Securing the Border
Federal RegisterOct 7, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
8 CFR Parts 208 and 235
[CIS No. 2778-24; Docket No: USCIS-2024-0006]
RIN 1615-AC92
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Executive Office for Immigration Review
8 CFR Part 1208
[A.G. Order No. 6053-2024]
RIN 1125-AB32
Securing the Border
AGENCY:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), Department of Justice (“DOJ”).
ACTION:
Final rule; request for comments.
SUMMARY:
On June 3, 2024, the President signed a Proclamation under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) suspending and limiting the entry of certain noncitizens into the United States during emergency border circumstances. DHS and DOJ (“the Departments”) issued a complementary interim final rule (“IFR”) shortly thereafter. This final rule responds to public comments received on the IFR, makes certain revisions to the regulatory text, and seeks comment on potential changes to the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule as well as changes that parallel modifications made by the subsequent Proclamation.
DATES:
Effective date:
This rule is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on October 1, 2024.
Comment period for solicited comments:
Comments on the extended and expanded applicability of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rebuttable presumption in Section IV of this preamble and changes that parallel modifications made by the subsequent Proclamation described in Section II.C.1 of this preamble must be submitted on or before November 6, 2024.
The electronic Federal Docket Management System will accept comments prior to midnight eastern time at the end of that day.
ADDRESSES:
Docket:
To view comments on the IFR that preceded this rule, search for docket number USCIS-2024-0006 on the Federal eRulemaking Portal at
https://www.regulations.gov.
Comment period for solicited additional comments:
You may submit comments on the specific issues identified in Sections II.C.1 and IV of this preamble via the electronic Federal Docket Management System at
https://www.regulations.gov,
to DHS Docket Number USCIS-2024-0006. Follow the website instructions for submitting comments. Comments submitted in a manner other than the one listed above, including emails or letters sent to the Departments' officials, will not be considered comments on the rulemaking and may not receive a response from the Departments. Please note that the Departments cannot accept any comments that are hand-delivered or couriered. In addition, the Departments cannot accept comments contained on any form of digital media storage device, such as CDs/DVDs and USB drives. The Departments are not accepting mailed comments at this time. If you cannot submit your comment by using
https://www.regulations.gov,
please contact the Regulatory Coordination Division, Office of Policy and Strategy, USCIS, DHS, by telephone at (240) 721-3000 for alternate instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For DHS:
Daniel Delgado, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Immigration Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, DHS; telephone (202) 447-3459 (not a toll-free call).
For EOIR:
Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, Office of Policy, EOIR, DOJ, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041; telephone (703) 305-0289 (not a toll-free call).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Public Participation
II. Executive Summary
A. Background and Purpose
1. Basis for the IFR
2. The Departments' Experience With the IFR
B. Legal Authority
C. Changes From the IFR to Final Rule
1. Changes to the IFR's Thresholds
2. Clarifying Changes to Regulatory Text
3. Other Technical Changes
D. Rule Provisions
E. Severability
III. Public Comments and Responses
A. Legal Authority and Background
1. Legality Concerns
a. General Comments on Domestic Law
b. Statutory Conditions and Limitations on Asylum Eligibility
c. Expedited Removal
d. General Comments on International Law
e. UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection
f. 2000 Protocol To Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
2. Justification and Statements on Need for the Rule
a. Rule Is Unjustified, Unsubstantiated, or Arbitrary
b. Lack of Resources Does Not Justify the Rule
c. Rule Does Not Acknowledge Factors Contributing to Migration
d. Other Comments Related to the Departments' Justification
B. General Feedback on the IFR
1. General Support
2. General Opposition
a. Negative Impacts on Noncitizens and Others
i. Conflicts With Humanitarian Values
ii. Procedural and Due Process Concerns
(1) General Concerns
(2) Access to Counsel, Unrepresented Applicants, and the Ability or Time To Prepare
(3) Noncitizens' Ability to Have Their Claims Heard
(4) Issues With Asylum Officers, Detention Conditions, and Quality of Credible Fear Determinations
(5) Fairness or Risks Associated With Process
iii. Impacts on Specific Vulnerable Populations, Discrimination Concerns
iv. Impacts on Criminal Enforcement
v. Negative Impacts on Other Affected Entities
b. Negative or Minimal Impacts on Immigration System and Government Operations
i. Undermines the Administration's Promises and Goals
ii. Similarity to Actions of Past Administration
iii. Would Be Ineffective or Not Achieve Its Intended Outcomes
c. Negative Impacts on the U.S. Economy, Workforce, Citizenry, Public Health, and Safety
d. Other General Opposition
C. Provisions of the Rule
1. Limitation on Asylum Eligibility
a. Proclamation Exceptions—Section 3(b) of Proclamation
i. Legal Concerns Related to CBP One and the Lack of Exceptions
ii. Wait Times for CBP One Appointments
iii. Availability of and Access to CBP One Appointments and Concerns about Discrimination
b. Regulatory Exception—Exceptionally Compelling Circumstances
c. Implementation by CBP Officers
d. Application of the Limitation on Asylum Eligibility in Proceedings Before EOIR
e. Family Unity Provisions
2. Manifestation of Fear Standard
a. Legality Concerns
b. Concerns About the Efficiency and Complexity of the Manifestation Standard
c. Implementation Guidance and Accuracy of Manifestation To Identify Fear of Return
d. Trauma Impacting Manifestation and Vulnerable Populations
e. A Manifestation of Fear Does Not Sufficiently Align With a Valid Claim for Asylum
f. Noncitizens May Not Understand Their Legal Right to Seek Asylum
3. “Reasonable Probability” Screening Standard for Statutory Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection
4. Other Comments on the Regulatory Provisions
a. Application to Mexican Nationals
b. Adequacy of Statutory Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection
c. Requests for Reconsideration
D. Other Issues Relating to the Rule
1. Scope of the Rule and Implementation
a. Concerns That the Encounter Thresholds Are Too Low or Arbitrary
b. Concerns Regarding Exceptions From the Encounter Thresholds
c. Other Concerns About the Encounter Thresholds
2. Other Comments on Issues Relating to the Rule
E. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
1. Administrative Procedure Act
a. Foreign Affairs Exception
b. Good Cause Exception
c. Length and Sufficiency of Comment Period
2. Impacts, Costs, and Benefits (E.O. 12866 and E.O. 13563)
3. Alternatives
a. Address Root Causes of Migration
b. Prioritize Funding and Other Resources
c. Further Expand Refugee Processing or Other Lawful Pathways
d. Expand Asylum Merits Process
e. Other Congressional Action
f. Additional Suggested Measures or Revisions
F. Out of Scope
IV. Requests for Comments
A. Aligning the Geographic Reach of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule With That of the Proclamation and This Rule
B. Extending the Applicability of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rebuttable Presumption
V. Regulatory Requirements
A. Administrative Procedure Act
B. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and Executive Order 14094 (Modernizing Regulatory Review)
1. Effects Under a Without-IFR Baseline
2. Effects Under a With-IFR Baseline
3. Discontinuation Analysis Under a Without-IFR Baseline
4. Effects of Expansion and Extension of Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rebuttable Presumption
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
E. Congressional Review Act
F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
G. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
H. Family Assessment
I. Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments)
J. National Environmental Policy Act
K. Paperwork Reduction Act
List of Abbreviations
AO Asylum Officer
AMI Asylum Merits Interview
APA Administrative Procedure Act
BIA Board of Immigration Appeals (DOJ, EOIR)
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBP One app CBP One mobile application
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CHNV Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review
ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations
FARRA Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
FERM Family Expedited Removal Management
FY Fiscal Year
HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IFR Interim Final Rule
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
IJ Immigration Judge
INA or the Act Immigration and Nationality Act
LGBTQI+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning, and Intersex
MPP Migrant Protection Protocols
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NTA Notice to Appear
OFO Office of Field Operations
OHSS Office of Homeland Security Statistics
POE Port of Entry
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
SWB Southwest Land Border
TCO Transnational Criminal Organization
TVPA Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
UC Unaccompanied Child, having the same meaning as Unaccompanied Alien Child as defined at 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2)
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UIP U.S. Customs and Border Protection Unified Immigration Portal
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USBP U.S. Border Patrol
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USCG U.S. Coast Guard
I. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to submit comments on the specific issues identified in Sections II.C.1 and IV of this preamble by submitting relevant written data, views, comments, and arguments by the deadline stated above. To provide the most assistance to the Departments, comments should explain the reason for any recommendation and include data, information, or authority that supports the recommended course of action. Comments must be submitted in English, or an English translation must be provided. Comments submitted in a manner other than pursuant to the instructions, including emails or letters sent to the Departments' officials, will not be considered comments on the rule and may not receive a response from the Departments.
Instructions:
If you submit a comment, you must include the USCIS Docket No. USCIS-2024-0006 for this rulemaking. All submissions may be posted, without change, to the Federal eRulemaking Portal at
https://www.regulations.gov,
and will include any personal information you provide. Therefore, submitting this information makes it public. You may wish to consider limiting the amount of personal information that you provide in any voluntary public comment submission you make to the Departments. The Departments may withhold information provided in comments from public viewing that they determine may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. For additional information, please read the Privacy and Security Notice available at
https://www.regulations.gov.
Docket:
For access to the docket and to read background documents or comments received, go to
https://www.regulations.gov,
referencing USCIS Docket No. USCIS-2024-0006. You may also sign up for email alerts on the online docket to be notified when comments are posted, or a final rule is published.
II. Executive Summary
A. Background and Purpose
1. Basis for the IFR
On June 3, 2024, the President signed Proclamation 10773 (“June 3 Proclamation”)
1
under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), finding that because the border security and immigration systems of the United States were unduly strained, the entry into the United States of certain categories of noncitizens was detrimental to the interests of the United States, and
suspending and limiting the entry of such noncitizens. 89 FR 48487, 48487-91 (June 7, 2024). The June 3 Proclamation directed DHS and DOJ to promptly consider issuing regulations addressing the circumstances at the southern border of the United States, including any warranted limitations and conditions on asylum eligibility.
Id.
at 48492. The Departments subsequently promulgated an IFR, effective June 5, 2024, “designed to implement the policies and objectives of the Proclamation by enhancing the Departments' ability to address historic levels of migration and efficiently process migrants arriving at the southern border during emergency border circumstances.”
2
Securing the Border, 89 FR 48710, 48718 (June 7, 2024) (“the IFR”).
1
As discussed in Section II.C.1 of this preamble, the President has since issued a proclamation amending portions of the June 3 Proclamation. That amending proclamation is referred to as the “September 27 Proclamation” in this preamble. Where the preamble refers to “the Proclamation” without specifying a date, it is referring to Proclamation 10773 as amended by the September 27 Proclamation.
2
The Departments use the term “emergency border circumstances” in this preamble to generally refer to situations in which high levels of encounters at the southern border exceed the Department of Homeland Security's (“DHS's”) capacity to deliver timely consequences to most individuals who cross irregularly into the United States and cannot establish a legal basis to remain in the United States.
See
89 FR at 48711 & n.2.
The June 3 Proclamation and the IFR explain that, since 2021, as a result of political and economic conditions globally, there have been substantial levels of migration throughout the Western Hemisphere, including at the southwest land border (“SWB”). 89 FR at 48487;
id.
at 48711 & n.3. In December 2023, migration levels at the SWB surged to the highest monthly total on record.
3
Id.
at 48712 n.5. DHS assessed that the surge in late 2023 was likely the result of a number of factors, including the growing understanding by smugglers and migrants that DHS's capacity to impose consequences at the border is limited by the lack of resources and tools made available by Congress and the Government of Mexico's operational constraints caused by a lack of funding at the end of the 2023 calendar year, which limited its ability to enforce its own immigration laws.
Id.
at 48725 & n.115.
3
There were nearly 302,000 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) encounters at and between ports of entry (“POEs”) along the southwest land border (“SWB”) in December 2023, higher than any previous month on record. Office of Homeland Security Statistics (“OHSS”) analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset [Encounters Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2000-2024]; 89 FR at 48714 n.21;
see also
OHSS,
Immigration Enforcement and Legal Processes Monthly Tables
(last updated Sept. 6, 2024),
https://www.dhs.gov/ohss/topics/immigration/enforcement-and-legal-processes-monthly-tables
(SWB encounters from FY 2014 through December 2023). OHSS figures are generally rounded throughout this preamble.
These sustained high encounter rates outstripped the Departments' abilities—based on available resources—to deliver timely decisions and consequences in significant numbers for those without a legal basis to remain in the United States. 89 FR at 48714. Due to its funding shortfall, DHS lacked adequate resources such as sufficient USCIS asylum officers (“AOs”) to conduct fear screenings and sufficient temporary processing facilities, often called “soft-sides.”
Id.
These factors limited DHS's ability to conduct credible fear interviews for individuals in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) custody and to process and hold individuals in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody during the expedited removal process.
Id.
The substantial migration throughout the hemisphere, combined with inadequate resources and tools to keep pace, limited DHS's ability to impose timely consequences through expedited removal, the main consequence Congress has made available at the border under title 8 authorities. 89 FR at 48713-14. Consistent with past practice prior to the Title 42 public health Order, individuals who are subject to but cannot be processed under expedited removal due to resource constraints are instead generally released, after screening and vetting, pending removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1229a (“section 240 removal proceedings”), before an immigration judge (“IJ”).
These higher encounter rates also place significant strain on the immigration courts. Recently, despite significant increases in the total number of IJs and case completions since Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2021, newly initiated cases have far outpaced such completions.
4
Placing more noncitizens in section 240 removal proceedings before an IJ—rather than processing eligible noncitizens through the expedited removal process—only further contributes to the immigration court backlog, and those cases can take several years to conclude.
5
This strain is also particularly acute in light of EOIR's current underfunding. Rather than increase funding to support IJ team hiring, EOIR's FY 2024 budget was $16 million less than in FY 2023 and was $94.3 million less than its inflation-adjusted funding requirements (referred to as “Current Services”).
6
4
See
Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”),
Adjudication Statistics: New Cases and Total Completions
(July 2024),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344796/dl?inline
; EOIR,
Adjudication Statistics: Immigration Judge (IJ) Hiring
(July 2024),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344911/dl?inline
.
5
EOIR decisions completed in July 2024 were, on average, initiated in February 2022, during the significant operational disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (with encounters several months earlier than that), but 60 percent of EOIR cases initiated during that time were still pending as of July 2024, so the final mean processing time (once all such cases are complete) will be longer. OHSS analysis of EOIR data as of July 2024 (Mean EOIR Filed Dates tab); EOIR,
EOIR Strategic Plan 2024, EOIR's Strategic Context, Current Operating Environment, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/strategic-plan/strategic-context/current-operating-enviroment
(last visited Sept. 20, 2024) (“EOIR . . . suffered operational setbacks during the COVID-19 pandemic years of FY 2020 through FY 2022, including declining case completions due to health closures and scheduling complications and delays in agency efforts to transition to electronic records and the efficiencies they represent. While the challenges of the pandemic were overcome by adaptive measures taken during those years, the pandemic's impact on the pending caseload is still being felt.”). Although EOIR does not report statistics on pending median completion times for removal proceedings in general, it does report median completion times for certain types of cases, such as detained cases and cases involving unaccompanied children (“UCs”).
See, e.g.,
EOIR,
Median Unaccompanied Noncitizen Child (UAC) Case Completion and Case Pending Time
(Apr. 19, 2024),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344951/dl?inline
(median completion time of 1,254 days); EOIR,
Median Completion Times for Detained Cases
(Apr. 19, 2024),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344866/dl?inline
(median completion time of 46 days in the second quarter of 2024 for removal, deportation, exclusion, asylum-only, and withholding-only cases); EOIR,
Percentage of DHS-Detained Cases Completed within Six Months
(Apr. 19, 2024),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344886/dl?inline
(reporting seven percent of detained cases not completed within six months).
6
See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Public Law 118-42, 138 Stat. 25, 133; EOIR,
FY 2024 Budget Request at a Glance, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-03/eoir_fy_24_budsum_ii_omb_cleared_03.08.23.pdf.
The Departments reasoned that their capacity to predictably deliver timely decisions and consequences is jeopardized by emergency border circumstances, which, left unmitigated, further add to the incentives and motivations for migrants to make the dangerous journey to the SWB, regardless of their ultimate likelihood of success on an asylum or protection application, and that the current immigration and asylum systems had become a driver for irregular migration
7
throughout the region and an increasingly lucrative source of income for dangerous transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”). 89 FR at 48714. Despite the Departments' efforts to address these substantial levels of migration, strengthen the consequences in place at the border, and enhance the overall functioning of the immigration system, including through the
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule, 88 FR 31314 (May 16, 2023), these circumstances still existed as a direct result of Congress's failure to update outdated immigration laws and provide needed funding and resources for the efficient operation of the border security and immigration systems. 89 FR at 48711-13, 48715.
7
As used in this preamble, “irregular migration” refers to the movement of people into another country unlawfully or without authorization. With respect to the United States' borders, the term “irregular” is used in this preamble to refer to physically entering between POEs or otherwise entering without documents sufficient for lawful admission, unless entering with advance authorization to travel or at a pre-scheduled time and place to present at a POE.
In the absence of congressional action, and consistent with the President's direction in the June 3 Proclamation to consider issuing regulations, the Departments adopted the provisions in the IFR, which were intended to address the emergency border circumstances and to substantially improve the Departments' ability to deliver timely decisions and consequences during such circumstances.
See
89 FR at 48710. The IFR established a limitation on asylum eligibility that applies to certain individuals who enter irregularly across the southern border during emergency border circumstances and revised certain procedures applicable to the expedited removal process during such periods to reduce the time required to apply consequences to those individuals and remove noncitizens who do not have a legal basis to remain in the United States.
Id.
at 48715. The IFR was expected to achieve several benefits: reduce strains on limited Federal Government immigration processing and enforcement resources; preserve the Departments' continued ability to safely, humanely, and effectively enforce and administer the immigration laws; protect against overcrowding in border facilities; and reduce the ability of exploitative TCOs and smugglers to operate.
Id.
at 48745, 48767.
2. The Departments' Experience With the IFR
The IFR's limitation on asylum eligibility and revised procedures are working as intended, though as discussed below, the Departments have determined that modest adjustments to the threshold calculations are warranted. As explained in the paragraphs that follow, in the weeks since June 5, 2024, U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”) encounters between the ports of entry (“POEs”) have dropped markedly. Although the Departments believe that this has occurred for a range of reasons, one important reason is that the rule itself has significantly shifted incentives at the southern border. As explained further below, and consistent with the explanation provided in the IFR, the rule has, at least in part, significantly improved DHS's ability to place into expedited removal a majority of single adults and individuals in family units encountered by USBP; to avoid large-scale releases of such individuals into the United States pending section 240 removal proceedings; and to allow for swift resolution of such individuals' cases and, where appropriate, their removal.
See id.
At the same time, the Departments have continued to implement the largest expansion of lawful, safe, and orderly pathways and processes
8
for individuals to come to the United States and to uphold the United States' non-refoulement obligations under international law.
8
The terms “lawful pathways,” “lawful, safe, and orderly pathways,” “lawful pathways and processes,” and “lawful, safe, and orderly pathways and processes,” as used in this preamble, refer to the range of pathways and processes by which migrants are able to enter the United States or other countries in a lawful, safe, and orderly manner, including to seek asylum and other forms of protection or other immigration benefits for which they may be eligible.
In the period between June 5, 2024, and August 31, 2024, average daily total encounters between POEs at the SWB under the Proclamation and IFR have fallen 59 percent from the level of average daily encounters during the immediate post-pandemic period,
i.e.,
the period after the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule began to apply on May 12, 2023,
9
and before the IFR entered into effect on June 5, 2024.
10
This dramatic decrease in encounters has spanned multiple demographic categories. For instance, DHS has observed a drop in encounters of family units, a demographic category that presents particular operational challenges. During the immediate post-pandemic period, DHS experienced an average of about 2,000 daily encounters of individuals in family units.
11
Since the Departments issued the IFR, that daily average has dropped 70 percent to about 600 individuals in family units encountered daily.
12
Other significant drops in encounter numbers occurred with single adults and unaccompanied children (“UCs”).
13
9
While the rule's effective date was May 11, 2023, 88 FR at 31314, the rule only applies to noncitizens who enter the United States “[s]ubsequent to the end of implementation of the Title 42 public health Order[,]” 8 CFR 208.33(a)(1)(ii), which expired at 11:59 p.m. on May 11, 2023,
see
DHS,
Fact Sheet: Department of State and Department of Homeland Security Announce Additional Security Measures to Humanely Manage Border through Deterrence, Enforcement, and Diplomacy
(May 10, 2023),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/05/10/fact-sheet-additional-sweeping-measures-humanely-manage-border.
Therefore, the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule began to apply on May 12, 2023.
10
OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset and data downloaded from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Unified Immigration Portal (“UIP”) on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab). There was an average of about 2,100 total encounters per day (including all demographic groups) between POEs at the SWB from June 5, 2024, to August 31, 2024, compared to around 5,100 per day during the immediate post-pandemic period, defined as May 12, 2023, through June 4, 2024.
Id.
11
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
12
OHSS analysis data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
13
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
In contrast to processing before the IFR, DHS is now placing the majority of single adults and individuals in family units encountered by USBP at the SWB into expedited removal. Between June 5, 2024, and August 31, 2024, DHS placed 59 percent of these noncitizens into expedited removal proceedings, compared to 18 percent of such noncitizens during the immediate post-pandemic period following the end of the Title 42 public health Order.
14
In the pre-pandemic period,
15
DHS placed 41 percent of such noncitizens into expedited removal proceedings.
16
The decrease in the number of encounters at the SWB directly enabled DHS's increased placement rate of noncitizens into expedited removal proceedings. Because encounter levels have decreased, DHS is able to use its operational resources to refer a higher percentage of noncitizens into expedited removal proceedings and deliver timely consequences in a greater proportion of cases.
17
The IFR is remedying the
negative effects of the previously sustained high encounter numbers described in the IFR and in this rule.
See, e.g.,
89 FR at 48749 (“In order to maximize the consequences for those who cross unlawfully or without authorization, DHS endeavors to deliver consequences swiftly to the highest proportion of individuals who fail to establish a legal basis to remain in the United States. This includes, subject to available resources, referring the maximum number of eligible individuals possible into expedited removal to quickly adjudicate their claims.”).
14
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
15
Throughout this preamble the “pre-pandemic period” refers to FY 2014 to FY 2019.
16
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab). DHS reinstated removal orders for a larger share of single adults and individuals in family units during the pre-pandemic period (26 percent during the pre-pandemic period compared to 14 percent under the interim final rule (“IFR”)), which is unsurprising given that the Departments are seeing fewer repeat encounters as a result of the higher proportion of non-Mexicans/non-northern Central Americans—with more limited migration histories—as a share of total encounters.
Id.;
89 FR at 48721 n.49. Notably, the sum of reinstatements and expedited removals is still higher during the IFR (a combined 73 percent) than it was during the pre-pandemic period (67 percent). OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
17
The most effective way to deliver timely consequences to noncitizens who enter irregularly is through the expedited removal system, but DHS's capacity to use that system on a large scale is subject to resource constraints. One such constraint is space to hold noncitizens in DHS custody during the expedited removal process. Because noncitizens in expedited removal are subject to detention, including during the pendency of their credible fear proceedings, the use of expedited removal may lead to an increase in the time that an individual spends in CBP custody. This is particularly the case when the individual is receiving their credible fear interview while in CBP custody. When there are high numbers of individuals placed in expedited removal, the number of individuals who remain in CBP custody for a lengthier period can increase rapidly, leading to overcrowded conditions. In
addition, given the nature of CBP facilities—which are designed for short-term temporary holding—CBP endeavors to move all individuals out of custody in an expeditious manner and to avoid overcrowding.
Thus, if high encounter levels result in a significant number of individuals in CBP custody, or if those individuals have been in custody for a significant period of time, CBP may lose optionality: having lost the capacity to place additional noncitizens into the expedited removal process, CBP generally must take steps to release some individuals from custody to ensure safe and sanitary conditions and appropriate time in custody. In cases when release is appropriate or warranted, CBP generally issues an individual a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) before an immigration judge (“IJ”) prior to their release from custody. Although in some circumstances transfer of such noncitizens to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for detention for the duration of the credible fear process is possible, the ability to do so is dependent on the availability of space in ICE's already significantly strained detention network. Therefore, when ICE detention space is unavailable, noncitizens must then be processed by CBP through non-expedited removal pathways.
Relatedly, the IFR has also significantly reduced the percentage of noncitizens encountered between POEs at the SWB who are released into the United States pending completion of their section 240 removal proceedings. For instance, from June 5, 2024, through August 31, 2024, USBP placed 25 percent of noncitizens encountered at the SWB into section 240 removal proceedings.
18
This is down 41 percentage points from the immediate post-pandemic period, when USBP placed 66 percent of such noncitizens into section 240 removal proceedings, translating to a reduction of over 60 percent.
19
Similarly, between June 5, 2024, and August 31, 2024, 33 percent of all noncitizens encountered at the SWB were sent to Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”); this figure is up from 19 percent during the immediate post-pandemic period.
20
18
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
19
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
20
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
The IFR's change to how DHS immigration officers identify and refer noncitizens for credible fear interviews has resulted in a reduction of such referrals. Under the IFR, during emergency border circumstances, instead of asking specific questions about fear or providing lengthy advisals, DHS refers a noncitizen for such an interview if the noncitizen manifests a fear of return, expresses an intention to apply for asylum or protection, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture or a fear of return to the noncitizen's country or the country of removal. From June 5, 2024, through August 31, 2024, 27 percent of noncitizens encountered between POEs at the SWB and processed for expedited removal indicated an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution or torture, compared with a 37 percent fear-claim rate during the pre-pandemic period and 57 percent during the immediate post-pandemic period.
21
In the IFR, DHS explained that based on its extensive experience administering the expedited removal process, it concluded that the affirmative questions asked under steady state operations are suggestive and account for part of the high rates of referrals and screen-ins that do not ultimately result in a grant of asylum or protection. 89 FR at 48743.
22
The shift to a manifestation standard has, as intended, reduced the gap between high rates of referrals and screen-ins and historic ultimate grant rates as well as increased processing efficiency for DHS, and noncitizens who manifest or claim a fear, or who indicate an intention to apply for asylum, still have their claims adjudicated as required by the INA.
21
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
22
From FY 2014 through 2019, of total SWB encounters processed for expedited removal and then referred to section 240 proceedings, only 18 percent of EOIR case completions ultimately resulted in a grant of protection or relief. 89 FR at 48743 n.219; OHSS analysis of June 2024 Enforcement Lifecycle dataset (Historic ERCF Results tab). During that same period, 37 percent of SWB encounters processed for expedited removal claimed fear, and 76 percent of those who claimed fear were screened in and referred to section 240 removal proceedings. OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
The shift to a “reasonable probability” standard for screening for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the regulations implementing U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S 85,
23
has further reduced the difference between high screen-in rates and historically low ultimate grant rates of protection or relief. Overall, of those USBP has referred for credible fear interviews, the comprehensive screen-in rate has dropped to 57 percent, compared to 83 percent during the pre-pandemic period and 62 percent during the immediate post-pandemic period.
24
Of USBP encounters screened by USCIS under the rule's “reasonable probability” standard, the screen-in rate has decreased to approximately 48 percent
25
compared to 76 percent
26
under the “significant possibility” standard during the pre-pandemic period, and approximately 51 percent
27
for those screened under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathway rule's lower “reasonable possibility” standard.
28
The Departments believe the lower screen-in rate under the IFR better
aligns with the percentage of noncitizens who have historically been granted protection or relief. That is to say, noncitizens screened under the higher “reasonable probability” standard that receive positive findings are more likely to have meritorious claims in ultimate adjudications.
23
In this preamble, consistent with the IFR, the Departments generally refer to protection under the regulations implementing U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) as “CAT protection.”
See, e.g.,
89 FR at 48716.
24
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab). Data for immediate post-pandemic and IFR periods are limited to SWB encounters between POEs. The comprehensive screen-in rate includes positive determinations issued by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), cases where an IJ vacated USCIS's negative determination, and cases administratively closed by USCIS in which a discretionary NTA was issued. For cases processed under either the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule or the IFR, the comprehensive screen-in rate encompasses cases where USCIS or an IJ determined that the noncitizen was found not subject to the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule's rebuttable presumption or the IFR's limitation on asylum eligibility under the significant possibility standard, in addition to cases screened-in under the “reasonable possibility” or “reasonable probability” standards, as applicable.
25
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Fear Screening—STB tab, Line 9 divided by Line 8). Data are limited to SWB encounters between POEs.
26
OHSS analysis of June 2024 Enforcement Lifecycle dataset (Historic ERCF Results tab). Data are limited to SWB encounters between POEs.
27
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Fear Screening—CLP tab, Line 13 divided by Line 12). Data are limited to SWB encounters between POEs.
28
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab). Although in the preamble to the IFR, DHS anticipated that the manifestation approach “will likely lead to a higher proportion of those referred having colorable claims for protection[,]”
see
89 FR at 48743, USCIS screen-in rates have dropped slightly, as noted above,
see
OHSS analysis of June 2024 Enforcement Lifecycle dataset, July 2024 Persist Dataset, and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Historic ERCF Results, Fear Screening—STB, and Fear Screening—CLP tabs). There could be multiple reasons for this development, including the effects of the “manifestation” and “reasonable probability” provisions, which are difficult to disentangle.
As a result of the IFR, DHS is able to more quickly remove a greater percentage of those who do not have a legal basis to remain in the United States. In the pre-pandemic period, the median processing time for a noncitizen encountered by USBP with a negative fear determination in expedited removal was 75 days from encounter to removal.
29
During the immediate post-pandemic period, this metric dropped to 44 days.
30
From June 5, 2024, through August 31, 2024, the metric dropped again to 32 days.
31
Similarly, the processing time from when a noncitizen is referred for a credible fear interview to when the noncitizen receives a fear determination is down 58 percent compared to the immediate post-pandemic period and down 71 percent compared to the pandemic period.
32
The Departments attribute the decreased processing time to key provisions of the IFR. For instance, the manifestation of fear provision has resulted in streamlined processing and a lower percentage of individuals indicating fear, thereby shortening the average processing time as those who do not indicate fear do not receive a screening by an AO or review by an IJ prior to removal. Then, for those who indicate fear, following a minimum consultation period that DHS reduced through separate guidance,
33
AOs, supervisory AOs, and IJs have been applying the IFR's reasonable probability screening standard. In addition, between June 5, 2024, and August 31, 2024, 32 percent of all noncitizens encountered at the SWB were removed or returned to their home country or to Mexico directly from USBP custody.
34
This is double the rate of repatriations from USBP custody (16 percent) that occurred during the immediate post-pandemic period.
35
Overall, from June 5, 2024, through August 31, 2024, DHS has removed or returned 70 percent of single adults and individuals in family units encountered by USBP.
36
This contrasts with a 28-percent rate during the immediate post-pandemic period.
37
Viewed in terms of daily averages, under the IFR through August 31, 2024, there have been about 1,880 daily encounters of single adults and individuals in family units.
38
And DHS has averaged about 1,320 total daily repatriations and 580 releases from CBP custody pending immigration proceedings over that time frame.
39
29
OHSS analysis of June 2024 Enforcement Lifecycle dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
30
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
31
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
32
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
33
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) requires that the noncitizen be given information about the credible fear interview and provides the right for noncitizens in the credible fear process to consult with a person or persons of their choosing prior to the interview, so long as the consultation is conducted “according to [duly prescribed] regulations.” INA 235(b)(1)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv);
see
INA 103(a), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a); 6 U.S.C. 557. Under those regulations, including during circumstances in which the measures in the IFR apply, consultation shall be at no expense to the Government, and consultations “shall be made available in accordance with the policies and procedures of the detention facility where the alien is detained, . . . and shall not unreasonably delay the process.” 8 CFR 235.3(b)(4)(ii), 235.15(a). The regulations do not require that the noncitizen be allowed a particular amount of time to consult with the person or persons of their choosing.
Id.
On June 4, 2024, to support implementation of the Proclamation and IFR, as a matter of internal policy, USCIS reduced the minimum consultation period for noncitizens subject to the rule's provisions from at least 24 hours to at least 4 hours beginning at the time ICE or CBP provides the noncitizen with the opportunity to consult and continuing only during the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. local time.
See
Memorandum for Jennifer B. Higgins, Deputy Dir., USCIS, from Ted Kim, Assoc. Dir., Refugee, Asylum, and Int'l Operations Directorate, USCIS,
Re: Scheduling of Credible Fear Interviews While the Measures in the Securing the Border Interim Final Rule Apply
(June 4, 2024).
34
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Summary Statistics tab).
35
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Summary Statistics tab).
36
DHS encountered 165,000 single adults and individuals in family units between June 4, 2024, and August 31, 2024, and had repatriated 119,000 of them as of September 3, 2024. OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on Sept. 3, 2024 (IFR Details tab).
37
During that time period, there were 1.87 million such encounters with noncitizens other than UCs, of which 511,000 noncitizens were repatriated. OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset (Immediate Post-Pandemic Details tab).
38
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (IFR Details tab).
39
Id.
Faster repatriations free up DHS resources and capacity for processing new arrivals, allowing for further increases in the use of expedited removal and fewer releases pending completion of section 240 removal proceedings. These successes disrupt the “vicious cycle” the Departments sought to counteract in issuing the IFR. 89 FR at 48714;
see id.
at 48751 (“This reality contributes to the vicious cycle . . . in which increasing numbers of releases lead to increased migration, fueled by the narrative, pushed by smugglers, that migrants who are encountered at the border will be allowed to remain and work in the United States for long periods of time.”).
Meanwhile, noncitizens have continued to use lawful, safe, and orderly pathways and processes to seek entry to the United States. For example, the use of the CBP One mobile application (“CBP One app”) to schedule an appointment at a SWB POE is an available tool that permits noncitizens to present themselves at the border in a lawful, safe, and orderly manner. From June 5, 2024, through August 31, 2024, approximately 123,500 noncitizens with CBP One appointments presented at SWB POEs and were accordingly processed outside of the procedures set forth in the IFR.
40
See
8 CFR 208.35(a)(1), 1208.35(a)(1); section 3(b)(v)(D) of the Proclamation. During the pre-pandemic period, approximately 300 encounters were processed at SWB POEs per day.
41
Since the launch of the CBP One app in January 2023, approximately 1,500 encounters have been processed at SWB POEs each day (with and without CBP One appointments).
42
And from the start of FY 2024 through August 31, 2024, that average increased to approximately 1,700 per day.
43
Other lawful pathways that continue to be available include expanded parole processes for specific populations and demographics such as nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (“CHNV”), which allow certain individuals with U.S.-based supporters to seek parole on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit;
44
the Safe Mobility Offices in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala, which provide, among other services, access to information and referrals for humanitarian and family parole processes, labor pathways, expedited refugee processing, and other lawful, safe, and orderly pathways for eligible
individuals to the United States and other countries;
45
country-specific family reunification parole processes for certain nationals of Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras who have qualifying U.S. citizen relatives in the United States;
46
and temporary nonimmigrant worker visas, which provide employment opportunities for eligible individuals.
47
40
Id.
41
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (OFO Encounters tab).
42
Id.
On June 30, 2023, CBP announced the expansion of available appointments for noncitizens through the CBP One mobile application (“CBP One app”) to 1,450 per day, up from 1,250. Cumulatively, the expansion to 1,450 appointments represented a nearly 50 percent increase from May 12, 2023, when CBP processed 1,000 appointments per day.
See
CBP,
CBP One
TM
Appointments Increased to 1,450 Per Day
(June 30, 2023),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-one-appointments-increased-1450-day.
43
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (OFO Encounters tab).
44
USCIS,
Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans
(last reviewed/updated Aug. 29, 2024),
https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV
.
45
U.S. Dep't of State,
Safe Mobility Initiative: Helping Those in Need and Reducing Irregular Migration in the Americas, https://www.state.gov/safe-mobility-initiative/
(last visited Aug. 23, 2024).
46
See
USCIS,
Family Reunification Parole Processes
(last reviewed/updated Sept. 10, 2024),
https://www.uscis.gov/FRP.
47
See
USCIS,
Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers
(last reviewed/updated July 24, 2024),
https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers.
Thus, the provisions of the IFR and other measures taken to assist in the IFR's implementation are effective tools in managing levels of irregular migration that, absent key policy interventions like this rule, severely strain the Departments' abilities to safely, effectively, and humanely enforce and administer U.S. immigration laws. The historically high level of encounters that DHS experienced in the months before the IFR's implementation has decreased markedly, and DHS's ability to expeditiously process noncitizens and deliver swift consequences to those who do not establish a legal basis to remain in the United States has therefore improved significantly.
B. Legal Authority
The Secretary and the Attorney General jointly issue this rule pursuant to their shared and respective authorities concerning consideration of claims for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under regulations implemented pursuant to U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the CAT. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”), Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, as amended, created DHS and transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security many functions related to the administration and enforcement of Federal immigration law while maintaining some functions and authorities with the Attorney General, including some shared concurrently with the Secretary.
48
48
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”) further provides, “Nothing in this Act, any amendment made by this Act, or in section 103 of the [INA], as amended . . . , shall be construed to limit judicial deference to regulations, adjudications, interpretations, orders, decisions, judgments, or any other actions of the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.” 116 Stat. at 2274 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 522).
The INA, as amended by the HSA, charges the Secretary “with the administration and enforcement of [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” except insofar as those laws assign functions to certain other officers. INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). The INA grants the Secretary the authority to establish regulations and take other actions that the Secretary deems “necessary for carrying out” the Secretary's authority under the immigration laws. INA 103(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3);
see also
6 U.S.C. 202.
The HSA provides the Attorney General with “such authorities and functions under [the INA] and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens as were [previously] exercised by [EOIR], or by the Attorney General with respect to [EOIR].” INA 103(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1);
see also
6 U.S.C. 521(a). In addition, under the HSA, the Attorney General retains authority to “establish such regulations, . . . issue such instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out” the Attorney General's authorities under the immigration laws. INA 103(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(2).
Under the HSA, the Attorney General retains authority over the conduct of section 240 removal proceedings. These adjudications are conducted by IJs within DOJ's EOIR.
See
6 U.S.C. 521(a); INA 103(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1); 8 CFR 1240.1. With limited exceptions, IJs adjudicate asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and CAT protection applications filed by noncitizens during the pendency of section 240 removal proceedings, including asylum applications referred by USCIS to the immigration court. INA 101(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4); INA 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a)(1); INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3); 8 CFR 1208.2(b), 1240.1(a);
see also Dhakal
v.
Sessions,
895 F.3d 532, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing affirmative and defensive asylum processes). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), also within DOJ's EOIR, in turn hears appeals from IJ decisions.
See
8 CFR 1003.1(a)(1), (b)(3);
see also Garland
v.
Ming Dai,
593 U.S. 357, 366-67 (2021) (describing appeals from IJs to the BIA). And the INA provides that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.” INA 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1).
In addition to the separate authorities discussed above, the Attorney General and the Secretary share some authorities. Section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, authorizes the “Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General” to “grant asylum” to a noncitizen “who has applied for asylum in accordance with the requirements and procedures established by” the Secretary or the Attorney General under section 208 if the Secretary or the Attorney General determines that the noncitizen is a “refugee” within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A). INA 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A). Section 208 thereby authorizes the Secretary and the Attorney General to “establish[ ]” “requirements and procedures” to govern asylum applications.
Id.
The statute further authorizes them to “establish,” “by regulation,” “additional limitations and conditions, consistent with” section 208, under which a noncitizen “shall be ineligible for asylum.” INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C);
see also
INA 208(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(B) (authorizing the Secretary and the Attorney General to “provide by regulation for any other conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for asylum not inconsistent with [the INA]”).
49
The INA also provides the Secretary and the Attorney General authority to publish regulations governing their respective roles regarding apprehension, inspection and admission, detention and removal, withholding of removal, deferral of removal, and release of noncitizens encountered in the interior of the United States or at or between POEs.
See
INA 103(a)(3), (g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), (g)(2);
see also, e.g.,
INA 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (B)(iv), (C), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (B)(iv), (C).
49
Under the HSA, the references to the “Attorney General” in the INA also encompass the Secretary with respect to statutory authorities vested in the Secretary by the HSA or subsequent legislation, including in relation to immigration proceedings before DHS. 6 U.S.C. 251, 271(b)(3), (5), 557.
The INA and HSA grant DHS the authority to adjudicate asylum applications and to conduct credible fear interviews, make credible fear determinations in expedited removal proceedings, and establish procedures for further consideration of asylum applications after an individual is found to have a credible fear. INA 103(a)(1), (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), (a)(3); INA 208(b)(1)(A), (d)(1), (d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), (d)(1), (d)(5)(B); INA 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B);
see also
6 U.S.C. 271(b)(3) (providing for the transfer of adjudication of asylum and
refugee applications from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, now USCIS); 6 U.S.C. 557 (providing that references to any officer from whom functions are transferred under the HSA are to be understood as referring to the Secretary of Homeland Security). Within DHS, AOs conduct credible fear interviews, make credible fear determinations, and determine whether a noncitizen's asylum application should be granted, all of which are subject to review by a supervisory AO.
See
8 CFR 208.2(a), 208.9, 208.14(b), 208.30(b), (e)(6)(i), (e)(8). The INA grants IJs the authority to review AO negative credible fear determinations. INA 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (“Refugee Protocol”), which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (“Refugee Convention”). Article 33.1 of the Refugee Convention generally prohibits parties to the Convention from expelling or returning (“refouling”) “a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Refugee Convention, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
Because the Refugee Protocol is not self-executing,
50
Congress implemented these non-refoulement obligations through the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (“Refugee Act”).
See
8 U.S.C. 1253(h) (1952);
Sale
v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155, 174-77 (1993) (describing the history of the statutory withholding provision and the Refugee Act amendments). The Supreme Court has long recognized that the United States implements its non-refoulement obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (via the Refugee Protocol) through the statutory withholding of removal provision in section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) (“statutory withholding of removal”), which provides that a noncitizen may not be removed to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the protected grounds listed in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
51
See
INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3);
see also
8 CFR 208.16, 1208.16. The INA also authorizes the Secretary and the Attorney General to implement statutory withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3).
See
INA 103(a)(1), (3), (g)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), (3), (g)(1)-(2).
50
E.g., Al-Fara
v.
Gonzales,
404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The 1967 Protocol is not self-executing, nor does it confer any rights beyond those granted by implementing domestic legislation.” (citations omitted)).
51
See INS
v.
Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415, 426-27 (1999);
see also INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1987) (distinguishing between Article 33's non-refoulement prohibition, which aligns with what was then called withholding of deportation, and Article 34's call to “facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees[,]” which the Court found aligned with the discretionary provision in section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158).
The Departments also have authority to implement Article 3 of the CAT, which is likewise not self-executing.
52
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”) delegates to the Departments the authority to “prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the [CAT], subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention.” Public Law 105-277, div. G, sec. 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1231 note). Consistent with FARRA, DHS and DOJ have implemented in the Code of Federal Regulations the United States' obligations under Article 3 of the CAT.
See, e.g.,
8 CFR 208.16(c)-208.18, 1208.16(c)-1208.18; Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 FR 8478 (Feb. 19, 1999), amended by 64 FR 13881 (Mar. 23, 1999).
52
Omar
v.
McHugh,
646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“This multilateral treaty is non-self-executing and thus does not itself create any rights enforceable in U.S. courts.” (citation omitted)).
This rule is necessary because, although the Proclamation recognizes that the asylum system has contributed to the border emergency, the Proclamation itself does not and cannot affect noncitizens' right to apply for asylum, their eligibility for asylum, or asylum procedures. This recognition that section 212(f) does not affect the right to pursue a claim for asylum has been the Executive Branch's consistent position for four decades.
53
That longstanding understanding follows from the text and structure of the governing statutes. Section 212(f) provides that under certain circumstances, the President may “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” INA 212(f), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). Although this provision—first enacted in 1952—“grants the President broad discretion,” it “operate[s]” only within its “sphere.”
Trump
v.
Hawaii,
585 U.S. 667, 683-84, 695 (2018). Section 212 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182 (entitled “Inadmissible aliens”), generally “defines the universe of aliens who are admissible” and “sets the boundaries of admissibility into the United States.”
Id.
at 695. Hence, when section 212(f) authorizes the President to suspend “entry,” it “enabl[es] the President to supplement the other grounds of inadmissibility in the INA,”
id.
at 684 (citing
Abourezk
v.
Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)), and to bar individuals from entry into the United States.
53
In 1984, then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Theodore B. Olson advised that section 212(f) did not permit the President to eliminate the asylum rights of noncitizens who had hijacked a plane and, as a condition of the plane's release, been flown to the United States. And in 2018, the Departments reaffirmed that “[a]n alien whose entry is suspended or restricted under . . . a [section 212(f)] proclamation, but who nonetheless reaches U.S. soil contrary to the President's determination that the alien should not be in the United States, would remain subject to various procedures under immigration laws[,]” including “expedited-removal proceedings” where they could “raise any claims for protection[.]”
Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims,
83 FR 55934, 55940 (Nov. 9, 2018). Although Presidents have invoked section 212(f) at least 90 times since 1981, to the Departments' knowledge, none of those proclamations were understood to affect the right of noncitizens on U.S. soil to apply for, or noncitizens' statutory eligibility to receive, asylum. Kelsey Y. Santamaria et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
Presidential Authority to Suspend Entry of Aliens Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(f)
(updated Feb. 21, 2024). At the same time, nothing in the proclamations or the INA has precluded the Departments from considering as an adverse discretionary criterion that a noncitizen is described in a section 212(f) proclamation.
This authority, though broad, does not authorize the President to override the asylum statute.
54
First enacted in the Refugee Act, the asylum statute today provides that “[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States[,]
. . . irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum.” INA 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1). The right to apply for asylum thus turns on whether a noncitizen is “physically present” or has “arrive[d] in the United States.”
55
Id.
As a result, the power under section 212(f) to suspend “entry” does not authorize the President to override the asylum rights of noncitizens who have already physically entered the United States and who are entitled to an adjudication of eligibility under the applicable statutory and regulatory rules and standards.
56
54
The Supreme Court, though it has never squarely addressed this issue, has also never indicated that section 212(f) confers power to affect asylum rights of those present in the United States.
Cf., e.g., Sale,
509 U.S. at 164 n.13, 174-77, 187-88 (upholding a Coast Guard program of intercepting migrant vessels and returning migrants to their home country, authorized in part by section 212(f), on the basis that statutory rights under the withholding of removal statute did not have “extraterritorial application” to migrants who were not physically present);
Hawaii,
585 U.S. at 689, 695 (assuming, without deciding, that section 212(f) “does not allow the President to expressly override particular provisions of the INA[,]” while emphasizing the particular “sphere[ ]” in which it operates).
55
Section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), contrasts with 42 U.S.C. 265, which authorizes the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) to temporarily suspend “the right to introduce . . . persons and property” into the United States if such suspension “is required in the interest of the public health.” During the COVID-19 pandemic and to prevent the “serious danger of the introduction of [the] disease into the United States,” 42 U.S.C. 265, the CDC issued a public health Order invoking section 265 to expel certain noncitizens generally without title 8 protections, including asylum applications. As the final rule implementing section 265 explained, that provision originates in a “broad public health statute” that Congress intended to “operate[ ] separately and independently of the immigration power” and authorizes the CDC “to temporarily suspend the effect of any law[ ] . . . by which a person would otherwise have the right to be introduced . . . into the U.S.,”
Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension of the Right To Introduce and Prohibition of Introduction of Persons Into United States From Designated Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes,
85 FR 56424, 56426, 56442 (Sept. 11, 2020), including the immigration laws,
id.
at 56426 (noting that legislative history indicates that section 265's predecessor was intended to suspend immigration if public health required it). The drafting history of section 265 also confirms that Congress conferred authority to prohibit “the introduction of persons” in order to broaden this provision and that this provision subsumed but was not limited to the authority to “suspend immigration[.]” Br. for Appellants at 41-43,
Huisha-Huisha
v.
Mayorkas,
27 F.4th 718 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (No. 21-5200);
see Huisha-Huisha,
27 F.4th at 730-31 (determining plaintiffs not likely to succeed on their challenge to the CDC Order on the ground that it improperly suspended migrants' right to apply for asylum). Section 265 is a public-health authority under the Public Health Service Act. Its grant of authority to allow the CDC to temporarily suspend immigration laws in case of a public health emergency has no relevance to the interpretation of section 212(f), which is in title 8.
56
For similar reasons, section 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1185(a), which the Proclamation also invokes, does not authorize the President to impose the condition and limitation on asylum eligibility created by this rule.
Cf. United States ex rel. Knauff
v.
Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 540-47 (1950) (holding that under the precursor to section 215(a)(1) of the INA and the presidential proclamation and regulations issued pursuant to that provision, which during times of national emergency made it unlawful for “any alien to . . . enter or attempt to . . . enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe[,]” the Attorney General could issue regulations governing entry during such an emergency to “deny [certain noncitizens] a hearing . . . in special cases” notwithstanding the ordinary exclusion hearing provisions governing entry). This does not mean, however, that the President is prohibited from invoking section 215(a) as authority to impose reasonable rules, regulations, and orders on asylum applicants and asylees, such as travel document requirements for re-entry and departure controls.
This rule, as discussed in the IFR and this preamble, is authorized because Congress has conferred upon the Secretary and the Attorney General express rulemaking power to create new conditions and limitations on asylum eligibility and create certain procedures for adjudicating asylum claims. INA 103(a)(1), (a)(3), (g), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), (a)(3), (g); INA 208(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B); INA 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (iv), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (iv).
C. Changes From the IFR to Final Rule
The Departments issued the IFR, effective June 5, 2024, adopting provisions at 8 CFR 208.13(g), 208.35, 235.15, 1208.13(g), and 1208.35 that effectuated three key changes to eligibility for asylum and the expedited removal process for noncitizens who are encountered at the southern border during the emergency border circumstances giving rise to the suspension and limitation on entry under the June 3 Proclamation: (1) adding a limitation on asylum eligibility, subject to an exception for exceptionally compelling circumstances, that is considered during credible fear screenings in addition to its application during adjudications on the merits; (2) rather than asking specific questions of every noncitizen encountered and processed for expedited removal, providing general notice regarding the process for seeking asylum, statutory withholding of removal, or CAT protection and referring a noncitizen for a credible fear interview only if the noncitizen manifests a fear of return, expresses an intention to apply for asylum or protection, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture or a fear of return to his or her country or the country of removal; and (3) for those found not to have a credible fear of persecution for asylum purposes because they could not establish a significant possibility that they are not subject to or are exempt from the limitation on asylum eligibility, screening for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection under a “reasonable probability” standard.
Following careful consideration of public comments received and the Departments' experiences implementing the IFR's provisions since early June 2024, the Departments have made modifications to the regulatory text adopted in the IFR, as described below. The rationale for the provisions adopted in the IFR and the reasoning provided in the IFR's preamble remain valid, except as distinguished in this regulatory preamble.
1. Changes to the IFR's Thresholds
On September 27, 2024, the President issued a proclamation amending the June 3 Proclamation.
See
Presidential Proclamation of September 27, 2024,
Amending Proclamation 10773
(“September 27 Proclamation”). Following the issuance of the IFR, the Departments have closely monitored its implementation and results across the southern border. The Departments recommended to the President adjustments to the Proclamation based on their experiences implementing the Proclamation and IFR. Following those recommendations, the President issued the September 27 Proclamation, which amended section 2 of the June 3 Proclamation in two ways. First, section 2(a) of the June 3 Proclamation provided that the suspension and limitation on entry would be discontinued at 12:01 a.m. eastern time on the date that is 14-calendar-days after the Secretary makes a factual determination that there has been a 7-consecutive-calendar-day average of fewer than 1,500 encounters between POEs. As amended by the September 27 Proclamation, the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average must remain below 1,500 encounters between POEs for 28-consecutive-calendar-days before the 14-calendar-day waiting period is triggered.
57
Second, the September 27 Proclamation deleted section 2(c) of the June 3 Proclamation, which provided that UCs
58
from non-contiguous countries shall not be included in calculating the number of encounters for purposes of section 2(a) and 2(b) of the June 3 Proclamation.
57
As an illustration, for any given day, DHS will calculate the average number of encounters for that day and the prior 6 calendar days
i.e.,
the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average. If that average remains below 1,500 for 28 consecutive calendar days, the 14-day waiting period will begin.
58
In this preamble, as in the Proclamation, the terms “unaccompanied children” or “UCs” have the same meaning as the term “unaccompanied alien child[ren]” under 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2).
The Departments are implementing changes in this final rule that parallel those made in the September 27 Proclamation. Specifically, the Departments are revising §§ 208.13(g) and 1208.13(g) to refer to “the Presidential Proclamation of June 3, 2024, as defined in paragraph (h) of this section.” Paragraph (h) of each section now defines “Presidential Proclamation of June 3, 2024” as referring to
“Proclamation 10773 of June 3, 2024, as amended by the Presidential Proclamation of September 27, 2024[ ]” for the purpose of §§ 208.13(g), 208.35, and 235.15 (in the case of § 208.13(h)) and §§ 1208.13(g) and 1208.35 (in the case of § 1208.13(h)). The Departments are also making conforming changes in §§ 208.35, 235.15, and 1208.35. To ensure that the rule can function even if the September 27 Proclamation were rendered inoperative by court order, and consistent with the September 27 Proclamation, the Departments have also included a severability clause in both §§ 208.13(h) and 1208.13(h).
The Departments believe that shifting to the 28-consecutive-calendar-day requirement for this rule, in parallel with the changes made in the September 27 Proclamation, is necessary to ensure that the rule's measures discontinue only once there has been a durable and sustained decrease in encounters at the southern border such that the emergency border circumstances have in fact abated. Premature and frequent discontinuations of the rule's measures, as discussed below, would increase the risk of sizeable and disruptive surges and could undermine the message the Departments intend the rule to send, which is to discourage noncitizens from utilizing irregular migration and the services of smugglers and TCOs to enter the United States. In the IFR, the Departments explained that at 1,500 daily encounters between POEs, “DHS would be able to swiftly deliver a consequence to enough individuals to meaningfully impact migratory decisions and deter unlawful entries.” 89 FR at 48752. The Departments further explained that “[t]he 14-day waiting period prior to a discontinuation provides time for the Departments to complete processing of noncitizens encountered during emergency border circumstances and to confirm that a downward trend in encounters is sustained.” 89 FR at 48749 n.248. The changes made here further both purposes.
Requiring the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average to remain below 1,500 encounters for 28 consecutive calendar days instead of one calendar day will guard against a circumstance in which the threshold for discontinuation is met solely due to a short-term, erratic decrease (such as a short-term holiday downturn
59
or a decrease due to an extreme weather event) that does not signal a meaningful reduction in overall migration pressures. Such short-term decreases could force the provisions of the rule to trigger on and off more frequently, causing operational strain while also signaling to migrants that emergency border circumstances are so temporal and episodic that the rule's measures can be avoided by waiting in Mexico for a short period of time—which could lead to a cycle of surges that significantly disrupt border processing. Moreover, if the Departments had opted for a substantially smaller number of consecutive days, there is a significant risk that the rule would deactivate due to a transient drop due to holidays, weather, or another cause, which can lead to several weeks of uncharacteristically low encounters. At the same time, a 28-day period is still a short enough period to ensure a timely response when an actual, sustained downturn occurs. The Departments have therefore decided that 28 days strikes an appropriate balance.
59
Short-term decreases that are not associated with changes in the fundamental drivers of migration have been especially notable during the end-of-year holiday season. From FY 2013 through FY 2024, SWB encounters fell by an average of 42 percent in the two weeks between December 23 and January 5, only to be followed by an average increase of 41 percent in the two weeks between January 5 and January 18.
See
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (USBP Encounters—Holiday Dip tab). Although the January rebound was less dramatic in 2023 and 2024, this historic pattern suggests that if average encounters heading into the holidays are even as low as the mid-2000s—well above the intended threshold for discontinuation of emergency circumstances—a short-term decrease could push the 7-day average number of encounters below 1,500 even though the fundamental drivers of high levels of migration have not changed. A metric based on a 7-day average would trigger a discontinuation of emergency circumstances in this scenario, but the likely January rebound means a 28-day metric would not.
The Departments' experience since the IFR's implementation has informed their view that the limited changes made by this rule are necessary to provide greater assurance that a decrease is likely to be sustained and to guard against costly toggling of the rule when a brief decrease proves not to be sustained. For one thing, this experience highlights the risk that under an approach that looks only to a 7-consecutive-calendar-day average, the rule might discontinue even though a reduction is unlikely to be sustained. Comparing the week ending June 4, 2024, to the week ending August 31, 2024, the Departments observed (as expected) a significant decrease in encounters at the southern border, but Mexico's government reported a much smaller decrease in encounters within Mexico.
60
This trend suggests that even though the IFR has affected incentives for migrants to try to cross the U.S. border, migrants continue to travel towards the U.S. border in large numbers, and that even if the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average dropped below 1,500 encounters, that drop likely would not be sustained given the large and growing population of migrants in Mexico who could relatively quickly reach the U.S. border. Moreover, if the IFR's provisions did deactivate, that large and growing population in Mexico would be a ready target for smugglers and TCOs, increasing the risk of a surge following a discontinuation that does not reflect a truly sustained decrease in migration flows.
60
See
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024, and data provided by the Government of Mexico as of August 31, 2024 (Mexican Enforcement tab) (showing that comparing the week ending June 4, 2024, to the week ending August 31, 2024, total Mexican enforcement apprehensions dropped 19 percent, while total U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”) encounters dropped 48 percent).
Adding this rule's 28-consecutive-day requirement reduces those concerns by providing for greater stability. With that change, the rule's provisions will not be discontinued unless there has been a 7-consecutive-calendar-day average of less than 1,500 encounters that is sustained over a period of 28 days. The Departments expect that this change, coupled with the IFR's 14-day waiting period after the Secretary makes the factual determination necessary to discontinue the suspension and limitation on asylum eligibility, will reduce any perceived incentive to remain close to the U.S.-Mexico border in anticipation of a rapid change in policy. Although the Departments recognize that this change does not eliminate the risk of the rule discontinuing even when regional migration flows remain high, they assess that this rule's approach better balances this risk against this rule's purpose as an exceptional measure to address emergency border circumstances that should not apply when encounters have fallen for a sustained period. The Departments further discuss later in this subsection why the rule's approach appropriately balances those considerations.
The Departments' concern is also consistent with some of the public comments received on the IFR. For instance, one commenter remarked that some migrants had concluded that they should congregate near the border in preparation for the Proclamation and IFR's measures to discontinue. Other commenters expressed concern regarding potential misunderstandings about the threshold for discontinuation. Given the reality that a surge remains possible, the Departments seek to avoid a situation where the emergency
measures in this rule are discontinued prematurely.
The Departments note that the existing 14-day waiting period before discontinuation once this threshold is reached will continue to help the Departments complete processing of noncitizens encountered during emergency border circumstances and to confirm that a sustained downward trend in encounters has been achieved.
See
89 FR at 48749 n.248. At the same time, under the prior standard for discontinuation, a rapid shift between discontinuing and reactivating the rule's provisions would remain possible.
61
Such a shift would pose significant operational challenges.
61
From FY 2013 through FY 2019, there were 2,014 days where the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average of USBP encounters (including encounters of UCs from non-contiguous countries) was below 1,500. OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (Trigger Analysis tab). Of those 2,014 days, 1,813 days (90 percent of the total) were also part of a period of time when the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average had remained below 1,500 for 28 consecutive days.
Id.
Thus, considering hypothetical lower-bound thresholds for the period FY 2013 through FY 2019, switching from the IFR's approach to this rule's approach would have reduced the number of below-threshold days by only 10 percent.
Id.
While it is too early in the post-IFR period to know the precise reduction in volatility it has brought about, requiring the 7-day average to remain below 1,500 encounters for 28 consecutive days may have a broadly similar effect.
Experience with the IFR suggests that rapidly switching between the rule's provisions discontinuing and reactivating would result in harmful operational burdens. For instance, upon implementation of the Proclamation and IFR, the Departments had to prioritize processing of individuals encountered prior to June 5. Therefore, USBP was unable to immediately maximize processing of the desired number of noncitizens through expedited removals.
62
USBP took 6 days to ramp up processing for expedited removal under the IFR, from about 60 encounters processed under the rule on June 5 to about 1,500 on June 10, which was the first day that a majority of encounters were processed for expedited removal under the rule.
63
Similarly, USBP released an average of about 930 post-June 4 encounters per day between June 5 and June 17, including 8 days of over 1,000 releases, before releases fell to an average of about 510 per day between June 18 and August 31, including an average of about 410 per day in August.
64
And although ICE repatriated approximately 38,500 single adults and members of family units from June 5 through July 31, 2024, only around 15,400 (40 percent) of them were encountered by USBP after June 4, 2024.
65
The rest were pre-June 5th USBP SWB encounters and pre- and post-June 5th Office of Field Operations (“OFO”) encounters (39 percent) or non-SWB encounters and interior enforcement (21 percent).
66
USCIS did not complete its first credible fear interview under the IFR until June 9, 2024, and completed an average of about 20 interviews per day for the first two weeks after June 4, compared to an average of roughly 330 per day in the month of August.
67
EOIR did not conduct its first review of an adverse credible fear determination under the IFR until June 11, 2024, and averaged approximately 9 reviews per day in the first 3 weeks after June 4 compared to an average of about 90 per day in August.
68
The lag between the rule's activation and the Departments' ability to fully avail themselves of the rule's efficiencies means that when the provisions of the rule discontinue and then reactivate, the Departments' abilities to deliver timely decisions and consequences consistent with the rule's purpose may be unnecessarily impaired.
62
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (IFR Ramp Up tab).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
OHSS analysis of July 2024 Persist Dataset (IFR Ramp Up tab).
66
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (IFR Ramp Up tab).
67
Id.
68
Id.
In addition, although the Departments continue to believe that the burden of shifting between applying this rule and the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule is warranted when there has been a sustained reduction in irregular migration, such a burden is much harder to justify in the context of a short-lived reduction in encounters followed by very high levels of encounters. For instance, USCIS required time to provide training, procedures, and guidance to the field before its staff could process credible fear referrals under the IFR. Additionally, EOIR required time to ensure IJs have sufficient docket capacity for any increase in credible fear reviews in response to any increased number of expedited removal cases. EOIR also required time to provide training to IJs who conduct credible fear reviews or who adjudicate cases involving individuals who enter the United States while the Proclamation and rule are in effect. To be sure, subsequent reactivation of the rule's measures will be easier given that the Departments' personnel will have become familiar with the rule's provisions. Nonetheless, reactivation will always require resources and coordination within the workforce necessitating the need to ensure that discontinuations and reactivations do not occur with undue frequency.
69
69
The Departments acknowledge that they have not made a similar change to require 28 consecutive days of a 7-day average of encounters above 2,500 for the rule's provisions to be reactivated. The absence of a similar requirement prior to reactivation reflects the operational exigencies in a circumstance where there has been a 7-consecutive-calendar-day average of more than 2,500 encounters.
See
89 FR at 48749 n.248. The Departments have determined that those operational exigencies require the rule's provisions to be reactivated and outweigh the resources and coordination that reactivation requires.
The Departments have also determined that it is appropriate and necessary to include UCs from non-contiguous countries in the encounter calculations relevant to discontinuing and continuing or reactivating the provisions of this rule, in parallel with the changes made in the September 27 Proclamation. Under the June 3 Proclamation and the IFR, the thresholds for such discontinuation and continuation or reactivation did not include encounters of such UCs. But as some commenters on the IFR correctly noted, excluding such encounters results in an unrealistic assessment of the Departments' resources and capabilities. All UCs (regardless of whether they came from a contiguous country or a non-contiguous country) require a greater proportion of resources to process and hold safely in CBP facilities and merit inclusion in the threshold calculations to accurately reflect this reality. For example, UCs in CBP custody generally must be referred to the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement and transferred to its care within 72 hours after determining that the noncitizen is a UC, absent exceptional circumstances. 8 U.S.C. 1232(b)(3);
see also
6 U.S.C. 279. Because of this, UCs are generally prioritized for processing in CBP facilities. The processing and treatment of UCs also include a number of other unique legal and policy requirements, such as conducting a thorough screening for trafficking and any claims of fear of return.
70
During their time in custody, UCs receive medical screenings and child-appropriate activities and humanitarian supplies. They also must generally be held separately from unrelated adults, impacting CBP's holding capacity. This means that DHS must expend resources to quickly process, refer, and transfer UCs to the Office of Refugee Resettlement's care. This time-consuming and resource-intensive process must always be followed for
UCs encountered at the southern border, regardless of whether emergency border circumstances are present.
70
See
8 U.S.C. 1232(a)(2)(A)(ii).
In addition, UCs who are nationals or habitual residents of a contiguous country may, in certain circumstances, be permitted to withdraw their applications for admission and voluntarily return to their respective countries of nationality or habitual residence.
See
8 U.S.C. 1232(a)(2). To determine whether such an outcome is permissible, such UCs are screened for indicators of trafficking or credible evidence that they are at risk of being trafficked upon return, whether they are able to make an independent decision to withdraw their applications, and whether they have any fear of return owing to a credible fear of persecution.
See
8 U.S.C. 1232(a)(2)(A), (a)(4). However, as a matter of longstanding policy, CBP screens all UCs—even those from non-contiguous countries—in this manner.
Because one of the primary purposes of the rule is to alleviate undue strain on the limited resources of the border security and immigration systems, the Departments found that they must consider the operational burden that results from all UC encounters at the border. That is why UC encounters from all countries, not just from contiguous countries, should be considered by the Secretary when making a factual determination that average daily encounters at the southern border have exceeded or fallen below the requisite thresholds contained in the rule and the Proclamation.
Also informing the Departments' decision to reconsider the IFR's approach is that in recent months, encounters of UCs from non-contiguous countries have grown relative to other encounters. That growth, which adds operational burdens separate from those inherent in the processing of individuals for expedited removal, increases the distorting effects of excluding these UCs. Specifically, the Departments had observed from June 2023 through May 2024 that rates of encounters of UCs from non-contiguous countries had generally accounted for about 6.5 percent of total encounters of all non-contiguous nationalities, and comprised about 15 percent of encounters of nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
71
However, while encounters of UCs from non-contiguous countries have decreased in absolute terms since June 2024, such encounters have not decreased in proportion with the decreases seen among single adults and individuals in family units. Rather, the UCs' share of total non-contiguous encounters has increased to 8.9 percent, including 24 percent of all encounters of nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
72
As a result, the share of total encounters attributable to UCs from non-contiguous countries increased from 4.6 percent from June 2023 to May 2024 to 6.4 percent from June 2024 to August 2024, and the share of all UCs increased from 6.2 percent to 9.4 percent.
73
71
See
OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (USBP Encounters by Fam Status tab).
72
See
OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (USBP Encounters by Fam Status tab). While the monthly average single adult encounters fell 53 percent between June 2023-May 2024 and June 2024-August 2024, and the monthly average number of encounters of individuals in family units fell 69 percent, encounters of non-contiguous UCs fell just 42 percent, and encounters of UCs overall fell just 37 percent.
Id.
73
OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset and data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (USBP Encounters by Fam status tab).
With the two changes just described, the rule will continue to serve the purposes that the IFR pursued from the start. First, the rule continues to target emergency border circumstances exceeding the Departments' capacity to effectively process, detain, and remove, as appropriate, the noncitizens encountered; Section III.D.1 of this preamble describes why the rule's thresholds continue to reflect those circumstances, accounting for the inclusion of UCs from non-contiguous countries.
Second, the rule will continue to deactivate when a decrease in encounters means that those emergency border circumstances no longer exist. Although the change to require that the 7-consecutive-calendar-day average must remain below 1,500 encounters for 28 consecutive days appropriately ensures that the rule does not deactivate prematurely, the rule will continue to deactivate where a decrease is likely to be genuinely sustained. Encounter levels are driven by a variety of factors, many of which are external to the United States and difficult to predict, such as natural disasters, economic changes, and political instability. However, the Departments believe, based on past experience, that the Departments may experience an average daily encounter rate below 1,500 for 28 consecutive days. In fact, from FY 2013 through FY 2019, the 7-consecutive-calendar-day USBP encounter average was below 1,500 encounters for 28 consecutive days 71 percent of the time.
74
Even since the IFR was promulgated, encounters have dropped to levels indicating that the threshold in section 2(a) of the Proclamation will be met if migration dynamics change for a sustained period. If, consistent with the June 3 Proclamation, one excludes UCs from non-contiguous countries, the Departments have observed 40 separate days between June 5, 2024, and August 31, 2024, with encounters within 15 percent of 1,500 (
i.e.,
below 1,725).
75
And if, consistent with the September 27 Proclamation, one includes such UCs, the Departments have observed 15 such days.
76
These single-day figures suggest that the threshold for discontinuation, as revised, will be met if migration dynamics change for a sustained period.
74
See
OHSS analysis of July 2024 OHSS Persist Dataset (Trigger Analysis tab). The Departments rely on data from FY 2013 through FY 2019 and not data from the pandemic period given the unique circumstances dictating migratory trends during the latter time.
75
See
OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP on September 3, 2024 (Section 2c Encounters tab).
76
See id.
2. Clarifying Changes to Regulatory Text
This final rule also makes clarifying changes to the regulatory text. In §§ 208.35(b)(2) and 1208.35(b)(2)(iii), the Departments removed from the definition of “reasonable probability” the clause: “that the alien would be persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, or tortured, with respect to the designated country or countries of removal.” The Departments believe that the remaining definition of “reasonable probability”—“substantially more than a reasonable possibility, but somewhat less than more likely than not”—accurately defines the reasonable probability standard. The deleted clause describes what the AO or IJ is assessing for rather than what the standard means, so it need not be part of the standard's definition.
3. Other Technical Changes
The final rule also implements two technical changes. First, the rule replaces the term “alien” with “noncitizen” where it appears in 8 CFR 1208.35.
See
8 CFR 1001.1(gg). Second, the rule amends 8 CFR 208.35(a)(2)(i)(C) and 1208.35(a)(2)(i)(C) as well as the provisions of the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule at 8 CFR 208.33(a)(3)(i)(C) and 1208.33(a)(3)(i)(C) to update the cross-references to the definition of “victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons.” Specifically, the rule replaces the cross-references to 8
CFR 214.11 with cross-references to 8 CFR 214.201. This change recognizes that on August 28, 2024, after the Departments published the IFR, DHS's rule Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant Status, 89 FR 34864 (Apr. 30, 2024),
77
became effective, which moved the definition of “victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons” from § 214.11 to § 214.201.
See id.
at 34931-32.
77
See also
89 FR 68081 (Aug. 23, 2024) (making corrections).
D. Rule Provisions
The rule contains the following key provisions:
• The rule applies to certain individuals who seek asylum, statutory withholding of removal, or CAT protection during emergency border circumstances giving rise to this rule and to the suspension and limitation on entry under the June 3 Proclamation, as amended by the September 27 Proclamation.
See
8 CFR 208.13(g), 208.35, 235.15, 1208.13(g), 1208.35.
• The rule establishes that those who enter across the southern border during emergency border circumstances and who are not described in section 3(b) of the June 3 Proclamation will be ineligible for asylum unless they demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that exceptionally compelling circumstances exist, including if the noncitizen demonstrates that they or a member of their family as described in 8 CFR 208.30(c) with whom they are traveling: (1) faced an acute medical emergency; (2) faced an imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as an imminent threat of rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder; or (3) satisfied the definition of “victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons” provided in 8 CFR 214.201.
See
8 CFR 208.13(g), 208.35(a), 1208.13(g), 1208.35(a). Exceptionally compelling circumstances may also be established for noncitizens in section 240 removal proceedings or the asylum merits interview (“AMI”) process under specified conditions to ensure family unity.
See
8 CFR 208.35(c), 1208.35(c).
• The rule also establishes that, during emergency border circumstances, rather than asking specific questions of every noncitizen encountered and processed for expedited removal to elicit whether the noncitizen may have a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, for those who enter across the southern border and are not described in section 3(b) of the June 3 Proclamation, DHS will provide general notice regarding the process for seeking asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT and will refer a noncitizen for a credible fear interview only if the noncitizen manifests a fear of return, expresses an intention to apply for asylum or protection, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture or a fear of return to their country or the country of removal.
See
8 CFR 235.15.
• The limitation on asylum eligibility will be applied during credible fear interviews and reviews, and those who enter across the southern border during emergency border circumstances and are not described in section 3(b) of the June 3 Proclamation will receive a negative credible fear determination with respect to their asylum claim unless there is a significant possibility that the noncitizen would ultimately be able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the limitation does not apply or that they meet an exception. Such noncitizens will thereafter be screened for a reasonable probability of persecution because of a protected ground or torture, a higher standard than that applied to noncitizens in a similar posture under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule. The “reasonable probability” standard is defined to mean substantially more than a “reasonable possibility” but somewhat less than more likely than not. 8 CFR 208.35(b), 1208.35(b).
E. Severability
As stated in 8 CFR 208.13(h), 208.35(b)(3), 208.35(e), 235.15(g), 1208.13(h), 1208.35(b)(4), and 1208.35(e), the Departments intend for the provisions of the rule to be severable from each other and to be given effect to the maximum extent possible, such that if a court holds that any provision is invalid or unenforceable as to a particular person or circumstance, the other provisions will remain in effect as to any other person or circumstance.
78
See
89 FR at 48757-59. During emergency border circumstances, the Departments' abilities to refer and safely process noncitizens through expedited removal is overwhelmed and prevents the border security and immigration systems from delivering timely decisions and consequences to noncitizens arriving at the southern border.
See
89 FR at 48714. Consequently, each provision of the rule is designed to function sensibly without the others, and the Departments intend for them to be severable so that each can operate independently.
78
Courts have uniformly held that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 706(2), authorizes courts to sever and set aside “only the offending parts of the rule.”
Carlson
v.
Postal Regulatory Comm'n,
938 F.3d 337, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2019);
see, e.g., K Mart Corp.
v.
Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 294 (1988).
For example, the Departments intend for the “reasonable probability” screening standard to be used—even in the absence of a limitation on asylum eligibility, the manifestation of fear procedures, or the Proclamation—to screen for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection claims if a noncitizen was otherwise unable to establish a credible fear of persecution for asylum purposes due to the Lawful Pathways rebuttable presumption. 8 CFR 208.35(b)(3), 1208.35(b)(4);
see
8 CFR 208.35(b)(2), (e), 1208.35(b)(2), (e), 235.15(g); 89 FR at 48757. That approach ensures that, during emergency border circumstances, the Departments will continue to be able to benefit from the higher screening standard, even without the limitation on asylum eligibility this rule adopts.
To maintain operational flexibility, DHS similarly intends for manifestation of fear procedures under 8 CFR 235.15 to remain in effect, even without a limitation on asylum eligibility, the reasonable probability standard, or the Proclamation.
See
8 CFR 235.15(g). As with the reasonable probability standard, allowing for the continued use of the manifestation of fear provisions absent the other portions of the rule or Proclamation ensures that such a tool remains available to the Departments during emergency border circumstances.
Finally, the Departments intend for the limitation on asylum eligibility to be severable from the manifestation of fear procedures, the reasonable probability standard, and the Proclamation because the limitation on asylum eligibility operates independently of those provisions and the Proclamation, and in the absence of those tools would likewise continue to be an important tool for addressing emergency border circumstances at the southern border.
See
8 CFR 208.35(e), 1208.35(e).
III. Public Comments and Responses
The Departments received 1,067 comments on the IFR, the majority of which expressed opposition. A range of governmental and non-governmental entities, public officials, and private persons submitted comments. The Departments summarize and respond to the public comments below.
A. Legal Authority and Background
1. Legality Concerns
a. General Comments on Domestic Law
Comment:
Commenters asserted that the rule violates domestic law and
emphasized that U.S. law allows noncitizens to apply for asylum regardless of where they entered the United States. Some commenters described a fundamental right to apply for asylum for anyone inside the United States and stated that analysis of an asylum application should focus on the applicant's reasonable fear of persecution rather than manner of entry, criticizing what a commenter characterized as a categorical exclusion of those “apprehended between ports of entry from asylum eligibility, barring narrow exceptions.” Commenters asserted that entering the United States either through a POE or across the southern border between POEs and asking for asylum constitutes a “lawful pathway.” Other commenters stated that the Departments should not and cannot categorically deny asylum for reasons unrelated to the merits of the claim itself. One commenter claimed that the rule effectively closes the border and asserted that closing the border is unconstitutional.
Although some commenters agreed that the rule is within the scope of the Departments' authority and is consistent with the INA, other commenters claimed that the rule would violate the Refugee Act of 1980 and the INA, specifically section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158. Commenters claimed that the rule conflicts with the plain language of these provisions, which permit a noncitizen “physically present in the United States” to apply for asylum. Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. at 105; INA 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1). Commenters asserted that the INA does not require those seeking protection to apply before entering or at a POE or to schedule an appointment through a website or app in order to make an application, but instead allows applications from anywhere along the border. Commenters also stated that, although Congress gave the Attorney General and the Secretary authority to impose additional limitations on asylum eligibility, such limitations must be consistent with legislation and congressional intent. Along the same lines, a commenter stated that the IFR undermines the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive Branch because it is Congress, not the Executive Branch, that enacts laws, and the IFR rewrites the INA.
Response:
The Departments disagree that this rule is inconsistent with U.S. law or congressional intent. The rule does not effectively close the border, require the Departments to turn away migrants at the southern border, or categorically deny all asylum applications filed by noncitizens who enter the United States across the southern border. Nor does the rule prohibit any noncitizen from seeking protection solely because of the manner or location of their entry into the United States. Rather, the rule is a limitation on asylum eligibility, as authorized by sections 208(b)(2)(C) and (d)(5)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C) and (d)(5)(B), and the Departments' other discretionary authorities,
e.g.,
sections 103(a)(3), (g)(2), and 208(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), (g)(2), and 1158(b)(1)(A). Given these authorities for the Departments to act, the Departments disagree that the IFR (or the final rule) violates the principle of separation of powers.
The rule's limitation on asylum eligibility does not prevent anyone from pursuing a claim for asylum, nor does it categorically foreclose eligibility for asylum. The Departments have authority to impose limitations on asylum eligibility. As explained above, the INA authorizes the Secretary and the Attorney General to establish, by regulation, “additional limitations and conditions, consistent with” section 208, under which a noncitizen “shall be ineligible for asylum.” INA 208(b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C);
see also
INA 208(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(5)(B) (authorizing the Secretary and the Attorney General to “provide by regulation for any other conditions or limitations on the consideration of an application for asylum not inconsistent with [the INA]”). And section 208(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), authorizes the Secretary or the Attorney General to grant asylum in their discretion. The INA also provides the Secretary and the Attorney General authority to publish regulations governing their respective roles regarding apprehension, inspection and admission, detention and removal, withholding of removal, deferral of removal, and release of noncitizens encountered in the interior of the United States or at or between POEs.
See
INA 103(a)(3), (g)(2), 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (B)(iv), (C), 241(a)(3), (d)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), (g)(2), 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), (B)(iv), (C), 1231(a)(3), (d)(2)(B);
see also
INA 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A).
Consistent with these authorities, the Departments have promulgated other limitations or conditions on asylum eligibility, including some provisions that Congress later adopted and codified in the INA.
See
Aliens and Nationality; Refugee and Asylum Procedures, 45 FR 37392, 37392 (June 2, 1980) (imposing firm resettlement bar); Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 FR 30674, 30678, 30683 (July 27, 1990) (promulgating 8 CFR 208.14(c) (1990), which provided for mandatory regulatory bars to asylum for those convicted in the United States of a particularly serious crime or those who constitute a danger to the security of the United States while retaining a prior regulatory bar to asylum for noncitizens who were firmly resettled in a third country prior to arriving in the United States); Asylum Procedures, 65 FR 76121, 76134 (Dec. 6, 2000) (providing that an applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if they could avoid persecution by internally relocating);
see also, e.g., Afriyie
v.
Holder,
613 F.3d 924, 934-36 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing internal relocation),
overruled on other grounds by Bringas-Rodriguez
v.
Sessions,
850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc);
Yang
v.
INS,
79 F.3d 932, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the regulatory firm resettlement limitation was a permissible exercise of the Attorney General's authority under the asylum statute). Restraining the Departments' authority to promulgate additional limitations and conditions on the ability to establish eligibility for asylum consistent with section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, would be contrary to Congress' intent that the Departments' only constraint be that additional limitations and conditions are consistent with section 208, 8 U.S.C. 1158, and “this chapter.” INA 208(b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C), (d)(5)(B);
see also DHS
v.
Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 112 (2020) (recognizing that the “theme” of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) “was to protect the Executive's discretion from undue interference by the courts” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted));
R-S-C
v.
Sessions,
869 F.3d 1176, 1187 (10th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that the “delegation of authority” in section 208(b)(2)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C), “means that Congress was prepared to accept administrative dilution” of section 208(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1));
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 444-45 (1987); Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 FR 11704, 11740 (Feb. 23, 2023).
The rule is within the scope of the Departments' authority and does not conflict with the statutory requirement that noncitizens “physically present in the United States” be permitted to apply for asylum because it adds a limitation on asylum eligibility as permitted under section 208(b)(2)(C) and (d)(5)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C) and
(d)(5)(B). The limitation is not a sweeping categorical bar that would preclude a grant of asylum solely based on manner of entry, which some courts have found to conflict with section 208(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1).
E.g., East Bay Sanctuary Covenant
v.
Biden (East Bay III),
993 F.3d 640, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a prior regulation that enacted a bar on asylum eligibility for those who entered the United States between designated POEs was “effectively a categorical ban” on migrants based on their method of entering the United States, in conflict with section 208(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1)).
Under this rule—and contrary to commenter assertions—manner of entry alone is never dispositive. Rather, the rule's limitation on asylum eligibility does not apply if a noncitizen establishes that exceptionally compelling circumstances exist.
See
8 CFR 208.35(a)(2)(i), 1208.35(a)(2)(i). The rule provides that such exceptionally compelling circumstances include where the noncitizen, or a family member with whom they are traveling, faced an acute medical emergency; faced an imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as an imminent threat of rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder; or was a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons. 8 CFR 208.35(a)(2)(i), 1208.35(a)(2)(i).
Specifically, the limitation at issue here turns on whether—during the emergency border circumstances described in the Proclamation and this rule—an individual has followed the lawful, safe, and orderly pathways that the United States Government has established, or shown exceptionally compelling circumstances, when it is essential that noncitizens use such pathways to ensure the Government's ability to manage the border.
Limitations and conditions on asylum eligibility do not need to directly relate to whether a noncitizen satisfies the definition of a “refugee” within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), but instead can embrace policy considerations that justify a finding of ineligibility.
See, e.g., Zheng
v.
Mukasey,
509 F.3d 869, 871 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that IIRIRA included several provisions, including the one-year bar, “intended to reduce delays and curb perceived abuses in removal proceedings”);
Ali
v.
Reno,
237 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that asylum law “was never intended to open the United States to refugees who had found shelter in another nation and had begun to build new lives” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
Matter of Negusie,
28 I&N Dec. 120, 125 (A.G. 2020) (discussing the persecutor bar, and noting that Congress intended to make “certain forms of immigration relief,” including asylum, “unavailable to persecutors”),
stayed by Matter of Negusie,
28 I&N Dec. 399, 399 (A.G. 2021);
Singh
v.
Nelson,
623 F. Supp. 545, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[A]ttempting to discourage people from entering the United States without permission . . . provides a rational basis for distinguishing among categories” of noncitizens who are not lawfully present.).
In sum, as with other conditions and limitations imposed by section 208(b)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2), this rule is grounded in important policy objectives, including providing those with meritorious asylum claims an opportunity to have their claims heard in a timely fashion, preventing an increased flow of migrants arriving at the southern border that will overwhelm the Departments' ability to provide safe and orderly processing, and reducing the role of exploitative TCOs and smugglers. In seeking to enhance the overall functioning of the immigration system and to improve processing of asylum applications, the Departments are, in the exercise of their authority to promulgate limitations on asylum eligibility and in recognition of the limited resources provided by Congress, electing to implement a limitation on asylum eligibility that places greater weight on manner of entry. This limitation on asylum eligibility is expected to disincentivize irregular migration by those unlikely to establish exceptionally compelling circumstances during times when encounters exceed certain benchmarks and therefore challenge the Departments' ability to swiftly process single adults and individuals in family units encountered by USBP at the SWB through expedited removal. See Section II.A.2 of this preamble for further discussion of the Departments' experience with the IFR.
Comment:
Commenters claim that the rule violates the principles of non-refoulement and nondiscrimination in the Refugee Act and other U.S. laws. Some commenters claimed the rule conflicts with congressional intent to create a uniform procedure for noncitizens applying for asylum regardless of manner of entry.
Response:
The Departments disagree that the rule conflicts with U.S. law or congressional intent. The rule does not violate the principles of non-refoulement and nondiscrimination. And the rule does not conflict with what commenters describe as a congressional intent to create a uniform procedure for noncitizens applying for asylum.
See Cazun
v.
Att'y Gen. U.S.,
856 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 2017). The Departments may create additional substantive limitations and conditions on asylum eligibility—as Congress itself has done, and as Congress expressly authorized the Departments to do. INA 208(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(C). Moreover, all noncitizens to whom the rule applies are subject to the same procedures for adjudicating their asylum claims as those who are not subject to the rule. The United States has implemented its non-refoulement obligations through section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) (which is referred to as statutory withholding of removal) and the regulations implementing U.S. obligations under Article 3 of the CAT at 8 CFR 208.16(c), 208.17, 208.18, 1208.16(c), 1208.17, and 1208.18. The INA's provision in section 208, 8 U.S.C. 1158, for the discretionary granting of asylum instead aligns with Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, which is precatory and does not require any signatory to actually grant asylum to all those who are eligible.
See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 441.
Comment:
Commenters asserted that, under
Matter of Pula,
19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987), manner of entry may not be the dispositive factor in deciding whether a noncitizen is eligible for asylum. Similarly, commenters argued that
Matter of Pula
is binding precedent and precludes consideration of manner of entry over all other factors. A commenter claimed that manner of entry can only be considered in determining whether a noncitizen merits asylum as a matter of discretion and not in determining whether the noncitizen is eligible for asylum.
Response:
The rule is consistent with historical consideration of manner of entry as a relevant factor in considering whether to grant asylum as a matter of discretion. In
Matter of Pula,
the BIA identified—as relevant factors as to whether a noncitizen warrants the favorable exercise of discretion in granting asylum—the noncitizen's “circumvention of orderly refugee procedures,” including their “manner of entry or attempted entry”; whether they “passed through any other countries or arrived in the United States directly”; “whether orderly refugee procedures were in fact available to help” in any transit countries; and whether they “made any attempts to seek asylum before coming to the United States.” 19 I&N Dec. at 473-74. The BIA explained that section 208(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a), required the Attorney General to establish procedures for adjudicating
applications filed by any noncitizen, “irrespective of such alien's status,” but the BIA did not preclude consideration of the manner of entry in assessing whether to grant asylum.
Id.
at 473. The BIA also stated that while the manner of entry could “be a serious adverse factor, . . . it should not be considered in such a way that the practical effect is to deny relief in virtually all cases.”
Id.
at 473. The BIA cautioned against placing “too much emphasis on the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures” as “the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors.”
Id.
at 473-74.
While the Departments acknowledge that the rule places greater weight on manner of entry under certain emergency circumstances, this decades-old precedent establishes that the Departments can permissibly take into account manner of entry. Both how much weight to place on that factor and whether to do so in weighing asylum eligibility fall well within the broad discretion conferred on the Departments by section 208(b)(2)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C).
Cf. Lopez
v.
Davis,
531 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2001) (government can rely on rulemaking to “resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority” (quoting
Am. Hosp. Ass'n
v.
NLRB,
499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991));
Reno
v.
Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 313 (1993) (noting that INS need not “forswear use of reasonable presumptions and generic rules” even where the statute “requires some level of individualized determination” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Under this rule, manner of entry, standing alone, is never dispositive. Rather, the limitation at issue here turns on whether—during the emergency border circumstances described in the Proclamation and this rule—an individual has followed the lawful, safe, and orderly pathways that the United States has established when it is essential that noncitizens use such pathways to ensure the United States' ability to manage the border. And even during these situations, the rule's limitation on asylum eligibility does not apply if a noncitizen establishes that exceptionally compelling circumstances exist.
See
8 CFR 208.35(a)(2)(i), 1208.35(a)(2)(i). The rule provides that such exceptionally compelling circumstances include where the noncitizen, or a family member with whom they are traveling, faced an acute medical emergency; faced an imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as an imminent threat of rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder; or was a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons. 8 CFR 208.35(a)(2)(i), 1208.35(a)(2)(i).
In line with
Matter of Pula,
then, the rule considers factors other than manner of entry. And, like
Matter of Pula,
this rule provides for consideration of manner of entry in assessing eligibility for some asylum seekers in “a way that the practical effect is” not “to deny relief in virtually all cases.” 19 I&N Dec. at 473. Rather, the manner of entry reduces the availability of relief only in limited circumstances—during emergency border circumstances described in the Proclamation and this rule—and only for those unable to establish exceptionally compelling circumstances.
The Departments also recognize that the specific analysis discussed in
Matter of Pula
(considering manner of entry in the discretionary decision of whether to grant asylum) is distinct from how this rule considers manner of entry (as part of provisions governing asylum eligibility).
See
19 I&N Dec. at 472. The Departments, in exercising their broad discretion to issue regulations adopting additional limitations on asylum eligibility, are not bound to consider manner of entry only as a factor contributing to whether a particular noncitizen warrants a favorable exercise of discretion. While
Matter of Pula
allows manner of entry to be one factor in the consideration of whether a noncitizen merits a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion, it does not purport to restrict the Departments from considering a noncitizen's manner of entry in assessing eligibility.
Id.
at 473-74.
Moreover, while
Matter of Pula
considered manner of entry for purposes of a discretionary grant whereas the rule considers manner of entry as a limitation on asylum eligibility, adjudicators are not precluded from considering the same facts when evaluating both eligibility and discretion. Indeed, it is possible for a single fact to be relevant to both determinations.
See Kankamalage
v.
INS,
335 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a conviction did not render a noncitizen ineligible for asylum, but stating that the Board was “not prohibited from taking into account Kankamalage's robbery conviction when it decides whether or not to grant asylum as a matter of discretion”);
Matter of Jean,
23 I&N Dec. 373, 385 (A.G. 2002) (concluding that even a noncitizen who “qualifies as a `refugee' ” and whose criminal conviction did “not preclude her eligibility” for asylum could nevertheless be “manifestly unfit for a
discretionary
grant of relief”).
The Departments conclude that this rule does not conflict with
Matter of Pula,
which remains the applicable standard for discretionary determinations in the absence of a regulation that otherwise governs the discretionary determination.
See, e.g., Thamotar
v.
U.S. Att'y Gen.,
1 F.4th 958, 970-71 (11th Cir. 2021) (observing that discretionary asylum determinations continue to be governed by
Matter of Pula
);
Hussam F.
v.
Sessions,
897 F.3d 707, 718 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that “circumvention [of proper immigration procedures] may be taken into account as a `serious adverse factor'” (quoting
Matter of Pula,
19 I&N Dec. at 473));
see also Andriasian
v.
INS,
180 F.3d 1033, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that reliance on certain
Matter of Pula
factors was inappropriate once regulations controlling discretionary denials of asylum on the basis of a petitioner's stay or opportunity to stay in a third country had been promulgated). And the Departments view
Matter of Pula
as providing support for the proposition that it is lawful to consider manner of entry for asylum applicants.
b. Statutory Conditions and Limitations on Asylum Eligibility
Comment:
Commenters stated that the rule would be inconsistent with or would otherwise render superfluous the statutory firm-resettlement bar and safe-third-country bar.
See
INA 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); INA 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A).
Response:
This rule is within the Departments' broad authority to create new limitations on asylum eligibility, and the Departments disagree that the rule conflicts with any of the exceptions to a noncitizen's ability to apply for asylum or limitations on a noncitizen's eligibility for a grant of asylum under section 208(a)(2) or (b)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2) or (b)(2).
The INA's firm-resettlement provision precludes a noncitizen who “was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States” from demonstrating eligibility for asylum. INA 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi);
see also
8 CFR 208.15, 1208.15 (2020).
79
The INA's safe-third-
country provision prohibits a noncitizen from applying for asylum if the noncitizen “may be removed, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agreement” to a safe third country in which the noncitizen would not be subject to persecution and “would have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection.” INA 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(A).
79
These regulations were amended by
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review,
85 FR 80274 (Dec. 11, 2020), but the amendments were preliminarily enjoined.
See Pangea Legal Servs.
v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
512 F. Supp. 3d 966, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2021). This order remains in effect,
and thus the 2020 version of these provisions—the version immediately preceding the enjoined amendment—is currently effective.
The rule does not conflict with or otherwise render the firm-resettlement bar or safe-third-country bar superfluous; instead, this rule and the statutory bars apply independently.
First, this rule has a different scope. In contrast to those statutory bars, this limitation on asylum eligibility only applies to those who enter the United States during emergency border circumstances.
See
8 CFR 208.35(a)(1), 1208.35(a)(1). Additionally, unlike those who are subject to the firm-resettlement or safe-third-country bars, those who are subject to this limitation on asylum eligibility are not categorically barred from applying for asylum or from being eligible for asylum, as application of the rule's limitation on asylum eligibility will be considered on a case-by-case basis, including to determine if exceptional circumstances apply to overcome this limitation.
The rule also serves a different purpose than those statutory bars. The INA's firm resettlement and safe-third-country provisions limit asylum eligibility and applications, respectively, for noncitizens who have available sustained protection in another country, and they help protect against forum shopping.
See Rosenberg
v.
Yee Chien Woo,
402 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1971) (noting that the concept of firm resettlement is historically rooted in the notion of providing “a haven for the world's homeless people” while encouraging “other nations to do likewise”);
see also Maharaj
v.
Gonzales,
450 F.3d 961, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that the firm-resettlement provision protects against forum shopping, an issue “that our immigration laws have long sought to avoid”). The limitation on asylum eligibility adopted in this rule, by contrast, seeks to streamline the Departments' processing of noncitizens while upholding all screening and protection requirements, thereby conserving limited resources during the emergency border circumstances described in the Proclamation and this rule and allowing for enough resources to continue to process lawful cross-border trade and travel and noncitizens who present in a safe and orderly manner at a POE. The rule is also designed to encourage noncitizens to use lawful, safe, and orderly pathways to the United States during emergency border circumstances or to wait until such circumstances have abated, to the extent possible. Thus, the limitation has a different object and purpose, and it is consistent with those statutory provisions.
Moreover, the INA permits the Attorney General and the Secretary to create new eligibility limitations and does not limit this authority from overlapping with existing statutory conditions.
See R-S-C,
869 F.3d at 1187 (noting that Congress's delegation of authority in section 208(b)(2)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C), “means that Congress was prepared to accept administrative dilution” of the right to seek asylum);
cf. Hawaii,
585 U.S. at 690-91 (recognizing that the existence of the Visa Waiver Program “did not implicitly foreclose the Executive from imposing tighter restrictions” in “similar” areas).
Indeed, section 208(b)(2)(C) and (d)(5)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(C) and (d)(5)(B), provide no subject-matter limit other than requiring any regulation be “consistent with” section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, and the INA generally.
See R-S-C,
869 F.3d at 1187 n.9. The limitation on asylum eligibility established by this rule is consistent with section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, as a whole, and the INA generally, and it is consistent with the firm-resettlement and safe-third-country bars in particular.
c. Expedited Removal
Comment:
Several commenters claimed that the rule conflicts with the expedited removal process created by Congress in IIRIRA. Commenters noted that the statutory framework provides for preliminary screening of noncitizens in credible fear interviews, where noncitizens may apply for asylum after demonstrating a “significant possibility” that the noncitizen could establish eligibility for asylum. In this regard, one commenter asserted that Congress had intended the “significant possibility” standard to be a “low screening standard,” but that the IFR “would convert the preliminary screening into a full adjudication” of whether the IFR applied and would eliminate the “significant possibility” standard “entirely for all asylum seekers covered[,] . . . forc[ing] them to meet an even higher `reasonable probability' standard.” Commenters asserted that the rule's requirement that noncitizens instead show a “reasonable probability” of persecution or torture is in conflict with this statutory framework. Commenters further asserted that the rule effectively creates a new legal framework by which to evaluate asylum claims in conflict with the statutory process. One commenter claimed that the rule unlawfully shuts down the U.S. asylum system.
Response:
The Departments disagree that the rule conflicts with the expedited removal process created by Congress. The expedited removal process is applicable to certain noncitizens arriving in the United States (and, in the discretion of the Secretary, certain other designated classes of noncitizens) who are found to be inadmissible under either section 212(a)(6)(C) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C), which renders inadmissible noncitizens who make certain material misrepresentations, or section 212(a)(7) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7), which renders inadmissible noncitizens who lack documentation required for admission. INA 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Upon being subject to expedited removal, such noncitizens may be “removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.”
Id.
Congress created a screening process, known as “credible fear” screening, to identify potentially valid claims for asylum by noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings.
See
INA 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B). But Congress has not provided for such a screening for statutory withholding of removal or CAT protection. In the absence of a statutory process for screening for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection, the Departments have also used the credible fear screening process to identify potentially valid claims for such protection.
See generally
8 CFR 208.30, 1003.42, 1208.30 (providing for screenings for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection alongside screening for potential asylum eligibility). If a noncitizen indicates a fear of persecution or torture, a fear of return, or an intention to apply for asylum during the course of the expedited removal process, DHS refers the noncitizen to an AO to determine whether the noncitizen has a credible fear of persecution or torture in the
country of nationality or removal. INA 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B);
see also
8 CFR 208.30(e)(2), 235.3(b)(4);
id.
208.13(b)(1)-(2), 1208.13(b)(1)-(2) (defining the grounds for asylum eligibility);
id.
208.16(b)-(c), 1208.16(b)-(c) (defining the grounds for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection). A noncitizen has a “credible fear of persecution” if “there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.” INA 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
Just as the statute is silent on the availability of screening procedures for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection, it is also silent on the standard applied during such screenings. By regulation, the Departments have applied the “significant possibility” standard to also screen for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection,
see
8 CFR 208.30(e)(2)-(3), 1003.42(d): AOs must determine whether “there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien can establish eligibility . . . for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act,” 8 CFR 208.30(e)(2), and whether the noncitizen “shows that there is a significant possibility that the alien is eligible for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, pursuant to § 208.16 or § 208.17,” 8 CFR 208.30(e)(3). If the AO determines that the noncitizen does not have a credible fear of persecution or torture in the proposed country of removal, the noncitizen may request that an IJ review that determination.
See
INA 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 CFR 208.16(b)-(c), 208.30(g), 208.33(b)(2)(v), 1208.16(b)-(c), 1208.30(g).
To the extent commenters allege that the Departments are not applying the “significant possibility” standard to screen for asylum eligibility—such as for application of the limitation on asylum eligibility—the commenters are mistaken. Under this rule, the AO or IJ determines whether there is a significant possibility that the noncitizen would ultimately be able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the limitation does not apply or that they meet the exception for exceptionally compelling circumstances. The “significant possibility” standard applies by statute, section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(B)(v), and the regulation does not in any way displace that standard, by its terms or otherwise. The Departments did not explicitly include this language in the regulation itself. This is because the provisions regarding credible fear screenings at 8 CFR 208.35(b) and 1208.35(b)(2) generally explain the order of operations—instructing the AO or IJ to consider the limitation first before considering the rest of the asylum claim. In other rules adopting conditions and limitations on asylum eligibility, the Departments have consistently used the regulatory text to explain the order of operations for consideration of the limitations during credible fear screenings without explicitly restating the applicable statutory standard,
80
while at the same time explaining that the “significant possibility” standard applies in the preamble.
81
Deviating from the Departments' practice here could wrongly imply that, in other regulations pertaining to the credible fear process, the default standard of proof for AO and IJ determinations is something other than the “significant possibility” standard. To avoid that unwanted implication, the Department declines to modify the text of §§ 208.35 and 1208.35 as well. The “reasonable probability” standard does not affect or change the “significant possibility” standard used to screen for asylum eligibility, which, as discussed above, is set by statute and remains in effect for asylum claims in the credible fear process. Accordingly, the Departments disagree with the claim that the use of the “reasonable probability” standard for the purposes of screening for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection would eliminate, or in any way affect, the “significant possibility” standard as it applies to screening for asylum eligibility.
80
For example, under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule, “[t]he asylum officer shall first determine whether the alien is covered by the presumption . . . and, if so, whether the alien has rebutted the presumption[.]” 8 CFR 208.33(b)(1);
see also
8 CFR 1208.33(b)(2) (“The immigration judge shall first determine whether the alien is covered by the presumption at 8 CFR 208.33(a)(1) and 1208.33(a)(1) and, if so, whether the alien has rebutted the presumption in accordance with 8 CFR 208.33(a)(3) and 1208.33(a)(3).”);
Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications,
84 FR 33829, 33843-45 (July 16, 2019) (interim final rule amending and adding provisions at 8 CFR 208.30(e)(5)(ii) through(iii), 1003.42(d)(2) and(3), and 1208.30(g)(1)(i) through (ii), providing the order of operations for applying two now-rescinded bars to asylum eligibility); 88 FR at 31319;
id.
at 31449 (adding amendatory instructions to remove regulatory provisions added to implement the bars to asylum eligibility adopted in two prior rules).
81
See, e.g.,
89 FR at 48755 (explaining that, during the credible fear interview, “the AO will first determine whether there is a significant possibility that the noncitizen is eligible for asylum in light of the [rule's] limitation on asylum eligibility”);
id.
at 48757-58 (discussing the application of the “significant possibility” standard under the rule during IJ review of a negative credible fear determination); 84 FR at 33837 (“If there is a significant possibility that the alien is not subject to the eligibility bar (and the alien otherwise demonstrates that there is a significant possibility that he or she can establish eligibility for asylum), then the alien will have established a credible fear.”);
Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims,
83 FR 55934, 55943 (Nov. 9, 2018) (“If there is a significant possibility that the alien is not subject to the eligibility bar (and the alien otherwise demonstrates sufficient facts pertaining to asylum eligibility), then the alien will have established a credible fear.”).
The Departments also disagree that the rule's application of the “reasonable probability” standard to screen for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal or CAT protection is inconsistent with the “significant possibility” standard under the expedited removal statute. As the Departments observed previously, “Congress clearly expressed its intent that the `significant possibility' standard be used to screen for asylum eligibility but did not express any clear intent as to which standard should apply to other applications.” 88 FR at 11742. Section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and FARRA section 2242 are silent as to what screening standards and procedures are to be employed in determining potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal or CAT protection, and the INA elsewhere confers broad discretionary authority to establish rules and procedures for implementing those provisions.
See, e.g.,
INA 103(a)(3), (g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3), (g)(2). Accordingly, the Departments have some discretion to articulate the screening standard for claims for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection. As further discussed in Section III.C.3 of this preamble, the Departments continue to believe that during the emergency border circumstances described in the IFR and this rule, the “reasonable probability” screening standard is more appropriate in light of the ultimate burden of proof for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection and better captures the population of noncitizens with potentially valid claims for such protection.
See
89 FR at 48745-47.
Thus, despite the claims of some commentators, the rule does not effectively shut down the U.S. asylum system or deviate from applicable statutory standards. Noncitizens still
may seek asylum and protection in the United States.
d. General Comments on International Law
Comment:
Commenters generally asserted that the rule violates international law. A commenter wrote that seeking asylum is a human right guaranteed by international law and the rule unjustly denies people this right. In this regard, a commenter asserted that the use of emergency border circumstances as a justification for promulgating the rule is insufficient to justify violating international law and that the lack of a time frame or sunset provision denies access to migrants seeking asylum and places them at risk of refoulement. Commenters claimed that the rule imposes prohibited penalties on asylum seekers, bars refugees from a path to citizenship, and impermissibly discriminates based on manner of entry, race, and nationality. A commenter stated that regulations that deny access to asylum based on arbitrary factors that do not relate to a person's status as a refugee are inconsistent with the Refugee Convention and that the United States has an obligation under the Convention to provide a “fair and efficient refugee status determination procedure” to individuals in the U.S. asylum process.
Commenters were concerned that the rule violates the United States's non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention (through the Refugee Protocol) and Article 3 of the CAT. For example, commenters predicted many noncitizens would not be able to satisfy the comparatively higher standards of proof for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection claims and that, in turn, would lead to the refoulement of persons who, if not for the rule's limitation on asylum eligibility, would have been granted asylum. Several of these commenters also asserted that statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection are insufficient to satisfy the United States's non-refoulement obligations because they afford lesser protection than asylum. Commenters expressed apprehension that the rule would result in the turning away of migrants who seek refuge at the southern border.
Another commenter wrote that the rule is consistent with U.S. commitments under the Refugee Protocol and the CAT, reasoning that neither is self-executing and therefore the United States is bound only by its own law implementing these treaties. The commenter acknowledged that the United States implements its non-refoulement obligations through the withholding of removal statute at section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). Another commenter, however, asserted that the argument that asylum is discretionary under U.S. law and therefore the rule does not violate the Refugee Protocol is incorrect as a matter of international law, even if true under domestic law, because parties to the Refugee Convention must provide asylum and protection from refoulement to those who meet the definition of “refugee.”
Response:
This rule is consistent with the United States' international treaty obligations. Three primary documents govern the rights of refugees and corresponding obligations of states in international law: the Refugee Convention; the Refugee Protocol, which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention; and the CAT. 88 FR at 31384. Together, these documents provide a framework for states to provide protection to noncitizens fleeing persecution or torture and establish the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits states from returning refugees to territories in specific circumstances.
Id.
These treaties, however, do not prescribe or impose any particular minimum procedures for implementation of non-refoulement obligations. Although the United States is a party to the 1967 Refugee Protocol
82
and the CAT, these treaties are not directly enforceable in U.S. law.
See INS
v.
Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 428 & n.22 (1984);
Al-Fara
v.
Gonzales,
404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The 1967 Protocol is not self-executing, nor does it confer any rights beyond those granted by implementing domestic legislation.”);
Omar
v.
McHugh,
646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the CAT “is non-self-executing and thus does not itself create any rights enforceable in U.S. courts”). Instead, the United States has implemented its obligations through domestic legislation and implementing regulations. The Refugee Convention's non-refoulement obligation is contained in Article 33.1, which prohibits contracting states from returning a refugee to a territory “where his life or freedom would be threatened” on account of an enumerated ground. 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. The United States has implemented the non-refoulement provisions of Article 33.1 of the Refugee Convention through the withholding of removal provisions at section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), rather than through the asylum provisions at section 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158.
See Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 429, 440-41. The CAT's non-refoulement provision is in Article 3, which prohibits the return of a person to a country where there are “substantial grounds for believing” the person will be tortured. S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 at 20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114. The United States has implemented its obligations under Article 3 of the CAT through regulations.
See
FARRA, Public Law 105-277, sec. 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1231 note);
see also, e.g.,
8 CFR 208.16(c), 208.17, 208.18, 1208.16(c), 1208.17, 1208.18. The rule does not change or limit ultimate eligibility for statutory withholding of removal or CAT protection. Instead, applicants subject to the rule's limitation on asylum eligibility will be screened for potential eligibility for statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection under a “reasonable probability” standard, which is lower than the ultimate statutory or regulatory standard of proof for those forms of protection.
82
See Sale
v.
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155, 169 n.19 (1993) (“Although the United States is not a signatory to the [1951 Refugee] Convention itself, in 1968 it acceded to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which bound the parties to comply with Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention as to persons who had become refugees because of events taking place after January 1, 1951.” (citation omitted)).
The rule will limit asylum eligibility for some noncitizens. But, as the Supreme Court has explained, asylum “does not correspond to Article 33 of the Convention, but instead corresponds to Article 34[,]” which provides that contracting countries “shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 441 (quoting Refugee Convention art. 34, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176);
see also
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”),
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
16 para. 25 (2019 ed.) (“[T]he granting of asylum is not dealt with in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol”). Article 34 “is precatory; it does not require the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are eligible.”
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 441. Because the limitation on asylum eligibility does not affect ultimate eligibility for statutory withholding of removal or protection under the CAT regulations, the rule is consistent with U.S. non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Protocol (incorporating,
among other things, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention) and the CAT.
See R-S-C,
869 F.3d at 1188 n.11 (explaining that “the Refugee Convention's nonrefoulement principle—which prohibits the deportation of aliens to countries where the alien will experience persecution—is given full effect by the Attorney General's withholding-only rule”);
Cazun
v.
Att'y Gen. U.S.,
856 F.3d 249, 257 & n.16 (3d Cir. 2017);
Ramirez-Mejia
v.
Lynch,
813 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 2016).
The Departments agree that asylum is an important form of protection and acknowledge that the right to seek asylum has been recognized under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), art. 14, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The UDHR is a nonbinding human rights resolution of the UN General Assembly, and thus it does not impose legal obligations on the United States.
See Sosa
v.
Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004) (“[T]he [UDHR] does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.”).
Moreover, although the rule creates a limitation on eligibility for asylum, the rule does not bar those seeking asylum from taking part in procedures that protect them from refoulement. Under the rule, all noncitizens processed for expedited removal who manifest a fear of return, express an intention to apply for asylum or protection, or express a fear of persecution or torture or a fear of return to their country or the country of removal are referred for a credible fear interview. Even in those cases where the AO determines that the noncitizen has not established a significant possibility that they could ultimately demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they are not subject to the limitation on asylum eligibility or are excepted from it, the noncitizen may still demonstrate credible fear by showing a reasonable probability of persecution or torture. Similarly, even if found ineligible for asylum by an IJ due to the application of the limitation on asylum eligibility, a noncitizen may still demonstrate eligibility for statutory withholding of removal or CAT protection.
The rule is also consistent with the Refugee Convention and the corresponding obligations under international law, including the specific provisions cited by commenters. The rule does not violate the nondiscrimination requirement in Article 3 of the Refugee Convention. Article 3 prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, religion or country of origin.” 19 U.S.T. at 6264, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156. The rule does not discriminate on the basis of any of the protected characteristics described in Article 3. This rule is limited to the southern border because that is the U.S. border where emergency circumstances exist. The Departments acknowledge that this limitation will affect those noncitizens with easier access to the southern border and not those with easier access to other borders of the United States. However, the rule does not treat such noncitizens differently on that basis; the rule applies equally based on the actions of a noncitizen during emergency border circumstances. Specifically, the application of this rule is limited to those who enter the United States across the southern border during emergency border circumstances described in the Proclamation and this rule, are not described in section 3(b) of the Proclamation, and do not establish the existence of exceptionally compelling circumstances. For the same reason, the rule does not violate other antidiscrimination principles described in other international human rights treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, arts. 2-5, Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 2-3, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
Similarly, the rule is consistent with Article 31.1 of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits states from “impos[ing] penalties” on refugees based on “illegal entry or presence” if such refugees are “coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened” and “present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” 19 U.S.T. at 6275, 189 U.N.T.S. at 174. As the commentary to the Refugee Convention explains, the term “penalties” in Article 31.1 refers “to administrative or judicial convictions on account of illegal entry or presence, not to expulsion.” UNHCR,
The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Préparatoires Analyzed with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis
219,
https://www.unhcr.org/us/media/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul-weis; see Cazun,
856 F.3d at 257 & n.16 (rejecting argument that the reinstatement bar on asylum was a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 31.1). The rule does not change any rules or policies relating to detention or convictions for unlawful entry or presence. The Departments acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit concluded in
East Bay III,
993 F.3d at 674, that the bar to asylum at issue in that case violated Article 31.1 of the Refugee Convention because it imposed a “penalty.” As described in the IFR, the rule here does not create a categorical bar to asylum, but instead a limitation on asylum eligibility, and
East Bay III
accordingly does not address the lawfulness of this rule. 89 FR at 48735. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion was erroneous because the denial of discretionary relief is not a penalty within the meaning of Article 31.1.
Id.
at 48736.
Comment:
One commenter asserted that the IFR conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Murray
v.
Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), which generally states that ambiguous U.S. statutes should be interpreted to avoid conflicts with international law where possible, and
INS
v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987), which explained that “one of Congress' primary purposes” when passing the Refugee Act of 1980 “was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 [Refugee Protocol].”
Response:
The Departments disagree with the commenter that the IFR conflicts with
Charming Betsy
or
Card
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