United States v. Nagel Motors, Inc., et al.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. Nagel Motors, Inc., et al.; Proposed Final

Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and

Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment,

Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been lodged with the

United States District Court for the District of Wyoming in United

States of America v. Nagel Motors, Inc., et al., Civil Action No.

94CV146-J. The Complaint in this case alleges that the three defendant

corporations and co-conspirators agreed to participate in discussions

and information exchanges to facilitate an increase in the rates

charged for automobile body repair services in the Casper, Wyoming area

in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. The proposed

Final Judgment enjoins the defendants from agreeing with any other

automobile body repair shop to fix an hourly rate or part price or

discount. It also enjoins the defendants from participating in any

discussion with or communicating with any other automobile repair shop

concerning adherence to or changes to, or the need or desirability of

adhering to or changing, any hourly rate or part price or discount. The

proposed Final Judgment further enjoins the defendants from

disseminating any information to any automobile body repair shop

concerning any planned or contemplated change in an hourly rate or part

price or discount. Each defendant is required to establish an antitrust

compliance program.

Public comment on the proposed Final Judgment is invited within the

statutory 60-day comment period. Such comments, and responses thereto,

will be published in the Federal Register and filed with the Court.

Comments should be directed to Gary R. Spratling, Chief, San Francisco

Office, Box 36046, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, San

Francisco, California 94102 (telephone: (415) 556-6300).

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

In the United States District Court, District of Wyoming

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. Nagel Motors, Inc.,

Greiner Motor Company, Inc., and Benson Chevrolet, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 94-CV-146-J.

Complaint

The United States of America, plaintiff, by its attorneys, acting

under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States,

brings this civil action to obtain equitable relief against the

defendants named herein, and complains and alleges as follows:

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

1. This Complaint is filed under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. 4, as amended, in order to prevent and restrain the continuing

violations by the defendants of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

1.

2. Each of the defendants maintains an office, transacts business,

and is found within the District of Wyoming, within the meaning of 15

U.S.C. 22 and 28 U.S.C. 1391(c).

II. Defendants

3. Nagel Motors, Inc. (``Nagel'') is made a defendant herein. Nagel

operates a General Motors Corporation dealership with its principal

place of business in Casper, Wyoming. Nagel sells both new and used

automobiles and offers a full range of automobile repair services,

including automobile body repair services. Nagel is engaged in

interstate commerce and in activities substantially affecting

interstate commerce.

4. Greiner Motor Company, Inc., d/b/a Greiner Motor & Marine

(``Greiner''), is made a defendant herein. Greiner operates a Ford

Motor Company dealership with its principal place of business in

Casper, Wyoming. Greiner sells both new and used automobiles and offers

a full range of automobile repair services, including automobile body

repair services. Greiner is engaged in interstate commerce and in

activities substantially affecting interstate commerce.

5. Benson Chevrolet, Inc. (``Benson'') is made a defendant herein.

Benson operates a General Motors Corporation dealership with its

principal place of business in Casper, Wyoming. Benson sells both new

and used automobiles and offers a full range of automobile repair

services, including automobile body repair services. Benson is engaged

in interstate commerce and in activities substantially affecting

interstate commerce.

6. Whenever this Complaint refers to any corporation's act, deed,

or transaction, it means that such corporation engaged in the act,

deed, or transaction by or through its officers, directors, agents,

employees, or other representatives while they actively were engaged in

the management, direction, control, or transaction of its business or

affairs.

III. Co-Conspirators

7. Various firms and individuals, not named as defendants in this

Complaint, have participated as co-conspirators with defendants in the

violations alleged in this Complaint, and have performed acts and made

statements in furtherance thereof.

IV. Trade and Commerce

8. During the period covered by this Complaint, each of the

defendants has engaged in the business of providing automobile repair

services, including automobile body repair services, in Casper,

Wyoming.

9. Between January 1, 1991 and June 30, 1993 the defendants' total

revenue from automobile body repair services was approximately

$3,250,000.

10. During the period covered by this Complaint, the activities of

each of the defendants that are the subject of this Complaint, and the

activities of their co-conspirators, have been within the flow of, and

have substantially affected, interstate trade and commerce.

11. Each of the defendants and their co-conspirators perform

automobile body repair services for out-of-state customers as well as

Wyoming customers.

12. Each of the defendants and their co-conspirators purchase

substantial quantities of parts, paints and materials for use in

automobile body repair from various sources located outside the State

of Wyoming.

13. Each of the defendants and their co-conspirators do business

with insurance carriers with headquarters located outside the State of

Wyoming and receive payments from such insurance carriers which are

issued from offices located outside the State of Wyoming.

V. Violation Alleged

14. During the period beginning at least as early as December 1990

and continuing through at least July 1993, the defendants and their co-

conspirators engaged in a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable

restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. This offense is likely to recur unless

the relief hereinafter sought is granted.

15. This combination and conspiracy consisted of a continuing

agreement, understanding, and concert of action among the defendants

and co-conspirators to participate in discussions and information

exchanges to facilitate an increase in the rates charged for automobile

body repair services in the Casper, Wyoming area.

16. For the purpose of forming and effectuating this combination

and conspiracy, the defendants and their co-conspirators did the

following things, among others:

(a) discussed insurance company requirements that an automobile

body repair rate increase would not be accepted unless a requisite

number of area automobile body repair shops had adopted such a rate

increase;

(b) disseminated information relating to possible changes in

automobile body repair rates; and

(c) discussed plans of various area automobile body repair shops

concerning possible rate increases.

17. This combination and conspiracy had the following effects,

among others:

(a) coordinated interaction among the defendants and co-

conspirators was made more successful and more complete;

(b) price competition among the defendants and their co-

conspirators for providing automobile body repair services in the

Casper, Wyoming area has been unreasonably restrained and eliminated;

and

(c) consumers have been deprived of the benefits of free and open

competition in the purchase of automobile body repair services.

VI. Prayer

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays:

1. That the Court adjudge and decree that the defendants and their

co-conspirators engaged in unlawful agreements, combinations and

conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce

in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

2. That each defendant, its officers, directors, agents, employees,

and successors and all other persons acting or claiming to act on its

behalf be enjoined, restrained ad prohibited for a period of ten years

from:

(a) agreeing with any other automobile body repair shop to fix,

establish, raise, stabilize or maintain any hourly rate or part price

of discount;

(b) participating in any discussion with or communicating with any

other automobile body repair shop concerning adherence to or changes

to, or the need or desirability of adhering to or changing, any hourly

rate or part price or discount; and

(c) disseminating any information to any automobile body repair

shop concerning any planned or contemplated change in an hourly rate or

part price or discount.

3. That each defendant shall establish and maintain an antitrust

compliance program.

4. That for ten years after the entry of the Final Judgment, on or

before its anniversary date, each defendant shall file with plaintiff

an annual Declaration reporting that such defendant has complied with

the terms of the Final Judgment and has engaged in no activities of the

type prohibited by the Final Judgment.

5. That plaintiff have such other relief as the nature of the case

may require and the Court may deem just and proper.

6. That plaintiff recover the costs of this suit.

Dated: June 2, 1994.

Anne K. Bingaman,

Assistant Attorney General.

Robert E. Litan,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

March C. Schechter,

Gary R. Spratling,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

David D. Freudenthal,

United States Attorney, District of Wyoming.

Richard B. Cohen,

Carla G. Addicks,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Box 36046,

450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 556-6300.

In The United States District Court, District of Wyoming

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. Nigel Motors, Inc.,

Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 94-CV-146.

Stipulation

It is stipulated by and between the undersigned parties, by their

respective attorneys, that:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

action and over each of the parties thereto, and venue of this action

is proper in the District of Wyoming;

2. The parties consent that a Final Judgment in the form hereto

attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the motion of any

party or upon the Court's own motion, at any time after compliance with

the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15

U.S.C. 16), and without further notice to any party or other

proceedings, provided that Plaintiff has not withdrawn its consent,

which it may do at any time before the entry of the proposed Final

Judgment by serving notice thereof on Defendants and by filing that

notice with the Court;

3. In the event Plaintiff withdraws its consent or if the proposed

Final Judgment is not entered pursuant to this Stipulation, this

Stipulation shall be of no effect whatever and the making of this

Stipulation shall be without prejudice to any party in this or any

other proceeding.

Dated: June 2, 1994.

For Plaintiff United States of America.

Anne K. Bingaman,

Assistant Attorney General.

Robert E. Litan,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Mark C. Schechter,

Gary R. Spratling,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

David D. Freudenthal,

United States Attorney, District of Wyoming.

Richard B. Cohen,

Carla G. Addicks,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Box 36046,

450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, (415) 556-

6300.

For Defendant Nagel Motors, Inc.: Stoel, Rives, Boley, Jones &

Grey.

By:

J. Ronald Sim,

One Union Square, 36th Floor, 600 University Street, Seattle,

Washington 98101, (206) 386-7592.

For Defendant Greiner Motor Company, Inc.: Brown and Drew.

By:

W. Thomas Sullins II,

123 West 1st Street, Suite 800, Casper, Wyoming 82601, (307) 234-1000.

For Defendant Benson Chevrolet, Inc: By: Keith P. Tyler, Esq.,

P.O. Box 2671, Casper, Wyoming 82602, (307) 266-0129.

In The United States District Court, District of Wyoming

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. Nagel Motors, Inc.,

Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 94-CV-146.

Final Judgment

Plaintiff, United States of America, filed its Complaint on June 2,

1994. Plaintiff and defendants, by their respective attorneys, have

consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or

adjudication of any issue of fact or law. This Final Judgment shall not

be evidence against or an admission by any party with respect to any

issue of fact or law. Therefore, before the taking of any testimony and

without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and

upon consent of the parties, it is hereby

Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed, as follows:

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action

and of each of the parties consenting hereto. The Complaint states a

claim upon which relief may be granted against the defendants under

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

II. Definitions

As used herein, the term:

(A) ``Automobile body repair services'' means work performed by

automobile body repair shops applying new or used parts and labor to

the damaged bodies and frames of automobiles and trucks for the purpose

of repairing them;

(B) `'Automobile body repair shop'' means any person engaged in the

performance and sale of automobile body repair services;

(C) ``Hourly rate'' means the dollar charge per hour in connection

with time spent on automobile body repair services; and

(D) ``Person'' means any individual, partnership, corporation,

association, firm, or any other business or legal entity.

III. Applicability

(A) This Final Judgment applies to the defendants and to each of

their successors, assigns, and to all other persons in active concert

or participation with any of them who shall have received actual notice

of the Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

(B) Nothing herein contained shall suggest that any portion of this

Final Judgment is or has been created for the benefit of any third

party and nothing herein shall be construed to provide any rights to

any third party.

IV. Prohibited Conduct

Each of the defendants is enjoined and restrained from:

(A) Agreeing with any other automobile body repair shop to fix,

establish, raise, stabilize or maintain any hourly rate or part price

or discount;

(B) Participating in any discussion with or communicating with any

other automobile body repair shop concerning adherence to or changes

to, or the need or desirability of adhering to or changing, any hourly

rate or part price or discount; and

(C) Disseminating any information to any automobile body repair

shop concerning any planned or contemplated change in an hourly rate or

part price or discount.

V. Compliance Program

(A) Each defendant is ordered to establish and maintain an

antitrust compliance program which shall include designating, within 30

days of entry of this Final Judgment, an Antitrust Compliance Officer

with responsibility for accomplishing the antitrust compliance program

and achieving compliance with this Final Judgment. The Antitrust

Compliance Officer shall, on a continuing basis, supervise the review

of the current and proposed activities of his or her defendant company

to ensure that the company complies with this Final Judgment. The

Antitrust Compliance Officer shall be responsible for accomplishing the

following requirements:

(1) Distributing, within 60 days of the entry of this Final

Judgment, a copy of this Final Judgment to all officers and to

employees who have any responsibility for approving, disapproving,

monitoring, recommending, or implementing any hourly rate or part price

or discount;

(2) Distributing in a timely manner a copy of this Final Judgment

to any officer or employee who succeeds to a position described in

Section V(A)(1);

(3) Briefing annually those persons designated in Section V(A)(1)

on the meaning and requirements of this Final Judgment and the

antitrust laws and advising them that the defendant's legal advisors

are available to confer with them regarding compliance with the Final

Judgment and the antitrust laws;

(4) Obtaining from each officer or employee designated in section

V(A)(1) an annual written certification that he or she: (a) Has read,

understands, and agrees to abide by the terms of this Final Judgment;

(b) has been advised and understands that his or her failure to comply

with this Final Judgment may result in conviction for criminal contempt

of court; and (c) is not aware of any violation of the Final Judgment

that has not been reported to the Antitrust Compliance Officer;

(5) Maintaining a record of persons to whom the Final Judgment has

been distributed and from whom the certification in section V(A)(4) has

been obtained; and

(6) Reporting to the Department of Justice any violation of the

Final Judgment.

(B) Each defendant is ordered to distribute, within 60 days of

entry of this Final Judgment, a copy of this Final Judgment to an owner

or manager of each automobile body repair shop located within 50 miles

of Casper, Wyoming, which is presently in business and which has

purchased parts or automobile body repair services from the defendant

in the last five years.

VI. Certification

(A) Within 75 days of the entry of this Final Judgment, each

defendant shall certify to the plaintiff whether it has designated an

Antitrust Compliance Officer and has distributed the Final Judgment in

accordance with section V (A)(1) and (B) above.

(B) For ten years after the entry of this Final Judgment, on or

before its anniversary date, each defendant shall file with the

plaintiff an annual Declaration as to the fact and manner of its

compliance with the provisions of sections IV and V(A).

VII. Plaintiff Access

(A) To determine or secure compliance with this Final Judgment and

for no other purpose, duly authorized representatives of the plaintiff

shall, upon written request of the Assistant Attorney General in charge

of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to any defendant

made to its principal office, be permitted, subject to any legally

recognized privilege:

(1) Access during such defendant's office hours to inspect and copy

all documents in the possession or under the control of such defendant,

who may have counsel present, relating to any matters contained in this

Final Judgment; and

(2) Subject to the reasonable convenience of such defendant and

without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers,

employees or agents of such defendant, who may have such defendant's

counsel and/or their own counsel present, regarding such matters.

(B) Upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney General in

charge of the Antitrust Division made to any defendant's principal

office, such defendant shall submit such written reports, under oath if

requested, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment as

may be reasonably requested, subject to any legally recognized

privilege.

(C) No information or documents obtained by the means provided in

section VII shall be divulged by the plaintiff to any person other than

a duly authorized representative of the Executive Branch of the United

States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United

States is a party, or for the purpose of securing compliance with this

Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

(D) If at the time information or documents are furnished by any

defendant to plaintiff, such defendant represents and identifies in

writing the material in any such information or documents to which a

claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and such defendant marks each pertinent page

of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then 10 days notice shall be

given by plaintiff to such defendant prior to divulging such material

in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding) to which

that defendant is not a party.

(E) Nothing set forth in this Final Judgment shall prevent the

Antitrust Division from utilizing other investigative alternatives,

such as the Civil Investigative Demand process provided by 15 U.S.C.

1311-1314 or a Federal grand jury, to determine if the defendant has

complied with this Final Judgment.

VIII. Further Elements of the Final Judgment

(A) This Final Judgment shall expire ten years from the date of its

entry.

(B) Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of

enabling any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this

Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary

or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment, to modify

or terminate any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to

punish violations of its provisions.

(C) Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

In The United States District Court, District of Wyoming

United States of America, Plaintiff, vs. Nagel Motors, Inc.,

Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 94-CV-146.

Competitive Impact Statement

Pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties

Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), the United States submits this Competitive

Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for

entry with the consent of Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company,

Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

On June 2, 1994, the United States filed a civil antitrust

complaint alleging that Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company,

Inc., Benson Chevrolet, Inc. and their co-conspirators conspired to

unreasonably restrain competition among Casper, Wyoming automobile body

repair shops in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1.

The Complaint asks the Court to find that Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner

Motor Company, Inc., and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. have violated Section 1

of the Sherman Act and further requests the Court to enjoin the

continuance of the conspiracy.

Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will terminate the action,

except that the Court will retain jurisdiction over the matter for

further proceedings which may be required to interpret, enforce or

modify the Judgment or to punish violations of any of its provisions.

II. Practices Giving Rise to the Alleged Violations

Defendants, Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and

Benson Chevrolet, Inc. are automobile dealerships operating in Casper,

Wyoming. They each offer a full range of automobile repair services,

including automobile body repair work.

The Government contends, and was prepared to show at trial, that

during the period beginning as early as December 1990 and continuing

through at least July 1993, the defendants and their co-conspirators

agreed, combined and conspired to unreasonably restrain competition

among Casper, Wyoming area automobile body repair shops in violation of

Section 1 of the Sherman Act. These agreements, combinations and

conspiracies consisted of discussions and information exchanges aimed

at increasing the rates charged for automobile body repair services in

the Casper area.

For the purpose of forming and effectuating these agreements,

combinations and conspiracies, Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor

Company, Inc., Benson Chevrolet, Inc., and their co-conspirators,

communicated with each other concerning the need to increase automobile

body repair rates and, in conjunction with these discussions,

disseminated to each other information concerning contemplated changes

in automobile body repair rates. As a result of their discussions and

exchange of contemplated changes in repair rates, coordinated rate

increases were put into effect.

These agreements, combinations and conspiracies suppressed price

competition among the defendants and their co-conspirators for

providing automobile body repair services in the Casper area and

deprived consumers of the benefits of free and open competition in the

purchase of automobile body repair services.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

The United States and Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company,

Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. have stipulated that the Court may

enter the proposed Final Judgment after compliance with the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h). The proposed Final

Judgment provides that its entry does not constitute any evidence

against or admission of any party with respect to any issue of fact or

law.

Under the provisions of Section 2(e) of the Antitrust Procedures

and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(e), the proposed Final Judgment may not

be entered unless the Court finds that entry is in the public interest.

Section VIII of the proposed Final Judgment sets forth such a finding.

The proposed Final Judgment is intended to ensure that Nagel

Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc.

discontinue all practices which unreasonably restrain competition among

automobile body repair shops.

A. Prohibitions and Obligations

Under Section IV of the proposed Final Judgment, Nagel Motors,

Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. are

enjoined and restrained from: (1) Agreeing with any other automobile

body repair shop to fix, establish, raise, stabilize or maintain any

hourly rate or part price or discount; (2) participating in any

discussion with or communicating with any other automobile body repair

shop concerning adherence to or changes to, or the need or desirability

of adhering to or changing, any hourly rate or part price or discount;

and (3) disseminating any information to any automobile body repair

shop concerning any planned or contemplated change in an hourly rate or

part price or discount.

Section V of the proposed Final Judgment obligates Nagel Motors,

Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. to

implement and maintain an antitrust compliance program. This program

would require each defendant to designate an Antitrust Compliance

Officer within 30 days of entry of the Final Judgment. The Antitrust

Compliance Officer for each defendant would be responsible for

implementing and supervising the antitrust compliance program and

compliance with the Final Judgment. Section V also obligates Nagel

Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. to

distribute within 60 days from entry of the Final Judgment, a copy of

the Final Judgment to all officers and employees responsible for

approving, disapproving, monitoring, recommending, or implementing any

hourly rate or part price or discount, as well as any officer or

employee who succeeds to such a position, and briefing those persons

annually on the meaning and requirements of the Final Judgment and the

antitrust laws and advising them that the defendant's legal advisors

are available to confer with them regarding compliance with the Final

Judgment and the antitrust laws. Further the Antitrust Compliance

Officer must obtain from each such officer or employee, annual written

certifications stating that he or she: (1) Has read, understands, and

agrees to abide by the terms of the Final Judgment; (2) has been

advised and understands that his or her failure to comply with the

Final Judgment may result in conviction for criminal contempt of court;

and (3) is not aware of any violation of the Final Judgment that has

not been reported to the Antitrust Compliance Officer. The Antitrust

Compliance Officer must maintain a record of recipients to whom the

Final Judgment has been distributed and from whom certifications have

been obtained. He or she must also report to the Department of Justice

any violation of the Final Judgment. Finally, the Antitrust Compliance

Officer must also distribute copies of the Final Judgment to the owner

or manager of each automobile body repair shop, located within 50 miles

of Casper, Wyoming, which is presently in business and has purchased

parts or body repair services from the defendant in the last five

years.

In addition to the prohibitions and obligations contained in

Section IV and V, Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc. and

Benson Chevrolet, Inc. are further obligated, under Section VI, to

certify, within 75 days after the entry of the Final Judgment, that

they have designated an Antitrust Compliance Officer and have

distributed the Final Judgment in accordance with the Section V

requirement. Section VI also requires Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor

Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc., for a period of ten years

after the entry of the Final Judgment, on or before its anniversary

date, to file with the Government, a statement as to the fact and

manner of compliance with the provisions of Section V of the Final

Judgment.

B. Scope of the Proposed Final Judgment

Section VIII of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Final

Judgment shall remain in effect for ten years.

Section III of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Final

Judgment shall apply to Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor Company, Inc.

and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. and to each of their successors, assigns,

and to all other persons in active concert or participation with any of

them who shall have received actual notice of the Final Judgment by

personal service or otherwise.

C. Effect of the Proposed Final Judgment on Competition

The relief set out in the proposed Final Judgment is designed to

prevent recurrence of the activities alleged in the Complaint. The

proposed Final Judgment's provisions are designed to remove the

artificial restraints that the defendants have imposed on competition

among automobile body repair shops and create an environment in which

more vigorous competition may take place. It is intended to ensure that

marketing and pricing decisions of Nagel Motors, Inc., Greiner Motor

Company, Inc. and Benson Chevrolet, Inc. are made independently,

without any discussions and conversations with each other. The

Department of Justice believes that the proposed Final Judgment

contains sufficient provisions to prevent further violations of the

type alleged in the Complaint.

IV. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

The alternative to the proposed Final Judgment would be a full

trial of the case. In the view of the Department of Justice, such a

trial would involve substantial cost to the United States and is not

warranted because the proposed Final Judgment provides relief that will

remedy the violations of the Sherman Act alleged in the United States'

Complaint.

V. Remedies Available to Private Litigants

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any

person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the

antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times

the damages suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.

16(a), the Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any subsequent

lawsuits that may be brought against any defendant in this matter.

VI. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Judgment

As provided by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, any

person believing that the proposed judgment should be modified may

submit written comments to Gary R. Spratling, Chief, San Francisco

Office, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Golden Gate

Avenue, San Francisco, California 94102, within the 60-day period

provided by the Act. These comments, and the Government's responses to

them, will be filed with the Court and published in the Federal

Register. All comments will be given due consideration by the

Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to

the proposed judgment at any time prior to its entry if it should

determine that some modification of the judgment is necessary to the

public interest. The proposed judgment itself provides that the Court

will retain jurisdiction over this action, and that the parties may

apply to the court for such orders as may be necessary or appropriate

for the modification or enforcement of the judgment.

VII. Determinative Documents

No materials and documents of the type described in Section 2(b) of

the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b), were

considered in formulating the proposed judgment. Consequently, none are

filed herewith.

Gary R. Spratling,

Richard B. Cohen,

Carla G. Addicks,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

[FR Doc. 94-15911 Filed 7-1-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M