Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement United States v. MCI Communications Corporation and BT Forty-Eight Company ``(NewCo'')

Federal RegisterJun 27, 1994

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement United

States v. MCI Communications Corporation and BT Forty-Eight Company

``(NewCo'')

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and

Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h) that a proposed Final Judgment,

Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United

States v. MCI Communications Corporation and BT Forty-Eight Company

(``NewCo''), Civil Action No. 94 1317(TFH). The proposed Final Judgment

is subject to approval by the Court after the expiration of the

statutory 60-day public comment period and compliance with the

Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h).

The Complaint alleges that the proposed sale of 20% of the voting

shares of MCI Communications Corporation (``MCI'') to British

Telecommunications plc (``BT''), and the proposed formation of a joint

venture, presently known as BT Forty-Eight Company (``NewCo''), between

MCI and BT to provide certain international telecommunications

services, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15

U.S.C. 18, in the markets for international telecommunications services

between the United States and the United Kingdom and for global

seamless telecommunications services.

The proposed Final Judgment includes three categories of

substantive obligations and restrictions. First, it requires the

defendants, MCI and NewCo, to disclose certain information about the

telecommunications services that MCI and NewCo receive from BT or

provide together with BT. This ongoing disclosure is a precondition for

MCI and NewCo to provide international telecommunications services,

including enhanced telecommunications and global seamless

telecommunications services.

Second, the proposed Final Judgment prohibits MCI and NewCo from

receiving from BT certain non-public and confidential information

provided to BT by other United States telecommunications service

providers in connection with the arrangements between such United

States providers and BT to provide telecommunications services,

including both international correspondent relationships and

interconnection with BT in the United Kingdom.

Finally, the proposed Final Judgment prohibits MCI and NewCo from

providing telecommunications services or facilities to BT to enable it

to engage in the practice known as ``international simple resale'' from

the United Kingdom to the United States, which would involve bypassing

existing correspondent relationships to send BT's traffic to the United

States, until two conditions are met. First, all qualified United

States telecommunications services providers that had applied for

licenses in the United Kingdom to engage in international simple resale

on or before December 1, 1993 must have been granted such licenses.

Second, all such licensed providers must be afforded the opportunity to

interconnect with BT on standard, published and nondiscriminatory

terms.

Public comment is invited within the statutory 60-day comment

period. Such comments, and the responses thereto, will be published in

the Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be

directed to Richard L. Rosen, Chief, Communications & Finance Section,

Antitrust Division, Room 8104, 555 Fourth Street, NW., Washington, DC

20001 (202-514-5621).

Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive

Impact Statement are available for inspection in Room 3233 of the

Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Tenth Street and

Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20530 (202-514-2481) and at

the office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, Third Street and Constitution Avenue, NW.,

Washington, DC 20001.

Copies of any of these materials may be obtained upon request and

payment of a copying fee.

Constance K. Robinson

Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. MCI Communications

Corporation and BT Forty-Eight Company (``NewCo''), Defendants.

Civil Action No.-------------------------------------------------------

Filed:-----------------------------------------------------------------

Stipulation

It is stipulated and agreed by and between the undersigned parties,

by their respective attorneys, that:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this

action and over each of the parties hereto and venue of this action is

proper in the District of Columbia. Defendants are hereby estopped from

contesting the entry or enforceability of the Final Judgment on the

ground that the Court lacks venue or jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the action or over any defendant. For purposes of this

stipulation defendant BT Forty-Eight Company, known as ``NewCo,'' and

any reference to NewCo herein, shall be understood to have the same

meaning as the term ``NewCo'' in the attached proposed Final Judgment.

2. The parties consent that a Final Judgment in the form hereto

attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the motion of any

party or upon the Court's own motion, at any time after compliance with

the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15

U.S.C. 16), and without further notice to any party or other

proceedings, provided that plaintiff has not withdrawn its consent.

Plaintiff may withdraw its consent to entry of the Final Judgment at

any time before it is entered, by serving notice on the defendants and

by filing that notice with the Court.

3. Pending entry of the Final Judgment, defendants shall abide by

and comply with the provisions of the Final Judgment following

consummation of the Amended and Restated Investment Agreement dated

January 31, 1994 (and related agreements) or any similar arrangement

between any defendant and British Telecommunications plc (``BT''). This

obligation shall not be affected by the timing of execution of any

agreements between defendants and BT requiring BT to provide to MCI and

NewCo information needed for compliance with the requirements of

Sections II.A.1-6. Such agreements, which shall be executed prior to

the entry of the Final Judgment, shall be consistent with Sections

II.B-D of the Final Judgment and shall be provided to the Department of

Justice upon execution.

4. The agreements governing disclosure to United States

corporations, referred to in Section IV.E of the Final Judgment, will

provide that: (1) Non-public information received from the Department

of Justice is intended for use to complain or provide information to

any government authorities in the United States or the United Kingdom,

and to identify and evaluate internally any conduct that may be made

the subject of such a complaint or provision of information, but may

not be used for the sale or marketing of the corporation's services;

(2) such information may not be disclosed to persons other than

officers, directors, employees, agents, or contractors of the

corporation and to government authorities in the United States or the

United Kingdom (including, but not limited to, the Federal

Communications Commission and OFTEL); (3) all persons to whom the

information is disclosed will be advised of the limitations on use and

disclosure of the information; and (4) if unauthorized use or

disclosure occurs, the Department of Justice can revoke or otherwise

limit the corporation's further access to such information, unless the

Department decides, in its sole discretion, that revocation of access

is inappropriate. Plaintiff, in its discretion, may add further

conditions to such agreements. Any actions taken by the Department to

redress unauthorized use or disclosure will not diminish or create any

ability in NewCo or MCI to pursue separately against persons receiving

such information from the Department any legal remedies for

unauthorized use or disclosure.

5. Plaintiff and defendants are presently aware that the entities

listed in Attachment A to this Stipulation are, or based upon the best

available information appear to be, qualified United States

international telecommunications providers as defined in Section II.E

of the Final Judgment. Any other persons (including corporations or

other legal entities) that make known to the Department of Justice

before the entry of the Final Judgment that they meet the standards for

qualification under Section II.E of the Final Judgment shall be added

to Attachment A of this Stipulation if the Department concludes that

such persons are qualified United States international

telecommunications providers within the meaning of Section II.E. The

Department shall publish the names of such persons in its response to

public comments under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act.

6. Six months prior to the expiration of the Final Judgment,

defendants shall inform the Department of Justice in writing whether

they will continue or discontinue the operation of NewCo beyond the

term of the Final Judgment.

7. In the event plaintiff withdraws its consent to entry of the

proposed Final Judgment or if the proposed Final Judgment is not

entered pursuant to this Stipulation, this Stipulation shall be of no

effect whatsoever and its making shall be without prejudice to any

party in this or any other proceeding, except that if the Court decides

not to enter the Final Judgment, and the defendants and British

Telecommunications plc have consummated pursuant to paragraph 3 of this

Stipulation, defendants shall abide by and comply with the terms of the

Final Judgment until the conclusion of this action, unless the parties

otherwise agree or the Court otherwise orders.

8. The Stipulation and the Final Judgment to which it relates are

for settlement purposes only and do not constitute an admission by

defendants in this or any other proceedings that Section 7 of the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18, as amended, or any other provision of

law, has been violated.

Dated: June 10, 1994.

For Plaintiff United States of America:

Anne K. Bingaman,

Assistant Attorney General.

Steven C. Sunshine,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Diane P. Wood,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Constance K. Robinson,

Director of Operations.

U.S. Department of Justice,

Antitrust Division.

Richard L. Rosen,

Chief, Communications and Finance Section.

Jonathan M. Rich,

Assistant Chief, Communications and Finance Section.

Carl Willner,

D.C. Bar #412841.

Sara J. DeSanto,

John J. Sciortino,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 555 4th

Street, NW., Washington, DC 20001, (202) 514-5813.

For Defendant MCI Communications Corporation: Jenner & Block.

By:

Michael H. Salbursy,

D.C. Bar #365888, 601 13th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005,(202) 639-

6000.

Anthony C. Epstein,

D.C. Bar #250829, 601 13th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005, (202)

639-6000.

For Defendant at Forty-Eight Company (NEWCO''): Hogan & Hartson

By:

Janet L. McDavid,

D.C. Bar #204073, 555 l3th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20004, (202)

637-8780 (direct), (202) 637-5600 (main).

David J. Saylor,

D.C. Bar #96826, 555 l3th Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20004, (202)

637-8679 (direct), (202) 637-5600 (main).

Stipulation Approved for Filing

Done this ______ day of ____________, 1994.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

United States District Judge

Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 108(k)

Pursuant to Rule 108(k) of the Local Rules of this Court, the

following is a list of individuals entitled to be notified of the entry

of the foregoing Stipulation and of the entry of the proposed Final

Judgment.

Michael H. Salbury, Escquire, Jenner & Block, 601 13th Street,

NW.Washington, DC 20005; Counsel for Defendant MCI.

Janet L. McDavid, Esquire, Hogan & Hartson, 555 l3th Street, NW.,

Washignton, DC 20004

Jack Greenberg, Esquire, Syncordia Legal Department, Two Paces West,

Suite 1500, 2727 Paces Ferry Road, NW., Atlanta, Georgia 30339; Counsel

for Defendant BT Forty-Eight Company (``NewCo'')

Carl Willner, Esquire, Attorney, Communications & Finance Section,

Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 555 4th Street, NW.

Washington, DC 20001; Counsel for Plaintiff the United States.

Attachment A

List of entities entities pursuant to paragraph 5 of this

Stipulation.

ACC Global Corp., including ACC Long Distance UK Ltd.

Ameritel Communications Inc., including Amera Tela Communications (UK)

Ltd.

AT&T Corporation, including AT&T (UK) Ltd.

City of London Telecommications Ltd. (COLT)

IDB Communications Group, Inc. including WorldCom International, Inc.

MFS Communications Co. Inc., including MFS Communications Ltd.

Sprint Corporation, including Sprint Holdings (UK) Ltd.

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MCI COMMUNICATIONS

CORPORATION and BT FORTY-EIGHT COMPANY (``NewCo''), Defendants.

Civil Action No.-------------------------------------------------------

Filed:-----------------------------------------------------------------

Final Judgment

Whereas, plaintiff United States of America, filed its Complaint on

June 15, 1994,

And whereas, plaintiff and defendants, by their respective

attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without

trial or adjudication on any issue of fact or law,

And whereas, defendants have further consented after any

consummation as defined in the Stipulation entered into by defendants

and the United States on June 10, 1994, to be bound by the provisions

of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court,

And whereas, plaintiff the United States believes that entry of

this Final Judgment is necessary to protect competition in United

States telecommunications and enhanced telecommunications markets,

Therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed:

I

Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action

and of each of the parties consenting to this Final Judgment. The

Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against the

defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, as

amended.

II

Substantive Restrictions and Obligations

A. MCI and NewCo shall not offer, supply, distribute, or otherwise

provide in the United States any telecommunications or enhanced

telecommunications service that makes use of telecommunications

services provided by BT in the United Kingdom or between the United

States and United Kingdom, unless the following information is

disclosed in the United States by MCI or Newco or such disclosure is

expressly waived, in whole or in part, by plaintiff through written

notice to defendants and the Court.

1. By NewCo, within 30 days following any agreement or change to an

agreement--The prices, terms, and conditions, including any applicable

discounts, on which telecommunications services are provided by BT to

NewCo in the United Kingdom pursuant to interconnection agreements;

2. By NewCo, within 30 days following any agreement or change to an

agreement, or the provision of service absent any specific agreement--

The prices, terms, and conditions, including any applicable discounts,

on which telecommunications services, other than those provided

pursuant to interconnection agreements made under Condition 13 of BT's

license, are provided by BT to NewCo in the United Kingdom for use by

NewCo in the supply of telecommunications or enhanced

telecommunications services between the United States and United

Kingdom, or are provided by BT in the United Kingdom in conjunction

with such NewCo services where BT is acting as the distributor for

NewCo;

3. By MCI, with respect to international switched

telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications services jointly

provided by BT and MCI on a correspondent basis between the United

States and United Kingdom, and to the extent not already disclosed

publicly pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Federal

Communications Commission, or otherwise to the corporations referred to

in Section IV.E.

(i) within 30 days following any agreement or change to an

agreement, or the provision of service absent any specific agreement,

the accounting and settlement rates and other terms and conditions for

the provisions of each such service; and

(ii) on an annual basis, for any such services for which more than

one accounting and settlement rate may be applicable (e.g., rates for

peak and off-peak service), or services with different accounting and

settlement rates which are pooled or otherwise combined for calculating

proportionate returns, if other United States international

telecommunications providers do not have or receive data sufficient to

determine whether they are receiving their appropriate share of return

traffic in each accounting rate category (e.g., the total volumes of

United States traffic to BT, and total volumes of BT traffic to the

United States, for each type of traffic with a different accounting

rate), MCI's minutes of traffic to and from BT in each accounting rate

category;

4. By NewCo, on a semiannual basis--Schedules of telecommunications

services provided by BT to NewCo in the United Kingdom for use by NewCo

in the supply of telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications

services between the United States and the United Kingdom, or provided

by BT in the United Kingdom in conjunction with such NewCo services

where BT is acting as the distributor for NewCo, showing:

(i) the types of circuits (including capacity) and

telecommunications services provided;

(ii) the actual average time intervals between order and delivery

of circuits (separately indicating average intervals for analog

circuits, digital circuits up to 2 megabits, and digital circuits 2

megabits and larger) and telecommunications services; and

(iii) the number of outages and actual average time intervals

between fault report and restoration of service for circuits

(separately indicating average intervals for analog and for digital

circuits) and telecommunications services;

but excluding the identifies of individual customers of BT, MCI, or

NewCo or the location of circuits or telecommunications services

dedicated to the use of such customers;

5. By MCI--Schedules showing:

(i) on a semiannual basis, separately for analog international

private line circuits (IPLCs) and for digital IPLCs jointly provided by

BT and MCI between the United States and the United Kingdom, the actual

average time intervals between order and delivery by BT;

(ii) on an annual basis, separately for analog IPLCs and for

digital IPLCs jointly provided by BT and MCI between the United States

and the United Kingdom, the number of outages and actual average time

intervals between fault report and restoration of service, for any

outages that occurred in the international facility, in the cablehead

or earth station outside the United States, or the network of a

telecommunications provider outside the United States, indicating

separately the number of outages and actual average time intervals to

restoration of service in each such area; and

(iii) on a semiannual basis, for circuits used to provide

international switched telecommunications services or enhanced

telecommunications services on a correspondent basis between the United

States and the United Kingdom, the average number of circuit

equivalents available to MCI during the busy hour;

6. By NewCo, within 30 days of receipt of any information described

herein--Information provided by BT to MCI or NewCo about planned and

authorized improvements or changes to BT's United Kingdom public

telecommunications system operated pursuant to its license that would

affect interconnection arrangements between BT and either NewCo or

other licensed operators, provided that if MCI receives any such

information from BT separately from NewCo, MCI shall similarly be

required to disclose such information in the same manner as NewCo.

The obligations of this Section II.A shall not extend to the

disclosure of intellectual property or other proprietary information of

the defendants or BT that has maintained as confidential by its owner,

except to the extent that it is of a type expressly required to be

disclosed herein, or is necessary for licensed operators to

interconnect with BT's United Kingdom public telecommunications system

operated pursuant to its license or for United States international

telecommunications providers to use BT's international

telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications correspondent

services.

B. MCI and NewCo, and any person who may be designated by MCI to

sit on the Board of Directors of BT, shall not receive from BT, or from

any persons designated by BT to sit on the Board of Directors of MCI,

any information that is identified as proprietary by United States

telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications service providers

(and maintained as confidential by them) and is obtained by BT from

such providers as the result of BT's provision of interconnection or

other telecommunications services to them in the United Kingdom.

C. MCI and NewCo, and any person who may be designated by MCI to

sit on the Board of Directors of BT, shall not receive from BT, or from

any persons designated by BT to sit on the Board of Directors of MCI,

any confidential, non-public information obtained as a result of BT's

correspondent relationships with other United States international

telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications service providers,

except to the extent necessary for MCI to comply with its obligations

under Section II.A.3(ii) concerning disclosure of the total volume of

traffic (but not the individual traffic volumes for other providers)

received by BT from the United States and sent by BT to the United

States that is subject to proportionate return, or under Section II.A.5

(but not including individual information on other providers).

D. MCI, and any person who may be designated by MCI to sit on the

Board of Directors of BT, shall not seek or accept from BT, or from any

persons designated by BT to sit on the Board of Directors of MCI, any

non-public information about the future prices or pricing plans of any

provider of international telecommunications services between the

United States and the United Kingdom with which MCI competes in the

provision of such services.

E. Neither MCI nor NewCo shall provide to BT any telecommunications

facilities or services to be used by BT for international simple resale

between the United Kingdom and the United States, until the following

conditions have occurred or unless such conditions are expressly waived

in whole or part by plaintiff through written notice to defendants and

the Court:

1. All qualified United States international telecommunications

providers (including their United Kingdom subsidiaries or affiliates)

that have applied for licenses in the United Kingdom that would include

the ability to provide international simple resale between the United

States and the United Kingdom on or before December 1, 1993 have been

granted licenses to provide international simple resale by the

responsible governmental authorities in the United Kingdom; and

2. All such United States international telecommunications

providers licensed to provide international simple resale in the United

Kingdom have been offered the opportunity to interconnect with BT's

telecommunications network in the United Kingdom operated pursuant to

its license, on standard, nondiscriminatory and published terms

(including the locations where interconnection is offered) and with

reasonable arrangements for any other necessary technical aspects of

interconnection, enabling them to engage in international simple resale

without limitation on the amount of traffic carried.

``Qualified United States international telecommunications providers,''

for purposes of this Section II.E, shall mean all United States

international telecommunications providers as of December 1, 1993,

except for any provider that (a) has withdrawn its license application

to provide international simple resale, (b) has been found by United

Kingdom government authorities to have failed to pursue effectively its

license application or to have failed to meet the requirements for a

license to provide international simple resale, so long as such

requirements are applicable to all persons that seek to provide

international simple resale between the United Kingdom and the United

States, (c) has, in the judgment of the plaintiff, absent any finding

by United Kingdom government authorities, failed to pursue effectively

its license application, (d) has voluntarily modified its license

application after December 1, 1993 (other than to make modifications

requested by United Kingdom government authorities) to such a

substantial extent that it is subject to additional publication and can

no longer be pursued on its original schedule; (e) has been offered a

license that would allow it to commence providing international simple

resale between the United States and the United Kingdom and has not

accepted such license; or (f) has failed, after the grant of a license,

to supply promptly an adequate statement of the necessary information

required for interconnection. A list of the entities that plaintiff the

United States and defendants presently understand to be qualified under

this Section II.E is included in the Stipulation entered into by

defendants and plaintiff on June 10, 1994.

III

Applicability and Effect

The provisions of this Final Judgment shall be binding upon

defendants, their affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns,

officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those

persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual

notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

Defendants shall cooperate with the United States Department of Justice

in ensuring that the provisions of this Final Judgment are carried out.

Neither this Final Judgment nor any of its terms or provisions shall

constitute any evidence against, an admission by, or an estoppel

against the defendants. The effective date of this Final Judgment shall

be the date upon which it is entered.

IV

Definitions

For the purposes of this Final Judgment:

A. ``Affiliate'' and ``subsidiary'' when used in connection with

MCI, do not include NewCo and BT, when used in connection with BT do

not include NewCo and MCI, and when used in connection with NewCo do

not include BT or MCI (but do include all entities in which NewCo has

an ownership interest or which are subject to its control, or are

jointly owned and controlled by BT and MCI). Nor shall BT be deemed to

be a person in active concert or participation with NewCo or MCI for

purposes of this Final Judgment.

B. ``BT'' means British Telecommunications plc, and any entity

owned or controlled by BT, apart from NewCo and MCI. BT does not

include any MCI employees who may serve on BTs Board of Directors.

C. ``Correspondent'' means a bilaterally negotiated arrangement

between a provider of telecommunications services in the US or the UK

and a provider of telecommunications services in the other of the US or

the UK for provision of an international telecommunications or enhanced

telecommunications service, by which each party undertakes to terminate

in its country traffic originated by the other party. A service managed

by NewCo, and provided without correspondent relationships with any

other provider, shall not be deemed to constitute a correspondent

service.

D. ``Defendant'' or ``defendants'' means MCI and NewCo.

E. ``Disclose,'' for purposes of II.A.1-6, means disclosure to

the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division, which may

further disclose such information to any United States corporation that

directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate holds or has applied for

a license from either the United States Federal Communications

Commission or the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry to

provide international telecommunications services between the United

States and the United Kingdom. Disclosure by the Department of Justice

to any corporation described above shall be made only upon agreement by

such corporation, in the form prescribed in the Stipulation entered

into by defendants and the United States on June 10, 1994, not to

disclose any non-public information to any other person, apart from

governmental authorities in the United States or United Kingdom. Where

NewCo is required to disclose, in Section II.A, particular

telecommunications services provided, this shall include disclosure of

the identity of each of the services, and reasonable detail about each

of the services to the extent not already published elsewhere, but

shall not require disclosure of underlying facilities used to provide a

particular service that is offered on a unitary basis, except to the

extent necessary to identify the service and the means of

interconnection with the service.

F. ``Enhanced telecommunications service'' means any

telecommunications service that involves as an integral part of the

service the provision of features or capabilities that are additional

to the conveyance (including switching) of the information transmitted.

Although enhanced telecommunications services use telecommunications

services for conveyance, their additional features or capabilities do

not lose their enhanced status as a result.

G. ``Facility'' means: (i) any line, trunk, wire, cable, tube,

pipe, satellite, earth station, antenna or other means that is directly

used or designed or adapted for use in the conveyance, transmission,

origination or reception of a telecommunications or enhanced

telecommunications service; (ii) any switch, multiplexer, or other

equipment or apparatus that is directly used or designed or adapted for

use in connection with the conveyance, transmission, origination,

reception, switching, signaling, modulation, amplification, routing,

collection, storage, forwarding, transformation, translation,

conversion, delivery or other provision of any telecommunications or

enhanced telecommunications service, and (iii) any structure, conduit,

pole, or other thing in, on, by, or from which any facility as

described in (i) or (ii) is or may be installed, supported, carried or

suspended.

H. ``Interconnection,'' ``interconnect'' and ``interconnection

agreement'' mean interconnection under Condition 13 of BT's License (or

any subsequent or other condition governing interconnection that may be

imposed by United Kingdom government authorities).

I. ``International simple resale'' means the transmission through

international private or leased telecommunications facilities, or by

any other means of telecommunications in which international usage is

not measured, of international voice or data telecommunications traffic

(excluding capabilities in addition to conveyance and such switching,

processing, data storage or protocol conversion as is necessary for the

conveyance of information in real time) that is carried over the public

switched telecommunications network in both the country where it

originates and the country where it terminates.

J. ``MCI'' means MCI Communications Corporation, and any entity

owned or controlled by MCI, apart from NewCo. MCI does not include any

BT employees who may serve on MCI's Board of Directors.

K. ``NewCo'' means BT Forty-Eight Company, the joint venture of MCI

and BT to be created pursuant to the terms of the Joint Venture

Agreement entered into by MCI and BT as of August 4, 1993 (including

any subsequent modifications or amendments to such agreement),

regardless of the name under which it may subsequently do business, and

any subsidiary, affiliate, predecessor (whether the predecessor is

jointly owned by MCI and BT or separately owned by either of them),

successor, or assign of such joint venture, or any other entity jointly

owned by MCI and BT and having among its purposes substantially the

same purposes as described for NewCo in the Joint Venture Agreement.

NewCo shall not be deemed to include BT or any of its affiliates in

which NewCo does not have an ownership interest.

L. ``Telecommunications service'' means the conveyance, by

electrical, magnetic, electromagnetic, electromechanical or

electrochemical means (including fiber-optics), of information

consisting of:

--Speech, music and other sounds;

--Visual images;

--Signals serving for the impartation (whether as between persons and

persons, things and things or persons and things) of any matter,

including but not limited to data, otherwise than in the form of sounds

or visual images;

--Signals serving for the actuation or control of machinery or

apparatus; or

--Translation or conversion that does not alter the form or content of

information as received from that which is originally sent.

``Convey'' and ``conveyance'' include transmission, switching, and

receiving, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. A

telecommunications service includes all facilities used in providing

such service, and the installation, maintenance, repair, adjustment,

replacement and removal of any such facilities. A service that is

considered a ``telecommunications service'' under this definition

retains that status when it is used to provide an enhanced

telecommunications service, or when used in combination with equipment,

facilities or other services.

M. ``United Kingdom'' and ``UK'' mean England, Wales, Scotland,

Northern Ireland and all territories, dependencies, or possessions of

the United Kingdom (excluding the Isle of Man) for which international

telecommunications traffic is not normally separately reported to the

United States Federal Communications Commission by United States

telecommunications carriers.

N. ``United States'' and ``US'' mean the fifty states, the District

of Columbia, and all territories, dependencies, or possessions of the

United States.

O. ``United States international telecommunications provider''

means any person or entity actually providing international

telecommunications services or enhanced telecommunications services to

users in the United States, and that is incorporated in the United

States, or that is ultimately controlled by United States persons

within the meaning of 16 CFR 801.1.

V

Visitorial and Compliance Provisions

A. MCI and NewCo each agree to maintain sufficient records and

documents to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of this Final

Judgment.

B. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance of

defendants with this Final Judgment, duly authorized representatives of

the plaintiff, upon written request of the Attorney General or the

Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on

a reasonable notice to the relevant defendant, shall have access

without restraint or interference to MCI and to NewCo in the United

States:

1. during their office hours to inspect and copy all records and

documents in their possession or control relating to any matters

contained in this Final Judgment; and

2. to interview or take sworn testimony from their officers,

directors, employees, trustees, or agents, who may have counsel

present, relating to any matter contained in this Final Judgment.

Provided, however, that NewCo officers and directors who are employees

of BT shall be required to produce only NewCo documents and to provide

information only concerning NewCo.

C. NewCo consents to make available to duly authorized

representatives of the plaintiff, for the purposes of determining

whether defendants have complied with the requirements of this Final

Judgment and to secure their compliance:

1. at the premises of the Antitrust Division in Washington, DC.,

within sixty days of receipt of written request by the Attorney General

or Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,

records and documents in the possession or control of NewCo or any

NewCo affiliate or subsidiary, wherever located; and

2. for interviews or sworn testimony, in the United States if

requested by plaintiff but subject to their reasonable convenience,

officers, directors, employees, trustees or agents, who may have

counsel present. Provided, however, that NewCo officers and directors

who are employees of BT shall be required to produce only NewCo

documents and to provide information only concerning NewCo.

D. Upon the written request of the Attorney General or the

Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, a

defendant shall submit written reports, under oath if requested,

relating to any of the matters contained in this decree.

E. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in

this Section V shall be divulged by the plaintiff to any person other

than the United States Department of Justice, the Federal

Communications Commission, and their employees, agents and contractors,

except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is

a party, or for the purpose of securing compliance with this decree, or

for identifying to the United Kingdom Office of Telecommunications or

other appropriate United Kingdom regulatory agencies conduct by

defendants or BT that may violate United Kingdom law or regulations or

BT's license to operate its United Kingdom public telecommunications

system (but no documents received from defendants pursuant to this

Section V shall be disclosed to United Kingdom authorities by the

Department of Justice), or as otherwise required by law. Prior to

divulging any documents, interviews or sworn testimony obtained

pursuant to this Section V to the Federal Communications Commission,

plaintiff will obtain assurances that such materials are protected from

disclosure to third parties to the extent permitted by law.

VI

Retention of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purposes of enabling

any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any

time for such further orders or directions as may be necessary or

appropriate to carry out or construe this decree, to modify or

terminate any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish

any violations of its provisions.

VII

Modification

Any party to this Final Judgment may seek modification of its

substantive terms and obligations, and other parties to the Final

Judgment shall have an opportunity to respond to such a motion. If the

motion is contested by another party, it shall only be granted if the

movant makes a clear showing that (i) a significant change in

circumstances or significant new event subsequent to the entry of the

Final Judgment requires modification of the Final Judgment to avoid

substantial harm to competition or consumers in the United States, or

to avoid substantial hardship to defendants, and (ii) the proposed

modification is (a) in the public interest, (b) suitably tailored to

the changed circumstances or new events and would not result in serious

hardship to any defendant, and (c) consistent with the purposes of the

antitrust laws of the United States and with the telecommunications

regulatory regime of the United Kingdom. Neither the absence of

specific reference to a particular event in the Final Judgment nor the

foreseeability of such an event at the time this Final Judgment was

entered, shall preclude this Court's consideration of any modification

request. This standard for obtaining contested modifications shall not

require the United States to initiate a separate antitrust action

before seeking modifications. The same standard shall apply to any

party seeking modification of this Final Judgment. If a motion to

modify this Final Judgment is not contested by any party, it shall be

granted if the proposed modification is within the reaches of the

public interest. Where modifications of the Final Judgment are sought,

the provisions of Section V of this Final Judgment may be invoked to

obtain any information or documents needed to evaluate the proposed

modification prior to decision by the Court.

VIII

Sanctions

Nothing in this Final Judgment shall prevent the United States from

seeking, or this Court from imposing, against defendants or any other

person, any relief available under any applicable provision of law.

IX

Further Provisions

A. The entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

B. The substantive restrictions and obligations of this Final

Judgment shall be removed after five years have passed from the date of

entry of the Final Judgment, unless the Final Judgment has been

previously terminated.

Dated:

----------------------------------------------------------------------

United States District Judge

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. MCI Communications

Corporation and BT Forty-Eight Company (``NewCo''), Defendants.

Civil Action No.-------------------------------------------------------

Filed:-----------------------------------------------------------------

Competitive Impact Statement

The United States, pursuant to section 2(b) of the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C.

16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the

proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust

proceeding.

I

Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

On June 15, 1994, the United States filed a civil antitrust

complaint under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.

25, alleging that the proposed acquisition of a 20% equity interest in

MCI Communications Corporation (``MCI'') by British Telecommunications

plc (``BT''), and the proposed formation of a joint venture between MCI

and BT to provide international enhanced telecommunications services,

would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18,

by lessening competition in the markets for international

telecommunications services between the United States and the United

Kingdom and for global seamless telecommunications services, thereby

depriving United States consumers of the benefits of competition--lower

prices and higher quality services. Defendants are MCI and BT Forty-

Eight Company, also known as NewCo, which at present is a wholly owned

subsidiary of BT and which will become the joint venture of MCI and BT

upon consummation of the agreements between them. The Complaint seeks

injunctive and other relief.

The United States and the defendants have stipulated to the entry

of a proposed Final Judgment, after compliance with the Antitrust

Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h). Entry of the

proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the

Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, and enforce the

proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations of the Judgment. The

United States and the defendants also have stipulated that the

defendants will abide by the terms of the proposed Final Judgment after

consummation of the transactions between them, pending entry of the

Final Judgment by the Court, permitting the transactions to go forward

prior to completion of the Tunney Act procedures. Should the Court

decline to enter the Final Judgment, defendants have also committed in

the stipulation to abide by its terms until the conclusion of this

action.

II

Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The Proposed Transactions

On August 4, 1993, MCI and BT entered into an Investment Agreement

by which BT would acquire a 20% equity stake in MCI for approximately

$4.3 billion. MCI and BT entered into an amended and restated version

of this Investment Agreement on January 31, 1994. With consummation of

this Investment Agreement and related agreements, BT would become the

single largest shareholder in MCI. In addition, BT would receive a

number of special shareholder rights, including the need for BT's

consent to various actions by MCI, access to internal MCI information,

and proportionate board representation consisting of three of the

fifteen seats on MCI's Board of Directors. MCI would gain certain

special rights with respect to BT as well, including a seat on the BT

Board of Directors.

MCI and BT have agreed that if either party competes with the other

in its ``core'' business (defined to include any telecommunications

services or equipment, with specific limited exceptions) in its

assigned territory (the ``Americas'' for MCI, and the rest of the world

for BT), it will lose all special rights, including board

membership.\1\ While the agreement does not formally prohibit BT and

MCI from competing with each other in their domestic and international

telecommunications businesses, as a practical matter it ensures that BT

will only enter the United States telecommunications markets through

its investment in MCI so long as their relationship continues. BT's

operations in the United States principally consist of Syncordia, a

wholly owned subsidiary engaged in ``global outsourcing.'' This is the

provision of various integrated international telecommunications

services and enhanced services to large users through a single source,

allowing customers to transfer responsibility for owning and managing

their corporate telecommunications networks.\2\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\Pursuant to agreement with the competition authorities of the

Commission of the European Union, the restriction on MCI entering

BT's core business in its territory has been limited to a period of

five years from closing, but the duration of the restriction on BT

competing in the United States has not been limited. 1994 O.J. 94/C,

Notice re Case No. IV/34,857-BT-MCI (March 30, 1994).

\2\BT and MCI had a more significant competitive overlap in the

United States at the time that they entered into the Investment

Agreement, in the area of public data networks. BT's subsidiary

British Telecommunications North America (BTNA) owned the Tymnet

public data network, a major provider of such services, while MCI

owned 25% of Infonet, one of Tymnet's principal competitors. MCI

agreed to acquire Tymnet from BT. Before it consummated this

acquisition earlier in 1994, however, MCI sold its share in Infonet

to the other owners of Infonet.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While they entered into the Investment Agreement, MCI and BT also

entered into a Joint Venture Agreement and other related agreements

committing them to form a joint venture, to be owned 75.1% by BT and

24.9% of MCI. This joint venture, NewCo, is incorporated in the United

Kingdom, and will have its principal place of business and most of its

employees in the United States. BT and MCI both will contribute

international telecommunications facilities to the joint venture,

including BT's Syncordia business. The stated purpose of the joint

venture is to provide international enhanced telecommunications

services to large international users, such as multinational

corporations. These services will be available from a single source and

will be consistent in quality, features and capabilities wherever

purchased. These services may include various types of data services,

messaging and video conferencing, global calling card services,

intelligent network services, certain types of satellite services and

global outsourcing such as Syncordia already offers in the United

States and other countries. Under certain circumstances, and if

permitted by regulatory authorities, the role of the joint venture may

be expanded to include other telecommunications services in addition to

enhanced ones. The venture may also expand its business operations to

other types of customers.

MCI will be the exclusive distributor of the joint venture's

services in North and South America and the Caribbean (``the

Americas''), and BT will be the joint venture's exclusive distributor

in the rest of the world. MCI and BT also have agreed to supply the

necessary services and facilities in their respective distribution

regions to enable the joint venture to operate. In addition, MCI and BT

have agreed not to compete with the joint venture anywhere in the

world. Therefore, BT and MCI will have to realize all gains from the

areas of business in which the joint venture is engaged through their

ownership interests in the joint venture and their sales of its

services, and BT generally will only be able to participate in this

market in the United States through its investments in MCI and the

joint venture.\3\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\There is a limited possibility for so-called ``passive

sales,'' that is, sales by BT or MCI to a customer with no presence

in its assigned area where the customer has on its own initiative

chosen to contract with the firm outside its area, but has not been

solicited by that firm.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. The Parties to the Transaction and the Relevant Markets

MCI is the second largest long distance telecommunications carrier

in the United States, and in terms of traffic, the fifth largest

telecommunications carrier in the world. Its principal long distance

domestic and international competitors in the United States are AT&T

Corporation, the largest carrier, and Sprint Corporation, the third

largest carrier. BT, formerly a government-owned monopoly, is now

privately held. It is by far the largest telecommunications carrier in

the United Kingdom, and is the fourth largest telecommunications

carrier in the world in terms of traffic. BT is the dominant

telecommunications carrier in the United Kingdom, as it provides almost

all local services and had high market shares in long distance domestic

and international services. Indeed, BT has over ten times the total

sales revenues of Mercury Communications Ltd., its only substantial

competitor in long distance services. Thus, the transactions between

MCI and BT will result in vertical affiliation between the dominant

telecommunications carrier in the United Kingdom and the second largest

long distance provider in the United States.

Both MCI and BT provide international telecommunications and

enhanced telecommunications services between the United States and the

United Kingdom to individuals and businesses for the exchange of voice,

video, and data messages. MCI carries about 20% of the international

switched telecommunications traffic originating and terminating in the

United States and BT carries about 75% of the international switched

telecommunications traffic originating and terminating in the United

Kingdom. Mercury is the only other company the United Kingdom currently

permitted to provide international telecommunications services between

the United States and United Kingdom using its own telecommunications

facilities (there is also some limited resale of the services of BT and

Mercury). No other companies have been licensed in the United Kingdom

to provide international telecommunications systems.

BT has substantial market power in the provision of

telecommunications services in and to the United Kingdom, in large part

because access to its local network is necessary for all other

telephone companies that seek to provide long distance domestic and

international services. About 97% of all telecommunications traffic in

the United Kingdom terminates through BT's local network, and the great

majority of traffic also originates on BT's network. Although cable

television companies provide local telecommunications services in some

areas of the United Kingdom, today they account for an insignificant

proportion of such services, in the range of 1%, and their activities

are unlikely to diminish BT's market power during the term of the

proposed decree.\4\ Substantial replication of BT's local

telecommunications network in the United Kingdom would be prohibitively

expensive for any new entrant or existing long distance provider.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\In addition to BT and the cable companies, there is one other

provider of local telecommunications services in the United Kingdom,

serving only the city of Kingston-upon-Hull where BT does not have a

local network.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BT also controls the largest and most comprehensive long distance

domestic and international telecommunications network in the United

Kingdom, and carries about 84% of domestic switched long distance

traffic in the United Kingdom. (Mercury carries virtually all of the

rest.) Since 1991, the United Kingdom government has granted additional

licenses for domestic telecommunications systems. Those new domestic

licensees either have not yet begun commercial long distance operations

using their own facilities (some firms operate on a limited scale as

resellers using the facilities of BT or Mercury), or have not yet

achieved any substantial share of the United Kingdom market.

BT has been able to retain a dominant position in the provision of

long distance domestic and international telecommunications services in

the United Kingdom for several reasons, including its control of the

local network. BT does not provide Mercury or other competitors either

equal access or number portability. Both of these features are

generally offered to all long distance carriers by operators of the

monopoly local exchange networks in the United States, and have been

important factors in the development of domestic and international long

distance competition. Equal access would allow customers to gain access

to the long distance networks of Mercury and other competitors through

BT's network without dailing additional numbers or obtaining special

equipment that is not needed to use BT's long distanced services.

Number portability would allow customers switching from BT to Mercury

or other competitors to retain their original telephone number. The

lack of equal access and number portability places Mercury and any

other competitors who may offer long distance service at a competitive

disadvantage to BT, contributing to BT's ability to sustain its

substantial market power in the provision of long distance domestic and

international telecommunications services in the United Kingdom. These

long distance services are necessary to deliver enhanced

telecommunications and seamless global telecommunications services

internationally.

In addition, Mercury must pay BT Access Deficit Charges (``ADCs'')

in order to have traffic delivered through BT's network. ADCs are

payments made by competing carriers to BT for each minute of traffic

those carriers send through BT's network. ADCs are intended by United

Kingdom regulatory authorities to compensate BT for providing its other

local exchange services subject to price controls. These charges,

especially for international traffic, greatly exceed BT's cost of

providing interconnection to Mercury. ADCs may be imposed on new

entrants that compete with BT and interconnect with its network. The

total cost for Mercury, or any other United Kingdom competitor of BT

that is required to pay ADCs, to send international traffic through

BT's local network is several times greater than the comparable costs

paid by international long distance carriers in the United States for

interconnection with local networks.

C. The Competitive Effect of the Acquisition

The Complaint alleges that the acquisition of MCI shares by BT may

substantially lessen competition in the provision of international

telecommunications services between the United States and the United

Kingdom. BT will have increased incentives and the ability, using its

dominant position in the United Kingdom, to favor MCI and to disfavor

its United States competitors in international telecommunications

services in various ways, making competitors' offerings less attractive

in quality and price than those of MCI, and so lessening the ability of

MCI's rivals to compete effectively in these services. As a result of

this anticompetitive conduct, the price of international

telecommunications services to the United Kingdom available to United

States consumers could be increased, and the quality lessened, relative

to what United States consumers would pay and receive in a competitive

market.

International telecommunications services are generally provided

today on a ``correspondent'' basis, meaning that providers in different

countries enter into commercially negotiated bilateral agreements with

one another to complete each other's traffic. International

correspondent telecommunications services primarily consist of the

basic switched voice telephone call, which is known either as

International Direct Dial (``IDD'') or International Message Telephone

Service (``IMTS''), and International Private Line Service (``IPLS'').

They also include certain other switched telecommunications and

enhanced telecommunications services.

``Switched'' traffic makes use of switching facilities and common

lines. Consumers typically obtain switched correspondent services from

the provider in the country where a call originates, and calls are

handed off to the provider in the other country without direct customer

involvement. IPLS consists of circuits dedicated to the use of a single

customer, and the providers of IPLS in each country typically sell

their ``half'' of the circuit to the user separately. Switched services

constitute the great majority of international telecommunications

services in terms of both traffic and revenues.

The Complaint alleges that acquiring a 20% ownership interest in

MCI will increase BT's incentive to discriminate in favor of MCI and

against other United States international carriers in the market or

markets for international telecommunications services between the

United States and the United Kingdom. BT's incentive to favor MCI is

reinforced by the provision in the Investment Agreement that subjects

BT to loss of its special rights if it competes in the Americas in the

provision of telecommunications services and equipment.

MCI could receive various forms of favorable treatment from BT with

respect to its international correspondent services between the United

States and the United Kingdom. For example, BT could favor MCI or

disfavor its competitors with respect to the prices, terms and

conditions on which international services are provided, as well as the

quality of provisioning of those services, and could provide to MCI

advance information about planned changes to its network. Such

discrimination could place other United States international carriers

at a competitive disadvantage to MCI, enabling MCI to charge more for

its services or to provide a lower quality of service than it would

otherwise be able to do without losing customers.

In addition, the Complaint alleges that BT's ownership interest in

MCI would increase BT's incentive to provide MCI confidential,

competitively sensitive information that BT obtains from other United

States carriers through their correspondent relationships with BT. In

order to use BT's correspondent switched and private line services and

to negotiate terms of use, United States international

telecommunications providers must provide BT various types of

competitively sensitive information, including private line customer

identities, service requirements, plans for the introduction of new

services, changes in existing services, and future traffic projections.

If BT were to share this information with MCI, then MCI could gain an

anticompetitive advantage over its United States competitors. Allowing

MCI access to such competitively valuable information about its

competitors would also increase the risk of collusion.

Finally, the Complaint alleges that the agreements will give BT the

increased incentive and ability to send its international switched

traffic to the United States exclusively or largely to MCI. Such

diversion of traffic could harm competition among international

telecommunications service providers in the United States, and United

States consumers, by increasing the net settlement payments that other

United States carriers must make to BT.\5\ If BT diverted all or most

of its traffic to MCI, unaffiliated United States international

carriers would lose offsetting return traffic from BT and would have to

make larger settlement payments to BT, putting them at a competitive

disadvantage in the market for United States-United Kingdom

telecommunications, and this could result in MCI charging higher

prices. The ability to divert the bulk of its traffic to an affiliated

United States carrier could also give BT an increased incentive to keep

international accounting rates above costs.\6\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\The correspondent agreements governing switched services

establish an ``accounting rate'' per minute of traffic, for each

type of traffic sent over a particular international route. The

carriers in each country pay half the accounting rate (the

``settlement rate'') to their foreign correspondents for each minute

of traffic completed. Settlement payments for outgoing traffic are

offset by the settlement payments for incoming traffic. When there

is an imbalance in the amount of outgoing and incoming traffic

between carriers, the carrier with the most outgoing traffic makes a

net settlement payment to its correspondent. Today, United States

carriers accept the same proportion of the total switched traffic

from each of their correspondents in a foreign country as the

proportion of total switched traffic to the correspondent that each

of the United States carriers send. This protects each carrier from

being competitively disadvantaged by having to make large net

settlement payments that other competitors can avoid. Federal

Communications Commission policy supports this proportionate

allocation of switched traffic, although the FCC has not adopted

regulations governing proportionate allocation.

\6\Because United States carriers send substantially more

traffic to the United Kingdom than United Kingdom carriers send to

the United States, United States carriers must make large net

settlement payments to United Kingdom carriers, most of which go to

BT. Current accounting rates between the United States and the

United Kingdom are substantially above the cost of providing

service.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. The Competitive Effect of the Joint Venture

The Complaint also alleges that the formation of the BT-MCI joint

venture may substantially lessen competition in the market or markets

for seamless global telecommunications services provided in the United

States. BT will have increased incentives and the ability, using its

dominant position in the United Kingdom, to favor NewCo and MCI and to

disfavor their United States competitors in seamless global

telecommunications services in various ways, lessening the ability of

the competitors of MCI and NewCo to develop and offer new seamless

global services and compete effectively in these services. As a result

of this anticompetitive conduct, the quality of seamless global

telecommunications services available to United States consumers could

be lessened, and the price increased, relative to what United States

consumers would pay and receive in a competitive market.

Seamless global telecommunications services would be made available

by a single provider using an integrated international network of owned

or leased facilities, and would have the same quality, features,

characteristics, and capabilities wherever they are provided, making

them significantly superior to ordinary correspondent

telecommunications services for many customers, particularly

multinational corporations and other large users of international

telecommunications. Seamless services would permit one-stop shopping,

so that users could avoid negotiation with telecommunications network

operators in different countries, and would overcome the inadequacies

and differences in standards in various national telecommunications

systems. They could offer scale economies by comparison with private

networks individually organized by users. However, creating seamless

global networks will require a major commitment of resources and

expertise that few firms can supply.

Seamless global telecommunications services represent an emerging

market, but an important one for the evolution of international

telecommunications. Other entrants or potential entrants in this

market, in addition to BT and MCI, include AT&T's Worldsource (a non-

exclusive partnership with several foreign providers including Japan's

KDD), Unisource (an alliance of the national or principal

telecommunications providers in Switzerland, Sweden and the

Netherlands), Eunetcom (an alliance of the German and French national

telecommunications providers), Sprint, and Cable & Wireless plc (the

parent of Mercury).

By their nature, seamless global telecommunications services must

be offered on a consistent basis in all the major countries where

customers are located. Thus, nondiscriminatory access to the

telecommunications networks in these countries is essential for any

provider of these services. The United Kingdom has a crucial role in

seamless global telecommunications services because about ten percent

of all likely potential customers have their headquarters there, and

most potential customers of these services need telecommunications

services in the United Kingdom.

BT's role in the joint venture would increase its incentive to

favor the joint venture and MCI over other United States providers of

seamless global telecommunications services. Since BT could not compete

with the joint venture and only MCI could solicit customers for the

joint venture's services in the United States, where about 40 percent

of all potential customers have their headquarters, BT would depend on

MCI and NewCo for revenues from such services in the United States. It

would not have the opportunity to earn additional revenues in non-

exclusive arrangements to provide similar services with other

providers, so its incentive to use its dominant position in the United

Kingdom to place MCI and NewCo in the strongest possible position in

the United States, at the expense of competitors, would be reinforced.

BT could discriminate in favor of NewCo and MCI using its

vertically integrated position in the United Kingdom, with a virtual

monopoly in local services and a dominant position in long distance

domestic and international services, as these services will be needed

by competing providers of seamless global services to complete traffic.

Discrimination could occur in interconnection to the BT network,

provision of information about the network, and provision of the

international private circuits NewCo and its competitors would need for

their seamless global service ``platforms.'' BT could also provide

NewCo and MCI with competitively sensitive information it obtains from

seamless global service competitors who interconnect with BT's United

Kingdom network. Finally, BT could favor MCI and NewCo by sending them

on a non-correspondent basis traffic from the United Kingdom that would

otherwise be allocated proportionately. The agreements between BT and

MCI specifically provide for such use of NewCo facilities.

III.--Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

A. Prohibitions and Obligations

Under the provisions of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act,

the proposed Final Judgment may only be entered if the Court finds that

it is in the public interest. The United States has tentatively

concluded that the proposed Final Judgment affords an adequate remedy

for the alleged violations and is in the public interest.

Section II contains the substantive restrictions and obligations.

They include transparency requirements (Section II.A), confidentiality

requirements (Sections II.B, II.C and II.D), and requirements related

to international simple resale (Section II.E). These various

requirements, in combination, will substantially diminish the risk of

abuse of BT's market power to discriminate or otherwise afford

anticompetitive advantages to MCI and NewCo.\7\ They will do so by

making discrimination easier to detect, by precluding the misuse of

confidential information obtained by BT from MCI's competitors, and by

increasing the likelihood that United States competitors of MCI and

NewCo, if licensed, will be interconnected with BT in the United

Kingdom, so that they can respond effectively to international

discrimination and diversion of BT's traffic to MCI. The object of

these substantive terms is to ensure that MCI, as the result of its

direct affiliation with BT or its position as the exclusive distributor

of NewCo services in the United States, is not advantaged over its

competitors in the United States to the detriment of competition or

consumers.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\NewCo is broadly defined in Sections IV.A and IV.K to ensure

that the entire joint venture will be subject to the Final Judgment,

regardless of the forms that it may take or restructurings that may

occur.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Transparency Requirements

Section II.A forbids MCI and NewCo from offering, supplying

distributing or otherwise providing any telecommunications or enhanced

telecommunications service that makes use of telecommunications

services provided by BT in the United Kingdom or between the United

States and the United Kingdom, unless MCI and NewCo disclose certain

types of information. Because these transparency requirements may be

affected by changes in regulation or other circumstances, Section II.A

provides the United States with the ability to waive these requirements

in whole or in part.

Pursuant to Section IV.E., MCI and NewCo will provide the

information to the Department of Justice, which may then disclose the

information to any United States corporation that holds or has applied

for a license, from either United States or United Kingdom authorities,

to provide international telecommunications services between the United

States and the United Kingdom. This will enable the principal

competitors of MCI and NewCo to monitor whether either of these

companies is receiving discriminatory treatment in their favor from BT,

and provide them with evidence that could be used to make a complaint

to any governmental authorities in the United States or the United

Kingdom. The term ``governmental authorities'' is used broadly and

includes independent agencies. Corporations receiving this information

from the Department of Justice would be required to sign a

confidentiality agreement with the Department, obligating them not to

disclose non-public information to any persons other than governmental

authorities. The stipulation between the defendants and the United

States describes the form of a confidentiality agreement in more

detail. This confidentiality provision was adopted to prevent to wider

dissemination of defendants' non-public business information than is

necessary to detect and prevent anticompetitive conduct.

Defendants also have stipulated to enter into agreements with BT,

prior to entry of the Final Judgment, that will ensure that they are

provided with sufficient information to comply with Section II.A. Such

agreements with BT must also be consistent with the separate

obligations on defendants, under Sections II.B-D, precluding receipt

from BT of various types of information about their competitors.

The terms ``Telecommunications services'' and ``enhanced

telecommunications services'' are employed throughout the transparency

requirements as well as elsewhere in the Final Judgment.\8\

``Telecommunications services,'' as defined in the Final Judgment (see

Section IV.L), include ordinary switched voice telephony and private

circuits as well as conveyance (including transmission, switching and

receiving) of data and video information, and signaling, translation

and conversion in the network. These basic telecommunications services

are the bulk of existing telecommunications, and are licensed and

regulated to some degree in both the United States and the United

Kingdom. There are relatively few significant providers. In contrast,

``enhanced telecommunications services'' (as defined in Section IV.F),

which use telecommunications services as a foundation to provide

various advanced and intelligent applications of additional value to

users, are subject to little or no regulation in the United States and

the United Kingdom. The number of providers is often greater than for

basic telecommunications, although all such providers must have access

to the basic telecommunications services in order to do business.\9\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\The definitions of ``telecommunications services'' and

``enhanced telecommunications services'' in the Final Judgment are

based on the distinction between basic services and enhanced

services recognized by the FCC, as well as similar concepts in the

United Kingdom (where ``value-added services'' is analogous to

enhanced services). The definitions do not duplicate those used by

the national regulatory authorities, which differ somewhat in

terminology, but they incorporate as much as possible the underlying

concepts, while ensuring consistent treatment within the context of

this judgment for services offered in the United States and in the

United Kingdom.

\9\If an activity is a ``telecommunications service'' as defined

in the Final Judgment, it remains so when it is offered or bundled

with enhanced services or other equipment, facilities, or services,

or if it is called a ``package of facilities'' or something other

than a telecommunications service.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NewCo will interconnect directly with BT's United Kingdom network,

and will obtain other telecommunications services from BT, such as

international circuits, to use in the provision of seamless global

network services. NewCo's services may be distributed by BT either

alone or together with BT's own domestic services in the United

Kingdom. NewCo may have access to valuable information concerning

changes to BT's United Kingdom network that has not yet been disclosed

to other competitors.

Accordingly, NewCo is subject to four categories of disclosure

requirements. Section II.A.1 obligates it to disclose the prices, terms

and conditions, including any discounts, on which telecommunications

services are provided to NewCo pursuant to interconnection agreements.

Interconnection agreements are specific arrangements (see Section IV.H)

by which other licensed operators in the United Kingdom receive rights

to connect their systems to BT's network and have BT complete delivery

of traffic, on terms that may differ from those available to retail

customers. Although BT began to publish new interconnection agreements

last year, BT's license allows it the option to publish pricing

methodologies instead of actual prices. Section II.A.1 will compel

NewCo to disclose the actual prices BT charges it for interconnection.

Section II.A.2 imposes similar disclosure obligations on NewCo for

prices, terms and conditions, including any discounts, of any other

telecommunications services it obtains from BT. These services could

include international private circuits obtained at retail or otherwise

from BT. The disclosure requirements under this provision also apply to

the terms on which BT provides U.K. telecommunications services to

customers together with NewCo services, thus facilitating detection of

discrimination in bundling of services. To some extent these types of

information are already disclosed by BT in its retail tariffs pursuant

to United Kingdom regulation, but Section II.A.2 ensures comprehensive

transparency to prevent discrimination.

Section II.A.4 requires NewCo to provide additional information

about the specific telecommunications services that it receives from BT

to supply telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications services

between the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the

services BT provides directly to customers in the United Kingdom as the

distributor for NewCo. NewCo is required to disclose the types of

circuits, including their capacity, and other telecommunications

services provided. NewCo also is required to disclose information

concerning the actual average times between order and delivery of

circuits and the number of outages and actual average times between

fault report and restoration for various categories of circuits. These

types of information are not otherwise disclosed under existing

regulations, and are important to the detection of various types of

discrimination. Where NewCo has to disclose particular

telecommunications services provided by BT under II.A., it is required

to identify the services and provide reasonable detail about them (if

not already published). However, if a service is sold as a unit,

separate underlying facilities need only be disclosed to the extent

necessary to identify the service and the means of interconnection.

NewCo is not required to identify individual customers or the locations

of circuits and services dedicated to particular customers.

Finally, under Section II.A.6 NewCo is required to disclose

information it or MCI receives from BT about planned and authorized

changes in BT's United Kingdom network that would affect

interconnection arrangements with any licensed operators. Should MCI

receive information separately from NewCo, it has the same disclosure

obligation. Disclosure of information of this nature is important to

ensure that NewCo, through its affiliation with BT, is not given

commercial advantages through advance notice.

MCI's relationship with BT in the provision of international

services will be less complex than NewCo's, owing to MCI's agreements

not to compete with NewCo and to suffer loss of its special rights if

it competes with BT outside the Americas for a period of five years

from closing. MCI will continue to provide international correspondent

switched and private line services together with BT. To ensure greater

transparency in MCI's dealings with BT, Section II.A contains two sets

of disclosure obligations specifically applicable to MCI.

Section II.A.3 applies to any international switched

telecommunications or enhanced telecommunications services provided by

MCI and BT on a correspondent basis between the United States and the

United Kingdom. It requires MCI to disclose both the accounting and

settlement rates, and other terms and conditions, applicable to any of

these services. When there is no specific agreement between MCI and BT

setting forth this information, MCI must state the rates, terms and

conditions on which the service is actually provided. If BT combines

types of traffic subject to different accounting rates to determine the

proportionate allocation of switched traffic to United States

providers, MCI must disclose its own minutes of traffic in each

separate accounting rate category so that the other United States

providers can determine whether they are being sent the appropriate

shares of traffic from BT, if they do not already receive data (such as

total traffic volumes in each rate category) that is sufficient to

enable them to do so. This latter obligation addresses a particular

type of possible discrimination in international services, known as

``grooming,'' by which a foreign carrier can favor particular United

States correspondents with traffic of superior value while appearing to

allocate minutes of traffic on a proportionate basis. Today some types

of information covered by Section II.A.3, such as agreed-upon

accounting rates, are supplied to the Federal Communications Commission

(``FCC'') and are published, or are provided to competitors. Where

information has already been made available in these ways, Section

II.A.3 of the Final Judgment does not require MCI to provide it to the

Department of Justice.

Section II.A.5 requires MCI to provide information about the United

States-United Kingdom international private circuits it provides

jointly with BT. MCI must disclose the actual average times between

order and delivery by BT, and the actual average time intervals between

fault report and restoration in specific areas of the international

facility and the overseas network. This information is similar to types

of information NewCo provides under Section II.A.4 and serves similar

purposes. MCI is also required, for circuits used to provide

international switched services on a correspondent basis between the

United States and the United Kingdom, to identify average numbers of

circuit equivalents available during the busy hour. The great majority

of these circuits would be with BT. None of the information disclosed

under Section II.A.5 is made public today.

Under Section II.A., MCI and NewCo are required to disclose

intellectual property or proprietary information only if it is one of

the types of information expressly required to be disclosed by any of

these transparency obligations, or if it is necessary for licensed

operators to interconnect with BT's United Kingdom network or for

United States international providers to use BT's international

facilities to complete their services. MCI and NewCo, as well as BT

indirectly, are thus protected against overly broad disclosure of such

valuable commercial information.

2. Confidentiality Requirements

Three provisions of the proposed Final Judgment, Sections II.B,

II.C and II.D, constrain the ability of MCI (including the director it

appoints to the BT board) and NewCo to receive from BT (including BT-

appointed directors on the board of MCI), various types of confidential

information that BT obtains from MCI's and NewCo's United States

competitors. Existing regulatory requirements do not adequately protect

any of this information from disclosure.

Under Section II.B MCI and NewCo will not receive information from

BT that other United States competitors identify as proprietary and

maintain as confidential, but that has been obtained by BT as the

result of its provision of interconnection or other telecommunications

services to the competitors in the United Kingdom. In order to obtain

interconnection, other licensed operators are commonly required to

provide BT with a statement of requirements containing detailed

information about their planned services and interconnection needs. As

interconnection needs change over time, BT will receive more

confidential information. BT may also learn the identities and service

needs of particular customers of its competitors who need to have

private circuits interconnected with BT. Of course, there is no

alternative to interconnection with BT because of its local monopoly

bottleneck and overall market power in the United Kingdom.

Section II.C similarly forbids MCI and NewCo from receiving

confidential, non-public information from BT that BT may obtain from

other United States competitors of MCI and NewCo through its

correspondent relationships with them. United States international

telecommunications providers have no reasonable alternative at present

to using BT for at least some of their correspondent traffic to and

from the United Kingdom. A limited exception is provided to allow MCI

to obtain certain types of aggregate information it may need to comply

with its transparency obligations under Sections II.A.3(ii) and II.A.5,

but in no circumstances may MCI use this exception to receive

individual information about other providers that is otherwise

prohibited by this section.

Finally, Section II.D. addresses a specific competitive risk in the

context of international correspondent relationships, by prohibiting

MCI from seeking or accepting from BT any non-public information about

the future prices or pricing plans of any competitor of MCI in the

provision of international telecommunications services between the

United States and United Kingdom. BT and its United States

correspondents, in the course of accounting rate negotiations, exchange

considerable information including business plans and traffic

projections. Section II.D addresses the substantial risk of violation

of Section 1 of the Sherman Act that would arise if BT were to obtain

non-public pricing information from MCI's competitors once BT becomes

MCI's single largest owner, by precluding any sharing of price

information through BT. Risks of price collusion, tacit or explicit,

are considerable in an industry with a small number of large providers

offering similar types of services.

3. International Simple Resale Requirements

The international simple resale provision of the proposed Final

Judgment, Section II.E, is directed at actions by BT, using its

dominant position in the United Kingdom, that would discriminate in

favor of MCI, including the diversion of most or all of BT's traffic

from the United Kingdom through MCI and NewCo. Such conduct could raise

prices to United States consumers or otherwise harm competition in the

United States, unless United States carriers are licensed to operate in

the United Kingdom and interconnected with BT so that they can respond

effectively to BT's conduct.

International simple resale (``ISR'') (see Section IV.I) is the

transmission through private or leased international telecommunications

facilities (or by any other international means where usage is not

measured) of voice or data traffic (excluding certain enhanced

capabilities), if that traffic is carried over the public switched

telecommunications network in both the country where it originates and

the country where it terminates. ISR avoids the correspondent system,

and traffic sent by ISR would be exempt from proportionate allocation

policies. When all providers on an international route are equally

capable of using ISR, it can lessen the risk of discriminatory

practices in switched correspondent services, and can enable United

States providers to retaliate against attempts by a foreign carrier to

use its market power to increase the settlement liabilities of

unaffiliated carriers relative to those of its United States affiliate.

ISR between the United States and the United Kingdom can lawfully

occur only when the telecommunications regulatory authorities of both

countries find generally that equivalency exists between them in

policies relating to open entry and non-discrimination. However, that

equivalency finding will not be sufficient for all United States

providers to begin offering ISR to the United Kingdom, because in the

United Kingdom each provider of international simple resale services

must also be individually licensed. To provide ISR, a firm must have

the ability to use international facilities and interconnections to the

domestic networks at both ends of the international route.

Section II.E prohibits MCI and NewCo from providing any

telecommunications facilities or services to be used by BT for

international simple resale between the United Kingdom and the United

States, until (1) All qualified United States international

telecommunications providers that applied by December 1, 1993 for

United Kingdom licenses that would allow them to provide ISR have been

granted ISR licenses,\10\ and (2) all such licensed United States

providers have been offered the opportunity to interconnect with BT's

United Kingdom network on standard, nondiscriminatory and published

terms, with reasonable arrangements for any other necessary technical

aspects of interconnection. This provision does not compel or direct

the grant of any licenses, which is the prerogative of the United

Kingdom government. It ensures, however, that any delays in licensing

competing United States providers, or delays on BT's part in

interconnecting such licensed providers in the United Kingdom, will not

be used to anticompetitive effect by MCI, NewCo and BT.\11\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\Some of these applicants may have also applied for other

types of licenses from United Kingdom authorities. The Final

Judgment requires only the grant of international simple resale

authority.

\11\Section II.E., by providing objective criteria for

determining which United States international telecommunications

providers are qualified, ensures that no individual United States

carrier can misuse its United Kingdom ISR license application to

delay BT's ability to provide ISR.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The December 1, 1993 cutoff date for qualified providers included

all qualified United States applicants who sought to provide

international simple resale service before NewCo's own license

application was filed in the United Kingdom. Plaintiff and defendants

have sought to identify, by stipulation, the United States

international telecommunications providers that they presently

understand to be qualified under Section II.E.\12\ Any other persons,

however, may notify the Department before entry of the Final Judgment

that they believe they are also qualified within the meaning of Section

II.E. If plaintiff concludes that any such additional persons are

qualified they will be added to the stipulated list.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\12\The stipulated list presently includes: ACC Global Corp.,

including ACC Long Distance UK Ltd.; Ameritel Communications Inc.,

including Amera Tela Communications (UK) Ltd.; AT&T Corporation,

including AT&T (UK) Ltd.; City of London Telecommunications Ltd.

(COLT); IDB Communications Group, Inc., including WorldCom

International, Inc.; MFS Communications Inc., including MFS

Communications Ltd.; and Sprint Corporation, including Sprint

Holdings (UK) Ltd. Some of these firms have already received United

Kingdom international simple resale licenses.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section II.E. does not affect the ability of the FCC, and United

Kingdom authorities, to determine when general conditions warrant

authorizing international simple resale or other forms of resale

between the United States and the United Kingdom.

4. Modifications

Section VII, the modifications provision, affords the means of

expanding, altering or reducing the substantive terms of the Final

Judgment, and is essential to the protection of competition.

Modifications that are not contested by any party to the Final Judgment

are reviewed under a ``public interest'' test. See, e.g, United States

v. Western Electric Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (D.C. Cir. 983).

Where a proposed modification is contested by any party to the

Final Judgment, the Court must determine both whether modification is

required, and whether the particular modification proposed is

appropriate. The United States is able to seek changes to the

substantive terms and obligations of the Final Judgment from the Court,

including additional requirements to prevent receipt of discriminatory

treatment by defendants, in order to avoid substantial harm to

competition or consumers in the United States. The defendants are able

to seek modifications removing obligations of the Final Judgment in

order to avoid substantial hardship to themselves. In either case, the

party seeking modifications must make a clear showing that modification

is required, based on a significant change in circumstances or a

significant new event subsequent to the entry of the Final Judgment.

Such a change in circumstances or an event subsequent to the entry of

judgment need not have been unforeseen, nor need it have been referred

to in the Final Judgment. The parties recognize that discrimination of

a significant nature involving BT and defendants, subsequent to the

entry of the Final Judgment, could constitute such a new event. Before

concluding that discrimination against any particular competitor of MCI

or NewCo required seeking a modification of the Final Judgment to

protect competition or consumers, the Department of Justice would

ordinarily inquire at the outset whether the injured competitor had

availed itself of existing regulatory remedies, if any, in the United

Kingdom as well as the United States, and what relief had been provided

or action taken, if any, by the telecommunications regulatory agencies.

If the Court concludes that any party has met its burden of showing

that the Final Judgment should be modified over the opposition of

another party, it would then be empowered to grant any particular

modification that meets three criteria. The modification must be (i) in

the public interest, (ii) suitably tailored to the changed

circumstances or new event that gave rise to its adoption, and must not

result in serious hardship to any defendant, and (iii) consistent with

the purposes of the antitrust laws of the United States, and the

telecommunications regulatory regime of the United Kingdom. This

standard protects against overbroad modifications, and recognizes that

mere inconvenience or some hardship to a defendant will not preclude a

modification, but only ``serious'' hardship. The loss of opportunity to

profit from anticompetitive conduct is not a ``serious'' hardship

within the meaning of this standard. Any proposed modification, to be

consistent with the antitrust laws, must not be of an anticompetitive

character, and must protect competition or consumers in the United

States. Modifications must also be consistent with the system of

regulation of telecommunications in the United Kingdom.

Section VII permits the United States, where any party has sought

modifications of the Final Judgment, to invoke any of the visitorial

provisions contained in Section V of the Final Judgment in order to

obtain from defendants any information or documents needed to evaluate

the proposed modification prior to decision by the Court.

5. Visitorial and Compliance Requirements

Section V of the Final Judgment allows the Department of Justice to

monitor defendants' compliance by several means. Section V.A obliges

defendants to maintain records and documents sufficient to show their

compliance with the Final Judgment's requirements. Sections V.B and V.C

enable the United States to gain access to inspect and copy the records

and documents of defendants, and also to have access to their personnel

for interviews or to take sworn testimony. Section V.B covers access to

MCI, as well as to NewCo's operations in the United States. To avoid

difficulties that might arise in applying that visitorial procedure to

discovery directed at foreign operations of NewCo, Section V.C.

provides that NewCo documents and personnel, wherever located

(including abroad), would be produced by NewCo in the United States,

within sixty days of request in the case of documents, and subject to

the reasonable convenience of the persons involved in the case of

requests for interviews or sworn testimony. Section V.D permits the

United States also to require any defendant to submit written reports

relating to any matters contained in the Final Judgment. Finally,

Section V.E supplies confidentiality protections for information and

documents furnished by defendants to the United States under the other

provisions of Section V. It permits the Department of Justice to share

information and documents with the Federal Communications Commission

(subject to confidentiality protections), and to share information with

the Office of Telecommunications (``OFTEL''), the United Kingdom

telecommunications regulator.

6. Term of Years

Section IX.B of the proposed Final Judgment specifies that the

substantive restrictions and obligations of the Final Judgment shall

expire five years after the entry of the judgment. Five years is an

appropriate duration for the substantive provisions because the joint

venture is expected by BT and MCI to last a minimum of five years and

has been planned on that basis. In addition, MCI can enter BT's

assigned territory outside the Americas to compete with BT five years

after closing without losing its special rights in BT. The parties have

committed by separate stipulation to notify the Department whether they

will continue the joint venture six months before the expiration of the

Final Judgment's substantive requirements, giving the United States an

opportunity to decide whether it is necessary to take further action to

protect competition. The international telecommunications markets,

including the market or markets for international telecommunications

services between the United States and the United Kingdom and the

emerging market or markets for seamless global telecommunications

services, may evolve rapidly during the next five years, in part due to

the transactions under consideration in this case and the Final

Judgment. Under these circumstances, the United States does not

consider it necessary to impose a lengthier duration on the substantive

provisions of the proposed Final Judgment.

B. Effects of the Proposed Final Judgment on Competition

The transactions between BT and MCI represent the first opportunity

the Department of Justice has had to consider the competitive

consequences of the acquisition of a substantial interest in a major

United States international telecommunications provider by a foreign

telecommunications provider with market power in its home market. The

formation of an exclusive international joint venture between such

firms to provide a wide range of enhanced telecommunications services

presents additional competitive issues.

The BT-MCI joint venture may enable the parties to offer services

that they would not otherwise provide. But the BT-MCI transactions also

pose substantial risks to competition in the United States, owing to

BT's vertically integrated virtual monopoly in local services and its

dominant position in long distance domestic and international services

in the United Kingdom, which when combined with MCI's competitive long

distance services would give rise to increased incentives for BT's

market power to be used to favor MCI and NewCo and disadvantage

competitors in the United States. In other circumstances involving

vertical integration between large monopoly providers of local exchange

telecommunications services and competitive long distance providers in

the United States, the Department of Justice has obtained various forms

of relief under the antitrust laws to protect competition. See, e.g.,

United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131

(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.

1001 (1983); United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C.

1984). While the relief proposed here is not the same as in those

cases, it serves a similar competitive purpose, taking into account the

particular circumstances and risks associated with the transactions

between MCI and BT. These include the unique practices and

relationships between carriers in the provision of international

telecommunications services, the continued existence of MCI as a

separate entity following these transactions, and the involvement of a

foreign telecommunications provider subject to a distinct regulatory

regime overseas.

The United States believes that the relief proposed here, including

both the substantive restrictions and obligations and the ability of

the Court to modify the Final Judgment to respond to additional

competitive problems, will substantially benefit competition. The

ability of MCI and NewCo to realize anticompetitive advantages in the

United States will be substantially constrained.

Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will allow the transactions

between BT and MCI to proceed, and any benefits from them to be

realized by consumers. At the same time, it will provide United States

competitors with increased means to detect discrimination, protect them

against misuse of their confidential business information, and enable

them to respond to BT's provision of international simple resale

through MCI and NewCo with services of their own to the United Kingdom

that could bypass BT's international switched correspondent services

and alleviate the risks of anticompetitive conduct involving MCI and

NewCo. It will also provide the United States with a mechanism to

modify the Final Judgment, in response to post-judgment changed

circumstances or other events, without having to initiate separate

antitrust litigation. This opportunity to impose additional

restrictions on defendants to protect competition and consumers in the

United States will ensure against any possibility that the other

substantive provisions of the Final Judgment and existing regulatory

requirements may prove insufficient to protect competition. Thus, the

modification provision will serve as an additional important deterrent

to anticompetitive behavior.

IV

Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any

person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the

antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times

the damages suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither impair nor assist the

bringing of such actions. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima

facie effect in any subsequent private lawsuits that may be brought

against defendants in this matter.

In addition, persons affected by unreasonable discrimination on the

part of MCI, in violation of 47 U.S.C. 202, may complain to the Federal

Communications Commission as provided by 47 U.S.C. 208, for such relief

as is available under the Communications Act and the Commission's

regulations, or bring suit for damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 206.

Persons affected by an undue preference or undue discrimination on the

part of BT in violation of Condition 17 of BT's license, or other

violation of BT's license, in favor of MCI or NewCo, may complain to

the United Kingdom Office of Telecommunications for such relief as

OFTEL is authorized to provide under the United Kingdom

Telecommunications Act and BT's license. Entry of the proposed Final

Judgment will not impair the bringing of such complaints and actions,

and indeed will likely facilitate the effective detection and

prevention of anticompetitive conduct through existing regulatory

mechanisms.

V

Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

As provided by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, any

person believing that the proposed Final Judgment should be modified

may submit written comments to Richard L. Rosen, Chief, Communications

and Finance Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,

555 Fourth Street, N.W., Room 8104, Washington, D.C. 20001, within the

60-day period provided by the Act. These comments and the Department's

responses, will be filed with the Court and published in the Federal

Register. All comments will be given due consideration by the

Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to

the proposed Judgment at any time prior to entry. The proposed Final

Judgment provides that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action,

and the parties may apply to the Court for any order necessary or

appropriate to carry out or construe the Final Judgment, to modify or

terminate any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish

any violations of its provisions. Modifications of the Final Judgment

may be sought by the United States or by the defendants under the

standards described therein.

VI

Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

As an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, the United States

considered litigation to seek an injunction to prevent the proposed

transactions between BT and MCI. The United States rejected that

alternative because the relief in the proposed Final Judgment, together

with existing regulatory safeguards in the United States and the United

Kingdom, should provide protection against significant anticompetitive

effects on competition.

In formulating the proposed Final Judgment, the United States also

considered the extent to which the regulatory regime in the United

Kingdom and the FCC have mechanisms currently in place to address

anticompetitive conduct, including discrimination, by providers of

international telecommunications services. The United States considered

including in the Final Judgment specific nondiscrimination conditions,

enforceable through contempt sanctions, to deter discrimination by BT

in favor of MCI and NewCo. It concluded that the other provisions of

the Final Judgment, existing regulatory requirements and enforcement

practices in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the ability

of the United States to seek modifications of the Final Judgment, are

sufficient to protect competition.

The United States was not prepared to rely on existing regulation

alone to prevent harm to competition and consumers in the United

States. While the United Kingdom regulatory authorities share with the

United States a generally procompetitive approach to telecommunications

policy, protection of competition and consumers in the United States is

not the primary goal of United Kingdom regulators. There are a number

of important telecommunications regulatory issues that remain unsettled

in the United Kingdom, and some policies specifically limiting

competition remain in effect, such as the duopoly on international

facilities-based competition. Historic experience and the present state

of competition in the United States and the United Kingdom were also

taken into account in determining that this relief was needed.

Because, however, the telecommunications regulatory regime in the

United Kingdom now embodies or is developing important competitive

policies and safeguards, the United States concluded that it is

possible to protect competition adequately in these circumstances

without placing specific antidiscrimination prohibitions in the

proposed Final Judgment or prohibiting the MCI-BT transactions,

altogether, as would likely have been necessary otherwise. The

procompetitive direction of United Kingdom telecommunications

regulation is evidenced by the ending of the BT-Mercury domestic

duopoly policy in 1991, and by the more recent licensing of additional

facilities-based domestic competitors to BT and Mercury and the grant

of several international simple resale licenses to, among others,

United States firms. OFTEL, the principal U.K. telecommunications

regulatory authority, has issued a statement on interconnection and

accounting separation setting forth policies and targets for making a

wider variety of interconnection arrangements with BT available to

competitors, and creating greater transparency in the relationship

between BT's own network and retail operations. OFTEL is seeking to

improve its regulatory oversight of BT and promote greater competition

in other respects as well. In sum, the United Kingdom

telecommunications regulatory regime has taken steps to promote and

foster competition that have not yet occurred in most of the world, and

it was appropriate for the United States to take these developments

into account in not requiring more extensive relief to be included in

the proposed Final Judgment.

The United States also considered issues of international comity in

shaping the proposed Final Judgment. Consistently with its longstanding

enforcement policy, the United States sought in the substantive

provisions of the Final Judgment to avoid situations that could give

rise to international conflicts between sovereign governments and their

agencies. The substantive requirements imposed on MCI and NewCo have

been tailored so as to avoid direct United States involvement in BT's

operation of its telecommunications network in the United Kingdom on an

ongoing basis, minimizing the potential for conflict with United

Kingdom authorities.

VII

Standard of Review Under the Tunney Act for the Proposed Final Judgment

The APPA requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust

cases brought by the United States are subject to a sixty-day comment

period, after which the court shall determine whether entry of the

proposed final judgment ``is in the public interest.'' In making that

determination, the court may consider:

(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including

termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and

modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of

alternative remedies actually considered, and any other

considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;

(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public

generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the

violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the

public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the

issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e) (emphasis added). The courts have recognized that the

term ``public interest'' ``take[s] meaning from the purposes of the

regulatory legislation.'' NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662,

669 (1976); United States v. American Cynamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565

(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984). Since the purpose

of the antitrust laws is to ``preserv[e] free and unfettered

competition as the rule of trade,'' Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.

United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), the focus of the ``public

interest'' inquiry under the Tunney Act is whether the proposed final

judgment would serve the public interest in free and unfettered

competition. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 1985-2 Trade Cas.

66,651, at 63,046 (D.D.C. 1985). In conducting this inquiry, ``the

Court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended

proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of

prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree

process.''\13\ Rather,

\13\119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See United States v. Gillette

Col., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975). A ``public interest''

determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive

Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the

APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures,

15 U.S.C. 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court need

not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments have

raised significant issues and that further proceedings would aid the

court in resolving those issues. See H.R. Rep. 93-1463, 93rd Cong.

2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in (1974) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6535,

6538.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to

discharge its duty, the Court, in making the public interest

finding, should * * * carefully consider the explanations of the

government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to

comments in order to determine whether those explanations are

reasonable under the circumstances.

United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,508,

at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).

It is also unnecessary for the district court to ``engage in an

unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.''

United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981). Precedent requires that

[T]he balancing of competing social and political interests

affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the

first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The

court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring

that the government has not breached its duty to the public in

consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not

whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society,

but whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public

interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the

effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.\14\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\United States v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (quoting United

States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716). See United States v.

BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.

National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978);

see also United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d at 565.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A proposed consent decree is an agreement between the parties

which is reached after exhaustive negotiations and discussions.

Parties do not hastily and thoughtlessly stipulate to a decree

because, in doing so, they waive their right to litigate the issues

involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and

inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached

normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost

and the elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they

might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.

United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).

The proposed consent decree, therefore, should not be reviewed

under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every

anticompetitive effect of a merger or whether it mandates certainty of

free competition in the future. The court may reject the agreement of

the parties as to how the public interest is best served only if has

``exceptional confidence that adverse antitrust consequences will

result * * *'' United States v. Western Electric Co., 993 F.2d 1572,

1577 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

Court approval of a final judgment requires a standard more

flexible and less strict than the standard required for a finding of

liability. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls

short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it

falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the reaches of

public interest.'''\15\ Under the public interest standard, the court's

role is limited to determining whether the proposed decree is within

the ``zone of settlements'' consistent with the public interest, not

whether the settlement diverges from the court's view of what would

best serve the public interest. United States v. Western Electric Co.,

993 F.2d at 1576 (quoting United States v. Western Electric Co., 900

F.2d 283, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\15\United States v. American Tel. and Tel Co., 552 F. Supp.

131, 150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460

U.S. 1001 (1982) (quoting United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F.

Supp. at 716); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F. Supp.

619, 622 (W.D. Ky 1985).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII

Determinative Materials and Documents

No documents were determinative in the formulation of the proposed

Final Judgment. Consequently, the United States has not attached any

such documents to the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: June 15, 1994.

Anne K. Bingaman,

Assistant Attorney General.

Steven C. Sunshine,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Diane P. Wood,

Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Constance K. Robinson,

Director, Office of Operations, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530.

Richard L. Rosen,

Chief, Communications & Finance Section.

Jonathan M. Rich,

Assistant Chief, Communications & Finance Section.

Carl Willner,

Sara J. DeSanto,

John J. Sciortino,

Attorneys, Communications & Finance Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, 555 Fourth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001,

(202) 514-5813.

[FR Doc. 94-15453 Filed 6-24-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-M

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.