Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station); Exemption

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-029]

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station);

Exemption

I

The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC or the licensee), is the

holder of Facility Operating License (Possession Only) No. DPR-3 which

authorizes possession and maintenance of the Yankee Nuclear Power

Station (YNPS or plant). The license provides, among other things, that

the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility is a permanently shutdown pressurized water reactor,

currently in the process of being prepared for decommissioning, and is

located at the licensee site in Franklin County, Massachusetts.

II

The licensee, by letter dated February 27,1992, supplemented by

letter dated January 19,1 993, informed the NRC and YAEC had

permanently ceased power operations, removed the fuel from the reactor

to the fuel pool, and had begun to develop detailed plans to

decommission the facility. The reactor was actually shut down on

October 1, 1991; thus, the fuel has now undergone over two years and

seven months of decay. The NRC in a license amendment dated August 5,

1992, modified License No. DPR-3 to possession only status. The license

is conditioned so that YAEC is not authorized to operate the reactor

and fuel may not be placed in the reactor vessel, thus formalizing the

YAEC commitment to permanently cease power operations.

By letter dated September 28, 1992, the licensee requested an

amendment to the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Indemnity

Agreement No. B-17 which would reduce the primary level of financial

protection maintained at the plant to $4.5 million from the current

level of $200 million and provide relief from participation in the

industry retrospective rating plan (secondary level). This letter was

supplemented by the licensee letter to the Commission dated January 19,

1993.

III

The justification presented by the licensee for amendment of its

indemnity agreement is that because of the permanently shutdown status

of the plant, defueled condition of the reactor, and possession only

license amendment (which prohibits operation), 10 CFR 140.11 no longer

applies to YAEC. Given these considerations, the licensee contends that

10 CFR 140.12, which describes financial protection for reactors not

covered by 10 CFR 140.11, applies to YAEC. The licensee also addressed

past NRC actions with respect to relief granted to the consolidated

Edison facility, Indian Point Unit 1. Consequently, the licensee has

requested that its indemnity agreement be amended such that the

licensee would no longer be required to participate in the secondary

protection program, and that its primary financial protection be

reduced to the minimum required under 10 CFR 140.12, which is $4.5

million.

The staff has determined on its own initiative that an exemption

from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11 is required in order to

implement an amendment to the licensee indemnity agreement. The bases

for providing this exemption to 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) are provided

herein.

The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical

issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to

permanently shut down reactors in SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection

Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During

Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993. In this evaluation, the staff

concluded that the Commission has discretionary authority to respond to

licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary financial

protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry

retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific

configuration and the time since permanent shutdown, the staff also

concluded that potential hazards may exist at permanently shutdown

reactors for which financial protection is warranted. The staff

concluded that accidents and hazards insured against under the Price-

Anderson Act go beyond design basis accidents and beyond those

considered ``credible'' as that term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and

cases interpreting the application of that regulation. The Commission

issued a SRM in response to SECY-93-127 on July 13, 1993. In this SRM,

the Commission approved a staff recommendation to permit a reduction of

primary level coverage to $100 million through the exemption process

after an appropriate spent fuel cooling period and after allowing

withdrawal from participation in the secondary level of financial

protection.

In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission may,

as long as a potential hazard exists at a permanently shutdown reactor,

require the full amount of primary financial protection and full

participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such time

that the hazard is determined to no longer exist or to be significantly

reduced, the Commission may reduce the amount of primary financial

protection and permit the licensee to withdraw from participation in

the industry retrospective rating plan.

Since the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act does not

explicitly consider the potential hazards that might exist after

termination of operation, the staff generically evaluated the offsite

consequences associated with normal and abnormal operations, design

basis accidents, and beyond design basis accidents for reactors that

have been permanently defueled and shut down. The staff concluded that

where an appropriate cooling time has elapsed since plant shutdown,

aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and

radioactive materials, no reasonably conceivable potential accident

exists that could cause significant offsite damage.

As summarized in SECY-93-127, a severe transportation accident

could potentially result in local contamination requiring cleanup and

offsite liabilities resulting from traffic disruption and consequential

damages. This type of accident would warrant maintaining some level of

liability insurance. The liabilities an indemnification requirements

associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the

Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis at a

future time when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.

As further set forth in SECY-93-127, the most significant accident

sequence for a permanently defueled and shutdown reactor involves the

complete loss of water from a light water reactor spent fuel pool. This

beyond-design-basis accident sequence could result in a zirconium fuel

cladding fire that could propagate through the spent fuel storage pool

and result in significant offsite consequences. The potential

consequences of such an accident could involve billions of dollars.

Although such an accident is beyond the design bases, it may be

considered ``reasonably conceivable'' and could warrant requiring

substantial financial protection. Such an accident is possible during

the first year after reactor shutdown for a low density spent fuel

storage configuration and during the first two or three years after

shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high density configurations.

Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in

conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically

extend the time within which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could

occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water,

air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products

would likely be inhibited by such blockage. The staff believes that

this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.

Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has

elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence after a postulated

loss of spent fuel pool water is no longer a concern since the fuel

would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium fuel cladding

combustion. Possible accident scenarios, after these cooling period

have elapsed, have greatly reduced consequences but could still result

in small releases or precautionary evacuations which could result in

offsite liability.

With respect to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station plant-specific

evaluation, the NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and

technical justifications for this exemption. In particular, the NRC

evaluated the current Yankee status, that is, the plant is permanently

shut down and defueled, the license has been amended to authorize

``possession only,'' the possession only license amendment prohibits

fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the reactor building, and

the fuel is stored in a low density configuration. The staff concludes,

after evaluation of the remaining spectrum of accidents and considering

that the stored fuel has decayed for over two years and seven months

and is stored in a low density configuration, that any such accident

would result in greatly reduced offsite consequences. Thus, the staff

further concludes that the YNPS meets the criterion established in

SECY-93-127 for relief from the full financial protection requirements.

Although the licensee presented legal views and opinions regarding

the applicability of 10 CFR 140.12 versus 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), the

staff did not concur with those legal views and opinions and concludes

that the licensee has not demonstrated the applicability of 10 CFR

140.12 to the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that the Three Mile

Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) claims settlement experience (an accident which

did not result in a significant release of radioactivity) provides a

reasonable basis for establishing the appropriate level of primary

insurance coverage. Because TMI-2 claims have reached $60 million and a

large number of TMI-2 claims are still unsettled, the staff concluded

that a level of $100 million for primary financial protection coverage

is warranted. This level of primary insurance coverage is consistent

with the SRM dated July 13, 1993, based on SECY-93-127, for relief from

financial protection requirements.

IV

The staff, based on its independent evaluation, consistent with the

Commission July 13, 1993 SRM based on SECY-93-127, ``Financial

Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During

Decommissioning,'' has concluded that sufficient bases exist for

approval of a partial exemption from the financial protection

requirements for the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that granting

the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or

consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at the

facility.

V

Based on the discussion presented in Sections III and IV above, the

Commission has determined, that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, this

exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission grants an exemption from the requirements of

10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent that primary financial protection in

the amount of $100 million shall be maintained, and an exemption from

participation in the industry retrospective rating plan (secondary

level financial protection) is granted for the YNPS.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment (59 FR 31651).

This exemption is effective immediately.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June 1994.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brian K. Grimes,

Director, Division of Operating Reactor Support, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 94-15482 Filed 6-24-94; 8:45 am]

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