Finding of No Significant Impact for the Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Finding of No Significant Impact for the Urgent-Relief Acceptance

of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

AGENCY: United States Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.

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SUMMARY: In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Council on Environmental Quality's

implementing regulations, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, DOE's implementing

procedures, 10 CFR part 1021, and Executive Order 12114, Environmental

Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, the DOE has prepared an

Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-0912, April 1994) to evaluate the

potential environmental impacts of the proposed urgent-relief

acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel.

The Environmental Assessment analyzed the potential environmental

impacts under the proposed action of accepting up to 409 spent nuclear

fuel elements from eight reactors in Europe for storage in an existing

DOE wet storage facility to meet the urgent needs of certain foreign

research reactor operators and to avoid failure of a key United States

nuclear weapons nonproliferation objective of minimizing and eventually

eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs

worldwide. Specifically, the Environmental Assessment analyzed the

potential impacts of transporting the spent nuclear fuel elements by

commercial or chartered vessel from eight reactors in Europe to any one

of five ports of entry in the United States (Wilmington, North

Carolina; the Army Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North

Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and

Jacksonville, Florida), off-loading the spent fuel at the port of entry

and transporting it by truck or rail to the Savannah River Site, near

Aiken, South Carolina; and storing the spent fuel there until decisions

are made regarding interim storage and ultimate disposition. The

Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorizes ultimate disposal of the spent fuel

in a geologic repository.

In October 1993, DOE provided a draft Environmental Assessment for

comment to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, and the

Commonwealth of Virginia, and interested individuals and organizations.

In February 1994, DOE provided a revised draft Environmental Assessment

to the States of Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina,

the Commonwealth of Virginia, and to individuals and groups known to

have an interest in the proposed action, and requested that comments on

the draft Environmental Assessment be submitted by March 7, 1994. On

February 10, 1994, Federal, State and local government representatives,

citizen groups, individuals and members of the international community

attended a meeting in Washington, DC, to present their views concerning

the proposed action. DOE also held public meetings in communities

potentially affected by the proposed acceptance of foreign research

reactor spent fuel. On March 18, 1994, the comment period on the draft

Environmental Assessment was extended until April 8, 1994, to provide

an additional opportunity for stakeholders to provide comments. The

Environmental Assessment has been revised, where appropriate, to

reflect comments received during the comment period.

Based on an evaluation of the use of either commercial or chartered

vessels, the proposed ports of entry and alternative modes of

transporting the spent nuclear fuel (truck or train) from the port of

entry to the Savannah River Site, DOE has concluded that no significant

impact would result from receipt of the spent fuel at any of the five

proposed ports and overland transport by rail or truck from the port of

entry to the Savannah River Site. Therefore, based on the analysis in

the Environmental Assessment and after careful consideration of all

comments from Federal, State and local officials, members of the public

and from the international community, DOE has determined that the

acceptance of up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements from eight foreign

research reactors in Europe for storage at the Savannah River Site does

not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National

Environmental Policy Act. Accordingly, an Environmental Impact

Statement is not required and the DOE is issuing this Finding of No

Significant Impact.

However, upon further consideration, and in an effort to balance

the domestic and international interests at stake, DOE has decided to

implement the proposed action as follows. The spent fuel will be

shipped either by commercial or chartered vessel from Europe to the

Army's Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina to the

maximum extent practicable (rather than allowing the shipper to select

from among any one of the five proposed ports as described in the

Environmental Assessment), and transported overland by rail (rather

than truck). Should DOE determine that another port or mode of

transport (from among those considered as the proposed action) is

necessary, DOE will provide direct notice of the change to State and

local government officials of the affected States and will notify the

public through local media and other means, as appropriate.

ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Persons requesting additional

information regarding this action or desiring a copy of the

Environmental Assessment should contact: Mr. David Huizenga, Office of

Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy (Mail Stop EM-30),

1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-9441.

Copies of the Environmental Assessment are available for public review

at the following DOE reading rooms and public libraries:

Aiken, South Carolina

DOE Public Reading Room, Gregg-Graniteville Library, 171 University

Parkway, Aiken, SC 29801, (803) 641-3465

Charleston, South Carolina

Charleston County Public Library, 404 King Street, Charleston, SC

29403, (803) 723-1645

Savannah, Georgia

Chatham County Public Library, 2002 Bull Street, Savannah, GA

31499-4301, (912) 234-5127

Jacksonville, Florida

Haydon Burns Public Library, Attn: Technical Services Dept., 122 N.

Ocean Street, Jacksonville, FL 32202, (904) 630-2665

Wilmington, North Carolina

New Hanover County Public Library, Attn: Daniel Horn, 201 Chestnut

Street, Wilmington, NC 28401, (910) 341-4390

Brunswick County, North Carolina

Brunswick County Manager's Office, Attn: Joyce Johnson, P.O. Box

249, 45 Courthouse Drive, Bolivia, NC 28422 (910) 253-4331

Washington, DC

DOE Freedom of Information, Reading Room, Forrestal Building, Room

1E-190, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-

6020

For general information regarding DOE's National Environmental

Policy Act process, please contact: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Office of

National Environmental Policy Act Oversight, U.S. Department of Energy

(Mail Stop EH-25), 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585,

(202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the 1950's, as part of the ``Atoms for

Peace'' program, the United States began providing assistance in the

peaceful application of nuclear technologies to countries that agreed

to forego the development of nuclear weapons. This assistance included

the provision of highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors

around the world. After irradiation in the reactor, the used (spent)

fuel was transported to the United States, where it was reprocessed to

extract the uranium still remaining in the spent fuel. In this way, the

United States maintained control of the highly enriched uranium, which

otherwise could be used to make nuclear weapons.

To reduce the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, the United

States began a program in 1978 aimed at minimizing and eventually

eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactor

programs worldwide. This effort (the Reduced Enrichment for Research

and Test Reactors Program) was directed at replacing the highly

enriched uranium used in research reactors with low enriched uranium, a

material that is not directly usable in nuclear weapons. Research

reactors are of particular interest because the major civilian use of

highly enriched uranium is as fuel in research reactors. If research

reactors worldwide were to convert to low enriched uranium fuels,

highly enriched uranium essentially would be eliminated from use in

civil commerce.

For research reactors converting to low enriched uranium fuel,

acceptance of spent fuel by the United States was viewed as essential

to offset the substantial expenses and reduction in reactor efficiency

and capability resulting from conversion. The United States accepted

highly enriched uranium spent fuel for several decades, until the

program was allowed to expire in 1988.

DOE decided in mid-1993 to prepare an Environmental Impact

Statement on a new proposed policy to accept, over a 10-15 year period,

up to 15,000 spent fuel elements containing uranium enriched in the

United States. The goal of the proposed long-term policy would be to

recover highly enriched uranium exported from the United States, while

giving foreign research reactor operators sufficient time to develop

their own long-term solutions for storage and disposal of spent fuel.

Although the Environmental Impact Statement is under preparation, DOE

does not expect to complete the analysis and make a decision on whether

to implement the policy until mid to late 1995.

Because DOE has not accepted any spent fuel containing uranium

enriched in the United States for more than five years, several foreign

research reactor operators are running out of storage capacity and

facing safety and regulatory issues associated with the presence of

spent fuel at their sites. If the United States is unable to commit now

to the near-term acceptance of a small amount of foreign research

reactor spent fuel, several reactor operators soon will either shut

down their reactors or ship their spent fuel offsite for reprocessing.

Neither option would serve the nonproliferation interests of the United

States. Thus, at the urging of the Department of State, DOE is

proposing to accept a small number of highly enriched uranium spent

fuel elements in the near term for storage in an existing federal

facility in South Carolina.

DOE believes that preparation of the Environmental Assessment,

which analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed

urgent-relief acceptance of a small number of spent fuel elements

before the Environmental Impact Statement is completed, fully complies

with the National Environmental Policy Act and its implementing

regulations. The proposed near-term acceptance is justified

independently of the decision on whether to establish a new policy on

the proposed long-term acceptance of foreign research reactor spent

fuel. Until the Environmental Impact Statement is completed and a

decision made whether to implement the proposed long-term acceptance

policy, the proposed acceptance of a small number of spent fuel

elements is necessary to maintain the United States program of

encouraging the conversion by research reactors to low enriched uranium

fuel. Further, while there is an obvious relationship between the two

proposals, a decision to accept such a small number of fuel elements

does not foreclose or prejudice future decisions regarding

establishment of a new spent fuel acceptance policy, or the decisions

regarding interim storage or ultimate disposition of spent nuclear

fuel. (In the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Environmental

Impact Statement, due to be completed by June 1995, DOE is considering

where to manage all spent fuel within the DOE complex nationwide for

the interim period prior to ultimate disposition.)

In October 1993, to ensure that countries currently possessing

spent fuel continue to support the nonproliferation initiatives of the

United States embodied in the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test

Reactor Program until the ongoing Environmental Impact Statement can be

completed, DOE issued for comment a draft Environmental Assessment

which evaluated the proposed urgent-relief acceptance of up to 700

elements of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing

uranium enriched in the United States. It was apparent from the

comments that DOE received in response to the October 1993 draft that

many people did not agree that there is a need for the United States to

accept this spent fuel. Others expressed concerns regarding DOE's plans

for implementing the proposed action. Subsequent to the release of the

October 1993 draft Environmental Assessment and after consideration of

comments received, teams of experts from the United States visited

foreign research reactors in Europe and Australia to assess the near-

term need for acceptance of foreign research reactor spent fuel

elements before the Environmental Impact Statement on the proposed

long-term acceptance policy is completed.

In February 1994, a revised draft Environmental Assessment, which

included revisions made in response to comments received on the October

1993 draft Environmental Assessment, was prepared and issued for public

review and comment. The proposed action evaluated in the February draft

Environmental Assessment was to accept 448 highly enriched uranium

spent fuel elements shipped by sea to any one of seven ports (Newport

News, Norfolk, or Portsmouth, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina;

Wilmington, North Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Jacksonville,

Florida) and then by truck to DOE's Savannah River Site near Aiken,

South Carolina, for storage. The comment period on the revised draft

Environmental Assessment was scheduled to close on March 7, 1994. On

February 10, 1994, DOE and the Department of State co-hosted a meeting

of stakeholders from State and local governments, Congress,

environmental and non-proliferation public interest groups, other

private sector interest groups, foreign research reactor operators and

key affected communities. The purpose of that meeting was to involve

stakeholders in a meaningful and constructive dialogue on the proposed

urgent-relief acceptance of a small number of spent fuel elements from

foreign research reactors. Subsequent to that meeting and based on

concerns raised by local communities potentially affected by the

proposed action, DOE extended the comment period on the February draft

Environmental Assessment until April 8, 1994.

Proposed Action

The DOE proposes to accept up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements

containing highly enriched uranium of United States origin from eight

research reactors in seven European countries (Austria, Denmark,

Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). The spent fuel

would be shipped across the ocean in up to 15 spent fuel transportation

casks from the country of origin to one or more United States eastern

seaboard ports. The casks are expected to be transported in the next

several months either by commercial container ships or chartered ships.

Several casks could be transported together on a single ship to any one

of the five proposed ports of entry: Wilmington and the United States

Army's Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina;

Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and Jacksonville,

Florida.

After arriving in the United States, the casks would be transported

to DOE's Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, where the fuel

elements would be stored underwater in an existing storage facility

(the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels).

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Routine Operation: During routine (non-accident condition) ocean

transport, there would be no impact to the marine environment.

Radiation exposure from the very small radiation fields being emitted

from the casks--about 1 millirem per hour at 1 meter from the cask

surface--would be limited primarily to crew members who inspect the

cargo on a daily basis to ensure secure stowage and structural safety

of the vessel. Incident-free dose estimates to these crew members would

be essentially the same regardless of the port of entry, largely

because the exposure is proportional to the numbers of inspections over

time. Distances and time of transit are similar from the European ports

to the proposed United States ports of entry. Assuming that the ship

makes three intermediate port stops and then unloads at the fourth

stop, the incident-free dose to a ship cargo inspector is estimated to

be 4.3 millirem for shipments into Sunny Point and Wilmington, North

Carolina; 4.5 millirem for shipments into Charleston, South Carolina;

and 4.6 millirem for shipments into Jacksonville, Florida and Savannah,

Georgia. The likelihood of a single fatal cancer among the entire crew

of all the ships used in the proposed action is approximately one in

450,000. If no intermediate port stops are assumed, the collective dose

would be reduced by approximately 30 percent.

Because container cargo handling is relatively uniform throughout

the world, exposure to port workers (handlers/inspectors) also would be

essentially the same regardless of the port of entry. Using a

conservative assumption, i.e., the same handler/inspector inspects all

shipments, the maximally exposed port worker would receive a dose of

approximately 5.2 millirem. The collective exposure (assuming the same

crew of handlers/inspectors for all shipments) to the handlers/

inspectors is estimated as 0.078 person-rem (0.0052 rem x 15

workers). The likelihood of a single individual port worker dying from

cancer as a result of the proposed action is about 1 in 380,000. Dose

to members of the general public during port operations would be

extremely low because residences are separated from dock facilities by

buffer spaces such as parking lots, warehouses and other port

facilities.

During truck transport of the spent fuel from the port of entry to

the Savannah River Site, the maximally exposed individual truck crew

member (assuming the same person is involved in all truck shipments)

would receive 2.4 millirem for shipments from Charleston, South

Carolina; 2.7 millirem for shipments from Savannah, Georgia; 4.1

millirem for shipments from Wilmington, North Carolina; 4.5 millirem

for shipments from Sunny Point, North Carolina; and 3.9 millirem for

shipments from Jacksonville, Florida. The likelihood of a single crew

member dying from cancer as a result of transporting spent fuel from

Sunny Point to the Savannah River Site is about 1 in 440,000.

The maximum exposure to an individual not actively involved in

shipping the spent fuel during routine transport was estimated for two

cases: (1) a member of the public who lives beside the highway route

(this individual was assumed to be exposed to each of the 15 truck

shipments at a distance of 30 meters); and (2) an individual located

near a stopped truck, e.g., in a traffic jam. The maximum in-transit

dose under the first instance was calculated to be 0.002 millirem for

routine operations. A dose of 0.002 millirem would increase the risk of

a latent cancer fatality by 1 in one billion. For the second case, an

individual could receive doses higher than 0.002 millirem depending on

the duration of the stop and the distance of the individual from the

truck. For example, in the unlikely event that a person was standing

outside a stopped truck for a period of 1/2 hour at a distance of two

meters, the person could receive a dose of one millirem.

Since port workers, inspectors, and truck drivers are not

considered radiation workers, as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC), the maximum annual allowable exposure for these

personnel would be 100 millirem, the same radiation dose limit

established by the NRC to protect the individual members of the general

public. As discussed above, during normal transport of the spent

nuclear fuel, the maximum annual exposure to the public, port workers,

inspectors, and truck drivers would be well below the 100 millirem dose

limit, and no doses large enough to result in acute health effects are

predicted among either the workers or general public for the proposed

action. The cumulative annual incident-free dose from the proposed

activity to all persons potentially exposed would range between 0.12

person-rem (Charleston and Savannah) and 0.16 person-rem (Sunny Point).

Currently, the average annual individual worker dose at the

Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuels (RBOF) for all operations

(unloading, handling and storage of the spent nuclear fuel elements) is

approximately 150 millirem. Based on very conservative assumptions,

i.e., all 409 spent fuel elements are received in a one-year period and

the same individuals unload all 15 casks, the maximum annual increase

in the average individual dose to a worker at RBOF is estimated to be

60 millirem. This dose would be well below both the DOE limit of 5,000

millirem per year for radiation workers and the DOE Administrative

control level of 2,000 millirem per year per person, for all DOE

activities. Once the spent fuel elements were stored under water in the

RBOF, the increase in radiation exposure to facility personnel from the

storage of the foreign spent fuel elements would not be detectable.

Only minor environmental impacts would be expected from the

proposed action because the receipt and storage of up to 409 spent fuel

elements represents only a small increase to existing site activity and

involves no new construction. Approximately 15 cubic feet of laundry

type waste and 5.5 cubic feet of solid waste would be generated per

cask. The proposed action would add less than 4 percent to the average

annual solid waste normally generated at RBOF. Receipt and storage of

foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would have no effect on the

types, quantities or utilization of hazardous compounds stored at RBOF,

and no incremental risk to workers would be expected.

Accident Conditions: The Environmental Assessment evaluates the

potential for accidents during ocean transport (port departure, ocean

crossing, and port arrival), overland transport, and storage at RBOF.

In the extremely unlikely event of an accidental fire at sea in

which a cask was sufficiently damaged by the fire to release its

contents, members of the ship crew near the fire would be exposed to

the released radioactive material. However, any crew member close

enough to the fire to suffer a significant radiation dose likely would

be more severely injured from the fire than the radiation dose. If crew

members were to survive the fire, radiological impacts would be similar

to those resulting from a severe accident in port, which would result

in a maximum exposure to workers and the public of approximately 0.21

person-rem. This exposure would result in an approximately one in 9,500

chance of one additional cancer in the entire exposed population. If

such an accident were to occur at sea, however, there would be

essentially no exposure to members of the public, and all released

activity would be deposited in the ocean. Assuming that the spent fuel

cask lay on the ocean floor where it slowly released its radioactive

inventory, the peak doses to biota residing on the ocean floor in or

near the uppermost sediment layer are estimated to be 0.11 rad

(radiation adsorbed dose) per year for fish, 0.17 rad per year for

crustaceans and 7.3 rad per year for mollusks. The radioactive material

would be expected to disperse and to be diluted due to the influence of

ocean currents. Since deleterious effects of chronic irradiation have

not been observed in natural populations at dose rates of less than 365

rad, no significant impacts would be expected. Further, uranium, the

major constituent of the spent fuel, has not been found to

bioaccumulate in fish and bioaccumulates only slightly in crustaceans

and mollusks. No significant chemical hazard would be expected from the

release of the contents of the spent fuel elements into the open ocean.

Spent fuel casks are designed to withstand at least a 15-meter

immersion, and it has been demonstrated that the cask seals will remain

intact at much greater depths. Further, damaged and undamaged casks can

be recovered readily from water up to 200 meters deep. Recovery from

depths of up to 2,000 meters may be possible, but would be costly.

In an extreme situation, where the accident occurs in coastal

wasters, the spent fuel is not recovered, and both the spent fuel and

cask are damaged, the peak dose to an individual is estimated to be 11

millirem per year. This individual is assumed to reside near the shore

and to eat seafood (fish, mollusk, seaweed) harvested from the area in

the immediate vicinity of the spent fuel cask.

In the event of the most severe port accident (major mechanical

damage, fire, oxidation of 100 percent of the fuel, and release of

radioactive material from a cask containing 33 spent fuel elements),

the dose to a maximally exposed individual, i.e., an individual assumed

to be standing outside approximately 100 feet away from the event and

remaining there for 24 hours, would be 25 rem. At such close distance,

it is highly probable that the individuals, if not evacuated, would be

harmed more by the explosion and fire engulfing the cask than by the

radiation dose. If the individual were inside a building approximately

100 feet away and remained there for 24 hours after the accident, the

dose would be reduced to 0.22 rem. At a more likely distance, where an

individual may be located outside for a period of 24 hours after the

accident, the dose at 0.6 miles would be 0.21 rem. If the person were

inside at the same distance, the dose would be 0.002 rem. When

considered in conjunction with the unlikely probability of occurrence

(approximately 1 chance in 7.7 million), the accident has an extremely

small risk. For example, the risk of developing a single fatal cancer

for the most severe case, i.e., individual outside, 100 feet away for

24 hours receiving 25 rem, is about 1 chance in 600 million.

In the event of an overland accident, assuming the surrounding

population remains there for a 24-hour period, the estimated population

dose risk is 0.0000015 person-rem for transport from Savannah,

0.0000018 person-rem from Charleston, 0.0000028 person-rem from

Wilmington, 0.0000024 person-rem from Jacksonville, and 0.0000035

person-rem from Sunny Point. While there would be slightly different

risks among the different ports, no significant impacts would result.

Four hypothetical accidents at RBOF were evaluated that could

potentially release radionuclides to the atmosphere. These accidents

include: (1) A nuclear criticality incident; (2) a fire and explosion

at RBOF; (3) accidental cutting of fuel element cores; and (4) rupture

or failure of fuel elements during underwater storage. The maximum dose

was attributed to the unlikely accident of 1000 foreign fuel elements

rupturing during storage at RBOF. This event would result in an 8.3

millirem maximum dose to the individual at the site boundary and a 70

person-rem dose for the offsite population. The probability of such an

accident occurring, however, would be less than one in 2000 years. When

the probability is taken into account, there would be an additional 1

in 500 million chance that the individual at the site boundary would

develop a fatal cancer, and a 1 in 55,000 chance that a single fatal

cancer would occur in the exposed populations.

Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

Alternatives considered in the Environmental Assessment include no

action, receipt of a greater or lesser number of spent fuel elements,

alternate ports of entry, alternative modes of transport from the

receiving port to the Savannah River Site, and reprocessing abroad and

transport of low or highly enriched uranium to the United States.

No Action: Under the No Action Alternative, there would be no

environmental impact in the United States. However, United States

nonproliferation policy would be adversely affected. Foreign reactor

operators will try to avoid shutting down their reactors. The operators

of two reactors can elect to reprocess their spent fuel at an existing

facility in Scotland, although one of the two would need United States

authorization to do so. Reprocessing would allow the uranium to be

extracted for reuse, and thus would increase the threat of nuclear

proliferation. Reactor operators in Belgium and Germany resorted to

reprocessing on four occasions in 1993 and 1994.

Six of the eight research reactors from which DOE proposes to

accept spent fuel either do not have the option to reprocess their

spent fuel or could not obtain regulatory authority to reprocess in

time to avoid shutdown. Shutdown of these reactors would severely

undermine the United States' credibility as a reliable partner in

matters of nuclear cooperation. This, in turn, could influence other

reactor operators to cease their conversion to low enriched fuel or to

revert to the use of highly enriched fuel if they have already

converted. In fact, several reactor operators have stated that, if the

United States is unable to accept spent fuel, they will cancel or delay

their reactor conversions to low enriched uranium fuel. Such actions

would encourage development of a world market for highly enriched

uranium, thereby undermining a key aspect of the United States

nonproliferation program.

Selection of the No Action Alternative would also adversely affect

the upcoming 1995 international conference on the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The conference will consider the

indefinite extension of the Treaty, which the United States strongly

supports. Other Treaty parties will want assurance that the United

States has fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty to share the

benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. If several countries that are

parties to the Treaty are compelled to shut down their research

reactors, thereby foregoing the benefits from these reactors, the

United States may be accused, fairly or unfairly, of not sharing the

benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. Such an accusation, however

ill-founded, could create or increase opposition to the indefinite

extension of the Treaty, which is the foundation for the international

nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime.

Greater or Lesser Number of Spent Fuel Elements Accepted: In

addition to the proposed action (shipment of up to 409 spent nuclear

fuel elements), the environmental impacts of shipping alternative

numbers of spent fuel elements (i.e., 953, 359, 291, and 248 spent fuel

elements) were also considered in the Environmental Assessment. The

risks for the 953-element alternative are slightly more than double the

risks for shipping 409 elements through the proposed ports. Conversely,

the risks of shipping 359, 291 and 248 elements are less than the risks

for shipping 409 elements. While there are differences in the risks

depending upon the number of elements shipped, the impacts associated

with the shipment of any alternative number of elements are extremely

small.

Acceptance of up to 409 spent fuel elements would allow the foreign

research reactors to ship full casks, and would not force the two

reactors that can ship spent fuel to Scotland for reprocessing to do

so. (Acceptance of 359 spent fuel elements, i.e., shipment in partially

full casks, also would not force these two reactors to reprocess.) In

proposing to accept full casks, DOE took note of the fact that there is

no significant difference in the environmental impacts between shipping

full and partially full casks. Further, shipping full casks is the

customary shipping procedure, and more cost-effective. Accordingly,

proposing to accept full casks appeared to be a prudent course to

encourage the continued participation of foreign research reactors in

the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program.

Other Ports of Entry: The Environmental Assessment also evaluated

the impacts of shipping 409 spent fuel elements through alternate

commercial and military ports using two assumptions: (1) No

intermediate port stops and eight casks per vessel; and (2) three

intermediate port stops and one cask per vessel. Dose to handlers and

port workers would be essentially the same from port to port. During

ocean transport, dose to the ship's crew would be generally the same

regardless of the port of entry. However, dose to the truck's crew

showed some slight variation consistent with the distance of travel,

i.e., slightly higher doses are associated with greater distances

traveled. The dose to the ship's crew and the dose to the truck crew

would be well below the 100 millirem limit for nonradiation workers.

None of the alternate ports appeared as advantageous for the

proposed receipt of spent fuel as the five proposed ports based on the

application of screening criteria drawn from the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, and additional criteria

recommended by a panel of maritime experts at a DOE-sponsored workshop

on port selection criteria for shipments of spent fuel. While there are

comparative advantages and disadvantages among the five proposed ports,

all five of the proposed ports appear comparatively more advantageous

than other United States seaports for the proposed action.

Other Modes of Overland Transport: The spent nuclear fuel could be

transported by rail from the port of entry to the Savannah River Site.

The incident-free dose to spent fuel cask handlers would depend on how

the casks were handled in port. If two casks are shipped per rail car,

the handler would continue to receive a small dose from the first

loaded cask as the second cask is loaded. Dose would also be influenced

by the number of cargo transfers required. For example, if the spent

fuel cask cannot be off-loaded directly from the ship to a rail car,

spent fuel cask handlers would receive an additional small dose during

the transport by truck to the rail car and from the transfer of the

cask from the truck to the rail car. In addition, rail cargo is

inspected after loading and prior to off-loading. As a result,

transport by rail would result in a slightly higher dose to port

handlers/inspectors and rail crew than transport by truck. Dose to the

public, however, would be generally lower, partly because rail stops

would normally occur in rail yards (removed from the general

population). For example, rail transport from Sunny Point to the

Savannah River Site would result in an annual dose of 0.16 person-rem

total to port handlers/inspectors, other port workers and rail crew,

and in a dose of 0.0017 person-rem to members of the public. Truck

transport of the spent fuel from Sunny Point to the Savannah River Site

would result in an annual dose of 0.08 person-rem to port handlers/

inspectors, other port workers and truck crew and a dose of 0.067

person-rem to members of the public. Neither mode of transport would

result in a significant health effect.

Reprocessing Abroad and Transport of Low or Highly Enriched Uranium

to the United States: The potential environmental impact of

transporting low enriched uranium by ship to the United States after

reprocessing the spent fuel abroad was analyzed in detail in two

recently issued Environmental Assessments prepared by the United States

Enrichment Corporation. Low enriched uranium was found to be a common

commercial product that has been shipped safely around the world in

large quantities by air, water, and land transport modes for over 30

years without significant impact. Consequently, if the spent nuclear

fuel elements were reprocessed in Europe (i.e., at Dounreay, Scotland),

blended down to low enriched uranium, and the low enriched uranium was

returned to the United States, no significant impacts would be

expected.

If the spent fuel were reprocessed in Scotland, but not blended

down, then highly enriched uranium could be transported from Scotland

to the United States for blending. The shipment of highly enriched

uranium would require extensive security activities and would involve

the use of military assets for protection and safety. The military has

had considerable experience in shipment of highly enriched uranium and

has safely transported such materials throughout the world without

significant impact.

These options, however, would not serve the nonproliferation

interests of the United States. As discussed above and in greater

detail in the Environmental Assessment, reprocessing would likely

result in reactor operators postponing conversion from highly enriched

uranium fuel, or reverting back to its use if conversion has already

been completed. This is because the only current reprocessor of highly

enriched uranium does not reprocess low enriched uranium fuel, and

reactor operators have only limited capacity to store spent fuel

generated as a result of operating. Thus, to continue operating,

research reactors would have to continue to use highly enriched uranium

fuels. In addition, for those reactors for which United States consent

is not required for reprocessing to occur, there is no mechanism to

implement or to enforce a blending requirement by the reactor operators

or reprocessors. Consequently, reactor operators could elect to have

their fuel reprocessed, but not blended. This would result in the

continued use of highly enriched uranium fuel by research reactors,

contrary to United States nonproliferation policy.

Enhanced Storage in Europe: DOE considered but rejected as

unreasonable the alternative of assisting foreign research reactors to

expand spent fuel storage capacity at the reactor sites or at other

sites in Europe. By the time new facilities could be constructed and

licensed, or existing facilities modified, the reactors from which DOE

proposes to accept spent fuel would have been forced to send their

spent fuel to Scotland for reprocessing, where that is an option, or to

shut down. For the reasons discussed above and in greater detail in the

Environmental Assessment, forcing research reactors to shut down or

reprocess would undermine the gains already realized in converting to

low enriched uranium fuels under the Reduced Enrichment for Research

and Test Reactors Program. The governments in the countries where these

reactors are located have stated that acceptance of spent fuel has

become a measure of the United States' reliability in worldwide nuclear

cooperation. A perceived lack of reliability could complicate upcoming

negotiations for renewal of important nonproliferation agreements.

Cumulative Impact

In addition to the environmental impacts from the proposed action,

the Environmental Assessment also considered the cumulative dose of

transporting other shipments of spent fuel to the Savannah River Site

and shipments of low-level radioactive materials to the Barnwell

facility, east of the Savannah River Site. No significant cumulative

effects were identified.

Determination

Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, and after

careful consideration of comments received, DOE has determined that the

acceptance of up to 409 spent nuclear fuel elements from eight foreign

research reactors in Europe for storage at the Savannah River Site does

not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National

Environmental Policy Act. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement

is not required and DOE issues this Finding of No Significant Impact.

Based on an evaluation of the five proposed ports of entry

(Jacksonville, Florida; Savannah, Georgia; the Army Military Ocean

Terminal at Sunny Point, and Wilmington, North Carolina; and

Charleston, South Carolina) and alternative modes of transporting the

spent nuclear fuel from the port of entry to the Savannah River Site

(truck or train), DOE has concluded that no significant impact would

result from any combination of proposed port and mode of transport from

the port of entry to the Savannah River Site.

However, upon further consideration, and in an effort to balance

the domestic and international interests at stake, DOE has decided to

implement the proposed action as follows. The spent nuclear fuel will

be shipped by commercial or chartered vessel from Europe to the Army's

Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina to the maximum

extent practicable (rather than allowing the shipper to select from

among any one of the five proposed ports as described in the

Environmental Assessment) and transported overland by rail (rather than

truck). Should DOE determine that another port or mode of transport

(from among those considered as the proposed action) is necessary, DOE

will provide direct notice of the change to State and local government

officials of the affected states and will notify the public through

local media and other means, as appropriate.

Issued at Washington, DC, this 22nd day of April, 1994.

Tara O'Toole,

Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.

[FR Doc. 94-10569 Filed 5-2-94; 8:45 am]

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