Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations

Federal RegisterAug 7, 2025

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 36, 43, 45, 48, 89, 91, 107, 108, 119, 133, 135, 137, and 146

[Docket No. FAA-2025-1908; Notice No. 25-07]

RIN 2120-AL82

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Parts 1540 and 1544

RIN 1652-AA80

Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations

AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)

SUMMARY:

This action proposes performance-based regulations to enable the design and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) at low altitudes beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and for third-party services, including UAS Traffic Management (UTM), that support these operations. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 directs the development of this proposed rule. This proposed rule is necessary to support the integration of UAS into the national airspace system (NAS). This proposed rule is intended to provide a predictable and clear pathway for safe, routine, and scalable UAS operations that include package delivery, agriculture, aerial surveying, civic interest, operations training, demonstration, recreation, and flight testing. TSA proposes to make complementary changes to its regulations to ensure it can continue to impose security measures on these operations under its current regulatory structure for civil aviation.

DATES:

Send comments on or before October 6, 2025.

ADDRESSES:

Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2025-1908 using any of the following methods:

•

Federal eRulemaking Portal:

Go to

https://www.regulations.gov/

and follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

•

Mail:

Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

•

Hand Delivery or Courier:

Take comments to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

•

Fax:

Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.

Docket:

Background documents or comments received may be read at

https://www.regulations.gov/

at any time. Follow the online instructions for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michelle Ferritto, ARM-100, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20592; Phone: Phone: 844 359-6982; Email:

9-FAA-UAS-BVLOS-Rule@faa.gov

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AAM—Advanced Air Mobility

AC—Advisory Circular

ACAS—Airborne Collision Avoidance System

ADS—B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

AE—Associated Elements

AGL—Above Ground Level

API—Application Programming Interface

ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee

ASOS—Automated Surface Observing System

ASRS—Aviation Safety Reporting System

ATC—Air Traffic Control

ATM—Air Traffic Management

AWOS—Automated Weather Observing System

BVLOS—Beyond Visual Line of Sight

C2—Command-and-Control

CBI—Confidential Business Information

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations

CMSA—Conformance Monitoring for Situational Awareness

COA—Certificate of Waiver or Authorization

COMAT—Company Materials

ConOps—Concept of Operations

COS—Continued Operational Safety

DAA—Detect and Avoid

DOC—Declaration of Compliance

DOT—Department of Transportation

DSS—Discover and Synchronization Service

EASA—European Union Aviation Safety Agency

EC—Electronic Conspicuity

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

FRIA—FAA-Recognized Identification Areas

FSDO—Flight Standards District Office

GA—General Aviation

GCS—Ground Control Station

GPS—Global Positioning Systems

HAZMAT—Hazardous Materials

HIRF—High Intensity Radiated Field

HME—Hazardous Materials Endorsement

HMR—Hazardous Materials Regulations

IBR—Incorporation by Reference

ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization

IRFA—Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

IUEI—Intentional Unauthorized Electronic Interaction

JARUS—Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems

LAANC—Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability

MAIS—Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale

METAR—Meteorological Aerodrome Report

MIT/LL—Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory

MOA—Memorandum of Agreement

MOC—Means of Compliance

MOPS—Minimum Operational Performance Standards

MOSAIC—Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification

NAICS—North American Industry Classification System

NAS—National Airspace System

NASA—National Aeronautics and Space Administration

nm—Nautical Miles

NOTAM—Notice to Airmen

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board

NWS—National Weather Service

OMB—Office of Management and Budget

OpSpecs—Operation Specifications

OST—Office of the Secretary of Transportation

PAO—Public Aircraft Operation

PHMSA—Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

PNT—Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

POI—Principal Operations Inspector

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act

RPA—Rule of Particular Applicability

SAC—Special Airworthiness Certificate

SARPS—Standards and Recommended Practices

SBA—Small Business Administration

SDSP—Supplemental Data Service Provider

SMS—Safety Management System

SOH—State of Health

SORA—Specific Operations Risk Assessment

SPSO—Service Provider Standard Order

SRA—Safety Risk Assessment

STA—Security Threat Assessment

STEM—Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics

sUAS—Small UAS

SUI—Simplified User Interaction

sXu—System X for sUAS

TAF—Terminal Area Forecast

TRACON—Terminal Radar Approach Control

TSA—Transportation Security Administration

TSO—Technical Standards Order

UA—Unmanned Aircraft

UAS—Unmanned Aircraft System

UAT—Universal Access Transceiver

UES—Universal Enrollment Service(s)

UFT—UTM Field Test

UPP—UTM Pilot Program

USS—Unmanned Aircraft System Service Supplier

USSP—U-Space Service Provider

UTM—Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management

VLOS—Visual Line of Sight

VSL—Value of Statistical Life

VTOL—Vertical Takeoff and Landing

xTM—Extensible Traffic Management

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of This Regulatory Action

B. Overview of Proposed Rule

C. Summary of the Costs and Benefits

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

A. Section 44807 Statutory Findings

B. Authority for Regulating Third-Party Services

C. Authority for Regulating Noise

III. Background

A. Related FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT) Actions

B. Use of Exemptions, Type Certificates, and Waivers

C. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee

D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership

IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS

A. Enabling UAS BVLOS Operations

B. Need for Automated Data Service Providers

C. Definitions (§ 108.5)

V. Part 108 General Requirements (Subpart A)

A. Applicability (§ 108.1)

B. Reporting and Prohibitions

C. Recordkeeping (§ 108.40)

D. Reporting (§ 108.45)

VI. Conducting UAS BVLOS Operations (Subpart B)

A. Operating Unmanned Aircraft Under Part 108

B. General Operating Rules (§ 108.120)

C. ADS-B and Transponder Use (§ 108.160)

D. Area of Operations (§ 108.165)

E. Preflight Requirements (§ 108.170)

F. Operating Restrictions (§ 108.175)

G. Operation in Controlled Airspace (§ 108.180)

H. Operations Over People (§ 108.185)

I. Use of Strategic Deconfliction and Conformance Monitoring (§ 108.190)

J. Operations Near Aircraft: Low Altitude Right-of-Way Rules (§ 108.195)

K. Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft (§ 108.200)

L. Operation in Shielded Areas (§ 108.205)

M. Operations of Multiple Unmanned Aircraft (§ 108.210)

N. Careless and Reckless Operation (§ 108.125)

O. Manuals (§§ 108.130 and 108.135)

P. Emergency Conditions (§ 108.215)

Q. Unmanned Aircraft Flight Restriction (§ 108.220)

VII. Personnel Requirements (Subpart C)

A. Approach to Personnel in Part 108

B. Personnel Roles and Responsibilities

C. Personnel Knowledge and Training (§ 108.315)

D. Medical Condition (§ 108.320)

E. Alcohol or Drugs (§ 108.325)

F. Duty and Rest (§ 108.330)

G. Security Threat Assessment for Certain Personnel (§ 108.335)

VIII. Permitted and Certificated Operations (Subparts D and E)

A. Requesting Operating Permits or Operating Certificates (§§ 108.400 and 108.500)

B. Permitted Operations

C. Certificated Operations

IX. Maintenance and Alterations (Subpart F)

A. Applicability

B. Persons Authorized To Perform Maintenance (§ 108.605)

C. Persons Performing Maintenance and Alterations (§ 108.605)

D. Unmanned Aircraft Maintenance (§ 108.610)

E. Life-Limited Parts (§ 108.615)

F. Unmanned Aircraft Batteries (§ 108.620)

G. Repairs and Alterations (§ 108.625)

H. Operations After Maintenance (§ 108.630)

X. Procedures for Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness (Subpart G)

A. Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness

B. Associated Elements (§ 108.5)

C. Applying for a Part 108 Airworthiness Acceptance

D. Means of Compliance (§§ 108.705 and 108.710)

E. Compliance With Design, Test, Production, Noise, and Airworthiness Requirements (§ 108.710)

F. Declaration of Compliance (§ 108.715)

G. Required Documents for Airworthiness Acceptance (§ 108.720)

H. Flight Data and Data Reporting (§ 108.725)

I. Quality Assurance System (§ 108.730)

J. Production Acceptance (§ 108.735)

K. Continued Operational Safety Program (§ 108.740)

L. Inspections and Audits (§ 108.745)

M. Design Changes (§ 108.750)

N. Repairs and Alterations (§ 108.755)

O. Record Retention (§ 108.760)

P. Rescission (§ 108.765)

XI. Design and Testing Requirements for Airworthiness Acceptance (Subpart H)

A. General (§ 108.800)

B. Size, Weight, and Speed (§ 108.805)

C. Simplified User Interaction (§ 108.810)

D. Signal Monitoring and Transmission (§ 108.815)

E. Position, Navigation, and Timing (§ 108.820)

F. Collision Avoidance (§ 108.825)

G. Anti-Collision Lighting Requirements (§ 108.830)

H. Position Lighting Requirements (§ 108.835)

I. Power Generation, Storage, and Distribution System (§ 108.840)

J. Propulsion System (§ 108.845)

K. Fuel System (§ 108.850)

L. Fire Protection (§ 108.855)

M. Software (§ 108.860)

N. Electronic Hardware (§ 108.865)

O. Systems and Equipment (§ 108.870)

P. Cybersecurity (§ 108.875)

Q. Associated Elements Design and Performance Requirements (§ 108.880)

R. Suitability and Durability of Materials (§ 108.885)

S. Operating Environment Conditions (§ 108.890)

T. Lightning Protection (§ 108.895)

U. Flight Data Recorder (§ 108.900)

V. Flight Data Analysis (§ 108.905)

W. Noise (§ 108.910)

X. Placards (§ 108.915)

Y. Identification and Marking (§ 108.920)

Z. Additional Design and Performance Requirements for Operational Purposes (§ 108.925)

AA. Testing

XII. Corresponding Regulatory Updates

A. Updates to Noise Requirements

B. Updates to Other Operating Rules

XIII. Part 146: Automated Data Service Providers

A. Introduction

B. Legal Authority to Regulate Automated Data Service Providers

C. BVLOS ARC Recommendations

D. Overview of Proposed Part 146

E. Subpart A—General

F. Subpart B—Certificate

G. Subpart C—Service Authorizations

H. Subpart D—Certificated Service Providers

I. Subpart E—Authorized Service Requirements

J. Subpart F—Due Process

K. Proposed Advisory Circulars

XIV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

F. International Compatibility

G. Environmental Analysis

H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska

XV. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation

E. Executive Order 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation

XVI. Incorporation by reference

XVII. Privacy

XVIII. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

B. Confidential Business Information

C. Electronic Access and Filing

D. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of This Regulatory Action

This action proposes performance-based regulations for the design and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) and for third-party services that support these operations, including UAS Traffic Management (UTM). The purpose of this proposed rule is to enable the expansion of BVLOS UAS operations for commercial and recreational purposes at low altitudes in the national airspace system (NAS).

date, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has allowed some such operations through individualized exemptions and waivers to existing regulations. This NPRM leverages lessons learned from individual exemptions and waivers to create the repeatable, scalable regulatory framework FAA proposes here that would allow for wide-scale adoption of UAS technologies. This proposed rule would be the next phase of integrating UAS into the NAS and provide a predictable and clear pathway for operators to conduct expanded operations safely. Further, this proposed rule's Automated Data Service requirements would provide clarity for manufacturers and service providers producing UAS and offering key enabling services, such as UTM, to UAS operators. FAA anticipates that this proposed rulemaking will allow operators to conduct a variety of operations, including package delivery, agriculture, aerial surveying, civic interest (to include wildfire recovery, wildlife conservation, and public safety), flight training, demonstration, flight testing, and recreation.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), FAA has provided a summary of this proposed rule in the

docket for 2120-AL82,

available at

www.regulations.gov

Since the promulgation of 2016's operating requirements for small UAS in part 107, FAA has sought to incorporate more complex operations (

e.g.,

larger, and more automated aircraft operating BVLOS of the operator) safely into the NAS through appropriate regulatory means. In June 2021, FAA chartered the UAS BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), soliciting recommendations to support a regulatory framework reflective of the technological capabilities of UAS. In March 2022, the ARC provided FAA with recommendations on how BVLOS operations could be safely integrated into the NAS.

Further, in May of 2024, Congress passed FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Public Law [Pub. L.] 118-63). Section 930 of Public Law 118-63 directs the FAA Administrator to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and subsequent final rule establishing a performance-based regulatory pathway for UAS to operate BVLOS. In addition, section 932 directs the FAA Administrator to establish procedures to approve third-party service suppliers of UTM. As part of its ongoing efforts to integrate UAS operations into the NAS, and pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807, the FAA Administrator is proposing to amend FAA regulations to adopt specific rules for BVLOS operations of UAS in the NAS.

Based on its experience over the past few years with enabling limited BVLOS operations through exemption or waiver and with the comprehensive set of recommendations from the UAS BVLOS ARC, FAA has developed the framework proposed in this rule to enable routine and scalable BVLOS operations in the NAS. This proposed framework would accommodate technologies as they evolve and mature using a performance-based regulatory framework.

In addition, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing revisions to its regulations to ensure that the decision to regulate these UAS operations under part 108 does not inadvertently create a security gap under TSA regulations. Under this proposal, which has been developed in consultation with FAA, TSA would continue to ensure the security of the national airspace by imposing appropriate security requirements. TSA notes that in the sections of this preamble related to package delivery operations, TSA has included a request for comment regarding potential security program applicability in a final rule. This request for comment relates to a broader set of activities than package delivery operations. While FAA and TSA are issuing a joint proposed rulemaking, the agencies intend to concurrently issue separate final rules.

B. Overview of the Proposed Rule

This proposed rule would establish requirements for conducting UAS BVLOS operations in United States airspace. FAA anticipates many, though not all, operations under proposed part 108 will be commercial. This action would normalize certain low altitude UAS operations and expedite the introduction of BVLOS UAS operations in the NAS while ensuring the safety and efficiency of United States airspace. This proposed rule is the next step in integrating UAS into the NAS, which FAA anticipates would provide safety, societal, and economic benefits.

Section II of this preamble details the legal authority for this rulemaking, while section III of this preamble provides a background of prior rulemakings and policy efforts FAA has undertaken to allow UAS operations in the United States. Section IV of this preamble describes the approach FAA has proposed to integrate BVLOS UAS operations, including the novel approaches to authorizing aircraft and personnel proposed under part 108 and the framework for third-party service suppliers proposed by part 146. Section V of this preamble describes the operational requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations conducted under part 108. These general operating requirements include the administrative requirements for the two tiers of operational authorization, permits and certificates, as discussed in section VIII of this preamble. Section VI of this preamble outlines FAA's approach for airspace management, including requirements for strategic deconfliction, detect and avoid (DAA), operations in uncontrolled and controlled airspace, operations over people, operations of multiple aircraft, and other conditions for safe operation.

This rule proposes a novel structure for operations personnel, as discussed in section VII of this preamble. Under this proposal, FAA would not require airman certificates but would require each operator—both permitted and certificated—to have an operations supervisor responsible for the overall safety of the operation. In addition, FAA proposes that operators must have qualified flight coordinators, who are individuals responsible for monitoring and, if necessary, intervening in an operation to ensure safe conditions. Whereas the operations supervisor has operational control over the entire operation, the flight coordinator(s) would have tactical oversight of individual aircraft.

FAA anticipates that the operations conducted under part 108 would have a variety of operational personnel positions and therefore does not propose to require any additional operations personnel positions. All operators would be responsible for identifying the necessary operations personnel to ensure the safety of the operation, in addition to ensuring that the operations personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills for their role. In this manner, responsibility is tied to the company operating the UAS rather than an individual that has limited control of the actual operation and can be removed from their position if necessary.

As noted above, section VIII of this preamble describes the permit and certificate structure proposed by this rule. Permitted operations would allow operators to conduct certain BVLOS operations using a streamlined approach under a permit issued by FAA. The permit structure would allow package delivery, agricultural operations, aerial surveying, civic interest, unmanned aircraft (UA) operations training, flight test, demonstration, and recreational operations, though subject to certain limitations on size, number of aircraft, and other operating requirements. Those operators conducting higher risk

threshold operations, due to size, weight, speed, or other parameters, would instead need to seek operational certification. Obtaining an operating certificate would allow for more complex package delivery, agricultural operations, aerial surveying, and civic interest operations than operating under an operating permit. Certificated operations would receive greater oversight from FAA but would also be able to use larger aircraft, have more aircraft, and have more flexibility to operate over people. Operations conducted under an operating certificate would require operators to develop a safety management system (SMS) and a training program for operations personnel.

Maintenance personnel would not be certificated under this proposed rule. Section IX of this preamble details the requirements for maintenance and maintenance personnel. Maintenance standards for these aircraft would be set by the manufacturer and be based on industry adopted consensus standards, and personnel that maintain them would be required to be competent in their duties and receive the training required by the manufacturer to perform those duties.

Sections X and XI of this preamble lay out the proposal for the new airworthiness acceptance process developed to allow for an efficient approval process of part 108 UAS, while maintaining the integrity of the NAS and the safety of the public. Using industry consensus standards, this action would establish a regulatory process for airworthiness acceptance of a UAS, consisting of a UA and its associated elements (AE), where the UA weighs not greater than 1,320 pounds (including anything attached to, or carried by the UA). Proposed part 108 would include new operational requirements for UA with airworthiness acceptance, enabling routine BVLOS operations without waivers or exemptions.

Section XII of this preamble discusses corresponding changes to related regulations in other parts of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) including a noise regulatory approach for UAS operating under proposed part 108.

Finally, this action would create a defined regulatory approval pathway for third-party services and providers of those services—first to approve services that support UTM, and then eventually, to approve services that support extensible traffic management (xTM). FAA broadly defines all those service providers—be it third-party service suppliers or services self-provided by the operators—as Automated Data Service Providers.

The term Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) is used to refer to cooperative service environments in general and is comprised of UTM, AAM, etc. FAA further discusses these concepts in its Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Version 2.0 Concept of Operations (ConOps) (Apr. 26, 2023),

available at www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/Urban%20Air%20Mobility%20%28UAM%29%20Concept%20of%20Operations%202.0_1.pdf

As further discussed in section XIII of this preamble, FAA would create a new part 146 to establish the process by which FAA would regulate automated data service providers as well as their automated data services. The purpose of part 146 is to provide a regulatory framework for appropriate government oversight of automated data services that support aircraft operations, especially those conducted under part 108. At the same time, the framework is designed to be flexible enough to accommodate the natural evolution and development of the technologies and systems on which these services are based. Through proposed part 146, FAA would authorize automated data service providers certificated under part 146 to provide services that would manage UAS traffic and information necessary for safe and efficient operation in the airspace. The provision of such services would be crucial, given the projected increase in numbers of UAS operating in the NAS once part 108 is finalized. Under this proposal, strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring services provided under part 146 would be key to the successful integration of UAS into the NAS and would be a requirement for several categories of UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108.

C. Summary of the Costs and Benefits

The benefits of the proposed rule are the economic, safety, and health values that would result from scaled BVLOS operations. These benefits derive from the increase in regulatory certainty and efficiency, and framework for scaled operations, that proposed rule would provide. FAA evaluates the benefits of the proposed rule qualitatively. Compared with operations under the current regulatory framework, this proposed rule may result in incremental costs to comply with requirements for design, production, and operations. There may also be cost implications to becoming certificated to provide automated data services. FAA provides potential unit costs and example total costs.

However, given that the proposed rule includes requirements that mirror current BVLOS exemptions while also proposing several new requirements to mitigate risks inherent in expanded BVLOS operations, incremental costs are few, and benefits would likely exceed costs. See section XIV.A of this preamble for more information.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). subtitle I, § 106 describes the authority of FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of FAA's authority.

This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in subtitle VII part A, subpart iii, § 44807, Special authority for certain UAS, which permits FAA Administrator

to use a risk-based approach to determine if certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS. Section 44807(b) provides a list of factors that the FAA Administrator must consider when determining which types of UAS may operate safely in the NAS, including size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, operation over people, operation within visual line of sight (VLOS), or operation during the day or night. Section 44807(b) further requires the FAA Administrator to consider whether an airman certificate under § 44703, a type, production, airworthiness, or design and production certificate under section 44704 of chapter 447, or a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) is required. Per § 44807(c), when the FAA Administrator determines that certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS per that section, “the Administrator shall establish requirements, or a process to accept proposed requirements, for the safe and efficient operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”

See

section 927 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public Law 118-63.

In addition, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (section 930 of Pub. L. 118-63) amended chapter 448 of title 49 of the U.S.C. by adding section 44811 to require the FAA Administrator to establish performance-based regulations for UAS to be used for BVLOS operations. The FAA Administrator must, at a minimum, establish acceptable risk levels for BVLOS operations; standards for remote pilots or UAS operators; an approval or acceptance process for UAS which may leverage special airworthiness certificates (SAC) or a manufacturer declaration of compliance (DOC) process; operating rules for UAS that are approved or accepted; protocols of

networked information; and safety of manned aircraft operating in the NAS. However, § 44811 does not require the FAA Administrator to rescope any ongoing rulemaking efforts. This regulation is within the scope of these authorities.

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254), which adopted 49 U.S.C. 44808, requires FAA to conduct rulemaking to authorize the carriage of property by small UAS for compensation or hire within the United States. FAA intends this proposal will also address that requirement. Furthermore, this rulemaking is promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which directs FAA to issue regulations: (1) to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by prescribing regulations FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

On June 6, 2025, the President issued Executive Order No. 14307,

Unleashing American Drone Dominance,

which directs that “the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the FAA, shall issue a proposed rule enabling routine BVLOS operations for UAS for commercial and public safety purposes.

A final rule shall be published within 240 days of the date of this order, as appropriate.” FAA is publishing this proposed rule to fulfill that directive.

90 FR 24727.

A. Section 44807 Statutory Findings

To determine whether certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807, the Administrator must find that the operation of the UAS would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. The Administrator must also determine whether a certificate under 49 U.S.C. 44703 (“Airman certificates”) or section 44704 (“Type certificates, production certificates, and airworthiness certificates, and design and production organization certificates”), or a certificate of waiver or certificate of authorization, is required for the operation of the UAS subject to this proposed rule. Using a risk-based approach, the Administrator has determined that UAS operations under this proposed rule would operate safely in the NAS; the individual findings required by section 44807 are as follows.

1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the Public

Section 44807(b)(1) requires the Administrator to determine which types of UAS operations, because of their size, weight, speed, operational capability, proximity to airports and populated areas, operation over people, and operation within or BVLOS, or operation during the day or night do not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public.

The hazards to the NAS and the public from BVLOS UAS operations are twofold: the collision risk posed to other users of the NAS (including manned aviation and other UAS), and the risk of collision debris or a faulty UAS posed to persons and property on the ground. Here, these safety concerns would be mitigated by the provisions of this rule. The risks to other NAS users and to persons and property on the ground would be mitigated by the airworthiness acceptance process, the personnel regulations, the general operating rules, and the specific operating rules for operating permits and operating certificates. The risks to other NAS users are further mitigated with the use of strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring. In addition, the risks to people and property on the ground are mitigated through the designation of population density categories (and the corresponding restrictions on certain operations to certain population density categories), the general prohibition of operations over open-air assemblies, and the hazardous material carriage restrictions.

This rulemaking uses the definition of hazardous material as defined in 49 U.S.C. 5102(2) and 49 CFR 171.8.

Accordingly, the Administrator has found that the UAS operations subject to this proposed rule would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. FAA invites comments on this finding.

2. Certificate Requirements

In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44807(b)(2) requires the Administrator to determine whether the UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification or airman certification.

i. Airworthiness Certification

The Administrator has determined that airworthiness certification should not be required for the UAS subject to this proposed rule. As discussed in section X of this preamble, the proposed airworthiness acceptance regulatory framework would prevent incidents like loss of flight or control stemming from factors such as structural integrity, software and hardware functionality, performance attributes, and operational factors. Specifically, the proposed design and performance standards require the UAS to handle all expected flight and ground stresses during its operations without compromising the UAS's safe operation.

From a risk perspective, FAA considers UAS operations under proposed part 108 fall between part 107 small UAS and aircraft with a SAC.

Part 108, which encompasses BVLOS operations, presents higher risks than part 107 due to the potential for airspace conflicts with other users, operation of larger aircraft, operation over densely populated areas, and riskier operational use cases such as package delivery. The intrinsic risks associated with routine BVLOS operations of UAS require mitigations beyond what is required under part 107. Conversely, the SAC process would require a higher level of initial FAA oversight than would be necessary for BVLOS operations envisioned under part 108, because it would require FAA to conduct an airworthiness inspection of each UAS produced. Proposed part 108 airworthiness acceptance requirements described in section X aim to mitigate those risks and promote the safety of people on the ground and other airspace users. FAA determined the requirements proposed in section X are appropriate for UA without passengers or crew where airworthiness certification under 14 CFR part 21 is more appropriate to ensure the safety of those on board those aircraft.

FAA has proposed changes to the SAC process to enable enhancements in safety and performance and to increase privileges under a number of sport pilot and light-sport aircraft rules in the

Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification

notice of proposed rulemaking, 88 FR 47650 (July 24, 2023).

Consequently, the regulatory and certification demands for BVLOS operations are more stringent than those for part 107 but less so than for light-sport aircraft. This intermediate positioning supports a balance between flexibility and safety. Therefore, the Administrator finds, pursuant to § 44807(b)(2), that airworthiness certification would be unnecessary for the UAS subject to this proposed rule. FAA invites comments on this finding.

ii. Airman Certification

The Administrator has also determined that airman certification

should not be required because certification is not consistent with the envisioned UAS and operations subject to this proposed rule. On manned aircraft, the pilot is responsible for operational control and safety of flight from the flightdeck. Pilot responsibilities on the flightdeck are constructed around pilot control, including seeing and avoiding other aircraft, interacting with air traffic control (ATC), and monitoring instruments and displays. With the increasing autonomy of UAS, particularly those anticipated for use under this proposal, the role of the pilot has and will continue to decrease. The UAS industry has increasingly come to rely on technology, rather than human interaction or intervention, to ensure safe operation. Industry reliance on technology rather than human interaction is driven in part by the fact that UAS do not carry responsible persons that can control and ensure the safety of flight from within the aircraft.

As discussed herein, the proposed personnel provisions serve to provide personnel with the knowledge, training, and skills to operate the anticipated UAS safely under this proposed rule. In addition, other mitigating provisions of this rule would ensure that the risk posed by the UAS is offset by the design requirements (section XI of this preamble) and general operating requirements (section VI of this preamble) that further mitigate risk as operations increase in complexity. Therefore, the Administrator finds, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807(b)(2), that airman certification would be unnecessary for the UAS and operations subject to this proposed rule. FAA invites comments on this finding.

B. Authority for Regulating Third-Party Services

Section 932 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public Law 118-63, directs the FAA Administrator to establish procedures, including rulemaking, to approve third-party service suppliers. Those would include suppliers of UTM services to support the safe integration and commercial operation of UAS. In accordance with this provision, the Administrator must ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that industry consensus standards are included as an acceptable means of compliance for third-party services. Consistent with this direction from Congress, FAA proposes to regulate third-party service suppliers and the use of third-party services.

FAA also has authority to regulate air agencies under chapter 447 of title 49, U.S.C. FAA may issue certificates to air agencies (49 U.S.C. 44702) as well as “examine and rate” air agencies (49 U.S.C. 44707). Congress defined air agencies to include certain aviation schools (§ 44707(1)), repair stations (§ 44707(2)), and “other air agencies the Administrator decides are necessary in the public interest” (§ 44702(3)). FAA proposes to regulate automated data service providers that support aircraft operations using a distributed computational system under this authority to regulate air agencies.

Regulation of these automated data service providers is necessary in the public interest. In 49 U.S.C. 40101(d), Congress identified the following matters for FAA to consider as being in the public interest: “assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security” and “encouraging and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology.” Enabling automated data services to mitigate the potential risk that BVLOS operations could pose to the NAS would enhance aviation safety and aid in the development of new aviation technology.

49 U.S.C. chapter 447.

For further discussion on the legal authority of third-party services and FAA rulemaking procedure for regulating such services, see section XIII.B of this preamble.

C. Authority for Regulating Noise

In 49 U.S.C. 44715, FAA has the responsibility to “protect the public health and welfare from aircraft noise.” This responsibility came with broad authority to adopt regulations and noise standards to carry out this mandate. Historically, FAA has applied the part 36 noise certification regulations when the agency issued type certificates as provided in § 44715(a)(3).

However, FAA has authority to apply noise standards for aircraft with or without type certificates. As such, FAA is proposing in this rule to exercise that authority and use a regulatory approach for UAS operating under part 108 that would apply noise requirements as part of airworthiness acceptance.

For further discussion on the legal authority of FAA to regulate noise as part of the airworthiness acceptance process, see section XII.A of this preamble.

D. Transportation Security Administration Authority

The security of the nation's transportation systems is vital to the economic health and security of the United States. Ensuring transportation security while promoting the movement of legitimate travelers and commerce is a critical counter-terrorism mission assigned to TSA.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress created TSA under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and established the agency's primary federal role to enhance security for all modes of transportation. The scope of TSA's authority includes assessing security risks, developing security measures to address identified risks, and enforcing compliance with these measures. TSA has broad regulatory authority to issue, rescind, and revise regulations as necessary to carry out its transportation security functions.

See, e.g.,

49 U.S.C. 114(

)(1), 44903(b).

III. Background

A. Related FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT) Actions

FAA began developing its regulatory framework for UAS in 2012 after Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-95). Section 333 of Public Law 112-95 directed the Secretary of Transportation to determine which types of UAS do not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public or pose a threat to national security. Based on such findings, Congress directed the Secretary to establish requirements for the safe operation of such UAS. Since the passage of Public Law 112-95, FAA has been incorporating limited UAS operations into the NAS using a phased, incremental, and risk-based approach to enable UAS operations through narrowly tailored regulations, individual grants of regulatory relief through FAA exemptions and waivers, and by authorizations based on discrete statutory authorities. Understanding the steps FAA has already taken to integrate UAS into the NAS is critical to understanding why these proposed regulations to enable scaled BVLOS operations is the appropriate next step in this phased approach.

1. Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft

On December 16, 2015, FAA published the Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft interim final rule (Registration Rule).

The Registration Rule, which established 14 CFR part 48, enabled a simplified, web-based registration

system for small UA,

as an alternative to the registration requirements found in 14 CFR part 47. The Registration Rule required all small UAS owners to register under the existing part 47 or 48 by March 31, 2016.

Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft

interim final rule, 80 FR 78645 (Dec. 16, 2015).

“Small UAS” is defined in 14 CFR 1.1 as an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, including everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft.

The Registration Rule also established marking requirements for small UA. In accordance with that rule, all small UA must display a unique identifier. Each small UA operated in accordance with part 107 must display a unique registration number, visible on inspection of the small UA.

2. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

On June 28, 2016, FAA and DOT jointly published the Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems final rule (the 2016 Final Rule) establishing 14 CFR part 107.

Part 107 created a regulatory structure allowing small UAS to operate within specified parameters without requiring airworthiness certification, exemption, or waiver. Part 107 established operational rules for certain routine civil operation of small UAS in the NAS in a safe manner. To mitigate risk to people and property on the ground and to other users of the airspace, the 2016 Final Rule established operating limitations for small UAS such as limiting operations to daylight and civil twilight, within confined areas, and within visual line-of-sight. The 2016 Final Rule also established airspace restrictions, remote pilot certification, visual observer requirements, and operating limitations. Finally, the 2016 Final Rule included a waiver provision

allowing individual operators to deviate from certain specifically identified operating limitations if FAA found the applicant could safely conduct the proposed operation under the terms of the COA.

Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

final rule, 81 FR 42064 (Jun. 28, 2016).

See

14 CFR 107.200 and 107.205.

3. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People

Published by FAA on January 15, 2021, the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule

allowed routine operations over people in accordance with part 107 and routine operations at night under certain conditions without a waiver or exemption. Under regulations implemented by the rule, the requirements for routine operations over people vary depending on the level of risk that operations of small UA present to people on the ground. In the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule, FAA established four categories of permissible operations over people based on the risk of injury they present: Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, and Category 4. Under this rule, operations over people (in accordance with the categories) are permitted with small UA that have an airworthiness certificate.

Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People

final rule, 86 FR 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021).

Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay of Effective Date; Correction

final rule, 86 FR 11623 (Feb. 26, 2021);

Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay; Withdrawal; Correction

final rule, 86 FR 3630 (Mar. 10, 2021).

4. External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft

The External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft interim final rule (External Marking Rule, 2019) was published on February 13, 2019.

The External Marking Rule requires small UA owners to display the unique identifier assigned by FAA upon completion of the registration process (registration number) on an external surface of the aircraft. Small UA owners are no longer permitted to enclose the FAA-issued registration number in a compartment on the aircraft, such as inside of a battery compartment.

External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft

interim final rule, 84 FR 3669 (Feb. 13, 2019).

5. Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft

The Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft final rule (Remote ID Final Rule) was published on January 15, 2021.

The Remote ID Final Rule requires that UA broadcast certain identification, location, and performance information while in-flight. The remote identification of UA is necessary to ensure public safety and the safety and efficiency of the NAS. Remote identification provides airspace awareness to FAA, national security agencies, law enforcement entities, and other government officials. The broadcasted information can be used to distinguish compliant airspace users from those potentially posing a safety or security risk. The Remote ID Final Rule applies to UA flown for both recreational and commercial purposes. It allows operators to request authorization to operate without remote identification for aeronautical research and other limited purposes. UA manufactured for operation in the NAS are subject to the production requirements of the Remote ID Final Rule. There are limited exceptions in the Remote ID regulations that allow manufacturing UA without remote identification, including home-built UA and United States Government UA, amongst others.

Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft

final rule, 86 FR 4390 (Jan. 15, 2021);

Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft; Delay

final rule, 86 FR 13629 (Mar. 10, 2021).

6. Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the Safety Continuum

On July 24, 2023, FAA published the Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification (MOSAIC) NPRM.

The MOSAIC NPRM proposed enabling enhancements in safety and performance and would increase privileges under several sport pilot and light-sport aircraft rules. The proposed language in the MOSAIC NPRM would also expand the types and characteristics of aircraft that sport pilots may operate. The proposed changes would increase the suitability of light-sport category aircraft for flight training, limited aerial work, and personal travel. As the MOSAIC NPRM notes, FAA is updating the requirements for light-sport aircraft due to a developed understanding about the purposes and flexibilities of light sport aircraft. This development is framed in the context of the safety continuum. As noted in the MOSAIC NPRM, FAA bases the rigor of certification requirements and operational limitations on a safety continuum that looks at public exposure to risk for each aircraft and operation. As the risk increases due to increased operating privileges and aircraft capability, so do the requirements and corresponding rigor of requirements and procedures for aircraft and airman certification.

Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification

notice of proposed rulemaking, 88 FR 47650 (Jul. 24, 2023).

88 FR 47653.

The safety continuum represents the targeted level of safety because of FAA regulation, guidance, and oversight, which changes based on risk and societal expectations of safety. FAA uses the safety continuum to determine the appropriate level of regulatory oversight for a variety of aircraft, from small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The differing targeted level of safety balances the needs of the flying public, applicants, and operators while facilitating both the advancement of safety and the encouragement of technological innovation.

Light-sport aircraft appear at the low end of the safety continuum for manned operations because of its aircraft design and recreational use. As a result, there is less FAA oversight. Given there is no pilot nor passengers on board UAs, FAA has decided UA operations involve less risk and should fall lower on the safety continuum than light sport aircraft. Therefore, UAS operations under parts 107 and 108 are positioned on the lower end of the safety continuum and FAA is proposing a level of oversight for part 108 operations are positioned between the oversight for part 107 small UAS and MOSAIC aircraft. The reasons for this placement and for more information as to risk, please see section III.A of this preamble.

B. Use of Exemptions, Type Certificates, and Waivers

The intent of this proposed rule is to provide a predictable, stable, and transparent regulatory construct that enables scaled BVLOS operations. Presently, UAS operators looking to conduct BVLOS operations require some level of regulatory relief by way of exemption or waiver.

1. Exemptions for UAS BVLOS operations

The exemption process has proven to be a useful tool for FAA to enable operations that cannot be conducted under part 107, particularly for operations using UA weighing 55 pounds or more.

However, operating by exemption often requires navigating a labyrinth of regulations designed for both manned and unmanned aviation to determine from which regulations exemption should be sought to operate UAS BVLOS. Each exemption is specific to the operation that the petitioner is pursuing, but typically the exemptions include relief from certain requirements of parts 91 and 135 that are not compatible with UAS operations. This section describes the history of using the exemption process for UAS operations and what the exemption process requires. This background is intended to help draw out how this rulemaking will move UAS operations from the limits of “enablement though exemption”, which requires case-by-case assessment and contributes to the current “patchwork” of rules and exemption precedents that today's operators rely on, to “enablement by rule”, in which a right-size regulatory framework could streamline how FAA enables operation, manufacture, and supporting services of BVLOS UAS.

The 55 lb. weigh limit for UAS operating under part 107 is not waivable under § 107.205.

In the early 2010s, prior to the development and implementation of the regulatory framework of part 107 (the 2016 Final Rule), FAA relied on the flexibility provided in section 333 of Public Law 112-95 to allow certain UAS operations in the NAS by way of the FAA exemption process. Under the section 333 authority, the Secretary of Transportation was granted the authority to determine if an airworthiness certificate was necessary for safe operation of a UAS. While this statutory flexibility permitted FAA to issue thousands of exemptions, the regulatory framework resulting from the 2016 Final Rule created a much more stable, transparent, and scalable system for early civil UAS operations and this process of evolving from operation by exemption to operation by rule is a precursor to FAA's objectives through this proposed rule.

Section 347 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254) granted the Secretary the authority to determine, using a risk-based approach, which UAS may operate safely in the NAS. Congress further extended this discretionary authority to determine if an airworthiness certificate was necessary and clarified that the Secretary may determine if an airman certificate under section 44703 was necessary. This authority, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44809, was further extended in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024.

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 also established an additional avenue for limited recreational operations under 49 U.S.C. 44809.

Per updates to 49 U.S.C. 44807 as provided by § 927 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (Pub. L. 118-63), the authority to determine if certain UAS are safe for operation the NAS rests with the Administrator the of FAA rather than with the Secretary of Transportation.

Section 44807 grants the Administrator of FAA the authority to use a risk-based approach to determine if certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS on a case-by-case basis. The requirements for petitioning for an exemption are codified in 14 CFR part 11. Under 14 CFR 11.15, a petition for exemption is a request to FAA by an individual or entity (“petitioner”) asking for relief from the requirements of a regulation. Under 14 CFR 11.81, petitioners must include the following information in their petitions for exemption: name, mailing address, and other contact information (such as email or fax number); the specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which they are seeking exemption; the extent of relief that is being sought and the reason for seeking relief; the reasons why granting this request would be in the public interest, that is, how this exemption would benefit the public as a whole; the reasons why granting the exemption would not adversely affect safety, or how the exemption would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which exemption is sought; a summary that FAA can publish in the

Federal Register

that states the rule from which the exemption is sought along with a brief description of the nature of the exemption sought; any additional information, views, or arguments available to support the exemption request; and, if a petitioner wants to exercise the privileges of their exemption outside of the U.S., the reason why the petitioner needs to do so.

FAA recommends that the petitioner review all FAA guidance to ensure that the petition includes all necessary information, if relevant, including concept of operations, operations manual, emergency procedures, checklists, maintenance manual, training program, flight history (hours, cycles, accidents), and a safety risk analysis.

The safety risk analysis is required for all complex operations for any proposal that includes, but is not limited to, flight over or in the proximity of people, flight beyond visual line of sight, operation of multiple UAS, operations from a moving vehicle, package delivery, part 135 operations, or ground speeds. Guidance for the safety risk analysis can be found in FAA Order 8040.4,

Safety Risk Management Policy,

and FAA Order 8040.6,

UAS Safety Risk Management Policy.

FAA,

Section 44807: Special Authority for Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems

(Mar. 20, 2024),

available at

www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification/section_44807

FAA has issued thousands of exemptions using the 49 U.S.C. 44807 authority described herein.

Many of

these exemptions permit the use of UAS for agricultural operations, including thousands of exemptions enabling agricultural operations with UAS over 55 pounds. Agricultural spraying operations comprise the vast majority of exemptions for UAS above 55 pounds, with over 1,700 operator certificates issued for agricultural operations at the time of publication of this proposed rule. FAA-issued exemptions also include advanced UAS operations reflected in four precedent-setting exemptions issued in fall of 2023 expanding BVLOS operational capabilities and supporting the Unmanned Traffic Management Operational Evaluation.

FAA has also issued several exemptions for UAS operators operating under part 135. Upon obtaining their exemption(s), operators must then seek operational approval, typically by obtaining an operating certificate under 14 CFR part 135 or 137, depending on the operation type.

Prior to the finalization of the 2016 Final Rule, FAA had granted numerous exemptions to unmanned aircraft operators for purposes such as experimental operations, agricultural operations, BVLOS and other various use-case applications. These exemptions were granted with minimal Part 61 pilot certification requirements to the remote pilot-in-command. Examples include unmanned aircraft agricultural operations only requiring the remote pilot-in-command to possess a private pilot certificate or even in later cases a minimum of remote pilot certificate, as opposed to similar operations with manned aircraft that require a commercial pilot certificate. The 2016 Final Rule obviated the need for exemptions for this particular relief for UA under 55 pounds with the establishment of a part 107 remote pilot certificate but did not extend to UA weighing 55 pounds or

more. The first exemption to substitute a part 61 commercial pilot certificate with a part 107 remote pilot certificate with additional training requirements under these circumstances was to DroneSeed Co., Exemption No. 17936. FAA subsequently issued several grants of exemption allowing the use of a remote pilot certificate for commercial operations with UA above 55 pounds, although requiring a second-class medical certificate. In November 2022, FAA issued a grant of exemption to Amazon Prime Air permitting them to conduct BVLOS operations with a UA weighing 55 pounds or more and requiring the pilot-in-command to hold a part 107 remote pilot certificate with a third-class medical certificate, Exemption No. 18601B.

See

Phoenix Air Unmanned, LLC, Exemption No. 20973, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2023-1827,

available at

www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2023-1827-0009

; uAvionix Corporation, Exemption No. 21097, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2022-0921,

available at

www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2022-0921-0013

; Zipline International, Inc. Exemption No. 19111B, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2020-0499,

available at

www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2020-0499-0033

; UPS Flight Forward, Exemption No. 18339D, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2019-0628,

available at

www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2019-0628-0029

Exemptions are issued on a case-by-case basis and each exemption petition is individually assessed by FAA. This process can be time and resource-intensive for operators. This proposed rule is intended to level the playing field for operators by offering a well-defined and purpose-built set of regulations for the operation, manufacture, and supporting services for BVLOS UAS operations. Furthermore, this proposed rule should foster innovation and growth among U.S. businesses in this market and simultaneously allow these businesses to serve a larger U.S. customer base.

2. Type Certification for UAS

Furthermore, FAA also allows UAS manufacturers to pursue type certification for their UAS. However, the type certification process was not designed for UAS, which have shorter expected lifespans than manned aircraft, do not carry people, and are redesigned easily and often by manufacturers. As such, the type certification pathway may not be the most appropriate path for most of the operational uses envisioned for these aircraft. Like the exemption process, operators using a type certificated UAS must then seek operational approval, typically under 14 CFR part 135 or 137 depending on the operation type.

3. Current Use of Waivers for UAS

In addition, FAA continues to use the flexibility of the waiver process in issuing waivers for more complex operations under part 107. FAA has issued thousands of waivers since the 2016 Final Rule. Since the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Over People final rule eliminated the need for most night waivers, the most common types of waivers granted in recent years have been for altitude limitations, BVLOS operations, operation of multiple UA, and operations over people. Waivers are processed faster than exemptions and submission and approval of them has improved as UAS operators have become more familiar with the appropriate safety cases. FAA recognizes the flexibility that comes with waivers and, as noted in various sections below, many of the proposed requirements of part 108 are subject to waiver.

C. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee

On June 8, 2021, FAA established the UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations ARC with the goal of providing recommendations to FAA for performance-based regulatory requirements to normalize safe, scalable, and economically viable UAS BVLOS operations that are not receiving the provisioning of Air Traffic Management (ATM) services.

This ARC took a holistic approach in recommending a performance-based regulatory framework for BVLOS operations.

FAA,

UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee,

Aviation Rulemaking Committee Charter (Jun. 8, 2021),

available at

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20BVLOS%20ARC%20Charter%20(eff.%206-8-2021).pdf

FAA requested that, at a minimum, the ARC's recommendations clearly address requirements to support the following concept of operations (ConOps): long-line linear infrastructure inspections, industrial aerial data gathering, small package delivery, and precision agriculture aircraft operations, including crop spraying. The ARC did not specifically address aircraft or operations carrying passengers or crew, nor did it address the integration of operations for which ATM services are being provided.

The ARC's final report was submitted to FAA on March 10, 2022.

In this report, the ARC provided an extensive list of recommendations to FAA. Overall, the ARC recommended that FAA set an acceptable level of risk for UAS that is consistent across all types of operations being performed. The ARC also recommended a series of modifications to the right-of-way rules in Low Altitude Shielded Areas (within 100 feet of a structure or critical infrastructure as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c) and in Low Altitude Non-Shielded Areas (below 400 feet above ground level (AGL)) to accommodate UAS operations. The ARC's report provided comprehensive recommendations that the UAS industry argued would enable BVLOS operations by regulation, including package delivery by UAS, in a safe and economically viable manner. In addition, it provided recommendations for developing a regulatory approach to enable the use of third-party services to support UAS BVLOS operations.

As discussed throughout this preamble, FAA considered the recommendations provided by the BVLOS ARC in developing this proposed framework.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final Report

(“BVLOS ARC Report”) (Mar. 10, 2022),

available at

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/5424.

Section XIII of this preamble discusses the ARC recommendation regarding third-party services in greater detail.

D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership

Establishing a regulatory framework for BVLOS operation that enables several valuable use cases would establish the U.S. as a global leader in UAS operations. Home of the Wright Brothers and the Chicago Convention, the U.S. has long been a leader in aviation and has claimed many firsts in this industry including the first powered airplane, the home of the pilot who flew the first solo transatlantic flight, and the first pilot to break the sound barrier.

For UAS, however, the

United States has strong peers competing for leadership in this space. Globally, several countries have taken significant steps to enable BVLOS operations including China, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Japan, and Rwanda.

Key to other countries' successes is that these other countries have provided the UAS industry with a clear regulatory framework that facilitates the scaling of BVLOS operations.

Vaughn College, Greatest First Flights in Aviation History in Honor of Aviation History Month (Nov. 14, 2019),

available at

www.vaughn.edu/blog/greatest-first-flights-in-aviation-history-in-honor-of-aviation-history-month/.

Commercial Drone Alliance, U.S. Global Leadership in Aviation at Stake: Scaled BVLOS UAS Operations Around the World (Nov. 27, 2024).

There are several recent examples of countries advancing the integration of UAS operations into their airspaces, including BVLOS operations. In June of 2023, Canada's Minister of Transport announced standardized BVLOS rules for small and medium drones.

In 2021, the European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA) adopted three regulations that together create the conditions necessary for both drones and manned aircraft to operate safely and has begun the gradual implementation of U-space, a type of airspace designated for safely integrated operation of manned and unmanned aircraft.

The U-space approach provides cooperative airspace for manned and unmanned aircraft where the manned aircraft are equipped with technology to enable sharing airspace with the UAS. Australia and the EU have also published guidance for BVLOS operators seeking to fly using the specific operations risk assessment (SORA) framework developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).

In Shenzhen, China, a commercial drone company made over 100,000 drone deliveries in 2022, demonstrating UAS logistics at scale.

In Rwanda, UAS are regularly deployed to transport blood and medicines to hospitals in remote regions and these programs have existed as early as 2016.

Minister of Transport Announces Canada's first proposed drone safety regulations for beyond visual line-of-sight operations, Transport Canada (Jun. 23, 2023),

available at

www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/06/minister-of-transport-announces-canadas-first-proposed-drone-safety-regulations-for-beyond-visual-line-of-sight-operations.html.

Drones: Commission adopts new rules and conditions for safe, secure and green drone operations,

Directorate-General for Mobility and Transportation, European Commission (Apr. 22, 2021),

available at

transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/drones-commission-adopts-new-rules-and-conditions-safe-secure-and-green-drone-operations-2021-04-22_en.

See

European Aviation Safety Agency,

Specific Category—Civil Drones, available at

www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/drones-air-mobility/operating-drone/specific-category-civil-drones#Registration%20of%20drone%20operators

;

see also

Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

Beyond visual line of sight operations, available at

www.casa.gov.au/drones/flight-authorisations/beyond-visual-line-sight-operations#HowtorenewyourBVLOSflightapproval.

See

Zeyi Yang,

Food delivery by drone is just part of daily life in Shenzhen,

MIT Technology Review (May 23, 2023),

available at

www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/23/1073500/drone-food-delivery-shenzhen-meituan

See

World Economic Forum,

Medicines from the sky: how drones can save lives

(Apr. 21, 2020),

available at

www.weforum.org/stories/2020/04/medicines-from-the-sky-how-a-drone-may-save-your-life/

; see also World Economic Forum,

Medicine from the Sky: Opportunities and Lessons Learned from Drones in Africa

(Mar. 2021),

available at

www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Medicine_from_the_Sky_2021.pdf.

Foreign commercial aviation authorities (CAAs) enabling BVLOS operations through their own regulatory frameworks have fostered attractive environments for U.S. companies to expand their operations abroad. Today, U.S. companies are performing BVLOS operations abroad including in Italy, the U.K., Rwanda, and Japan.

An overarching goal of this proposed rule is to encourage U.S. UAS companies to expand, innovate, and thrive domestically. A robust domestic UAS BVLOS operating environment could spur technological innovation, bolster U.S. aerospace manufacturing, provide services like package delivery to large swaths of the public, create skilled jobs, and secure the U.S. as a leader for UAS BVLOS operations, UTM, and UAS manufacturing.

Italy Chosen For Amazon Prime Air Service In Late 2024,

Intrieste (Oct. 20, 2023),

available at

www.intrieste.com/2023/10/20/italy-chosen-for-amazon-prime-air-service-in-late-2024/

; Jack Daleo,

Google's Wing to Use Drones to Fly Blood Between London Hospitals,

Flying Magazine (Sep. 17, 2024),

available at

www.flyingmag.com/modern/googles-wing-to-use-drones-to-fly-blood-between-london-hospitals/

; Jack Daleo,

Rwanda launches nationwide drone delivery service with Zipline,

Freight Waves (Dec. 15, 2022),

available at

www.freightwaves.com/news/rwanda-launches-nationwide-drone-delivery-service-with-zipline

;

Skydio Secures Nationwide BVLOS Approval for Remote Drone Operations In Japan,

Skydio (Jun. 6, 2023),

available at

www.skydio.com/blog/nationwide-bvlos-approval-for-remote-drone-operations-in-japan

Due to the relatively low cost of highly capable UAS technology, hundreds of thousands

of new operators have entered the aviation community. This significant increase in the volume of UAS and UAS operators, as well as the rapid advancement of UAS technologies, has created significant opportunities—and challenges—for the integration of UAS into the United States airspace. These UAS in the NAS pose new challenges and risks but safety remains paramount for FAA. Through research, industry partnerships and feedback, and regulatory changes, FAA has made steady progress toward integrating UAS operations of varying complexity in the NAS in a safe, timely, and equitable manner.

FAA,

Drones by the Numbers, available at

www.faa.gov/uas.

In proposing this rule, FAA fully expects that the scope and frequency of UAS operations in the NAS would increase as BVLOS operations become normalized. FAA also appreciates that this proposal would open a new range of opportunities and possible concepts of operations for local communities interested in leveraging the benefits of UAS. FAA emphasizes that it is important for community leaders, local elected officials, and operators to ensure that the general public is informed and engaged in early planning discussions and that the individuals involved in planning the operation have a clear plan for how they will respond to the public's interest, questions, and concerns about operations occurring in local communities. FAA will support community leaders, local elected officials, and operators with responding to the public in its role as a regulator and encourages localities and operators to leverage best practices for community engagement in introducing UAS operations.

For more information regarding legal considerations applicable to state and local regulation of UAS, please see FAA and DOT's 2023 Fact Sheet,

available at www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/State-Local-Regulation-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Fact-Sheet.pdf.

IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS

A. Enabling UAS BVLOS Operations

FAA has long intended to develop a regulatory framework for more advanced UAS operations, enabling the more complex operations that industry has successfully demonstrated at small scale using waivers and exemptions. Waivers, exemptions, and other authorizations, such as operations conducted at UAS Test Sites or through the Integration Pilot Program

and BEYOND

initiatives, have safely enabled numerous BVLOS operations including infrastructure inspection, package delivery, and surveillance. These operational advancements have occurred within the existing aviation regulatory framework, one that did not imagine the types of technologies that could, at a minimum, replace the human eye or that could coordinate operations through decentralized automation platforms. To realize the

next phase in UAS operations, FAA proposes a new set of regulations specific to UAS.

Available at

www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/integration_pilot_program.

Available at

www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/beyond.

UAS technology, as well as the various systems that support it, has advanced faster than the regulatory framework. Having clear regulations and guidance about how to operate BVLOS is essential for future integration of UAS. This rule proposes requirements for airworthiness acceptance, operating requirements, and a framework for automated data service providers to enable scalable, repeatable, and safe BVLOS operations.

The airworthiness and operating requirements would reside in part 108 of title 14 of the CFR, a new part that represents FAA's commitment to a regulatory framework that permits increasingly complex UAS operations while building on the knowledge gleaned from existing rules. The proposed requirements for automated data service providers would reside in new part 146. This proposed framework would provide assurance that operations can be conducted safely, but also within the appropriate position on the safety continuum. As discussed throughout this rule, FAA recognizes that type certification may not be the most appropriate regulatory regime for the safe operation of proposed part 108 aircraft, nor may the airman certification structure of manned aviation be appropriate for these types of operations.

Proposed part 108 would enable UAS BVLOS operations through design, procedural, and operational requirements. Operations traditionally accomplished through manned aviation could be executed more safely and at greater scale than currently conducted. In this context, UAS, using programmed paths managed by third-party services, operating BVLOS, can offer alternatives to manned aircraft to perform the same function safely. UAS can supplement tasks that would otherwise be accomplished by surface transportation or individuals, which could have a positive impact on safety. A UA can fly over crops distributing pesticide or fertilizer without the need for a person to fly a full-sized aircraft low to the ground and risk an accident or pilot exposure to chemicals. Enabling BVLOS operations could have a transformative impact on logistics. Life-saving medicine, equipment, or even human organs can be transported rapidly between points, without having to contend with traffic congestion, or requiring a pilot to fly a helicopter into a high-risk situation. Local regulatory authorities can use UAS to inspect the underside of bridges or check the integrity of the railroad tracks that crisscross the wide expanse of the United States, both more efficiently and more safely than is possible without UAS. UAS-based collection and analytics can inspect more energy production, transmission, and storage infrastructure per day compared to a manual, ground-based inspection, which significantly increases the opportunity to detect and remedy leaks and other issues.

Through the proposed airworthiness acceptance process, operational and personnel frameworks, and standards for automated data service supply, the level of risk proposed in this rulemaking would be equivalent to the level of acceptable risk in part 107, but for more complex aircraft and operations. Part 107 notably did not require any airworthiness certification or design standards, instead fixing the weight at 55 pounds and relying on operating limitations to ensure safe operation. In the 2016 Final Rule, FAA acknowledged the biggest concerns for risk were the inability of a pilot to maintain safe separation from other aircraft and the possibility of a loss of control in flight due to a failure of the control link. The risk-based approach in part 107 has proven to be safe and effective for operations conducted within VLOS.

As we have seen through existing operations that we have enabled through exemptions and waivers, the existing technological tools to enable these operations are generally already available, and need only a repeatable, scalable regulatory framework that would allow the various potential benefits that UAS BVLOS operations could provide to be realized. This can also be seen through the new and novel approaches FAA has seen implemented through special programs such as BEYOND. Under existing systems, operators can equip a UAS with technology that will detect other aircraft, both manned and unmanned, and program it to avoid other aircraft in a consistent, safe manner. Similarly, should a mechanical malfunction occur, the technology is able to avoid impacting people through pre-programmed flight responses. This use of technology, in combination with management of the areas within which the UAS operates, helps mitigate the risks involved in these operations, as described in this preamble.

The regulations under this proposal would also ensure that operators address and manage cybersecurity risks. To that end, this proposed rule would require cybersecurity policies be in place for most operators. The security of computers and networked systems is an overarching goal. Operators under proposed part 108, with the limited exception of recreational operators, would be required to assess and monitor cybersecurity risks continuously and take appropriate precautions to protect their operations from being compromised on an ongoing basis.

The part 107 framework for small UAS operations prioritized individual responsibility for operations, placing the burden of safe operations on the remote pilot in command. While there is merit in this approach, it does not always align with the way UAS are used, especially in a BVLOS operation. This proposed rule would place responsibility at a corporate level, utilizing flexible approaches to training, operations personnel duty assignment, and development of manuals, while also providing the flexibility to allow operators to make risk-based decisions to conduct operations safely. Under this proposed rule, the person exercising control over the operation would not be certificated by FAA. Instead, FAA proposes to require an operations supervisor who would act on behalf of the company and be responsible for the overall safety and security of the operation, including ensuring that operations are conducted within the parameters of the applicable requirements and that personnel are appropriately trained for their role. The position would also demand knowledge of the relevant regulatory requirements, as well as company procedures and the specific requirements associated with the UA used in their operations. In addition, this rule proposes the utilization of flight coordinators, if required by the aircraft design, who would have more direct involvement in the operation of a UA and would similarly require training in safe operation.

This proposed rule is designed to assess and manage risks to people and property on the ground and other users in the NAS while allowing the growth of UAS operations. The main factors considered in assessing the risks are the industry-consensus standards that inform the design of the UAS, the weight, speed, and size of the UA, the environment it is operating in or over, technological mitigations to include strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and DAA capabilities, and what, if anything, it is transporting.

Under proposed part 108, many types of operations would take place over people. One significant risk factor for these operations would depend on the number of people the UA is operating over. Proposed part 108 would address a variety of operating environments. To

present an accurate and consistent picture of population, FAA is proposing the use of LandScan, a Federally sponsored and freely accessible set of population data. LandScan provides a basis for operational categories to allow complex operations over areas with increased population density, with both technological and operational requirements to ensure continued safety.

In proposed part 108, operations would be conducted primarily below 400 feet AGL (unless authorized by the Administrator to go higher), and this rule would establish new requirements to allow for safe operations BVLOS in this more integrated airspace. UAS operating under part 108 would be required to yield right of way to traffic broadcasting their position using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment. Under proposed part 108, strategic deconfliction would be required for operations over certain populated areas, and operations in controlled airspace would require strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and the ability to detect cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft in certain airspace classifications. Operators would need to be aware of factors such as the location, weather, obstacles, and other traffic to ensure safe operation, even as they may not be physically present at the flight operation.

As discussed in section III.A.5 of this preamble, FAA is approaching airworthiness in the context of a safety continuum that considers exposure of the public to risk for each aircraft and operation. Whereas traditional manned aircraft generally require a type certification or special airworthiness certification to operate in the NAS, FAA is proposing a process that would ensure public safety while also being mindful of the level of appropriate rigor associated with the operational envelope of UA operating under proposed part 108. While type certification is appropriate for manned operations, it does not necessarily follow that the time, resources, or requirements for type certification are appropriate to allow safe operation of UAS under proposed part 108. With airworthiness acceptance and industry consensus standards, FAA is proposing a process that will provide a more time and resource appropriate avenue to allow more complex UAS operations while appropriately mitigating risk. FAA is also proposing changes that will streamline compliance with UAS noise requirements. FAA recognizes that a fast and efficient process is critical as the UAS technology is constantly changing. A particular model of UAS may only be produced for a matter of months before substantial changes occur and a new version is produced. A lengthy approval process would not only slow advancement, but the costs would be greater to implement design improvements. Thus, the airworthiness acceptance, as proposed under part 108, will allow the use of industry consensus standards and a streamlined acceptance process.

Likewise, FAA proposes a streamlined approach for operations. An operator would apply for authorization to operate using a UA that holds an airworthiness acceptance. Proposed part 108 has a two-level framework that manages risk in an efficient manner: permits and certificates. A smaller-scale operator can apply for an operating permit, which could be issued with sufficient oversight in a prompt and efficient manner. For those operators wanting to expand by operating larger aircraft in size or number, operating over larger concentrations of people, or conducting higher risk or more complex operations, an operating certificate would be required. This certificate would be more akin to operating certificates in traditional aviation and would entail a higher level of interaction with FAA for both issuance and oversight of the certificate.

FAA further proposes new part 146 to create requirements for the standards and establish FAA oversight of automated data service providers. As part 108 enables UAS BVLOS operation, data is critical to the safe and effective operation of these aircraft, as the ability to operate BVLOS is predicated on the fidelity and assurance of the data. To support the operational and airworthiness requirements of part 108, FAA proposes part 146 to enable those providing these services to obtain certification and defines minimum performance standards for those services using industry consensus standards. Proposed part 146 is essential for laying the groundwork for the next step for UAS operations and providing a service approval pathway that could be used to support other types of operations, both manned and unmanned, in the future. This proposal would ensure operators have options in the services that they use depending on their needs, while being assured that they meet a standard that will keep the public safe. And by keeping the regulation flexible, and allowing operators to choose the service they need, future technological innovations would be recognized while allowing choice by the part 108 operators and competition among the part 146 service providers.

B. Need for Automated Data Service Providers

An automated data service provider is a person or company who provides an automated data service using a distributed computational system to support or manage aircraft operations, promoting safety and efficiency of the operation. Automated data service providers may or may not be directly involved in the aircraft operation but would nonetheless support the operation before or during its flight. Automated data service providers would add an important layer of safety and risk mitigation benefits to the operating requirements proposed in this rulemaking. To realize those benefits to scale, FAA proposes to regulate automated data service providers and their services under proposed part 146.

See section XIII of this preamble for further discussion on FAA's proposal to regulate automated data service providers and authorize their services.

Not all automated data services and providers of those services would be subject to proposed part 146. Only those that provide services to support an aircraft operators' ability to comply with an FAA requirement by promoting the safety and efficiency of the operation would be subject to part 146. FAA would not, nor intends to, regulate an entity that does not fall under its purview; as such, providers of automated data services that are not provided to support an aircraft operators' ability to comply with an FAA requirement or do not impact NAS safety nor efficiency would not be enabled through proposed part 146.

Strategic deconfliction is one example of an automated data service that would be promulgated under proposed part 146. Strategic deconfliction would significantly scale UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108. Using strategic deconfliction, a UAS operator can strategically deconflict flight paths, thereby operate safely in the NAS. In contrast, automated data services providers providing fleet management services to aircraft operators would not be regulated under proposed part 146. Fleet management services are used by operators to fulfill a business need, not a safety objective, thus would not be regulated under proposed part 146. For a detailed discussion on the scope and applicability of automated data services and providers of those services under proposed part 146, see section XIII.E of this preamble.

FAA selected the term “automated data service provider” to avoid confusion with terms used to describe services provided by FAA's Air Traffic Organization, which are not subject to this rulemaking. In addition, in presentations and discussions, FAA personnel and industry stakeholders have also used terms such as “third-party service suppliers” and “UTM

service providers.” The term automated data service provider is intended to cover both of those terms. The selected term would also include persons and companies that self-provision their own services (often referred to as vertically integrated companies), as well as persons and companies that provide distributed services dependent on ground-based sensors or equipment—sometimes referred to as Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In addition, the term “automated data service providers,” and part 146 in general, may apply to companies that are new to aviation and market a specific product to UAS operators, such as mobile network operators that have a UAS-specific command-and-control (C2) link offering.

Under proposed part 146, all these terms referring to UTM servicers or third-party servicers and the providers of such services would fall within the umbrella term of automated data service provider. Whether the automated data services are self-provided or outsourced to a third-party, any entity that provides automated data services to support an aircraft operation complying with an FAA regulation would be subject to proposed part 146 regulations.

Automated data services may fulfill a variety of purposes, including mitigating risk, depending on their exact functionality. For example, automated data services that provide strategic coordination for UAS operations reduce the risk of midair collision between UA, thereby reducing the risk of harm to people and property due to falling debris from that midair collision. Other kinds of automated data services may support operators' DAA responsibilities, including by providing surveillance information or avoidance maneuvering instructions that could be more comprehensive or accurate than those the operators may provide using their own systems. Automated data services may also help operators avoid controlled flight into terrain, or loss of control, by providing operators with specialized data before and during flight operations to manage a variety of risk factors.

FAA recognizes that it might not be feasible for some UAS operators to provide all the services and functionality necessary to meet BVLOS safety requirements in-house. This could be for a variety of reasons, including resource and technical knowledge constraints. Automated data services may provide a cost-effective, safe, and scalable means for those UAS operators to meet some of the regulatory requirements in part 108. As a result, automated data services that meet the minimum requirements proposed in this rule would provide a viable set of alternative solutions to ensure operational safety and regulatory compliance without placing undue restrictions or responsibilities on UAS operators.

FAA expects that automated data service providers will deploy services to meet emerging demands and capabilities, some of which are yet to be developed. These services may be based on emerging industry standards that will develop to meet market demands. Recognizing the rapid pace of technological change, FAA proposes a flexible regulatory structure designed to enable the recognition of new services as future standards are designed. Section XIII of this preamble provides the framework for regulating automated data service providers and their services.

C. Definitions (§ 108.5)

FAA proposes to add several definitions in § 108.5 that are unique to operations conducted under proposed part 108. FAA is proposing definitions for AE, C2 link, conformance monitoring, DAA, flight coordinator, ground control station, hazardous material, life-limited part, operational intent, operations personnel, package delivery, safe distance, strategic deconfliction, strategic conflict detection, strategic conflict resolution, and target average conformance. These terms have specific meanings and usage in part 108 that may be unfamiliar to readers, or their usage in part 108 is specifically important to the new UAS framework. These definitions would help the public understand the context of how these terms are used and identify their specific usages throughout part 108. FAA invites comments on the use of the terms and the associated language used in the definitions, as well as if any definitions are not needed, or if any definitions should be added to the list. Discussion and further context for the definitions included in this section can be found in the pertinent sections of the preamble.

V. Part 108 General Requirements (Subpart A)

Currently, most UAS operations in the United States fall under part 107, which applies to small UAS operated within VLOS of the remote operator. Since larger and more complex UAS operations are not covered by part 107, nor are operations permitted beyond VLOS under part 107 without a waiver, UAS operators continue to rely on requesting regulatory exemptions and waivers to allow them to conduct such operations. While FAA has utilized the flexibility of the existing structure broadly to permit increasingly complex and advanced UAS operations, the current regulatory framework impedes full integration of all operations into the U.S. airspace. FAA seeks to fulfill its regulatory responsibility of ensuring the safety and efficiency of the NAS by facilitating the increased integration of UAS into the NAS and realizing UAS operational benefits. Therefore, FAA proposes to enable complex UAS operations, specifically those conducted BVLOS of the operator, under the proposed structure of part 108.

FAA understands that expanding UAS operations may introduce certain safety risks to the NAS. As part of addressing those safety risks, proposed part 108 would require new sets of processes and guidelines for UAS BVLOS operations, including requirements for UAS operators and maintenance personnel.

Under this proposed rule, FAA would require all UAS operators to obtain either an operating permit or an operating certificate to conduct their UAS operations under this part. Operators without an operating permit or certificate would not be allowed to operate under proposed part 108. Under this proposed rule, whether a UAS operator applies for a part 108 operating permit or an operating certificate would depend on the scale and overall risk of their UAS operation. FAA expects that presenting UAS operators with those two options would cultivate a flexible approach for operators to obtain the necessary credentials to then be able to comply with the requirements of this proposed part.

See section VIII of this preamble for the process of obtaining a part 108 operating permit or certificate.

Under this proposed rule, FAA would require operators who wish to conduct BVLOS operations using an operating permit to comply with subpart D of part 108. Likewise, operators who wish to conduct BVLOS operations using an operating certificate would be required to comply with subpart E of proposed part 108. For a discussion on the distinction between part 108 operating permits versus operating certificates, see section VIII of this preamble.

Regardless of whether an operator holds an FAA-issued operating certificate or an FAA-issued operating permit, the proposed rule would require all part 108 operators to comply with the applicable operating rules under subpart B. Subpart B of proposed part 108 would prescribe the general rules of engagement that each operator would need to abide by in order to conduct UAS BVLOS operations under part 108, including preflight operating

requirements and regulations related to operating BVLOS over people. A further discussion on general operating rules is contained in section VI.B of this preamble. Lastly, proposed part 108 would also prescribe operating personnel requirements under subpart C, aircraft maintenance and alterations requirements under subpart F, and general procedural requirements—which includes inspection requirements and prohibitions against engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices—under subpart A of the proposed part.

For subpart A, General, see section V of this preamble; for subpart C, Operations Personnel, see section VII of this preamble; for subpart F, Maintenance and Alterations, see section IX of this preamble.

A. Applicability (§ 108.1)

Proposed § 108.1 states that the requirements in proposed part 108 would apply to any person

who wishes to conduct UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS. Regarding operator requirements, as proposed in § 108.1(a), the requirements of part 108 would apply to any person who (1) conducts, or intends to conduct, UAS BVLOS operations in U.S. airspace; (2) requests FAA issuance of an operating permit or an operating certificate; (3) performs maintenance on a UAS under an operating permit or certificate issued in accordance with this proposed part; (4) is involved in the design, manufacture, or production of UAS to be operating in accordance with part 108; (5) requests FAA airworthiness acceptance of a UAS in accordance with subparts G and H of this part; or (6) submits a voluntary consensus standard for acceptance or approval by FAA as a means of compliance for any provision of part 108.

Per 14 CFR 1.1, a person is described as an individual or an entity, including a corporation, company, association, governmental entity, etc.

In addition to noting who part 108 would apply to, FAA is also proposing specific exclusions from part 108 to delineate between the different regulations that UAS could be operated under. As proposed in § 108.1(b), part 108 would not be applicable to any persons who choose to conduct UAS operations under 14 CFR part 107 or part 91.

In addition, UAS operations conducted under the recreational flyer provisions of 49 U.S.C. 44809 would not be subject to this rulemaking. FAA anticipates that certain operations such as agricultural, package delivery, aerial surveying, photography, and flight testing currently conducted under waivers or exemptions to 14 CFR part 107, 91, or 135 would transition to the operations under part 108 when their exemptions expire, and a reasonable transition can occur. For operations that would not fall within the proposed operating requirements of part 108, FAA believes those operators who are currently complying with FAA requirements to conduct safe and efficient UAS operations may continue to do so in accordance with their existing framework. Proposed part 108 is not intended to fulfill the need for every type of operation related to UAS but rather would expand the types of operations that can be conducted under existing FAA regulations.

FAA considered whether it would be appropriate to amend part 107 or to add an additional subpart to proposed part 108 to provide a regulatory path for certain VLOS operations with aircraft weighing 55 pounds or greater with less automation than envisioned for airworthiness acceptance under this proposed part. Ultimately, FAA determined that adding a VLOS subpart to proposed part 108 would unnecessarily complicate the rule, as the risk mitigations under this proposed part rely on minimal human intervention to manage risk for BVLOS operations of larger aircraft with more complex operations. Operation of larger VLOS aircraft is a different risk set than what is being addressed in proposed part 108 and including it would add significant complexity to the structure of this proposed rule.

In addition, at this time FAA has also opted out of expanding the VLOS rules under part 107 to add UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater because doing so could unnecessarily delay this proposed rule. The 55-pound limit within part 107 functions as a significant risk mitigation in VLOS UAS operations and increasing the weight threshold would require FAA to either develop new risk mitigation measures or have sufficient data to establish that operations can be safely conducted at a higher weight threshold with no additional risk mitigation measures.

Also, FAA is unable to gauge the public's need or desire for VLOS operations of aircraft weighing 55 pounds or greater where the operator cannot, or would be seriously disadvantaged to, meet the airworthiness or operational requirements proposed for part 108. While FAA anticipates that there may be business cases in which manually operated UA equal to or exceeding 55 pounds may be the best option, FAA expects these cases to be limited in number based on current operations. Further, FAA's intention with proposed part 108 is to create a regulatory framework for greatly expanded UAS operations with new and more capable UA, not to create a retrofit model for existing UAS with limited lifespans. Nevertheless, FAA recognizes that there are many existing UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater that are currently operating under an exemption to part 91 and those types of operations will be able to continue as they always have. FAA invites comments on whether there is a need or desire to expand part 107 for VLOS UAS operations weighing 55 pounds or greater. FAA also considered updating the relevant part 91 regulations

that are not currently in alignment with operations of a UA and are frequently the cause of exemptions needed for operators choosing to operate under that part. FAA, however, has opted out of updating part 91 in this way because doing so could unnecessarily prolong this rulemaking. In addition, FAA is unsure how great the need would be for part 91 exemptions after the framework for part 108 is put into place. Finally, FAA invites comments on the assumptions above related to parts 91 and 107, and areas where FAA may be lacking information.

FAA has granted relief from several regulations within 14 CFR; notably, from §§ 91.7(a), 91.109(a), 91.119(b), 91.119(c), 91.121, 91.151(a), 91.151(b), 91.209(a)(1), 91.403(b), 91.405(a), 91.407(a)(1), 91.409(a)(1), 91.409(a)(2), 91.417(a), 91.417(b), among other sections of part 91.

It is important to note that, while proposed part 108 enables the operation of UA BVLOS, there is no prohibition from operating within VLOS under proposed part 108, so long as all the regulatory requirements are met. To illustrate this, an aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds that is to be operated within VLOS would have several options for which part they could operate under. They could operate under part 107, proposed part 108, part 91, or 49 U.S.C. 44809. Each regulation has its own set of unique requirements and allowances. An operator would have to meet all relevant requirements associated with the regulatory part they choose to operate under.

Proposed part 108 is not intended to be used for carriage of people. The risk mitigations provided by this part are not sufficient for passenger carriage nor were they designed with carriage of people in mind. To that end, FAA proposes in § 108.1(b)(4) that UA operated under part 108 are not permitted to carry a person. Operations contemplating carriage of people would appropriately occur under other regulatory parts, such as 14 CFR parts 91 or 135.

B. Reporting and Prohibitions

1. Reproduction or Alteration (§ 108.10)

FAA expects that all parties affected by this proposed rulemaking would comply with FAA requirements when conducting UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108. Engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices would be prohibited under proposed part 108, as it is under all existing FAA regulations.

As proposed in the

Falsification, Reproduction, Alteration, Omission, or Incorrect Statements

notice of proposed rulemaking (89 FR 8560), FAA intends to use a comprehensive prohibition on fraudulent or deceptive practices that covers all FAA regulations. If that rule becomes final, proposed § 108.10 would be redundant.

Proposed § 108.10(a) would prohibit anyone from making any fraudulent or intentionally false statement to any information submitted to FAA to show compliance with proposed part 108. Persons would be prohibited from fraudulently reproducing or altering an FAA-issued operating certificate or permit. If anyone were to engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices, proposed § 108.10(b) would enable FAA to issue penalties to those persons for their violations. Those penalties could include issuing a denial to applications for part 108 operating permits, part 108 operating certificates, certificates of waiver or authorizations, or declarations of compliance. Under the proposed rule, FAA may also penalize violators by suspending or revoking any permit, certificate, authorization, DOC, or similar that were already issued or accepted by FAA. Lastly, anyone violating this provision may also be subject to civil penalties.

2. Prohibition on Interference With Unmanned Aircraft Operations Personnel (§ 108.15)

Proposed § 108.15 would prohibit anyone from assaulting, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with operations personnel of a UA in the performance of their duties regarding the operation of a UA. This requirement would be necessary to protect the safety and efficiency of the NAS. Bad actors who interfere with UAS operations may endanger public safety, or any persons or property—both in the air or on the ground—which is anathema to FAA's obligation to ensure the safe and efficient use of the NAS. FAA notes that nothing in this requirement would preclude law enforcement, emergency services, the intelligence community, military personnel, or FAA personnel executing their authorized duties from intervening in operations in the interests of national security, emergency response, or oversight and surveillance necessary for the safety of the NAS.

3. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration of Compliance (§ 108.20)

To ensure operations are conducted in accordance with existing rules and limitations, and FAA's statutory oversight responsibilities,

§§ 108.20(a)(1) and (2) proposes that an operator would need to have their authorization to operate and identification readily accessible when operating and present it to any of the following: FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and law enforcement officers. This measure would ensure that all operators are appropriately authorized, enhancing the safety and security of airspace operations. This requirement would set the stage for obligations aimed at maintaining operational integrity and oversight. This mandate would hold the operator accountable for unauthorized access and operation of UAS, which could result in incidents or accidents. The proposed requirement that operators have their authorization and identification on hand is so that government personnel would be able to verify that the operation is authorized and that qualified personnel are in control. This would ensure that operations are conducted efficiently and in compliance with regulatory standards.

See

49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(2)(A).

Section 108.20(a)(3) further proposes that an operator would need to make available, upon request of FAA or any authorized representative of the NTSB, any document, record, or report required to be kept under the regulations of 14 CFR chapter I. By ensuring that all relevant documents, records, and reports are readily available for inspection, government representatives would be able to monitor compliance with established safety standards and regulations. This oversight would be essential for identifying potential areas of non-compliance or safety risks that could jeopardize the safety of operations. Utilizing these documents as part of regular and ad-hoc inspections would allow for a proactive approach to safety management, enabling the early detection and resolution of safety issues before they lead to accidents or incidents.

In the aftermath of an incident, the availability of comprehensive documentation is important for thorough investigations conducted by the NTSB or other relevant authorities. These documents would provide a detailed account of operational procedures, maintenance records, personnel qualifications, and other factors that might contribute to understanding the root causes of an incident. Access to such information supports developing effective recommendations to prevent future occurrences, thereby improving overall safety standards.

Section 108.20(b) proposes that each operator of UAS would be required to, upon request, allow FAA to make or witness any test or inspection of the UAS, including any aspect of the operation of a UAS, and if applicable, the automated data services utilized, to determine compliance with this part, including access to the operations area for the aircraft. This proposed requirement is consistent with FAA's exercise of its authority to ensure operational safety in the NAS. In circumstances in which FAA were to identify a safety issue that warrants review of the operation, this proposed requirement would permit FAA review of all applicable information to make any appropriate determinations about the safety of the operation.

The ability for FAA to perform inspections without prior notice would ensure that operators consistently adhere to the highest standards of safety as a fundamental practice, not just when an inspection is anticipated. This continuous state of readiness and compliance would safeguard not only the operators and their assets, but also the public potential hazards.

Moreover, these inspections would serve as a feedback loop. They would allow FAA to observe operational practices, the state of equipment, and adherence to regulations. Such inspections would promote transparency and accountability. By allowing FAA access to conduct these evaluations, operators would demonstrate their commitment to operating within existing limitations and requirements. This openness would build trust among stakeholders, including regulatory bodies, the public, and other airspace users.

Section 108.20(c) proposes that each employee of, or person used by, the operator who is responsible for maintaining the operator's records would need to make those records available to FAA. Making records accessible to FAA would allow for thorough audits and reviews that can verify compliance with safety standards, operational procedures, and maintenance practices. These records would include, but would not be limited to, logs of operational procedures, maintenance and repair

records, safety assessments, and employee training records and any other record relating to compliance.

Requiring records to be available for inspection would encourage operators to maintain accurate and comprehensive documentation of their operations. This practice would support continuous improvement by facilitating regular reviews and updates to safety practices based on insights gained from record analysis.

As part of FAA's safety oversight framework, this proposal would require individuals holding an FAA airworthiness acceptance to make available evidence of such acceptance and any other requisite documents upon request. It would ensure that aircraft operating within FAA's regulatory jurisdiction meet the safety standards, thereby protecting the public, enhancing the integrity of the aviation industry, and fostering continuous improvement in aviation safety.

Section 108.20(d) proposes that failure by any operator to make available to the Administrator upon request, the certificate, operations specifications, or any required record, document, or report would be grounds for suspension of all or any part of the operator's permit or certificate.

4. Aviation Safety Reporting System: Prohibition Against Use of Reports for Enforcement Purposes (§ 108.25)

Proposed § 108.25 would prohibit FAA from using reports submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in any enforcement action against part 108 operators. This prohibition would not apply, however, in cases where the information submitted to NASA concerns accidents or criminal offenses, which are wholly excluded from ASRS. ASRS was originally created to collect aviation safety event information from pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers, and other users of the NAS. Under part 107, UAS pilots operating within the VLOS may also use ASRS to report safety events.

The prohibition in proposed § 108.25 against FAA using ASRS data in enforcement actions would be very similar to how such reports are protected and used for part 91 pilots, part 107 UAS pilots, and other airspace users who are subject to various portions of FAA regulations. FAA and NASA have recognized the benefit of having accurate, candid, and timely reports of unsafe (or potentially unsafe) conditions in the NAS. Such data and reports are vital for proactive and generative safety assurance, enabling FAA to identify leading indicators of increasing risk prior to an accident or incident. As FAA stated in Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46F, “the effectiveness of this program in improving safety depends on the free, unrestricted flow of information from the users of the NAS.” FAA is concerned that, without such a prohibition on enforcement actions, pilots, UAS operators and other NAS users would be disincentivized from making safety reports, including acknowledging unintentional or honest mistakes, for fear of being penalized by FAA.

5. Base of Operation and Operator Identification (§§ 108.30 and 108.35)

FAA proposes in §§ 108.30(a) and (b) that each operator would be required to maintain a principal base of operations in the United States and would be required to provide FAA with a physical address. This physical address would serve as the primary point of contact for FAA, though (per proposed § 108.30(d)) the operator may perform operations at locations other than the principal base of operations, as authorized by FAA. Further, per proposed § 108.30(c), the operator would need to notify FAA at least 30 days prior to changing their principal base of operations. However, recreational operators would not be required to submit a principal base of operations, in accordance with proposed § 108.475(f)(3). Recreational operators would only be required to submit a physical address.

By ensuring that all operators supply a physical address, FAA would have the ability to accomplish prompt and cost-effective service of process and service of other safety-critical or time-sensitive documents, including notices of proposed civil penalties, orders of suspension or revocation, and emergency orders of suspension or revocation. In addition, as this proposed rule would only apply to operations conducted within the United States, FAA finds it necessary that the physical base of operations is also located in the United States. While part 47 aircraft registration does require the aircraft owner to provide a mailing address, FAA is including this requirement for a principal base of operations in proposed part 108 because it is important for FAA to know the primary location where the operator will be conducting operations to conduct inspections. The address required for part 47 is the owner's mailing address, which may or may not be where the UA is located or from which it is operated.

In addition, FAA proposes in § 108.35(a) that an operator would not be able to operate or advertise services of a UA under part 108 using a business name other than what is listed on the operating permit or operating certificate. If the operator were to operate under a d/b/a, the business names would need to be provided on the application and listed on the permit or certificate to be valid. Furthermore, in proposed § 108.35(b), no person would be able to operate a UA under part 108 unless the identity of the operator is displayed on the UA in a manner acceptable to FAA. In addition to the registration number, FAA proposes that an operator would need to include the company name or trademark on the exterior of the aircraft for ease of identity in the case of a lost aircraft or off-site landing. FAA also encourages the addition of contact information in the form of a phone number, QR code, or other method to enable people who may come across the UA be able to report the sighting easily.

These proposed requirements in § 108.35 would be consistent with FAA practices for other commercial operations and would ensure FAA has sufficient information to contact the operator as necessary, including in instances where a UA is destroyed and access to remote ID or other electronic systems is not possible, or FAA has other reason to contact the operator. In addition, as with other regulations applicable to commercial operations, the proposed prohibition on advertising under a different name would ensure that the people using the operator have the assurance that the company is operating within the regulatory framework established by FAA and would ensure FAA can appropriately link the operator who is advertising with the approval for the operation.

C. Recordkeeping (§ 108.40)

FAA proposes in § 108.40 to require each operator under proposed part 108 to maintain records for each aircraft used in part 108 operations, each required operations personnel used in part 108 operations, any mechanical irregularities for the UA and its AE, any maintenance or alterations performed on the UA or its AE, and all initial and recurrent training taken by each person required to receive training under proposed part 108. The operator would also be expected to provide FAA access to the records upon request, either electronically or in paper form.

For aircraft records, FAA proposes under § 108.40(a) that operators would need to include a current list of UA used in the permitted or certificated operation, the total time in service of each UA, and the status of any life-limited parts. FAA and industry rely

heavily on current aircraft status and past aircraft servicing and inspections to determine airworthiness of an aircraft. FAA would therefore require these records to be kept by the operator under this part.

FAA further proposes in § 108.40(a)(3) that an operator who performs a flight under this proposed rule would need to maintain records of each flight, including the date, time, and duration of the flight; the aircraft registration number; the type of operation (

e.g.,

package delivery); the flight path including destination, origin, and altitude(s); the name of the designated operations personnel assigned to each flight; and landing locations if different from origin and destination locations. FAA is proposing this recordkeeping to ensure the availability of information critical to incident or accident investigations. By requiring the operator to maintain these, FAA and operator would have historical data to determine root causes of occurrences, incidents, or accidents.

Proposed §§ 108.40(a)(3)(vii) and 108.40(a)(3)(viii) include operation type-specific recordkeeping requirements for package delivery and agricultural operators. Under proposed § 108.40(a)(3)(vii), FAA would require package delivery operators to keep a record of the pickup points and delivery locations for each operation. FAA is proposing this requirement in addition to destination, origin, and landing locations because some UA do not physically land to pick up or deliver packages and it would be critical for FAA to know who the customers or warehousers are and where they are located in the event of an incident or accident investigation. Under proposed § 108.40(a)(3)(viii), FAA would also require the operators performing agricultural operations to keep a record of the name and address of each person for whom agricultural UA services were provided, the date of the service, and the name and quantity of the substance dispensed be kept as a record by the operator. The rationale for this additional requirement is that the agricultural operator may be contracted to provide services to one or more customers, and it is important for FAA to know who these customers are and where they are located in the event of an incident or investigation. Oftentimes, FAA does not discover non-compliance, accidents, or incidents involving aircraft until after the flight has been completed. By requiring these detailed records to be kept by the operator, FAA and operator would have historical data to look back on to determine root causes to occurrences, incidents, or accidents.

Because personnel are a key contributor to how any permit or certificate holder conducts safe operations, FAA proposes in § 108.40(b) that each operator would need to maintain records on each person required for the safe operation of the UAS used in its operations, including their full name, qualifications in sufficient detail to determine the individual's ability to participate in part 108 operations, current duties and date of duty assignment, and information relating to an individual's release from employment for cause. In addition, for operators holding an operating certificate, the operator would also need be required to maintain records on the date and times of operations personnel assigned work shifts, the length of the rest period prior to each duty period for each of the required personnel, and the total hours on duty per calendar day for each of the required operations personnel which, as discussed in VII.F, would require a minimum of 10-hour rest periods and maximum 14-hour duty days. This information would be valuable in understanding if persons are fit for duty and appropriately qualified. In addition, this information would be beneficial to FAA for continued surveillance purposes.

FAA proposes in § 108.40(c) that operators would need to provide logs for personnel to record mechanical irregularities. Having this log would allow personnel to view current and previous discrepancies for corrections and airworthiness of the aircraft. FAA further proposes that operations personnel would be required to enter, or to have entered, in the log each mechanical irregularity for the UA and their AE that comes to the person's attention. For operators to ensure that faulty or inoperative equipment is addressed per manufacturers’ maintenance instructions, operations personnel would need to create a log of the faulty item should it come to their attention. This log would ultimately be used by both maintenance personnel for correction and operations personnel for determining overall UA airworthiness. In addition, when entering a log of mechanical irregularity, FAA proposes that personnel who take corrective action concerning a reported or observed failure or malfunction would need to enter, or need to have entered, the action taken in the log. This would ensure that any person(s) responsible for determining UA airworthiness can decide the UA's overall operational status.

Further, FAA proposes that, under § 108.40(d), the operator would be required to maintain records of the UA inspection status for each maintenance or alteration activity to the UA or its AE. It is important for anyone operating the UA to be able to determine when the last inspections were performed and the status of all the required inspections as outlined in the manufacturer's maintenance instructions. In addition, persons performing maintenance on the UA would be required under proposed § 108.40(d)(1) to make a record of that activity, including a description of the work performed, the date of completion of the work, the identification of the person who performed the maintenance, and a return to service approval. These requirements would additionally help persons responsible for airworthiness determination to ensure proper airworthiness status of the UA by showing a complete log of all work performed.

FAA proposes in § 108.40(d)(2) that operators would not need to comply with the logging and documenting requirements of proposed § 108.40 for removal and replacement of UA batteries designed for frequent, toolless replacement if the operator has other means of tracking battery use, life, and performance. Some UA designs necessitate the removal of the aircraft batteries on every flight for charging. Aircraft designed this way are expected to have an easy, toolless feature that prevents the battery from being installed improperly and ensures that the battery is secure. Therefore, all of the information generally required for other maintenance entries may not be needed in these cases and may become overly burdensome if required for every flight. However, FAA recognizes that batteries are essential to most UA operations and does propose that operators would still need a way to track battery use, life, and performance.

FAA also proposes in § 108.40(d)(3) that operators would not need to comply with the logging and documenting requirements of § 108.40 for removal and replacement of UA components that are designed for toolless removal and installation, such as removable rotors which may be necessary to remove for UA storage, so long as the operator has procedures for ensuring that any part that is removed is inspected for serviceability prior to being reinstalled and: (1) the parts are reinstalled on the same aircraft; (2) the parts are not subject to time limits; or (3) the operator has other means of tracking installations and use. Through current experience, FAA understands that UA often have various removable parts that are frequently removed and replaced without being deemed faulty. These typical parts are removed for

reasons such as storage or repositioning of the UA. FAA does not intend to overburden an operator with logging and documenting parts that the manufacturer has designed to be normally removed and reinstalled. So long as operators have procedures for ensuring parts are removed, inspected, and reinstalled, FAA has concluded that safety would not be affected by not requiring logging and documenting normal removal and reinstallation of parts.

Personnel training is of great importance, as it ensures appropriate qualification, competency, and proficiency of a person performing their duties. To understand each person's qualification, competency, and proficiency, proposed § 108.40(e) would require the operator to keep a record showing personnel training. Initial and recurrent training records are important because they show a person's baseline qualifications and continuing proficiency. In addition to requiring recordkeeping of all initial and recurrent training, operators would additionally need to maintain records on initial and recurrent training on handling hazardous materials and for agricultural operations. As described in section VIII.C 9, these types of operations would have additional knowledge requirements to address the use of agricultural products. In addition, these training records would give a snapshot of company policies and procedures at the time that the training occurred. This may be of importance when reviewing archival records for root cause of non-compliance or a safety incident.

FAA proposes that the records required by § 108.40(e) would need to contain the person's name, the date of hire or start of a related job function, the most recent training completion date, a description, copy, or reference to training materials used to meet the training requirement, the name and address of the organization providing the training, and a copy of the certification issued when the individual was trained, which would show that training has been completed satisfactorily. All of this documentation would help not only the operator to have a complete description of the training event for tracking, scheduling of future training, and archival documentation for non-compliances, but also would help FAA to determine continued compliance.

Finally, this proposal would include minimum retention periods. FAA recognizes that operators may struggle to keep track of old records and the necessity for archival data from those records becomes unnecessary and non-applicable as time goes on. FAA therefore proposes that UA records, mechanical irregularity records, and maintenance records would need to be kept either for the life of the aircraft, or for 24 months, as applicable. Records of the total time in service of each UA and the status of any life-limited parts must be kept for the life of the aircraft as they establish important history for the UA that must be maintained. Records of each flight performed, must be retained for a period of 24 months. Personnel records must generally continue to be maintained as long as the employee is employed and continue until 12 months after the person has separated from the company, to include any training performed or received, however, duty and rest records only have to be maintained for 3 months. Records of mechanical irregularities and maintenance performed must also be retained for a period of 24 months.

In addition, personnel and training records would need to be retained for 12 months following the separation of the personnel from the operator. This amount of time would be sufficient for these records to be useful. FAA does not want to impose on an operator record filing that, after years of retention, may create faulty, inundated databases with records that have not shown to be of concern within the previous 12 months. FAA proposes that initial and recurrent training records required by § 108.315, initial and recurrent training records required by § 108.440(b), initial and recurrent training records required by § 108.570(a) and records received for agricultural operations required by §§ 108.445(i)-(j) and 108.575(g) would need to be retained under the proposed above requirements for 12 months after separation.

Finally, FAA proposes that operators holding an operating certificate would need to retain records in proposed § 108.40(b)(5) concerning the date and times of operations personnel assigned work shifts, the length of the rest period prior to each duty period for each of the required operations personnel, and the total hours on duty per calendar day for each of the required operations personnel for a period of 3 months. Information contained in these records are related to individual flights. FAA would use this type of data during routine surveillance inspections to determine individual flight compliance with regulations. FAA does however recognize the burden that would be imposed on an operator should records for multiple flights be required to be kept for long periods at a time. Operator databases would be overloaded with data. During routine surveillance, FAA typically reviews samplings of this type of data to determine overall compliance. FAA does not see the need to retain lengthy archival data concerning individual flights.

D. Reporting (§ 108.45)

FAA has a duty to ensure the safety of the NAS. To do so, FAA needs to be aware of accidents, incidents, and precursor safety events and occurrences in the NAS. The reporting requirements proposed in § 108.45 are intended to capture a diverse set of data ensuring that FAA can appropriately track and monitor the safety of UAS operations under this part.

In § 108.45(a)(1), FAA proposes that each operator would be required to report aggregate flight data to FAA. This data would include the total number of flight hours operated for each individual UA, including the specific make, model, or series of aircraft and the associated FAA registration number. This data would be helpful for three reasons. First, it would support FAA's safety oversight functions. By collecting flight data, FAA would gain insights into UAS operations. This information would help FAA identify potential risks, and areas for improvement. Second, this data would be useful in identifying trends that could otherwise lead to accidents or incidents. Monitoring flight hours would allow FAA to track usage patterns and identify any anomalies or excessive usage. This would also aid in preventing accidents due to overuse or fatigue-related issues. Third, reporting flight data would ensure compliance with regulations by enabling FAA to verify that operators are adhering to their operational limits.

In § 108.45(a)(2) FAA proposes requiring operators to provide flight data to the manufacturer or permit and facilitate flight data collection by the manufacturer to ensure continued operational support for the operator. Traditionally, these data collection systems are already voluntarily implemented within the industry to analyze flight data to aid in the identification of safety issues with the UA design. FAA envisions that this could be accomplished by submitting the data log file to support both § 108.725 and § 108.905. In § 108.45(b), FAA proposes requiring each operator to report the registration and serial numbers of each aircraft used in part 108 operations. This report would need to be made in a form or manner acceptable to the Administrator. FAA notes in proposed § 108.45(b) that this reporting can be combined with the flight data reporting required under

proposed § 108.45(a). Requiring this reporting allows FAA to easily determine an operator's compliance with § 108.115 as well as to ensure ongoing regulatory compliance.

In § 108.45(c), FAA proposes that operators would be required to submit a monthly interruption report summary to FAA when there is an occurrence related to an unplanned or precautionary landing away from the normally designated landing location or where the planned UAS route is altered due to known or suspected mechanical difficulties or malfunctions. By analyzing these occurrences, FAA would gain insights into common failure modes. This information would inform maintenance practices and would help improve reliability—including potential changes that the manufacturer may need to make or that can be addressed through revisions to industry consensus standards. Aggregated reports would allow FAA to assess the overall health of a growing and diverse fleet of UAS. This would inform regulatory decisions, training programs, and safety best practices, among other outcomes. Taken together, these reporting requirements would serve as essential tools for maintaining safety, compliance, and operational efficiency.

FAA further proposes that operators certificated under subpart E would be mandated under § 108.45(d)(1) to report to the UA manufacturer any failure, malfunction, or defect that results in a momentary or permanent loss of control or communication of the UAS if it has endangered, or may endanger, the safe operation of the UA. Under the proposed rule, operators would also have to provide such reports to FAA upon request. FAA's intent for this proposed requirement is that this information could be used by the manufacturer to monitor and identify negative trends affecting the safe operation of the UA and its AE. Reporting reliability issues to the UAS manufacturer would provide a vital source of data to help detect and mitigate potential hazards and improve aircraft design. Safety reporting can provide precursor data before a hazard leads to a more significant event. By analyzing these events, industry may be able to avoid future incidents or accidents.

Operators would need to include specific details in their reports, including the date, aircraft identification and nature of the failure. Furthermore, FAA proposes in § 108.45(d)(1) that service difficulty reports would also need to include identification of a part or system involved, which aids in pinpointing root causes and assessing overall system reliability. FAA also proposes in § 108.45(d)(1) requiring operators to indicate the apparent cause of the failure, malfunction, or defect. This could include factors such as wear, cracks, a design deficiency, or a personnel error on the part of the operator. Regardless of what the cause is, understanding the root cause would inform better preventive measures. To assist manufacturers in determining the best course to address a service difficulty report, FAA also proposes in § 108.45(d)(1) that operators would need to report any corrective actions taken.

The service difficulty reporting requirements for operators to report to automated data service providers in proposed § 108.45(d)(2) would substantially mirror those discussed in proposed § 108.45(d)(1), albeit with several notable exceptions. The requirement to make service difficulty reports related to service usage would apply to all users of a service, not just operational certificate holders. Because the operational use of automated data services is new, FAA wants to enable greater information exchange between users and service providers when the failure, malfunction, or defect of an authorized service has endangered or may endanger the safe operation of the aircraft. This proposed rule would require that users report details of the apparent failure of an automated data service, which could include operational or functional issues including notification of a contingent state, interface issues, data issues, time delay/latency issues, or the operational response to information or alerts from a service. FAA intends for this to be broad so that users and service providers alike can recognize a range of issues, including systemic incorrect usage of a service that may be due to ambiguities in documentation, design, or other factors.

Prompt reporting of service difficulties of not later than 7 days after the occurrence would enable manufacturers and automated data service providers to play a proactive role in assessing and mitigating potential safety risks. By reporting to the aircraft manufacturer or the automated data service providers, operators would contribute to a broader understanding of real-world performance and reliability. This feedback would inform design improvements, corrective actions, and other sets of standards upon which the airworthiness acceptance and service authorization rely. Therefore, in proposed § 108.45(h)(4), FAA proposes that reporting under (d)(1) and (d)(2) would need to occur no later than 7 days after the occurrence.

FAA proposes several security-related reporting requirements in § 108.45(e). Any security breach where an operator loses control of the UAS would need to be reported to FAA. This would include unauthorized control that may be careless in nature or perpetrated by a malicious agent, regardless of if that individual is an employee or an outsider. Furthermore, an operator would need to report unauthorized access to the operator's facilities, including areas where UAS are loaded, hazardous materials are stored, or goods are prepared for transport. Finally, an operator would need to report unauthorized access to the operator's networks, devices, or data, regardless of its impact on UAS operations' integrity, accuracy, or reliability. In the report for any incident, the operator would need to include the date and time of the incident, the nature and scope of the incident, identification of any vulnerabilities that led to loss of control or unauthorized access, and corrective actions taken. These security-related reporting requirements would work in conjunction with similar requirements FAA proposes for aircraft manufacturers (sections X and XI) and automated data service providers (section XIII). Reporting security incidents would ensure that potential threats are identified and addressed promptly and contributes to national security by preventing misuse of UAS technology. Reporting would allow FAA to investigate breaches, assess vulnerabilities, and implement corrective measures. It also would help prevent future incidents. Reporting such breaches helps safeguard critical data and maintain public trust.

FAA proposes in § 108.45(f) that part 108 UAS operators report any deviation from this part in the event of an emergency within 10 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays. While emergencies may necessitate deviations from standard procedures, reporting these deviations would ensure transparency and accountability on the part of the operator, and may provide insights into operational challenges that could inform changes in training or operational policies.

FAA proposes in § 108.45(g) that operators must report to FAA any operation of a UA that involves damage to property, other than the UA, which exceeds $500, and for any malfunction or failure of any system that leads to operations into an unauthorized area. Note that these reports are in addition to the reporting of aircraft accidents and

serious incidents required under 49 CFR 830. FAA chose not to add a duplicative reporting requirement as FAA would also receive these notifications in due course through that regulatory process. FAA intends to use the data both to track overall safety performance and to establish and update relevant safety policies for ongoing BVLOS UAS operations under the rule. Reports under proposed § 108.45(g) would need to include the date, time, and location of the event, as well as a description of the event (including operational factors including whether use, failure, malfunction, or defect of an automated data service provider was a factor) and any known contributing factors. FAA proposes requiring reports within 10 days of the event. This would be consistent with the corresponding reporting requirement in proposed § 107.20.

Finally, FAA proposes in § 108.45(h) reporting timeframes for each reporting requirement enumerated under proposed § 108.45. Under the proposed rule, flight data and UA registration and serial numbers (§§ 108.45(a) and 108.45(b)) would need to be provided to FAA at least once each calendar month. FAA intends to provide an automated interface to facilitate the collection of this data and anticipates that most manufacturers and operators will incorporate automation to comply with this request, so that data collection could be as frequent as near real-time, weekly, or any other frequency that is at least once a month. As this is a new requirement, FAA invites comments on the impact this might have on operators, including potentially less-burdensome alternatives.

Summaries of occurrences under interruption reports (§ 108.45(c)) would need to be provided no later than the end of the 10th day of the following month in which the occurrence took place, which would be consistent with other similar requirements in other regulations.

Service difficulty reports (§ 108.45(d)) would need to be submitted 7 days after the occurrence, with additional information provided as needed to supplement the initial report which is also consistent with similar requirements.

Security occurrences (§ 108.45(e)) would need to be reported no later than 96 hours after the occurrence, with supplemental information after the initial report as needed, which would be a new requirement but is being proposed as a 96-hour requirement due to the nature of the information. Emergency conditions and event reporting (§§ 108.45(f) and (g)) would need to be submitted within 10 days of the deviation or event, respectively.

See, e.g.,

14 CFR 135.417, 14 CFR 121.705, 14 CFR 91.1417.

See, e.g.,

14 CFR 135.415, 14 CFR 121.703, 14 CFR 125.409.

Lastly, in considering appropriate reporting requirements for operations under part 108, FAA is considering requiring UA operators to report to FAA all aircraft traffic targets received by their UA operating under this part. This would include reporting ADS-B targets used to meet § 108.195 and part 89 compliant remote ID received by the operator's UA. The latter remote ID reporting requirement would have required additional aircraft reception capability that is not explicitly required by the proposed part 108 rule. This reporting requirement would allow FAA to have a more comprehensive awareness of operations within airspace used by part 108 operators. It would allow FAA to better respond to governmental or public inquiries about UAS operations as low altitude UAS operations increase in scale. However, the presumed additional cost to meet the reporting requirement for the UA manufacturer, part 108 operator, and FAA is considerable. FAA requests comment on whether FAA should require this traffic target reporting, and if so, what type of general time latency would be appropriate for FAA to require.

VI. Conducting UAS BVLOS Operations (Subpart B)

Subpart B of proposed part 108 prescribes the general operating requirements for all operators conducting operations under proposed part 108. To conduct UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS under this proposed rule, FAA would require part 108 operators to comply with all applicable requirements of this part. As noted in proposed § 108.100(a), this rule would establish two pathways for operation under part 108, operating permits and operating certificates. Subpart B applies to operations conducted under an operating permit (subpart D) and operations conducted under an operating certificate (subpart E). Further description of the operating permits and certificates can be found in section VIII of this preamble and personnel requirements can be found in section VII of this preamble.

This rule proposes requirements for BVLOS operations conducted within the United States, using risk-based criteria that permit further evolution of operations than currently allowed in existing regulations. The below section lays out FAA's reasoning and proposed requirements for a BVLOS operating framework, while this section describes the overall requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations envisioned under this rule.

Proposed part 108, like part 107, would have specific risk mitigation and hazard reduction provisions that would facilitate integration. The requirement for all part 108 operations to have a means to avoid manned aircraft broadcasting their position using ADS-B Out equipment would extend to Class G airspace, providing additional collision risk reduction compared with the strategic mitigations provided through the regulatory requirements of part 107. In addition, UAS would be required to have anti-collision lighting that conforms to an industry standard to ensure that they are visible to manned aircraft.

To meet the requirements of proposed part 108, operations under this proposed part would require the use of a registered aircraft (section VI.A.2) with an airworthiness acceptance received in accordance with subparts G and H of part 108, with an exception for flight testing. The UA and its AE would be required to be equipped with aircraft lighting (section VI.A) and be in safe condition for operation (section VI.B). This rule proposes to permit operations in both uncontrolled (section VI.F) and controlled airspace (section VI.G), with operations limited to 400 feet AGL and below. Access to controlled airspace would depend on the operator holding an approved method for strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring, as discussed in section VI.I.

This rule also proposes a set of criteria by which operators could operate over people (section VI.H). These criteria would rely on a population distribution data set called LandScan USA, developed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and define categories and criteria for operation. This rule would continue to prohibit operations over open-air assemblies.

In order to enable operations in controlled airspace and over people, this rule also proposes requirements for strategic deconfliction (section VI.I), changes to right-of-way rules (section VI.J), and Remote ID performance (section VI.K). These three proposed requirements would provide a framework for the kind of shared, dynamic environment FAA anticipates this proposed rulemaking could enable. In addition, this rule sets requirements for shielded operations (section VI.L), which would permit BVLOS operations within 50 feet of an obstacle or a structure or other designated areas, without further authorization. The

proposed rule would permit operations with multiple UA (section VI.M).

Finally, this rule proposes requirements to prohibit careless or reckless operation (section VI.N), manuals (section VI.O), and emergency conditions (section VI.P).

A. Operating Unmanned Aircraft Under Part 108

As explained in section X of this preamble, FAA is proposing that a UA operating under this rule would be required to have an airworthiness acceptance rather than an airworthiness certification. Because an individual UA evaluation by FAA would not take place, FAA would additionally require under proposed § 108.720(a)(1) that the manufacturer develop limitations for the UAS to be operated as specified in the manufacturer's UAS operating instructions. This requirement would ensure that operators do not exceed the manufacturer's operational limits on the UA, which could lead to UA failure. Under this proposed rulemaking, manufacturers would develop and test UA to meet consensus standards for FAA airworthiness acceptance. Manufacturers would need to demonstrate that the UAS design may be safely used in BVLOS operations in accordance with FAA-accepted consensus standards.

Accordingly, to operate under proposed part 108, operators would be required to use a UA that holds an airworthiness acceptance, as noted in proposed § 108.105(b), except for UA operated under the flight test permit of proposed § 108.470. These UA and AE would need to be in condition for safe operation and, per proposed § 108.105(a), meet the equipage requirements of subpart H, further described in section XI. These equipage requirements to meet proposed § 108.105(c) would provide the assurance that the aircraft would be able to operate safely, including the fidelity of the AE, suitability and durability of materials, and lighting requirements.

1. Aircraft Lighting (§ 108.110)

Using an anti-collision lighting system or position lights on UA would provide a means for a manned aircraft pilot to observe UA. As such, FAA has proposed in § 108.110 that aircraft lighting would be required for operations under part 108. Proposed § 108.110(a) would require operators to use an anti-collision lighting system during all flight operations, day or night, except when in the interest of safety, as discussed below. To comply with proposed § 08.110(a), the anti-collision lighting system would need to meet the requirements of proposed § 108.830. In addition, proposed § 108.110(b) would require operators use lighted position lights during all operations at night when operating a UA that is equipped with position lights per the requirements of proposed § 108.835.

An anti-collision light is designed to minimize the risk of collision with other aircraft while airborne. Anti-collision lighting usually consists of white pulsating strobe-type lights. The bright flash of an anti-collision light is typically the first visual a pilot has at night of another aircraft, allowing pilots to take appropriate actions to avoid collisions. Under this proposal, anti-collision lights would be required during all operations, as the use of the anti-collision lights can always provide awareness of an aircraft operation prior to and during flight.

As stated in § 108.110(c), this proposal would also permit the flight coordinator to reduce the intensity of, or turn off, the anti-collision lighting if they determine that, because of operating conditions, it would be in the interest of safety to do so. FAA anticipates that there may be situations, primarily during takeoff and landing, where the flight coordinator may want to either reduce the intensity of or turn off the anti-collision lighting due to close proximity with the flight coordinator or other persons on the ground. Allowing the flight coordinator to reduce the intensity of or turn off the anti-collision lighting during takeoff and landing would help to maintain the flight coordinator's full night vision adaptation, which generally takes 30 minutes after exposure to bright lights. If the flight coordinator were to lose their night vision adaptation from exposure to the anti-collision light, they might no longer be able to ensure that the takeoff or landing area is clear for operations.

The primary purpose of requiring lighted position lights on UA during night operations is to enhance the visibility of these aircraft to other airspace users. This requirement would help prevent midair collisions and ensure safe distance between aircraft, particularly in areas of high traffic density or when operating in proximity to manned aircraft. Position lights would make it easier for pilots of manned aircraft and other UA operators to see and track UA, thereby facilitating better situational awareness and decision-making in flight.

Enforcing the use of lighted position lights at night would align with existing regulations for manned aircraft, promoting a consistent and predictable environment for all airspace users. This requirement would ensure that UA are visible to other pilots and air traffic control, thereby supporting safer coexistence and minimizing the risk of incursions or airspace violations.

2. Registration (§ 108.115)

Per 49 U.S.C. 44101, all aircraft operated in the NAS must be registered with FAA. No person is allowed to operate a UA unless it has been registered by its owner, unless the aircraft meets a limited exception from registration.

There are currently two ways to register a UAS. Part 47, which broadly applies to all aircraft, including UA, and part 48, which provides an alternate route to register a small UA, defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds. Since part 108 would cover operations of UA weighing greater than 55 pounds, part 48 could not be used for all part 108 operations without making significant changes to part 48. FAA has determined that it is appropriate for UA operated under part 108 to follow the existing registration structure set out in part 47. Though small UA may operate under part 108, FAA is proposing that all aircraft conducting part 108 operations would be required to follow the registration procedures of part 47, as proposed in § 108.115(a). As a result, FAA is proposing to amend § 48.1, Applicability, to require small UA that operate under 108 to use the registration procedures of part 47.

Section 48.105 Registration: Small unmanned aircraft intended exclusively for limited recreational operations adds an exception to the general registration requirement for small UA for recreational flyers. In those cases, a Certificate of Aircraft Registration issued in accordance with § 48.110 constitutes registration for all the small UA used exclusively for operations in compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44809 owned by the individual identified on the application.

The web-based registration process under part 48 was designed as an alternative streamlined system for the registration and marking of small UA. Aircraft records created under part 48 only contain a minimal amount of data, such as the owner's name, email address, physical address, and phone number, the manufacturer and model of the UA, and the standard remote identification serial number or remote identification broadcast module serial number, if applicable. The part 48 database cannot house document images, such as transfers, security conveyances, or airworthiness applications and certificates. Such documents would likely be commonplace for part 108 UAS. Therefore, any UAS operating under part 108 would be required to register under part 47 (

e.g.,

an N-number), regardless of weight. To facilitate this,

FAA is also proposing to amend the applicability under part 48 to restrict the registration of small UA operating under part 108, in addition to small UA that hold an airworthiness certificate. UA operating under part 107 may continue to be registered under the requirements of part 48.

The aircraft registration requirements in part 47, along with the requirements pertaining to the recording of aircraft title and security documents in part 49, necessitate a filing and recording system for the collection of ownership and financial interests in aircraft. FAA Aircraft Registry is the official repository for all title and security documents affecting an interest in aircraft and all airworthiness applications and certificates. Contrary to part 48, part 47 does not restrict the eligibility for aircraft registration based on aircraft weight.

It is possible that a UA currently registered under part 48 could obtain airworthiness acceptance under proposed part 108. However, to be operated under part 108, the aircraft would need to be registered under part 47. While it is not possible to transfer a part 48 registration to part 47, due to the nature of the registrations and the necessary information for each, a current part 48 registration holder could cancel that registration and then submit a new application for a part 47 registration.

While FAA proposes to amend part 47 to apply its registration requirements to part 108 operators, the Agency also considered allowing registration under part 48 or even imposing registration requirements in part 108 itself. If the registration requirements were implemented under part 108, they would be tailored to the particularities of operations under this rule. This could eliminate requests for information that are not available to UAS operators and issuing proof of registration other than a physical registration certificate. FAA requests comment on a potential registration process tailored to UAS operations under this part.

B. General Operating Rules (§ 108.120)

FAA proposes in § 108.120(a) that operations conducted under part 108 would need to be conducted with a UAS that is in a condition for safe operation, including both the UA and the AE. Proposed § 108.120(a) would prohibit an operator from initiating or continuing a flight if they know or have reason to know that the UA or the AE are no longer in a condition for safe operation. As noted in the 2016 Final Rule, FAA considers safe operation to be essential to ensure overall safety of flight. Determinations made of the overall condition of the UAS include an evaluation based on the make, model, age, type and completeness of continued maintenance and inspections of the aircraft and AE. The varied designs of possible UAS mean that FAA cannot presc

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