ADS-Equipped Vehicle Safety, Transparency, and Evaluation Program

Federal RegisterJan 15, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 595 and 597

[Docket No. NHTSA-2024-0100]

RIN 2127-AM60

ADS-Equipped Vehicle Safety, Transparency, and Evaluation Program

AGENCY:

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY:

This document proposes a voluntary framework for the evaluation and oversight of motor vehicles equipped with automated driving systems (ADS). The ADS-equipped Vehicle Safety, Transparency, and Evaluation Program (AV STEP) would establish a national program for ADS-equipped vehicles that operate or may operate on public roads in the United States under NHTSA's oversight with the goal of improving public transparency related to the safety of certain ADS-equipped vehicles, while allowing for responsible development of this technology. This proposal includes procedures for application, participation, public reporting, and program administration. It identifies content requirements for applications, including independent assessments of ADS safety processes, such as the safety cases used and conformance to industry standards. These application requirements will inform NHTSA's decisions on terms and conditions for participation. The proposal also contains reporting requirements for participants, including periodic and event-triggered reporting.

DATES:

Comments are requested on or before March 17, 2025. In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act, NHTSA is also seeking comment on a new information collection. For additional information, see subsection D (Paperwork Reduction Act) under Section IX (Regulatory Notices and Analyses). All comments relating to the information collection requirements should be submitted to NHTSA and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) at the address listed in the

ADDRESSES

section on or before March 17, 2025.

ADDRESSES:

You may submit comments to the docket number identified in the heading of this document by any of the following methods:

•

Federal eRulemaking Portal:

Go to

www.regulations.gov

and follow the instructions for submitting comments.

•

Mail:

Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

•

Hand Delivery or Courier:

U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

•

Fax:

(202) 493-2251.

Instructions:

All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without change to

www.regulations.gov,

including any personal information provided. For detailed instructions on sending comments and additional information on the rulemaking process, see the “Public Participation” heading of the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section of this document. Comments on the proposed information collection requirements should be submitted to OMB at

www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.

To find this particular information collection, select “Currently under Review—Open for Public Comment” or use the search function. It is requested that comments sent to OMB also be sent to the NHTSA rulemaking docket identified in the heading of this document.

Docket:

For access to the dockets or to read background documents or comments received, please visit

www.regulations.gov,

and/or Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. The Docket Management Facility is open between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For non-legal issues: Katherine L. Chasins, Rulemaking Office of Automation Safety by email:

katherine.chasins@dot.gov,

or phone: (202) 366-7396. For legal issues: Hunter B. Oliver, Office of the Chief Counsel by email:

hunter.oliver@dot.gov,

phone: (202) 366-8875. The mailing address for these officials is: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

II. Program Context

A. How the Current ADS Technology Landscape Shaped This NPRM

B. How NHTSA's Authorities Shaped This NPRM

1. NHTSA's Mission and ADS Activity

2. NHTSA Exemptions

III. Program Structure (Regulatory Text Subpart A)

A. Program Eligibility

B. Program Steps

C. Terms and Conditions

IV. Application and Review (Regulatory Text Subparts B and D)

A. Application Form

1. Operational Baseline

2. Location Sheet

3. Confirmation of Reporting During Participation

B. Protocols for ADS Operations

1. Law Abidance

2. System Fallback Response

3. User and Surrounding Road User Interactions

C. Data Governance Plan

D. Independent Assessment

1. Focus of Independent Assessment

2. Summary Report Requirements

3. Assessment Context Requirements

4. Reliability and Credibility Disclosures

E. Application Review

V. Participation (Regulatory Text Subparts E and F)

A. Reporting Requirements

1. Periodic Reporting

2. Event-Triggered Reporting

3. Update Reporting

B. Agency Protocols

1. Amendment Process

2. Concern Resolution Process

VI. Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)

VII. Requirements for AV STEP Exemptions (Regulatory Text Subpart C)

A. Exemption Eligibility Requirements

B. Exemption Application Requirements

C. Exemption Participation Requirements

D. Exemption Public Reporting

VIII. Public Comments

IX. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, 14094 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

1. Need for Regulation

2. Uncertainties and Assumptions

3. Costs

4. Benefits

5. Regulatory Approaches Considered

B. National Environmental Policy Act

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)

F. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

G. Executive Order 13609: Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation

H. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

I. Privacy Act

J. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

K. Regulation Identifier Number

L. Plain Language

M. Rule Summary

I. Executive Summary

Automated driving systems (ADS)

are evolving rapidly, posing challenges to vehicle manufacturers and the agency alike regarding the safety of the traveling public. It is important that ADS technology be deployed in a manner that protects the public from unreasonable safety risk while at the same time allowing for responsible development of this technology, which has the potential to advance safety. Under NHTSA's existing regulatory framework, which implements the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act),

motor vehicle manufacturers may already deploy ADS-equipped vehicles on public roads, as long as they comply with existing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and state and local laws.

Automated driving systems are systems developed (or being developed) to fully perform the driving task without any expectation of an attentive human driver. ADS-equipped vehicles are sometimes referred to as self-driving cars or autonomous vehicles. In contrast, driver support features (sometimes referred to as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems or ADAS), such as highway or parking assist features, must be continuously supervised by a human driver.

49 U.S.C. Ch. 301.

Many ADS operations take this approach, and the FMVSS do not currently set performance standards specifically for ADS. Vehicles that are compliant with all applicable FMVSS can generally be equipped with ADS technology without NHTSA approval. Alternatively, if an ADS-equipped vehicle does not comply with all applicable FMVSS, exemptions may be requested from NHTSA. Past exemption requests involving ADS have typically involved purpose-built vehicles (those designed specifically for ADS operations).

See 85 FR 7826, 7842 (February 11, 2020) (granting an exemption “to the requirements that an LSV be equipped with exterior and/or interior mirrors; have a windshield that complies with FMVSS No. 205, `Glazing materials'; and a backup camera system that meets the requirement in FMVSS No. 111, `Rear visibility,' limiting the length of time that a rearview image can remain displayed by the system after a vehicle's transmission has been shifted out of reverse gear.”) NHTSA also publishes notices of receipt of exemption requests under 49 CFR part 555, which provide examples of other standards for which exemptions have been requested for ADS-equipped vehicles.

See

89 FR 88856 (November 8, 2024); 87 FR 43602, 43607 (July 21, 2022); 87 FR 43595 (July 21, 2022).

To account for this current ADS landscape, this document proposes a national program, entitled the ADS-equipped Vehicle Safety, Transparency, and Evaluation Program (AV STEP), designed to complement and further NHTSA's ADS oversight, rulemaking, research, and transparency efforts as well as to support new proposed processes for exemptions involving ADS-equipped vehicles. This voluntary program would provide NHTSA with a framework for reviewing and overseeing ADS-equipped vehicles at a time when ADS technology continues to rapidly evolve.

In the future, as ADS technologies mature, NHTSA anticipates there may be a need to establish minimum standards for ADS safety performance, much as NHTSA's existing FMVSS govern the performance of conventional vehicle systems and attributes. However, the data, methods, and metrics to support such standards do not yet exist. Many of the elements included in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) are intended to help NHTSA obtain insight and data that could, in turn, support the future development of such standards. Pending such future developments, AV STEP would serve as a national program built for the evolving state of the technology, offering an interim boost to regulatory oversight and a process for motor vehicle manufacturers and other participants to build public trust by demonstrating a commitment to responsible safety practices, accountability, and transparency.

As a voluntary program, AV STEP would be available to vehicle manufacturers, ADS developers, fleet operators, and system integrators of ADS-equipped vehicles seeking to operate on public roadways in the United States. NHTSA proposes AV STEP for two categories of ADS-equipped vehicles: ADS-equipped vehicles in need of exemptions and ADS-equipped vehicles that can lawfully operate on public roads today. For vehicles needing an exemption, AV STEP would offer an exemption pathway that is tailored for ADS-equipped vehicles (see Section VII (Requirements for AV STEP Exemptions (Regulatory Text Subpart C)) for additional details on the proposed exemption process). For all entities seeking participation in AV STEP (whether needing an exemption or not), the program would offer participants an opportunity to demonstrate their operational safety and their commitment to transparency for their vehicles and operations by engaging in a national program with well-defined participation and reporting criteria focused on advancing safety.

Under the proposed program, an applicant would provide NHTSA with information and data related to the safety of the design, development, and operations of ADS-equipped vehicles for their intended deployment under the program. NHTSA would review this information, engage with the applicant as needed to clarify or ask for additional information, and establish terms and conditions for participating in the program. Once admitted into AV STEP, a participant would be required to submit both periodic and event-triggered reports to NHTSA. To improve public transparency, the agency also proposes to publish much of the application and reporting information that NHTSA would receive.

Acceptance into the program would be based on the sufficiency of information supplied and after coordination with an applicant about terms and conditions for participation. Acceptance into the program would reflect a determination by NHTSA that the applicant has provided evidence showing it followed well-documented engineering processes and has the needed technical, operational, and management resources in place to mitigate safety concerns. Acceptance into the program would not be an assurance of safety, a validation of the ADS technology, or a guarantee that the applicant will execute its operational oversight functions as described. NHTSA would continue to exercise its existing defect and investigation authorities as ADS-equipped vehicles are deployed on public roadways.

As proposed, the program would be structured around two levels of participation: Step 1 and Step 2. Generally, Step 1 would apply to vehicles that rely on fallback personnel

and Step 2 would apply to vehicles that do not rely on fallback personnel. The proposed participation requirements differ between these steps, as the approach to managing risk is significantly different in these two cases. In ADS operations that rely on fallback personnel, a human is expected to intervene to compensate for any deficiency in the ADS, whereas in operations that do not rely on fallback personnel, the ADS must be able to safely respond to all driving scenarios without such intervention.

As used within this proposal, fallback personnel are specially trained individuals that continuously supervise the performance of prototype ADS-operated vehicles and intervene whenever necessary to prevent a hazardous event by exercising any means of vehicle control. The full definition of “fallback personnel” appears in § 597.102 of the proposed rule.

AV STEP would enhance public transparency and Federal oversight of ADS technologies to better understand and address emerging risks associated with their deployment. The agency proposes to examine applications for AV STEP in part through the use of an applicant's safety case, which would

need to contain structured arguments, supported by evidence, intended to justify that a system is acceptably safe for a given use in a specified environment. The safety case concept is commonly used in safety-critical products and industries such as aviation, energy (including nuclear), medical devices, and other technology sectors. An application for AV STEP would require an assessment of an applicant's safety case by an independent entity with specialized experience and expertise. This independent assessment would consider the holistic safety of ADS-equipped vehicles, spanning technical, organizational, and operational challenges relevant to safety decision-making. While currently available testing and evaluation methods cannot conclusively determine an ADS' safety, this approach would facilitate NHTSA's review of the engineering rigor and due diligence applied to a system's development and operation. It would also provide a proactive opportunity to identify and resolve any safety concerns.

It is the agency's expectation that, by promoting a safer, more transparent, and more responsible environment for developing and deploying ADS in the United States, AV STEP will help foster the technological innovation and public confidence needed to advance ADS and the potentially significant safety benefits of the technology.

II. Program Context

AV STEP would build on NHTSA's other ADS transparency, oversight, and research activities. The first subsection below describes how the program would fit into the current ADS technology landscape. The second subsection describes the legal authorities for the AV STEP proposal and the agency's other ADS activity taken pursuant to these authorities.

A. How the Current ADS Technology Landscape Shaped This NPRM

Vehicle automation technologies, which include both ADS and advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), have significantly transformed the automotive landscape over the last decade. Currently, the automation systems available to the public in consumer-owned vehicles are almost all driver support or convenience ADAS features, such as partial driving automation systems.

For these features, the human driver remains responsible for supervising the system and must stay engaged and attentive.

Partial driving automation systems are described by SAE International (SAE) as executing “both the lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion control subtasks of the [dynamic driving task] with the expectation that the driver . . . supervises the driving automation system.” SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

In contrast, an ADS is responsible for performing the entire dynamic driving task (DDT)

while operating within the system's operational design domain (ODD),

without any expectation that a human driver will be attentive. However, a human may still be expected to take over the driving task when the ADS exits its ODD or, during an ADS' development, to perform a safety oversight role, such as preventing the ADS from handling a situation incorrectly.

This NPRM defines DDT in part as “all of the real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints . . .”

See

§ 597.102 of the proposed rule. This definition is largely derived from SAE International's definition.

See

SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

This NPRM defines ODD as “the operating conditions under which the Automated Driving System or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, including, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or absence of defined traffic or roadway characteristics.” This definition is largely derived from SAE International's definition.

See id.

NHTSA proposes to limit AV STEP eligibility to ADS-equipped vehicles. This scope allows focus on the unique complexities of ADS while most ADS operations are within the control of the companies responsible for their testing. Currently, very few ADS-equipped vehicles are available for purchase by the general public.

Instead, almost all such vehicles are owned and operated by vehicle manufacturers, ADS developers, or fleet operators. Most of these vehicles remain in the testing and development stage. If they operate on public roads at all, they do so only in limited environments. Limited numbers of ADS-equipped vehicles are engaged in commercial applications, such as goods delivery platforms or mobility on demand operations.

However, even those commercial applications remain largely under development and operate in limited environments.

See, e.g.,

California Department of Motor Vehicle's announcement regarding its acceptance of Mercedes' DRIVE PILOT System, available at

https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/news-and-media/california-dmv-approves-mercedes-benz-automated-driving-system-for-certain-highways-and-conditions.

The announcement states: “The Level 3 Mercedes-Benz DRIVE PILOT system can only operate on highways during daylight at speeds not exceeding 40 miles per hour. This permit excludes operation on city or county streets, in construction zones, during heavy rain or heavy fog, on flooded roads and during weather conditions that are determined to impact performance of DRIVE PILOT.”

Mobility on demand is used to refer to vehicles that are often colloquially referred to as robotaxis, or, as discussed in SAE J3016, “robotic taxis.”

See

SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

This proposal recognizes that the potential of ADS is still largely unproven. ADS technologies have the potential to improve safety, advance sustainability, provide accessible transportation for people with disabilities, increase mobility options for underserved communities, and enhance American competitiveness. However, positive outcomes are not inevitable.

The impact ADS may have in these areas and others, such as on the workforce and on the environment, will ultimately be the result of future engineering, deployment, policy, and other choices.

ADS are defined by their functionality rather than safety: “the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire [dynamic driving task] DDT on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it [the system] is limited to a specific operational design domain (ODD).” SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

The capabilities and expectations of ADS are likely to evolve significantly in the coming years. Currently, ADS can handle narrowly defined environments, but often struggle with driving tasks that humans consider relatively simple. Routine occurrences, such as adverse weather, overgrown foliage, or road construction, can exceed the capabilities of even the most advanced versions of existing ADS. To reach broader deployment, the roadway scenarios and ODDs that ADS can reliably navigate will have to substantially expand.

The tools used to develop and evaluate ADS will also need to mature. Currently, many different approaches exist within the automotive industry for designing, testing, and overseeing ADS operation. Industry standards, guidance documents, and best practices for ADS have been proposed and published but remain, collectively, in an early stage of establishment and implementation. Published standards are frequently updated to reflect the evolving state of the art, and while generalized performance metrics are sometimes included in these standards, they do not define specific measurement and analysis methods or acceptable value ranges. Given their new and evolving state, little evidence exists to prove that existing methods of evaluating ADS

technology are capable of ensuring safety. Instead, these industry approaches often aim to provide safety guidance, such as by recommending minimal content for safety decision-making frameworks or by detailing high-level vehicle behavior expectations.

This issue has been referred to as a long-tail problem.

See, e.g.,

Phillip Koopman, “How Safe is Safe Enough: Measuring and Predicting Autonomous Vehicle Safety” (2022).

Given this uncertain landscape, too little transparency exists about ADS operations on public roads in the United States. There is sparse public information about basic facts, such as the number of ADS-equipped vehicles operating on public roads, the areas where those vehicles are operating, and attributes or limitations of the ADS that may affect other road users who interact with those vehicles. Publicly available information is often filtered through the companies that are proponents of their own technologies. Greater availability of objective information about ADS capabilities, operations, and outcomes would promote safety and more responsible growth of ADS technology.

AV STEP's proposed application, review, oversight, and reporting would create a holistic framework for evaluating and overseeing an ADS-equipped vehicle. To account for the current limits of performance-based ADS safety evaluations, the proposed evaluations would focus on the robustness of safety decision-making during all stages of an ADS operation—from development of the ADS to system operations on public roads. Reporting during participation would include data elements that are designed to oversee how this safety decision-making affects real-world safety performance. Collectively, these approaches would consider how comprehensively a company has identified the limits of its system, has accounted for risks likely to arise during operation, and is prepared to respond responsibly to problems encountered.

The agency proposes to examine this safety decision-making through a review of an applicant's safety case. The independent assessment of a safety case included with an AV STEP application and subsequent NHTSA review would consider the holistic safety of ADS-equipped vehicle operations. While currently available methods cannot definitively conclude that an ADS is safe, this approach would facilitate review of the robustness of the safety practices employed during a system's development and operation. It would also provide a proactive opportunity to identify and resolve any safety concerns.

The requirements for participating in AV STEP must be flexible enough to evolve as ADS technology evolves. To that end, the proposed independent assessment would consider industry consensus standards and best practices that exist at the time of an assessment. Likewise, the proposed ongoing reporting requirements would facilitate NHTSA's continued oversight of vehicle operations, and the proposed procedures would allow for review and changes in operations during participation. In addition, NHTSA proposes to tailor many of the reporting requirements to the specific systems under review, to evaluate and account for the current diversity in approaches to ADS.

AV STEP is also designed to increase the amount of publicly available information about ADS operations in the United States. This proposal includes two program steps based on the competency of an ADS. NHTSA proposes to publish regularly on the agency's website a list of applicants and participants in the program, along with details regarding the scope and status of each operation. This publication would increase the public's awareness and understanding of ADS operations on public roads.

B. How NHTSA's Authorities Shaped This NPRM

NHTSA proposes AV STEP as a national program available for two categories of vehicles. The first category consists of vehicles that can lawfully operate on public roads regardless of participation in AV STEP, as long as they comply with all other Federal, state, and local laws. These vehicles include those that are compliant with and certified to all applicable FMVSS, those that have received exemptions under other NHTSA programs, and those that may operate on public roads under 49 U.S.C. 30112(b)(10).

The second category consists of vehicles that seek an exemption from NHTSA through AV STEP. Under this proposal, vehicles that do not comply with all applicable FMVSS or those that originally complied but are taken out of compliance by an ADS retrofit could seek exemptions through AV STEP. This section discusses how NHTSA's authorities and other ADS work support both of these categories of participation.

This provision is described further later in this section.

1. NHTSA's Mission and ADS Activity

The establishment of a national program for ADS-equipped vehicles stems from NHTSA's authority under the Safety Act,

in addition to other statutory authorities. Under 49 U.S.C 322(a), “[t]he Secretary of Transportation may prescribe regulations to carry out the duties and powers of the Secretary.” The Safety Act and other statutes provide NHTSA, by delegation, with authority relating to oversight, rulemaking, research, transparency, and exemptions.

See, e.g.,

49 U.S.C. 30101(b) (noting need “to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards” and “carry out . . . safety research and development”); Section 30111 (authority to “prescribe motor vehicle safety standards”); Section 30112 (restricting the activities of vehicles that do not comply with applicable vehicle standards or that contain a defect); Section 30114 (authority to issue FMVSS exemptions for particular purposes); Section 30122 (authority to issue exemptions from the make inoperative prohibition); and Section 30182 (authority to “conduct motor vehicle safety research, develop, and testing programs and activities, including activities related to new and emerging technologies that impact or may impact motor vehicle safety”).

This authority forms the foundation for AV STEP. The remainder of this subsection explains how AV STEP carries out each of these authorities, as well as how AV STEP fits into NHTSA's broader regulatory activities pertaining to ADS technologies.

These duties are generally set forth in 49 U.S.C. chapter 301.

see also

87 FR 14406 (March 15, 2022).

The proposed Make Inoperative Exemption in AV STEP would continue NHTSA's practice of exempting specific situations where the general make inoperative prohibition may not account for unique vehicle needs. Engagement with stakeholders on how ADS technology relates to NHTSA's authorities has repeatedly raised the possibility that equipping an FMVSS-certified vehicle with an ADS may implicate the make inoperative prohibition in Section 30122.

NHTSA's 2022 Final Rule on Occupant Protection for Vehicles With Automated Driving Systems discussed comments that raised hypothetical situations where ADS modifications to a vehicle may relate to the make inoperative prohibition.

Questions about how the make inoperative prohibition in Section 30122 affects ADS equipment will likely persist over the coming years, particularly as NHTSA promulgates new FMVSS that govern the performance of vehicle automation features.

NHTSA has also explored the relationship between Section 30122 and ADS-equipped vehicles—including the use of exemptions under Section 30122(c)—in past regulatory notices.

NHTSA, 87 FR 18560, 18571 n.36 (September 26, 2022).

See, e.g.,

89 FR 39686 (May 9, 2024).

See

NHTSA, 83 FR 50872, 50882 (October 10, 2018) (requesting comment on: what role could a pilot program play in determining when to grant an exemption from the make inoperative prohibition under Section 30122 for certain dual mode vehicles).

NHTSA takes no position in this rulemaking on the effect of the make inoperative prohibition in Section 30122 on ADS equipment or associated aftermarket modifications. The AV STEP framework would enable NHTSA to address this issue by providing a set of procedures to govern the review and oversight of make inoperative exemptions for ADS-equipped vehicles.

The AV STEP Make Inoperative Exemption is proposed pursuant to NHTSA's authority in Section 30122(c). The proposed AV STEP framework would further the purposes of the Safety Act in carrying out NHTSA's oversight, rulemaking, research, and transparency authorities, as explained previously in this section. The AV STEP framework is designed to help NHTSA identify potential safety issues with an ADS and to oversee its performance during the course of program participation. These review and oversight procedures would help NHTSA assess the statutory criteria for such an exemption.

Exemptions to the make inoperative provision are codified in 49 CFR part 595. NHTSA proposes to add a new subsection in part 595 that incorporates the proposed procedures for AV STEP that would be codified in the new part 597. In addition, NHTSA proposes to amend the Purpose and Applicability subsections in part 595 so that they encompass all of the exemptions set forth in the part.

The discussion in this preamble is generally organized around the sequence in which an entity would engage with AV STEP. The first section below (Section III) explains the threshold requirements for AV STEP, including eligibility and required terms and conditions for all participants. Sections IV through VI provide an overview of the application process, the participation stage, and the information that NHTSA proposes to make public regarding both applications and participations. These aspects of AV STEP would all apply across the entirety of the program, while Section VII outlines proposals specific to AV STEP exemptions. For reader convenience, NHTSA includes reference to the associated subparts of the proposed regulatory text in the headings for each of these sections.

In past exercises of its authorities, NHTSA has often implemented standalone voluntary or exemption programs analogous to AV STEP's various components, and NHTSA intends that the components of the proposal be severable. AV STEP is proposed as a national framework that encompasses three independent structural components: (1) a voluntary program for compliant vehicles; (2) a process for administering FMVSS exemptions; and (3) a process for administering exemptions from the make inoperative prohibition. As explained in this proposal, each of these structural elements stems from independent NHTSA authorities under the Safety Act. Although NHTSA believes that AV STEP offers an opportunity to combine all three of these elements into a national framework, as the proposal explains, each of these structural elements has independent value.

III. Program Structure (Regulatory Text Subpart A)

This section explains the threshold requirements for AV STEP, such as those relating to eligibility and the required terms and conditions for all participants. AV STEP would be available to vehicles that can lawfully operate on public roads without AV STEP, as well as those that would need one of the two types of exemptions proposed in this NPRM.

In several places, this document proposes unique requirements for AV STEP exemptions to account for their particular attributes. However, in general, the proposed requirements for AV STEP are the same regardless of whether a subject vehicle needs an AV STEP exemption. Keeping these requirements consistent would further the continuity of the program, reduce confusion for potential applicants and the public about what participation entails, and simplify NHTSA's administration of the program. When developing these proposed requirements, NHTSA sought to make program application and participation requirements stringent enough to require meaningful commitments to safety while also making them feasible for participating entities. Participation in AV STEP, as proposed, would be valuable both for vehicles that need one of the AV STEP exemptions and for entities choosing voluntary participation.

NHTSA's experience suggests that a variety of incentives may exist for entities to voluntarily participate in AV STEP. Voluntary programs have historically played an important role in advancing automotive safety, particularly for advanced vehicle technologies. Recent examples include voluntary industry commitments to equip vehicles with specific safety technologies,

the submission of

VSSAs to NHTSA by entities engaged in ADS testing and deployment,

the participation of entities engaged in ADS testing in NHTSA's AV TEST Initiative,

and the participation of vehicle manufacturers in the Partnership for Analytics Research in Traffic Safety.

NHTSA, “NHTSA Announces Update to Historic AEB Commitment by 20 Automakers”

(December 17, 2019), available at

https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers.

NHTSA, “Automated Driving Systems: Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment,” available at

https://www.nhtsa.gov/automated-driving-systems/voluntary-safety-self-assessment.

NHTSA, “AV TEST Initiative: Automated Vehicle Transparency and Engagement for Safe Testing Initiative,” available at

https://www.nhtsa.gov/automated-vehicle-test-tracking-tool.

NHTSA, “PARTS: Partnership for Analytics Research in Traffic Safety,” available at

https://www.nhtsa.gov/parts-partnership-for-analytics-research-in-traffic-safety.

The extent and nature of the incentives for entities to participate in AV STEP may depend on the entity and the type of operation. NHTSA believes that companies that strive to develop and implement robust safety practices will understand that AV STEP participation entails a public commitment to safety, transparency, and the continuous refinement of their ADS operations. Public trust is often difficult to establish for ADS operations, particularly given that incidents involving ADS-equipped vehicles receive significant negative attention. Within this climate, some entities may see AV STEP as an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to transparency and willingness to subject their safety decision-making to external scrutiny.

Other entities that engage with ADS operations may find value in the review and oversight that would be conducted by NHTSA through AV STEP. Examples of these types of entities could include state or local authorities that regulate ADS, insurers of ADS-equipped vehicles, entities providing grants for ADS projects, or business partners, such as goods delivery services looking to partner with an ADS company. These third-party relationships could motivate companies to participate in AV STEP even if their vehicles could lawfully operate without the program.

As participation in the program grows, competitive forces may motivate other companies to participate. Accounting for these potential incentives for voluntary participation, as well as the clear incentives that would exist for entities in need of exemptions, the proposed AV STEP requirements balance the value of encouraging participation with the need to ensure that participation requirements are meaningful. NHTSA requests comment on how this proposal strikes that balance.

A. Program Eligibility

This proposal is designed to oversee ADS-equipped vehicles under the control of motor vehicle manufacturers, ADS developers (

i.e.,

manufacturers of ADS, which is motor vehicle equipment), fleet operators, or system integrators that plan to engage in public road operations where the ADS will perform the driving task.

Section 597.103 of the proposed rule contains the following eligibility requirements:

For this NPRM's definition of these terms, see § 597.102 of the proposed rule.

Vehicle Eligibility.

NHTSA proposes two eligibility requirements for vehicles participating in AV STEP. First, the vehicles must be equipped with an ADS being used or developed for operation without an expectation of an attentive human driver (whether in-vehicle or remote) while engaged. Second, the ADS equipped on such vehicles must perform the entirety of the DDT for all or part of the participating operations. These vehicle eligibility criteria focus on the ultimate design intent of the system.

Although these eligibility criteria are not tied to any preexisting taxonomy for vehicle automation, for illustration purposes, under the current SAE International levels of driving automation, these eligibility criteria could apply to certain vehicles operating at SAE Levels 3, 4, or 5.

The proposal does not extend AV STEP eligibility to partial driving automation systems, also known as SAE Level 2 ADAS. Excluding such systems optimizes AV STEP to address ADS' unique safety considerations and complexities.

For instance, a vehicle would be considered to be equipped with an ADS even if the ADS remained in development and dependent, at times, on a human operator such as an onboard test driver.

SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021). A limited number of Level 3 systems have recently become available on consumer-owned vehicles. Those vehicles would not be eligible for participation because they do not meet the separate program requirement that a vehicle manufacturer, ADS developer, fleet operator, or system integrator retain operational control over a subject vehicle.

Beyond these ADS requirements, NHTSA proposes to consider the effect of other vehicle attributes on a case-by-case basis during the agency's review, especially insofar as they may impact safety. NHTSA does not propose to categorically restrict program participation to any particular vehicle classes or types of operations (

e.g.,

public transit). However, NHTSA recognizes there may be unique considerations related to certain vehicle attributes or classes, such as those relating to accessibility for people with disabilities or impacts on labor and employment. NHTSA requests comment on incorporating such considerations into AV STEP, for example, through program limitations or specialized requirements.

Applicant Eligibility.

NHTSA proposes to limit AV STEP participation to motor vehicle manufacturers, ADS developers, fleet operators, and system integrators for the subject vehicle. Section 597.102 of the proposed rule defines these entities as follows:

“ADS Developer” means the entity that is principally responsible for the manufacture of the ADS at the system level, including but not limited to its design, development, and testing.

“Manufacturer” has the meaning given in 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(6). Under Section 30102, the term manufacturer includes a person (A) manufacturing or assembling motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment; or (B) importing motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment for resale. Under § 597.102 of the proposed rule, an entity qualifying as a manufacturer would need to be the manufacturer of the subject vehicle. Other than ADS developers, who are manufacturers of the ADS, which is motor vehicle equipment, NHTSA is not currently proposing to extend eligibility to manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment unless they can meet one of the other eligible classes of applicants. NHTSA does not believe that other manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment, such as suppliers of an individual component on a vehicle, are likely to have a broad enough understanding of the system-level performance of the vehicle to satisfy the considerations described in the following paragraphs.

“Fleet Operator” means the individual or entity that exercises all or part of the operational control over the ADS installed in a subject vehicle or group of subject vehicles. The threshold for “operational control” is described further in the next subsection.

“System Integrator” means an entity responsible for integration of an ADS at the vehicle level. For example, an ADS that was developed for use across varied vehicle platforms could be integrated into a given vehicle and validated for that vehicle integration by an entity that does not qualify as any of the three preceding stakeholders.

In many cases, the same entity may perform the role of multiple entities. For instance, some vehicle manufacturers

are responsible for the development and system integration of the vehicle's ADS and many ADS developers conduct fleet operations for their own vehicles. However, when one or more of these entities are separate, their collective contributions are critical to the system-level operation of an ADS-equipped vehicle. Under the proposal, any of these four entities or any combination of these four entities could apply to participate in AV STEP.

The agency believes that an application and a participation must include at least one of these entities to ensure successful program engagement. An entity other than these four stakeholders could not meet the application requirements without relying heavily on these stakeholders' representations. Likewise, it could not meet the participation requirements without relying on their commitments regarding the vehicle's operation or data collection. Limiting participation to these four entities would promote direct accountability. NHTSA may also engage with other entities throughout the application and participation stages. Other proposed provisions address such engagement.

Operational Control.

As a precondition for participation in AV STEP, NHTSA proposes to limit all operational control of the subject vehicles to the vehicle manufacturer, ADS developer, fleet operator, or system integrator. This limitation would ensure that vehicle operations remain within the direct reach of the entities with the technical knowledge of the vehicle systems and operations. This requirement would also maintain a direct relationship between NHTSA and the parties that exercise control over the subject vehicles. This “operational control” standard has provided an effective threshold for maintaining oversight in past NHTSA ADS exemptions.

For instance, a 2020 exemption issued by NHTSA for an ADS-equipped vehicle under 49 CFR part 555 (which implements 49 U.S.C. 30113) imposed the condition that the vehicle manufacturer: must maintain ownership and operational control over the [exempted vehicles] that are built pursuant to this exemption for the life of the vehicles. 85 FR 7826, 7842 (February 11, 2020).

For operations where only one of those four entities maintains full ownership and possession of the subject vehicles, this requirement would be straightforward. In contrast, certain fleet operations may involve more complicated arrangements, such as projects that involve multiple entities. For instance, some operations may involve an ADS developer responsible for the ADS software and a fleet operator responsible for the fallback personnel present during operations. Other types of projects may involve entities other than Essential System-Level Stakeholders,

such as a grocery store that takes possession of the vehicle while loading goods for delivery. In these situations, requiring the Essential System-Level Stakeholders to retain ownership or even possession of the subject vehicles may not always be feasible given the specific logistics of an operation.

To account for this possibility, NHTSA proposes to require Essential System-Level Stakeholders to retain operational control of the subject vehicles. NHTSA proposes a scope of operational control similar to the scope of a dispatching entity that exercises control over fleet operations, as described in SAE J3016.

As proposed in the AV STEP definitions, the list of Essential System-Level Stakeholders would include, at a minimum, the vehicle manufacturer, ADS developer, fleet operator, and system integrator. Additional entities may be listed as well depending on their role in the operation.

Those receiving an exemption under AV STEP would, however, be subject to additional restrictions on possession or ownership.

See

Section VII (Requirements for AV STEP Exemptions (Regulatory Text Subpart C)).

See generally

SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

Definition 3.3 of J3016 defines a “dispatching entity” as “an entity that dispatches an ADS-equipped vehicle(s) in driverless operations.”

Definition 3.4 defines “dispatch” as “[t]o place an ADS-equipped vehicle into service in driverless operation by engaging the ADS.”

Finally, definition 3.13 describes “fleet operations” or fleet functions as:

Id.

at 3.3, p. 7 (“[Driverless Operation] Dispatching Entity”) (bracketed language in original).

Id.

at 3.4, p. 7 (“Dispatch [In Driverless Operation]”) (bracketed language in original). Note 1 of this definition clarifies that “[t]he term `dispatch,' as used outside of the context of ADS-equipped vehicles, is generally understood to mean sending a particular vehicle to a particular pick-up or drop-off location for purposes of providing a transportation service. In the context of ADS-equipped vehicles, and as used herein, this term includes software-enabled dispatch of multiple ADS-equipped vehicles in driverless operation that may complete multiple trips involving pick-up and drop-off of passengers or goods throughout a day or other pre-defined period of service, and which may involve multiple agents performing various tasks related to the dispatch function. To highlight this specialized use of the term dispatch, the term is modified and conditioned by the stipulation that it refers exclusively to dispatching vehicles in driverless operation.”).

The activities that support the management of a fleet of ADS-equipped vehicles in driverless operation, which may include, without limitation:

• Ensuring operational readiness.

• Dispatching ADS-equipped vehicles in driverless operation (

i.e.,

engaging the ADSs prior to placing the vehicles in service on public roads).

• Authorizing each trip (

e.g.,

payment, trip route selection).

• Providing fleet asset management services to vehicles while in use (

e.g.,

managing emergencies, summoning or providing remote assistance as needed, responding to customer requests and breakdowns).

• Serving as the responsible agent vis-a-vis law enforcement, emergency responders, and other authorities for vehicles while in use.

• Disengaging the ADS at the end of service.

• Performing vehicle repair and maintenance as needed.

Id.

at 3.13, p. 14 (“Fleet Operations [Functions]”) (bracketed language in original).

Under this proposal, a vehicle manufacturer, ADS developer, fleet operator, or system integrator (or any combination thereof) could each exercise aspects of this control even if only one of them were an AV STEP participant. For instance, if the ADS developer were the sole participant, a fleet operator could exercise some measure of operational control. Likewise, this proposed requirement is not intended to prohibit vehicle passengers from having limited control authority over the vehicle, such as selecting a destination for a ride-hailing operation.

Given the complex relationships among different stakeholders in operations, NHTSA requests comment on the workability of the proposed operational control requirement.

In such cases, the vehicle user would be acting within a set of parameters controlled by an ADS developer, such as by selecting a destination within a developer-established ODD.

Location Eligibility.

NHTSA proposes to require that AV STEP operations take place, in part or entirely, on public streets, roads, and highways in the United States. This eligibility requirement mirrors statutory language for the Safety Act's definition of “motor vehicle” in 49 U.S.C. 30102. Since the program framework for AV STEP is designed principally to oversee vehicles operating on public roads, this eligibility requirement ensures that each operation involves at least some public road usage. During participation, NHTSA expects that subject vehicles may also engage in operations on non-public roads, such as closed course testing. In general, the proposed application and reporting requirements

for AV STEP would not cover such private road operations.

However, non-public road testing would likely be relevant to the validation evidence for the safety case assessment discussed in Section IV.D.1.b) (Independent Assessment, Safety Case).

B. Program Steps

AV STEP would have two program participation categories. In general, Step 1 would apply to vehicles that rely on fallback personnel, and Step 2 would apply to vehicles that do not rely on fallback personnel. Given the increased responsibility of the ADS at Step 2, the level of system maturity is expected to be higher than at Step 1. As proposed, a vehicle could start participation at either step level. It would not be necessary to complete Step 1 before moving to Step 2. However, Step 1 participants could apply to participate at Step 2 as their systems and operations mature. Likewise, under this proposal, if a company had multiple vehicle platforms or systems, some of which were more mature than others, the company could apply to participate in Step 1 for some operations and in Step 2 for others.

The reliance on fallback personnel is used to delineate between Steps 1 and 2 because the approach to managing risk is significantly different in these two cases. In an operation that relies on fallback personnel, a human is expected to compensate for known limitations or unproven aspects of the ADS. In contrast, in an operation that does not rely on fallback personnel, the ADS must be capable of handling all scenarios within an ODD without the intervention of fallback personnel. AV STEP can more easily account for these unique safety considerations by dedicating a separate step to each type of operation.

The ADS industry acknowledges the significance of these differences. For instance, when discussing its ADS, referred to as the Aurora Driver, Aurora Innovation Inc. (Aurora) explained in its 2022 VSSA that:

as we continue to develop with the Aurora Driver, we currently have vehicle operators . . . monitoring the performance of the Aurora Driver at all times and ready to take over as necessary to ensure operational safety. Therefore, our tailored safety case for this use case includes claims focused on vehicle controllability and vehicle operator hiring, training, and operational procedures, among others. However, when we reach the point of removing the vehicle operators from cabs, these vehicle operator-centric claims will no longer be relevant.

Aurora, “Safety Report” (2022), available at

https://info.aurora.tech/hubfs/website%20Public%20Files/Q4_Safety_VSSA%202022_digital_r2.pdf

Similarly, Waymo LLC explained in a 2020 discussion of safety readiness determinations that:

[d]eterminations to move from public road testing with trained vehicle operators to driverless operations, of course, are conducted at the greatest level of detail. Going completely driverless entails extremely rigorous analysis of expected behaviors and risks within the ODD, including unique risks presented by the absence of a human driver (

e.g.,

responding to system failures through fallback maneuvers that do not rely on human intervention).

Webb, N., Smith, D., Ludwick, C., Victor, T.W., Hommes, Q., Favarò F., Ivanov, G., and Daniel, T., “Waymo's Safety Methodologies and Safety Readiness Determinations,” (2020) available at

https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.00054.

Under the proposal, an entity would be eligible to apply for Step 1 participation for vehicles that operate with fallback personnel during all participating operations on public roads.

An entity would be eligible to apply for Step 2 participation for vehicles that operate, at any time during participation on public roads, without fallback personnel. NHTSA proposes to define “Fallback Personnel” as an individual specially trained and skilled in supervising the performance of prototype ADS-operated vehicles in on-road traffic, who continuously supervises the performance of an ADS-operated vehicle in real time and intervenes whenever necessary to prevent a hazardous event by exercising any means of vehicle control. This intervention may occur as part of a DDT Fallback

or in anticipation of possible future ADS behavior that is unsafe or otherwise unwanted by the user. This definition of fallback personnel would not include vehicle assistance, which does not involve directly exercising vehicle control authority.

An ADS that relied only on vehicle assistance during public road operations would fall under Step 2 rather than Step 1.

Stakeholders use a variety of terms to refer to the fallback personnel role, such as in-vehicle fallback test drivers, safety operators, or testing safety operators.

Section 597.102 of the proposed rule defines

DDT Fallback

as: the response by an individual to either perform the DDT or achieve a minimal risk condition after occurrence of a DDT performance-relevant system failure(s) or upon operational design domain exit, or the response by an ADS to achieve a minimal risk condition, given the same circumstances.

Section 597.102 of the proposed rule defines

Vehicle Assistance

as: an individual providing information or instruction about a situation to an ADS-equipped vehicle in driverless operation (instead of exercising direct control of the vehicle) to help the ADS continue a trip when encountering a situation that the ADS cannot manage. Vehicle assistance may be provided remotely, by an individual not physically present in the vehicle, or by an individual on board (physically present in) the vehicle. Unlike fallback personnel, as defined in this section, vehicle assistance personnel provide information or instruction to an ADS-equipped vehicle rather than directly exercising vehicle control authority.

As defined in this proposal, individuals who perform the fallback role could do so from within the vehicle or remotely. Remote fallback personnel would be considered remote drivers under the proposed definition of remote driving—the real-time performance of part or all of the DDT by an individual physically located outside of the vehicle.

However, NHTSA proposes to narrowly limit remote driving in AV STEP, as described in Section III.C (Terms and Conditions).

Some vehicle designs do not facilitate any human occupancy. Remote fallback personnel would be the only option for such vehicles to rely on fallback personnel.

The proposed eligibility requirements of Step 2 are not intended to disincentivize the limited use of fallback personnel when a participant deems it beneficial for safety. Therefore, once admitted into AV STEP, a vehicle participating under Step 2 could rely on fallback personnel on a limited basis during public road operations. For example, fallback personnel could be temporarily reintroduced during the validation of a software update. Such limited exceptions notwithstanding, Step 2 is intended to demarcate an ADS' readiness to operate without fallback personnel, and the agency does not intend participants in Step 2 to functionally operate as Step 1 participants through the widespread or sustained use of fallback personnel. To oversee this expectation, NHTSA proposes reporting requirements to monitor the extent to which Step 2 operations use fallback personnel.

These requirements are set forth in § 597.501(f) of the proposed rule and described further in Section V.A (Reporting Requirements) of this document.

For both steps, NHTSA proposes to prohibit vehicle operations that rely on fallback personnel from providing rides to public passengers.

This would mean that no public ridership would be permitted under Step 1 or in any of the limited situations where fallback personnel could be used under Step 2. This prohibition is proposed in light of the lower level of ADS maturity that is expected of a system that must rely on a human as a fallback. The need for fallback personnel indicates that an ADS has known limitations or requires

further validation. The presence of fallback personnel also introduces training and human factor considerations into the safety of those vehicles, such as whether fallback personnel remain attentive while monitoring the ADS. Although the use of fallback personnel can be beneficial for safety during testing, NHTSA believes their role is better suited for operations engaged in significant development than those ready to carry public passengers. NHTSA requests comment generally on the conditions under which AV STEP should permit public ridership, including, more specifically, whether it should be permitted during operations that rely on fallback personnel.

This prohibition would apply to any passenger who is a member of the public other than an employee or agent of an entity designated as an Essential System-Level Stakeholder or a public official acting in an official capacity, such as law enforcement or government personnel.

See

§ 597.105(c) of the proposed rule.

C. Terms and Conditions

Each AV STEP participation would be governed by a Final Determination Letter that establishes the full set of terms and conditions for the participation. NHTSA's proposed review process that would lead to the issuance of a Final Determination Letter is described in Section IV.E (Application Review). In general, the terms and conditions established by a letter would be tailored to the unique aspects of a participation and may cover subjects other than those expressly enumerated in § 597.105(b) of the proposed rule. Section IV.E lists seven subjects that would, at a minimum, be addressed in a Final Determination Letter. These include whether the participation is permitted under Step 1 or 2, the vehicles approved for participation,

the locations where participation is permitted, the duration of participation, and the stakeholders deemed essential for the participation. This letter would also govern the permitted uses of those vehicles, which could include commercial operations.

Section VII (Requirements for AV STEP Exemptions (Regulatory Text Subpart C)) explains a unique set of procedures for vehicles receiving exemptions under AV STEP.

Section VII (Requirements for AV STEP Exemptions (Regulatory Text Subpart C)) explains the requirements for FMVSS exemptions that involve commercial operations.

A Final Determination Letter would also govern the maximum number of vehicles approved for participation.

This number would be informed by NHTSA's review of the information submitted in the application. NHTSA proposes, when appropriate, to authorize increases in vehicle numbers over time if requested by the participant. Incrementally increasing participation would allow the scope of participation to mature along with a technology, enabling expansions to correspond to performance benchmarks or limiting initial operations until the agency gains further insight from overseeing the vehicles. Conversely, NHTSA could reduce the number of vehicles permitted to participate in AV STEP. For instance, this could occur during participation by lowering the cap on permitted vehicles through the concern resolution procedures proposed in this document or through a term in a Final Determination Letter that sets benchmarks for expanding or contracting vehicle participation numbers. NHTSA requests comment on whether the proposed rule should establish a cap on the number of vehicles allowed for each participant, including what such a cap should be and the grounds for setting it, as well as whether the cap should be able to be modified during program participation.

Setting limits on participation numbers through the adjudication of each request rather than through a categorical cap that applies to all participants would align with the longstanding approaches of the other NHTSA programs that administer exemptions under Section 30114(a).

NHTSA also proposes for Final Determination Letters to contain terms governing the use of remote driving during participation. NHTSA proposes, in § 597.105(j) of the proposed rule, to generally prohibit remote driving in AV STEP except as temporarily needed to briefly move a vehicle after the ADS initiates a minimal risk maneuver or during any situations expressly permitted in a Final Determination Letter.

This proposal would limit remote driving to short distances, such as moving a vehicle to the side of the road after it has stopped in a travel lane or moving a vehicle in response to direction from emergency responders. Conditioning remote driving on the initiation of a minimal risk maneuver would, for example, allow this brief use of remote driving after the vehicle achieves a minimal risk condition or if remote personnel realize that a vehicle undertaking a minimal risk maneuver is taking inappropriate action. Minimal risk maneuvers and minimal risk conditions are discussed further in Section IV.B.2 (System Fallback Response).

Human factors issues, connection latency, and jitter can result in unavoidable challenges for remote driving operations, even in locations with optimal connectivity. Therefore, although the agency extends eligibility to prospective operations that would entail limited remote driving, NHTSA expects, through the review framework described in the ensuing sections, to significantly scrutinize such uses. For further discussion of latency, jitter, and other remote driving considerations,

see, e.g.,

Y. Yu and S. Lee, “Remote Driving Control With Real-Time Video Streaming Over Wireless Networks: Design and Evaluation” (June 2022), available at

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=9797698.

As proposed, this general prohibition on remote driving also allows an exception for other situations expressly delineated in a Final Determination Letter. An application would need to describe any such situations for which permission is requested.

NHTSA requests comment on the proposed approach to remote driving and, specifically: (1) whether to include operations that use remote fallback personnel within the scope of the program; (2) whether the proposed rule should include a limited allowance for remote driving after the ADS achieves a minimal risk condition or after the ADS initiates a minimal risk maneuver; and (3) whether the proposed rule should expressly include any other exceptions to the general prohibition on remote driving.

The required information about remote driving in an application is discussed in Section IV.B (Protocols for ADS Operations).

Other potential exceptions could include if remote driving is unexpectedly needed to respond to a hazardous circumstance or if remote driving could enable temporary navigation around a roadway change, such as a construction zone, for which the ADS has not yet been validated.

The proposed rule contains several terms to promote NHTSA's engagement with other regulatory authorities, such as states and local governments, during the review of an application and participation in the program. The proposed rule would require all vehicles, including their operations, to comply with all Federal, state, and local laws and requirements during participation.

This provision would cover both generally applicable requirements, including local traffic laws, and those specific to ADS technologies. The proposed application and reporting requirements would provide NHTSA with information to consider whether an entity has a responsible process for identifying and following these laws. NHTSA intends to coordinate with Federal, state, and local governments, as appropriate, regarding these and other issues associated with ADS operations in their jurisdictions.

This requirement would maintain NHTSA's practice of imposing a similar term in other exemptions issued under Section 30114(a).

The Federal, state, and local regulatory frameworks and programs that also cover ADS operations span a range of different regulatory approaches. At the Federal level, examples include grants for ADS projects funded by other parts of DOT

and pilot projects to

explore the potential for ADS to further the mission of other agencies.

Examples at the state and local levels include state permitting requirements for ADS-equipped vehicles

and traffic laws that are specific to ADS-equipped vehicles.

See, e.g.,

U.S. Department of Transportation, “Automated Driving Systems Demonstration Grants Program,” available at

https://

www.transportation.gov/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/ads-demonstration-grants.

The Federal Transit Administration also administers grants for ADS.

See generally

Federal Transit Administration, “Transit Automation Research,” available at

https://www.transit.dot.gov/automation-research.

National Park Service, “NPS Emerging Mobility: Summary Evaluation of Low-Speed Automated Shuttle Pilots at NPS Sites,” June 2022.

https://www.nps.gov/subjects/transportation/upload/NPS-Automated-Shuttle-Pilots-Evaluation-Summary.pdf.

See, e.g.,

California Department of Motor Vehicles, “Autonomous Vehicles,” available at

https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/vehicle-industry-services/autonomous-vehicles/#:~:text=The%20DMV%20administers%20the%20Autonomous,and%20applying%20for%20a%20permit.

See, e.g.,

National Conference of State Legislatures, “Autonomous Vehicles Legislation Database,” available at

https://www.ncsl.org/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislation-database.

The goals of these initiatives are varied, given the diverse regulatory missions of the different jurisdictions. It is not feasible or appropriate to design AV STEP around all of the various approaches that other authorities may take concerning ADS. At the same time, AV STEP would not override any of those other authorities, such as by imposing Federal preemption of state requirements. Instead, NHTSA considers AV STEP best suited to exist in parallel with those other requirements. The proposed requirement that an AV STEP participant comply with all Federal, state, and local laws and requirements would ensure the requirements of those other authorities coexist with AV STEP. This requirement is consistent with how NHTSA has historically approached exemptions for ADS-equipped vehicles that are issued under Section 30114(a).

During the review of an AV STEP application, NHTSA will engage with applicants and other authorities, as appropriate, to explore opportunities to harmonize certain AV STEP requirements with those of overlapping authorities. As a result of such engagement, if a reporting requirement of another authority is identified that is similar to a subject for which NHTSA proposes a customized requirement in AV STEP, a Final Determination Letter could scope AV STEP's customized reporting requirements in a way that harmonizes with another report. Other jurisdictions could likewise harmonize their own processes with AV STEP or otherwise find value in the enhanced Federal oversight and transparency of participating operations when considering whether to allow those vehicles to operate under their own authorities. As one example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has oversight authority for motor carrier use and operations of ADS technologies. Opportunities may exist to harmonize, as appropriate, certain requirements in AV STEP operations that involve commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) with any applicable FMCSA activities, in the interest of a consistent Departmental approach. For instance, FMCSA is engaged in rulemaking that would govern motor carrier operation of ADS-equipped CMVs

and other activities related to AV technologies. NHTSA specifically requests comment on other ways that AV STEP could help to harmonize regulatory requirements.

See

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,” Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, RIN 2126-AC17: Motor Carrier Operation of Automated Driving Systems (ADS)-Equipped Commercial Motor Vehicles, available at

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202310&RIN=2126-AC17.

IV. Application and Review (Regulatory Text Subparts B and D)

A. Application Form

NHTSA proposes that all AV STEP applications contain a standard set of information, regardless of program step or whether an exemption is requested.

This proposal would create a common foundation for the program through consistent, structured responses from all applicants. It would also ensure that NHTSA has a fundamental understanding of the systems and requested participation when making decisions on program admission and overseeing operations. NHTSA proposes that this information be furnished through an application form containing three parts: the Operational Baseline; Location Sheet(s); and a Reporting Confirmation Sheet.

An exemption would require an additional application form specific to that purpose, as discussed later in Section VII.C (Exemption Participation Requirements).

An example form, based on the proposed requirements, is available in the docket for this rulemaking under the title “NPRM Example of AV STEP Application Form.”

1. Operational Baseline

The Operational Baseline portion of an application would focus on critical characteristics of an operation. Section 597.201 of the proposed rule requires 14 items of information, most of which NHTSA proposes to make public because they reflect basic facts about the entity's requested participation.

These items are listed below, accompanied by a description of the expected level of detail:

See

Section VI (Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)).

Participation Category.

An applicant would indicate whether it requests participation under Step 1 or Step 2.

Applicant(s).

Each of the entities requesting to participate would need to be listed. An application could be submitted by a single applicant or multiple applicants (co-applicants). In either situation, every applicant would need to meet the eligibility requirements for participation set forth in § 597.103 of the proposed rule. This field would also require primary and secondary points of contact for each applicant.

Essential System-Level Stakeholders.

Applicants would identify any entities that have a significant role in the safety of the operation covered by the application. At a minimum, these would include the vehicle manufacturer, the ADS developer, the fleet operator, and the system integrator. These entities would need to be listed regardless of whether they were applying for the program or would be participating in the proposed operation. This requirement is included because, whether active participants or not, the products or services they provide factor directly into the vehicle's system-level performance.

Vehicle Platform.

Applicants would identify a baseline vehicle platform being used. This information includes the vehicle make, model, model year, unloaded vehicle weight,

Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR),

and vehicle class.

If the vehicle was certified as FMVSS compliant, the FMVSS certifying entity should also be listed in this field. Different vehicle models could not be considered a single vehicle platform for the purposes of this field,

and would instead require separate program applications. As long as all vehicles in an application were the same vehicle model, a single application could be used for different versions of the model, such as differences in the model year, trim level, or GVWR. NHTSA would review any differences within the vehicle model to decide whether any of the vehicles

should participate separately. This approach would help to streamline individual applications and preserve the consistency of operations contained in a single application or participation.

See

49 CFR 571.3.

Id.

See

49 CFR part 523.

Even if the traditional use of the term “vehicle platform” often includes multiple vehicle models, NHTSA considers a narrower use of the term appropriate in this context. This narrower use is to account for any developers or manufacturers that do not characterize their purpose-built ADS vehicle platforms as vehicle models.

Sensing Suite.

An applicant would identify any sensors, such as cameras, radar, lidar, and microphones, involved in the perception of the ADS.

For any such sensors on the vehicle, a response to this field would need to identify the specific sensor (

i.e.,

make and model information), the type of sensor, its location on the subject vehicle, and its use in ADS operations.

ADS perception is defined in SAE International publication J3131 as “an ADS' capability to sense and characterize the entities, events, and situations, in its environment.” SAE International, “J3131 MAR2022: Definitions for Terms Related to Automated Driving Systems Reference Architecture,” Section 3.1.3, (Revised March 2022).

Crash Detection Capabilities.

Applicants would detail the subject vehicle's crash detection capabilities including, if applicable, any units towed by the subject vehicle. This response would need to identify any limitations or thresholds for detecting physical contact relating to a crash. For example, if only certain scenarios involving debris impacts are identified as crashes, a response to this element should explain how those crashes are identified.

Certain Vehicle Modifications.

An applicant would identify any modifications to safety features installed as original equipment on the subject vehicles, other than any modifications for which an AV STEP exemption is sought. Modifications associated with an exemption request would be identified in a response to the requirements detailed in Section VII.B (Exemption Application Requirements).

Data Logging.

Applicants would identify the designed data-logging functionality, including the continuously recorded data and event-triggered data logged by a subject vehicle. For each type of data identified, an applicant would also need to describe the onboard or offboard storage protocols and the duration of data retention. For this element, NHTSA anticipates focusing on whether responses explain the scope of data logging for reporting required under AV STEP, such as the regular and event-triggered reporting in §§ 597.500 and 597.501 of the proposed rule.

Onboard Fallback Personnel.

A response to this field would identify the seating position(s) of any onboard fallback personnel who may be physically present in the subject vehicle(s) during requested operations. Even though Step 2 applications would largely not rely on the presence of fallback personnel during participating operations, those applications should still list the seating positions of any onboard fallback personnel that may be present on a limited basis.

If the subject vehicles would never use fallback personnel, even on a limited basis, a response could indicate that this field is not applicable.

The possibility of limited reliance on fallback personnel under Step 2 is discussed in Sections III.B (Program Steps) and V.A.2 (Event-Triggered Reporting).

Use of Remote Driving.

A response to this field should indicate whether remote driving may be used to control a subject vehicle at any time during operation. Applicants would need to identify any restrictions in place for any planned use of remote driving, such as speed thresholds or limiting its use to locations with validated network strength. This response would inform whether NHTSA should permit narrow uses of remote driving in a Final Determination Letter beyond those allowed under § 597.105(j) of the proposed rule.

In addition, given the potential risks associated with remote driving,

NHTSA believes that information about the extent of remote driving in a participation should be publicly available. Accordingly, an application that involves remote driving would need to also include a public summary of limitations on the use of remote driving. NHTSA would publish this summary along with other information from an application, as discussed in Section VI (Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)).

More detailed information regarding the technical parameters and safety of any remote driving included in a participation request would also need to be provided to NHTSA under the requirements proposed in Section IV.B (Protocols for ADS Operations).

See

supra n.80.

Use of Vehicle Assistance.

A response to this field would need to indicate whether any remote or onboard vehicle assistance may be used to direct the subject vehicle at any time during a requested operation. The proposed rule defines vehicle assistance as an individual providing information or advice about a situation to an ADS-equipped vehicle in driverless operation (instead of performing the DDT for the vehicle) to help the ADS continue a trip when encountering a situation that the ADS cannot manage. Vehicle assistance may be provided remotely, by an individual not physically present in the vehicle,

100

or by an individual on board (physically present in) the vehicle.

101

Any applications indicating that vehicle assistance may occur would need to describe the specific capabilities that this assistance could entail.

102

100

For additional discussion of “remote assistance,”

see

SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” Section 3.23: Remote Assistance, (Revised April 2021).

101

Unlike Fallback Personnel, as defined in this proposal, vehicle assistance personnel provide information or instruction to an ADS-equipped vehicle rather than directly exercising vehicle control authority.

102

As with the preceding remote driving field, more detailed information regarding any vehicle assistance included in a participation request would also need to be provided to NHTSA, as detailed in Section IV.B (Protocols for ADS Operations).

Operational Permits Required.

An application would indicate whether any other Federal, state, or local permits are required for the operations requested in the application. If so, the application should list each such permit, the regulatory entity requiring a permit, and the status of each permit. For any permits that have already been issued at the time of application, an applicant would need to identify the effective dates of each permit, describe any conditions imposed by those permits, and provide a copy of each such permit.

AV STEP Exemption.

An application would indicate whether the request to participate in AV STEP includes a request for an AV STEP exemption. If so, an application would also need to include a separate exemption form that covers unique application requirements for the exemption.

103

See

Section VII.C (Exemption Application Requirements).

Accessibility.

An application would summarize any features or design modifications of the vehicles that are the subject of an application that are intended to promote the safe accommodation of passengers with disabilities. This required disclosure would include any such features or modifications that are intended for passengers with physical, sensory, and cognitive disabilities—including passengers who use wheelchairs and other mobility equipment. NHTSA proposes to publish this summary to enable the public to understand the accessibility options offered in an operation.

104

NHTSA also proposes to require an application to include more information and technical detail about any such features or designs in response to the separate application requirements detailed in Section IV.B.3 (Operator, User, and Surrounding Road User Interactions). NHTSA encourages entities to include accessibility features for passengers with disabilities in their

vehicle designs and believes that it is important for the public to understand the availability of such features.

104

See

Section VI (Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)).

2. Location Sheet

The second proposed portion of an application is a Location Sheet. Each application would be required to contain at least one Location Sheet. An application that requests participation in multiple distinct locations would need to include a Location Sheet for each location. Entities may combine operations in multiple locations in the same application or participation, as long as the Operational Baseline characteristics of the operations remain the same across the locations.

AV STEP's use of Location Sheets would provide enough flexibility for an operation to evolve over the course of time, including by adding more Location Sheets during participation as operations expand to new areas.

105

It would also reduce the administrative burden of applications and participations by enabling NHTSA to focus on the aspects of an operation unique to a particular location once the agency understands the baseline approach to an operation that would apply no matter where the operation occurs. The proposed rule would require applications to include the following information for each Location Sheet:

105

The process for adding new Location Sheets during participation is discussed in Section V.B.1 (Amendment Process).

Location Name.

Applicants would assign a unique reference name to the operation proposed in the Location Sheet. The Location Name field in a Location Sheet would provide a unique identifier for each location that a participation includes. Much of the reporting described in Sections V.A (Reporting Requirements) and VI (Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)) is segmented by Location Sheet.

Location Limitation.

Applicants would define the geographical boundaries for the operations in the Location Sheet, generally by using maps to define this boundary.

106

This field could be changed during an active participation, as discussed in Section V.B.1 (Amendment Process). However, this response should cover the full breadth of operations that are anticipated at the time of an application.

106

For example, a .kmz/.kml file containing a varied map boundary could be provided. If operations would be constrained to specific route maps, this constraint should be reflected in a response to this field.

Maximum Number of Vehicles Proposed for Participation.

An applicant would identify the maximum number of vehicles for which they seek to participate under the Location Sheet. This number could correspond to the actual number of vehicles that an applicant is ready to operate or reflect a projected number of vehicles.

107

During participation, the actual number of vehicles operating would be reported to NHTSA under the proposed periodic reporting requirements described in Section V.A.1 (Periodic Reporting).

107

If an application requests such a projected number of vehicles, the application information would still need to support the full scope of requested operations.

Legal Speed Limits.

This field would require information about the posted speed limits on roadways on which a vehicle plans to operate. An applicant would identify specific information for: (1) the road segments in an operation that have the highest legal speed limit; and (2) the road segments with the greatest speed differential between the legal speed limit and the maximum speed allowed for the ADS while operating on the road segment. NHTSA expects that the most efficient way to identify roadway segments will usually be pairs of GPS coordinates for the start and end points. However, an applicant could use other methods to identify the roadway segments, for example, if such segments represent a significant portion of an operation. NHTSA will use this information to understand the speeds of traffic around which a vehicle could operate and whether the vehicle could pose a risk by operating at different speeds from the surrounding traffic.

Vehicle Speeds.

An application would identify the highest speed allowed for the ADS upon commencing participation at the location, as well as the highest speed for which participation is requested for the ADS at the location. In many cases, these two speeds may be the same. However, the two answers could diverge, such as if an ADS initially operates at lower speeds to complete further validation before planned speed increases are pursued.

108

As with any other proposed requirements, the application information would need to support the full scope of operations requested, even if it included projected future changes.

Public Ridership.

An application would indicate whether the subject vehicle would carry public passengers during the requested operations.

109

The proposed rule refers to public passengers as “public ridership.”

See

§ 597.102.

Intended Use.

An applicant would describe the planned use or uses of vehicles during operations, such as a shuttle or ride hailing service, goods delivery, or research and development.

110

For an applicant seeking an exemption under 49 U.S.C. 30114(a), additional information on use would be required by the exemption portion of the application.

Operational Design Domain.

An applicant would provide a complete specification of all aspects of the ODD. This response should be a detailed answer that comprehensively explains the entire ODD, which the proposed rule defines as “the operating conditions under which the automated driving system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, including, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or absence of defined traffic or roadway characteristics.”

111

If an application contains multiple Location Sheets, a response to this element should identify any ODD differences among the Location Sheets. Several industry documents provide guidance on the specification of an ODD.

112

However, this general guidance may not necessarily address the full level of detail associated with an ADS developer's particular approach to defining its system's ODD. NHTSA seeks comment on incorporating any such guidance into the regulation or otherwise specifying the form in which minimum information about the proposed ODD should be described in an application. An applicant would also need to include a public summary of the ODD. NHTSA proposes to publish this summary along with other information about an application or participation. The public reporting section of this document describes those aspects of the proposal.

113

111

See

§ 597.102 of the proposed rule.

112

See, e.g.,

International Organization for Standardization, “ISO 34503: Road Vehicles—Test scenarios for automated driving systems—Specification for operational design domain” (2023);

and

Automated Vehicle Safety Consortium (AVSC), “AVSC00002202004: Best Practice for Describing an Operational Design Domain: Conceptual Framework and Lexicon” (2020).

113

See

Section VI (Public Reporting Requirements (Regulatory Text Subpart G)).

Vehicle Equipment.

An applicant would describe how several attributes of a vehicle covered by the Location Sheet compare to the base model of the vehicle. This information would help NHTSA gauge whether differences in the same vehicle model may need to be considered during the application review. This field should disclose how three categories of equipment or vehicle characteristics compare between the subject vehicle and the base model, if applicable: (1) any trim level characteristics that affect safety; (2) any

optional technologies that affect safety; and (3) any other distinguishing safety characteristics. If an application contains multiple Location Sheets, a response to this element should also identify any differences among the Location Sheets. For example, if sensor heating elements are used in one location but not necessary in another, that information should be provided in response to this field.

3. Confirmation of Reporting During Participation

The third portion of the application form would focus on information necessary to carry out the reporting requirements discussed in Section V.A (Reporting Requirements) if an applicant is admitted for participation.

First, an applicant would need to confirm its ability to carry out all of the AV STEP reporting requirements if approved for participation. Some reporting requirements may require coordination with third parties, such as Essential System-Level Stakeholders that are not participants, or may involve specific technical capabilities. This confirmation would ensure that an applicant understands these responsibilities up front. If an application has a single applicant, that applicant would be responsible for compliance with all of the reporting requirements. If an application has multiple co-applicants, they could collectively meet the reporting requirements. If reporting responsibilities are to be shared by co-applicants, a response to this element should explain which entity would be primarily responsible for meeting each reporting requirement that is set forth in Subpart E of the proposed rule.

114

In addition to clarifying reporting responsibilities for co-applicants, this proposed requirement would ensure that data generation and processing capabilities support the AV STEP reporting elements.

114

Even if reporting is shared among multiple participants, NHTSA proposes that it may suspend, revoke, or take other appropriate action to address a failure to fully comply with all reporting required under AV STEP by any participant.

Second, this portion of the application would solicit proposals for “customized” reporting terms. For reporting requirements designated as customized, NHTSA has proposed the subject matter for a required report but has not defined a specific metric or threshold for the reporting. Applications would need to propose specific metrics or thresholds to be used for the terms of the reporting. Each such proposal should be informed by the independent assessment submitted in an application (and described further in Section IV.D, Independent Assessment). In developing these proposals, applicants should consider the extent to which the proposed reporting would support an evaluation of the operation, performance, and safety of the subject vehicles. Each proposal should be accompanied by enough information to allow NHTSA to interpret the proposed metrics or thresholds, as well as explain their value and relevance to the applicable requirement. In Section V.A (Reporting Requirements), NHTSA provides high-level examples of potential terms for each of the proposed customized requirements.

The current state of ADS technology necessitates flexibility in reporting certain subjects. Even so, these subjects represent important safety considerations for any ADS operation. Establishing customized terms would provide this necessary flexibility while ensuring meaningful reporting. The proposed approach to customized requirements would enable NHTSA to consider the value of these different types of reporting metrics and thresholds across various participants.

B. Protocols for ADS Operations

Section 597.204 of the proposed rule would require applications to explain two types of protocols critical to the safety of subject vehicle operations. The first pertains to the ADS' compliance with traffic safety laws and the second covers situations where an ADS is unable to continue performing the driving task reliably. These protocols both relate to how an ADS will execute roadway responsibilities that may arise during an operation. Detailed information regarding each of these topics in an application would provide necessary context for the proposed reporting on these topics that would occur during participation.

115

See

Section V.A (Reporting Requirements).

1. Law Abidance

Compliance with traffic safety laws and local requirements for operating is a critical aspect of safety for ADS-equipped vehicles on public roads. Section 597.204(a) of the proposed rule lists four elements of information required in an application that would enable NHTSA to consider an applicant's strategy for complying with Federal, state, and local laws that apply to the subject vehicles or their operations.

A response to this element would, at minimum, summarize how applicable traffic safety laws are identified (including both initially and during operations), describe how an ADS' compliance with traffic safety laws is monitored,

116

and describe any conditions under which the design of the ADS may allow the subject vehicle to violate traffic laws. A response would also need to summarize recognition, interaction, and response strategies for emergency, law enforcement, and construction vehicles, personnel, and equipment, as well as crossing guards and other traffic control personnel. The response should cover laws that explicitly address ADS-equipped vehicles as well as those that apply to road users more broadly.

117

NHTSA recognizes that in some situations, temporary deviations from traffic safety laws may be necessary to safely react to roadway conditions. Many traffic safety laws specifically allow for such exigencies. The information provided in response to this element is intended to help NHTSA understand the ADS' approach to determining what behavior is appropriate in these situations.

116

As noted elsewhere by NHTSA, vehicle automation features that contribute to behaviors that cause traffic violations can constitute a motor vehicle defect. This has been demonstrated by partial driving automation system recalls relating to such incidents.

See

Tesla, Inc., “Part 573 Safety Recall Report, Recall No. 23V-085” (February 15, 2023), available at

https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2023/RCLRPT-23V085-3451.PDF.

117

A response to this element would not need to include “unwritten rules of the road” or “implicit traffic rules,” which are phrases used within the industry to refer to behaviors associated with good roadway citizenship that are not typically defined by traffic laws. However, these concepts would likely be relevant to other aspects of an application, such as certain claims and evidence in the safety case that would be reviewed by an independent assessment. For further discussion of these concepts, see,

e.g.,

Mobileye Technologies Ltd., “The Unwritten Rules of the Road, Codified in RSS” (February 2023), available at

https://www.mobileye.com/blog/responsibility-sensitive-safety-unwritten-rules-of-the-road/

and Aptiv et al., “Safety First for Automated Driving” (2019), available at

https://static.mobileye.com/website/corporate/media/Intel-Safety-First-for-Automated-Driving.pdf.

An applicant's response to this element should also describe a vehicle's response plans for emergency, law enforcement, and other traffic control interactions. In particular, this response would help the agency evaluate how ADS technologies interact with first responders. An ADS-equipped vehicle's behavior should be easily anticipated and understood by these personnel during such interactions.

118

NHTSA would use this information to consider whether the ADS may negatively affect safety-critical functions performed by first responders.

118

See

AVSC, “AVSC00005202012: Best Practice for First Responder Interactions with Fleet-Managed Automated Driving System-Dedicated Vehicles (ADS-DVs)” (December 2020).

2. System Fallback Response

Section 597.204(b) of the proposed rule would require an application to explain protocols surrounding ADS failure scenarios. The response of an ADS-equipped vehicle to these situations is varyingly referred to as minimal risk maneuvers (MRMs), fallback strategy, failsafe response, or other similar terms. For simplicity, this proposal refers to the achievement of a minimal risk condition (MRC), which is defined in the proposed rule as “a stable, stopped condition to which a user or an ADS may bring a vehicle after performing the DDT fallback, including after a DDT takeover, to reduce the risk of a crash when a given trip cannot or should not be continued.”

119

See

§ 597.102 of the proposed rule. This proposed definition is derived from SAE International's definition of an MRC: “a stable, stopped condition to which a user or an ADS may bring a vehicle after performing the DDT fallback in order to reduce the risk of a crash when a given trip cannot or should not be continued.” SAE International, “J3016 APR2021: Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,” (Revised April 2021).

NHTSA proposes to require an applicant to describe any system fallback strategies or designs, as well as any protocols for their execution or activation. A response to this element should describe any MRCs that might be undertaken by the subject ADS. This description should identify the circumstances under which each MRC would be triggered, detail how MRMs to achieve each MRC would be initiated and executed, and explain any protocols for the ADS following the achievement of each MRC. An applicant should also explain the engineering rationale for selecting each MRC and setting triggering conditions for them.

120

For example, do the trigger conditions fully capture any feasible ODD exits, such as sudden weather changes?

In addition, an applicant would need to provide an overview of any other protocols associated with averting or achieving a minimal risk condition. This response should focus on protocols that apply to individuals who may interact with the vehicle rather than protocols that are followed by the ADS. This would include any protocols for providing input to the ADS or disengaging the ADS prior to or during an MRM, resuming ADS driving following the achievement of an MRC, and vehicle recovery. This information would provide NHTSA additional context for the MRC strategies employed by an operation, such as the role of any vehicle assistance or onboard test drivers and potential impacts to traffic after an MRC is achieved.

To further understand these issues, NHTSA proposes to require a response to this element to provide information about the personnel responsible for each such protocol. This response should include the role and number

121

of responsible personnel and each such personnel's: (1) responsibilities under the protocol, (2) physical location when performing those responsibilities, (3) expected response time in performing those responsibilities, (4) potential control authority over the subject vehicle, (5) means of exercising that control authority, and (6) any operational restrictions on the use of that control authority. In addition to informing NHTSA's review of an application, this information would contribute to the agency's assessment, during operations that occur under an AV STEP participation, of whether an ADS-equipped vehicle responded appropriately after an incident occurred.

121

For example, a minimum number of personnel in a certain role who would be available to respond relative to a given number of subject vehicles operating on-road.

Lastly, NHTSA proposes to require that an application describe any protocols for vehicle immobilizations that occur without the achievement of an MRC. This description could include protocols for responding to a crash or a catastrophic vehicle failure that results in a vehicle immobilization that the ADS did not initiate. For example, a vehicle could coast to a stop after loss of all motive power.

3. User and Surrounding Road User Interactions

This section of an application is intended to consider the safety of members of the public who may interact with the vehicles that are the subject of an application. Section 597.204(c) of the proposed rule would require that an application include an overview of any design and process measures that are in place to facilitate safe and predictable interactions with members of the public. This element does not include the inherent functionality of the ADS, such as the object and event detection and response (OEDR) involved in avoiding collisions. Although that ADS functionality is, of course, crucial to the safety of both occupants and surrounding road users, an application would need to cover it separately in response to the independent assessment requirements in Section IV.D (Independent Assessment).

To focus the information provided in response to this element, the proposed rule contains four sub-elements of required information. The first three relate to communication and behavioral strategies for promoting safe and predictable interactions with the subject vehicle. NHTSA considers such predictability an important aspect of ADS safety. Through ADS crash reporting, NHTSA has observed incidents in which the unexpected behavior of an ADS-equipped vehicle may have contributed to a collision even when the ADS was operating as intended. The following are the sub-elements relating to communication and behavioral strategies:

• Any communication strategies to convey information to individuals outside of a subject ADS-equipped vehicle, including individuals with physical, sensory, and cognitive disabilities;

• Any measures to promote the predictability of the ADS' behavior for other road users in the vicinity of the subject vehicle. This response should include information about how the ADS accounts for “unwritten rules of the road” or “roadmanship.”

122

See, e.g.,

Fraade-Blanar, Laura, Marjory S. Blumenthal, James M. Anderson, and Nidhi Kalra, “Measuring Automated Vehicle Safety: Forging a Framework. Santa Monica,” CA: RAND Corporation (2018), available at

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2662.html.

• Any communication strategies for non-operator occupants of the subject ADS-equipped vehicle. This disclosure would be expected to encompass the communication of safety information or the availability of safety controls to occupants of the subject vehicles who are not operators. Examples of responses to this sub-element could include a system's logic for communicating with occupants about whether they are wearing a seat belt during a trip or ways in which a passenger could initiate an emergency stop.

123

See

AVSC, “AVSC00003202006: Best Practice for Passenger-Initiated Emergency Trip Interruption” (June 2020).

NHTSA also proposes a fourth sub-element, which would focus on the applicant's approach to ensuring safe and predictable interactions for passengers with disabilities. An application would need to include information in response to this fourth sub-element regarding the response to the Operational Baseline question about accessibility of subject vehicles containing features or design modifications that are intended to promote the safe accommodation of passengers with disabilities. NHTSA proposes for this sub-element to cover:

• Any features or design modifications that are intended to promote safe accommodation of passengers with disabilities. Information

provided in response to this sub-element should describe how, under this design, passengers with physical, sensory, and cognitive disabilities—including passengers who use wheelchairs and other mobility equipment—would safely locate and enter the vehicle, secure themselves and any mobility equipment, input information, interact with the ADS in routine and emergency situations, communicate with any support personnel in such situations, and exit the vehicle.

Promoting the safety of passengers with disabilities is critical for ADS-equipped vehicles to reach their full potential for improving accessible options for mobility. The availability of ADS-equipped vehicles with effective accessibility features would enable greater choice, independence, and access to needed transportation for people with physical, sensory, and cognitive disabilities, as well as others whose current transportation options are limited, such as older adults. However, these benefits cannot be realized without intentional inclusive design choices that consider the needs of such individuals. NHTSA requests comment on this approach to considering the safety of accessible design choices, as well as whether any safety data specific to the experience of passengers with disabilities should be collected as part of AV STEP and how it could inform the program.

C. Data Governance Plan

ADS-equipped vehicles depend on an array of sensors, computer systems, and electronic communications. These technologies introduce cyber risks. To promote good cybersecurity practices for modern vehicles, NHTSA has embraced a multi-faceted approach that leverages industry consensus standards

124

and encourages industry to adopt practices that improve the cybersecurity posture of their vehicles. NHTSA has also issued voluntary guidance on cybersecurity best practices for all motor vehicles.

125

The agency requests comment on how participants should validate to NHTSA that they have taken the proper precautions in evaluating and mitigating cyber risks associated with ADS operations.

124

See

Section IV.D.1.a) (Conformance with Industry Standards).

125

NHTSA, “Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles” (September 2022), available at

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf.

While NHTSA is not proposing that participations meet specific cybersecurity standards, this section proposes to require that an application contain a governance plan for data relevant to AV STEP. This plan would outline the applicant's processes for managing the data to ensure its integrity and security. Participants would need a continuous stream of reliable data to responsibly monitor the safety of their ADS operations and comply with the proposed reporting requirements for AV STEP.

126

NHTSA requests comment on seven potential subjects for the data management plan, listed in § 597.207 of the proposed rule.

127

In general, these subjects consider organizational processes, including any safeguards or shared responsibilities for operations in which data are available to multiple stakeholders or jointly managed. These seven subjects are listed below, accompanied by a description of the expected level of detail:

128

126

Subpart E of the proposed rule outlines required data reporting during participation.

127

These subjects would supplement the data logging information that would be required for an application under § 597.201(f) of the proposed rule, as discussed in Section IV.A.1 (Operational Baseline).

128

NHTSA expects that some applications may jointly respond to some of these subjects if information responsive to one is also responsive to others.

A top-level accountability and management process for the data governance plan, including a description of the applicable positions and roles.

An explanation of the relevant processes for each stakeholder that generates or accesses the data,

129

including the titles and responsibilities of key individuals.

129

Such as an ADS developer and fleet operator for operations in which these are different entities.

Access control mechanisms to maintain data security and privacy.

Training or procedures for granting data access, the means of authenticating such access, and anonymization processes—particularly to the extent they may impact the safety value of the data. This disclosure should include information regarding the protections in place for both onboard vehicle data logging and physical or wireless data transmission.

Processes for maintaining data quality and integrity.

Detection and correction of data corruption and data processing errors.

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for adherence to the plan.

How applicants would oversee the governance plan, such as through automated mechanisms or spot-checking, to ensure that the plan is followed.

Procedures for identifying and responding to incidents that compromise data security or integrity.

How the responsible parties would recognize that an incident has occurred

130

and react to it, including monitoring for and responding to cybersecurity incidents.

130

Including, for instance, if an applicant has a process for quantifying a level of confidence that an incident would be identified, a response to this element could describe those calculations.

Risk management strategies for mitigating internal and external data-related risks, including cybersecurity risks.

Risk management strategies not already addressed by other elements in this subsection, such as data backup protocols.

A list of any published industry standards, guidance, or best practices with which the plan conforms.

This element does not propose to prescribe standards to which a process must conform. However, if an applicant claims conformance with any standards, those standards would need to be identified in response to this element.

131

While many potentially relevant standards exist, one example of such a standard is the International Organization for Standardization's road vehicle standard: “Safety and Cybersecurity for Automated Driving Systems—Design, Verification and Validation.” (2020).

D. Independent Assessment

NHTSA proposes to require that AV STEP applications contain assessments conducted by an independent third party. The independent assessment requirements are proposed to enhance the efficiency and efficacy of NHTSA's review. An assessment from a third party with expertise in the subject technologies would provide value to this process. In rapidly evolving technology fields, such as ADS, independent assessments provide an opportunity for the oversight of such technologies to remain agile and adapt with the changing state of the art, while also more efficiently managing voluminous data.

132

The ADS technologies in AV STEP applications would be complex, technically specialized, and accompanied by extensive documentation. An independent assessor's review would streamline NHTSA's review by pinpointing important aspects of a system and add a neutral perspective on

an applicant's claims. In addition, the proposed assessments would provide NHTSA with insight into the value of different third-party ADS review methodologies and subject matters.

132

Outside of the automotive industry, independent assessments have long existed as standard practice for sophisticated technologies, such as software systems. For instance, industry standards and best practices for third-party audits of software systems have been in place for decades and provide routine and pivotal support for many aspects of software development.

See, e.g.,

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “IEEE 1028-2008: IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits” (August 2008); International Organization for Standardization, “ISO/IEC 20246:2017: Software and systems engineering—Work product reviews” (February 2017).

These assessments would be informative but not determinative. A favorable assessment would not necessarily lead to admission into AV STEP. Instead, NHTSA would consider the perspective provided by an assessment along with the full context of the other application materials. This role resembles NHTSA's engagement with third parties in other oversight activities.

133

Likewise, the automotive industry often uses third parties to assess vehicle design or corporate processes. The proposed assessment for AV STEP builds on these practices.

134

NHTSA seeks comment on the proposed independent assessment, particularly regarding the scope, timing, and logistics of reviews and assessor qualification requirements and disclosures.

133

Examples include third parties performing failure analyses in defects investigations, contractors adding specialized expertise in vehicle testing, and independent monitors promoting accountability in regulatory compliance oversight.

134

See, e.g.,

Pete Bigelow, “Self-driving tech companies take a hard look at their own blind spots, Automotive News,” (October 14, 2024), available at

https://www.autonews.com/mobility-report/autonomous-driving-companies-seek-independent-safety-reviews/.

1. Focus of Independent Assessment

AV STEP proposes a comprehensive independent assessment of the subject vehicles, which would encompass an applicant's holistic approach to vehicle safety. This assessment would consider the full extent of ADS operations requested in an application. The proposed rule organizes this assessment around three subjects: (a) conformance with relevant industry standards, best practices, and guidance; (b) a safety case, including safety management systems; and (c) specific policies and capabilities.

NHTSA proposes to apply the same independent assessment requirements for applications requesting participation under Step 1 and Step 2. However, an independent assessment at Step 2 would need to be more rigorous because it would need to consider whether the ADS could be exclusively relied on during operations. In contrast, an independent assessment at Step 1 could consider the fallback personnel's ability to mitigate certain risks rather than fully reviewing the ADS' ability to address those risks. For instance, a review of a Step 1 safety case could consider safety claims to be satisfied by fallback personnel even if the evidence available for the ADS would not support those claims. In contrast, at Step 2, an ADS would be solely responsible for the DDT within its ODD, and the independent assessment would need to reflect these heightened expectations.

(a) Conformance With Industry Standards

First, NHTSA proposes to require third-party review of the conformance of subject vehicles with relevant industry standards, best practices, and guidance pertaining to the design, development, or operation of the ADS.

135

Industry standards are established through consensus processes in which a written standard is refined by the collective contributions of members of the standard-setting bodies, who possess substantial expertise. Industry standards conformance provides valuable insight into safety design and the extent to which applicants adopt state-of-the-art practices. Considering industry standards conformance also aligns with the goals of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA).

136

135

While not all best practices or guidance may be considered “standards,” for simplicity, they are collectively referred to as “standards” or “industry standards” hereafter.

136

See

Public Law 104-113 (1996).

For the conformance review, an independent assessment would need to consider which industry standards are relevant to the ADS under review. Because the relevant standards will likely differ based on the system in question and the standards used by a manufacturer during the development process, NHTSA is not currently proposing to prescribe particular standards with which conformity is required. This flexibility accounts for the current early stage of industry standards pertaining to ADS, which continue to evolve along with the technologies. A variety of standards currently exist, with the approaches of some standards overlapping or conflicting with others. Affording an assessor the flexibility to identify the most relevant standards in place at the time of the assessment would allow the assessment to adapt to the ADS safety community's prevailing views on safety approaches and best practices.

For the standards identified as relevant, the independent assessment would need to determine full conformance, partial conformance, or nonconformance with each standard. If an entity had previously obtained an independent assessment for a standard (such as for an applicant's internal purposes), NHTSA anticipates that a third party conducting an assessment for AV STEP could consider this prior review instead of re-assessing to the standard. To do so, the third-party assessor for AV STEP would need to verify the approach, results, and continued applicability of the prior assessment.

For each standard with which partial conformance or nonconformance is determined, an assessor would also need to assess any justification provided by an applicant for not conforming with the standard or portion of the standard and consider any potential safety implications of the nonconformances. If a third-party reviewer's reasoning for not assessing conformance with a published industry standard relies upon an alternative standard,

137

the reviewer should assess conformance with the alternative standard and explain how the two standards compare.

137

This alternative standard could include a standard used in the entity's development process, such as a company-specific standard, in lieu of a comparable published standard.

In addition, the independent assessment would need to evaluate whether, collectively, the degree of conformance with relevant standards represents a responsible approach to developing and operating the subject vehicles. Despite the evolving landscape of industry standards, understanding how an ADS conforms to industry standards in the aggregate would help NHTSA ascertain the level of due diligence applied to the system's development. Disregarding industry standards without carefully considering how the safety goals of those standards could be met may be indicative of whether the system was developed in a responsible way that reflects state-of-the-art safety practices for ADS.

Finally, to inform how the assessed approach to industry standards should shape any further development of the system, an assessor would also need to provide recommendations regarding: (1) the list of industry standards with which conformance should, in full or in part, be achieved or maintained during operations; and (2) how to address any safety gaps that would not be covered even if this recommended conformance was met. Collectively, the recommendations regarding these two subjects would help NHTSA consider the practical impacts of the reviewed approach to industry standards.

(b) Safety Case

The second subject for which NHTSA proposes to require an independent assessment is the safety

case

138

detailing how the safety of the subject vehicle, including the safety of the vehicle's occupants and surrounding road users, is assured for the operations requested in an application. Many diverse stakeholders have generally encouraged the agency to consider such safety cases for ADS. For example, in response to NHTSA's 2020 “Framework for ADS Safety” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM),

139

a wide variety of organizations—including consumer advocacy groups,

140

ADS developers,

141

and local authorities

142

—advocated for NHTSA to collect and review safety cases. Such comments informed the safety case review requirements that NHTSA proposes in this subsection.

138

This proposal defines a safety case as “a structured argument, consisting of claims supported by a body of evidence, that provides a complete,

comprehensible, and valid case that a system is acceptably safe for a given use in a specified environment.”

See

§ 597.102 of the proposed rule.

139

85 FR 78058 (December 3, 2020).

140

Center for Automotive Safety, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0106, Comment ID NHTSA-2020-0106-0763 (April 2, 2021), available at

https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2020-0106-0763.

141

Waymo, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0106-0771 (April 28, 2021), available at

https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2020-0106-0771.

142

City of New York, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0106-0764 (April 2, 2021), available at

https://www.regulations.gov/comment/NHTSA-2020-0106-0764.

In general, an independent assessment of an applicant's safety case would be required to review the validity and soundness of the safety case. This review would entail considering whether the safety case claims for the operations of the subject vehicle are supported by sufficient evidence, as well as whether appropriate processes exist for maintaining the safety case throughout the operations. Where a standardized safety case framework has been adopted,

143

or where conformance with industry standards supports safety case claims, this safety case assessment could incorporate the industry standards assessment described in the prior subsection.

143

Such as that published by the UL Standards and Engagement organization: American National Standards Institute (ANSI), “UL Standard ANSI/UL4600: Standard for Evaluation of Autonomous Products:” (March 2022).

As with industry standards for ADS more generally, standardized safety case frameworks for ADS have not yet been universally adopted. A variety of approaches to arguing the safety of ADS design and operations are currently used across the ADS safety community. NHTSA currently prefers to encourage the evolution of these different approaches so that their maximum potential benefit can be realized. This proposal does not prescribe a specific format for safety cases. However, to mitigate the potential for variability in safety cases, NHTSA proposes to require assessment of a set of minimum considerations fundamental to operational safety.

Specifically, the proposed rule would require detailed analysis for these nine aspects of a safety case:

Safety Risk Assessment.

Whether the safety case comprehensively identifies and assesses safety risks, including potential vehicle and operational hazards and faults.

Safety Risk Management.

Whether the safety case contains appropriate risk management, including mitigations, for the risks identified.

System Evolution.

Whether the safety case contains appropriate processes for maintaining or improving safety over time.

Safety Performance Indicators.

Whether the safety case relies on appropriate safety performance indicators and thresholds.

Conformance with Traffic Safety Law.

Whether appropriate processes exist for identifying applicable traffic safety laws in an area of operation and overseeing their conformance during operations.

Vehicle Fallback and Assistance.

Whether the safety case contains appropriate processes for ensuring the effectiveness of any expected fallback or vehicle assistance.

Human Factors.

Whether the safety case appropriately accounts for human factors considerations that may affect safety, including, where applicable, those related to fallback personnel, vehicle assistance, vehicle occupants, or surrounding road users.

Crash Avoidance.

Whether the safety case appropriately identifies and considers the variety of crash-imminent situations that could occur within the operations.

144

This should cover the full extent of potential crash circumstances within the system's ODD, including the full range of environmental conditions, such as poor lighting or adverse weather conditions, as well as the full range of other road users that a subject vehicle could encounter, such as those using mobility aids or those with sensory impairments.

Tool Qualification.

145

Whether software tools used to evaluate expected ADS performance are representative and accurate.

145

For further discussion of tool qualification, particularly with regards to summarizing the tool qualification approaches outlined by industry consensus standards, including ISO 26262,

see, e.g.,

M. Conrad, G. Sandmann, and P. Munier, “Software Tool Qualification According to ISO 26262” (April 2011), available at

https://www.mathworks.com/content/dam/mathworks/tag-team/Objects/s/68068-2011-01-1005-mathworks.pdf.

These nine aspects of the safety case review would probe the robustness of the analytical framework used to develop and oversee the ADS. In addition, NHTSA proposes for an assessment of the safety case to further evaluate the safety processes that govern such development and oversight by also including a review of the safety management systems

146

in place to oversee the safety of subject vehicles, including during development and operations. This review should focus on the organizations responsible for the safety of operations involving the subject vehicles, including any Essential System-Level Stakeholders that would remain engaged with an operation during AV STEP participation.

146

See, e.g.,

AVSC, “AVSC00007202107: Information Report for Adapting a Safety Management System (SMS) for Automated Driving System (ADS) SAE Level 4 and 5 Testing and Evaluation” (July 2021).

As with the prior elements, NHTSA is not prescribing a specific type of safety management system for this requirement but, instead, proposes eight elements for the required review:

• Whether the leadership fosters a positive safety culture and demonstrates a safety commitment throughout the organization. This element focuses on how leadership support for safety management policies may affect their use in the organization. For instance, if leadership prioritizes achieving development milestones in a way that tacitly discourages internal reporting of safety concerns, internal reporting policies that read well may not be followed in practice. Such policies are more likely to reach their full potential if leadership rewards identifying and resolving safety issues early.

• Whether those responsible for the implementation of the safety management systems possess appropriate resources, authorities, and accountability. This element would include considerations that affect the responsibilities of the workforce that would oversee safe ADS operations. A review under this element may span working conditions, such as work intensity, fatigue risk, shift length, length between shifts, and human-to-vehicle ratios for fallback or vehicle assistance personnel.

• Whether there are appropriate policies and processes for encouraging the reporting and timely investigation of safety-related concerns from internal staff and members of the public.

• Whether appropriate capabilities and policies exist for monitoring the location and state of each participating vehicle.

• Whether appropriate processes exist to monitor safety performance indicators.

• Whether sufficient capabilities and policies exist for timely responding to a vehicle incident or immobilization and, if necessary, to clear a disabled vehicle from the roadway. This review must estimate a range of time for an expected response.

• Whether an appropriate plan exists for reaching timely decisions regarding future operations if an emergency arises. For instance, this element should consider the decision-making processes for determining when and how operations should be curtailed or paused after an incident.

• Whether there are appropriate processes in place for how Essential System-Level Stakeholders will engage with each other regarding ongoing operations, including for carrying out software updates, operational updates, vehicle maintenance, and the collection and reporting of safety data.

Collectively, these two focuses of a safety case assessment would provide insight into whether robust safety assurance frameworks exist for the public operation of subject vehicles and whether sufficient organizational support underpins those frameworks.

Finally, NHTSA proposes to require an independent assessment to cover three other topics. Each of these topics may already be covered by a comprehensive safety case or by industry standards conformance. If so, to the extent an assessment already reviewed these topics, it could be incorporated in satisfying these requirements. However, the proposed rule separately enumerates the following topics to ensure that they would be covered by an assessment:

Community Engagement.

Whether policies for engaging with state and local authorities, local communities, and other entities affected by the subject vehicle's operation are sufficiently robust to identify the relevant stakeholders, provide them with appropriate information regarding operations, engage with them about concerns, and meaningfully address those concerns as needed. These relevant stakeholders may range from law enforcement, first responders, and local regulatory authorities to labor organizations representing the transportation workforce to residents that live in the area in which the subject vehicles would operate. The appropriate engagement processes likely depend on the stakeholders and operations in question. However, examples of potentially effective engagement strategies from NHTSA's past experience administering ADS exemptions in AVEP include town halls hosted by an ADS developer to allow members of the community to express their views on local operations, demonstrations with local law enforcement of how to interact with the vehicle during an emergency situation, and coordination with local officials and law enforcement about how proposed operations may affect local traffic patterns.

Training and Qualifications of Personnel.

Whether the personnel responsible for developing and maintaining the safety case or executing safety critical processes possess appropriate qualifications and training. This should include consideration of training procedures and materials used, on both an initial and ongoing basis. ADS-equipped vehicles rely, and are expected to continue to rely,

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.