) California has traditionally addressed not only

the protectiveness determination but also the other two criteria set

forth in section 209(b)(1)(B) and (C). This approach simply reflects

the fact that California is the party interested in obtaining the

waiver. Similarly, under section 209(e) EPA believes it appropriate for

California to make a preliminary use determination (primary use, as

discussed above) based on the available evidence and for EPA to review

that determination in light of any public comments and additional

evidence received.

EPA agrees with the industry commenters that the arbitrary and

capricious standard of review is not appropriate for review of

California's primary use determination. The arbitrary and capricious

standard is generally applied in two types of circumstances: (1) where

the decision-maker must apply his expertise to resolve complex issues,

or (2) where the decision-maker has been accorded discretion in making

the decision under review. Underlying the arbitrary and capricious

standard is a recognition that the reviewing authority either does not

have as much expertise as the decision-maker or that the judgment of

the reviewing authority should not be substituted for that of the

decision-maker to whom discretion has been granted. An illustration of

this approach to application of the arbitrary and capricious standard

of review is Congress' specification of that standard for California's

protectiveness determination under section 209. The legislative history

of that section makes clear that Congress sought to give California

broad leeway to design a program that in California's judgment was best

suited to the unique set of circumstances faced by that state.

Neither reason for applying the arbitrary and capricious standard

of review applies to California's primary use determinations.

California does not have unique expertise in determining the use of

nonroad engines and equipment. Nor is there any indication that

Congress sought to accord California discretion to determine the scope

of federal preemption. Indeed the fact that Congress prohibited all

state regulation of certain categories of new nonroad equipment and

required California to obtain EPA authorization to regulate any other

categories suggests a strong congressional interest in limiting state

regulation affecting makers of new nonroad engines and equipment. While

preemption provisions are generally construed narrowly, congressional

intent to prohibit states from regulating in certain areas must also be

safeguarded. EPA believes the arbitrary and capricious standard of

review would not sufficiently reflect congressional intent to prohibit

state regulation of farm and construction equipment.

At the same time, EPA does not believe that the much stricter clear

and compelling evidence standard suggested by CIAQC is the appropriate

standard of review. CIAQC argued that in Motor and Equipment

Manufacturers Association, Inc., 627 F.2d 1095, (D.C. Cir. 1979) (MEMA

I), the court found that the Administrator's use of a clear and

compelling evidence standard to evaluate California's request for a

waiver for enforcement procedures was valid. EPA disagrees with CIAQC's

application of MEMA I.

As an initial matter, MEMA I does not deal with the threshold

matter of the scope of preemption. On such matters the court is silent

as to the appropriate standard of review beyond providing general

guiding principles. Instead, the court focuses on the standard of

review to be employed by EPA on California's protectiveness

determination. In fact, the section of the decision cited by CIAQC

focuses on this issue, not on the issue of preemption. There the court

not only states that California's determination is presumed to satisfy

the waiver requirements, but that the burden of proving otherwise falls

on the party attacking the determination. It is in this context that

the court notes that the Administrator determined that there must be

``clear and compelling evidence'' to show that California's proposed

procedures undermine the protectiveness of California's standards. It

is in the context of a party challenging California's protectiveness

determination that the clear and compelling standard comes into play.

Thus, EPA believes that the clear and compelling standard is neither

applicable nor appropriate for its review of CARB's primary use

determination.

The Agency considers the preponderance of the evidence standard of

review to be appropriate for its review of California's primary use

determination. If EPA were to make the determination itself, it would

apply such a test in making it. There is no reason to apply a different

test simply because California has made an initial determination.

Public commenters may supplement the record assembled by California in

support of its determination, and the Agency will weigh all the

evidence in reviewing California's determination. To the extent

California's determination is supported by a preponderance of the

evidence in the record, EPA will accept it.

Several commenters stated that EPA was denying interested parties

their due process rights by attempting to consider California's request

for authorization for its Utility Engine Rule at the same time it is

seeking comment on its proposed criteria for authorizing nonroad

requests. The commenters argued that a final rule under section 209(e)

was necessary to comment meaningfully on the CARB authorization

request.

EPA believes parties should be given another opportunity to comment

on California's utility engine rule after today's rule implementing

section 209(e) has become final. Thus, EPA will publish in the Federal

Register a Notice of Opportunity for Public Hearing and Request for

Comments regarding California's request for authorization of its

Utility Engine Rule. Interested parties will have the opportunity to

submit written comments, and if requested, EPA will hold a hearing.

This will provide interested parties with an opportunity to comment on

California's request after today's rule is finalized.

L. Executive Order 12866

In the NPRM, EPA stated it had determined that the proposed rule is

not ``major'' within the criteria set forth in section 1(b) of

Executive Order (E.O.) 12291 and was therefore not required to prepare

a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). Since the NPRM E.O. 12291 has been

replaced by Executive Order 12866.

Under Executive Order 12866, (58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993)) the

Agency must determine whether the regulatory action is ``significant''

and therefore subject to OMB review and the requirements of the

Executive Order. The Order defines ``significant regulatory action'' as

one that is likely to result in a rule that may:

(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or

adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the

economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public

health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or

communities;

(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an

action taken or planned by another agency;

(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,

user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations or recipients

thereof; or

(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal

mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in

the Executive Order.

Comments were received from EMI which suggested that an RIA be

performed under the guidelines set forth in E.O. 12291. EPA will

examine these comments in the context of E.O. 12866. In connection with

every ``significant regulatory action'' as defined at section 3(f)(1)

(Annual effect on the economy of $100 million * * *), E.O. 12866

requires an RIA be performed. EMI submitted that the second and third

independent criteria for a ``major rule'' under E.O. 12291, were met by

both the NPRM and CARB's Utility Engine Rule currently before EPA.

In relation to the second criterion for determining whether a rule

is ``major'', EMI stated that its member manufacturers of farm and

construction equipment will incur costs in attempting to comply with

EPA's rule and CARB's Utility Engine Rule. EMI also states that both

consumers of farm and construction equipment and California's economy

will incur costs as a result of geographically diverse emission

standards. EMI makes reference to no evidence or cost data in support

of its claim.

EMI points to the potential of diverse or multiple emission

standards as its support that United States farm and construction

equipment manufacturers would be unduly hindered in the international

marketplace as evidence that the rule meets the third criterion for a

``major rule''. Again, EMI makes no reference to any examples of costs

or evidence to support its belief.

EPA still believes that an RIA is not needed for the NPRM or the

final rule. Today's rule does not itself impose any increase in costs

to individual industries or the State of California. Indeed, the rule

merely sets out definitions and criteria for nonroad authorization

requests. California makes cost determinations as part of its own

rulemaking and provides the rulemaking record to EPA as part of an

authorization request. At the same time, EPA notes that while its rule

does not impose any direct costs on equipment manufacturers, the more

narrowly the scope of preemption is drawn, the more opportunities

California has to impose costs through regulations.

Pursuant to the terms of E.O. 12866, OMB notified EPA that it

considered the action a ``significant regulatory action'' within the

meaning of the Executive Order. EPA has submitted this action to OMB

for review. Changes made in response to OMB suggestions or

recommendations will be documented in the public record.

M. Paperwork Reduction Act

In the NPRM, EPA stated that the proposed rule did not contain any

additional information collection requirements subject to OMB review

under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

(PRA). The purpose of the PRA is ``to minimize and control burdens

associated with the collection of information by federal agencies from

individuals, businesses and other private institutions, and State and

local governments.'' 5 CFR 1320.1.

EPA received comments from two parties claiming that the PRA

applied to the proposed rule and that such application would require

changes within the proposed rule. North American Equipment Dealers

Association (NAEDA) and EMI indicated that the ``primary use'' test

would cause an increase of burdensome paperwork, with manufacturers

dependent upon dealers and end users to provide the requisite

information to determine primary use. At the same time, EMI noted that

EPA did not specify any particular paperwork requirements. In addition,

EMI did not indicate that any information need be submitted to EPA.

Instead, EMI apparently supposes that under the PRA a greater

administrative burden would be created by implementing a primary use

information collection system as opposed to a ``designed for'' test and

information collection system, and thus claims the latter should be

implemented.

EPA finds these comments are not relevant to the question of

whether the Paperwork Reduction Act applies to the proposed and final

rule. Although EPA finds the comments helpful in understanding the

distinction between the ``primary use'' versus ``designed for'' issue,

the comments fail to set forth any basis for asserting that the final

rule, which adopts the proposed primary use test, contains any

additional information collection requirements. Indeed, the comments

presuppose the applicability of the PRA and focus on options to make

information collection less burdensome without recognizing the

significance of the fact that EPA has not required any information

collection from manufacturers, dealers, or any private entity. EPA did

not propose and has not included in the final rule any paperwork

requirements and thus imposes no burden upon manufacturers, dealers or

end users of nonroad equipment to submit to EPA any information

regarding the use of nonroad equipment. EPA recognizes that in order

for California to receive authorization from EPA for non-preempted

nonroad equipment, California must present sufficient information that

nonroad equipment is not used more than 51 percent as farm or

construction equipment. California may thus require submission of

relevant information to determine primary use, but EPA has not.

EPA has determined that the Paperwork Reduction Act does not apply

towards this rulemaking. EPA has not set forth any specific

requirements for these entities to collect or submit any data to EPA.

N. Regulatory Flexibility Act

In the NPRM, EPA stated that the proposed regulation would not have

a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. EPA

determined that the proposed rule would affect manufacturers of nonroad

equipment, a group without a substantial number of small entities.

EPA received public comments which suggested that the proposed rule

would in fact affect small entities. One small business equipment

dealer commented that if the proposed rule and CARB's Utility Engine

Rule are enacted, and nonroad farm and construction equipment is

separately regulated by California, then it would be adversely

impacted. This same dealer, along with the Far West Equipment Dealers

Association (FWEDA), stated that a scenario would arise where new and

used nonroad farm and construction equipment purchased outside

California would cost less than that found in California, and would

thus adversely affect dealers of such equipment within California.

FWEDA provided examples of several pieces of farm or construction

equipment, and their projected cost increases in order to meet proposed

CARB emission standards, in an effort to present the price differential

for California dealers of such equipment. In addition, FWEDA states

that the purchasers/users of their farm and construction equipment

within California will be at an unfair cost disadvantage in relation to

users outside of California's boundary.

For purposes of Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis, the issue is

whether the final rule will have a significant impact on a substantial

number of small entities. EPA makes no change in its determination in

the NPRM that the final rule will have no significant impact on a

substantial number of small entities since the rule imposes no burden

on any entities. However, EPA reminds the parties which submitted

comments on the applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act that

California is specifically preempted from regulation of farm and

construction equipment under 175 horsepower. The pieces of equipment

cited by FWEDA as being potentially affected are preempted from

regulation by California. Thus, the apprehension that such equipment

will cost less outside of California is unfounded, as such equipment

will be subject only to the federal regulations.

As a result, EPA has determined, as required under the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, that the final rule does not have a significant impact

on a substantial number of small entities.

List of Subjects for 40 CFR Part 85

Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure,

Air pollution control, Federal preemption, Motor vehicle pollution,

Nonroad engine and vehicle pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements, and State controls.

Dated: July 1, 1994.

Carol Browner,

Administrator.

Therefore, 40 CFR Part 85 is amended as follows:

PART 85--CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION FROM MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTOR

VEHICLE ENGINES

1. The authority citation for part 85 is revised to read as

follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7521, 7522, 7524, 7525, 7541, 7542, 7543,

7547, and 7601(a), unless otherwise noted.

2. Part 85 is amended by adding subpart Q to read as follows:

Subpart Q--Preemption of State Standards and Waiver Procedures for

Nonroad Engines and Nonroad Vehicles

85.1601 Applicability.

85.1602 Definitions.

85.1603 Application of definitions; scope of preemption.

85.1604 Procedures for California nonroad authorization requests.

85.1605 Criteria for granting authorization.

85.1606 Adoption of California standards by other states.

Subpart Q--Preemption of State Standards and Waiver Procedures for

Nonroad Engines and Nonroad Vehicles

Sec. 85.1601 Applicability.

The requirements of this subpart are applicable to nonroad engines

and nonroad vehicles.

Sec. 85.1602 Definitions.

As used in this subpart, all terms not defined shall have the

meaning given them in the Clean Air Act, as amended.

Commercial means an activity engaged in as a vocation.

Construction equipment or vehicle means any internal combustion

engine-powered machine primarily used in construction and located on

commercial construction sites.

Engine used in a locomotive means either an engine placed in the

locomotive to move other equipment, freight, or passenger traffic, or

an engine mounted on the locomotive to provide auxiliary power.

Farm equipment or vehicle means any internal combustion engine-

powered machine primarily used in the commercial production and/or

commercial harvesting of food, fiber, wood, or commercial organic

products or for the processing of such products for further use on the

farm.

Locomotive means a self-propelled piece of on-track equipment

(other than equipment designed for operation both on highways and

rails, specialized maintenance equipment, and other similar equipment)

designed for moving other equipment, freight, or passenger traffic.

New means a domestic or imported nonroad vehicle or nonroad engine

the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred to an

ultimate purchaser. Where the equitable or legal title to an engine or

vehicle is not transferred to an ultimate purchaser until after the

engine or vehicle is placed into service, then the engine or vehicle

will no longer be new after it is placed into service. A nonroad engine

or vehicle is placed into service when it is used for its functional

purposes. The term ultimate purchaser means, with respect to any new

nonroad vehicle or new nonroad engine, the first person who in good

faith purchases such new nonroad vehicle or new nonroad engine for

purposes other than resale. This definition of new shall not apply to

locomotives or engines used in locomotives.

Nonroad engine means:

(1) Except as discussed in paragraph (2) of this definition, a

nonroad engine is any internal combustion engine:

(i) In or on a piece of equipment that is self-propelled or serves

a dual purpose by both propelling itself and performing another

function (such as garden tractors, off-highway mobile cranes and

bulldozers); or

(ii) In or on a piece of equipment that is intended to be propelled

while performing its function (such as lawnmowers and string trimmers);

or

(iii) That, by itself or in or on a piece of equipment, is portable

or transportable, meaning designed to be and capable of being carried

or moved from one location to another. Indicia of transportability

include, but are not limited to, wheels, skids, carrying handles,

dolly, trailer, or platform.

(2) An internal combustion engine is not a nonroad engine if:

(i) The engine is used to propel a motor vehicle or a vehicle used

solely for competition, or is subject to standards promulgated under

section 202 of the Act; or

(ii) The engine is regulated by a federal New Source Performance

Standard promulgated under section 111 of the Act; or

(iii) The engine otherwise included in paragraph (1)(iii) of this

definition remains or will remain at a location for more than 12

consecutive months or a shorter period of time for an engine located at

a seasonal source. A location is any single site at a building,

structure, facility, or installation. Any engine (or engines) that

replaces an engine at a location and that is intended to perform the

same or similar function as the engine replaced will be included in

calculating the consecutive time period. An engine located at a

seasonal source is an engine that remains at a seasonal source during

the full annual operating period of the seasonal source. A seasonal

source is a stationary source that remains in a single location on a

permanent basis (i.e., at least two years) and that operates at that

single location approximately three (or more) each year. This paragraph

does not apply to an engine after the engine is removed from the

location.

Primarily used means used 51 percent or more.

Sec. 85.1603 Application of definitions; scope of preemption.

(a) For equipment that is used in applications in addition to

farming or construction activities, if the equipment is primarily used

as farm and/or construction equipment or vehicles, as defined in this

subpart, it is considered farm or construction equipment or vehicles.

(b) States are preempted from adopting or enforcing standards or

other requirements relating to the control of emissions from new

engines smaller than 175 horsepower, that are primarily used in farm or

construction equipment or vehicles, as defined in this subpart.

(c) States are preempted from adopting or enforcing standards or

other requirements relating to the control of emissions from new

locomotives or new engines used in locomotives.

(d) No state shall enforce any standards or other requirements

relating to the control of emission from new nonroad engines or

vehicles except as provided for in this subpart.

Sec. 85.1604 Procedures for California nonroad authorization requests.

(a) California shall request authorization to enforce its adopted

standards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions

from new nonroad vehicles or engines that are otherwise not preempted

by Sec. 85.1603(b) or 85.1603(c) from the Administrator of EPA and

provide the record on which the state rulemaking was based.

(b) After receipt of the authorization request, the Administrator

shall provide notice and opportunity for a public hearing regarding

such requests.

Sec. 85.1605 Criteria for granting authorization.

(a) The Administrator shall grant the authorization if California

determines that California standards will be, in the aggregate, at

least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal

standards.

(b) The authorization shall not be granted if the Administrator

finds that:

(1) The determination of California is arbitrary and capricious;

(2) California does not need such California standards to meet

compelling and extraordinary conditions; or

(3) California standards and accompanying enforcement procedures

are not consistent with section 209.

Sec. 85.1606 Adoption of California standards by other states.

Any state other than California which has plan provisions approved

under Part D of Title I of the Clean Air Act may adopt and enforce

emission standards, for any period, for new nonroad vehicles or engines

subject to the following requirements:

(a) The state must provide notice to the Administrator that it has

adopted such standards.

(b) Such standards shall not apply to new engines which are used in

construction equipment or vehicles or used in farm equipment or

vehicles and which are smaller than 175 horsepower or to new

locomotives or new engines used in locomotives.

(c) Such standards and implementation and enforcement shall be

identical, for the period concerned, to the California standards

authorized by the Administrator.

(d) The state shall adopt such standards at least two years before

commencement of the period for which the standards take effect.

(e) California shall have adopted such standards two years before

commencement of the period for which the standards take effect in the

state that is adopting under section 209(e)(2)(B).

[FR Doc. 94-17002 Filed 7-19-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.