Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Federal RegisterNov 3, 2025

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

8 CFR Parts 1, 103, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 214, 215, 216, 235, 236, 240, 244, 245, 245a, 264, 287, 333 and 335

[CIS No. 2814-25; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0205]

RIN 1615-AC99

Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

AGENCY:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS.

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposes to amend its regulations governing biometrics use and collection. DHS proposes to require submission of biometrics by any individual, regardless of age, filing or associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, unless exempted; expand biometrics collection authority upon alien arrest; define “biometrics;” codify reuse requirements; codify and expand DNA testing, use and storage; establish an “extraordinary circumstances” standard to excuse a failure to appear at a biometric services appointment; modify how VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant status applicants demonstrate good moral character; and clarify biometrics collection purposes.

DATES:

Submission of Public Comments:

Written comments on the proposed rule must be submitted on or before January 2, 2026. Comments on the information collection described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of this proposed rule must be received on or before January 2, 2026. The electronic Federal Docket Management System will accept comments prior to midnight eastern time at the end of that day.

ADDRESSES:

You may submit comments on the entirety of this proposed rulemaking package, identified by DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0205, through the Federal eRulemaking Portal:

http://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the website instructions for submitting comments.

Comments must be submitted in English, or an English translation must be provided. Comments that will provide the most assistance to USCIS will reference a specific portion of the proposed rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Comments submitted in a manner other than the one listed above, including emails or letters sent to DHS or USCIS officials, will not be considered comments on the proposed rule and may not receive a response from DHS. Please note that DHS and USCIS will not accept or consider any comments that are hand-delivered, couriered, or sent by mail. In addition, USCIS cannot accept comments contained on any form of digital media storage devices, such as CDs/DVDs and USB drives. If you cannot submit your comment by using

http://www.regulations.gov,

please contact the Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, by telephone at (240) 721-3000 for alternate instructions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Security and Public Safety Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, Camp Springs, MD 20746; telephone (240) 721-3000.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Public Participation

II. Executive Summary

A. Purpose and Summary of the Regulatory Action

B. Summary of Costs and Benefits

III. Background and Purpose

A. Legal Authority and Guidance for DHS Collection and Use of Biometrics

1. Background Checks

2. Secure Document Production

3. Biometric Collection From U.S. Citizens, U.S. Nationals, and Lawful Permanent Residents

4. Required Biometric Collections

5. Administrative Guidance

B. The Use of Biometrics by DHS

IV. Discussion of Proposed Changes

A. Use of Biometrics for Identity Management and Enhanced Vetting

1. Identity Management

2. Enhanced and Continuous Vetting

B. Verify Identity, Familial Relationships, and Preclude Imposters

1. Use of DNA Evidence

2. Special Treatment of DNA Evidence

3. Identity Management

C. Flexibility in Biometrics Requirements

1. Definition of Biometrics

2. Additional Modalities

3. Amend Related Regulations To Align With the Purposes of This Proposed Rule and To Facilitate Electronic Filing

D. Biometrics Requirement for U.S. Citizens, U.S. Nationals, and Lawful Permanent Residents

1. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006

2. The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA)

3. Certain Family-Based Petitioners

4. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners

5. T Nonimmigrant Adjustment of Status Applicants

6. Persons Involved With EB-5 Regional Center Program

7. Collection of Biometrics From Other Individuals Associated With a Benefit Request, Other Request, or Collection of Information

E. Biometrics Services Appointments and Interviews

1. Biometric Services Appointments

2. Interviews for Benefits

3. Interviews for Alien Spouses

F. Proposed Implementation

1. Phased-In Additional Biometrics Collection

2. Collection of the Biometric Services Fee

G. Evidence of Age and Birth Parentage for an Adopted Child

V. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

A. Executive Orders 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)

1. Summary

2. Background and Purpose of the Proposed Rule

3. Population

4. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Rule

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional Review Act)

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

G. Paperwork Reduction Act

H. Family Assessment

I. National Environmental Policy Act

J. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments)

K. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

L. Executive Order 12630 (Governmental Actions and Interference With Constitutionally Protected Property Rights)

M. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks)

N. Executive Order 13211 (Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use)

Table of Abbreviations

AAC accompanied alien children

ABIS Automated Biometric Identification System

ADIT Alien Documentation, Identification and Telecommunication

APA Administrative Procedure Act

ASC Application Support Center

AWA Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006

BIA Board of Immigration Appeals

BCR Biometrics Collection Rate

BLS U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

CFRP Cuban Family Reunification Parole

CHRI Criminal History Record Information

CJIS FBI Criminal Justice Information Services

CNMI Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

CPI-U Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers

CPMS Customer Profile Management System

DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNA deoxyribonucleic acid

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

DOS U.S. Department of State

EAD employment authorization document

ELIS Electronic Immigration System

EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FWVP Filipino World War II Veterans Parole

FY Fiscal Year

GSA General Services Administration

HFRP Haitian Family Reunification Parole

HLA human leukocyte antigen

HSI Homeland Security Investigations

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System

IdHS Identity History Summary

IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

IMBRA International Marriage Broker Regulation Act

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRIS Immigration Records and Identity Services Directorate

LPR lawful permanent resident

INA Immigration and Nationality Act

NASS National Appointment Scheduling System

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NGI Next Generation Identification

NPD National Production Dataset

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTA Notice to Appear (issued to initiate removal proceedings under INA sec. 240)

OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPQ Office of Performance and Quality

PRA Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

RAIO Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations

RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

RIA regulatory impact analysis

SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996

SEVP Student and Exchange Visitor Program

TPS Temporary Protected Status

UAC Unaccompanied Alien Children

UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

VAWA Violence Against Women Act

I. Public Participation

DHS invites all interested parties to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, comments and arguments on all aspects of this proposed rule. DHS also invites comments that relate to the economic, environmental, or federalism effects that might result from this proposed rule. Comments must be submitted in English, or an English translation must be provided. Comments that will provide the most assistance to USCIS will reference a specific portion of the proposed rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that support such recommended change. Comments submitted in a manner other than the one listed above, including emails or letters sent to DHS or USCIS officials, will not be considered comments on the proposed rule and may not receive a response from DHS.

Instructions:

If you submit a comment, you must include the agency name (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) and the DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0205 for this rulemaking. Regardless of the method used for submitting comments or material, all submissions will be posted, without change, to the Federal eRulemaking Portal at

http://www.regulations.gov,

and will include any personal information you provide. Therefore, submitting this information makes it public. You may wish to consider limiting the amount of personal information that you provide in any voluntary public comment submission you make to DHS. DHS may withhold information provided in comments from public viewing that it determines may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. For additional information, please read the Privacy and Security Notice at

http://www.regulations.gov

Docket:

For access to the docket and to read background documents or comments received, go to

http://www.regulations.gov,

referencing DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0205. You may also sign up for email alerts on the online docket to be notified when comments are posted or a final rule is published.

II. Executive Summary

DHS proposes to amend its regulations concerning the use and submission of biometrics in the administration and enforcement of immigration and naturalization laws and the adjudication of any immigration application, petition, or benefit or any other related request or collection of information. This section summarizes the changes made by this proposed rule, which are described in detail in section IV of this preamble.

A. Purpose and Summary of the Regulatory Action

As detailed in section III.A of this preamble, DHS has broad statutory authority

to collect or require submission of biometrics from: applicants, petitioners, and beneficiaries for immigration benefits; any individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information; and from aliens upon their arrest for purposes of processing, care, custody, and initiation of removal proceedings.

2 3 4

DHS currently collects, stores, and uses biometrics for various purposes, including but not limited to: conducting background checks to determine eligibility for a benefit request, other request, or collection of information; document production associated with an application, petition, or other request for certain immigration

and naturalization benefits or other actions; and performing other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, such as identity verification upon issuance of a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings undersection 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1229a.

The applicable statutory sections of each provision are explained in the body of the preamble which follows this Executive Summary.

This rule proposes changes to the regulations governing collection of biometrics for benefit and other requests administered by USCIS. It also impacts U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which have immigration enforcement responsibilities that may require collection, use, and storage of biometrics and use of USCIS systems or forms for which biometrics would be required by this rule. For example, ICE, Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) uses USCIS Form I-539, Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status, and Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization Document. However, this rule generally does not propose to authorize CBP or ICE to expand biometrics collections beyond either agency's independent authorities, aside from authorizing the collection of additional biometrics modalities and authorizing the expansion of CBP and ICE authority to collect biometrics from aliens under the age of 14, within their respective statutorily authorized mission spaces. The applicable provisions are discussed further below.

On October 27, 2025, CBP published the final rule, “Collection of Biometric Data from Aliens Upon Entry to and Departure from the United States,” 90 FR 48604 (Oct. 27, 2025) (CBP Final Rule). DHS considered the CBP Final Rule during the drafting of this NPRM and notes that the CBP Final Rule specifically amends DHS regulations relating to aliens' photographs when entering or exiting the United States. While the CBP Final Rule states that exemptions in current biometrics collections based on age (

i.e.,

under 14 and over 79) will continue to apply to biometrics other than facial images, 90 FR at 48609, DHS is now proposing to amend such exemptions for the reasons stated throughout this rule.Found 1 occurrence(s) in 1 file(s)

In this notice, the terms “benefit request” or “other request” or “collection of information” refers to all requests processed by USCIS, including those that do not meet the definition of “benefit request” at 8 CFR 1.2 (“any application, petition, motion, appeal, or other request relating to an immigration or naturalization benefit”). For example, deferred action is solely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by DHS, whereby an alien can request that DHS defer removal action for a certain period of time, and not an immigration benefit. Accordingly, a request for deferred action is not a “benefit request,” but is instead a request processed by USCIS.

DHS is precluded in many cases from approving, granting, or providing immigration benefits to individuals with a record of certain criminal offenses or administrative violations, or who may pose risks to national security or public safety. Criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for immigration benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination. Therefore, DHS must include national security considerations and criminal history background checks in its adjudications. Several statutes authorize DHS to conduct biometrics collections in relation to national security and public safety purposes, as well as for document production.

Additionally, DHS is authorized to collect the biometrics of U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident petitioners of family-based immigrant and nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions to determine if a petitioner has been convicted of certain crimes. Therefore, DHS requires a robust system for biometrics collection, storage, and use related to adjudicating immigration benefits and other requests and performing other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws.

See

section III.A. of this preamble for a detailed description of DHS's statutory authorities to collect biometrics.

Current regulations also provide general authorities for the collection of biometrics in connection with administering immigration and naturalization benefits requests and in connection with administering and enforcing immigration laws. For example, any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing a benefit request, other request, or collection of information request may be required to appear for biometrics collection.

See

8 CFR 103.2(b)(9). DHS currently has authority to require an individual to submit biometric information to conduct background and security checks and perform other functions related to administering and enforcing immigration laws.

See

8 CFR 103.16(a).

The immigration benefit request adjudication process requires DHS to verify the identity of an individual applying for or seeking to receive any benefit and requires that national security and criminal history background checks be conducted to determine if such an individual is statutorily eligible for the benefit. In general, adjudication of an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information includes a review of the individual's current immigration status, current and past immigration filings, and whether previous benefits were granted or denied. Immigration laws preclude DHS from granting many immigration and naturalization benefits to individuals with certain criminal or administrative violations, or with certain disqualifying characteristics, while also providing DHS discretion in granting an immigration benefit in many instances. DHS conducts checks to determine if an individual has a history that could render him or her inadmissible or removable, including a criminal record or association or involvement with human rights violations or terrorist activities or organizations. The current DHS biometric collection process for adjudication of immigration benefit requests or other requests or collections of information often begins with the collection of an individual's photograph, fingerprints, and signature at an authorized biometrics collection site. Collections outside the United States may be conducted on behalf of DHS by other federal agencies.

While DHS has the authority to collect biometrics from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, requestor, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, or to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, submission of biometrics is currently only mandatory for certain benefit requests and enforcement actions. For all other benefit requests or other requests or collections of information and enforcement actions, DHS has discretion, in accordance with its statutory and regulatory authorities, to determine if the circumstances of the specific request or enforcement action warrant the collection of biometrics. If DHS determines that biometrics are needed in the individual case, DHS issues a notice to the individual with instructions for submitting biometrics and an explanation of the general purposes for which they may be used.

DHS has determined that it is necessary to expand its routine biometric collections to include individuals associated with immigration benefit requests or other requests or collection of information, and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, such as verifying identity. Using biometrics for identity verification

and management will assist DHS's efforts to combat trafficking, confirm the results of biographical criminal history checks, and deter fraud. Therefore, DHS proposes in this rule that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, supporter, derivative, dependent, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated

with a benefit request or other request or collection of information,

including U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents, and without regard to age, must submit biometrics unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement. For the same reasons, the proposed rule proposes to authorize DHS to require biometrics for all aliens subject to section 240 removal proceedings, as well as aliens processed through other removal pathways including expedited removal under section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, and aliens being processed for removal under section 238(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). This rule also proposes that DHS may collect biometrics from aliens subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order under section 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231, and aliens subject to removal under the Visa Waiver Program, INA sec. 217, 8 U.S.C. 1187. Additionally, DHS proposes to remove the age restrictions for biometrics submission when issuing an NTA for section 240 removal proceedings or when processing aliens for removal

through other pathways.

See

proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

See https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics

(last updated Jan. 24, 2025).

By “associated,” DHS means a person with substantial involvement or participation in the immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, such as a named derivative, beneficiary, petitioner's signatory, sponsor, or co-applicant. The terms “file,” “submit,” “associated with” or variations thereof, as used throughout this rule, do not relate to attorneys and accredited representatives, although attorneys and accredited representatives may file or submit a request on behalf of a client. DHS, at this time, is not proposing biometrics submission by attorneys and accredited representatives.

A “collection of information” includes forms filed with USCIS that do not request an immigration benefit, but which provide information, typically in support of someone who is requesting an immigration benefit. For example, certain immigration benefits require proof of sufficient financial resources or support (such as parole based on urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit) for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States. In such instances, Form I-134, Declaration of Financial Support, is filed by an individual who agrees to provide financial support to the alien who requested the benefit, but the supporter is not requesting a benefit.

The purpose of this rule is to establish a standard and provide notice that every individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information is subject to the biometrics requirement, unless DHS exempts a category of requests or individuals, or a specific individual. This includes any alien apprehended, arrested or encountered by DHS in the course of performing its functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States. As it relates to benefit requests, other requests and collections of information, notice of this requirement will be added in the form instructions for the relevant forms, as needed.

Under this proposed rule, if finalized, DHS will use biometrics for identity management in the immigration lifecycle,

which will assist DHS in transitioning to a person-centric model to organize and manage its records, manage unique identities, and verify immigration records. Critically, it will also allow DHS to reduce reliance on biographic data for identity management. In general, biographic data is associated with an individual and is not intrinsically unique to that individual, at least as such biographic data relates to identification. For example, thousands of individuals may share the same name. Additionally, biographic data possesses inherent characteristics that limit its suitability for identity management, such that it can be changed over time. A person's name could have multiple spellings, a name can be legally changed, the digits in a date of birth could be transposed, and any identifier could relate to multiple individuals. Exclusive reliance on biographic data may result in errors, misidentification of individuals, and the potential that immigration benefits may be granted to ineligible or incorrect individuals or imposters.

Immigration lifecycle refers to the processing period between an alien's first benefit request, other request, or collection of information submission, encounter, or apprehension, through naturalization or removal.

In contrast to biographic data, using biometrics for identity verification and management in the immigration lifecycle will help ensure that an individual's immigration records pertain only to that specific individual. Biometrics-based identity management will also help DHS locate, maintain, and update the individual's immigration status, previously submitted identity documentation, as well as certain biographic data. DHS proposes to collect biometrics at any age to ensure the immigration records created for children can be related to their adult records later, and to help combat child trafficking, smuggling, and labor exploitation by facilitating identity verification, while also confirming the absence of criminal history or associations with terrorist organizations or gang membership.

In sum, the changes proposed in this rule will help DHS transition towards a biometric based system for identity verification and management. This will ensure that DHS can carry out its various responsibilities under the INA related to the administration and enforcement of the immigration and naturalization laws. It will also help ensure that DHS grants immigration-related benefits only to individuals who are statutorily eligible to receive them and will enable DHS to more effectively enforce the immigration laws against aliens who are potentially subject to removal.

DHS also plans to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting and require that aliens receive continued and subsequent evaluation to ensure they continue to present no risks to national security or public safety subsequent to their entry. This rule proposes that any individual alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit may be required to submit biometrics—without regard to any immigration filing—until they obtain or acquire U.S. citizenship. The rule further proposes that a U.S. citizen, U.S. national or lawful permanent resident may be required to submit biometrics if he or she filed a benefit request, other request, or collection of information in the past and it was either reopened or the previous approval is relevant to a benefit request, other request, or collection of information currently pending with DHS. The changes to the use and collection of biometrics and expanded scope of populations also are pertinent to CBP, ICE, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a component of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), given that immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) are prohibited from granting relief or protection from removal to an alien 14 years of age or older unless an ICE attorney reports that all required “identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations” have been completed.

See

INA sec. 262, 8 U.S.C. 1302, and 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6) and 1003.47(g) (related to fingerprinting biometrics specifically). ICE attorneys rely, in part, on USCIS' biometric collection to confirm and report this. Further, DHS has leeway in terms of which background and security checks are performed in this regard.

See “

Background and Security Investigations in Proceedings Before Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals,” 70 FR 4743, 4744 (2005) (“There is no need for this rule to specify the exact types of background and security checks that DHS may conduct with respect to aliens in proceedings.”). As a result, this rule will help to ensure that ICE, immigration judges, and the BIA are timely and fully informed of the results of all identity, law enforcement, and security investigations prior to EOIR granting an alien relief or protection from removal.

DHS recognizes that it is removing the age restrictions associated with biometrics collection in DHS regulations, without DOJ making conforming changes and removing the age restrictions associated with biometrics collection in DOJ EOIR regulations. DHS and DOJ have disparate authorities and processes for collecting biometrics. Notwithstanding any conflict between DHS and DOJ authorities, DHS regulatory provisions control all DHS biometrics collections, since DHS can only collect biometrics under its own authorities, even if the benefit is pending with DOJ. DHS collects biometrics on behalf of DOJ as a courtesy to DOJ because of the existence of DHS/USCIS Application Support Centers. However, DHS is not authorized to operate or collect biometrics under DOJ authorities, and the rule does not seek to change that. Each Department is bound by their respective authorities and regulations. Noting that the expansion of the DHS regulations to encompass a broader scope does not constrain, supersede, or diminish the authority or application of the DOJ regulations in any respect. The agencies will continue to resolve any conflicts that result from disparate practices related to the collection and submission of biometrics through operational guidance and intra-governmental agreements when appropriate.

DHS anticipates that by removing age restrictions on the collection of biometrics this rule will enhance the ability of ICE and CBP to identify fraudulently claimed genetic relationships at the border and upon encounter.

Under the current interpretation of the

Flores

Settlement Agreement, DHS is required to release

or transfer to a licensed facility as expeditiously as possible any minor apprehended with a parent or legal guardian. This has led in the past to the practice of DHS releasing families together if their cases could not be fully resolved within approximately 20 days.

This has encouraged the proliferation of fraudulent family unit schemes wherein unrelated adults and children claim genetic relationships in order to secure prompt release into the United States. Alien smuggling organizations are aware of this loophole and are taking full advantage of it, placing children into the hands of adult strangers, so they can pose as families and be released from immigration custody after crossing the border, creating another safety issue for these children.

DHS's ability to collect biometrics, including DNA, regardless of a minor's age, will allow DHS to accurately prove or disprove claimed genetic relationships among apprehended aliens and ensure that unaccompanied alien children (UAC) are properly identified and cared for.

Under the authority granted by the proposed rule, if finalized, individual DHS components may establish an age threshold as necessary for biometric collection specific to a particular component's operational needs.

To clarify, DHS is not proposing mandatory DNA collection at U.S. ports of entry.

Flores

Reno,

85-4544-RJK (C.D. CA, 1997) stipulated settlement agreement.

See https://www.dhs.gov/archive/news/2018/02/15/unaccompanied-alien-children-and-family-units-are-flooding-border-because-catch-and

(last updated Apr. 10, 2025).

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Rapid DNA Operational Use,” DHS/ICE/PIA-050 (June 25, 2019),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-rapiddna-june2019_3.pdf.

Under this proposed rule, DHS may also require, request, or accept raw DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile,

as evidence of genetic relationship, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. Where evidence of a relationship is required, this rule proposes to grant DHS express authority to require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results (which include a partial DNA profile) from relevant parties such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship or biological sex.

DHS recognizes that there are qualifying family members, such as adopted children, who do not have a genetic relationship to the individual who makes an immigration benefit request on their behalf. To the extent the rule discusses using DNA evidence to establish claimed or unclaimed relationships in support of certain immigration benefit requests, it refers only to genetic relationships that can be demonstrated through DNA testing. Current regulations generally require documentary evidence such as marriage and birth certificates, and secondary evidence such as medical records, school records, religious documents, and affidavits to support claims based on familial relationships. DHS currently does not have regulatory provisions in place to require, request, or accept DNA testing results to prove or disprove the existence of claimed or unclaimed genetic relationships, but because documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, in some situations, individuals are allowed to voluntarily submit DNA test results. Under this rule, DHS may expressly require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results which include a partial DNA profile to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship.

See Section IV—Discussion of Proposed Changes, Section B for a discussion of “partial DNA profile.”

This proposed rule is not concerned with, and creates no authority to limit, DNA sample collection required by 34 U.S.C. 40702(a)(1)(A) and 28 CFR 28.12 from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted and from non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States.

Similarly, under this rule, DHS may expressly require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results (which include a partial DNA profile) as evidence to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. For example, DHS may request DNA evidence to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex in instances where that determination will impact benefit eligibility. DHS currently does not have regulatory provisions in place to require, request, or accept DNA testing results for such purposes, but because documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, in some situations, individuals may voluntarily submit DNA test results.

DHS proposes to collect, treat, and locate raw DNA (the physical sample taken from the applicable individual) that is taken as a biometric modality distinct from the other biometric modalities it is authorized to collect, at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility and further proposes to not handle, store or share any raw DNA for any reason beyond the original purpose of submission (

e.g.,

to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex), unless DHS is required to share by law.

DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, like other evidence, becomes part of the record, and DHS will store and share DNA test results for adjudication purposes, including to determine eligibility for immigration benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws, to the extent permitted by law.

See https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data

(last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

Id.

In recent years, government agencies have grouped together identifying features and actions, such as fingerprints, photographs, and signatures under the broad term, biometrics. The terms, biometric “information,” “identifiers,” or “data,” are used to refer to all of these modalities, including additional features such as ocular image, palm print, voice print, and DNA. As a result, DHS has adopted the practice of referring to fingerprints, photographs, and signature collectively as “biometrics,” “biometric information,” or “biometric services.” With the exception of fingerprints, most laws on the subject do not specify individual biometric modalities such as ocular image, palm print, voice print, DNA, and/or any other biometric modalities that may be collected from an individual in the future. DHS is proposing to update the terminology in the applicable regulations to uniformly use the term “biometrics.” DHS seeks to utilize a single, inclusive term comprehensively throughout regulations and form instructions. DHS proposes to define the term “biometrics” to clarify and fully explain its authority to collect more than just “fingerprints” in connection with administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization benefits or other services, and to expressly define “biometrics” to include a wider range of modalities than just fingerprints, photographs and signatures. DHS proposes to define the term “biometrics” to mean “measurable biological (anatomical, physiological or molecular structure) or behavioral characteristics of an individual,” and include a list of modalities of biometric collection.

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2. DHS

proposes the following biometrics as authorized biometric modalities that DHS may request, require, or accept from individuals in connection with services provided by DHS and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws:

• Facial imagery (digital image, specifically for facial recognition and facial comparison);

• Prints (including fingerprints and palm prints);

• Signature (handwritten);

• Ocular imagery (to include iris, retina and sclera);

• Voice (voice print, vocal signature, and voice recognition); and/or

• DNA (including partial DNA profile).

The proposed definition of biometrics would authorize the collection of specific biometric modalities and the use of biometrics for: identity enrollment, verification, and management in the immigration lifecycle; national security and criminal history background checks to support determinations of eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits; the production of secure identity documents; to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship; establish biological sex (in circumstances when needed to determine benefit eligibility) and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws. To conform to the proposed definition, DHS proposes to remove individual references to “fingerprints,” “photographs,” and “signatures” in various provisions of its regulations and replace them with the term “biometrics.”

DHS has internal procedural safeguards to ensure technology used to collect, assess, and store the differing modalities is accurate, reliable, and valid.

Further, as to any USCIS adjudication subject to 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16), if a decision will be adverse to an applicant, petitioner, or requestor, and is based on unclassified derogatory information the agency considered, including information obtained through biometrics, he or she shall be advised of that fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information. DNA, while a biometric, would only be collected in limited circumstances, for example to prove or disprove existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship or biological sex, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits, or perform any other function necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws.

See https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics

(last updated Jan 24, 2025).

DHS originally codified restrictions on the ages of individuals from whom biometrics could be collected based on the Department policies, practice, and on technological limitations. For biometrics use to expand to allow for identity management and verification through the entire immigration lifecycle, this rule would allow for biometric collection from any individual, without age limitation. Therefore, DHS proposes to remove all age limitations or restrictions on biometrics collection from current regulations in the context of both immigration benefit requests, other requests, or collection of information, entering or exiting the United States, NTA issuance, and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws.

DHS also proposes to consolidate sections of 8 CFR providing what USCIS can or will do with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, when required biometrics are not submitted and how biometrics appointments may be rescheduled. DHS is clarifying that it may reschedule a biometrics appointment in its discretion. In instances when an individual has informed DHS of an address change prior to the biometrics appointment, and the individual did not receive a notification of appointment to that new address, USCIS will reschedule the appointment.

DHS also proposes to incorporate a new standard that must be met if an individual seeks to reschedule a biometric services appointment. Under the proposed rule, an individual may reschedule their biometric services appointment one time prior to the date of their scheduled biometric services appointment for any reason. However, after the first reschedule, the individual must meet the standard of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify rescheduling a subsequent biometrics services appointment any additional times. DHS also proposes to apply the “extraordinary circumstances” standard if the individual fails to appear at any biometric services appointment that was not rescheduled.

DHS believes in most cases the current “good cause” standard in 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9)(ii) does not create a high enough standard for rescheduling a biometrics appointment. The current “good cause” standard allows appointments to be frequently rescheduled and creates operational inefficiencies in the biometric submission process.

Upon publication of this rule, USCIS will issue policy guidance providing examples of “extraordinary circumstances” that meet the standard for rescheduling a biometric services appointment. USCIS similarly does not define the term “good cause” in the current text of 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9) but has issued accompanying policy guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual.

See

USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 1, Part C, Chapter 2—Biometrics Collection, A—Biometric Services Appointments.

DHS further proposes to define instances that justify USCIS biometric reuse for an individual who may have a pending benefit request, other request, or collection of information that requires biometric submission and has previously submitted biometrics for another benefit request, other request, or collection of information. In those situations, USCIS must obtain a positive biometric-based identity verification before reusing an individual's previously submitted biometrics to process a benefit request, other request, or collection of information. Identity verification based solely upon a comparison of the individual's name or other non-unique biographic identification characteristics or data, or combinations thereof, does not constitute positive identity verification and will not be permitted to justify biometric reuse.

DHS is also proposing to remove or replace language that applies to paper filings with language that encourages electronic filing. References to position titles, form numbers, mailing addresses, copies, and office jurisdiction are proposed to be removed. In addition, DHS is proposing to remove internal USCIS processes from the regulatory text. DHS is also proposing to eliminate outdated requirements for submitting photographs for certain immigration benefit requests. The photograph submission and use requirements specified in the INA may be met by the collection and storage of digital images.

DHS is also proposing to require biometrics from U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, or lawful permanent residents, including when they submit a family-based visa petition. This will assist in compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA),

which prohibits DHS from approving family-based immigrant visa petitions and nonimmigrant fiancé(e) visa petitions if the petitioner has been convicted of certain offenses. In addition, the International Marriage

Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA)

provides that petitioners for an alien fiancé(e) or alien spouse must submit criminal conviction information for certain crimes. The DHS proposal will allow DHS to review a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report of the petitioner's criminal history to comply with the AWA and IMBRA. The proposed requirement would extend to family-based petitions for a spouse, fiancé(e), parent, unmarried child under 21 years of age, unmarried son or daughter 21 years of age or over, married son or daughter of any age, sibling, and any derivative beneficiary of an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa based on a familial relationship.

Public Law 109-248, section 402; 120 Stat. 587, 622 (July 27, 2006); INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii) and (B)(i)(I).

Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005), Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); and (VAWA 2013), Public Law 113-4, sections 807-8, 127 Stat. 54, 112-17; 8 U.S.C. 1375a); INA secs. 214(d)(1) and (3).

Consistent with this, DHS proposes to require that Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) self-petitioners appear for biometric collection, and to remove the language advising self-petitioners who have resided in the United States for at least the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the self-petition to submit police clearance letters as evidence of good moral character, as well as the requirement that VAWA self-petitioners submit an affidavit as primary evidence of their good moral character. DHS will no longer need such police clearances or the self-petitioner's affidavit because it will be able to obtain the self-petitioner's criminal history using the submitted biometrics, reducing the burden on both DHS and many self-petitioners.

VAWA self-petitioners are currently required to demonstrate that they are persons of good moral character in order to be eligible for a VAWA self-petition. USCIS generally looks at the 3-year period immediately preceding the date the self-petition is filed, and may consider any conduct, behavior, acts, or convictions. Good moral character may be established by primary evidence, such as the self-petitioner's affidavit and local police clearances, or state-issued criminal background checks from each locality or state in the United States where the self-petitioner has been physically present or resided for 6 or more months during the 3 years before filing. While self-petitioners are encouraged to submit primary evidence, when possible, USCIS must consider any credible evidence relevant to the petition. DHS proposes to require biometrics from VAWA self-petitioners to obtain the self-petitioner's official FBI criminal history; support identity enrollment, verification, and management in the immigration lifecycle; and conduct national security and criminal history background checks. The proposed change will reduce the evidence required to establish good moral character for many self-petitioners. Law enforcement clearances or background checks will be required for self-petitioners who resided outside the United States or were physically present for 6 months or more, during the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the self-petition. DHS proposes to require the self-petitioner submit arrest reports which occurred during the 3 years prior to filing the self-petition, regardless of the petitioner residing or being physically present in the jurisdiction for 6 or more months. In addition, DHS proposes in certain cases to consider VAWA self-petitioners' conduct beyond the 3 years immediately before filing where earlier conduct is relevant to establishing the good moral character for a VAWA self-petitioner.

See

proposed 8 CFR 204.2(c)(2)(v), (e)(2)(v), and (j)(2)(v).

DHS further proposes to remove the automatic presumption of good moral character for VAWA self-petitioners under 14 years of age and require VAWA self-petitioners under 14 to submit biometrics like any other VAWA self-petitioner. Similarly, DHS proposes to eliminate the requirement that VAWA self-petitioners submit police clearance letters, unless they lived outside the United States during the requisite period. Adjudicators would assess good moral character based on the applicant's criminal history, national security background check, and any other credible and relevant evidence submitted. DHS also proposes to amend 8 CFR 245.23(g) to refer to the relevant “continuous period” rather than “continued presence,” and to provide that USCIS would be able to consider the applicant's conduct beyond the requisite period, where earlier conduct is relevant to the applicant's moral character and conduct during the requisite period does not reflect a reform of character.

DHS also proposes to remove the presumption of good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants under 14 years of age. The rule proposes that such applicants submit biometrics that USCIS will use in the determination of good moral character and provides USCIS with the authority to require additional evidence of good moral character.

See

proposed 8 CFR 245.23(g). The proposed changes would remove the superfluous need for police clearance letters from T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants.

DHS proposes to continue its existing practice and collect biometrics and perform background checks on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and any other persons involved with an EB-5 regional center, new commercial enterprise or job-creating entity.

See

INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1152(b)(5)(H)(iii). USCIS proposes to also continue its existing practice to review the results of national security and criminal history background checks to decide whether such persons involved with such entities, and the entities themselves, are bona fide and eligible to participate in the regional center program.

Id.

DHS also proposes to remove 8 CFR 216.4(b)(1), “Authority to waive interview,” and 8 CFR 216.4(b)(2), “Location of interview” as they apply to a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent resident status filed by the alien and the alien's spouse. As any decision to waive the mandatory interview is purely discretionary, and 8 CFR 216.4(b)(1) simply reiterates this discretion, it serves no purpose, especially since determining whether the eligibility requirements for removal of conditions in 8 CFR 216.4(c) were established is central to the adjudication of the petition itself. Additionally, the limitation on who can conduct an interview and who has jurisdiction over an interview created by 8 CFR 216.4(b)(2) is unnecessary and creates operational restrictions that interfere with USCIS' ability to adjudicate the Form I-751, Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence. The decision to assign an interviewer and the location of an interview is a purely operational and procedural decision, and one that should be made upon the adjudicative priorities and operational resources available to USCIS.

DHS does not plan to immediately expand all of its programs to provide that all new biometrics modalities would be required of all individuals as of the effective date of a potential final rule. Only those revised forms that propose to add a particular biometric collection or DNA submission requirement in conjunction with this rule (as described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of this preamble) will be immediately subject to new biometrics, modalities, or DNA requirements.

DHS proposes that DHS component agencies may expand or contract their biometrics submission requirements described within this rule

in the future by notice in the

Federal Register

, updated form instructions, or otherwise consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the PRA.

Under this proposed rule USCIS maintains the right to request biometrics, as needed, via individualized notice to the individual.

USCIS is authorized to collect biometric services fees and has generally incorporated the biometric services costs into most of the underlying immigration benefit request fees for which biometric services are applicable in its most recent rule addressing the USCIS fee schedule (89 FR 6194, Jan. 31, 2024 (Fee Rule)).

In 2020, DHS previously published a similar Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to amend DHS regulations governing the use and collection of biometrics in the enforcement and administration of immigration laws (85 FR 56338, Sept. 11, 2020), however that NPRM was later withdrawn in May 2021 consistent with E.O. 14012 (86 FR 8277, Feb. 5, 2021), and the priorities of the administration at that time (86 FR 24750, May 10, 2021). On January 20, 2025, E.O. 14012 was rescinded by President Trump, and DHS intends to continue its previous efforts to enhance biometric submission, while also ensuring that all aliens seeking admission to the United States, or who are already in the United States, are vetted and screened (E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443, Jan. 29, 2025; E.O. 14161, 90 FR 8451, Jan. 30, 2025).

B. Summary of Costs and Benefits

The proposed rule would enable DHS to conduct the administration and adjudication of immigration benefit requests with increased fidelity and is conducive to the evolution to a person-centric model for organizing and managing its records, enhanced and continuous vetting, and reduced dependence on paper documents, as is described more fully in the preamble. DHS estimates that about 1.12 million more biometrics submissions will be collected annually, and the resulting biometrics-submitting population will increase from a current baseline of 2.07 million to 3.19 million.

DHS estimates that the annual costs for individuals who will submit biometrics under the proposed rule will be $231.5 million. This includes costs to petitioners of family-based requests, costs to VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant petitioners submitting evidence to demonstrate good moral character, costs to potential persons involved with regional centers, and fee costs incurred by Temporary Protected Status (TPS) registrants and individuals in EOIR proceedings. DHS estimates costs to the government of $55,040 for fees that the FBI will collect for providing fingerprint-based Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) checks prior to issuing NTAs. Combining the biometrics portion, which includes the biometric services fees and fees charged by the FBI related to CHRI checks (noted above), plus $57.1 million in the DNA submission costs, the total monetized costs of this proposed rule will potentially be $288.7 million annually. To compare costs over a 10-year period of analysis Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 through FY 2035, DHS applies 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates to the total estimated costs of the proposed rule. DHS estimates the 10-year total costs of the proposed rule to be $2.5 billion discounted at 3 percent, and $2.0 billion discounted at 7 percent.

The proposed rule will benefit the public by reducing the evidentiary burden of VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant petitioners who will in most cases no longer have to gather evidence such as police clearance reports and affidavits to demonstrate good moral character. It will provide individuals requesting or associated with immigration and naturalization benefits a more reliable system for verifying their identity when submitting a benefit request. This will limit the potential for identity theft while also reducing the likelihood that DHS will be unable to verify an individual's identity and consequently deny the benefit. DHS is unable to quantify this benefit because it has no data on how often these events happen under existing regulations. Increasing the types of biometrics collected will allow for better identification of individuals because each modality increases the unique physical, biological or behavioral characteristics that USCIS can use to identify the individual.

Finally, the allowance of individuals to use DNA testing as evidence to demonstrate the existence of a claimed genetic relationship provides them the opportunity to demonstrate a genetic relationship using quicker, less intrusive, and more effective technology than the blood tests provided for in past regulations.

See

8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi). Similarly, the use of DNA test results as evidence to establish biological sex will also allow applicants to provide proof without the need to produce additional documentation such as birth records, or other information.

The proposed rule will benefit the U.S. Government by providing it with the necessary tools to tackle and limit identity fraud and improve USCIS identity management systems. The proposed rule will enable DHS to have more fidelity and efficiency in identity management in the immigration lifecycle and vetting of individuals seeking certain immigration and naturalization benefits. Expanding the population subject to biometrics submission provides DHS with the ability to better identify and limit fraud because biometrics comprise unique physical or behavioral characteristics that are difficult to falsify and are less likely to change over time the way biographical information does in the majority of cases. Biometrics will also help to reduce the administrative burden involved in identity verification and the performance of criminal history checks, by reducing the need for manual document review and name-based security checks. The proposed rule will also enhance the U.S. Government's capability to identify criminal activity and protect vulnerable groups by extending the submission of biometrics to populations under certain benefit requests. The removal of age restrictions and the collection of biometrics from all aliens under the age of 14 will assist DHS in its mission to combat human trafficking, child sex trafficking, forced labor exploitation, and alien smuggling.

III. Background and Purpose

A. Legal Authority and Guidance for DHS Collection and Use of Biometrics

As discussed in detail below in section IV of this preamble, DHS is proposing to amend its regulations governing its use and collection of biometrics by USCIS and other DHS components. In short, the key proposed changes include:

• Requiring any individual filing or associated with an immigration-related benefit request or other request adjudicated by DHS, regardless of age, to appear for biometrics submission unless exempted.

• Clarifying the purposes for which biometrics are collected, stored, and utilized and when they can be reused, including for enhanced and continuous vetting.

• Expanding biometrics collection authority upon alien arrest or encounter.

• Defining the term “biometrics” as the measurable biological (anatomical, physiological and molecular structure) or behavioral characteristics of an individual. Modalities meeting this definition of biometrics include but are not limited to DHS-approved: facial imagery (digital image, specifically for facial recognition and facial comparison), prints (including fingerprints and palm prints), signature (handwritten), ocular imagery (to include iris, retina, and sclera), voice (including voice print, vocal signature,

and voice recognition), and DNA (partial DNA profile).

• Specifying that DHS may require, request, or accept the submission of raw DNA or DNA test results to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or as evidence of biological sex when a relationship or biological sex is relevant to an individual's statutory eligibility for an immigration-related benefit.

• Using biometrics for VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant status applicants for assessing good moral character; and

• Establishing an “extraordinary circumstances” standard to govern an individual's request to reschedule a biometric services appointment in certain circumstances, or when an individual fails to appear for appointment.

DHS has broad statutory authority under the INA to make these proposed changes. First, INA sec. 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), provides DHS with expansive authority to administer and enforce the nation's immigration and naturalization laws, and INA sec. 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), provides the Secretary of Homeland Security (“the Secretary”) with the authority to issue forms, regulations, instructions, other papers, and perform such other acts the Secretary deems necessary to carry out DHS's functions under the INA.

See also

6 U.S.C. 202 (authorities of the Secretary). Under the INA, DHS, through USCIS, has authority to adjudicate most immigration-related benefits,

and DHS components including ICE and CBP have authority related to the apprehension, inspection and admission, detention, and removal of aliens encountered in the interior of the United States or at or between the U.S. ports of entry.

Accordingly, the Secretary has broad authority to issue regulations necessary to carry out DHS's functions related to immigration benefits and enforcement of the immigration laws. Establishing and verifying an individual's identity using biometrics falls within this authority.

Section 415(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”), Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 271(b) transferred authority from DOJ to DHS to adjudicate most immigration-related benefits under INA, and charged USCIS, under the direction of the Secretary and the Director of USCIS with exercising this function.

See also

DHS, “Delegation to The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services,” Delegation of Authority 0150.1,

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=234775.

See

INA secs. 235, 236, 241, 8 U.S.C. 1225, 1226, 1231.

Section 287(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1357(b), also provides DHS with authority for this proposed rule. That statute provides DHS with broad discretion and authority to “take and consider evidence concerning the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the administration of the

Service.”

Id.

DHS's authority to adjudicate benefits under the INA necessarily includes an obligation to ensure that benefits are granted only to those individuals who are statutorily eligible and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. If finalized, this proposed rule would enhance DHS's ability to take and use evidence, through biometrics, to better ensure that USCIS grants benefits only to eligible individuals and identifies criminal or other threat actors attempting to obtain immigration benefits.

Prior to the HSA, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) administered the provisions of the INA related to immigration enforcement and benefits adjudication. In 2002, Congress abolished the INS and transferred these functions to the then-newly created DHS. By operation of the HSA, certain references to the “Attorney General” and the “Service” in the INA are understood to refer to the “Secretary” and “DHS”. HSA 1517, 6 U.S.C. 557.

As explained below in section IV of the preamble, this proposed rule, if finalized, would allow DHS to collect and use biometrics more robustly to help verify and manage an individual's identity to deter fraud and provide DHS with increased fidelity in benefits adjudications. It would also enhance DHS's ability to complete background, criminal history, and other immigration history checks necessary to adjudicate certain benefits consistent with law. The expanded use of DNA would enable DHS to confirm or non-confirm eligibility for certain family-based immigration-benefit requests where relevant. This rule, if finalized, would also support DHS's efforts to use biometrics more robustly through enhanced and continuous vetting to ensure that aliens who have been granted benefits under the INA should continue to have the “privilege” of “residing” in the United States and are not a risk to national security or the public safety. It would also support DHS's ability to collect and use or reuse biometrics to establish identity throughout the immigration lifecycle which will increase the effective and efficient “administration” of DHS functions related to benefits adjudications. Therefore, this proposed rule fits within the authority granted under INA sec. 287(b), 8 U.S.C. 1357(b).

For similar reasons, INA sec. 235(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1225(d)(3), provides additional authority for this proposed rule. This statute provides that the Secretary and immigration officers shall:

have power . . . to take and consider evidence of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, transit through, or reside in the United States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the administration of the Service.

This statute, in addition to the other statutes discussed above, provides authority to collect biometrics from all inadmissible and deportable aliens, regardless of age, that are subject to section 240 removal proceedings or other proceedings under INA secs. 235 (expedited removal) and 238(b) (aggravated felon removal), 8 U.S.C. 1225, 1238(b), in addition to certain other removable aliens, as proposed in this rule.

Accordingly, DHS is proposing to issue this regulation pursuant to the Secretary's broad authority under INA sec. 103(a), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), to issue regulations necessary to carry out DHS's various functions and authorities under the INA, including under INA secs. 287(b) and 235(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1357(b) and 1225(d)(3), and the various statutes in the INA related to benefits administered and adjudicated by DHS.

1. Background Checks

In addition to DHS's broad authorities discussed above, various provisions of the INA governing immigration benefits impose an obligation on USCIS to confirm that an alien has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense and does not pose a threat to national security or public safety. Indeed, DHS is precluded in many cases from approving, granting, or providing immigration benefits to aliens with a record of certain criminal offenses or administrative violations.

Whether granting a benefit is discretionary or not, criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination. Additionally, DHS is mandated to protect the American public from “aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes” and to “vet and screen to the maximum degree possible all aliens

who intend to be admitted, enter, or are already inside the United States.”

See

E.O. 14161 secs. 1(a) and 2(a), 90 FR 8451, (Jan. 20, 2025). Therefore, DHS adjudications must include national security considerations and criminal history background checks.

DHS would like to note that limitations on biometric collection or use in this proposed rule would not impact existing law enforcement authorities or other national security or intelligence gathering activities.

For example, one statute precludes the filing of a family-based immigrant petition by someone who has been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor.”

See

INA sec. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii). The criminal and security-related grounds of inadmissibility found in INA secs. 212(a)(2) through (3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2) through (3), apply to many benefits, such as adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, refugee status, and TPS. The INA provides that refugee applicants must be admissible as immigrants and the criminal, security, and terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility apply to refugee applicants.

See

INA sec. 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(1); INA sec. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182. The INA provides that asylum may be granted on a discretionary basis.

See

INA sec. 208(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1)(A). It provides that asylum applicants are subject to mandatory criminal and security bars.

See

INA sec. 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A). Sections of the INA apply the criminal, security, and terrorism-related bars to TPS applicants, including the mandatory asylum bars above.

See

INA secs. 244(c)(2)(A)(iii) through (B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii) through (B). Various INA sections require that adjustment of status applicants be admissible in order to qualify.

See, e.g.,

INA secs. 245(a)(2) and 209(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2) and 8 U.S.C. 1159(b)(5). The INA also provides a good moral character requirement for any applicant to be naturalized.

See

INA sec. 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3).

As discussed further below in section III.B. of this preamble, USCIS has long required aliens and certain other individuals associated with benefits applications to submit certain biometrics. USCIS needs these biometrics to run background checks to verify that an individual is not statutorily ineligible for the requested benefit and to protect national security and public safety. This proposed rule, if finalized, would enhance DHS's ability to establish an individual's identity through required biometrics collections and expanded modalities, which in turn will increase USCIS' ability to run background checks more quickly and with greater accuracy as discussed below.

Other statutes explicitly authorize DHS to conduct biometric services in relation to national security and public safety purposes. For example, Congress directed in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 354 (2001), reauthorized by Public Law 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at note to 8 U.S.C. 1365a, that “biometric technology” should be utilized in the development of the integrated entry-exit system originally mandated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1365a). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1365b), required the completion of a biometric data system to facilitate efficient immigration benefits processing and to protect the United States by preventing the entry of terrorists. These statutes reflect that Congress has recognized the importance and value of biometrics to the administration and enforcement of immigration laws, including to make the process of identifying aliens more efficient and accurate, and to protect national security. Although the primary focus of this proposed rule is biometrics collection and use for immigration-related benefits and processes, the rule is consistent with these overall goals. For USCIS, any limitations on the collection or use of biometrics in this proposed rule does not impact DHS law enforcement authorities or other national security or intelligence gathering activities.

Background checks are also required by EOIR regulation for aliens who apply for relief and protection in removal proceedings. Specifically, immigration judges and the BIA are prohibited from granting relief and protection to an alien unless an ICE attorney reports that all required “identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations” have been completed.

See

8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6) and 1003.47(g). Indeed, as pertaining to asylum applications, there is a statutory basis for such background checks as well.

See

INA sec. 208(d)(5)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(A)(i);

See also

8 CFR 1208.10. To the extent that any controversy may arise interpreting DHS and DOJ regulations regarding the removal of age restrictions for biometrics collection, DHS is not authorized to operate or collect biometrics under DOJ authorities, and this rule does not seek to change that. Each department is bound by their respective regulations. The agencies will continue to resolve any conflicts that result from disparate practices related to the collection and submission of biometrics through operational guidance and intra-governmental agreements when appropriate.

2. Secure Document Production

Still other statutes require the collection of biometrics for secure document production. For example, photographs are required by statute to create certificates of naturalization.

See

INA sec. 333(a), 8 U.S.C. 1444(a). Additionally, an alien granted asylum will be granted an employment authorization document (EAD) that shall at a minimum contain the fingerprint and photograph of such alien.

See

8 U.S.C. 1738. Relatedly, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act), Public Law 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002), requires that DHS issue aliens machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents using biometric identifiers.

See

8 U.S.C. 1732(b)(1).

3. Biometric Collection From U.S. Citizens, U.S. Nationals, and Lawful Permanent Residents

DHS is also authorized to collect the biometrics of U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent resident petitioners of family-based immigrant petitions, and U.S. citizen petitioners of nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions, to determine if a petitioner has been convicted of certain crimes pursuant to the AWA, Public Law 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.)

See

INA secs. 402(a) and (b) (applicable immigration provisions), and IMBRA, Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1375a). The AWA:

• Prohibits U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents who have been convicted of any “specified offense against a minor” from filing a family-based immigrant visa petition on behalf of any beneficiary, unless the Secretary determines, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion, that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the beneficiary. INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II); 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II).

• Renders ineligible to file “K” nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions those U.S. citizens convicted of such offenses, unless the Secretary determines, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion,

that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the fiancé(e) beneficiary. INA sec. 101(a)(15)(K), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K).

Independent of the AWA, USCIS is also required to disclose information regarding certain violent arrests and convictions for some U.S. citizen petitioners who file K-visas for fiancés or spouses in accordance with IMBRA, 8 U.S.C. 1375a.

4. Required Biometric Collections

Several sections of the INA also require DHS to collect certain biometrics from certain aliens for specific purposes. For example:

• INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(H)(iii), requires the Secretary to collect “fingerprints or other biometrics” from certain purposes related to the EB-5 visa category, specifically the regional center program.

• INA secs. 333 and 335, 8 U.S.C. 1444 and 1446, require the submission of photographs and a personal investigation before an application for naturalization, citizenship or other similar requests may be approved.

• INA sec. 262(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1302(a), generally requires aliens aged 14 and older, in the United States, to register with DHS and be fingerprinted, and INA sec. 264, 8 U.S.C. 1302, generally directs DHS to prepare registration and fingerprinting forms for such aliens.

• INA sec. 287(f), 8 U.S.C. 1357(f), requires DHS to fingerprint and photograph each alien 14 years of age or older when DHS issues an NTA.

These statutes require DHS to, at minimum, collect certain biometrics for certain populations, but they do not preclude or limit DHS from collecting additional modalities or expanding the populations subject to biometric requirements. Under this proposed rule, DHS will continue to collect the required biometrics from the individuals and aliens covered by these statutes. However, this rule proposes to expand the biometric modalities that DHS may collect from these individuals and others covered by the rule. Moreover, upon publication of this rule, DHS may require the submission of biometrics without regard to age from aliens against whom proceedings based on inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the INA or deportability under section 237 of the Act are initiated, including proceedings under sections 235, 238(b), and 240 of the INA.

See

proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

As discussed above in this section of the preamble, DHS has broad authority and discretion, including under INA secs. 103(a), 287(b), and 235(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), 1357(b) and 1225(d)(3), to collect biometrics from any person to establish and verify an individual's identity, eligibility for a benefit, and for other purposes material and relevant to DHS's benefits adjudication and enforcement functions under the INA. This authority also includes taking measures like the biometrics requirements proposed in this rule that are necessary for the effective and efficient administration of these functions. Therefore, Congress's decision to require certain biometric modalities from certain populations, does not limit DHS's broad authority to collect additional biometrics or expand the populations subject to biometrics submission requirements.

5. Administrative Guidance

This proposed rule is also consistent with non-statutory guidance on effective mechanisms for foreign national vetting, screening, and identification. DHS was directed by executive branch guidance to take actions that require a robust system for biometrics collection, storage, and use related to providing adjudication and naturalization services of immigration benefits. For example, with respect to secure documents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 11, “

Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures,

” (Aug. 27, 2004) directs DHS to “incorporate security features . . . that resist circumvention to the greatest extent possible.” DHS is directed to consider the “. . . information individuals must present, including, as appropriate, the type of biometric identifier[s] or other form of identification or identifying information to be presented, at particular screening opportunities.” DHS was also directed to expand the use of biometrics, consistent with applicable law, to identify and screen for individuals who may pose a threat to national security by HSPD 24, “Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security,” (June 5, 2008). Further, National Security Presidential Memorandum—9 established the DHS-led National Vetting Center to improve vetting “to identify potential threats to national security, border security, homeland security, and public safety”, and included expanding biometric integration, sharing, and use to that end.

More recently, DHS is directed, by E.O. 14161, to “identify all resources that may be used to ensure that all aliens seeking admission to the United States, or who are already in the United States, are vetted and screened to the maximum degree possible” with the intended goal to “protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.”

“Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting Enterprise” (Aug.5, 2018).

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NSPM-9%20Implementation%20Plan.pdf.

B. The Use of Biometrics by DHS

Current regulations provide both general authorities for the collection of biometrics in connection with administering immigration and naturalization benefits as well as requirements specific to certain benefit types.

Moreover, USCIS has authority under its current regulations to require an applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing a benefit request, other request, or collection of information to appear for biometrics.

See

8 CFR 103.2(b)(9). In addition, DHS has the authority to require biometrics and payment of any associated biometric services fee from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or requestor, or individual filing or seeking a benefit request, other request, or collection of information on a case-by-case basis, through form instructions, or through a

Federal Register

notice.

Id.

See, e.g.,

8 CFR 103.16(a), 204.2(a)(2) (requiring evidence of the claimed relationship), 204.3(c)(3) (requiring fingerprinting), 204.2(d)(2)(vi) (authorizing blood testing), 245a.2(d) (requiring photographs and a completed fingerprint card), and 316.4(a) (referring to form instructions which may require photographs and fingerprinting).

The former INS first used fingerprints for immigration processing solely for the purpose of performing criminal history background checks related to applications for which eligibility required good moral character or non-existence of a record of certain criminal offenses.

See, e.g.,

63 FR 12979 (Mar. 17, 1998) (prohibiting the former INS from accepting fingerprints for the purpose of conducting criminal background checks unless collected by certain U.S. Government entities). The beneficiary or applicant would submit fingerprints which were then checked against FBI databases to determine if they matched any criminal activity on file. The fingerprints were not retained by the INS and delays in processing would often result in individuals needing to submit fingerprints multiple times for the same application. Photographs were not historically collected by INS as a biometric identifier. For those immigration benefit requests that required a photograph to produce a resulting identity document, the regulations required submission of a

passport-style photograph.

See, e.g.,

8 CFR 204.2, 8 CFR 2210.5, and 8 CFR 264.2.

Today, DHS handles biometrics differently. Biometrics are still used in criminal history background checks to determine eligibility for immigration benefits and for public safety, fraud, and national security vetting. In addition, biometrics may be stored by DHS and used to verify an individual's identity in subsequent encounters with DHS. These encounters could vary from travel to and from the United States where an individual may encounter CBP officers, to arrest and detention by law enforcement components such as ICE, or to initiate removal proceedings.

DHS also uses collected biometric information for document production related to immigration benefits and status, including but not limited to: Travel Documents (Form I-512L), Permanent Resident Cards (Form I-551), Employment Authorization Documents (Form I-766), Certificates of Citizenship (Form N-560), Certificates of Naturalization (Form N-550), Replacement Certificates of Citizenship (Form N-561), and Replacement Certificates of Naturalization (Form N-570).

Most of these secure documents are created using the digital photograph (and signature) that is taken by DHS at an ASC, and not the paper photograph mailed with the benefit request.

See

Form I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status; Form I-90, Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card; Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization; Form N-600, Application for Certificate of Citizenship; Form N-400, Application for Naturalization; Form N-565, Application for Replacement Naturalization/Citizenship Document;

See also,

8 U.S.C. 1732(b) (Machine-readable, tamper-resistant entry and exit documents, Requirements) and 8 CFR 264.1(b) (Registration and fingerprinting).

The paper photograph is retained and may be used to verify the identity of an applicant who is required to be interviewed by comparing it to the digitally captured photograph or the applicant's motor vehicle operator's license.

As part of the benefit adjudications process, DHS must first verify the identity of an individual applying for or seeking any benefit. Biometric identity verification helps protect against fraud and imposters in subsequent encounters or filings for immigration benefits. Second, DHS must determine if the individual is eligible to receive the requested benefit. That determination may focus on the criminal, national security, and immigration history of the individual, depending on the eligibility requirements for the particular benefit type, and is accomplished through national security and criminal history background checks.

The immigration history review includes a review of the individual's current immigration status, current and past immigration filings, and whether previous immigration benefits were granted or denied. DHS conducts national security and criminal history background checks on individuals applying for an immigration benefit because U.S. immigration laws preclude DHS from granting many immigration and naturalization benefits to individuals with certain criminal or administrative violations, or with certain disqualifying characteristics (

e.g.,

certain communicable diseases, association with terrorist organizations, or lack of good moral character), while also providing DHS discretion in granting an immigration benefit in many instances.

See, e.g.,

INA sec 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A) (mandatory bars to asylum); INA secs. 245(a) through (k), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2) (admissibility requirements for adjustment of status applicants); INA sec. 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3) (good moral character requirement for naturalization).

DHS conducts multiple types of national security and criminal history background checks, including but not limited to: (1) biographic information-based checks such as the FBI Name Check, and (2) biometrics checks against the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), the FBI Next Generation Identification (NGI) system, and the Department of Defense (DoD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS).

32 33 34

DHS also uses biometrics to determine if an individual has ties in their background, to activities such as an association with human rights violations, involvement in terrorist activities, or affiliation with terrorist organizations rendering them inadmissible. To that end, DHS may vet an individual's biometrics against data sets of foreign partners in accordance with international arrangements.

IDENT will be replaced by a system called the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART). DHS will use the term “IDENT” in this rule to refer to both the current and successor systems.

The FBI NGI system is operated by the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division and provides the criminal justice community with multi-modal biometric and criminal history information.

See

“Privacy Impact Assessment Update for Biometric Interoperability Between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice,” (Oct. 13, 2011),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_nppd_visit_update-b.pdf.

FBI's NGI database, in turn, also provides access to DoD's ABIS database.

DoD's ABIS system is operated by the DoD and contains biometric records of individuals encountered overseas by the DoD that include known or suspected terrorists. The biographic and biometric data from ABIS is also transferred to the DoD's Special Operations Force Exhibition (SOFEX) Portal for additional biometric matching. Once complete, the NGI system forwards responses back from both the NGI and the ABIS systems to the IDENT system. When data is initially submitted and processed through IDENT, NGI, and ABIS, an ICE Analyst conducts biometric and biographic checks against other law enforcement and classified Intelligence Community databases before processing, exploiting, summarizing, and disseminating findings to the relevant ICE Attaché and Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) PMT.

See

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the International Biometric Information Sharing Program (IBIS),” DHS/ALL/PIA-095,

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsallpia-095-international-biometric-information-sharing-program-ibis;

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Immigration Benefits Background Check System (IBBCS),” DHS/USCIS/PIA-033,

https://www.dhs.gov/publication/immigration-benefits-background-check-systems-ibbcs;

“Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing,”

https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/statement-mutual-understanding-information-sharing/statement.html

(last updated Feb. 19, 2003); “Canada (13-1121)—Agreement for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information,” (Dec. 21, 2013),

https://www.state.gov/13-1121;

“Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Amending the agreement of April 18, 2013, as amended,” (Dec. 31, 2020),

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20-1231.3-Consular-Affairs-Visa-UK.pdf.

The DHS biometrics process for benefits adjudication purposes generally begins with the collection of an individual's biometrics at an authorized biometrics collection site, including DHS offices, ASCs, military installations, U.S. consular offices abroad, and, in some cases, Federal, State, and local law enforcement installations. Biometrics may also be collected digitally by an agency-approved technology. Domestically, DHS established a robust program to allow individuals to provide biometrics at ASC facilities, where individuals are generally scheduled to appear at a location close to their address of record. DHS has also established mobile biometrics collection capabilities domestically for certain limited scenarios (

e.g.,

those who are homebound or reside in certain remote locations). For collections outside the United States, biometrics may be handled differently. When biometrics are required by DHS and DHS does not have a presence in that country, the Department of State (DOS) will continue to collect biometrics on behalf of DHS. In cases where DOS will issue a boarding foil, immigrant visa, or non-immigrant visa associated with a DHS form, DOS will continue to collect biometrics under its existing authority.

Currently, USCIS biometrics consist of a photograph, fingerprints, and signature to conduct identity, eligibility, national security, and criminal history background checks, and in certain

situations, voluntary DNA testing to verify a claimed genetic relationship. For certain family-based benefit requests, where other evidence proves inconclusive, USCIS accepts, but does not require, DNA test results obtained from approved laboratories (along with other necessary identifiers, such as a name and date of birth), as evidence to assist in establishing the existence of genetic relationships. In these limited cases where DNA test results are voluntarily submitted, USCIS requires that DNA test results establish a sufficient probability of the existence of the alleged relationship to be accepted as evidence of that relationship.

DHS is bound by the confidentiality provisions of section 1367 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, “Penalties for disclosure of information” (originally enacted as section 384 of IIRIRA). Unless certain statutory exceptions apply (

e.g.,

the alien was convicted of a crime or crimes listed at INA 237(a)(2), etc.), all DHS officers and employees are generally prohibited from permitting use by or disclosure to anyone other than a sworn officer or employee of DHS, DOS, or DOJ of any information relating to a beneficiary of a pending or approved request for certain victim-based immigration benefits, such as an abused spouse waiver of the joint filing requirement to remove conditions on residence, a VAWA self-petition by an abused spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, VAWA cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation, or application or petition for T or U nonimmigrant status, including the fact that they have requested such a benefit. Importantly, the protection against disclosure extends to all records or other information, including those that do not specifically identify the individual as an applicant, petitioner, or beneficiary of the T visa, U visa, or VAWA protections, and only ends when the benefit request is denied and all opportunities for appeal of the denial have been exhausted. Therefore, the biometric collection contemplated here would also be protected from disclosure during that period in accordance with the requirements and exceptions found in 8 U.S.C. 1367. Thus, DHS has not separately codified the section 1367 protections in this proposed rule.

IV. Discussion of Proposed Changes

A. Use of Biometrics for Identity Management and Enhanced Vetting

DHS requires the submission of biometrics for certain immigration benefit requests

and for law enforcement purposes, including functions incident to apprehending, arresting, processing, and care and custody of aliens.

In addition, DHS has the authority to require biometrics and a biometric services fee from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or requestor, or individual filing a request on a case-by-case basis via individual notice. Notice of this requirement may also be made through law, regulation, form instructions or as provided in a

Federal Register

notice.

See

8 CFR 103.2(b)(9), 103.7(b)(1)(i)(C), and 103.17. Under this construct, although DHS has the authority to collect biometrics from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or requestor, or individual filing a request, biometrics are only mandatory for certain benefit requests. For all others, DHS must decide if the benefit requested, or circumstances of the request, justifies collection of biometrics and, if so, notify an individual that their biometrics are required along with when and where they will be collected.

See, e.g.,

8 CFR 204.310(b), 210.2(c)(2)(i), 210.5(b)(2), 212.7(e)(3)(ii), 214.2(w)(16), 245.15(g)(1), 245a.2(d), 245a.4(b)(4).

See e.g.,

8 CFR 236.5 (2025).

The primary purpose of this proposed rule is to flip the current construct from one where biometrics may be collected based on past practices, individual notice, regulations, or the form instructions for a particular benefit, to a system under which biometrics are required for any immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information unless DHS determines that biometrics are unnecessary for a specific population or benefit.

To this end, DHS is proposing to revise 8 CFR 103.16 to require that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, to include U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, and lawful permanent residents, and without regard to age, must submit biometrics, unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(1).

This proposed rule would also give DHS discretion to require any individual associated with such requests or collections of information to submit or update biometrics while the request is pending with DHS for adjudication.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(c)(1). DHS also proposes to establish standards related to scheduling, rescheduling, and failure to appear at biometrics appointments to better ensure that biometrics collections do not slow down USCIS' adjudication of benefits requests, other requests, and collections of information as discussed below in section IV.E of this preamble.

As explained more fully later in this preamble, DHS is not proposing that the requirement that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request or other request, U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents, and without regard to age, must appear for biometrics collection will apply to DNA.

DHS will make reasonable efforts that are consistent with the Government's need for biometrics in certain contexts and will comply with all requirements that are applicable under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Federal Rehabilitation Act.

As discussed further below, these proposed changes, if finalized, would increase DHS's ability to collect and use biometrics to establish and verify, with greater certainty, the identity of individuals requesting or associated with immigration-related benefits. DHS believes that the proposed changes, if finalized, would enhance DHS's ability to ensure that benefits are granted only to those who are eligible and to identify fraud, national security, and public safety risks during the benefits adjudication process, while also improving services to those who submit such benefit requests. USCIS' use of biometrics for criminal history background checks and document production is outdated.

As outlined above, DHS has broad statutory authority to administer and enforce immigration laws and adjudicate immigration-related benefits. This authority necessarily includes the use of tools, such as biometrics, needed to better verify identity and statutory eligibility, and to determine whether or not the individual poses a risk to national security or public safety in those instances where these factors may impact eligibility for an immigration benefit. Moreover, this proposed rule is intended to increase the collection and use of biometric information beyond benefits eligibility determinations. To this end, DHS proposes to expand the population of aliens who are subject to biometrics collection upon apprehension, arrest, or encounter by: (1) clarifying that DHS may require biometrics for all aliens subject to section 240 removal proceedings, as well as aliens processed through other removal pathways including expedited removal under section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, and aliens subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order under section 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231 and (2) removing age restrictions on biometrics as discussed further below in section IV.C.3 of this preamble.

See

proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

Biometrics collection upon apprehension, arrest, or encounter by

DHS will allow DHS in subsequent encounters or filings to accurately identify the individuals encountered, and can prove or disprove any claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship. This in turn will allow DHS to make better informed decisions as to the processing, transporting, and managing the custody of aliens subject to DHS's law enforcement authorities. Having more reliable data about the identities of aliens in DHS custody will increase the safety of DHS facilities in which aliens are held in custody for both DHS law enforcement officers and aliens. It would also eliminate an incentive that currently exists for unscrupulous aliens to jeopardize the health and safety of minors to whom they are unrelated, transporting the minors on a dangerous journey across the United States border, and claiming to be the parents of unrelated minors in order to claim to be a “family unit” and thus obtain a relatively quick release from DHS custody.

This rule also supports DHS's efforts to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting. Under this proposed rule, any alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information may be required to submit biometrics or undergo biometric-based screening and vetting unless and until they are granted U.S. citizenship.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(3), (c)(2). To further implement continuous vetting, the rule proposes to clarify that DHS may store biometrics (other than raw DNA) submitted by an individual in connection with an immigration-related benefits request or other collection of information and use or reuse biometrics to conduct background checks to verify continued eligibility for immigration and naturalization-related benefits and for administering and enforcing the immigration laws.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(1).

In sum, these proposed changes and others discussed throughout this preamble, are intended to enhance DHS's ability to collect and use biometrics throughout the immigration lifecycle,

i.e.,

the period between an alien's first benefit request, other request, or collection of information submission, encounter, or apprehension, through naturalization or removal.

However, DHS does not propose to impose an absolute biometrics collection requirement in all instances for all forms filed with the USCIS.

There may be circumstances where biometric collection would be unnecessary or duplicative. A particular application or petition (

e.g.,

an inadmissibility waiver request) may not require its own complete biometric collection when it is filed in conjunction with another benefit request, other request, or collection of information that already carries a biometrics collection requirement, and/or DHS determines it may reuse previously collected biometrics after a biometric-based verification. Under appropriate circumstances, DHS proposes to retain discretion to exempt certain forms from the complete biometric collection requirement because it would result in waste or redundancy to both the agency and the public. For example, when an alien files Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, biometrics are collected from all applicants. However, if the same applicant also files Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, due to an inadmissibility concern, that form is associated with the Form I-485. In most cases, there is no need to independently require complete biometrics collection in conjunction with Form I-601 because DHS is already collecting biometrics in association with Form I-485. Form I-601 would never be filed without an associated form carrying a biometrics collection requirement (

i.e.,

an immigrant visa application, adjustment of status application, certain non-immigrant visa applications, etc.). In instances such as this, DHS will simply reuse and associate the biometrics collected on the Form I-485 to the Form I-601. If the Form I-601 was not concurrently filed with the Form I-485, USCIS would first obtain a positive biometrics-based identity verification and a biographic data match to the previously submitted Form I-485 before associating different biometrics to the Form I-601. Identity verification based solely upon a comparison of the individual's name or other non-unique biographic identification characteristics or data, or combinations thereof, would never constitute positive identity verification for purposes of USCIS biometric reuse.

Only certain family-based or other benefit requests would be impacted by the proposed provision to allow, request, or require DNA evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex.

Further, DHS recognizes that there is no value in imposing a biometric collection for forms that are only filed in conjunction with other forms that already require biometrics collection. Consequently, the DHS forms that are being revised and posted in accordance with the PRA for public comments do not include an absolute requirement for biometrics collection. Instead, the revised form instructions put the individual on notice that (1) every applicant, petitioner, sponsor, supporter, derivative, dependent, and beneficiary of an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information submitted to DHS is required to provide biometrics unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement, and (2) that the individual will be notified of the time and place for the appointment. For most forms for which DHS proposes to mandate biometrics as proposed under this rule, DHS has incorporated any costs and fees associated with a biometric services appointment within the filing fee for the immigration benefit being sought.

See the PRA section of this rule for information on how to comment on the proposed form instructions for implementing the changes proposed in this rule.

See

8 CFR part 106.

1. Identity Management

DHS is proposing to use biometrics for identity management, during the entire course of the immigration lifecycle for several reasons. This will facilitate DHS's transition to a person-centric model for organizing and managing its records.

DHS plans to begin using biometrics to establish and manage unique identities as it organizes and verifies immigration records in a highly reliable, on-going, and continuous manner. Currently, USCIS relies on declared biographic data for identity management in the immigration lifecycle. Once an identity has been enrolled in IDENT

and established within DHS, future activities and encounters may be added to the original enrollment and will be confirmed through identity verification at various points in the immigration lifecycle. Biometric-based identity verification may be done outside of the United States (by DHS or DOS) or within the United States (at ASCs, USCIS offices, or as prescribed by DHS in accordance with law). Biometric-based identity verification also allows the reuse of enrolled identity data (both biometric and biographic) that has already been

vetted. Such reuse reduces the amount of erroneous or conflicting data that can be entered into systems and reduces the cost and complexity of repetitive collection and verification. After an identity has been biometrically verified, reusable fingerprints allow for more immediate and recurrent background checks, and reusable photographs allow for quick production of documents with high consistency and integrity.

See

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Person Centric Identity Services (PCIS) Initiative,” DHS Reference No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-087 (Dec. 7, 2022),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/privacy-pia-uscis-pia087-pcis-december2022.pdf.

See https://www.dhs.gov/exchanging-biometric-data

(last updated Apr. 4, 2025).

In this proposed rule, DHS recognizes that biometric reuse is acceptable only when there is a biometric-based identity verification.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(4). DHS has a duty to the public to ensure that immigration benefits are granted only to those who are eligible for them, to ensure that no benefit is provided to the wrong individual, and to verify that individuals entering the country are who they say they are.

See generally

INA sec. 103, 8 U.S.C. 1103 (charging DHS with the administration and enforcement of the INA). Further, DHS's responsibility is reinforced by E.O. 14161, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “determine the information needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA for one of its nationals, and to ascertain whether the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be and that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat.”

USCIS has allowed biometric reuse in specific situations including during the COVID-19 pandemic to address public health concerns.

See https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-to-continue-processing-applications-for-employment-authorization-extension-requests-despite

(last updated Mar. 30, 2020).

A biometrically-based, person-centric records model ensures that an individual's records are complete and pertain only to that individual. Under this model, DHS would be able to easily locate, maintain, and update the correct individual's information such as: results from national security and criminal history background checks, current address (physical and mailing), immigration status, or to associate previously submitted identity documentation, such as birth certificates and marriage licenses, in future adjudications thereby reducing duplicative biographic or other evidentiary collections.

Biometrics are unique to each individual and provide USCIS with tools for identity management, which is critical to better ensuring benefits are granted only to those who are eligible, while improving the services provided to those who submit immigration benefit requests. With regard to age, DHS proposes to reserve the authority to collect biometrics at any age to ensure the immigration records created for children can more assuredly be related to their subsequent adult records despite changes to their physical appearance and biographic information. USCIS notes that with respect to these biometrics, as with any other agency decision subject to 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16), if a decision will be adverse to an applicant, petitioner, or requestor, and is based on unclassified derogatory information the agency considered, he or she shall be advised of that fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information.

Another key driver for eliminating the age restrictions for biometric collection is the number of UAC and accompanied alien children (AAC) that have been intercepted at the border in recent years. The DHS proposal to remove age restrictions will help combat human trafficking, specifically human trafficking of children, including the trafficking and exploitation of children forced to accompany adults traveling to the United States with the goal of avoiding detention and exploiting immigration laws.

Beginning in May 2019, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and CBP conducted a pilot program where, with consent from aliens presenting themselves as family units, officers used Rapid DNA

testing technologies as a precise and focused investigative tool to identify suspected fraudulent families and vulnerable children who may be potentially exploited. Between June 2019 and September 2021, ICE HSI and CBP completed 3,516 Rapid DNA tests in instances where a parent-child relationship was suspect. Of those tested, 300 instances resulted in a negative finding, counter to the claimed parent-child relationship and indicating possible fraud (8.5 percent). The pilot program was concluded in May 2021 due to decreased testing attributable to Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic-related travel restrictions, among other considerations.

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Rapid DNA Operational Use,” DHS/ICE/PIA-050 (June 25, 2019),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-ice-rapiddna-june2019_3.pdf.

Office of Inspector General, DHS, “CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships,” OIG-22-27 (Feb. 8, 2022),

https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2022-02/OIG-22-27-Feb22.pdf.

Collecting biometrics on children that DHS encounters would assist in enabling definitive identification of them and may show that they have been reported missing. Generally, DHS plans to use the biometric information collected from children for identity management in the immigration lifecycle only, but will retain the authority for other uses in its discretion, such as background checks and for law enforcement purposes. DHS components have different statutory authorities and mission spaces; while ICE or CBP may elect to submit UAC or AAC collected biometrics to the FBI for criminal history background checks, USCIS would not routinely do so. Rather, for USCIS the biometrics collected from the majority of these children would be stored in IDENT

to help DHS with future encounters. USCIS is authorized to share relevant information with law enforcement or other DHS components, including “biometrics” for identity verification and, consequently, it may share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, with other agencies as it does other record information pursuant to existing law.

IDENT is the DHS enterprise repository for biometrics and provides biometric identification management services to DHS Components with technology for matching, storing, and sharing biometric data. DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) is the lead designated provider of biometric identity services for DHS and maintains the largest biometric repository in the U.S. government.

See https://www.dhs.gov/obim

(last updated Dec. 10, 2024).

DHS will have the express authority to send UAC or AAC biometrics to the FBI for criminal history background checks, but depending on the DHS component encountering the subject may only send biometrics to the FBI if DHS has some articulable derogatory information on the subject and needs to confirm criminal history or an association with other illegal or terrorist organizations in the interests of public safety and national security. Biometrics collected to identify or refute claimed or unclaimed genetic relationships at the border would be maintained in law enforcement systems for future identity verification, subject to the restrictions found in proposed 8 CFR 103.16.

2. Enhanced and Continuous Vetting

Individuals with certain types of criminal convictions, or those who present a threat to national security or public safety are not eligible for certain benefits. Benefit eligibility determinations in these cases often focus on the criminal, national security, and immigration history of the individual. The immigration history review considers the individual's current immigration status, past immigration filings, and whether previous benefits were granted or

denied. DHS conducts national security and criminal history background checks on individuals applying for or seeking an immigration benefit because U.S. immigration laws preclude DHS from granting many immigration and naturalization benefits to individuals with certain criminal or administrative violations, or with certain disqualifying characteristics (

e.g.,

lack of good moral character, certain communicable diseases, or association with terrorist organizations), while also providing DHS discretion in granting an immigration benefit in many instances.

See, e.g.,

INA sec. 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A) (mandatory bars to asylum); INA sec. 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2) (admissibility requirements for adjustment of status applicants and agency discretion); and INA sec. 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3) (good moral character requirement for naturalization).

This proposed rule would enhance DHS's ability to collect and use biometrics throughout the immigration lifecycle, from first benefit request, encounter, or apprehension to naturalization or removal. In the enforcement context, biometric collection when an individual is first encountered can establish an identity that can be relied upon in future encounters and interactions with the Federal government, help officers identify individuals in subsequent encounters, detect fraudulent identities, and confirm relationships between adults and children. Establishing and being able to match and confirm identities through biometric collection helps in the identification of scenarios and encounters involving child smuggling, trafficking, and exploitation. It can also help identify when an adult who has been previously encountered is posing as a child. Collection of biometrics during removal proceedings is primarily to verify that the individual is the correct individual being removed.

As part of the adjudication process for immigration benefits, DHS requires robust processes and procedures to administer the collection and use of biometrics from foreign nationals who enter the United States to ensure, as directed by the President, “that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists and other threats to our national security.”

See

E.O. 14161 sec. 1, 90 FR 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025). To accomplish this the President has directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to “vet and screen to the maximum degree possible all aliens who intend to be admitted, enter, or are already inside the United States, particularly those aliens coming from regions or nations with identified security risks.”

Id.

at sec. 2. The President also directed the Secretary to “take all appropriate action to use any available technologies and procedures to determine the validity of any claimed familial relationship between aliens encountered or apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security”

See

E.O. 14165 sec. 9, 90 FR 8467, 8468 (Jan. 20, 2025).

The changes proposed in this rule would assist DHS in developing appropriate means for ensuring the proper collection of all information necessary for a rigorous evaluation of any grounds of inadmissibility or grounds for the denial of an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information. Notably, expanding biometrics collection will provide DHS with more comprehensive biometric-based information, including criminal and immigration history information that may be missed if biometrics submission is only required from a limited population and in a less expansive way than proposed by this rule. For example, enhanced biometric submission may reveal a history of crimes involving moral turpitude, activities related to terrorism, fraud or misrepresentation, or derogatory immigration history such as illegal entries and immigration violations.

There are documented instances where biographical information was provided to USCIS, and relied upon in an adjudication, and subsequent biometric-based screening and vetting revealed additional derogatory information.

The rule proposes to broaden the population required to submit biometrics, expands biometric modalities and enhances subject identification and the detection of possible threats to national security and public safety. Collectively, information obtained via biometric submission per this proposed rule will improve national security and public safety while ensuring that only eligible individuals are granted immigration benefits and are permitted to maintain a previously granted benefit.

See generally

INA sec. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182, Grounds of Inadmissibility.

See, e.g., “

Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-17-111 (Sept. 2017); “Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-16-130 (Sept. 2016); “Review of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Alien Security Checks, Department of Homeland Security,” Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-06-06 (Nov. 2005).

DHS plans to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting during the entirety of the immigration lifecycle. Under continuous vetting, DHS may require aliens to be subject to continued and subsequent evaluation of eligibility for their immigration benefits to ensure they continue to present no risk of causing harm subsequent to their entry and are maintaining and complying with any terms of admission or conditions required of their nonimmigrant or immigrant status. This rule proposes that any individual alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information may be required to submit biometrics or undergo biometric-based screening and vetting unless and until they are granted U.S. citizenship.

DHS also proposes, at its discretion and in conformance with the requirements articulated in this NPRM, to reuse previously submitted biometrics in certain circumstances to perform continuous vetting if DHS is able to obtain a positive biometrics based identity verification based on the individual's stored biometrics.

See

proposed 103.16(a)(4), (d)(1). DHS does not anticipate the implementation of continuous vetting to have an adverse effect on DHS's ability to timely adjudicate its pending benefit requests, or other requests or collections of information as the individuals subject to continuous vetting will have previously submitted biometrics that USCIS may reuse at its discretion after a biometric based identity verification.

The rule further proposes that a U.S. citizen, U.S. national, or lawful permanent resident may be required to submit biometrics if he or she filed an immigration-related application, petition, or request in the past, and it was either reopened or the previous approval is relevant to the benefit request, other request, or collection of information pending with USCIS.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(c)(2). For example, if an alien lost an approval notice from a previously approved visa petition, he or she would have to file a Form I-824,

Application for Action on an Approved Application or Petition.

Biometrics

would be necessary to better verify the identity of the individual filing the Form I-824. In another example, if a United States citizen petitioner had a previously approved visa petition for a spouse and DHS discovered the potential existence of a “specified offense against a minor” it could result in a revocation of the approved visa petition—even where the conviction occurred prior to the visa petition approval or the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act.

For any such case, DHS would begin by requesting biometrics for the United States citizen petitioner in order to confirm the existence of any potentially disqualifying criminal history information.

See

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for Continuous Immigration Vetting,” DHS/USCIS/PIA-076 (Feb. 14, 2019),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pia-uscis-fdnsciv-february2019_0.pdf.

Id.

See Matter of Jackson and Erandio,

26 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 2014).

DHS welcomes public comment on the increased use of biometrics beyond criminal history background checks, to include identity management in the immigration lifecycle and enhanced vetting or other purposes, as well as any relevant data, information, or proposals.

B. Verify Identity, Familial Relationships, and Preclude Imposters

1. Use of DNA Evidence

The DNA Fingerprint Act authorizes the Attorney General to collect DNA from individuals arrested, facing charges, convicted, or from non-U.S. persons who are detained under the authority of the United States. 34 U.S.C. 40702. The implementing DOJ regulations require any agency of the United States that arrests or detains individuals or supervises individuals facing charges to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, and from non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United States. 28 CFR 28.12(b). DHS notes that the DNA collection requirements of 34 U.S.C. 40702 and 28 CFR part 28, subpart B are for law enforcement identification purposes, whereas this rule proposes to establish the authority for the use of DNA to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationships in the adjudication of immigration benefit requests.

U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, and lawful permanent residents petitioning for a family member, or individuals seeking to include a family member as a dependent or derivative (accompanying or follow-to-join) in an application for an immigration benefit, must demonstrate the existence of claimed genetic relationship or legal relationship in the case of gestational parentage. Current regulations generally require documentary evidence such as marriage and birth certificates as primary evidence of such a claimed relationship.

In the absence of primary evidence, acceptable secondary evidence includes medical records, school records, religious documents, and affidavits.

See, e.g.,

8 CFR 204.2(d)(2). However, documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, and individuals need additional means to establish claimed genetic relationships, in cases where a genetic relationship is claimed, to avoid denial of a benefit request, other request, or collection of information. USCIS currently accepts DNA test results from laboratories accredited by the AABB (formerly the American Association of Blood Banks) as proof of the existence of a claimed genetic relationship where other evidence is unavailable.

See, e.g.,

8 CFR 103.2(b)(2)(i), 204.2(c)(2)(ii), (d)(2)(i) through (iii), (d)(5)(ii), (f)(2)(i) through (iii), (g)(2)(i) through (iii), 207.7(e), 208.21(f), 245.11(b), 245.15(l)(2), and 254.24(h)(1)(iii).

Although most of the collection of DNA samples is performed by the AABB-accredited laboratory conducting the testing, for individuals residing overseas, DHS or the Department of State facilitate collection and transmission of the DNA sample to the laboratory to ensure regularity in the collection and proper chain of custody of the DNA sample.

DHS proposes to revise its regulations to provide that DNA genetic testing can be required, requested, or accepted as evidence, either primary or secondary, to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship where necessary.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2). DNA is the only biometric that can verify a genetic relationship. Current regulations allow USCIS to require Blood Group Antigen or Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tests to prove parentage only after other forms of evidence were inconclusive.

See

8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi). But those tests are no longer widely available and are not as reliable as a DNA test because, while blood-typing can be used as proof that an individual is not a child's biological parent, it cannot be used to

confirm

the individual

the child's parent.

According to the AABB, DNA testing provides the most reliable scientific test available to resolve a genetic relationship and replaced older serological testing such as blood typing and serological HLA typing.

Blood tests are also more invasive than DNA tests, as DNA collection generally does not require blood to be drawn from any individuals tested, and the most common method is a noninvasive buccal (mouth) swab.

This includes requiring, requesting, or accepting DNA testing to establish a genetic relationship with a birth parent in the context of a petition to classify a beneficiary as an orphan under INA sec. 101(b)(1)(F) or as a Convention adoptee under INA sec. 101(b)(1)(G).

Gunther Geserick & Ingo Wirth, “Genetic Kinship Investigation from Blood Groups to DNA Markers,” Transfus Med Hemother 39(3):163-75 (May 11, 2012),

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3375130/.

AABB, “Standards for Relationship Testing Laboratories,” Appendix 9 Immigration Testing, 16th ed (Jan. 1, 2024).

DHS proposes to define the term “DNA” in regulation as “deoxyribonucleic acid, which carries the genetic instructions used in the growth, development, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms.”

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2. When DHS uses the term “DNA” in this rule it is a reference to the raw genetic material, typically saliva, collected via buccal swab from an individual in order to facilitate DNA testing to prove or disprove genetic relationships or biological sex.

DHS will only require, request, or accept DNA testing to prove or disprove a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship or to confirm biological sex. DHS will only store or share raw DNA or biological samples to facilitate DNA testing (by using a DHS or DHS-authorized facility, an on-site automated machine, or transmitting to the AABB-accredited laboratory conducting the testing), unless DHS is required to share by law.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2).

https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data

(last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

For DHS, there are two different means of testing the raw DNA to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship. After DNA samples are collected, an individual's raw DNA material will be tested at a DHS facility or DHS authorized facility (locally by an automated machine (

i.e.,

Rapid DNA)

or mailed to a traditional AABB-accredited laboratory for testing). This testing allows for the comparison of partial DNA profiles to determine the statistical probability that the individuals tested have or do not have a genetic relationship. In either case, a partial DNA profile would be produced as a result of the test. When DHS uses the term “partial DNA profile” it is a reference to a visual or printed partial representation of a small portion of an individual's particular DNA characteristics.

An individual's partial DNA profile is a biometric identifier as unique as their fingerprints. Significantly, when an individual's DNA is tested in order to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship, the test

does not reveal medical or hereditary conditions.

The particular genetic markers profiled for relationship testing are markers specifically used to illustrate the existence of a genetic relationship. More specifically, the partial DNA profile created for relationship testing is a very small portion of an individual's full DNA characteristics. At present, DHS relationship tests profile between 16 and 24 genetic markers out of the nearly 2 million genetic markers typically contained in human DNA. In contrast with raw DNA or biological samples, which will not be shared or stored under any circumstances unless required to share by law, DHS may store or share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, with other law enforcement agencies to the extent permitted by and necessary to enforce and administer the immigration and naturalization laws.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2). For example, if a claimed genetic relationship is fraudulent and USCIS denies a petition, the DNA test results would be retained in the alien's A-file, the same as a rap sheet or a birth certificate; and if that alien is placed in removal proceedings EOIR would need to review the basis for the denial and any finding of fraud.

The DHS Science and Technology Directorate has been working in conjunction with DoD and DOJ to fund the development of cost-effective Rapid DNA equipment to allow non-technical users with appropriate training to analyze the DNA of individuals in a field setting and receive reliable results in about one hour.

https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data

(last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

Id.

The testing entity conducts the DNA test, either automatically by machine or in a traditional laboratory environment and generates a DNA test result. The term “DNA test result” is a reference to the ultimate scientific conclusion made by DHS or DHS authorized AABB-accredited testing entity as to the claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or determination of biological sex.

The DNA test result is represented by a probability or percentage of the likelihood of the existence of the genetic relationship as a result of comparing at least two partial DNA profiles. DHS has established by policy what minimum threshold probability for the relationship that it would accept in proving or disproving the existence of a genetic relationship, depending on the particular relationship in question (

i.e.,

parent, full-sibling, half-sibling, etc.).

DNA test results which include a partial DNA profile, where they indicate a sufficient probability of the existence of the relationship tested, are now accepted as evidence to establish parent and sibling genetic relationships.

See Matter of Ruzku,

26 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2016).

Id.

See

USCIS, DHS, “DNA Evidence of Sibling Relationships,” PM 602.0106.1, (April 17, 2018) (establishing the threshold probabilities for full and half sibling relationships); USCIS, DHS, “Genetic Relationship Testing; Suggesting DNA Tests Revisions to the Adjudicators Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21 (AFM Update AD07-25),” (Mar. 19, 2008) (establishing voluntary or suggested nature of DNA testing to verify claimed relationships and citing AABB testing standards); DOS, “Foreign Affairs Manual,” 9 FAM 601.11-1(A)(a)(2), CT: VISA-1276 (May 12, 2021) (stating that DNA “test results reporting a 99.5 percent or greater degree of certainty” may be accepted by consular officers as “sufficient to support a biological relationship between a parent and child in visa cases”);

See also

DOJ, “Matter of Nejat Ibrahim RUZKU, Beneficiary of a visa petition filed by Abdalla Ibrahim Ruzku, Petitioner,” 26 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2016) (Mar. 29, 2016) (holding direct sibling-to-sibling DNA test results reflecting a 99.5 percent degree of certainty or higher that a full sibling biological relationship exists should be accepted and considered to be evidence of the relationship).

This rule further proposes to grant DHS express authority to require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits, or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(1) and (d)(2)(i)(A), (B). It is in DHS' and the public's interests to protect the integrity of the immigration system and ensure that any individual who receives an immigration benefit is eligible for that benefit. The use of DNA as evidence to support eligibility, where applicable, may assist in the adjudication of certain benefit requests, other requests or collection of information where documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable. For example, DHS currently does not have regulatory provisions in place to require DNA testing results to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex as it pertains to eligibility for a non-immigrant visa under INA sec. 101(a)(15)(P)(i)(a), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(P)(i)(a), for certain athletes coming to the United States to compete in a sporting event and when documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable.

In some situations, individuals are allowed to voluntarily submit DNA test results. Under this proposed rule, DHS may expressly require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test (to include a partial DNA profile) to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex in instances where that determination will impact benefit eligibility.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2)(i) and (ii). DHS proposes to collect, treat and locate raw DNA (the physical sample taken from the applicable individual), at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility. DHS will not handle or share any raw DNA for any reason beyond the original purpose of submission (

e.g.,

to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex), unless DHS is required to share by law. DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, become part of the record, and DHS will store and share DNA test results, for adjudication purposes, including to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws, to the extent permitted by law.

See

E.O. 14201,

Keeping Men Out of Women's Sports,

section 1, 90 FR 9279 (Feb. 5, 2025).

Consistent with current practice, the DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, obtained by DHS and showing the ultimate probability of relationship or biological sex, would be retained in the individual's Alien file (A-file) and made part of the record. Under this proposed rule, if finalized, DHS may use and store DNA test results as necessary to administer and enforce the immigration and naturalization laws, and share said DNA results with other law enforcement agencies to the extent permitted by law.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2)(iii).

Currently, DHS allows individuals in certain situations to voluntarily submit DNA test results from AABB-accredited laboratories

where other documentary evidence is inconclusive or unavailable.

This rule proposes to clarify and codify that DHS may require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to an immigration-related benefit request, other request, or collection of information as evidence of a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex. It also proposes to clarify that DHS may consider DNA test results in adjudicating certain immigration benefits as a means of proving or disproving a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship, biological sex or to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. And the rule proposes to clarify DHS's authority to collect raw DNA from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, and

either perform a DNA test at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility or send the raw DNA to a traditional AABB-accredited lab. DHS requests comments on all aspects of this proposal, including the collection, use, and retention of DNA evidence.

See https://www.aabb.org/home

(last visited Apr. 3, 2025).

See

USCIS, DHS, “Genetic Relationship Testing; Suggesting DNA Tests Revisions to the Adjudicators Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21 (AFM Update AD07-25),” (Mar. 19, 2008) (establishing voluntary or suggested nature of DNA testing to verify claimed relationships and citing AABB testing standards).

2. Special Treatment of DNA Evidence

While DNA is fundamentally a biometric identifier, DHS recognizes the increased sensitivity surrounding the use of genetic information. DHS believes the other biometric modalities that will be collected are sufficient for most of the goals of this rule.

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2 (definition of biometrics); proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a) (biometric collection). Therefore, DHS proposes to treat raw DNA as a biometric modality distinct from the other biometric modalities it is authorized to collect.

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2 (definition of DNA); proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2). For purposes of DNA collected under this rule, DHS proposes that it will not handle or share any raw DNA for any reason beyond the original purpose of submission (

i.e.,

to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex), unless DHS is required to share by law. DHS would only store, use, and share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile derived from the raw DNA,

as provided by the testing entity or as produced by DHS, for adjudication purposes and would retain the results to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws, to the extent permitted by law. DHS would also only use the raw DNA and DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, for the original purpose of submission (

i.e.,

to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or an individual's biological sex) or as authorized by the immigration and naturalization laws. DHS components are authorized to share relevant information with law enforcement or other DHS components and, consequently, it may share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, with other agencies when there are national security, public safety, fraud, or other investigative needs, but always pursuant to existing law.

See

proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d). DHS especially welcomes comments on these proposed provisions.

https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data

(last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

3. Identity Management

DHS must ensure that immigration benefits are not fraudulently obtained and are granted to the rightful person, and that individuals entering the country are who they say they are. As part of the benefit adjudications process, USCIS must verify the identity of an individual applying for or seeking any benefit to protect against fraud and imposters. In all circumstances, DHS must identify persons using aliases after prior immigration encounters and assist in efforts to prevent human smuggling and trafficking. Currently DHS relies mainly on paper-based documentary evidence when evaluating or verifying identity in administering its programs. Unfortunately, there is no guaranteed way to prevent the manufacturing, counterfeiting, alteration, sale, and use of fraudulent identity documents or other fraudulent documents to circumvent immigration laws or for identity theft. On the other hand, biometric identifiers are not transferable and may provide confirmation or non-confirmation of an individual's claimed identity. Therefore, DHS believes that the best approach to address the vulnerabilities in the immigration process, preclude imposters, and deter fraud would be to rely more on biometrics for identity management in the immigration lifecycle.

C. Flexibility in Biometrics Requirements

1. Definition of Biometrics

In recent years, government agencies have grouped together identifying features and actions, such as fingerprints, photographs, and signatures under the broad term, biometrics.

The terms biometric “information,” “identifiers,” or “data” are used to refer to all of these features, including additional features such as ocular image (iris, retina and sclera), palm print, DNA, and voice print.

For example, authorities such as 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7)(B) and 17 CFR 162.30(b)(8) refer to identifying information, including “unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print or iris image, or other unique physical representation.” The term “biometrics” is also used in other laws and regulations.

See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7)(B), 17 CFR 162.30(b)(8)(ii), 21 CFR 11.3(b)(3), and 27 CFR 73.3. As a result, DHS has adopted the practice of referring to fingerprints and photographs collectively as “biometrics,” “biometric information,” or “biometric services.”

See

FBI, “Next Generation Identification (NGI),”

https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi

(last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

See

FBI, “Biometrics and Fingerprints,”

https://le.fbi.gov/science-and-lab/biometrics-and-fingerprints

(last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

For example, the instructions for Form I-90, Application to Replace Permanent Resident Card, refer to a “biometric services appointment,” while the Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, refers to “biometrics, including fingerprints and photographs.” Many forms also include a signature as a type of biometric identifier.

See

instructions for Form I-485 which references providing “biometrics” which is described as “fingerprints, photograph, and/or signature.” Most laws on the subject do not specify individual biometric modalities such as ocular image (iris, retina and sclera), palm print, voice print, DNA, and/or any other biometric modalities that may be collected from an individual in the future.

See, e.g.,

8 U.S.C. 1732(b)(1) (requiring the issuance of travel documents that use biometric identifiers recognized by international standards organizations). By proposing to update the terminology in the regulations to uniformly use the term “biometrics” DHS seeks to utilize a single, inclusive term comprehensively throughout regulations and form instructions.

DHS proposes to define the term “biometrics” to clarify and expand its regulatory authority to collect more than just fingerprints while administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization benefits or other services or perform any other function necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. To do this, DHS proposes to expressly define “biometrics” to mean “the measurable biological (anatomical, physiological and molecular structure) or behavioral characteristics of an individual.”

See

proposed definition of

Biometrics

in 8 CFR 1.2. Further, DHS proposes the following biometrics as authorized biometric modalities that may be requested or required from individuals in connection with the administration and enforcement of immigration and naturalization laws:

• Facial imagery (digital image, specifically for facial recognition and facial comparison);

• Prints (including fingerprints and palm prints);

• Signature (handwritten);

• Ocular imagery (to include iris, retina, and sclera);

• Voice (voice print, vocal signature, and voice recognition); and/or

• DNA (including partial DNA profile).

The term “biometric modality” is used to describe a type or class of a biometric. The collection of a biometric implies its use in a system used to identify an individual; hence the use of the term “modality.” “Modality” is often interchanged, or used in conjunction, with the term “biometric” because the collection of a biometric implies automation. For example, an individual's face is a biometric, but DHS intends to collect a digital image of an individual's face, making a facial digital image the modality. Similarly, ocular imagery is a biometric, but DHS intends to collect an image of an individual's iris, retina or sclera, making the iris, retina or sclera image the “modality.” An individual's voice is a “biometric,” but DHS intends to collect an audible recording of an individual's voice, making a voice print the “modality.” Finally, an individual's raw DNA is a “biometric,” but upon testing, the partial DNA profile becomes the “modality” and the DNA test result is the memorialization or evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship or an individual's biological sex, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits, or perform any other function necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. DHS will collect a photograph (facial image), fingerprint, palm print, audible recording, DNA, etc., for use in facial recognition, fingerprint and palm print recognition, ocular image recognition, voice recognition, DNA testing, etc.

The proposed definition of biometrics would codify and authorize the collection of specific biometric modalities and the use of biometrics for: identity enrollment, verification, and management in the immigration lifecycle; national security and criminal history background checks; determinations of eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits; and the production of secure identity documents.

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2. DNA, while a biometric, would be collected by USCIS in limited circumstances to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship, or biological sex and to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. Such examples include instances to verify a genetic relationship between a claimed biological parent and biological child or to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex in instances where that determination will impact benefit eligibility. Additionally, DNA evidence could be used to identify fraud in instances where DHS establishes the likelihood of a genetic relationship that invalidates eligibility for the benefit sought, such as the discovery of a parent-child or sibling relationship affiliated with a fraudulent claim of a marital relationship.

See

proposed 8 CFR 1.2 and 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2).

2. Additional Modalities

In addition to the current use of fingerprints

and photographs

(facial images) as biometric modalities, DHS proposes to begin requesting biometric collection (now and through emerging technologies) with the following additional biometric modalities: ocular (iris, retina, and sclera), palm print, voice, and DNA.

See

proposed Definition of

Biometrics

in 8 CFR 1.2. The technology for collecting and using biometrics has undergone constant and rapid change.

DHS needs to keep up with technological developments that will be used by the FBI and agencies with which we will be sharing and comparing biometrics and adjust collection and retention practices for both convenience and security, and to ensure the maximum level of service for all stakeholders. USCIS also has internal procedural safeguards to ensure technology used to collect, assess, and store the differing modalities is accurate, reliable, and valid. Additionally, as with any other USCIS petition or application, if a decision will be adverse to an applicant or petitioner and is based on unclassified derogatory information the agency considered, he or she shall be advised of that fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information per current 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16). Therefore, DHS proposes that, as of the effective date of this rule, if finalized, it may begin collecting new biometrics modalities as follows.

Currently USCIS does not routinely use signatures for identity verification purposes other than for document production and visual verification.

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Customer Profile Management System,” DHS Reference No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-060(d) (Sept. 27, 2024)

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/24_0930_priv_pia-dhs-uscis-cpms-060d.pdf.

While DNA is included in the list of additional modalities, USCIS is addressing DNA as a distinct modality and discusses DNA separately.

FBI, “Science and Technology,”

https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-investigate/science-and-technology

(last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

a. Ocular Image

DHS proposes to collect and use ocular images as a biometric modality. The term ocular image refers to the eye and the structures within the eye to include the iris, retina and sclera. Ocular structure as a biometric modality is a valuable identifier especially for individuals whose fingerprints are unclassifiable or unattainable through loss of fingers, hand amputation, normal wear in the ridges and patterns over time (

e.g.,

due to age, types of employment, etc.), or deliberate eradication/distortion of fingerprint ridges to avoid identification and detection. Ocular scanning biometric technology measures the unique characteristics and patterns within the iris,

retina and sclera to verify and authenticate identity. Biometric ocular recognition is fast, accurate, and offers a form of identification verification that requires no physical contact to collect. DHS may collect ocular images as part of the biometric enrollment process to enroll and verify identity against IDENT, as well as to assist in the adjudication process by verifying against previous immigration encounters.

See

DHS, “Biometric Technology Report,” (Dec. 26, 2024)

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1230_st_13e-Final-Report-2024-12-26.pdf.

b. Palm Print

DHS proposes to add palm prints as a biometrics modality in this rule. This proposal is consistent with what the FBI has announced as part of its NGI initiative for the development of the requirements for and deployment of an integrated National Palm Print Service.

Law enforcement agencies indicate that at least 30 percent of the prints lifted from crime scenes—from knife hilts, gun grips, steering wheels, and window panes—are of palms, not fingers. For this reason, capturing and scanning latent palm prints is becoming an area of increasing interest among the law enforcement community. The National Palm Print Service

is being

developed to improve law enforcement's ability to exchange a more complete set of biometric information, make additional identifications, and improve the overall accuracy of identification through criminal history records. Collecting palm prints would permit DHS to align our background checks capability with the total available records at the FBI's CJIS Division, keep current with the changing records of law enforcement, and make sure immigration benefit background checks are as accurate and complete as possible. Therefore, DHS proposes to reserve the authority to incorporate palm prints into its biometrics collection.

See

Subcommittee on Biometrics, Committee on Homeland and National Security, Committee on Technology, National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of the President, “Palm Print Recognition,”

https://ucr.fbi.gov/fingerprints_biometrics/biometric-center-of-excellence/files/palm-print-recognition.pdf

(last visited Apr. 11, 2025). For a basic explanation of NGI,

see https://le.fbi.gov/science-and-lab/biometrics-and-fingerprints/biometrics/next-generation-identification-ngi

(last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

CJIS Division, FBI, “National Palm Print System, Repository Available for Law Enforcement Access,” (Apr. 30, 2019)

https://le.fbi.gov/cjis-division/cjis-link/national-palm-print-system

(last accessed June 10, 2025).

c. Facial Image

DHS proposes to expand the use of facial photographs to reduce the burden of visiting an ASC for individuals previously biometrically enrolled by USCIS. For example, 1:1 facial biometric verification can be used in determining whether an applicant is who he or she is claiming to be and allows the reuse of previously collected fingerprints. Facial recognition can also be used to verify an identity if fingerprints are unobtainable subsequent to the initial biometric enrollment at an ASC. DHS would also use facial images and facial recognition technology for fraud, public safety or criminal history background checks, and national security screening and vetting. Facial photographs, as a biometric modality, are already collected by DHS for purposes such as secure document production and in some instances may be used to compare an individual to a claimed identity. DHS has collected facial photographs both manually and digitally for some time, such as for identity verification at ports of entry. DHS is proposing to increase the authorized use of previously collected biometrics, (such as facial photographs or fingerprints), but only after a biometric-based identity verification. DHS proposes to expand the use of facial recognition systems for those biometric-based identity verifications.

See

DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Customer Profile Management System,” (Sept. 27, 2024)

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/24_0930_priv_pia-dhs-uscis-cpms-060d.pdf.

d. Voice Print

DHS proposes to collect and use voice print as a biometric modality. DHS can use voice as a biometric in several ways to improve identity verification in several business processes. First, when immigration benefit requests are submitted electronically, an individual's voice print can be used to indicate that the individual who submitted the application is the same person who subsequently returns to access or change information.

Second, an individual's voice print can be used for integration into the call center process to accomplish faster, automated identification. Collecting and using an individual's voice print may reduce concerns about the caller's identity. With simpler identification and less effort, individuals will be able to call for assistance or inquire about the status of a pending immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information more effectively. The current identity verification process is typically more time-consuming than voice; in fiscal year 2023, USCIS contact centers received 14 million calls for assistance from the public.

This equates to an average of 53,846 calls to USCIS contact centers each day.

The use of a voice biometric holds the promise of significantly reducing the time to verify a person's identity. Voice biometrics can be passive, where the user can say anything and a match is made from the voice to a voiceprint, or it can be active, where the caller is asked to recite a previously captured passphrase. In either option, the process is a natural, effortless way to identify the caller.

Annual Statistics Report: FY2023, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (2024),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/fy2023_annual_statistical_report.pdf

(last accessed June 1, 2025).

Calculation: 14,000,000 annual calls received/approximately 260 operational working days in a year = 53,846 calls received per operational working day (rounded).

Third, voice ver

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