Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

Federal RegisterJul 20, 2026

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

8 CFR Parts 103 and 212

[CIS No. 2857-26; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0304]

RIN 1615-AD06

Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

AGENCY:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

DHS is rescinding the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations (“2022 Final Rule”). The 2022 Final Rule was not the best implementation of the statute. It was inconsistent with congressional intent, unduly restrictive, and hampered DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations of whether certain aliens are likely at any time to become a public charge. Rescission restores broader discretion for DHS officers to evaluate all pertinent facts and aligns with long-standing policy that aliens in the United States should be self-reliant and government benefits should not incentivize immigration. This rule also revises the breach and cancellation of public charge bonds regulations.

DATES:

The final rule is effective on September 18, 2026. This rule applies to applications for admission made on or after September 18, 2026 or applications for adjustment of status postmarked or electronically submitted on or after September 18, 2026. Receipt of means-tested public benefits before September 18, 2026 will be considered consistently with the 2022 Final Rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), DHS, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, MD 20746; telephone (240) 721-3000 (not a toll-free call).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

B. Legal Authority

C. Summary of the Proposed Rule

D. Implementation

E. Costs and Benefits

II. Background

A. Legal Authority

B. Grounds of Inadmissibility Generally

C. Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

III. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

A. Summary of Public Comments

B. Comments Expressing General Support for the Proposed Rule

C. Comments Expressing General Opposition to the Proposed Rule

D. Comments Regarding Legal Authority and Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority

2. Congressional Intent and Historical Application

3. Administrative Law Concerns

4. Constitutional Concerns

5. Prospective Application of the Final Rule and Retroactivity Concerns

E. Negative Impacts on DHS and Immigration Policy Objectives

1. Concerns About Immigration Officer Discretion

2. Lack of Replacement Language or Framework

3. Immigration System Impacts, Operational Burdens, and Processing Delays

4. Misalignment With Longstanding Immigration Policies or U.S. Values

F. Negative Impacts on Applicants, Petitioners, Beneficiaries, and Support Systems

1. Chilling Effects on Benefit Usage

2. Concerns About Clarity and Discrimination

G. Negative Impacts on U.S. Economy, Businesses, and Communities

1. Workforce Impacts

2. Impacts of Reduced Consumer Spending

3. Concerns About U.S. Demographics

4. Impacts on Housing

5. Impacts to Innovation

6. Other Economic Effects

7. Impacts on the Military and Veterans

H. DHS's Rationale and Justification for the Rule

1. Insufficient Evidence or Reasoned Justification To Change Policy

2. Insufficient Connection Between Receipt and Dependency on the Government

3. Would Not Accomplish Stated Goal To Reduce Public Expenditures

4. Agreement With Stated Need for Proposed Rule

I. Amendments to Cancellation and Breach of Public Charge Bond Provisions

J. Removal of 8 CFR 212.20, “Applicability of Public Charge Inadmissibility”

K. Removal of the Public Charge Regulatory Definitions

1. General Comments

2. Definition of “Likely at Any Time To Become a Public Charge”

3. Definition of “Public Benefits”

4. Definition of “Receipt (of Public Benefits)”

5. Definitions of “Government” and “Household”

L. Removal of the Public Charge Inadmissibility Determination Framework

1. Minimum Factors

2. Consideration of the Affidavit of Support

3. Consideration of Current and/or Past Receipt of Public Benefits

4. Disability Alone Is Not Sufficient

5. Totality of the Circumstances

6. Written Denial Requirement

7. Receipt of Public Benefits While an Alien Is in an Immigration Category Exempt From the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, or of Benefits Available to Refugees

M. Elimination of List of Exemptions and Waivers (8 CFR 212.23)

1. General Opposition to Removal

2. General Support for Removal

3. Certain Cubans and Haitians

4. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

N. Comments Unrelated to Specific Regulatory Sections

1. General Comments

2. Comments on the Development of Future Public Charge Inadmissibility Policy Interpretive Tool

3. Privacy and Personal Data Concerns

4. Recommendations for Public Charge Inadmissibility Regulations or Subregulatory Guidance

5. Recommendations for Implementation

6. Severability

7. Other Comments

O. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

1. Costs, Benefits, and Transfer Payments

2. Regulatory Flexibility Act

3. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

4. Other Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

P. Out-of-Scope

1. Support for Immigration and Opposition to Restrictive Immigration Policies

2. Opposition to Immigration Generally

3. Miscellaneous

IV. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)

1. Summary of Changes From the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the Final Rule

2. Summary of the Regulatory Changes

3. Background and Purpose

4. Population

5. Cost-Benefit Analysis

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

D. Small Business Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional Review Act)

E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

G. Family Assessment

H. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments)

I. National Environmental Policy Act

J. Paperwork Reduction Act

Table of Abbreviations

APA—Administrative Procedure Act

ASC—Application Support Center

BIA—Board of Immigration Appeals

CCBG—Child Care and Development Block Grant

CBO—Congressional Budget Office

CBP—U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations

CHIP—Children's Health Insurance Program

CMS—Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

CNMI—Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

COVID-19—Coronavirus Disease 2019

CPI-U—Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers

CPS—Current Population Survey

CTC—Child Tax Credit

DHS—U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOJ—Department of Justice

DOS—U.S. Department of State

EAD—Employment Authorization Document

eFMAP—Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentage

EITC—Earned Income Tax Credit

E.O.—Executive Order

FAM—Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual

FAS—Freely Associated States

FFP—Federal Financial Participation

FMAP—Federal Medical Assistance Percentage

FOIA—Freedom of Information Act

FR—Federal Register

FY—Fiscal Year

GW—George Washington University

HCV—Housing Choice Voucher

HHS—U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HSA—Homeland Security Act

HUD—U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

ICE—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICR—Information Collection Request

IIRIRA—Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

IMF—International Monetary Fund

INA—Immigration and Nationality Act

INS—Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRCA—Immigration Reform and Control Act

KFF—Kaiser Family Foundation

LPR—Lawful Permanent Resident

NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act

NEPA—National Environmental Policy Act

NHTSA—U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NOID—Notice of Intent to Deny

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTA—Notice to Appear

NTMVS Act—National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966

OBBBA—One Big Beautiful Bill Act

OHP—Oregon Health Plan

OMB—Office of Management and Budget

PII—Personally Identifiable Information

PRA—Paperwork Reduction Act

PRWORA—Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

RFE—Request for Evidence

RIA—Regulatory Impact Analysis

SNAP—Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

SSA—Social Security Administration

SSI—Supplemental Security Income

TANF—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

TPS—Temporary Protected Status

UBI—Universal Basic Income

UMRA—Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

U.S.C.—United States Code

USCIS—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

USDA—U.S. Department of Agriculture

VAWA—Violence Against Women Act

WIC—Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

The purpose of this rule is to remove from the Code of Federal Regulations the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility final rule (2022 Final Rule),

as these provisions straitjacket DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).

See

Public Law 104-193, section 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601). The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were directed to consider seven factors (five of those required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances.

87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022).

The Fourth Circuit emphasized the provision indicates the executive has extensive and ultimate discretion over the relevant determination, especially since Congress embedded discretion into the statutory scheme such as by identifying minimum, but not exclusive, factors for consideration.

See CASA de Maryland, Inc.

Trump,

971 F.3d 220, 243-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (request for rehearing

en banc

granted on December 3, 2020, but the appeal was later dismissed). DHS believes this rescission is more consistent with congressional intent as it restores ultimate discretion for officers to consider not just the minimum statutory factors but also any other information the officer deems relevant to a public charge inadmissibility determination.

DHS is moving away from a bright line primary dependence standard. By removing most

of the regulatory provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, DHS can implement policy and interpretive tools guiding officers in making individualized, fact-specific public charge inadmissibility determinations, based on a totality of the alien's circumstances, consistent with the statute, congressional intent, and precedent.

These tools will guide public charge inadmissibility determinations while empowering officers to consider: (1) the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B); (2) the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits; (3) any other individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case; and (4) any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency. Using good judgment and discretion, officers will more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, in the totality of the circumstances, as Congress intended.

Except certain public charge bond provisions, which this final rule amends.

See

Matter of Vindman,

16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (“The elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied. They are not defined by statute, but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of

all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.

”) (emphasis added);

Matter of Harutunian,

14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974) (“Since the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination of whether an alien falls into that category rests within the discretion of the consular officers or the Commissioner.”).

DHS reviewed and considered the feedback and recommendations submitted in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

B. Legal Authority

The authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) for the rescissions and regulatory amendments is found in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), (public charge inadmissibility determinations); section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, (applicants for admission); and section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, (eligibility criteria for applications for adjustment of status). In addition, section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), authorizes the Secretary to establish such regulations as deemed necessary for carrying out the Secretary's authority under the INA.

C. Summary of the Proposed Rule

On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). In the NPRM, DHS proposed the following changes:

• Amend 8 CFR 103.6(c), Cancellation and breach—Clarifying that receipt of any means-tested public benefit, or being otherwise noncompliant with any condition of the public charge bond, results in a breach of that bond and eliminating language stating that “USCIS may cancel a public charge bond at any time after determining that the alien is not likely at any time to become a public charge.”

• Remove 8 CFR 212.20, Applicability of public charge inadmissibility—Removal in its entirety of the language defining the categories

of aliens subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

• Remove 8 CFR 212.21, Definitions—Removal of the definitions, including the definitions of “likely at any time to become a public charge,” “receipt (of public benefits),” “public cash assistance for income maintenance,” and “long-term institutionalization at government expense.”

• Remove 8 CFR 212.22, Public charge inadmissibility determination—Removal of the overly restrictive language relating to an alien's current and/or past receipt of means-tested public benefits, the totality of the circumstances analysis, and receipt of public benefits by an alien in an exempt category.

• Remove 8 CFR 212.23, Exemptions and waivers for public charge ground of inadmissibility—Removal of the language listing exemptions and waivers to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

DHS received 8,846

comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The preamble to this final rule includes summaries of significant issues raised by the comments and includes responsive explanations for policy changes.

DHS received 5,882 comments during the 30-day comment period applicable to the rule, and 2,964 during the overlapping 60-day comment period applicable to the associated information collection.

D. Implementation

DHS will begin implementing this final rule on its effective date. This final rule will apply to applications for adjustment of status that are postmarked or electronically submitted on or after the effective date and applications for admission made on or after the effective date. On or before the effective date, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance to inform, but not prescribe, the outcome of USCIS officers' public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the totality of the circumstances. In addition, DHS will only consider the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government expense before the effective date of this final rule and will consider the receipt of any means tested public benefits on or after that date.

E. Costs and Benefits

DHS is removing most of the 2022 Final Rule provisions to allow DHS to better implement the public charge ground of inadmissibility. The final rule is expected to impose new benefits and transfers. To assess the impacts of the rule, DHS considers the potential impacts of the rule relative to a no-action baseline, which reflects the current state of the world absent this regulatory action.

The primary source of unquantified benefits of this rule is the removal of overly restrictive provisions promulgated in the 2022 Final Rule that hinder officers in making public charge inadmissibility determinations. By removing rigid regulatory definitions and standards, this rule ensures that officers can make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances. This approach will prevent the application of overly restrictive criteria that straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations.

The rule will also result in a reduction in transfer payments from Federal and State governments to individuals who may choose to disenroll from or forgo enrollment in a public benefits program. Individuals who might choose to disenroll from or forgo future enrollment in a public benefits program include aliens as well as U.S. citizens who are members of mixed-status households. DHS estimates that the total reduction in transfer payments from the Federal and State governments could be approximately $13.05 billion annually due to disenrollment or forgone enrollment in public benefits programs by members of households that include aliens who may be receiving public benefits. DHS estimates that the 10-year discounted Federal and State transfer payments reduction of this rule could be approximately $111.28 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $91.62 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. This total includes DHS's estimate that Federal transfer payments could decrease by approximately $65.76 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and about $54.14 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. Using the average Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), DHS further estimates that State transfer payments could decrease by approximately $45.52 billion at a 3-percent discount rate and approximately $37.48 billion at a 7-percent discount rate. DHS notes there may be additional reductions in transfer payments that we are unable to quantify. DHS also recognizes that the estimated reductions in transfer payments are approximations and could be influenced by external factors unrelated to this rule. For example, the recent changes to Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) included in H.R. 1 are expected to impact enrollment rates, adding complexity to quantification efforts.

DHS anticipates that disenrollment or forgone enrollment rates may fluctuate independently of this rule, potentially affecting the transfer payment estimates presented. However, those external factors are separate and independent of this rule.

See

H.R. 1 Reconciliation Bill,

e.g.,

secs. 10108 (SNAP Eligibility); 71109 (Alien Medicaid Eligibility); Public Law 119-21 (July 4, 2025).

For a complete list of regulatory changes in this rule, please see section V. “List of Subjects and Regulatory Amendments.”

Finally, DHS recognizes that reductions in Federal and State transfers under Federal benefits programs may have downstream and upstream impacts on State and local economies, large and small businesses, and individuals. For example, the rule might result in reduced revenues for healthcare providers, such as hospitals and nonprofits, participating in Medicaid, companies that manufacture medical supplies or pharmaceuticals, grocery retailers participating in SNAP, agricultural producers who grow foods that are eligible for purchase using SNAP benefits. Landlords participating in federally funded housing programs may also experience financial strain, such as increased tenant turnover and higher administrative costs.

Table I.1 provides a detailed summary of the regulatory changes and the estimated costs, benefits, and transfers associated with the expected impacts.

BILLING CODE 9111-97-P

ER20JY26.000

ER20JY26.001

ER20JY26.002

BILLING CODE 9111-97-C

II. Background

A. Legal Authority

The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101

et seq.,

and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA).

Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Section 101 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 111, establishes that part of DHS's primary mission is to ensure that efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland do not diminish either the overall economic security of the United States or the civil rights and civil liberties of persons.

See

Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 101

et seq.

(Nov. 25, 2002).

In addition to establishing the Secretary's general authority for the administration and enforcement of immigration laws, section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, enumerates various related authorities, including the Secretary's authority to establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, issue such instructions, and perform such other acts as the Secretary deems necessary for carrying out such authority.

Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), provides that any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if he or she is likely at any time to become a public charge. In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible based only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary.

Under section 213A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, certain aliens are required to submit a sufficient Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA (Form I-864) executed by a sponsor who agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line

during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable. The Form I-864 is intended to ensure that an intending immigrant has adequate means of financial support and is not likely to rely on the U.S. Government for financial support.

Sponsors on active duty (other than active duty for training) in the Armed Forces of the United States who are petitioning for the admission of their spouse or child only need to demonstrate the means to maintain an annual income equal to at least 100 percent of the Federal poverty line.

Section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, addresses the inspection of applicants for admission, including inadmissibility determinations of such aliens.

Section 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255, generally establishes eligibility criteria for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident (LPR).

B. Grounds of Inadmissibility Generally

The United States has a long history of permitting aliens to enter the United States, whether permanently or on a temporary basis. At the same time, Congress has excluded aliens who pose a threat to the safety or general welfare of the country or who seek to violate immigration laws.

See Fiallo

Bell,

430 U.S. 787, 787 (1977) (The Supreme Court has “long recognized [that] the power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control”).

Congress has exercised this authority in part by establishing the concepts of admission

and inadmissibility in the INA.

Aliens are inadmissible due to a range of acts, conditions, and conduct.

If an alien is inadmissible that alien is ineligible to be admitted to the United States and ineligible to receive a visa, unless he or she applies for and receives a waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief. Congress extended the applicability of the inadmissibility grounds beyond the context of applications for admission and visas by making admissibility an eligibility requirement for certain immigration benefits, including adjustment of status to that of an LPR.

If an alien is inadmissible, that alien is also ineligible for those benefits unless the alien is eligible to apply for and received waiver of inadmissibility or other form of relief, where available and appropriate.

Admission is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”

See

INA sec. 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A).

See

INA sec. 212(a), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a).

Id.

See

INA sec. 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2).

See, e.g.,

INA sec. 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v); INA sec. 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h); INA sec. 212(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(i); INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii);

see also

USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 9, Waivers and Other Forms of Relief,

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-9

(last updated Feb. 3, 2026). DHS has the discretion to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility as designated by Congress. Where an alien is seeking an immigration benefit that is subject to a ground of inadmissibility, DHS cannot approve the immigration benefit being sought if a waiver of that ground is unavailable under the INA, the alien does not meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for the waiver, or the alien does not warrant the waiver in any authorized exercise of discretion.

C. Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility

Section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), states any alien who applies for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status is inadmissible if in the opinion of the consular officer or immigration officer, as applicable, the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. The public charge ground of inadmissibility, therefore, applies to aliens applying for a visa to come to the United States temporarily or permanently, for admission at or between ports of entry,

and for adjustment of status to that of an LPR.

Under the statute, some categories of aliens are exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility, while others, if found inadmissible under the public charge ground, may apply for a waiver of the public charge ground of inadmissibility or may be invited to submit a public charge bond.

DHS notes that due to differences in the information collected from aliens and operational limitations at and between the ports of entry, the information and evidence considered in the totality of the circumstances by USCIS may be different from that which is considered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Three different agencies are responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility, each in a different context or contexts. DHS primarily applies the public charge ground of inadmissibility to applicants for admission at or between ports of entry and when adjudicating certain applications for adjustment of status. DOS consular officers are responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility as part of the visa application process and for determining whether a visa applicant is ineligible for a visa on public charge grounds at the time of application for a visa. This rule does not revise DOS standards or processes. DOJ is responsible for applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility with respect to aliens in Immigration Court. Immigration Judges adjudicate matters in removal proceedings, and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and, in some cases, the Attorney General, adjudicate appeals arising from such proceedings. This rule does not revise DOJ standards or processes.

See

INA secs. 212(d)(3)(A), 213, 245(d)(2)(B), and 245(j), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(3)(A), 1183, 1255(d)(2)(B), and 1255(j), and 8 CFR 213.1 and 8 CFR 245.11.

The INA does not define the terms “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” However, it does specify that when determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge, consular officers and immigration officers must,

at a minimum,

consider the alien's age; health; family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills.

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Section 212(a)(4)(B)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii), permits consular officers or immigration officers to consider any Form I-864 submitted on the alien's behalf, when determining whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge.

In fact, with very limited exceptions, most aliens seeking family-based immigrant visas and adjustment of status, and certain aliens seeking employment-based immigrant visas or adjustment of status, must submit a sufficient Form I-864 in order to avoid being found inadmissible as likely at any time to become a public charge.

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4)(C) and (D), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(C) and (D).

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B)(ii). When required, the applicant must submit an Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA (Form I-864 or Form I-864EZ).

In general, under section 213 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1183, the Secretary has the discretion to admit into the United States an alien who is determined to be inadmissible only on the public charge ground upon the giving of a suitable and proper bond or undertaking approved by the Secretary.

See

INA sec. 213, 8 U.S.C. 1183.

D. Current Rulemaking

On November 19, 2025, DHS published the NPRM, Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility, 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). The public comment period on the NPRM closed on December 19, 2025, and the public comment period on the associated information collection closed on January 20, 2026.

Following careful consideration of public comments received, DHS is issuing this final rule as proposed. The following section of the preamble includes a detailed summary and analysis of public comments received. Comments received may be reviewed at the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) at

https://www.regulations.gov,

docket number USCIS-2025-0304.

DHS received 5,882 comments during the first comment period, and 2,964 during the second comment period. Comments on the NPRM were to be submitted during the first comment period. Comments on the information collection described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section could be submitted during both comment periods.

For a detailed description of the history of the public charge ground of inadmissibility, public benefits under PRWORA, and prior public charge rulemakings, please refer to the NPRM.

E. Severability

DHS intends the changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) to be severable from the full rescission of regulatory provisions in 8 CFR part 212. To the extent a court finds this final rule rescinding the public charge inadmissibility regulations in 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23 is invalid or unenforceable, DHS intends that certain changes to 8 CFR 103.6(c) nevertheless be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to those provision(s) permitted by law, unless they are also held to be wholly invalid and unenforceable. Specifically, DHS intends to continue to give effect to the removal of the ground for cancellation 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1) stating that DHS can cancel a public charge bond at any time if it determines “that the alien is not likely at any time to become a public charge” because, as discussed in the NPRM, the rationale for the proposed removal of that ground of cancellation is based on the practical infeasibility of applying it rather than the broader justification for rescinding 8 CFR 212.20 through 212.23. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Similarly, if not separately invalidated or deemed unenforceable, DHS intends to keep the revised restructuring of 8 CFR 103.6(c)(1), separating the cancelation and breach provisions into paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) for clarity.

III. Response to Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

A. Summary of Public Comments

On November 19, 2025, DHS published an NPRM titled Public Charge Ground of Inadmissibility. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS received 8,846 comments on the proposed rule, the majority of which opposed the rule. Most of the comment submissions were from individual or anonymous commenters, including attorneys and academic researchers. Other commenters included healthcare providers, legal service providers, research and religious organizations, advocacy groups, social and community organizations, professional associations, State and local government agencies and elected officials, trade and business organizations, unions, schools and universities, and a foreign government entity.

B. Comments Expressing General Support for the Proposed Rule

Comment:

Several commenters were generally in favor of the proposed rule. Some of the commenters who supported the proposal stated that public benefit programs are intended for Americans and that the government should put America first.

Many commenters who supported the rule expressed concern about the burden of benefit use by immigrants on available resources, stating the government should not allow immigrants to burden the benefit systems for Americans. Several commenters stated that the United

States should eliminate the potential for aliens to be incentivized to immigrate for public benefits, with some commenters referencing aliens' fraud and abuse of public benefit programs, taking advantage of the United States, draining resources, or disproportionately benefiting from assistance at taxpayer expense. One commenter stated that resources for new immigrants should be limited, with another stating that when conditions for U.S. citizens in America improve immigrants can be helped. One commenter expressed their belief that supplemental programs are meant to be a temporary aid but that there are insufficient regulations to prevent such aid from becoming a lifestyle. Other commenters expressed support for the rule, remarking that immigrants should demonstrate advanced education, personal savings, and value provided to the United States upon admission.

Response:

DHS agrees that aliens applying for admission and adjustment of status who are subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility should be self-sufficient and should not depend on the government to meet their needs. DHS also agrees that the availability of public benefits should not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States, as Congress indicated in PRWORA.

This rulemaking seeks to align public charge inadmissibility determinations with those concepts. DHS firmly believes that this was Congress's intent in enacting section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

See

Public Law 104-193, sec. 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601).

This rulemaking will empower officers to consider not only the mandatory statutory factors and an alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, but also all relevant evidence and information in the record specific to the alien as the officers determine whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. This will restore a public charge inadmissibility determination that relies on DHS officers' good judgment and sound discretion as envisioned by Congress.

DHS emphasizes neither the public charge ground of inadmissibility nor this final rule govern eligibility for means-tested public benefits; rather they govern which aliens are inadmissible and, therefore, ineligible for admission and adjustment of status. This final rule does not address the government's responsibility to care for aliens or which aliens are, or should be, eligible to receive means-tested public benefits.

C. Comments Expressing General Opposition to the Proposed Rule

Comment:

Many commenters expressed general opposition to the rule. Some stated that the rule is unfair, cruel and inhumane or barbaric, that previous poverty is not a reason to penalize a person today, and that every human deserves to be cared for and treated respectfully. Some disagreed with the basis of the rule, commenting that the rule is not right for the country. One commenter called the rule pointless, with another stating the rule is unnecessary and would negatively impact children.

Response:

DHS strongly disagrees that the rule is pointless, unnecessary, or unfair. The purpose of this rule is to remove the public charge inadmissibility provisions promulgated by the 2022 Final Rule, 87 FR 55472 (Sept. 9, 2022), as these provisions straitjacketed DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA.

The 2022 Final Rule imposed narrow definitions of statutory terms and minimum factors as well as limited the public benefits that DHS could consider in a public charge inadmissibility determination, preventing officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. See 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). Rescission of the 2022 Final Rule allows officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge using good judgment and discretion, consider the mandatory statutory factors in section 212(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B), the alien's receipt of means-tested public benefits, all individualized case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to an alien's case, and any empirical data relevant to an alien's self-sufficiency.

See

Public Law 104-193, section 400, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1601).

Comment:

A commenter wrote that the proposed rule is not practical and instead driven by a desire to resurrect a punitive approach that was widely rejected by public health experts, State and local governments, and advocates.

Response:

DHS rejects the suggestion that it is resurrecting the public charge ground of inadmissibility approach found in the 2019 Final Rule, 84 FR 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019). As it made clear in the NPRM, previous regulations relating to the public charge ground of inadmissibility were overly restrictive.

By removing (not replacing or amending) the rigid definitions and factors, this final rule will allow officers to consider all case-specific factors and circumstances relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination, in the totality of the circumstances. This in turn enables officers to more accurately assess an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. DHS is not implementing the provisions of the 2019 Final Rule in this final rule.

90 FR 52180-52181 (Nov. 19, 2025).

D. Comments Regarding Legal Authority and Statutory Provisions

1. Statutory Authority

Comment:

One commenter stated that this rule is intended to reduce immigration to the United States, which only Congress can do via statute.

Response:

While it is possible this rule may decrease the number of aliens who will be admitted into or granted adjustment of status in the United States, as explained elsewhere in this final rule, DHS is unable to quantify those impacts due to the nature of the individualized case-by-case determination required by statute. DHS strongly disagrees that it is aiming to reduce immigration in excess of its statutory authority. While Congress established annual numerical limitations for certain immigrant and nonimmigrant visa classifications, Congress has not mandated, nor would it be practical to mandate, that these limits be fully utilized given specific eligibility criteria and other congressionally imposed restrictions, such as specific grounds of inadmissibility.

See e.g.,

INA secs. 202, 203, 212 and 214; 8 U.S.C. 1152, 1153, 1182, and 1184. In fact, Congress provided for the rollover or reallocation of immigrant visas in certain circumstances.

See e.g.,

INA sec. 201, 203, and 206, 8 U.S.C. 1151, 1153, and 1156.

The very purpose of the public charge ground of inadmissibility is to prevent the admission and adjustment of status of aliens who are determined by an officer to be likely at any time to become a public charge. Indeed, since 1882, Congress has clearly decided to limit the admission of such aliens.

To the extent the commenter does not like that this ground of inadmissibility prevents the admission and adjustment of status of certain aliens, the complaint is for Congress, not DHS. More than 70 years ago Congress recognized that setting the parameters for determining whether an

alien is likely at any time to become a public charge is best left to the judgment and interpretation of the executive branch and the courts because the elements constituting public charge are so varied.

If Congress wanted to conclusively define what it means to be “likely at any time to become a public charge” it would have done so when enacting immigration statutes in 1882,

1891,

1903,

1907,

1917,

1952,

1990,

or 1996.

However, Congress, at no point during the history of the public charge inadmissibility ground, limited the manner in which the executive branch made public charge inadmissibility determinations save providing a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be considered, in 1996.

Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882).

See

The 1950 Omnibus Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 349 (1950).

Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214 (Aug. 3, 1882).

Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (Mar. 3, 1891).

Immigration Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 825 (Feb. 13, 1903).

Immigration Act of 1907, 36 Stat 264 (Feb. 20, 1907).

Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874 (Feb. 5, 1917).

INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (June 27, 1952).

603

See

Immigration Act of 1990, Public Law 101-649, section 601, 110 Stat. 4978, 5072 (Nov. 29, 1990).

IIRIRA,

See, e.g., Cyan, Inc.

Beaver Cty. Emp. Ret. Fund,

138 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2018) (explaining that, if Congress had wanted to deprive State courts of jurisdiction over certain class actions, it could have easily done so by inserting a provision).

As referenced in the NPRM and this final rule, with the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule DHS is eliminating a rigid regulatory framework and restoring broader officer discretion, which ensures that aliens whom DHS has determined are likely at any time to become a public charge are not admitted or granted adjustment of status, as Congress intended.

Comment:

Several commenters said this rulemaking overreached the powers granted in the statute by Congress. Another said removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful.

Response:

DHS strongly disagrees that the removal of the 2022 Final Rule is unlawful or goes beyond the powers granted to DHS by Congress. The Secretary's authority for issuing this rule is found in various sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101

et seq.,

and the HSA. Section 102 of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112, and section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, charge the Secretary with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States. Indeed, this rulemaking is within DHS's express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, section 103(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). For these reasons as well as those discussed previously, the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule does not exceed the Secretary's authority.

The removal of the 2022 Final Rule in favor of a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis is a permissible implementation of the public charge inadmissibility statute enacted by Congress.

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). DHS believes that the express language of sections 212(a)(4)(A) and (B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B), the longstanding national policy on immigration and welfare, and the precedent decisions that have guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guidance for DHS officers to make public charge inadmissibility determinations.

Comment:

Some commenters stated that section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), does not authorize DHS to consider the past or present receipt of non-cash public benefits, and added that such consideration would constitute an impermissible expansion of the statutory criteria and undermine the intent of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Another commenter similarly stated that the expansion of the public charge definition to include non-cash benefits lacks a clear basis in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), or precedent decisions.

Response:

DHS is neither promulgating definitions for the terms “public charge” or “public benefits” through this rulemaking. As proposed in the NPRM, DHS believes that retaining regulations that disregard receipt of certain means-tested public benefits, when such receipt is relevant to assessing an alien's likelihood of becoming a public charge, is not the best reading of the statute. DHS is therefore removing the rigid provisions in the 2022 Final Rule, including limitations on what public benefits may be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination, which prevented officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with the clear self-sufficiency goals articulated by Congress in PRWORA. Consideration of non-cash public benefits in a public charge inadmissibility determination is neither precluded by section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), nor inconsistent with precedent decisions.

See

Matter of Vindman,

16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977) (considering receipt of cash benefits and other public funds as part of a public charge inadmissibility determination);

Matter of M-,

2 I&N Dec. 131, 131 (BIA 1944) (considering alien's receipt of public aid as part of public charge inadmissibility determination).

In fact, when passing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress added a list of minimum, but not exclusive, factors to consider in public charge inadmissibility determinations but did not preclude consideration of any other factors including the alien's receipt of non-cash public benefits. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Moreover, DHS disagrees that Congress intended to exclude consideration of non-cash benefits when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). Congress does not mention public benefits at all in section 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), leaving it to the agencies administering the public charge ground of inadmissibility

to specify how public benefits should be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination. However, Congress did prohibit consideration of any public benefits under 8 U.S.C. 1641(c) for certain battered aliens, without reference to cash versus non-cash benefits, which strongly suggests Congress understood and accepted DHS's consideration of past receipt of any public benefits—cash and non-cash alike—in all other circumstances. INA sec. 212(s), 8 U.S.C. 1182(s). DHS further disagrees that precedent decisions preclude consideration of non-cash benefits. On the contrary, as concluded in past precedent decisions that have informed public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades, receipt of public support of any kind is an appropriate consideration in a public charge inadmissibility determination.

DHS, DOJ, and DOS all administer this ground of inadmissibility.

See,

e.g., Matter of Vindman,

16 I&N Dec. 131 (Reg'l Comm's 1977) (consideration of past public benefits in determining the likelihood of becoming a public charge in the future);

Matter of Harutunian,

14 I&N Dec. 583, 589 (Reg'l Comm'r 1974) (“Congress intends that an applicant for a visa be excluded who is without sufficient funds to support himself, who has no one under any obligation to support him and who, being older, has an increasing chance of

becoming dependent,

disabled and sick.”) (emphasis added).

Comment:

A commenter stated removal of 2022 Final Rule contradicts DHS's statutory obligation to administer immigration laws fairly, equitably, and without discrimination.

Response:

DHS disagrees. As noted above, DHS has the authority to enforce

and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility and to prescribe regulations necessary to carry out that authority. INA sec. 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). By removing regulations that the Secretary determined are rigid, overly-restrictive, and not the best implementation of the statute, DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to a broader exercise of discretion on a case-by-case basis, consistent with Congress's express national policy on immigration and welfare and in line with the spirit of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4). With this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard which permits DHS officers to consider any and all factors, in the totality of the circumstances, relevant to each individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge.

As discussed in other comment responses, DHS disagrees any changes in this final rule risk inviting discriminatory decision-making.

See

Matter of Vindman,

all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.”

) (emphasis added);

Matter of Harutunian,

Comment:

One commenter, citing

Loper Bright

Raimondo

stated that “legal interpretation” of statutes—even statutes Congress expressly authorized agencies to implement, like section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)—is a judicial function driven by “traditional tools of statutory interpretation,” not the “policy preferences” of the Executive, adding the statute has a fixed, single best meaning which courts (and not the Supreme Court alone) must interpret and agencies must implement. The commenter said DHS mistakenly treats statutory meaning merely as a regulatory choice and mischaracterizes “primary dependence on the government for subsistence” as a “bright-line . . . standard” rather than acknowledging it is the statute's single best meaning. Another commenter indicated the rule suffers from the same defects which led courts to enjoin the 2019 Final Rule under the more deferential

Chevron

framework, adding that

Loper Bright

requires agencies to adopt a statute's best reading and asserted the existing regulatory framework reflects a better, if not the best reading. Another cited to

Loper Bright,

stating the Administration is not entitled to any deference when interpreting a statute in a way that is contrary to its plain meaning, history, and tradition. Another commenter said DHS does not have unchecked power, authority, or flexibility in defining the term public charge contrary to congressional intent.

603 U.S. 369 (2024).

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

Response:

The Supreme Court in

Loper Bright

held that courts are no longer required to defer to an agency's “reasonable” interpretations of ambiguous statutes. DHS strongly disagrees with the commenters' suggestion that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is simply a policy decision. On the contrary, it is a direct result of the Secretary's determination that the 2022 Final Rule is not the best reading of the statute, as well as congressional intent on immigration and welfare. As noted in the NPRM, DHS is removing the 2022 Final Rule to restore the longstanding case-by-case and inherently discretionary nature of public charge inadmissibility determinations expressly intended by Congress when mandating officers make these determinations in their opinion considering certain enumerated non-exhaustive factors at a minimum. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). The Secretary determined rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is appropriate to ensure officers are making public charge inadmissibility determinations in line with the statute and relevant precedent. 90 FR 52168, 52186-87 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS believes relevant precedent decisions that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades and, where applicable, recent circuit case law will provide officers with sufficient guidance to conduct individualized determinations based on the specific facts and circumstances of each alien's case. DHS believes this approach falls within the explicit discretionary authority Congress delegated to the Secretary.

Therefore, DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, and subsequent administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility consistent with the statute and applicable precedent, is well within the Secretary's authority. It is also consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA.

See

8 U.S.C. 1601. Therefore, this final rule does not reflect an exercise of unchecked power or unauthorized flexibility contrary to congressional intent.

See Loper Bright Enterprises

Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369, 394-395 (2024) (explaining that in some cases, a statute may authorize an agency to exercise discretion, such as by expressly delegating authority to define a particular statutory term, by empowering an agency to prescribe rules to fill up the details of a statutory scheme, or by authorizing an agency to regulate, subject to certain limits).

Finally, DHS disagrees that it is interpreting the term “public charge” in this final rule, or that any such interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning, history, or tradition. As proposed and discussed previously, this final rule is putting forth no definition of the term “public charge.” As discussed in the NPRM, there is no single settled meaning of the term and courts have differed in their positions regarding what the term encompasses, as well as what DHS can consider when making public charge inadmissibility determinations.

DHS does not dispute that the Supreme Court has tasked courts with ascertaining the best meaning of ambiguous statutes or that a number of federal courts found different meanings for the term. DHS, in operating the national immigration system, is not precluded from eliminating regulatory definitions and rigid frameworks that have not been definitively or uniformly endorsed as reflecting the best meaning of statutory terms, particularly where Congress delegated broad discretion to DHS over immigration and the public charge

ground of inadmissibility. DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to decades of agency practice, consistent with statute and binding precedent.

The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits opined on the plain language of the statute as well as the historical/traditional meaning of the term public charge but did not reach mutually consistent decisions. The Fourth Circuit, for example, disagreed that the primarily dependent standard is embedded into the text of the statute, as well as that the term has a fixed historical meaning and emphasized that instead the statute grants the executive extensive and ultimate discretion over inadmissibility determinations, including the consideration of a non-finite list of factors.

See, CASA de Maryland, Inc.

Trump,

971 F.3d 220, 242-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (rehearing

en banc

granted but the case was subsequently voluntarily dismissed). Other circuits focused on identifying limitations on the meaning of the term, and ensuring that the term public charge is not defined in such a way that would deem someone receiving a small amount of supplemental benefits for a short period of time inadmissible under the ground.

See, e.g., New York

DHS,

969 F.3d 42, 78 (2nd Cir. 2020);

City and Cnty. of San Francisco

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services,

981 F.3d 742, 759 (9th Cir. 2020);

Cook County

Wolf,

962 F.3d 208, 229, 246 (7th Cir. 2020). The Seventh Circuit held that the term “public charge” has a “floor inherent in the words,” which requires a degree of dependence that goes beyond temporary receipt of supplemental in-kind benefits from any type of public agency.

Id.

Comment:

A commenter stated that the “extraordinary breadth” of authority DHS exerts with the proposed rule, coupled with the economic significance of the action, also opens the proposed rule to major questions doctrine concerns under

West Virginia

EPA.

The commenter warned that courts would be skeptical to conclude Congress meant to confer this level of political and economic authority to DHS, writing that “reliance on Executive Orders to enact policy unmoored from statutory text and agency discretion has given rise to claims during this Administration that agency action is preordained.”

597 U.S. 697 (2022).

Response:

DHS disagrees that this final rule implicates the major questions doctrine as articulated in

West Virgina

EPA.

The major questions doctrine is triggered when the agency claims regulatory authority of vast economic and political significance, and the asserted authority lacks clear congressional authorization.

Id.

at 724.

First, DHS has clear congressional authorization for this final rule. As discussed throughout this preamble, the INA provides that an alien is inadmissible if, “in the opinion of the consular officer or the Attorney General” (now the Secretary of Homeland Security), the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A). The statutory text does not define public charge or likely at any time to become a public charge and only requires officers to consider a non-exhaustive list of specified minimum factors. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches possess plenary authority over admission of aliens.

And the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) repeatedly recognized the inherently discretionary nature of the public charge inadmissibility determinations.

This statutory structure reflects an express delegation from Congress to the Secretary, explicit discretionary language (“in the opinion of”), and mandatory but non-exhaustive factors. Unlike the statutes at issue in

West Virgina

EPA,

Biden

Nebraska

Congress did not assign a narrow, technical function that DHS has transformed into sweeping economic regulation. Congress instead gave DHS broad discretion in an immigration inadmissibility context. Unlike cases where agencies argued for an expansion of authority or claimed transformative new regulatory powers, in this final rule DHS is doing the opposite: it is rescinding rigid regulatory definitions adopted in 2022; restoring individualized, discretionary adjudications that track the plain language of the statute; and returning to long-standing totality of the circumstances analysis. This administrative calibration is within the precise domain Congress delegated: immigration admissibility.

Fiallo

Bell,

430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).

See, e.g., Matter of Harutunian,

14 I&N Dec. 583 (Reg'l Comm'r 1974);

Matter of Martinez-Lopez,

10 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964);

Matter of Vindman,

16 I&N Dec. 131 (BIA 1977).

600 U.S. 477 (2023).

Furthermore, the economic impact of this final rule does not alone trigger the major questions doctrine. The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) estimates potential transfer effects related to public benefits disenrollment, which is an indirect impact of the final rule. But the Supreme Court has made clear economic impact alone does not trigger the doctrine. In

West Virginia

EPA,

the Court emphasized the doctrine applies when agencies claim the power to make decisions of “vast economic and political significance” in a manner inconsistent with their statutory design.

Admissibility determinations, which could impact aliens' decisions to disenroll from public benefits programs, are squarely within DHS's statutory domain. Importantly, this final rule does not purport to regulate public benefit eligibility; rather, public benefits eligibility remains governed by PRWORA and other statutes. Any economic effects are incidental to admissibility determinations Congress explicitly authorized DHS to make. Finally, immigration is an area of heightened executive authority given that the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the political branches' broad authority over admission and exclusion.

This final rule pertains to admission eligibility and adjustment of status, but it does not more broadly regulate aliens' or citizens' conduct or restructure domestic industries.

West Virginia,

597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022).

See Fiallo

Bell,

430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).

Finally, this final rule does not reflect a transformative expansion of agency power, it simply implicates existing delegated authority that DHS is tailoring to more closely reflect the plain language of the statute, national policy on self-sufficiency of aliens, and longstanding agency practice.

Comment:

Citing section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), a commenter remarked DHS's choice to rescind the public charge regulations without promulgating a replacement regulation is inconsistent with the INA, which explicitly provides that the Secretary “shall establish such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”

Response:

DHS disagrees that it is required to promulgate a regulation to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule and notes this rulemaking is a permissible change in the manner in which DHS makes public charge inadmissibility determinations given prior interpretations of the statute were not the best interpretation. 90 FR 52168, 52185 (Nov. 19, 2025). On the contrary, while the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) mandates the process agencies must follow when issuing, amending, and rescinding regulations, it does not require agencies to replace a rescinded regulation. 5 U.S.C. 551

et seq.

Indeed, an agency may change or rescind regulations as long as it provides a reasoned justification,

but it is not required to replace a rescinded regulation unless required by law. There is nothing in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), requiring DHS to replace the rescinded 2022 Final Rule with a new rule. Further, DHS notes there were no regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations from 1882 until the 2019 Final Rule.

FCC

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009).

Although this is a change from the frameworks established since 1999, DHS emphasizes that it provided a reasoned justification for the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM and throughout this final rule, as well as an explanation as to why prior frameworks were lacking.

This position aligns with the plain language of section 103(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), which the commenter cites—which by incorporating the phrase “as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority” grants the Secretary both authority and discretion over issuing regulations. In this case, the Secretary has determined that issuing replacement regulations is not necessary for carrying out his authority. Therefore, DHS will not issue a replacement rule.

Id.

Comment:

Some commenters said DHS's emphasis on the subjective nature of the public charge inadmissibility determination contradicts the INA, which vests

discretionary authority with the Attorney General, not DHS. Specifically, the commenter suggests that it is only the opinion of the Attorney General, not the opinion of an individual DHS officer, that is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations.

Response:

DHS disagrees with the commenters' interpretations of DHS' statutory authority. On March 1, 2003, functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred from the Department of Justice (DOJ) to DHS.

Although several provisions of the INA discussed in this final rule refer exclusively to the “Attorney General,” such provisions are now read as referring to the Secretary by operation of the HSA.

DHS rejects the suggestion that only the Attorney General's (now, the Secretary's) opinion is relevant in the context of a public charge inadmissibility determination when an alien applies for admission or adjustment of status. Congress understood that the Attorney General and Secretary delegate authorities throughout the INA to officials serving under them.

DHS notes that no ground of inadmissibility in section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a), contains language referencing DHS or DOJ officers; throughout the section, Congress referred to consular officers, the Attorney General, or the Secretary. DHS also notes that section 245(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), states that the status of an alien “may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion” to that of an LPR. Congress knew that the Attorney General would not personally make millions of admissibility, adjustment of status, admission, and deportation decisions annually.

See

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, sections 402(3), 441, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178, 2192.

See

6 U.S.C. 202(3), 251, 271(b), 542 note, 557; 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), (g), 1551 note;

Nielsen

Preap,

586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2 (2019).

Specifically, section 102(b) of the HSA, 6 U.S.C. 112(b), states that the Secretary “. . . may delegate any of the Secretary's functions to any officer, employee, or organization unit of the Department.” In addition, section 103(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(4), states that “[the Secretary] may authorize any employee of the Service or the Department of Justice to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter. . .” See also, DHS Delegation No. 0150.1 (Jun. 5, 2003); DHS Delegation 07010.3 Rev. 03.2 (May 11, 2005).

Comment:

One commenter suggested that the rule is unjustified because DHS does not identify relevant post-1999 or post-2022 laws, data, or experience not already considered by INS, USCIS, or any other component or predecessor of DHS that would justify this change. The commenter requested that DHS identify and describe the legal authorities and other information, apart from those that predated the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the 2022 Final Rule, that DHS relied on in developing a new framework.

Response:

DHS's rescission of the 2022 Final Rule and return to a broader exercise of case-by-case discretion is based on the same statutes, authorities, and other resources that served as the basis and justification for the 2022 Final Rule. DHS rejects this commenter's suggestion that DHS cannot rely on previously considered authorities.

On the contrary, DHS may rely on the same authorities underlying the now rescinded 2022 Final Rule so long as DHS provides a reasoned explanation for coming to a different conclusion, which it has, and as long as the new approach is consistent with the plain language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

DHS explained the change and why DHS believes it to be a better reading of the statute. As explained in other comment responses, DHS has the express authority to enforce and administer the immigration laws of the United States, including the public charge ground of inadmissibility, and finds support for this rule in the express language of section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), the national statements of immigration policy and welfare in PRWORA, and the sources listed in the NPRM. See 90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025).

FCC

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502, 515-16, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811, 173 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2009) (holding that an agency “need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are

better

than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency

believes

it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”).

Comment:

Commenters stated that DHS's reliance on section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), to support its argument that Congress intended consideration of past benefit receipt in all contexts outside of certain battered aliens is flawed. One commenter said the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provisions speak broadly about benefits but do not support DHS's contention that Congress intended DHS to consider receipt of benefits beyond those considered in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. Another commenter said the language in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is not an express command to consider all means-tested public benefits, calling the proposal “particularly dubious” because Congress repeatedly expanded public benefit programs for certain aliens.

Response:

DHS disagrees that section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), does not support considering the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefit in public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule. Section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s),

prohibits considering the receipt of benefits by certain victims of violence and trafficking in applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status and was codified to ensure they could access the full range of support services necessary for recovery and cooperation with law enforcement, including healthcare, housing, food assistance, and other non-cash benefits.

The fact that Congress expressly precluded the consideration of receipt of benefits by this population strongly suggests that, absent such an exception, Congress intended DHS to consider the receipt of benefits when other aliens applied for immigrant visas and adjustment of status. “`Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' ”

Similarly, when Congress creates a specific exception to a general rule, it is presumed that Congress intended the general rule to apply in all other circumstances.

Accordingly, section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), reflects that Congress understood that unless expressly exempted, an alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits would be considered in all other applications for immigrant visas and adjustment of status.

This provision was enacted by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Public Law 106-386 sec. 1505(f) (2000).

See, e.g.,

Public Law 106-386 sec. 107(b) (2000).

Russello

United States,

464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

See TRW Inc.

Andrews,

534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“ `Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.' ”) (internal citations omitted).

As noted in the NPRM, the term benefits in section 212(s) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(s), is properly interpreted as

including both cash means-tested public benefits and non-cash means-tested public benefits since Congress did not limit benefits to cash assistance for income maintenance as the commenters suggest; it used the broad term “benefits.” 90 FR 52168, 52187 (Nov. 19, 2025). Additionally, Congress cross-referenced 8 U.S.C. 1641(c), which defines Federal public benefits as “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and . . . any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States,” clearly including both cash and non-cash benefits. 8 U.S.C. 1611 and 1641(c). The absence of limiting language, combined with Congress's intent to provide comprehensive support to victims, demonstrates that the exemption applies to all forms of public assistance, not just cash benefits. As Congress's prohibition on consideration of benefits for these victims is properly interpreted to include both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits, DHS believes that it is proper to consider the receipt of both cash and non-cash means-tested public benefits for all other cases as part of the public charge inadmissibility determination under this final rule.

Comment:

A commenter expressed concern that DHS is relying on a series of decades-old immigration statutes originating from the 1882 Immigration Act to justify stricter policies, stating that this represents an unjustifiable regression that conflicts with Congress's tailored framework in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).

Response:

DHS disagrees that it is impermissibly relying on decades-old immigration statutes to justify this final rule. DHS notes that the public charge ground of inadmissibility as it exists today has deep roots in the earliest immigration laws, as explained in detail in the NPRM. 90 FR 52168, 52174-52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS's interpretation and application of the public charge inadmissibility ground in this rulemaking is properly guided by the more than centuries-old history of this provision, the current statutory language at section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), relevant case law, and Congress's express statements of national policy with respect to immigration and welfare. Where Congress has not materially altered the statutory framework, DHS is tasked with implementing the statute as written. Reliance on the historical and current statutory framework for the public charge ground of inadmissibility is legally appropriate.

2. Congressional Intent and Historical Application

Comment:

Commenters expressed support for the proposed rule, stating that the rule better reflects congressional intent. In particular, one commenter stated that the definitions in the 2022 Final Rule were too rigid, artificially narrowed categories of public benefits considered, and frustrated Congress's intent that immigration policy discourage dependence on public resources. Another commenter stated that the rule returns the decision-making process to a more balanced, common-sense approach where the totality of the circumstances, not just one or two factors, may be considered.

Response:

DHS notes that the 2022 Final Rule emphasized seven factors that must be considered, not one or two factors as the commenter indicated. However, DHS agrees otherwise with these commenters; this final rule better reflects congressional intent. First, the commenter is correct that the 2022 Final Rule unduly limited DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in PRWORA.

See

8 U.S.C. 1601. Second, DHS agrees that the 2022 Final Rule prevented DHS officers from considering all factors and information relevant to an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, as Congress intended. Indeed, the 2022 Final Rule created a framework under which officers were limited to considering seven factors (five required by statute) rather than being explicitly empowered to consider any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances.

As a result, DHS agrees that it is essential to remove these limiting regulations in order to follow congressional intent.

For example, when considering the challenge to the 2019 Final Rule, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the language in the provision indicates that the executive has extensive and ultimate discretion over the relevant determination, especially since Congress embedded discretion into the statutory scheme such as by identifying minimum, but not exclusive, factors for consideration.

See CASA de Maryland, Inc.

Trump,

971 F.3d 220, 242-244 (4th Cir. 2020) (request for rehearing

en banc

granted on December 3, 2020, but the appeal was later dismissed). DHS believes that this rescission will be more consistent with congressional intent as it would restore ultimate discretion for officers to consider not just the minimum statutory factors but also any other information the officer deems relevant to a public charge inadmissibility determination.

See

Matter of Vindman,

all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.

”) (emphasis added);

Matter of Harutunian,

DHS also agrees that while Congress identified five minimum factors officers must consider, Congress intended, and the courts have endorsed, that the totality of an individual alien's circumstances, not a rigid number of regulatory factors, should be taken into consideration when determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge. Although the statute does not expressly include a totality of the circumstances test, this test “has been developed in several Service, BIA, and Attorney General decisions and has been codified in the Service regulations implementing the legalization provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.”

Federal courts have also endorsed this “totality of the circumstances” test.

As a result, officers had made public charge inadmissibility determinations considering all facts and circumstances in the totality prior to the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule. DHS will continue to do so, consistent with past precedent decisions, under this final rule.

See

64 FR 28689, 28690 (May 26, 1999) (citing

Zambrano

INS,

972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992), judgment vacated on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993)).

See, e.g.,

Zambrano

INS,

972 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1992), judgment vacated on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993).

Matter of A-,

19 I&N Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1988) (“The traditional test applied by the Service to determine whether an alien is likely to become a public charge is “a prediction based on the totality of the alien's circumstances” as presented in the individual case.”);

Matter of Perez,

15 I&N Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1974) (“The determination of whether an alien is likely to become a public charge under section 212(a)(15) is a prediction based upon the totality of the alien's circumstances at the time he or she applies for an immigrant visa or admission to the United States.”);

Matter of Martinez-Lopez,

10 I&N Dec. 409, 421-22 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964) (in determining whether a person is likely to become a public charge, factors to consider include age, health, and physical condition, physical or mental defects which might affect earning capacity, vocation, past record of employment, current

employment, offer of employment, number of dependents, existing conditions in the United States, sufficient funds or assurances of support by relatives or friends in the United States, bond or undertaking, or any specific circumstances reasonably tending to show that the burden of supporting the alien is likely to be cast on the public.).

Comment:

One commenter said that the proposed rule ignores decades of practice and contradicts congressional intent. Another wrote that Congress did not intend for the public charge ground of inadmissibility to punish people for using temporary or supplemental assistance while others opined that Congress did not intend for officers to consider an infinite set of factors. One asserts that Congress's silence as to whether additional factors can or should be considered was not intended to permit consideration of infinite factors and that Congress did not intend the statute to include a “catch-all” provision. In their view, the language “at a minimum” in the statute does not imply contemplation of factors not listed because the must-consider factors are complemented by one additional item that may be considered—the Form I-864.

Response:

DHS disagrees that this rule ignores or contradicts congressional intent. In fact, Congress made clear in PRWORA that aliens within the nation's borders should be self-sufficient and not dependent on public resources to meet their needs. As set forth in section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge are inadmissible to the United States unless a statutory exception applies. While DHS agrees that the broader discretionary approach to public charge inadmissibility determinations resulting from this rule is a departure from the 1999, 2019, and 2022 public charge efforts, it notes Congress authorized the Secretary to determine how to implement this provision. The Secretary determined, as he is authorized to do, that DHS needs to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that reflect Congress's intent when it enacted section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA. Indeed, with this rulemaking, DHS returns to a standard permitting officers to consider any and all factors relevant to an individual alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge, consistent with precedent.

See

Matter of Vindman,

all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting.”

) (emphasis added);

Matter of Harutunian,

Additionally, DHS agrees Congress made clear that officers must consider certain factors; however, we disagree that those factors are a limited, structured framework with defined parameters. The statute lists the five factors DHS officers must consider “at a minimum,” language that clearly does not preclude the consideration of other factors. INA sec. 212(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(B). Congress created the broad, non-exhaustive, and discretionary framework DHS will follow upon rescission of the unduly rigid 2022 Final Rule. As discussed thoroughly in the NPRM, the Secretary determined the 2022 Final Rule is overly restrictive and prevents DHS officers from making public charge inadmissibility determinations that align with the longstanding national policy set by Congress. 90 FR 52168, 52189 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also disagrees that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will lead to potential consideration of infinite factors, as DHS will limit consideration to only relevant factors;

i.e.,

factors bearing on an alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting, consistent with precedent decisions.

See

Matter of Vindman,

16 I&N Dec. 131, 132 (BIA 1977).

3. Administrative Law Concerns

a. Request To Extend the Comment Period

Comment:

Several commenters requested an extended comment period on the proposed rule, noting the 30-day comment period overlapping with a significant Federal holiday and arguing that that is not consistent with Federal law and the APA in particular, and stating the time provided was insufficient to respond to a rule of significant scope, lack of clarity, and potential impacts. A commenter remarked that the apparently rushed approach, combined with the lack of a replacement framework, suggests the rulemaking is driven by predetermined policy preferences not careful consideration of statutory requirements and practical implementation, while another asserted the compressed timeframe was an effort to curtail negative comments.

Commenters referenced longer public comment periods in DHS's past rulemaking efforts, including past public charge rules, as support for an extension and various comments requested between an additional 120 and 150 days (some for a total of 180 days) to enable sufficient time for all stakeholders, discussion and consideration of the data, and to provide comment on the potential impacts of the proposed rule. One commenter cited caselaw to support the insufficiency of a 30-day comment period, stating the purposes of “notice and comment requirements are `(1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.' ”

See Prometheus Radio Project

FCC,

652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am.

Mine Safety & Health Admin.,

407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005));

see also Connecticut Light & Power Co.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,

673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“The purpose of the comment period is to allow interested members of the public to communicate information, concerns, and criticisms to the agency during the rule-making process.”)

Response:

DHS believes the 30-day comment period provided an adequate opportunity for public input and declines to extend the comment period. DHS agrees with commenters regarding the purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking in that the APA is silent regarding the duration of public comment periods, and neither it nor relevant caselaw establish a minimum duration applicable in all cases. 5 U.S.C. 553. Often, agencies, including DHS in the past, provide a 60-day comment period consistent with the recommendation in Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, particularly when the rulemaking is broad, includes new policies not previously considered by the regulated public or has significant impacts on the regulated public. DHS emphasizes this final rule is not broad but narrow in scope since it only covers a single ground of inadmissibility. Further, it does not include new policies not previously considered by the regulated public since DHS is returning the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the approach that guided public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades before the 1999 Interim Field Guidance. While a 30-day comment period was shorter than the 60 days recommended in E.O. 12866, DHS believes in this instance 30 days was sufficient for the public to review, consider, and comment on the proposed rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS

notes that it received 5,882 public comments during the 30-day comment period,

including substantive, high-quality comments from attorneys, Federal, State, and local elected officials, and advocacy organizations who provided detailed information and, in some instances, raised significant issues to which DHS is responding in this final rule. As such, an extension of the comment period would not have been helpful or necessary.

As discussed elsewhere in this final rule, an additional 2,964 public comments were received during the second part of the comment period applicable only to the associated information collections.

As stated in the NPRM, DHS believes it is in the best interest of the United States and its citizens to ensure public benefits do not create an incentive for immigration contrary to the INA and PRWORA. In acting expeditiously to remove regulations requiring officers to ignore the receipt of a large swath of public benefits when making public charge inadmissibility determinations, DHS is returning the public charge ground of inadmissibility to the congressional intent underlying the INA, IIRIRA, and PRWORA.

Finally, DHS strongly disagrees it provided a shorter comment period to curtail negative public comments or failed to adequately consider practical impacts of the rulemaking in favor of predetermined policy preferences. As discussed in this preamble, during the comment period, DHS received a number of comments opposing the proposed rule. In addition to carefully explaining and addressing the anticipated impacts of the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule in the NPRM, DHS has carefully considered and here responds to public comments in this final rule.

DHS agrees with commenters, however, that every agency rulemaking reflects the policy objectives of the administration which initiated the rulemaking and reflects the will of the American people who elected the public officials heading a particular administration. So too, in this case, this rulemaking reflects current policy objectives. DHS published a proposed rule, carefully considered the public comments received, and provided substantive responses, in full compliance with the APA.

b. Future Guidance and Compliance With the APA

Comment:

Several commenters requested DHS commit to developing future public charge inadmissibility standards through transparent notice-and-comment rulemaking, not solely through subregulatory policy tools. Several commenters stated, if DHS decides to develop an alternative rule, it must be open to full public notice and comment along with any guidance or tools created to direct officers' decisions. Multiple commenters said asking for open-ended feedback and recommendations on what to include in such tools is not a substitute for notice and comment.

Response:

As indicated in the NPRM and other comment responses, DHS is not issuing regulations governing public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS is removing regulatory provisions that unduly hampered officers when making inadmissibility determinations. USCIS will issue nonbinding subregulatory guidance that will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule. This guidance will be a general statement of policy that will not have the force and effect of law and will thus be exempt from notice and comment rulemaking. USCIS plans to include the new guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual, which is available on the USCIS website, is transparent to the public, and will replace the existing guidance reflecting the 2022 Final Rule. If regulations are needed or would be helpful to the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility in the future, DHS will comply with the APA requirements in issuing any such regulations.

Comment:

Several commenters objected to eliminating regulatory standards in favor of undefined policy and interpretive tools without notice-and-comment rulemaking, arguing it denies the public a meaningful opportunity to review the adjudication standards and likely violates the APA. The commenters cited

Perez

Mortgage Bankers Association

and

Mendoza

Perez

to warn subregulatory guidance cannot create new substantive standards, alter statutory requirements, or expand adjudicator discretion in ways that affect rights. They stated that public charge inadmissibility determinations require clear, publicly vetted regulations, not internal guidance, and warned relying on future guidance would invite inconsistent, arbitrary USCIS decisions across offices, leave families uncertain which programs are safe to use, and chill participation in health, nutrition, and housing supports. Commenters urged DHS to withdraw the rulemaking or clarify its intentions, develop the rule internally, and reissue a more detailed proposed rule or a new NPRM if substantive changes are intended, noting that bypassing the APA would allow continual policy shifts without public input and create ongoing uncertainty.

575 U.S. 92 (2015).

754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Response:

DHS disagrees that this rule will lead to arbitrary outcomes and that any future guidance will alter statutory requirements or conflict with the APA and related case law. DHS will not withdraw the NPRM, and is issuing this final rule to conclude the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. DHS also disagrees that any clarification of its intentions is needed. The NPRM was explicit about rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and freeing officers from arbitrary and undue limitations on the exercise of congressionally-authorized discretion. DHS is committed to following the law, including the APA, and does not intend to issue regulations or promulgate substantive rules through subregulatory guidance without notice and comment rulemaking.

As discussed in other comment responses, the subregulatory guidance USCIS publishes in the USCIS Policy Manual will guide, but not prescribe, public charge inadmissibility determinations made under this final rule in the context of adjustment of status applications. This guidance will explain how officers will be able to consider the receipt of any means-tested public benefits by the alien and will ensure officers fully consider this and any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances, as Congress intended.

Comment:

Commenters supported the creation of appropriate interpretive tools, but said these should supplement, not supplant, Federal regulations, requesting regulations not be removed until after such tools are developed and any timeline appropriately reflect a period for soliciting and incorporating public input on these tools before they are finalized. Another commenter said instead of including details of the policies or interpretative tools in the NPRM, DHS elected to issue a “vague” NPRM and issue the tools later, which likely violates the APA at 5 U.S.C. 533 because the public is entitled to notice and comment rulemaking on impactful matters, especially those implicating the potential use of public benefits. Commenters asserted DHS should withdraw the NPRM because it cannot radically expand the definition of “public charge” without explicitly proposing a new public charge rule subject to notice and comment. Commenters stated that interpretive tools must undergo the full notice-and-

comment process, citing

Appalachian Power Co.

EPA

and

General Electric Co.

EPA,

noting soliciting feedback is not a substitute for notice and comment. They claimed that without clearer guidance, it would be very difficult to advise clients on the potential public charge implications of certain public benefits.

208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Other commenters said the 2025 NPRM explicitly seeks a return to policies similar to the 2019 Final Rule, while attempting an end-run around the APA's notice-and-comment requirements, noting to justify a new substantive public charge rule, DHS must go through the full APA-mandated process, as the first Trump Administration did in 2018-2019 and the Biden Administration did in 2022. The commenters warned simply rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and replacing it with “appropriate policy and interpretive tools” (

i.e.,

not a “legislative rule” under the APA) would be a clear violation of statute with no purpose other than haste and avoidance of public comment. A few commenters requested DHS use the full notice-and-comment process for any policy or tools in public charge determinations, clearly reaffirm any changes would apply only prospectively (in acknowledgement of the reliance interests) and not penalize individuals who relied in good faith on prior rules.

Response:

As indicated in the responses above, DHS disagrees with these commenters because the NPRM was not vague; rather, it clearly explained the changes DHS was considering and the reasoning behind them. DHS will not issue substantive rules without notice and comment rulemaking. Further, DHS is not making an “end run” around the APA's notice and comment requirements. As explained in the NPRM and elsewhere in this final rule, there are some substantive differences between the 2019 Final Rule and this final rule. For example, the 2019 Final Rule limited officer discretion. Specifically, the 2019 final rule included strict definitions, such as the term “likely at any time to become a public charge.” This definition included a new dependence threshold. The 2019 Final Rule also included regular and heavily weighted factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, and specific exclusions from consideration of certain public benefits (when such benefits were received by certain populations). DHS now finds this limited discretion is not aligned with Congressional intent. USCIS will issue guidance for officers to consider when making individualized public charge inadmissibility determinations, consistent with the INA and established precedent. The APA's notice and comment requirements apply to legislative rules but not to interpretative rules or general statements of policy.

See

5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). The Supreme Court has long recognized the distinction.

Interpretive rules or general statements of policy are lawful so long as they do not impose new rights or obligations or bind agency decisionmakers.

DHS disagrees that the guidance and interpretive tools it plans to issue would fail under

Appalachian Power

General Electric

because in those cases the guidance used mandatory language, left no room for agency discretion, imposed concrete regulatory obligations, the regulated parties reasonably believed that noncompliance would trigger enforcement, and they had no realistic alternative but compliance.

See Perez

Mortgage Bankers Association,

575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015 (“Interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.”);

Shalala

Guernsey Memorial Hospital,

514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (interpretive rules may be issued without notice and comment).

See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

Federal Power Commission,

506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974);

National Mining Association

McCarthy,

758 F.3d 243, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

See, generally, Appalachian Power Co.

EPA,

208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

General Electric Co.

EPA,

290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

DHS has determined regulations are unnecessary for the effective implementation of the public charge ground of inadmissibility and will not issue replacement regulations at this time. DHS believes the statute and applicable precedent decisions that guided the public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guideposts for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. DHS also disagrees that it would be possible or appropriate to delay the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule pending the issuance of new agency guidance because absent a rescission of existing regulations, USCIS would be bound by the prior administration's policies reflected in that regulatory framework when issuing subregulatory guidance to officers. By removing the 2022 Final Rule, DHS is reestablishing officer discretion within the existing statutory and precedential framework. Any guidance that USCIS issues will not amount to a binding rule but rather guide USCIS officer discretion in the context of adjustment of status applications without limiting it or prescribing adjudicatory outcomes.

Comment:

A commenter warned DHS cannot lawfully rescind binding regulations and substitute undisclosed subregulatory guidance to effect substantive policy changes while avoiding public participation and judicial review, noting that a November 6, 2025, Department of State (DOS) cable to consular posts broadened the public charge factors and evidence for visa adjudications. The commenter said the cable reportedly directs officers to deny visas unless applicants affirmatively show they will never become a public charge; treats non-cash benefits, charitable aid, and other lawful support as potential evidence of inadmissibility; and deepens financial scrutiny (previewing Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) updates) forcing applicants to produce extensive financial documentation and imposing disproportionate burdens on low-income, credit-thin, intermittently employed, or unstably housed individuals, an outcome the commenter contended plainly violates the APA.

Response:

DHS refers commenters to DOS on the issue of the DOS cable and the FAM. With respect to the evidentiary burden applicable to aliens seeking adjustment of status with USCIS after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS has proposed changes to the Form I-485 and disclosed the relevant paperwork burden estimate on which the public was invited to comment in conjunction with this rulemaking during the applicable 60-day comment period consistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) and implementing regulations. 44 U.S.C. 3501

et seq.,

5 CFR part 1320. As with all other adjudications, should USCIS officers require more evidence or clarification of information or evidence included with the Form I-485, USCIS may issue Requests for Evidence (RFEs) or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs).

c. Good Cause To Forgo Notice and Comment Rulemaking

Comment:

One commenter stated if DHS invoked the APA's good-cause exception to bypass notice-and-comment or the 30-day delayed effective date, it is improper for a rule of this scope absent a genuine, immediate emergency, since courts construe good cause narrowly; administrative convenience or policy urgency does not suffice.

Response:

When issuing this final rule, DHS did not invoke the good cause exception to the APA's notice and comment requirements but rather published a proposed rule with a 30-day

comment period, and is publishing this final rule with a 60-day effective date, as required by the Congressional Review Act and in compliance with the APA which requires a minimum of 30 days.

See

5 U.S.C. 553 and 5 U.S.C. 801-808.

d. Rule Is Arbitrary and Capricious

i. Lack of Reasoned Justification

Comment:

Multiple commenters asserted the NPRM should be struck down under 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) because the APA requires a reasoned explanation for rescinding or changing an existing rule beyond just a new administration. Some commenters asserted the rule is arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of a sufficient justification for DHS's changed position, the likelihood of inconsistent agency interpretations, and the failure to consider reliance interests stemming from prior rules and guidance. Citing to the litigation on the 2019 Final Rule, the commenters added the rule would also be inconsistent with the INA and it departs from the well-settled meaning of public charge. Another commenter stated, under basic principles of administrative law, “reasoned decision making” requires agencies to rely on expertise and coherent standards, not unguided intuition.

Response:

DHS disagrees with commenters that the NPRM or this final rule is arbitrary and capricious. Importantly, DHS is not providing a definition for public charge in this final rule. Moreover, there is no single well-settled meaning of the term public charge that definitively includes the consideration of some public benefits but not others, notwithstanding the caselaw commenters cite.

As discussed in the NPRM, the INA does not define “public charge” or “likely at any time to become a public charge.” Instead, Congress provided a framework of non-exhaustive minimum factors for consideration (age, health, family status, assets, resources, and financial status, and education and skills and left it to the agency's discretion to determine whether an alien is inadmissible under the ground.

See

INA sec. 212(a)(4)(A) and (B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4)(A) and (B); 90 FR 52168, 52186, 52187-88, 52175 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS acknowledges that there is a general understanding as reflected in certain dictionary definitions that public charge is generally a person in economic distress who is dependent on the government for his or her support. However, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have defined the term in statute or through case law. While there had been early 20th century Supreme Court precedent which found an alien inadmissible under the totality of the circumstances approach focusing on the labor market where the alien was headed and which seemed to consider the term narrowly to mean something akin to a pauper (

i.e.,

someone destitute and unable to work), the case was overridden by Congress.

See CASA de Maryland

Trump,

971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020) (“In all events, there is considerable doubt as to

Gegiow's

[v.

Uhl's,

239 U.S. 3 (1915)] continued relevance, as Congress amended the Immigration Act two years later to nullify

Gegiow's

restrictive interpretation of the statute.”) (internal citations omitted).

Administrative and judicial precedent decisions have consistently recognized the public charge inadmissibility determination is inherently subjective and discretionary and must be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the alien's circumstances. DHS notes these precedent decisions predate both the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and the regulatory definitions promulgated in 2019 and 2022. As indicated in

Matter of Harutunian,

the elements constituting likelihood of an alien becoming a public charge are varied; they are not defined by statute but rather are determined administratively upon consideration of all the factors bearing on the alien's ability or potential ability to be self-supporting. 14 I&N Dec. 583, 588 (BIA 1974). Similarly, as stated in

Matter of Martinez-Lopez,

the statute “requires more than a showing of a possibility that the alien will require public support. Some specific circumstance . . . must be present.” 10 I&N Dec. 409, 421-22 (BIA 1962; Att'y Gen. 1964). Finally, as stated in

Matter of A-,

the “traditional test . . . is `a prediction based on the totality of the alien's circumstances' as presented in the individual case.” 19 I&N Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1988) (citation omitted).

As DHS noted in the NPRM, there has never been a single, uniform, or “well settled” definition of public charge. 90 FR 52168, 52174 (Nov. 19, 2025). Instead, the meaning evolved over time and has been subject to varying administrative interpretations. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950 noted: “[s]ince the elements constituting likelihood of becoming a public charge are varied, there should be no attempt to define the term in the law, but rather to establish the specific qualification that the determination . . . rests within the discretion of the consular officers or [INS].” 90 FR 52168, 52181 (Nov. 19, 2025). Certain circuit courts recognized the statute grants the executive “extensive and ultimate discretion” and the term “public charge” does not have a fixed historical meaning.

Finally, as stated in the NPRM, past agency guidance and practice in place before the 2019 Final Rule, including the 1999 Interim Field Guidance and prior administrative decisions, have always emphasized a flexible, fact-specific approach, not a rigid or narrow definition. Congress, in enacting PRWORA and IIRIRA, did not codify a specific definition but instead reinforced the officer's discretion to consider all relevant evidence. 90 FR 52168, 52182-83, 52188-89 (Nov. 19, 2025). For these reasons, rescinding the 2022 Final Rule and restoring broader officer discretion is not arbitrary and capricious; it is not contrary to a well-settled meaning of public charge, because no such settled meaning exists.

See, e.g., CASA de Maryland, Inc.

Trump,

971 F.3d 220, 242-44 (4th Cir. 2020).

In addition, DHS disagrees this rule is arbitrary and capricious because it lacks justification or a reasoned explanation. DHS agrees that, under

FCC

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009), a change in agency regulations requires a reasoned explanation: the agency must acknowledge the change, provide good reasons for it, and indicate why it believes the new position is better. DHS satisfied these requirements in the NPRM and in this final rule.

DHS explicitly acknowledged it was proposing to rescind the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations established by the 2022 Final Rule and consistently provided good reasons for the proposed rescission.

DHS provided detailed, reasoned explanations for the change, including explaining the 2022 Final Rule is not the best implementation of the statute, is inconsistent with congressional intent, is unduly restrictive, and hampers DHS's ability to make accurate, precise, and reliable determinations. 90 FR 52168 (Nov. 19, 2025). While rescinding the 2022 Final Rule is a departure—in varying degrees—from the three prior efforts over the last 27 years related to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS is not required to retain any of the prior regulations and policy guidance the Secretary determined, upon a review of guidance and public-facing information dating back to 1946, are not the best way to implement the expansive, fact-specific, totality of the circumstances, and discretionary public charge inadmissibility determination Congress put into place.

See

90 FR 52168, 52181-82 (Nov. 19, 2025).

See

90 FR 52168, 52169-52170 (Nov. 19, 2025) (“DHS proposes to rescind the 2022 public charge ground of inadmissibility regulations . . . Rescission would restore broader discretion to evaluate all pertinent facts and align with long-standing policy . . .”).

The NPRM further stated the 2022 Final Rule straitjackets DHS officers' ability to make public charge inadmissibility determinations that are

consistent with Congress's express national policy on welfare and immigration enacted in the PRWORA by limiting what public benefits DHS can consider in the totality of the circumstances and by precluding officers from considering factors beyond the seven factors outlined in the regulations. 90 FR 52168, 52169-52170 (Nov. 19, 2025). DHS also explained that both the 2019 and 2022 rules provided a finite list of factors officers are required to consider without providing officers the authority to consider other factors relevant in any individual case, which is inconsistent with the discretionary and case-specific framework Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-52181 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also explained why it believes that public charge inadmissibility determinations after the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will be more consistent with congressional intent. Specifically, DHS noted that officers will be able to use good judgment and discretion to make highly individualized, fact-specific, case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions based on the totality of each alien's individual circumstances, rather than being limited by rigid regulatory definitions and standards. 90 FR 52168, 52194 (Nov. 19, 2025). Crucially, DHS explained that the 2022 Final Rule's approach including the primary dependence standard may have resulted in USCIS finding aliens eligible for adjustment of status even when their past receipt of means-tested public benefits may have demonstrated they lacked self-sufficiency and were likely at any time to become a public charge, due to officers' inability to consider all benefits the alien depended on and any other relevant case-specific factor that has bearing on the inadmissibility determination. 90 FR 52168, 52180 (Nov. 19, 2025). In fact, DHS provided multiple reasons to support the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81, 52186 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also discussed the underlying reasons for past policies, including their limitations in the NPRM. Specifically, DHS noted that both the 2019 Final Rule and 2022 Final Rule attempted to provide clarity and predictability by specifying a finite list of factors and benefits to be considered in public charge determinations, however in so doing these rules “severely and unduly limited the factors that DHS could consider in making a public charge inadmissibility determination,” which is inconsistent with the broad, discretionary standard Congress intended. 90 FR 52168, 52180-81 (Nov. 19, 2025).

DHS also discussed the 2019 Final Rule in various parts of the NPRM and determined that it was not a truly viable alternative, because, while closer to congressional intent behind section 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4), and PRWORA, that rule also prescribed a rigid and complex regulatory scheme that unnecessarily constrained officer discretion.

Furthermore, in proposing the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, DHS also provided a thorough review of statutory history, prior administrative practice, and case law, and explained the new approach is grounded in the agency's expertise and longstanding precedent.

Finally, DHS acknowledged the existence of reliance interests and specifically requested comments on what aspects of the 2022 Final Rule might have engendered such reliance interests, and how DHS should best address such reliance interests given its stated policy objectives. 90 FR 52168, 52193 (Nov. 19, 2025). In this final rule, DHS is responding to public comments raising specific reliance interests and has made clarifications in this final rule to further address those interests.

See, e.g.,

90 FR 52168, 52182-52187 (Nov. 19, 2025) (discussing the totality of the circumstances test and relevant BIA/Attorney General decisions).

For all of these reasons, DHS has established why the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is reasonable given the broad congressional delegation, and the fact that there is no settled meaning of public charge. DHS has provided a detailed, reasoned explanation for the change, identified the deficiencies in the prior rules, explained why the new approach is preferable, and addressed reliance interests and the need for coherent, expertise-driven discretionary determinations.

Comment:

Some commenters stated expanding the public charge inadmissibility framework so broadly—to potentially encompass working U.S. citizens with income—lacks historical or rational support and would be arbitrary and capricious. Citing the Supreme Court's requirement in

FCC

Fox Television

that agencies justify disregarding prior facts and reliance interests, commenters noted the proposal offers no evidence the 2022 Rule is unworkable or inconsistent with the INA, identifies no enforcement problems or data, and fails to account for the chilling effects on immigrants, domestic violence- survivors, and nonprofit service providers. One commenter stated the Supreme Court addressed the very issue of rescinding automobile safety standards without promulgating new regulations in the

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) (“

State Farm

”), finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. Several commenters warned DHS has not provided the necessary justification for abandoning longstanding interpretations or for why the codified provisions of the 2022 Final Rule could not instead be modified in response to H.R.1.

Response:

DHS disagrees that the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious or lacks a reasonable basis or sufficient explanation. As detailed above, DHS provided an ample reasonable basis for removing the 2022 Final Rule, explained removing the rule restores officer discretion, and aligns the administration of the public charge ground of inadmissibility closer to the congressional intent. Neither

State Farm

nor

FCC

Fox Television

requires DHS to establish the 2022 Final Rule is unworkable or that it is inconsistent with the INA. The Supreme Court in

FCC

Fox Television

held an agency does not need to show its prior policy or interpretation is unworkable to justify a change, explaining an agency may change its policy as long as it provides a reasoned explanation for the change, acknowledges the shift, and addresses any reliance interests.

The Court specifically rejected the requirement for heightened justification, stating an agency “need not demonstrate. . .that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.”

Instead, the agency must simply explain the new policy and why it believes it is preferable.

This principle allows agencies flexibility to adapt and revise policies without being constrained by the workability or enforceability of previous approaches.

All of this being said, DHS believes it established in the NPRM the 2022 Final Rule was not the best interpretation of the statute and not fully consistent with congressional intent.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States, Inc.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

FCC

Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009).

Fox Television,

556 U.S. at 515-516.

Id.

at 515.

Id.

at 514-515.

See

also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n

Brand X internet Servs.,

545 U.S. 967, 981-982 (2005) (“An agency is not required to adopt a new interpretation of a statute on the ground that its previous interpretation is unwise or outdated. Rather, the agency must merely provide a reasoned explanation for its change of position.”).

Similarly, DHS is not required to establish the 2022 Final Rule was

unenforceable, although DHS clearly stated in the NPRM the approach taken in the 2022 Final Rule (as also reflected in the 1999 Interim Field Guidance) inappropriately required officers to ignore a large swath of means-tested public benefits in public charge inadmissibility determinations and exclude the possibility of future dependence on such benefits as part of the overall framework. DHS strongly disagrees that it ignored reliance interests or facts underlying the promulgation of the 2022 Final Rule.

As articulated in the NPRM, DHS grappled with prior factual findings underlying the 2022 Final Rule particularly as it pertains to self-sufficiency and whether considering receipt of means-tested public benefits can be indicative of a lack of self-sufficiency, as well as collateral impacts of the rulemaking, such as chilling effects. 90 FR at 52183, 52208-10. To that end, DHS provided an adequate legal and policy justification for changing course given its interests to further the statutory purpose behind the public charge ground of inadmissibility and PRWORA by reducing the incentive for aliens who are not self-sufficient and are likely to become dependent on the government to enter or remain in the United States. Congress has established multiple statutory tools to reduce such dependence. PRWORA and other statutes significantly restricted the eligibility of aliens for public benefits. The public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability are other tools Congress created to advance these national policy objectives regarding aliens' self-sufficiency. Though an alien may be eligible to receive public benefits, Congress established consequences for such receipt by those aliens. If they become a public charge within 5 years after entry, they may be removed from the United States. INA sec. 237(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(5). Congress clearly intended these immigration consequences to disincentivize the receipt of public benefits by aliens.

This rule advances the clear national policy concerning welfare and immigration by making it possible for officers to more accurately assess whether, in their opinion, an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge.

While this policy objective differs from the prior administration's objectives, DHS has permissibly reevaluated the relevant facts and provided a reasoned explanation for its new policy. DHS therefore disagrees that the rule is arbitrary and capricious.

Chamber of Com. of United States

Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,

115 F.4th 740 (6th Cir. 2024) (examination of the same 2021 SEC rescission found that the SEC had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously because its reevaluation of old facts in “precisely the same record” reached new policy conclusions that were reasonably explained).

In addition, DHS finds the specific circumstances in

State Farm

to be distinguishable. Congress granted the Secretary broad discretion to administer the public charge ground of inadmissibility, provided only certain mandatory factors for consideration in individual cases, and at no point directed the Secretary to engage in rulemaking or establish binding standards to govern the public charge ground of inadmissibility. In contrast, Congress when wishing to improve motor vehicle and traffic safety by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, (NTMVS Act), 15 U.S.C. 1381

et seq.

(1976 and Supp. IV 1980) directed the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor vehicle safety standards and also mandated those standards be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms. 15 U.S.C. 1392(a).

Congress also directed that in issuing these standards, the Secretary must consider relevant available motor vehicle safety data, whether the proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle, and the “extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes” of the NTMVS Act. 15 U.S.C. 1392(f)(1), (3), (4).

See State Farm,

463 U.S. 29 (1983). Therefore, when the Secretary of Transportation rescinded the seatbelt regulation without requiring either the use of airbags or seat belts, or considering alternatives, the court determined this approach was arbitrary and capricious because National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ignored the statutory requirement to enhance safety and failed to consider reasonable alternatives.

Id.

at 46-57.

This is a historical reference cited in

State Farm.

The relevant provision has since been re-codified at 49 U.S.C. 30111(a).

This is a historical reference cited in

State Farm.

The relevant provisions have since been revised and re-codified at 49 U.S.C. 30111(b)(1), (3), and (4).

In the case of this rescission of the 2022 Final Rule, while DHS has the statutory authority to issue regulations or guidance (or both) to administer the public charge ground of inadmissibility in its discretion, it is not required by statute to issue regulations or guidance. INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). Furthermore, in the NPRM and this final rule, DHS has made it clear that USCIS will administer the ground of inadmissibility consistent with the statute and applicable precedent, and any USCIS guidance will guide but not prescribe officer discretion. This approach is consistent with INS' approach for most of the time this ground of inadmissibility existed. DHS only opted to issue binding regulations for the first time in 2019. As discussed in the NPRM and this final rule, DHS explained why retaining the 2022 Final Rule or returning to the 2019 Final Rule would not accomplish its objectives, and explained why DHS believes this rule is better, is more aligned with congressional intent and purpose, and fulfills its policy objective. 90 FR at 52180. Therefore, the rescission of the 2022 Final Rule is distinguishable from the rescission of the vehicle and traffic safety standards by the NHTSA in

State Farm.

With respect to comments stating DHS did not explain why the regulations could not be modified in response to H.R. 1, DHS is unclear what the commenters meant. While H.R. 1 narrowed eligibility for SNAP and imposed limits on federal matching payments for full Medicaid benefits, subject to certain exceptions,

it is unclear how or why DHS should have considered amending public charge regulations in line with H.R. 1.

See

H.R. 1 Reconciliation Bill,

e.g.,

secs. 10108 (SNAP Eligibility), 71109 (Alien Medicaid Eligibility); Public Law 119-21 (July 4, 2025).

ii. Failing To Define Undefined Terms

Comment:

A commenter said DHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to define vague statutory terms that it would be applying in individual cases, by transgressing the “fundamental norm of administrative procedure [that] requires an agency to treat like cases alike,” and by postponing guidance indefinitely and leaving individual DHS officers with no objective standard to follow. Another commenter agreed and said the NPRM's complete lack of guidance is arbitrary and capricious because it is vague, precludes individuals from knowing how to comply, while asserting the following terms are used multiple times throughout the NPRM without providing definitions: means-tested public benefit, public benefits, public benefit program, benefits, and public resources.

Response:

DHS disagrees that this final rule is arbitrary and capricious because it does not codify definitions of certain terms implicated in making

public charge inadmissibility determinations. DHS does not believe it is necessary to define the terms referenced, noting prior to the 2019 Final Rule officers successfully applied the 1999 Interim Field Guidance; and prior to 1999, officers similarly applied the statute, precedent decisions, and applicable agency guidance to make reasonable case-by-case public charge inadmissibility decisions without binding regulatory definitions. In fact, there were no codified definitions governing the public charge inadmissibility determination from 1882 until the 2019 Final Rule. As noted in other responses, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance that will go into effect on the effective date of this final rule to assist officers with applying the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

DHS agrees it used certain terms interchangeably in the NPRM and agrees consistent use of terms is preferable. When referring to public benefits and/or resources, DHS in all cases meant means-tested public benefits and when referring to public benefit programs, DHS intended to refer to Federal, State, territorial, Tribal, and local programs that provide means-tested public benefits. DHS does not believe that codifying a definition of means-tested public benefits is necessary as that term is generally understood to refer to a government program or benefit where eligibility is based on an individual's or family's income and/or assets falling below a specific threshold.

See, e.g.,

Institute for Research On Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Means -Tested Programs,

https://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/economic-support/means-tested-programs/

(last visited Feb. 11, 2026) (“Means-tested programs limit eligibility to individuals and families whose incomes and or assets fall below a pre-determined threshold (means test). They are generally financed by tax revenues and may take the form of entitlements (

e.g.,

Medicaid, SNAP/Food Stamps) or have spending caps (

e.g.,

State Child Health Insurance Program, housing subsidies, TANF)”).

iii. Consideration of All Means-Tested Public Benefits

Comment:

Commenters said the NPRM is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to cogently explain why participation in public benefit programs that improve health, educational, and financial stability, or are otherwise supplemental not necessary for subsistence or not indicative of a lack of self-sufficiency, is relevant to the public charge inadmissibility determination. One commenter said DHS ignores the data and evidence relied on in promulgating the 2022 Rule showing receipt of supplemental benefits is associated with increased employment and self-sufficiency. The other commenter indicated that the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion, observing many covered benefits are supplemental rather than primary resources. The commenter wrote that both courts recognized a crucial distinction between using benefits to supplement one's life and using them due to lack of self-sufficiency, and asserted the NPRM made no such distinction as PRWORA requires, leaving DHS unable to “show that there are good reasons” for the policy and risking another arbitrary and capricious ruling.

Response:

DHS disagrees it failed to explain how participation in certain public benefit programs is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations or failed to consider the evidence or policy considerations underlying the 2022 Final Rule. While DHS did not directly address the data and evidence from the 2022 Final Rule about the relationship between receipt of certain benefits and employment and self-sufficiency referenced by commenters in the NPRM, DHS's underlying rationale for this rulemaking makes such discussion superfluous because DHS is not promulgating a dependence threshold or making an alien inadmissible exclusively based on the receipt of one or more public benefits. Similarly, DHS is not drawing distinctions between public benefits based on whether they merely subsidize an alien's life or provide for the alien's basic needs, nor is DHS disputing the fact that some means-tested public benefits assist aliens on the path to self-sufficiency. Rather, DHS is engaging in this rulemaking to bring the public charge ground of inadmissibility in line with congressional intent and purpose and to ensure that all inadmissibility determinations are made by officers in the totality of the alien's circumstances and that officers are empowered to consider all relevant information and evidence, including the full universe of benefits aliens may have received and the circumstances surrounding such receipt. In administering the public charge ground of inadmissibility DHS must ensure that it does not permit aliens who are likely at any time to become a public charge to be admitted or adjust their status to that of an LPR. In the NPRM, DHS referenced precedent and recent court opinions providing support for the premise that receiving means-tested public benefits is relevant to public charge inadmissibility determinations.

See

90 FR 52168, 52186-87 (Nov. 19, 2025). Furthermore, DHS believes that officers will consider the relative importance of the alien's receipt of any particular means-tested public benefit in the totality of the circumstances and will provide training and guidance to support accurate adjudications. With the 2022 Final Rule removed, officers will be able to consider whether the alien: received means-tested public benefits for only a short period of time, received small dollar amounts of assistance, received any particular public benefit rendering the alien dependent on the benefit, received means-tested public benefits permanently or temporarily, and has good overall prospects for being and remaining self-sufficient.

DHS disagrees that PRWORA created a distinction in the context of public charge inadmissibility determinations between means-tested public benefits denoting a lack of self-sufficiency and benefits merely supplementing an alien's lifestyle. PRWORA outlined the national policy objectives for the role of public benefits and eligibility for the same, specifying eligibility rules based on public benefit types and an alien's immigration status, including establishing exceptions from such eligibility rules. 8 U.S.C. 1601,

et seq.

DHS agrees the Seventh Circuit in

Cook County

Wolf

found it failed to explain why it changed its longstanding policy of excluding non-cash benefits from the public charge inadmissibility determination, but the Seventh Circuit did not hold the consideration of such benefits was

de facto

arbitrary and capricious.

Similarly, the Second Circuit in

Make the Road New York

Cuccinelli

also focused on DHS's explanation for considering non-cash public benefits rather than finding such consideration was

de facto

unreasonable.

DHS believes these cases are distinguishable from this rule. The 2019 Final Rule approach treated the receipt of any included public benefits as having the same consequences as long as the durational threshold (12 months or more) was met. The 2019 Final Rule not only provided for the consideration of non-cash benefits but also prescribed heavy weight in the totality of the circumstances to certain circumstances surrounding the receipt of any one

public benefit (regardless of type); this Final Rule does not do that.

Cook County

Wolf,

962 F.3d 208, 226 (7th Cir. 2020) (“DHS did not adequately explain why it changed its longstanding policy of excluding non-cash benefits from the public charge determination.”).

62 F.3d 612, 638-39 (2d Cir. 2020) (The court held that DHS failed to adequately consider the evidence before it and to explain why it was changing course from the agency's longstanding interpretation, as well as to adequately explain why non-cash benefits which are designed to promote self-sufficiency should be considered evidence that an alien is likely to become a public charge.).

Comment:

A commenter said the proposed rule offers no evidence to support DHS's “belie[f] that any prior receipt of means-tested public benefits is a key gauge to determining the likelihood of future dependence on the government for subsistence” and the fundamental flaw of DHS's justification is it does not provide any factual basis for this belief. The commenter reasoned the goals and eligibility criteria of these benefits programs belie DHS's assumption and show these programs are designed to provide supplemental support to a broad swath of the population, as INS recognized in 1999.

Response:

DHS believes the commenter misunderstood DHS's proposal to remove the 2022 Final Rule and the impact on public charge inadmissibility determinations in expanding the consideration of a broader universe of public benefits. The NPRM did not state that considering a broader universe of public benefits would result in aliens

de facto

being found inadmissible under the public charge ground or the removal of the 2022 Final Rule would elevate the importance of receipt of means-tested public benefits in public charge inadmissibility determinations. To the contrary, DHS cited to precedent decisions holding receipt of public benefits is not in itself outcome determinative

and highlighted that the past receipt of means-tested public benefits is one consideration in the totality of the circumstances.

As discussed in other comment responses, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance to help its officers determine how to best consider the alien's current and past receipt of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances.

See Matter of Perez,

15 I&N Dec. 136, 137 (BIA 1974) (“The fact that an alien has been on welfare does not, by itself, establish that he or she is likely to become a public charge.”);

Matter of Martinez- Lopez,

10 I&N Dec. 409, 421 (BIA 1962) (“the statute requires more than a showing of a possibility that the alien will require public support.”);

Matter of A-,

19 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1974) (BIA considered that the alien was a mother of a small child, there were few jobs in the area where she lived, and that she was now employed despite receiving public benefits previously for 4 years to find her not likely to become a public charge).

90 FR at 52188 (“For example, following past precedent, an officer would not conclude that an alien is inadmissible as likely at any time to become a public charge simply because that alien received a means-tested public benefit.”)

iv. Lack of Replacement Framework or Guidance

Comment:

One commenter said by proposing to remove regulatory guidance related to public charge inadmissibility, DHS undermines a shared understanding of the law and its meaning. The commenter stated that the adjudicatory standards DHS proposes to erase are necessary to fair, transparent, and consistent application of law, and warned that all stakeholders must understand when and to whom the public charge rule does and does not apply, yet DHS proposes to remove the regulations explaining applicability, exemptions, and waivers.

Response:

DHS agrees the regulated public should understand how and to whom the public charge ground of inadmissibility applies. As explained in the NPRM and other responses to comments, DHS believes the statute and applicable precedent decisions that guided the public charge inadmissibility determinations for decades provide sufficient guideposts for determining whether an alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. However, to ensure transparency and consistent adjudications, USCIS will issue subregulatory guidance that will explain how officers, under this final rule, will be able to consider the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits and will ensure officers fully consider this and any other factors or information relevant to determining an alien's likelihood at any time of becoming a public charge in the totality of the alien's circumstances, as Congress intended.

With respect to concerns that the removal from DHS regulations of the list of exemptions and waivers is arbitrary and capricious, as stated in the NPRM, these exemptions are statutory and will not be impacted by the removal of the regulations. 90 FR 52168, 52192 (Nov. 19, 2025). In order to provide a convenient reference point for the regulated public as to the exemptions and waivers, DHS will retain the list on the USCIS website, in the USCIS Policy Manual, and on the Form I-485.

v. Reliance Interests

Comment:

Some commenters responded to DHS's request regarding which aspects of the 2022 Final Rule engendered reliance interests. Commenters identified key elements that engendered reliance interests:

• That no benefits would be considered other than cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government expense;

• That applications for or receipt of benefits by family members would not be considered;

• That receipt of public benefits while the alien was in an immigration status that is not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility would not be considered; and

• That information on applications for non-cash benefits would not be shared or used for immigration purposes.

Response:

DHS thanks the commenters for these specific examples. While DHS is adopting the proposed rescission of the regulations promulgated by the 2022 Final Rule without change, DHS has provided clarifications in this final rule in response to public comments to address some of these potential reliance interests. This approach is consistent with DHS' understanding of Congress's national policy objectives. DHS notes that given the regulatory changes since 2019, and subsequent litigation challenging the 2019 and 2022 Final Rules, the current reliance interests of the regulated public are not as significant as the reliance interests of the regulated public at the time the 1999 Interim Field Guidance was superseded with the 2019 Final Rule because the regulated public was placed on notice by recurring rulemakings and litigation of the significant differences in policy objectives and approaches among administrations when it comes to the public charge ground of inadmissibility.

The Supreme Court in

Regents

and

Encino Motorcars

emphasized that reliance interests are tied to the duration and stability of a prior policy—not rather than whether the agency has changed its position in the past. If a policy was longstanding and people relied on it, those reliance interests must be considered when the agency changes course.

See, Department of Homeland Security

Regents of the University of California,

140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020);

Encino Motorcars, LLC

Navarro,

579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016).

For reliance interests engendered by the 2022 Final Rule's limitations on the consideration of benefits outside of public cash assistance for income maintenance and long-term institutionalization at government's expense, DHS clarified that once this final rule goes into effect, there will be no limit on which means-tested public benefits officers can consider for benefits received on or after the effective date of the rule. However, with the exception of Medicaid-funded services for long-term institutionalization, officers will not consider non-cash public benefits received before the effective date of this final rule (including any information in the record that the alien applied for, was certified or approved to receive public benefits before the effective date of this final rule). However, where the evidence reflects that the alien has been approved or certified to receive benefits for a

period that extends beyond the effective date of this final rule, if the alien does not provide evidence of disenrollment from such benefits or that he or she withdrew such application or notified the relevant agencies he or she no longer wanted to receive the benefits, DHS would consider the application, certification, and receipt of such benefits in the totality of the circumstances that occurs on or after the effective date of the final rule. For a more detailed discussion of the prospective application of this rule, please see section III.D.5. of this final rule's preamble.

For the definition of receipt and the statement that applications for, or receipt of benefits by family members should not be considered in a public charge inadmissibility determination, DHS did not propose nor does this final rule direct officers to consider information about an alien's family member's receipt of public benefits, unless that family member is applying for admission or adjustment of status and is subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility. As such, DHS will generally not consider the application for, certification or approval to receive, or receipt of public benefits by the alien's family members. As discussed in other comment responses, DHS considers the alien's income as part of the mandatory assets, resources, and financial status factor, and if there is evidence in the record the alien's family members whom the alien is legally obligated to support receive means-tested public benefits based on the alien's income falling below the designated threshold, DHS would consider that fact as part of the alien's assets, resources, and financial status in the totality of the circumstances. Given the alien must exclude any income received from means-tested public benefits from household income information provided on the Form I-485, the inclusion of amounts received from means-tested public benefits by others in the household as household income may lead to an inadmissibility finding under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

For comments expressing concern regarding the consideration of means-tested public benefits while in a status not subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility, DHS believes these reliance interests are at least partially addressed by clarifying means-tested public benefits not previously considered under the 2022 Final Rule will also not be considered if received before the effective date of this final rule. DHS notes many aliens who received means-tested public benefits while in categories exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility are also able to adjust their status to that of LPR in a category similarly exempt from the public charge ground of inadmissibility (

e.g.,

T and U nonimmigrants and VAWA beneficiaries). For aliens who adjust under a different category, or aliens who cannot adjust under an exempt category, DHS notes, without the unduly rigid framework of the 2022 Final Rule, officers can consider the specific circumstances in which public benefits were received. Officers may give limited weight to the receipt of such benefits, examining any public policy considerations underlying the alien's eligibility for them, along with other factors officers normally consider in the totality of the circumstances; such as (but not limited to) duration or amount of receipt, whether circumstances leading to receipt were temporary or permanent, alien's age, health, family status, work prospects, etc.

Finally, DHS notes that prior to the 2019 Final Rule, under the 1999 Interim Field Guidance, there was no limitation on the consideration of means-tested public benefits received while in an exempt category. If an alien received public cash assistance or long-term institutionalization at government's expense while in a status exempt from public charge and subsequently sought to adjust status to an LPR in a category subject to public charge, such receipt could be considered in the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the approach DHS is taking now is consistent with past agency practice, and DHS's interest in taking a consistent approach across immigration categories outweighs any remaining reliance interests from the 2022 Final Rule.

The last element of reliance identified—that information included on non-cash benefits applications would not be shared or used for immigration purposes—DHS notes that the 2022 Final Rule excluded from consideration the applications, approval or certification to receive, or receipt of non-cash benefits, but it did not address information sharing between benefit providing agencies and DHS in this context. DHS did not propose nor does this final rule address any information sharing between agencies. Therefore, this portion of the comment is out of scope.

Comment:

Commenters said the NPRM disregarded reliance interests, noting families, advocacy groups, and service providers relied on the 2022 Final Rule's clarity when enrolling in health, nutrition, and housing programs. Commenters stated that unclear Federal direction undermines federalism and State reliance interests, disrupts extensive State and local networks, and risks worsening public health and fiscal outcomes by deterring use of programs like Medicaid, SNAP, and early childhood supports. These commenters stated that agencies failing to account for reliance interests raises serious concerns about retroactivity, arbitrary decision-making, and unequal treatment of applicants. Another commenter agreed and said that DHS must not only identify reliance interests or invite public input on them but it must meaningfully consider and weigh the reliance interests when reversing prior policy and explain why they do not want a different policy outcome. Commenters stated that merely soliciting comments about reliance after announcing wholesale rescission of the operative framework is not the “reasoned explanation” with “awareness” of reliance interests required by the Supreme Court. Commenters cited

Department of Homeland Security

Regents of the University of California,

where the Supreme Court emphasized agencies must consider the “reliance interests” fostered in changing policy, and found that failure to do so can render an action arbitrary and capricious under the APA.

Response:

DHS disagrees that the NPRM disregarded any reliance interests or that the NPRM or this final rule reflects unclear Federal direction. In the NPRM, DHS specifically described prior rulemakings and requested feedback regarding specific reliance interests. DHS considered comments and supporting information provided, including narrative explanations from aliens, immigration service providers, State and local governments, etc., consistent with Supreme Court precedent.

Department of Homeland Security

Regents of the University of California,

140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913-15 (2020) (holding that the agency “failed to consider the conspicuous issues of whether to retain forbearance and what if anything to do about the hardship to DACA recipients,”

i.e.,

whether there was legitimate reliance on the DACA policy, including not just DACA recipients but also their employers and states and local governments. The Court explained that agencies must assess reliance interests broadly, including those of parties not directly regulated, when those interests are substantial and foreseeable);

Encino Motorcars, LLC

Navarro,

579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (agencies must consider reliance interests when changing policies, and failure to do so is arbitrary and capricious).

DHS disagrees that rescission of the 2022 Final Rule adversely impacts federalism or disrupts State reliance interests. While DHS agrees aliens may have relied on the 2022 Final Rule when enrolling in certain means-tested public benefit programs, DHS addressed those

reliance interests by clarifying previously excluded benefits are excluded from consideration if received before the effective date of this rule (including any information in the record that the alien applied for, was certified or approved to receive public benefits before the effective date of this final rule) where the alien can provide evidence he or she disenrolled from such benefits, or in the case of application, certification or approval to receive means-tested public benefits, the alien withdrew such application or notified the relevant agencies he or she no longer wanted to receive the benefits. For a more detailed discussion of the prospective application of this rule, please see section III.D.5. of this final rule's preamble. DHS also repeatedly stated the receipt of means-tested public benefits alone is not outcome determinative in public charge inadmissibility determinations and explained in the NPRM and throughout this final rule that the nature of the discretionary determination after this final rule goes into effect takes into consideration all evidence relevant to an alien's case including the circumstances surrounding benefit receipt.

DHS also disagrees rescission of the 2022 Final Rule will disrupt extensive State and local networks' dependence on Federal policy or risks worsening public health and fiscal outcomes because few aliens are both subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility and eligible to receive means-tested public benefits like Medicaid, SNAP, and early childhood supports. However, DHS agrees that the change in the public charge inadmissibility determinations will require reevaluation for aliens, organizations providing immigration services to aliens, as well as Federal, State, and local benefit and service providers. DHS also agrees removing regulations constraining officer discretion and expanding the universe of means-tested public benefits in the totality of the circumstances may cause aliens to exercise caution when applying for or receiving Medicaid and benefits from the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), as well as food, housing, and other means-tested public benefits previously excluded from public charge inadmissibility determinations.

DHS acknowledges that immigration services providers, and Federal, State, local, and other public benefits providing agencies may have relied on information, services, and outreach to inform them of immigration consequences associated with receipt of means-tested public benefits; and DHS understands that such entities will need to update their practices and procedures consistent with this rulemaking. DHS believes that any new burden this may impose on aliens, immigration services providers, and public benefits providing agencies is outweighed by the need to conform to the statutory requirements, congressional intent, and the policy goals explained throughout this rule.

DHS is not promulgating a new, stricter standard, but rather is simply returning to decades of practice where officers will be able to consider all relevant factors, including the consideration of the alien's receipt of any means-tested public benefits, including the receipt of previously excluded means-tested public benefits received on or after the effective date of this final rule, as only one aspect of one factor in the totality of the circumstances. Under this approach and using governing precedent, officers have the discretion to logically determine how much such receipt should matter in the case of any specific alien. This approach is more likely to bring stability and accuracy to the administration of public charge inadmissibility.

Furthermore, DHS believes even expanding the public charge inadmissibility determination to consider previously excluded means-tested public benefits if received on or after the effective date of this final rule, as DHS is doing, would not meaningfully affect reliance interests. This is because, as DHS has noted, few aliens are both subject to the public charge ground of inadmissibility and eligible to receive means-tested public benefits.

At the time of the 2019 Final Rule, the Migration Policy Institute estimated that less than 1 percent of the 22.1 million aliens in the United States could be deemed inadmissible due to the current use of a listed benefit because there are very few benefit programs that are open to aliens who do not already hold a green card, resulting from PRWORA.

See

MPI, MPI Estimates No More than 167,000 Non-Citizens Could Be Ineligible for Green Cards Based on Current Public Benefits Use (Mar. 5, 2020),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-estimates-non-citizens-ineligible-green-cards-based-current-benefit-use#:~:text=March%205%2C%202020-,MPI%20Estimates%20No%20More%20than%20167%2C000%20Non%2DCitizens%20Could%20Be,that%20took%20effect%20February%2024;

and Randy Capps, Julia Gelatt and Mark Greenberg, MPI, The Public-Charge Rule: Broad Impacts, But Few Will Be Denied Green Cards Based on Actual Benefits Use (Mar. 2020),

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/public-charge-denial-green-cards-benefits-use.

DHS agrees the direct outreach conducted by the prior administration regarding excluding non-cash benefits could have strengthened certain reliance interests. As is the case with all its regulatory initiatives, DHS will notify the public via the DHS an

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