Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

Federal RegisterMay 25, 1994

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility

Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

Pursuant to Public Law 97-415, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular

biweekly notice. Public Law 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to

publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued,

under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants

the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective

any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the

Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards

consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a

request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or

proposed to be issued from May 2, 1994, through May 13, 1994. The last

biweekly notice was published on May 12, 1994 (59 FR 24745).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating

Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination,

and Opportunity for a Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following

amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation

of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis

for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown

below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public and State comments received

before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for

opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that

the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page

number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be

delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC

20555. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By June 24, 1994, the licensee may file a request for a hearing

with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility

operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local

public document room for the particular facility involved. If a request

for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above

date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,

designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition;

and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references

to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those

facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information

to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material

issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within

the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be

one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A

petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be

permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services

Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC 20555, by the

above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the

notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform

the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-

(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union

operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the

following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name

and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and

publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A

copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General

Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and

to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for a hearing will

not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the

presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment which is available for public inspection at

the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the local public document

room for the particular facility involved.

Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324,

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North

Carolina

Date of amendments request: March 25, 1994.

Description of amendments request: The proposed amendment would

make the following administrative changes to the Technical

Specifications.

Brunswick Unit 1

1. Bases Section 2.2.1: Remove references to the Rod Sequence

Control System (RSCS) in item 2 on page B 2-4.

2. Bases Section 2.2.1: Correct typographical error in acronym

for hydrogen water chemistry in item 6 on page B 2-6.

3. TS 3.1.4.1: Correct typographical errors in action d,

misspelling of preset, and action d.1, misspelling of BPWS acronym,

on page 3/4 1-14.

4. TS Table 4.3.4-1: Remove references to the RSCS in item g of

the Notes on page 3/4 3-52.

5. TS Table 3.3.5.5-1 Label each item to permit identification

consistent with the scheduling system used for surveillance testing

on pages 3/4 3-64a.

6. TS Table 4.3.5.5-1 Label each item to permit identification

consistent with the scheduling system used for surveillance testing

on page 3/4 3-64c.

7. TS 4.3.6.1.1: Correct typographical error that references

Non-existent Table 4.3.6.1.1-1 to provide correct reference of Table

4.3.6.1-1 on page 3/4 3-88.

8. TS 3.4.2: Correct typographical error indicating extraneous

second footnote on page 3/4 4-4.

Brunswick Unit 2

1. TS Table 2.2.1-1: Correct typographical error in item 2.b

under allowable values by changing 115% to 115.5% on page 2-4.

2. Bases Section 2.2.1: Remove references to the Rod Sequence

Control System (RSCS) in item 2 on page B 2-4.

3. Bases Section 2.2.1: Remove references to the Rod Sequence

Control System in item 10 and revise bases description of the Select

of the Select Rod Insertion consistent with removal of the RSCS on

pages.

4. TS 3.1.4.1: Correct typographical error in action d.1 to

correct misspelling of BPWS acronym on page 3/4 1-14.

5. TS Table 4.3.1-1: Correct grammatical omission of the word

``is'' in item e of the Notes on page 3/4 3-9.

6. TS Table 4.3.1-1: Remove references to the RSCS in item g of

the Notes on page 3/4 3-52.

7. TS Table 3.3.5.5-1: Label each item to permit identification

consistent with the scheduling system used for surveillance testing

on page 3/4 3-64a.

8. TS Table 4.3.5.5-1: Label each item to permit identification

consistent with the scheduling system used for surveillance testing

on page 3/4 3-64c.

9. TS 3.3.6.2: Eliminate footnote, revise applicability

statement and correct typographical errors in actions d and e that

references non-existent Specification on page 3/4 3-93.

10. Base Section 3/4.1.4: Correct identification of Reference

cited to reference 6 on page B 3/4 1-4.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated because the proposed change [sic] is

administrative in nature. These changes do not alter the

configuration or operation of the facility. The Limiting Safety

Systems Settings and Safety Limits specified in the current

Technical Specifications remain unchanged.

2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated. The safety analysis of the facility remains complete and

accurate. There are no physical changes to the facility and the

plant conditions for which the design basis accidents have been

evaluated are still valid. The operating procedure and emergency

procedures are unaffected with the possible exception of resolving

special notations that may have recognized the typographical errors

that are being corrected.

3. The margins of safety are established through the Limiting

Conditions of Operation, Limiting Safety Systems Settings and Safety

Limits specified in the Technical Specifications. Since there are no

changes to the physical design or operation of the facility, these

margins will not be changed.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of North Carolina

at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road,

Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297.

Attorney for licensee: R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power

& Light Company, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.

NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck

Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: January 28, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will

remove an exception for the purge and vent valves from surveillance

requirement (SR) 4.6.1.2.d and remove SR 4.6.1.2.f.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed changes do not involve an [significant hazards

consideration] SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change modifies SR 4.6.1.2.d. Currently this SR

indicates the purge supply and exhaust valves have an exception from

the 10CFR50 Appendix J, Type B and C tests. The proposed technical

specification change is consistent with current surveillance

procedures and the [Final Safety Analysis Report] FSAR. The second

proposed change, which removes SR 4.6.1.2.f, reflects current

containment leakage surveillance requirements. The present location

of SR 4.6.1.2.f could imply that containment leakage surveillance

requirements are met by performing SR 4.9.9. However, SR 4.9.9 is

applicable only during core alterations or movement of irradiated

fuel and not during the modes when Technical Specification 3.6.1.2

is applicable. These changes have no effect on actual Appendix J

testing of valves or the current plant accident analysis. Therefore,

the proposed changes cannot increase the probability or consequences

of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any previously analyzed.

The proposed changes do not introduce any new failure modes. The

plant will continue to operate as designed and there will be no

change to the testing of valves. The proposed changes will not

modify the plant response to the point where it can be considered a

new accident. Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident form any

previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes modify SR 4.6.1.2.d which, as presently

written, indicates that the purge supply and exhaust valves are an

exception to the 10CFR50 Appendix J, Type B and C test and

therefore, no exception is required. This is supported by current

surveillance procedures which include the purge supply and exhaust

valves as part of the Type B and C tests. In addition, the proposed

changes are consistent with the FSAR. FSAR Table 7.3-1 ``Containment

Penetrations,'' lists the purge supply and exhaust valves as

required to receive Type B and C tests. Therefore, these proposed

changes revise SR 4.6.1.2.d to reflect actual surveillance

procedures and offer no revisions or reductions to current

surveillance testing. Therefore, these changes will not result in a

significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Russell Library, 123 Broad

Street, Middletown, Connecticut 06457.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry &

Howard, Counselors at Law, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-

3499.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian

Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York

Date of amendment request: April 13, 1994

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment request

would revise the Technical Specifications to amend Sections 3.1.F and

4.13 to allow the repair of steam generator tubes by sleeving as an

alternative to plugging. Additionally, a new tube acceptance criteria,

F*, is proposed which would allow tubes that are degraded in a location

not affecting structural integrity of the tube to remain in service.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92, the

proposed Technical Specification change is deemed to involve no

significant hazards considerations because operation of Indian Point

Unit No. 2 would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated since the integrity

of the steam generator tubes after sleeving will be equivalent to

that of the original tubes. The sleeve, sleeve joint, and F* joint

have been analyzed and tested for design, operating, and faulted

condition loadings in accordance with NRC Regulatory [G]uide 1.121

safety factors. The potential for a tube rupture is not increased

with sleeving or F*. At worst case, a tube leak would occur,

resulting in a small primary to secondary leak. Primary to secondary

leakage occurring from within the sleeved or F* portions of the tube

is bounded by the steam generator tube rupture scenario evaluated in

the Final Safety Analysis Report. In addition, the steam generator

tube remains capable of performing its required heat transfer

function. Placing a sleeve in the steam generator tube or leaving a

tube in service with a defect in a portion of the tube that provides

no function results in a more efficient steam generator than

plugging an affected tube. Thus, the consequences of any accident

previously evaluated are not increased because the structural

integrity and the heat transfer capability of the steam generators

are not significantly altered by the proposed change.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously evaluated because both the

structural integrity and the heat transfer capability of the steam

generators will not be significantly affected by the use of either

of the sleeving processes or the implementation of the F* criteria.

Testing and previous experience indicate that any primary to

secondary leakage would be well below technical specification

limits. In addition, in the unlikely event the defective tube failed

completely at the defect, the remaining sleeve end or F* joint would

restrain tube movement due to the sleeve end geometry or length of

expanded contact within the tubesheet bore. Therefore, there is no

threat to adjacent tubes and no other plant systems will be affected

by this change. Thus, there is no potential for a new or different

kind of accident.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The

heat transfer capabilities of Indian Point 2 Steam Generators will

be improved by utilizing the proposed sleeving process or

implementing the F* criteria rather than the currently required tube

plugging and subsequent loss of heat transfer area. The proposed

change will allow a repaired (sleeved) tube or a tube with a tube

end defect below the F* distance to remain in service, rather than

completely blocking the tube's flow with plugs. Because the

structural integrity of the tubes will be unaltered, the net effect

of implementing the proposed change, rather than the currently

required plugging procedure, will be an increase in the heat

transfer characteristics of the steam generator. Westinghouse has

done an evaluation of selected LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident] and

non-LOCA transients to verify that use of sleeves resulting in a

plugging equivalency at the current plant limit will not have an

adverse affect on the thermal-hydraulic performance of the plant.

Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library,

100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10610.

Attorney for licensee: Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq., 4 Irving Place,

New York, New York 10003.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra.

Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren

County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: November 15, 1991, as supplemented

February 22, March 11, and April 7, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The amendment request, as

submitted November 15, 1991, proposed completely rewritten requirements

for the instrumentation and control (I&C) sections of the Palisades

Technical Specifications (TS) and was initially noticed in the Federal

Register October 28, 1992 (57 FR 48819). Since that time the licensee

has updated its submittal, providing (1) changes to pages affected by

intervening amendments, (2) clarifications suggested by NRC and

Palisades reviewers, (3) addition of two instrument channels to the

accident monitoring instruments Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO),

(4) deletion of surveillance requirements for safety injection tank

(SIT) instruments, as suggested by Generic Letter (GL) 93-05, ``Line-

Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance

Requirements for Testing During Power Operation,'' and (5) addition of

a general ``Applicability'' LCO which appears in the Standard TS but

not in the Palisades TS. Changes (4) and (5) were not addressed in the

initial proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSH)

determination. The licensee's NSH analysis for these two changes was

provided in its April 7, 1994, letter to the NRC and is discussed

below.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

Consumers Power Company finds that activities associated with

the February 22, 1994 and March 11, 1994 Instrument and Control

Technical Specification change revisions include no significant

hazards; and accordingly, a no significant hazards determination in

accordance with 10CFR50.92(c) is justified. The following summary

supports the finding that the proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Neither the deletion of instrument surveillance requirements for

the Safety Injection Tank (SIT) instrumentation nor the addition of

allowance of temporarily returning inoperable equipment to service

for maintenance or testing would affect the probability or

consequences of an accident.

The SIT instrument channels themselves have no accident

function. Their only purpose is to allow verification that the SITs

themselves are operable. Surveillance requirements for these

instruments were purposely deleted from STS during the Technical

Specification Improvement Program. Their removal from Technical

Specifications was suggested in GL 93-05.

Returning inoperable equipment to service as allowed by LCO

3.0.5 is necessary if failed channels are to be restored to operable

status. The restoration of such channels enhances the ability to

monitor for and mitigate abnormal operating conditions and

accidents.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes would not alter the operating conditions of

the plant systems, and would not reduce the reliability of any plant

safety equipment.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes would not affect the setpoints, capacities,

or operating limits for any equipment. Therefore, the proposed

changes do not involve a significant reduction of a margin of

safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request, as revised, involves no significant hazards

consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Van Wylen Library, Hope

College, Holland, Michigan 49423.

Attorney for licensee: Judd L. Bacon, Esquire, Consumers Power

Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201.

NRC Project Director: Ledyard B. Marsh.

Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50-255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren

County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: April 7, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

change certain Technical Specifications (TS) to relocate fuel cycle-

specific parameter limits that can generally change with core reloads

to a Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) in accordance with the

guidance of Generic Letter 88-16, ``Removal of Cycle-Specific Parameter

Limits from Technical Specifications.'' Several of the TS bases would

also be revised to refer to limits relocated to the COLR. In each case

where TS limits would be relocated to the COLR, the limits placed in

the COLR would be unchanged and the appropriate bases would be revised

accordingly.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

The following evaluation supports the finding that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed TS would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the TS simply move the values and

parameters for fuel cycle-specific limits from the TS to a Core

Operating Limits Report (COLR). The requirements to maintain the

plant within appropriate bounds are retained in the TS. The values

of the cycle-specific parameter limits in the COLR are determined

using an NRC-approved methodology and remain consistent with all

applicable limits of the plant safety analyses that are addressed in

the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). A requirements for the COLR

and identification of the approved methodology documents are added

to the TS. There are no associated changes in plant operation.

Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

TS would not result in a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any previously evaluated.

As discussed above, the proposed changes do not remove or

alleviate any requirements to maintain the plant within the

appropriate bounds. There are no associated changes in plant

operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with

the proposed TS would not create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes to the TS simply move the values and

parameters for cycle-specific limits from the Specifications to a

Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). The requirements to maintain

the plant within appropriate bounds are retained in the TS. The

values of the cycle-specific parameter limits in the COLR are

determined using an NRC-approved methodology and remain consistent

with all applicable limits of the plant safety analyses that are

addressed in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). A requirement

for the COLR and identification of the approved methodology

documents are added to the TS. There are no associated changes in

plant operation. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance

with the proposed TS would not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Van Wylen Library, Hope

College, Holland, Michigan 49423.

Attorney for licensee: Judd L. Bacon, Esquire, Consumers Power

Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201.

NRC Project Director: Ledyard B. Marsh.

Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi-2, Monroe County,

Michigan

Date of amendment request: March 29, 1994, as corrected April 26,

1994.

Date of amendment request: March 29, 1994, as corrected April 26,

1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

modify the surveillance requirements for scram discharge volume vent

and drain valves and isolation actuation instrumentation and modify the

required actions and surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel

generators to reduce testing during power operation. These changes are

in accordance with guidance contained in Generic Letter (GL) 93-05

``Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce

Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation,'' dated

September 27, 1993.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the frequency of testing for these

components will reduce the probability of failure due to wear and

eliminate the possibility of initiating transients during testing of

these components. Therefore, the proposed changes will result in a

decrease in the probability of previously evaluated accidents.

Further, the proposed changes do not alter the design, function, or

operation of the components involved and therefore, do not affect

the consequences of any previously evaluated accident.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated. As stated above, the proposed changes do not alter the

design, function, or operation of the components involved and

therefore, no new accident scenarios are created.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety. As developed in Reference 3 [NUREG-1366,

``Improvement to Technical Specification Surveillance

Requirements,'' dated December 1992] and endorsed in Reference 2 [GL

93-05], the proposed changes to the testing frequency will increase

the margin of safety through reduced equipment wear and elimination

of opportunities to induce transients.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Monroe County Library System,

3700 South Custer Road, Monroe, Michigan 48161.

Attorney for licensee: John Flynn, Esq., Detroit Edison Company,

2000 Second Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48226.

NRC Project Director: Ledyard B. Marsh.

Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi-2, Monroe County,

Michigan

Date of amendment request: April 26, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

relocate tables of instrument response time limits from the Technical

Specifications to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in

accordance with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 93-08 dated

December 29, 1993.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes delete and subsequently relocate the details of

Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-2, ``REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

RESPONSE TIMES,'' Table 3.3.2-3, ``ISOLATION ACTUATION SYSTEM

INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME,'' and Table 3.3.3-3, ``EMERGENCY CORE

COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES,'' consistent with the guidance

provided by Generic Letter 93-08 dated, December 29, 1993, entitled,

``Relocation of Technical Specification Tables of Instrument

Response Time Limits.'' Generic Letter 93-08 recommends the removal

and subsequent relocation of various Technical Specification tables

which denote instrument and system response time limits. The

response time limits and associated footnotes are proposed to be

relocated to the Fermi 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR). This allows Fermi 2 to administratively control subsequent

changes to the response time limit tables in accordance with 10 CFR

50.59. The procedures which contain the various response time limits

are also subject to the change control provisions in the

Administrative Controls section of the Technical Specifications. The

proposed change only relocates the existing response time limits.

The Surveillance Requirements and associated Actions are not

affected and remain in the Technical Specifications. Relocating this

information does not affect the initial conditions of a design basis

accident or transient analysis. Since any subsequent changes to the

UFSAR or procedures are evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59,

no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated is allowed. Further, the proposed changes do

not alter the design, function, or operation of the components

involved and therefore, do not affect the consequences of any

previously evaluated accident.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated. The proposed changes will not impose any different

operational or surveillance requirements. The changes propose to

relocate these response time limit tables to other plant documents

whereby adequate control of information is maintained. Further, as

stated above, the proposed changes do not alter the design,

function, or operation of the components involved and therefore, no

new accident scenarios are created.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety. The proposed change will not reduce a margin

of safety because it has no impact on any safety analysis

assumption. The proposed change does not alter the scope of

equipment currently required to be OPERABLE or subject to

surveillance testing nor does the proposed change affect any

instrument setpoints or equipment safety functions. In addition, the

values to be transposed from the Technical Specifications to the

UFSAR are the same as the exiting Technical Specifications. Since

any future changes to these requirements in the UFSAR or procedures

will be evaluated per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, no reduction

in a margin of safety is allowed. Therefore, the change does not

involve a significant reduction in margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Monroe County Library System,

3700 South Custer Road, Monroe, Michigan 48161.

Attorney for licensee: John Flynn, Esq., Detroit Edison Company,

2000 Second Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48226.

NRC Project Director: Ledyard B. Marsh.

Duke Power Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414, Catawba

Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, York County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: March 30, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would

allow the analog channel operational test interval for radiation

monitoring instrumentation to be increased from monthly to quarterly.

The proposed amendments are said by the licensee to be consistent with

NRC staff recommendations and guidance contained in NUREG-1366,

``Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements,''

and Generic Letter 93-05, ``Line-Item Technical Specifications

Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During

Power Operation.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1

The requested amendments will not involve a significant increase

in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated. Decreasing the frequency of the radiation monitor analog

channel operational test from monthly to quarterly will have no

impact upon the probability of any accident, since the radiation

monitors are not accident initiating equipment. Also, no credit is

taken in accident analyses for automatic actions performed by

radiation monitors contained in Catawba's Technical Specifications,

so the requested amendments will have no adverse impact upon the

consequences of any accident.

Criterion 2

The requested amendments will not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated. As stated above, the radiation monitors are not accident

initiating equipment. No new failure modes can be created from an

accident standpoint. The plant will not be operated in a different

manner.

Criterion 3

The requested amendments will not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety. Plant safety margins will be

unaffected by the proposed changes. No safety equipment which is

taken credit for in accident analyses will be affected by the

requested amendments. The availability of the affected radiation

monitors will be increased as a result of the proposed amendments

because the monitors will not have to be made unavailable for

testing as frequently. In addition, radiation monitor operating

experience supports the proposed amendments. Finally, the proposed

amendments are consistent with the NRC position and guidance set

forth in NUREG-1366 and Generic Letter 93-05.

Based upon the preceding analyses, Duke Power Company concludes

that the requested amendments do not involve a significant hazards

consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: York County Library, 138 East

Black Street, Rock Hill, South Carolina 29730.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Albert Carr, Duke Power Company, 422

South Church Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28242.

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews.

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey

Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of amendment request: April 19, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications (TS) 4.0.5 a,

``Applicability--Surveillance Requirements.'' The licensee proposes to

delete the wording ``. . . (g), except where specific written relief

has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR, Section

50.55a(g)(6)(i)'' in TS 4.0.5 a, for the inservice inspection and

testing programs. With the revisions to the Technical Specifications,

upon finding an ASME Code requirement impractical because of

prohibitive dose rates or limitations in the design, construction, or

system configuration, the licensee may implement the relief request

once it has been submitted to the NRC provided it has been: (1)

Acceptably reviewed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59; (2) approved by the plant

staff in accordance with the administrative process described in the

inservice inspection and testing programs administrative procedures;

and (3) reviewed and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendments remove the wording ``. . . (g), except

where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission

pursuant to 10 CFR, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i)'', provided a 10 CFR

50.59 evaluation is performed. The Inservice Inspection and Testing

Programs are described in the Technical Specifications pursuant to

10 CFR 50.55a. In addition, the proposed amendments, in accordance

with NUREG 1431 and draft NUREG 1482, provide relief to the ASME

code requirement in the interim between the time of submittal of a

relief request until the NRC has issued a safety evaluation and

granted the relief. The changes being proposed are administrative in

nature and do not affect assumptions contained in plant safety

analyses, the physical design and/or operation of the plant, nor do

they affect Technical Specifications that preserve safety analysis

assumptions. Any relief from the approved ASME Section XI code

requirements will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure no

Technical Specification changes or unreviewed safety questions

exist. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the

proposed amendments would not affect the probability or consequences

of an accident previously analyzed.

(2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The changes being proposed are administrative in nature and will

not change the physical plant or the modes of operation defined in

the Facility License. The change does not involve the addition or

modification of equipment nor does it alter the design or operation

of plant systems. Any reliefs from the approved ASME Section XI code

requirements will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure no

Technical Specification changes or unreviewed safety questions

exist. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the

proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

The changes being proposed are administrative in nature and do

not alter the bases for assurance that safety-related activities are

performed correctly or the basis for any Technical Specification

that is related to the establishment of or maintenance of a safety

margin. Any reliefs from the approved ASME Section XI code

requirements will require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to ensure no

Technical Specification changes or unreviewed safety questions

exist. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the

proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International

University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.

Attorney for licensee: Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzer,

P.C., 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow.

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey

Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of amendment request: April 19, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications by increasing the

surveillance interval specified for air or smoke flow test through the

containment spray header from ``at least once per 5 years'' to ``at

least once per 10 years.'' The licensee stated that the proposed

surveillance interval is consistent with both Generic Letter 93-05,

``Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce

Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation'' and

NUREG-1366, ``Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance

Requirements.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendments extend the surveillance interval

required for performing a qualitative smoke or air flow test on the

containment spray headers. This surveillance test is not designed to

track degradation of equipment by monitoring or trending

performance. The air and smoke flow test is a test of the passive

design of the containment spray nozzles, i.e., the testing

demonstrates whether or not the nozzles are clogged. A single

failure rendering a significant number of nozzles inoperable as a

result of clogging is considered not credible. The changes being

proposed do not affect assumptions contained in plant safety

analyses, the physical design and/or operation of the plant, nor do

they affect Technical Specifications that preserve safety analysis

assumptions. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with

the proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

(2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendments extend the surveillance interval

required for performing a qualitative smoke or air flow test on the

containment spray headers. The changes being proposed will not

change the physical plant or the modes of plant operation defined in

the Facility License. The change does not involve the addition or

modification of equipment nor does it alter the design or operation

of plant systems. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance

with the proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed

amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

The revised surveillance interval proposed by this submittal

will not change or otherwise influence the degree of operability

assumed for the containment spray system in the plant safety

analyses. The changes being proposed do not alter the bases for

assurance that safety-related activities are performed correctly or

the basis for any Technical Specification that is related to the

establishment of or maintenance of a safety margin. Therefore,

operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments

would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International

University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.

Attorney for licensee: Harold F. Reis, Esquire, Newman and Holtzer,

P.C., 1615 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.

NRC Project Director: Herbert N. Berkow.

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek

Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: April 15, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment requests

the deletion of the audit program frequency requirements from Technical

Specification (TS) 6.5.3 and to utilize the Operational Quality

Assurance (OQA) Plan as the controlling document. This change will

introduce more flexibility into audit scheduling to consider plant

activities and performance. In addition, a minor editorial change has

been incorporated correcting a reference in TS 6.5.1.14 in response to

a finding in the Operational Safety Team Inspection report of December

23, 1993.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

GPU Nuclear has determined that this [Technical Specification

change request] TSCR poses no significant hazard as defined by the NRC

in 10 CFR 50.92.

1. These changes do not affect the function of any system or

component. Therefore, they do not increase the probability of

occurrence or consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the

[Safety Analysis Report] SAR.

2. These changes do not involve a physical change to plant

configuration and they do not affect the performance of any

equipment. Therefore, they do not create the possibility of an

accident or malfunction of a different type than previously

identified.

3. The shifting of the audit frequency requirements from the

Technical Specifications to the OQA Plan and the extension of the

maximum interval between audits of certain areas do not change the

activities to be audited nor the scope of individual audits.

Furthermore, audit frequencies are not associated with the margin of

safety in the bases of any Technical Specification.

Therefore, the margin of safety is not affected by this change.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Ocean County Library,

Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, New Jersey

08753.

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire. Shaw,

Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek

Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: April 19, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed change updates and

clarifies Technical Specification 3.4.B.1 to be consistent with

existing Specifications 1.39 and 4.3.D (ASME Code Section XI, Article

5000 requirements).

The requested change would delete reference to the ASME Code

Section XI, IS-5000 ten year hydrotest inspection interval and replace

this with references to: (1) The Technical Specification 1.39

definition for Reactor Vessel Pressure Testing, and (2) the Technical

Specification 3.3.A.(i) Reactor Vessel Pressure Testing limits (P/T and

250 deg.F maximum test temperature).

The requested change will clarify that the five electromatic relief

valves' (EMRV) pressure relief function may be inoperable or bypassed

during system pressure testing required by ASME Code Section XI,

Article IWA-5000, including system leakage and hydrostatic test, with

reactor vessel completely solid, core not critical and Technical

Specification 3.2.A (Core Reactivity limits) satisfied.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The requested change will not involve a significant increase

in the probability or consequence of any accident previously

evaluated because this change: (a) Merely updates and clarifies

Technical Specification 3.4.B.1 to be consistent with other existing

Technical Specifications, (b) contains no adverse changes to any

existing safety function necessary for the reactor vessel solid,

core not critical condition, and (c) makes no modification or

physical changes to plant equipment, performance or operation

necessary to respond to accidents for the reactor vessel solid, core

not critical condition.

2. The requested change does not create the possibility of a new

or different accident from any accident previously evaluated because

this change: (a) Merely updates and clarifies Technical

Specification 3.4.B.1 to be consistent with other existing Technical

Specifications, (b) contains no adverse changes to any existing

safety function necessary for the reactor vessel solid, core not

critical condition, and (c) over pressure protection would continue

to be provided by the code safety valves when the EMRV pressure

relief function is bypassed.

3. A significant reduction in margin of safety is not involved

because even though the EMRV pressure relief function is bypassed,

over pressure protection would continue to be provided by the code

safety valves. Elimination of this relief function does not affect

the reactor safety analysis, since credit was not taken for the EMRV

pressure relief function . . . .

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Ocean County Library,

Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, New Jersey

08753.

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire. Shaw,

Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Gulf States Utilities Company, Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit

1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: March 15, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

revise the technical specifications (TS) by removing TS 3/4.3.8,

``Turbine Overspeed Protection System,'' from the TS and relocating it

to an administratively controlled document.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

Does the change involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

This change request proposes deletion of Technical Specification

3/4.3.8, ``Turbine Overspeed Protection System'' and relocates this

requirement to an existing plant program. The purpose of overspeed

protection is to minimize the possible generation of turbine

fragment missiles. Excessive overspeed could potentially result in

the generation of missiles which could impact and damage safety

related components, equipment or structures, depending on the size

and trajectory of the missiles. The proposed deletion of this

specification is based on the low probability of the generation of a

damaging turbine missile and other existing performance

verifications of the overspeed protection system.

The turbine-generator orientation at RBS [River Bend Station] is

a ``favorable'' orientation for reducing the probability of damage

to safety-related equipment from turbine missiles since all safety-

related components and structures are located in the axial direction

from the turbine-generator. Turbine Overspeed Protection System is

necessary for protection of the turbine from only an operational and

economic point of view. The system is not essential to mitigating

the consequences of an accident. The system is not used in an

initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis.

The probability of damage to safety-related equipment based on

turbine manufacturer's turbine failure data was calculated to be

1.473 x 10-8 per year and is acceptably low based on the

probability of turbine failure data of 4.75x10-7 per year as

recommended by NUREG-0800. Therefore, this proposed change does not

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of

an accident previously evaluated.

Does the change create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The change proposes to relocate this requirement to an existing

plant program, whereby adequate control of information is

maintained. The proposed change does not necessitate a physical

alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will

be installed) or changes to parameters governing normal plant

operation. The proposed change will not impose any different

operational or surveillance requirements. No new failure modes are

introduced. Therefore, this proposed change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety?

The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because

it has no impact on any safety analysis assumption. The proposed

change does not alter the scope of equipment currently required to

be OPERABLE or subject to surveillance testing, nor does the

proposed change affect any instrument setpoints or equipment safety

functions. The favorable orientation of the turbine provides a

margin of safety such that the possibility of missile damage to

safety-related equipment is acceptably low. Therefore the change

does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Government Documents

Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803.

Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & Strawn,

1400 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 20005.

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner.

Houston Lighting & Power Company, City Public Service Board of San

Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, City of Austin, Texas, Docket

Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda

County, Texas

Date of amendment request: April 28, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to revise

Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.e to add an

option which will allow the personnel airlock pneumatic system leak

test to be completed in 8 hours with a pressure drop of 0.50 psi. The

technical specifications currently require that the door seal pneumatic

system be demonstrated operable by verifying that the system pressure

does not decay more than 1.5 psi within 24 hours. The change to an 8-

hour test will expedite return to power following an outage since the

test is on the critical path for restart following outages.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase

in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

The door pneumatic seal system pressure drop test is not altered

except for providing an option to utilize a reduced test duration. A

conservative acceptance criteria of 0.50 psi will be assigned to the

optional short duration test thus maintaining the operability of the

pneumatic seal system. The proposed change does not alter equipment

or assumptions made in previously evaluated accidents, therefore the

consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not increased.

The probability of an accident is also unaffected because the seals

are not a potential accident initiator.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

With a conservative acceptance criteria of 0.50 psi assigned to

the optional 8 hour door pneumatic seal system pressure drop test

the capability of the door pneumatic seal system to maintain 65 psig

to the airlock seals, for a minimum of 15 days upon a loss of

instrument air, is assured. Loss of plant supply air is the accident

evaluated in the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report]

section 3.8.2.1.2 and plant specification 2C269SS0006. The proposed

change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety.

To ensure the pneumatic seal system pressure drop test is not

compromised, a conservative acceptance criteria of 0.50 psi will be

assigned to the 8 hour test. With the conservative acceptance

criteria, the proposed change does not involve a significant

reduction in the margin of safety previously evaluated.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Wharton County Junior College,

J. M. Hodges Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, Texas 77488.

Attorney for licensee: Jack R. Newman, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger,

P.C., 1615 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

NRC Project Director: Suzanne C. Black.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook

Station, Unit No. 1 Rockingham, New Hampshire

Date of amendment request: January 14, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

change the Technical Specifications (TS) to specify the composition of

the Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) based on experience and

expertise vice organizational position, to implement a Station

Qualified Reviewer Program (SQRP), to delete the requirement for

periodic procedure reviews, to revise the time within which the Nuclear

Safety Audit Review Committee (NSARC) must issue reports and minutes,

and to incorporate a number of editorial changes. The editorial changes

would delete certain items that are no longer applicable, would remove

inconsistencies involving the names of systems and equipment and NSARC

function, composition, and use of alternates, and would correct the

value for the reactor coolant system volume. Other editorial changes

would be made for document format consistency. The proposed amendment

would affect the following TS Sections and tables: 1.31, 3.3.3.6,

3.4.1.2, 4.6.3.2, 3.7.1.2, 3/4 10.6, 5.4.2, 6.3, and 6.4, and Table

4.3-1.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis

against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is

presented below.

A. The changes do not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated (10 CFR

50.92(c)(1)).

The proposed redefinition of the composition of the SORC would not

diminish the effectiveness of the SORC and would continue to ensure

that the SORC has the desired experience and expertise to advise the

Station Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety. The proposed

change would permit operational flexibility and eliminate the need for

an amendment whenever organizational changes occur. The proposed SQRP

would not reduce the level of procedure review, since the SORC

continues to retain responsibility to review any document requiring an

evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The SQRP would be limited to

reviewing procedures that do not affect nuclear safety.

Deleting the requirement to periodically review procedures would

not diminish the review process for procedures since other programmatic

requirements would continue to assure procedures are reviewed and

revised when necessary.

The proposed extension of time for preparing and forwarding NSARC

meeting minutes would not affect safe operation of the facility.

Significant safety concerns or unreviewed safety questions would still

be brought to the attention of the Senior Vice President without

waiting for the release of the NSARC meeting minutes. The change would

not impede in any manner prompt communication of significant concerns

to the Senior Vice President. The proposed changes do not affect the

manner by which the facility is operated and do not change any facility

design feature or equipment. The proposed changes involve

administrative or programmatic requirements or merely involve editorial

changes, corrections, or clarifications. Since there is no change to

the facility or operating procedures, there is no effect upon the

probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

B. The changes do not create the possibility of a new or different

kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated (10 CFR

50.92(c)(2)) because they do not affect the manner by which the

facility is operated and do not change any facility design feature or

equipment which affects the operational characteristics of the

facility. The proposed changes involve administrative or programmatic

requirements or merely involve editorial changes, corrections, or

clarifications.

C. The changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin

of safety (10 CFR 50.92(c)(3)) because the proposed changes do not

affect the manner by which the facility is operated or involve

equipment or features which affect the operational characteristics of

the facility.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR

50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine

that the amendment request involves no significant hazards

consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Exeter Public Library, 47

Front Street, Exeter, New Hampshire 03833.

Attorney for licensee: Thomas Dignan, Esquire, Ropes & Gray, One

International Place, Boston, Massachusetts 02110-2624.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-423,

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County,

Connecticut

Date of amendment request: February 10, 1992, as supplemented April

14, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

remove two tables from the Technical Specifications (TS) which list

reactor trip system (RTS) instrumentation response times and engineered

safety features actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation response

times. These tables will be placed in the Millstone 3 Technical

Requirements Manual.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards

consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to remove the RTS and ESFAS response times

from the Technical Specifications will not affect the operation of

the RTS and ESFAS. Operability and surveillance requirements are

still maintained in the Technical Specifications and the response

times will be included and maintained in the plant operating

procedures. A safety evaluation and PORC [Plant Operations Review

Committee] review will be required for the limits to be changed.

Since the systems will not be affected by the proposed changes,

there is no impact on the performance of these systems or the

consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any previously evaluated.

There are no new failure modes associated with the proposed

changes. Since the plant will continue to operate as designed, the

proposed changes will not modify the plant response to the point

where it can be considered a new accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes do not have any adverse impact on the

protective boundaries nor do they affect the consequences of any

accident previously analyzed. The Technical Specification

operability and surveillance requirements will still ensure that the

systems are tested and within the limits. Changing the limits

requires a safety evaluation and PORC review which will ensure that

the licensing basis is maintained. Therefore, the proposed changes

will not impact the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any

Technical Specification.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry &

Howard, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: April 22, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

delete the requirements regarding the condenser air ejector monitor

from Tables 3.3-12 and 4.3-12 of the Millstone Unit 2 Technical

Specifications.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed technical specification change has been reviewed

against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92, and it has been determined not to

involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). Specifically, the

proposed change does not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

Deleting the operability and surveillance requirements for the

condenser air ejector monitor from Tables 3.3-12 and 4.3-12 of the

Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications would leave the steam

generator blowdown monitor as the primary method of monitoring and

isolating steam generator blowdown. The proposed license amendment

imposes stricter limitations on the operation of Millstone Unit No.

2, because it requires the use of a single monitor, the steam

generator blowdown monitor, to meet the requirements of Millstone

Unit No. 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 (Table 3.3-12).

While NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] is proposing to

delete the operability and surveillance requirements for the

condenser air ejector monitor from the Millstone Unit No. 2

Technical Specifications, there are no plans to change any of the

design features or functions or the condenser air ejector monitor,

or any of the specified surveillances or frequency for such

surveillances. The condenser air ejector monitor will continue to

isolate blowdown upon a high radiation alarm.

Additionally, steam generator blowdown isolation is required to

ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20. It is not required to ensure

compliance with 10 CFR 100. Therefore, the condenser air ejector

monitor does not perform any safety function. The condenser air

ejector monitor is not safety related. It is not credited in any

radiological consequence calculations presented in the Millstone

Unit No. 2 FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report].

Based on the above, this proposed license amendment does not

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of

an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

form any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed license amendment does not involve any physical

changes to plant equipment or any changes to plant procedures that

would be a precursor to an accident. NNECO has no plans to change

any of the specified surveillances or frequency for such

surveillances. The condenser air ejector monitor will continue to

isolate blowdown upon a high radiation alarm. Also, the proposed

license amendment imposes stricter limitations on the operation of

Millstone Unit No. 2 because it requires the use of a single

monitor, the steam generator blowdown monitor, to meet the

requirements of Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.9

(Table 3.3-12). Therefore, this proposed license amendment does not

create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident form

any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Deleting the operability and surveillance requirements for the

condenser air ejector monitor from Tables 3.3-12 and 4.3-12 of the

Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications would leave the steam

generator blowdown monitor as the primary method of monitoring and

isolating steam generator blowdown. The proposed license amendment

imposes stricter limitations on the operation of Millstone Unit No.

2, because it requires the use of a single monitor, the steam

generator blowdown monitor, to meet the requirements of Millstone

Unit No. 2 Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 (Table 3.3-12).

Therefore, this proposed license amendment does not impact or reduce

the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry &

Howard, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: April 22, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

modify the Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specification Table 3.3-9 by

eliminating the measurement range of 10-1-104 counts per

second (CPS) for the entry regarding the ``Wide Range Logarithmic

Neutron Flux Monitor.'' Also the amendment would correct a few

typographical and editorial errors on page V of the Index for the

Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

NNECO [Northeast Nuclear Energy Company] has reviewed the proposed

changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90 and has concluded that the

changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The

basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c)

are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because

the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

NNECO's proposal to eliminate the CPS scale for the ``Wide Range

Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor'' entry in Millstone Unit No. 2

Technical Specification Table 3.3-9 will not affect the ability of

Millstone Unit No. 2 to meet the intent and purpose of panel C-21's

original design.

The 10-8% to 100% power scale overlaps the CPS scale. The

range of 10-8% to 100% power for the ``Wide Range Logarithmic

Neutron Flux Monitor'' is adequate to permit the operators to bring

the unit to hot shutdown from outside the control room. Also, the

instruments on C-21 are not used to provide the start-up rate signal

during start-up or refueling operations. This proposed license

amendment does not impact the performance of any safety-related

component, system, or structure.

A review of the original design drawings concluded that this

proposed change is consistent with the original plant design, and

reflects the actual as-built condition of the unit. The original

design drawings show that the wide range logarithmic neutron flux

indicators only receive a percent power signal.

NNECO's proposals to rectify a few typographical and editorial

errors on page V of the Index for the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical

Specifications are administrative in nature. They ensure that the

Index accurately reflects the contents of the technical

specifications.

Based on the above, the proposed license amendment does not

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of

an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any previously analyzed.

The proposed license amendment does not impact the performance

of any safety-related component, system, or structure. Panel C-21 is

required to permit the operators to bring the unit to a hot shutdown

condition from a location outside the control room. Deleting the CPS

range for the ``Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor'' does

not affect the ability of the operators to accomplish this function.

Also, the proposed change is consistent with the original design of

the plant. The proposed license amendment cannot create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident form any

previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

NNECO's proposal to eliminate the CPS scale for the wide range

logarithmic neutron flux monitors will not affect the ability of

Millstone Unit No. 2 to meet the intent and purpose of panel C-21's

original design. The 10-8% to 100% power scale overlaps the CPS

scale. The range of 10-8% to 100% power for the ``Wide Range

Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor'' is adequate to permit the

operators to bring the unit to hot shutdown from outside of the

control room. Also, the instruments on C-21 are not used to provide

the start-up rate signal during start-up or refueling operations.

This proposed license amendment does not impact the performance of

any safety-related component, system, or structure.

Therefore, this proposed license amendment does not involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry &

Howard, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-336, Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: April 25, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

change the Technical Specifications concerning four related issues: (1)

Power-operated relief valve (PORV) and block valve reliability; (2)

low-temperature overpressure protection (LTOP); (3) boron dilution; and

(4) shutdown risk management. Specifically, the proposed amendment

would revise Technical Specifications 3.4.3 and 3.4.9.3 to address the

issues specifically raised in Generic Letter (GL) 90-06. Technical

Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.8,

3.4.1.4, 3.4.2.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.3, 4.1.1.3, 4.1.2.3, 4.1.2.4, 4.4.1.4,

4.4.3.1., 4.4.3.2, 4.4.9.3.1, 4.4.9.3.2, 4.5.3.2 and 4.9.8.1 would be

revised to provide consistency with the proposed changes in GL 90-06 or

are related to the boron dilution issue or shutdown risk management

philosophies.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

The proposed changes do not involve an SHC [significant hazards

consideration] because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes address the operability and surveillance

requirements for the charging pump, HPSI [high-pressure safety

injection] pumps, reactor coolant pumps, safety valves, PORVs, block

valves, and the LTOP, boron dilution and SDC [shutdown cooling]

systems. These changes were proposed to address four main issues: to

reflect the guidance of GL 90-06 with respect to PORV and cold

overpressure; to address boron dilution concerns; to address

shutdown risk management lessons learned; and to address recent

information on cold overpressure mitigation concerns. Generally, the

changes are more restrictive than present requirements and are

consistent with the recommendations of GL 90-06. Also, the changes

provide the operator with additional guidance that was not

previously available. Therefore, the changes will not impact the

probability of occurrence or consequences of an LTOP event, boron

dilution event, loss of shutdown cooling, or other event requiring

emergency core cooling which has been previously analyzed.

PORV Requirements

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.4.3 have been

made to be consistent with GL 90-06. One enhancement has been made

to the guidance contained in GL 90-06 and that was to replace the

phrase ``because of excessive seat leakage'' with the phrase ``and

capable of being manually cycled.'' Although the PORV may be

designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and

closed and in this manner can be used to mitigate transients. For

example, PORV inoperability may be due to seat leakage,

instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other

causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a

possibility for a small break LOCA. The wording changes are meant to

be more specific while meeting the intent of GL 90-06. The

additional enhancement to GL 90-06 includes Surveillance Requirement

4.4.3.1c whereby Millstone Unit No. 2 proposed to bench test the

PORVs at a qualified laboratory under conditions representative of

Mode 3 or 4 conditions. We believe this off site test will result in

safer plant conditions than the in situ test proposed in the generic

letter. The remaining changes to Technical Specification 3.4.3

incorporate the guidance contained in GL 90-06 and do not

significantly increase the probability or consequence of an LTOP

event or the failure of the PORV to operate as required.

Cold Overpressurization Protection

Changes are being proposed to Technical Specification sections

3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, 3.4.1.4, 3.4.2.1, 3.4.3, 3.4.9.1, 3.4.9.3, 3.5.3,

4.1.2.3, 4.4.1.4, 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.2, 4.4.9.3.1, 4.4.9.3.2, and

4.5.3.2 to incorporate the guidance of GL 90-06 as well as enhance

the availability of equipment to reduce the shutdown risk while

still satisfying the cold overpressure requirements.

The proposed changes to Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and

3.1.2.3 will ensure only one charging pump and one HPSI pump are

operable in Mode 5 or 6 with the reactor vessel head on with an

available vent of less than 2.8 square inches. The remaining pumps

will be secured. These proposed changes have been made to ensure

Millstone Unit No. 2 does not create an LTOP condition by the

operation of too many pumps injecting fluid, thereby increasing

pressure in a low-temperature condition. These proposed

modifications are consistent with Technical Specification 3.5.3

which has also been modified and will decrease the possibility of an

LTOP condition from occurring.

The proposed change to Technical Specification 3.4.2.1 will

ensure consistency between this technical specification and

Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. The safety valves at Millstone Unit

No. 2 are not used for LTOP mitigation. The PORVs, or RCS [reactor

coolant system] vent at Millstone Unit No. 2 are used to mitigate an

LTOP condition. Safety valves are required to be operable during

operating conditions to automatically reduce system pressures. The

use of the PORV, which allows manual control, for mitigation of an

LTOP event, reduces the severity and consequence of a potential

overpressure event by giving the operators more control.

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3/4.9.3 provide

enhanced operational flexibility through the use of a PORV or RCS

vent. The APPLICABILITY statement has been changed for clarification

purposes with no change in intent and safety implications. The

ACTION requirements for the LTOP system include a 7-day allowable

outage time (AOT) to restore an inoperable LTOP channel to operable

status before other remedial measures would have to be taken. In

addition, new Action Statement `f' states that the provisions of

Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Therefore, the unit may

enter the Modes for which the LCO apply, during a unit shutdown or

placement of the head on the reactor vessel following refueling,

when an LTOP channel is inoperable. In this situation, the 7-day AOT

applies for restoring the channel to operable status before other

remedial measures would have to be taken. This is the same manner in

which the ACTION requirements apply when an LTOP channel is

determined to be inoperable while the plant is in a Mode for which

the LTOP system is required to be operable.

Specifications 3.4.1.4 and 3.4.9.1 have been revised to address

concerns identified in an NRC Information Notice regarding

previously unconsidered pressure drops across the reactor. The

modifications to these two technical specifications will ensure that

unanticipated pressure rises do not occur and that there will be no

increase in the probability or consequences of the LTOP event.

Based on the evaluation done in support of resolution to GL 90-

06 regarding the LTOP system unavailability, NNECO concludes that

additional restrictions on operation with an inoperable LTOP channel

are warranted when the potential for a low-temperature overpressure

event is the highest, and especially when the unit is in a water-

solid condition. It is also concluded that these additional measures

emphasize the importance of the LTOP system, especially while

operating in a water-solid condition as the primary success path for

the mitigation of overpressure transients during low-temperature

operation. Therefore, these enhancements will not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequence of an

accident previously evaluated.

Boron Dilution

Changes are being proposed to Technical Specifications 3.1.1.3,

3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.8, 4.1.1.3, 4.1.2.3, and 4.1.2.4 to

provide added assurance that the boron dilution analysis remains

bounding while allowing lower flow rates to reduce the potential of

a loss of shutdown cooling due to vortexing at mid-loop operation.

The changes to Technical Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.2.2,

3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.8, 4.1.1.3, 4.1.2.3, 4.1.2.4, and 4.9.8.1

will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of

an accident. Tagging out of a charging pump, increasing shutdown

margin, and reducing SDC flow will impact results of the boron

dilution accident, but will not increase the probability of

initiating events.

An increase in the shutdown margin requirement as was done in

Technical Specifications 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.8 will assure consistency

with the Core Operating Limits Report which provided additional

margin in a boron dilution event.

Shutdown Risk

The changes proposed to Technical Specifications 3.1.1.3,

3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, 3.5.3, 4.1.1.3, 4.1.2.3, 4.5.3.2 and 4.9.8.1 have

been optimized to take into account shutdown risk concerns. Lower

shutdown cooling flow rates are allowed to minimize the potential of

a loss of shutdown cooling due to vortexing during RCS mid-loop

operation.

The availability of injection sources in the shutdown modes have

been optimized while still meeting the cold overpressurization

requirements.

To address shutdown risk issues, the method to secure an

inoperable HPSI pump has been modified. Previously, disconnecting

the motor circuit breaker from its electrical power circuit was the

only acceptable method of isolating this pump. Additional methods of

isolating the pump have been added with the key locking of a

discharge valve downstream of the HPSI pump and the tagging the

valve. These actions from the control room will allow the operator

the ability to quickly restore water flow and reduce the risk

associated with having equipment out of service while shutdown.

Inadvertent actuation is prevented by requiring the operator to

obtain the key to open this discharge valve from the shift

supervisor. The opening of this valve would, therefore, require the

actions of two knowledgeable individuals, the operator, and the

shift supervisor. The limitation on the amount of pumps available is

as a direct result of LTOP concerns. This provides assurance that

the LTOP requirements are met while maintaining the maximum

available equipment to mitigate shutdown risk concerns.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any previously analyzed.

The proposed changes to Technical Specifications 3.1.1.3,

3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4, 3.1.2.8, 3.4.1.4, 3.4.2.1, 3.4.9.1,

4.1.1.3, 4.1.2.4, and 4.9.8.1 do not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The

proposed changes provide clarification or additional restrictions

for plant personnel concerning the operation of charging pumps, HPSI

pumps, PORVs, blocking valves, and the SDC, boron dilution, and LTOP

systems. The proposed technical specification changes do not

introduce significant changes in the manner in which the plant is

being operated. Therefore, no new failure modes are being

introduced, and the potential for an unanalyzed accident is not

created.

The proposed changes to Technical Specifications 3.4.3 do not

create the possibility of an accident of a different type than

previously evaluated, since there is no change to the design of the

plant. In addition, plant operations are only being altered enough

to allow a block valve and PORV to be placed in conditions which

allow them to better perform their safety functions.

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 do not

create the possibility of an accident of a different type than

previously evaluated, since there is no change to the design of the

plant and the way the plant is operated.

The proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.1.2.3 and

3.5.3 allow for the isolation of an inoperable HPSI pump by the key

lock closing of a valve at the discharge of the HPSI pump and the

safety tagging in the closed position. This isolation is required so

that a LTOP condition does not occur. This method of isolation is

required so that a LTOP condition does not occur. This method of

isolation is acceptable and will not create a new or different kind

of accident since it is not possible to inadvertently open this

valve. A deliberate action is required by the operator, with the

concurrence of the shift supervisor, to obtain the key and open the

valve.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes will not have an adverse impact on the

protection boundaries.

With regard to the GL 90-06 modifications, there is no

degradation in the operability and surveillance requirements for the

PORVs and block valves and the LTOP systems. There will be no change

in actual practice for, or resulting performance of, these systems.

All other changes are proposed mainly to clarify each requirement.

For Modes 1, 2, and 3, safety-related overpressure protection is

provided by the pressurizer code safety relief valves. Therefore,

there will be no adverse impact on the margin of safety as defined

in the bases of any technical specification. Although any two

charging pumps are allowed to be operable in a shutdown condition,

the flow of these pumps is consistent with the assumptions of the

boron dilution analysis. Additional pumping capability is being

provided to address shutdown risk concerns, however, the limitation

on pumping is tied to the vent path that is available. This will

ensure that the margin of safety is not impacted.

The combined effects of reducing SDC flow, tagging out a

charging pump, and increasing shutdown margin is that the required

operator response times of 15 minutes in Modes 4 and 5, and 30

minutes in Mode 6 are maintained.

By reducing the allowed SDC flow rate to less than that where

vortexing can occur, the potential for a loss of SDC event is being

reduced. Therefore, there is no decrease in the margin of safety for

the boron dilution and shutdown cooling events.

The proposed changes associated with the cold overpressure

mitigation system will ensure the appropriate margin of safety is

maintained by limiting RCP operation in Mode 5 and limit RCS

cooldown rates. These actions will ensure an LTOP condition does not

occur.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center,

Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New

London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry &

Howard, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Luzerne County,

Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: April 5, 1994.

Description of amendment request: This amendment will delete the

frequency requirements for a number of audits listed under Technical

Specification (TS) 6.5.2.8 for each unit. The proposed change also

includes removing the audit requirements for the Emergency Plan and the

Security Plan from the TS and relocating these requirements to each of

the respective plans.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

I. This proposal does not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed Technical Specification changes to delete

prescribed audit frequencies and remove the Emergency Plan and

Security Plan from Technical Specifications are administrative in

nature and neither directly increase or decrease the likelihood that

an accident will occur. The Technical Specification changes will not

impact the function or method of operation of plant systems,

structures, or components. Thus, the consequences of a malfunction

of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR is

not increased by the changes. Therefore, it is concluded that the

proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of

an accident previously evaluated.

II. This proposal does not create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident or from any accident previously

evaluated.

The proposed Technical Specification changes to delete

prescribed audit frequencies and remove the Emergency Plan and

Security Plan from Technical Specifications are administrative in

nature and do not involve changes to the physical plant or

operations. The proposed changes do not affect systems, structures,

or components (SSCs) or the operation of these SSCs; and therefore

do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident.

III. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The proposed Technical Specification changes to delete

prescribed audit frequencies and remove the Emergency Plan and

Security Plan from Technical Specifications do not involve any

reductions in the margin of safety. The proposed changes will enable

more effective resource utilization through performance based

scheduling of audits in the affected areas. Using performance

indicators and other measures of program effectiveness, potential

problems can be more readily identified and audit resources can be

applied to these areas to enhance performance. The proposed

performance based audit process will maintain or enhance the margin

of safety in the areas audited.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library,

Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania 18701.

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts

and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Charles L. Miller.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick

Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: March 28, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed modification to

Technical Specification (TS) Section 4.8.4.3.a, would increase the

surveillance interval for the functional test of the Reactor Protection

System (RPS). The increase would be from every six (6) months to each

time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of 24 hours, unless the

test was performed in the previous six months. This change is based on

guidance provided in Generic Letter 91-09, ``Modification Of

Surveillance Interval For The Electrical Protective Assemblies In Power

Supplies For The Reactor Protection System.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed Technical Specification changes do not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

The Reactor Protection System equipment subject to the proposed

Technical Specifications changes are not accident initiators.

The Electrical Protective Assemblies (EPAs) specified by these

proposed changes are not required to actuate in order to mitigate an

accident. The functional test methodology of the RPS electrical

power monitoring channels will not be effected by the proposed

change in test frequency. The design and function of the EPAs will

not be altered and will perform as originally designed.

A review of the RPS electrical power monitoring relays

surveillance test history results was performed and supports the

proposed TS changes to extend the testing interval. Fifty-one (51)

surveillance tests were reviewed, and all the as-found channel

calibration results were within the required TS limits. There were

identified deficiencies in four (4) of the fifty-one tests

performed, however, these four deficiencies did not affect the

operability of the RPS EPAs. Based on good historical surveillance

test results, we have concluded that the reliability of the

equipment is not expected to degrade during the proposed extended

test interval. Furthermore, the proposed reduced testing will result

in a net decrease in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction

of equipment important to safety. These malfunctions would cause an

invalid inadvertent trip of the RPS which would impose unnecessary

challenges on the affected unit at power. The guidance set forth in

Generic Letter 91-09 states ``The staff concludes that the benefit

to safety of reducing the frequency of testing during power

operations more than offsets the risk to safety from relaxing the

surveillance requirement to test the EPAs during power operation.''

Since the RPS EPAs are not accident initiators, and the design

and function of the equipment will not be affected by the proposed

TS changes, and the reliability of the equipment is not expected to

degrade during the extended test interval, and the changes would

reduce the probability of unnecessary challenges to the affected

unit, we have concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed TS changes do not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

The design and function of the RPS EPAs will not be affected by

the proposed TS changes. The failure modes of the existing equipment

will remain unchanged, and no new accident types will be created.

The RPS electrical power monitoring channels' functional test

methodology will not be affected by the proposed change in test

frequency. Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident

previously evaluated.

3. The proposed TS changes do not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on a review of the RPS electrical power monitoring relays

surveillance test history results we have concluded that the

reliability of the equipment is not expected to degrade during the

proposed extended test interval. In addition, the benefit to safety

by reducing the frequency of testing during power operation and the

attendant possible challenges to safety systems more than offsets

any risk to safety from relaxing the surveillance requirements to

test the EPAs during power operation. Therefore, the proposed TS

changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Pottstown Public Library, 500

High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Attorney for licensee: J.W. Durham, Sr., Esquire, Sr. V.P. and

General Counsel, Philadelphia Electric Company, 2301 Market Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101.

NRC Project Director: Charles L. Miller.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket No. 50-352, Limerick Generating

Station, Unit 1, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendment: May 6, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise Unit 1

Technical Specifications, Section 5.5.3, ``Capacity,'' to permit an

interim increase in the spent fuel storage capacity in the Unit 1 Spent

Fuel Pool (SFP) from 2040 fuel assemblies to 2500 fuel assemblies.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed Technical Specifications (TS) change does not

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of

an accident previously evaluated.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in the Unit 1 Spent

Fuel Pool (SFP) from 2040 fuel assemblies to 2500 fuel assemblies

does not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident.

Since all fuel handling activities will be performed using approved

procedures and compatible equipment, the probability of a fuel

handling accident occurring is unchanged.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP to

2500 fuel assemblies will facilitate storing 1940 spent fuel

assemblies (including contingency) that have been discharged from

LGS, Units 1 and 2, and 560 low exposure fuel assemblies shipped to

LGS from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. The decay heat load

associated with the entire Shoreham fuel inventory is insignificant,

since it equates to less than 5% of the heat load generated from one

(1) recently discharged full power fuel bundle. Therefore, the

actual decay heat load to the Unit 1 SFP will be equivalent to that

which is generated from storing the 1940 spent fuel assemblies

discharged from LGS, Units 1 and 2.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP to

accommodate the storage of 2500 fuel assemblies, as proposed in this

TS Change Request, is bounded by the existing analysis supporting

the storage of spent fuel at LGS. The existing analysis considers

design inputs for structural integrity, criticality, and thermal-

hydraulics and is based on the storage of 2862 spent fuel

assemblies. As documented in Section 9.1.3, ``Spent Fuel Pool

Cooling and Cleanup Systems,'' of Supplement 2 of the NRC's Safety

Evaluation Report, i.e., NUREG-0991, ``Safety Evaluation Report

Related to the Operation of Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and

2,'' the NRC indicated that based on its independent analysis the

heat removal capability of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC)

system could only support 2484 spent fuel assemblies. However, the

LGS, Unit 1 TS currently limit the storage of spent fuel to 2040

spent fuel assemblies. Since the decay heat load from the Shoreham

fuel inventory (i.e., 560 fuel assemblies) is insignificant, the

actual heat load to the Unit 1 SFP will be equivalent to that

generated from 1940 fuel assemblies discharged from LGS, Units 1 and

2, which is less than the limit currently specified [in] the TS

(i.e., 2040 fuel assemblies).

Relocating six (6) of the existing Unit 2 spent fuel storage

racks to the Unit 1 SFP will be conducted in accordance with PECO

Energy's Heavy Loads Program which was developed in order to

implement the guidance delineated in NUREG-0612, ``Control of Heavy

Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,'' such that the likelihood of a heavy

load drop is precluded. The Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks are

identical to those already in use in the Unit 1 SFP. Procedures will

be in place to ensure that the Unit 2 spent fuel storage racks are

situated in the Unit 1 SFP to insure [ensure] proper neutron poison

alignment with the existing Unit 1 racks. The existing spent fuel

storage racks are designed for rack-to-rack contact during design

basis events without the loss of structural integrity. The racks are

also designed to withstand the impact from a dropped fuel assembly

without the loss of structural integrity or be damaged in a way that

could adversely affect the criticality analysis. Increasing the

spent fuel storage capacity to accommodate the storage of 2500 spent

fuel assemblies will not affect the spent fuel storage racks since

the racks are specifically designed to safely store spent fuel.

This proposed TS change will not prevent the ability of the FPCC

system from performing its design function to adequately cool the

SFP. The FPCC system will continue to function normally and be

capable of maintaining the SFP temperature at or below 140 deg.F.

The backup cooling and makeup systems (i.e., Residual Heat Removal

(RHR), Emergency Service Water (ESW), and Residual Heat Removal

Service Water (RHRSW) systems) will continue to function as designed

to provide an alternate source of cooling and makeup water to ensure

SFP cooling is maintained. The RHR system is still capable of

maintaining the SFP temperature less than 140 deg.F as described in

LGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Increasing the

spent fuel storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP will not increase the

probability of a loss of fuel pool cooling accident or adversely

affect the Refuel Floor ventilation system.

The consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident as described in the

LGS UFSAR are not increased since the number of fuel assemblies

stored in a SFP is not an input to the initial conditions of the

accident evaluation. This accident evaluates the dropping of a spent

fuel assembly and the fuel grapple assembly into the reactor core

during refueling operations. A drop height of 32 feet for the spent

fuel assembly and 47 feet for the fuel grapple assembly are assumed

and will produce the largest number of failed fuel rods. Since the

maximum possible height a fuel assembly can be dropped over the SFP

does not exceed 32 feet, the consequences of a Fuel Handling

Accident will not be increased by increasing the number of fuel

storage cells.

The consequences of a loss of fuel pool cooling as described in

Section 9.1.3.6 of the LGS UFSAR will not be increased. The event

described in the UFSAR assumes that the iodine in the fuel from past

refuelings is negligible, due to the long decay time. Iodine is the

major contributor to thyroid dose. Since the iodine in the fuel from

past refuelings is negligible, due to the long decay time,

increasing the spent fuel storage capacity will not increase the

dose due to the release of iodine in the SFP water resulting from

boiling and therefore, the consequences are not increased.

Increasing the storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP, on an interim

basis, will not increase the probability of a malfunction of the

stored spent fuel since the existing thermal-hydraulic analysis

confirms that sufficient cooling capability exists to accommodate

the storage of 2500 fuel assemblies in the Unit 1 SFP. As for fuel

criticality, the existing analysis also confirms that the stored

fuel assemblies will remain sub-critical under normal and abnormal

conditions.

Increasing the storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP will not

increase the probability of a malfunction of the SFP structure or

SFP liner. The existing structural analysis confirms that the SFP

structure has adequate margin to prevent overstressing and meets the

code requirements. Increasing the storage capacity in the Unit 1 SFP

will not increase the probability of a malfunction of the spent fuel

storage racks during design basis events based on the existing

seismic/structural analysis.

Increasing the on-site spent fuel storage capacity will not

increase the probability of a malfunction of the FPCC system. The

FPCC system will continue to function as designed.

The probability of a malfunction of fuel handling equipment will

not be increased since increasing the storage capacity in the Unit 1

SFP, as proposed, does not affect fuel handling equipment.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity does not increase the

consequences of a spent fuel assembly failure since the failure of

one (1) assembly will not result in additional spent fuel assembly

failures.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity will not increase the

consequences of spent fuel storage rack failure, since the existing

racks have been designed/qualified to limit the consequences of a

failure. A failure of, or damage to one (1) storage rack, will not

result in failure or damage to another storage rack.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity will not increase the

consequences of the failure of fuel handling equipment since the

maximum expected number of fuel rods damaged by a fuel handling

equipment failure remains as evaluated in the LGS UFSAR.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve an increase

in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

2. The proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in the LGS Unit 1 SFP

to permit an interim increase from 2040 fuel assemblies to 2500 fuel

assemblies will not create the possibility of an accident of a

different type. The Unit 1 SFP has been analyzed for criticality

effects, structural effects, radiological effects, and thermal-

hydraulic effects. The increase in spent fuel storage capacity will

be achieved by relocating six (6) existing spent fuel storage racks

from the Unit 2 SFP to the Unit 1 SFP. The spent fuel storage racks

are of identical design and are passive components; therefore, the

possibility of creating a new accident does not exist.

No new operating schemes or active equipment types will be

required to store additional fuel bundles in the SFP. Therefore, the

possibility of a different type of malfunction occurring is not

created.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any

previously evaluated.

3. The proposed TS change does not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

Since the existing TS limits for fuel handling interlocks, heavy

loads restrictions, water coverage over irradiated fuel, in-core

decay time, and fuel sub-criticality will be maintained, the margin

of safety will not be reduced.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve a reduction

in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Pottstown Public Library, 500

High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Attorney for licensee: J. W. Durham, Sr., Esquire, Sr. V.P. and

General Counsel, Philadelphia Electric Company, 2301 Market Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101.

NRC Project Director: Charles L. Miller.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company,

Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company,

Dockets Nos. 50-277 and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,

Units Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania

Date of application for amendments: April 15, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would: (1)

revise Unit 3 Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.A.2.f to correct a

typographical error, (2) revise the license and TSs to change the

licensee's name from Philadelphia Electric Company to PECO Energy

Company, (3) revise the frequency listed in TS 4.3.A.2.a for exercising

each partially or fully withdrawn operable control rod from every 24

hours to within 24 hours when operating above the rod worth minimizer

low power setpoint if there are three or more inoperable control rods

or if there is one fully or partially withdrawn rod which cannot be

moved and for which control rod drive mechanism damage has not been

ruled out, (4) revise TS 4.4.A.2 to allow for the replacement charge on

the explosive valve for the standby liquid control system to be from

either the same manufactured batch as the one fired or another batch

which has been certified by having one of the batches successfully

fired, (5) revise the frequency in TS 4.4.B.3 to functionally test each

standby liquid control system pump loop from monthly to at least once

per 92 days.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated

because the proposed changes do not alter the operation of equipment

assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event or assumed to be

available for the mitigation of accidents or transients. Proposed

changes 1 and 2 are administrative in nature. Proposed change 3 to

reduce the requirement to verify insertion capability from every 24

hours to a single verification when one or more control rods are

stuck is sufficient to verify that the problem is not generic while

providing the benefit of removing a very resource intensive

requirement and permits licensed operators to focus on other, more

safety significant actions. Proposed change 4 will continue to

provide the necessary assurance that replacement charges on the

explosive valve of the standby liquid control system will be from a

batch from which a sample charge has been tested satisfactorily.

Proposed change 5 modifies the allowable interval between

surveillance tests for the standby liquid control system without

reducing the reliability of the system while providing the benefit

of reduced wear and tear on the system. Therefore, these proposed

changes do not increase the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated

because implementation of the proposed changes do not involve any

physical changes to plant systems, structures, or components. The

proposed changes do not allow plant operation in any mode that is

not already evaluated. Therefore, the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated is

not created.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety because the proposed changes do not affect the

manner in which the facility is operated or change equipment or

features which affect the operational characteristics of the

facility. Proposed changes 1 and 2 are administrative in nature.

Proposed change 3 maintains the assurance that when a scram is

required that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the accident

analysis will be met. Additionally, if the initial check of control

rod insertion is satisfactory, the subsequent checks are not likely

to identify similar problems because operating experience shows that

a [stuck] rod is rare. Once it has been determined that the same

problem is not occurring in other control rods the normal

surveillance frequency is sufficient to verify that scram capability

is maintained. Proposed change 4 provides added flexibility for

providing replacement [charges] from any batch that has had a charge

successfully fired. Proposed change 4 adds flexibility while

maintaining the firing reliability in excess of 99.99% for the

explosive valves on the standby liquid control system. Proposed

change 5 does not impact any safety analysis assumptions because the

frequency of testing is not assumed in any safety analysis and

standby liquid control system operability is maintained. In

addition, the test frequency reduction provides reduced wear and

tear on the system and increased system reliability. Therefore, the

proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin

of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Government Publications

Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, (REGIONAL DEPOSITORY) Education

Building, Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania 17105.

Attorney for Licensee: J. W. Durham, Sr., Esquire, Sr. V.P. and

General Counsel, Philadelphia Electric Company, 2301 Market Street,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101.

NRC Project Director: Charles L. Miller.

Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York

Date of amendment request: December 20, 1989, as supplemented

January 16, 1990, January 3, 1992, January 30, 1992, May 5, 1993, May

26, 1993, and March 2, 1994.

Description of amendment request: This application for an amendment

to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications proposes new

Safety/Relief Valve (SRV) performance limits to take credit for the

currently installed SRV capacity. Specifically, three changes to the

existing SRV performance limits are proposed:

The first permits continued plant operation with two SRVs

out-ofservice. Since 7 of the 11 SRVs at FitzPatrick are also automatic

depressurization system (ADS) valves, this reduces the number of ADS

valves required to be operable to 5. Current specifications permit only

one SRV out-of-service for 30 days.

Secondly, the setpoints for all 11 SRVs are changed to a

single nominal setpoint. Current specifications stagger the setpoints

from 1090 to 1140 psig.

The third change increases the maximum permissible

setpoint tolerance from one to three percent.

The new Limiting Safety System Setting (LSSS) for reactor coolant

system overpressurization protection (TS 2.2.1.B), as a result of these

changes, now requires that 9 of 11 SRVs be operable at a common

setpoint of 1110 psig plus or minus 3 percent.

Safety analyses were performed, using a conservative SRV setpoint

of 1195 psig, which demonstrate that these proposed changes are

acceptable.

Other changes, not associated with SRV performance, clarify

selected portions of the Technical Specifications and correct minor

typographical and editorial errors.

This ``Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing'' (Notice) supersedes the

related Notice which was published in the Federal Register on May 15,

1990 (55 FR 20228).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

Operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in

accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant

hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated. A bounding

analysis (NEDC-31697P, ``Updated SRV Performance Requirements for

the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant'') of the revised SRV

performance requirements considered plant operation with 9 of 11

SRVs operable and with a common valve actuation pressure of 1195

psig. The analysis demonstrates that a 50 psi margin exists between

the maximum anticipated pressure and the American Society of

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code upset reactor vessel pressure limit

of 1375 psig. The analyses of NEDC-31697P also demonstrate that the

new SRV performance limits have no significant impact on thermal

limits, ECCS/LOCA performance, HPCI/RCIC operability, containment

response, containment integrity, or 10 CFR [Part] 50 Appendix R

alternate shutdown capability. The analyses also considered simmer

margin and downward setpoint drift.

The five miscellaneous changes clarify terminology, correct

typographical errors, remove a surveillance requirement which should

have been deleted as part of Amendment 130, clarify when SRV manual

actuation is performed, and delete a duplicate specification. These

changes are purely administrative in nature and, as such, do not

impact previously evaluated accidents or equipment malfunctions.

2. Ccreate the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from those previously evaluated. The new SRV performance

limits are primarily administrative changes. The only physical

changes involve recalibration of SRV setpoints and operation with 2

SRVs/ADS valves out-of-service. The operation and function of the

pressure relief system and [are] unaffected. No new failure modes

are introduced.

The proposed miscellaneous changes are purely administrative in

nature and, as such, do not create the possibility of an accident or

malfunction.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The

new SRV performance limits slightly reduce the existing margin to

vessel overpressure and the margin to the 125% mechanical overspeed

trip for the HPCI and RCIC turbines. However, the reduction in the

overpressure margin is insignificant (approximately 25 psi) and the

plant's response to transients and accidents remains well within the

limits established in General Design Criteria (GDC) 15, Standard

Review Plan Section 5.2.2, and FSAR Section 4.4. The reduction in

turbine overspeed margin is negligible (less than 1%), because it is

within the allowable tolerance of the trip settings.

The proposed miscellaneous changes are purely administrative in

nature and do not involve a reduction in safety margin.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Reference and Documents

Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New

York 13126.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 1633 Broadway, New

York, New York 10019.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra

Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 50-286, Indian

Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York

Date of amendment request: April 18, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

relocate the fire protection requirements of Technical Specifications

(TSs) 3.14 and 4.12, and fire brigade staffing and training

requirements of TSs 6.2.2(f) and 6.4.2 from the TSs to

administratively-controlled operational specifications. Specifically,

the proposed changes would add the NRC standard fire protection license

condition to the Operating License, update the Final Safety Analysis

Report (FSAR) to include the Fire Protection Program by reference, and

relocate the fire protection requirements from the TSs to the Indian

Point 3 Operational Specifications Manual. The proposed changes have

been developed in accordance with the guidance contained in NRC Generic

Letter (GL) 86-10, ``Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements,''

and GL 88-12, ``Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from the

Technical Specifications.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

Consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92, the enclosed

application is judged to involve no significant hazards based on the

following information:

(1) Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences of any accident

previously evaluated?

Response

This change does not involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This proposed amendment merely relocates the fire protection

program elements from the Technical Specifications to the

Operational Specifications and the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis

Report]. No reduction in content is being made to the Technical

Specification requirements that are being relocated. Operating

limitations will continue to be imposed, and required surveillances

will continue to be performed in accordance with written procedures

and instructions auditable by the NRC.

Although future proposed changes to the fire protection program

elements previously located in the Technical Specifications will no

longer be controlled by 10 CFR 50.90, proposed changes to the Fire

Protection requirements relocated to the Operational Specifications

will be evaluated by plant administrative procedures.

Thus, programmatic controls will continue to assure that future

proposed fire protection program changes will not create an

unreviewed safety question.

(2) Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility

of a new or different kind of accident from any previously

evaluated?

Response

The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different

type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report is not

created.

This proposed amendment merely relocates the fire protection

Technical Specification requirements from the Technical

Specifications to the Operational Specifications. No reduction to

the fire protection Technical Specification requirements is being

made and thus the change does not create the possibility of a new or

different accident from those previously evaluated.

As noted above, future changes to the requirements in the

Operational Specifications will be evaluated by plant administrative

procedures.

(3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction

in a margin of safety?

Response:

The margin of safety as defined in the bases for any technical

specification is not reduced.

This proposed amendment does not involve a reduction to the

approved fire protection program or Fire Protection Technical

Specification requirements. The Technical Specification fire

protection requirements are being relocated, with no reduction in

content, to the Operational Specifications. Since there is no

reduction in the requirements, there is no reduction in the margin

of safety.

As noted above, proposed changes to the Fire Protection

Technical Specification requirements relocated to the Operational

Specifications will be evaluated by plant administrative procedures.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: White Plains Public Library,

100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York 10601.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Charles M. Pratt, 10 Columbus Circle,

New York, New York 10019.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra.

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311,

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New

Jersey

Date of amendment request: April 12, 1994.

Description of amendment request: This amendment request would

revise the Emergency Diesel Generator hot restart test by separating it

from the 24-hour endurance run and from the load sequence testing.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Do not involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The proposed changes would revise the Salem Emergency Diesel

Generator (EDG) surveillance criteria to allow the hot restart test

to be performed independent of the Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

load sequencing test and the 24-hour endurance run. The proposed

surveillance requirements would continue to demonstrate that the

objectives of each of these tests are met. Specifically, the EDG's

are shown to be capable of starting the ESF loads in the required

sequence, operating at full load for an extended period of time, and

restarting from a full load temperature condition. Therefore, the

proposed changes would not adversely affect the EDG's ability to

support mitigation of the consequences of any previously evaluated

accident. The proposed changes to the surveillance requirements do

not affect the initiation or progression of any accident sequence.

(2) Do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change affects surveillance test criteria such that

increased scheduling flexibility is allowed while the test

objectives associated with demonstrating EDG operability continue to

be met. The proposed changes do not allow any plant configurations

that are presently prohibited by the Salem Technical Specifications.

(3) Do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

Surveillance testing per the proposed Technical Specifications

would continue to demonstrate the ability of the EDG's to perform

their intended function of providing electrical power to ESF systems

needed to mitigate design basis transients, consistent with the

plant safety analyses. The margin of safety demonstrated by the

plant safety analyses is therefore not affected by the proposed

change.

Therefore, [Public Service Electric and Gas Company] PSE&G has

concluded that the changes proposed herein do not involve a

Significant Hazards Consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Salem Free Public library, 112

West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079.

Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and

Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502.

NRC Project Director: Charles L. Miller.

Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket No. 50-206, San

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1, San Diego County,

California

Date of amendment request: April 18, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will

revise Sections 2.C and 2.D of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating

Station, Unit 1 (SONGS 1) Operating License. Section 2.C will be

revised to modify or delete several licensing conditions which either

no longer apply or require revision to apply to SONGS 1 in its

permanently shutdown and defueled condition. Section 2.D will be

revised to exempt Fire Protection reporting from the reporting

requirements of Section 2.D.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. Will operation of the facility according to this proposed

change involve a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. SONGS 1 has been permanently shut down and all fuel has been

taken out of the reactor and stored in the SONGS 1 spent fuel pool.

The proposed change will not modify any of the existing plant

configurations, controls, procedures, or technical specification

requirements necessary to assure the integrity and safe operation of

the spent fuel pool.

The technical basis for deleting the four license conditions,

which relate to Integrated Implementation Schedule, Cycle 11 Thermal

Shield Monitoring Program, Plant Modification to Eliminate Single

Failure Susceptibility of Vital Bus Automatic Transfer Function, and

the NRC's Confirmatory Order of January 2, 1990, is that these

license conditions were intended to assure the continued safe

operation of SONGS 1 as a power producing plant. With the permanent

shutdown of SONGS 1 and the issuance of its Permanently Defueled

Technical Specifications (PDTS) on December 28, 1993, the plant

modifications and safety programs associated with the four license

conditions are no longer necessary.

The technical basis for modifying the license condition on fuel

transshipment is that this license condition was intended to ensure

the safety of the operating plant by putting restrictions on

operation of the turbine building gantry crane. These restrictions

are no longer necessary, in light of the permanent shutdown of SONGS

1.

The technical basis for modifying the license condition on

physical protection is that this is necessary to update the

information contained in the license condition.

The technical basis for exempting the Fire Protection Program

from the reporting requirements of Section 2.D is that the

applicable requirements are adequately covered in 10 CFR 50.72 and

50.73, as stated in Generic Letters 86-10 and 88-12.

2. Will operation of the facility according to this proposed

change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident

from any accident previously evaluated?

No. No safety-related equipment will be impacted by this

proposed change. Thus, there is no credible likelihood that a new or

different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated

would occur as a result of this proposed change.

3. Will operation of the facility according to this proposed

change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. As explained earlier, the plant modifications and safety

programs associated with the license conditions being deleted are no

longer necessary. The safety-related equipment concerns that led to

restrictions on operation of the turbine building gantry crane no

longer exist. The modification to the license condition on physical

protection will update the information contained in this license

condition.

The revision to Section 2.D will make the reporting requirements

regarding deficiencies in the Fire Protection Program consistent

with the NRC's generic guidance on this subject.

Thus operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed

change will not significantly reduce a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis of the licensee and, based

on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Main Library, University of

California, P.O. Box 19557, Irvine, California 92713.

Attorney for licensee: James A. Beoletto, Esquire, Southern

California Edison Company, P.O. Box 800, Rosemead, California 91770.

NRC Project Director: Seymour H. Weiss.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296,

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3, Limestone County, Alabama

Date of amendment request: December 23, 1993 (TS346).

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

revise the BFN Units 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specifications (TS) by

providing an alternate visual inspection schedule for safety-related

snubbers. The licensee has stated that the amendment follows the

recommendations of NRC Generic Letter (GL) 90-09, ``Alternative

Requirements for Snubber Visual Inspection Intervals and Corrective

Actions'' dated December 11, 1990. GL 90-09 describes a TS line item

improvement acceptable to the NRC staff. The purpose of the line item

improvement is to provide a means for reducing resource demands and

unnecessary occupational radiological exposure attributable to snubber

inspections while continuing to provide an acceptable level of

confidence in snubber operability.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant

increase in the probability or consequences of an accident

previously evaluated.

Implementing the guidance specified in GL 90-09 will not

introduce any new failure mode and will not alter any assumptions

previously made in evaluating the consequences of an accident. The

proposed alternate schedule for visual inspections will maintain the

same operability confidence level as the existing schedule. Also,

the surveillance requirement and schedule for snubber functional

testing remains the same providing a 95 percent confidence level

that 90 percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within the

specified acceptance limits. The proposed visual inspection schedule

is separate from functional testing and provides additional

confidence that the installed snubbers will serve their design

function and are being maintained operable. The proposed changes do

not affect limiting safety system settings or operating parameters,

and do not modify or add any accident initiating events or

parameters. Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly

increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

Implementing the recommendations specified in GL 90-09 does not

involve any physical alterations to plant equipment, changes to

setpoints or operating parameters, nor does it involve any potential

accident initiating event. As stated in the generic letter, the

alternate schedule for snubber visual inspections maintains the same

confidence level as the existing schedule. Additionally, functional

testing of snubbers provides a 95 percent confidence level that 90

percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within specified

acceptance limits. Since this TS change does not physically alter

the plant equipment and the snubber confidence level remains the

same there will not be any new or different accident resulting from

snubber failure from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change incorporates the surveillance requirements

for snubber visual inspection intervals following the guidance

provided in GL 90-09. As stated in the generic letter, the proposed

snubber visual inspection interval maintains the same confidence

level as the existing snubber visual inspection interval. This

surveillance requirement does not alter the current Limiting

Condition for Operation or the accompanying actions for the

snubber(s). The requirement for functional testing of safety-related

snubbers is unchanged and remains the basis for the established

margin of safety and assures a 95 percent confidence level that 90

percent to 100 percent of the snubbers operate within the specified

acceptance limits. This functional testing along with the proposed

visual inspection intervals provides adequate assurance that the

snubber will perform its intended function. Therefore, the proposed

changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of

safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Athens Public Library, South

Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.

Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority,

400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET llH, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

NRC Project Director: Frederick J. Hebdon.

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland

Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of amendment request: March 30, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

revise the TS 3/4.1.1.1 (Reactivity Control Systems--Boration Control

Systems--Boration Control--Shutdown Margin), TS 3/4.1.2.8 (Reactivity

Control Systems--Borated Water Sources--Shutdown), TS 3/4.1.2.9

(Reactivity Control Systems--Borated Water Sources--Operating), Bases

3/4.1.2 (Boration Systems), TS 3.4.5.1 (Emergency Core Cooling Systems,

ECCS--Core Cooling Tanks), TS 3/4.5.2 (ECCS--ECCS Subsystems), TS 3/

4.5.4 (ECCS--Borated Water Storage Tank), Bases 3/4.5 (ECCS), and TS 3/

4.10.4 (Special Test Exceptions--Shutdown Margin). This amendment

would: (a) Increase the required boration flowrate in the event the

required shutdown margin is not met, (b) increase the applicable

minimum boron concentration and/or volume requirements, (c) revise the

applicable Action statements and Surveillance Requirements, and (d)

propose several administrative and editorial changes.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below, indicating that the proposed

changes would:

1a. Not involve a significance increase in the probability of an

accident previously evaluated because no accident initiators,

conditions or assumptions are significantly affected by the proposed

changes.

The proposed changes would increase the required boration

flowrate in the event the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is not met,

increase the minimum required volume for the Boric Acid Addition

System (BAAS) and increase the minimum required boron concentration

for the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) and the Core Flooding

Tanks (CFT). The proposed changes would also revise the Technical

Specification (TS) Action Statements for the BWST and the CFT,

revise the TS Surveillance Requirement relating to boron

concentration sampling of the CFT, and would revise the TS

Surveillance Requirements involving trisodium phosphate chemistry.

In addition, various administrative and editorial changes, including

changes to the TS Bases, are proposed. As stated above, none of

these proposed changes involve accident initiators, conditions, or

assumptions.

1b. Not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated because no accident conditions or

assumptions are affected by the proposed changes.

The proposed changes for the minimum required boron

concentrations and volumes for the BAAS, BWST, and CPT comply with

existing requirements to maintain a 1% delta k/k shutdown margin

(SDM) at all times, and are consistent with reload and LOCA

analysis. Therefore, the accident condition assumption of 1% delta

k/k SDM at the initiation of an accident will still be met and the

radiological consequences will be as previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not alter the source term, containment

isolation, or allowable releases. The proposed changes, therefore,

will not increase the radiological consequences of a previously

evaluated accident.

2a. Not create the possibility of a new kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated because no new accident initiators

or assumptions are introduced by the proposed changes. As stated in

1a, the proposed changes do not affect any accident initiators and

are not initiators themselves. The proposed changes do not alter any

accident scenarios.

2b. Not create the possibility of a different kind of accident

from any accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes

only affect existing components, systems, and functions and do not

introduce any new requirements that cannot be met with the existing

components, systems, and functions. The proposed changes do not

alter any accident scenarios.

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes to the minimum required boron concentration and

volumes for the BAAS, BWST, and CFT would ensure the margin of

safety for reactor subcriticality is maintained at all times for

anticipated future core designs.

The proposed change to the TS Action statement to increase the

required boration flowrate in the event the SHUTDOWN MARGIN

requirement is not met, would ensure that the boration rate is

adequate for restoring the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN for anticipated

future core design.

The proposed changes to the TS Action statements for the BWST

and the CFT ensure that the plant is maneuvered in a timely and

conservative manner, without challenging any plant systems, while

minimizing the time the plant would be exposed to a LOCA with

assumptions not being met.

The proposed changes to the TS Surveillance Requirements

associated with trisodium phosphate chemistry would clarify the

requirements, make it easier to perform testing, minimize radwaste

generation, and reduce the consequences of a potential radioactive

spill. The proposed changes would also make the requirements

consistent with the DBNPS Updated Safety Analysis Report.

The proposed change to the TS Surveillance Requirement

associated with the boron concentration sampling of the CFT would

eliminate an unnecessary requirement and make the Surveillance

Requirement consistent with NUREG-1430.

None of these changes would adversely affect the margin of

safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library,

Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman,

Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon.

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland

Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear

Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of amendment request: April 5, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would

revise the TS 3/4.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System, TS 3/4.7.1.7,

Motor Driven Feedwater Pump System, and their applicable Bases. This

amendment would: (a) Clarify the requirements for operation of the

Auxiliary Feedwater System and Motor Driven Feedwater Pump System, (b)

increase the surveillance intervals for testing the steam turbine

driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the electric motor driven pump,

and (c) modify requirements relative to stationing an individual

locally, during associated surveillance testing.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration

determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has

provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards

consideration, which is presented below, indicating that the proposed

changes would:

1a. Not involve a significant increase in the probability of an

accident previously evaluated because no change is being made to any

accident initiator. The proposed changes are clarifications and the

incorporations of either the recommendations of Generic Letter 93-05

or the guidance provided by NUREG-1430. Therefore, it can be

concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant

increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

1b. Not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes do not

invalidate accident conditions or assumptions used in evaluating the

radiological consequences of an accident.

2a. Not create the possibility of a new kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes do

not change the way the plant is operated. No new types of failures

or accident initiators are introduced by the proposed changes.

2b. Not create the possibility of a different kind of accident

from any accident previously evaluated because no new failure modes

have been defined for any plant system or component important to

safety, nor has any limiting single failure been identified as a

result of the proposed changes. No different accident initiators or

failure mechanisms are introduced by the proposed changes.

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety

because the proposed changes continue to ensure the availability of

the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the Motor Driven Feedwater System

when called upon to perform their functions and will not adversely

impact any safety analysis assumptions.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library,

Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman,

Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John N. Hannon.

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339,

North Anna Power Station, Units No. 1 and No. 2, Louisa County,

Virginia

Date of amendment request: April 15, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise

the Technical Specifications (TS) for the North Anna Power Station,

Units No. 1 and No. 2 (NA-1&2). Specifically, the proposed changes

would modify the pressure/temperature operating limitations during

heatup and cooldown and the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection

System (LTOPS) pressure setpoints and temperatures for NA-1&2. Also,

the proposed changes include revised Limiting Conditions for Operation,

Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements for the Power-Operated

Relief Valves (PORVs) and block valves to address the concerns

discussed in NRC Generic Letter 90-06. Additionally, the proposed

changes include several editorial/administrative changes.

The NA-1&2 Reactor Coolant Systems (RCS) are protected from

material failure by the imposition of restrictions on allowable

pressure and temperature, and on heatup and cooldown rate. The LTOPS

ensures that material integrity limits are not exceeded during the

design basis overpressurization accidents. Equipment operability

requirements are imposed to ensure that the assumptions of the accident

analyses remain valid. The operating restrictions, setpoints, and

equipment operability requirements must be revised to extend their

applicability to a higher cumulative burnup, and to improve operational

flexibility.

The current pressure/temperature operating limits and LTOPS

setpoints are valid to 12 Effective Full-Power Years (EFPY) and 17 EFPY

for NA-1&2, respectively. According to the most recent estimates, the

burnup applicability limits will be exceeded by NA-1 in the spring of

1996. The NA-2 pressure/temperature operating limits and LTOPS

setpoints remain valid well into the year 2002. The proposed NA-1 TS

include revised pressure/temperature operating limits valid to end-of-

license. Although

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