Regulations Enhancing the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Remedy Laws
Federal RegisterJul 12, 2024
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
19 CFR Part 351
[Docket No. 240703-0184]
RIN 0625-AB25
Regulations Enhancing the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Trade Remedy Laws
AGENCY:
Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce.
ACTION:
Proposed rule; request for comments.
SUMMARY:
Pursuant to Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) proposes to update its trade remedy regulations to enhance the administration of the antidumping duty (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws. Specifically, Commerce proposes to codify existing procedures and methodologies and create or revise regulatory provisions relating to several matters including the collection of cash deposits, application of antidumping rates in nonmarket economy proceedings, calculation of an all-others' rate, selection of examined respondents, and attribution of subsidies received by cross-owned input producers and utility providers to producers of subject merchandise.
DATES:
To be assured of consideration, written comments must be received no later than September 10, 2024.
ADDRESSES:
Submit electronic comments only through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at
https://www.Regulations.gov,
Docket No. ITA-2023-0003. Comments may also be submitted by mail or hand delivery/courier, addressed to Ryan Majerus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy & Negotiations, Performing the Non-Exclusive Functions and Duties of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Compliance, Room 18022, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230. An appointment must be made in advance with the Administrative Protective Order (APO)/Dockets Unit at (202) 482-4920 to submit comments in person by hand delivery or courier. All comments submitted during the comment period permitted by this document will be a matter of public record and will be available on the Federal eRulemaking Portal at
https://www.Regulations.gov
. Commerce will not accept comments accompanied by a request that part or all the material be treated as confidential because of its business proprietary nature or for any other reason. Therefore, do not submit confidential business information or otherwise sensitive or protected information.
Any questions concerning the process for submitting comments should be submitted to Enforcement & Compliance (E&C) Communications office at
ECCommunications@trade.gov
or to John Van Dyke, Import Policy Analyst, at
john.vandyke@trade.gov
. Inquiries may also be made of the E&C Communications office during business hours at (202) 482-0063.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Scott D. McBride, Associate Deputy Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, at (202) 482-6292, or Jesus Saenz, Attorney, at (202) 482-1823.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
General Background
Title VII of the Act vests Commerce with authority to administer the AD/CVD trade remedy laws. Section 731 of the Act directs Commerce to impose an AD order on merchandise entering the United States when it determines that a producer or exporter is selling a class or kind of foreign merchandise into the United States at less than fair value (
i.e.,
dumping), and material injury or threat of material injury to that industry in the United States is found by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).
In addition, section 701 of the Act directs Commerce to impose a CVD order when it determines that a government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind of merchandise that is imported into the United States, and material injury or threat of material injury to that industry in the United States is found by the ITC.
Section 771(5)(B) of the Act defines a countervailable subsidy as existing when “a government or any public entity within the territory of a country provides a financial contribution; provides any form of income or price support; or makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if providing the contribution would normally be vested in the government and the practice does not differ in substance from practices normally followed by governments; and a benefit is thereby conferred.” To be countervailable, a subsidy must be “specific” within the meaning of section 771(5A) of the Act.
The Act provides numerous disciplines which Commerce must follow in conducting AD and CVD proceedings. For example, sections 703(d)(1)(B), 705(d), 733(d)(1)(B), 735(c), and 751 of the Act direct Commerce to order U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to collect cash deposits as security pursuant to multiple determinations in its proceedings, until Commerce orders the assessment of AD or CVD duties. Likewise, sections 705(c)(1)(B), 705(c)(5), 735(c)(1)(B)(i), and 735(c)(5) of the Act set forth the means by which Commerce determines the AD margin or countervailable subsidy rate to be applied to imported subject merchandise exported or produced by entities not selected in an investigation for individual examination. In addition, sections 777A(c)(2) and 777A(e)(2)(A) of the Act allow Commerce to limit the number of exporters or producers to be individually examined, while section 782(a) allows Commerce to select voluntary respondents.
In accordance with these and other statutory provisions, this proposed rule codifies and enhances the procedures and practices applied by Commerce in administering and enforcing the AD and CVD laws.
Explanation of the Proposed Rule
Commerce proposes several updates to the AD and CVD regulations found at part 351.
1
The proposed changes are summarized here and discussed in greater detail below. Commerce invites comments on all proposed regulatory changes and clarifications, including suggestions to improve them.
1
Commerce's proposed rule seeks to codify several distinct procedures and practices under various sections of the Act. As such, Commerce generally intends the rule's provisions to be severable and to operate independently from each other. Commerce's intent that the rule's provisions be severable is demonstrated by the number of distinct regulatory provisions addressed in this rulemaking and the structure of the preamble in addressing them independently and supporting each, respectively, with Commerce's statutory interpretation, agency practice, and court precedent. Accordingly, Commerce intends each portion of this rule to be severable from each other but has included all of the proposed provisions in one rulemaking for purposes of enhancing Commerce's trade remedy regulations.
• Revise the Subpart A heading of part 351 to reflect the provisions to which it applies.
• Revise § 351.104(a)(7) to reflect that preliminary and final issues and decision memoranda issued in investigations and administrative
reviews before the implementation of Commerce's filing system, Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Centralized Electronic Service System (ACCESS), may be cited in full in submissions before Commerce without placing the memoranda on the record.
• Revise § 351.107 to accurately and more holistically describe Commerce's establishment and application of cash deposit rates, including explaining that some cash deposit rates are calculated on an
ad valorem
basis at importation, while others are calculated on a per-unit basis. The proposed regulation would also describe situations in which Commerce applies cash deposit rates in a producer/exporter combination and the process by which a producer/exporter combination may be excluded from provisional measures and an AD or CVD order as a result of a calculated
de minimis
cash deposit rate following an investigation. Furthermore, the regulation would set forth an AD cash deposit hierarchy for imports from market economies, an AD cash deposit hierarchy for imports from nonmarket economies, and a CVD cash deposit hierarchy. Finally, revised § 351.107 would describe the effective date for cash deposit rates following the correction of ministerial errors in investigations and administrative reviews.
• Codify and update Commerce's methodology for determining if an entity exporting merchandise from a nonmarket economy should receive an antidumping duty rate separate from that of the nonmarket economy entity. New § 351.108 would provide that in a nonmarket economy, one dumping margin may apply to all exporting entities from that economy. It would explain that if an entity located in a nonmarket economy is majority-owned by the government, the government can control its production, management, sales and export activities and it will not receive a separate rate. It would also describe additional scenarios in which an entity in the nonmarket economy will not receive a separate rate if the government owns 50 percent or less of the entity's shares and (1) the government has a disproportionately larger degree of influence or control over the entity's production and commercial decisions than the ownership share would normally entail and the Secretary determines that the degree of influence or control is significant; (2) the government has the authority to veto or control the entity's production and commercial decisions; (3) government officials, employees or representatives have been appointed as officers and have the ability to make or influence production or commercial decisions; or (4) the entity is required by law to maintain or in fact maintains one or more government officials, employees, or representatives in positions of authority who have the ability to make or influence production or commercial decisions. Further, it would also codify Commerce's analysis for determining if an entity is
de jure
and
de facto
separate from the government for purposes of export determinations, including an additional consideration of whether the entity, regardless of government ownership, must maintain government officials, employees or representatives in positions of authority who have the ability to make or influence decisions on export activities. In addition, the proposed rule would allow for consideration of any other information on the record suggesting that the government has direct or indirect influence over the exporter's export activities. Finally, proposed § 351.108 would clarify the requirements for a separate rate application or certification and would suggest a revision to deadlines for separate rate applications of fourteen days following publication of the notice of initiation in the
Federal Register
.
• Add § 351.109 to address Commerce's methodologies for selecting respondents in investigations and administrative reviews, including the steps Commerce would take to determine the number of exporters or producers that is practicable to investigate or review for calculating the all-others rate in investigations and for calculating a rate for unexamined exporters and producers. This provision would allow for a single country-wide subsidy rate, provide a waiver from examination if both petitioners and the potential respondent agree to non-selection of that potential respondent, and clarify that a nonmarket economy entity rate is not the same thing as an all-others rate. In addition, § 351.109 would move the existing voluntary respondent provisions from § 351.204 to § 351.109 and update and revise the regulatory provisions applicable to the selection of voluntary respondents and deadlines for voluntary respondent submissions.
• Modify § 351.204 to move § 204(d)(1)-(3) to section 109 and move § 204(e)(1)-(3) to section 107. Further, update and simplify § 204(a) and (c), and move § 204(e)(4) to § 204(d), along with a new subheading for that paragraph and a new heading for section 204 itself.
• Modify § 351.212(b) to clarify that entries may be assessed either on an
ad valorem
value or per-unit basis.
• Modify § 351.213(f) to indicate that Commerce may select respondents, including voluntary respondents, in the context of an administrative review.
• Modify the header of § 351.214 to emphasize that the regulations cover both new shipper reviews and CVD expedited reviews, each derived from different statutory authorities.
• Modify § 351.301(b)(2) to require that interested parties submitting new information to rebut, clarify or correct factual information on the record must identify in writing the specific information being rebutted, clarified, or corrected and explain how the new factual information rebuts, clarifies or corrects that existing factual information.
• Modify § 351.301(c)(3) to revise the time in which surrogate value submissions in nonmarket economy country antidumping proceedings and benchmark information in countervailing duty proceedings may be submitted in investigations and administrative, new shipper, and changed circumstances reviews.
• Modify § 351.306(a)(3) to clarify that Commerce may share business proprietary information with CBP officials involved in negligence, gross negligence, or fraud investigations.
• Add paragraphs (g), (h), and (i) to § 351.308 to reflect that pursuant to section 776 of the Act, Commerce may apply partial or total facts available, may use previously calculated dumping margins and countervailable subsidy rates in separate segments of the same proceeding without the need to corroborate those margins or rates, may use the highest dumping margin available as adverse facts available, need not estimate what an antidumping or countervailing duty rate would have been if an entity had acted to the best of its ability, and need not consider the “commercial reality” of an interested party in applying adverse facts available.
• Revise § 351.309(c) and (d) to request that parties include a table of contents, sources such as tribunal decisions and administrative case determinations in the table of authorities, and a public executive summary of no more than 450 words for each discrete issue raised in case briefs and rebuttal briefs. This change would remove the encouraged inclusion of a five-page summary.
• Modify § 351.401(f) to reflect that Commerce may treat both producing and non-producing affiliated parties as a single collapsed entity.
• Add § 351.404(g) to address the filing requirements for those alleging the existence of a multinational corporation and to clarify that the multinational corporation provision will not be applied when the non-exporting country is located in a nonmarket economy.
• Add § 351.405(b)(3) to set forth the criteria Commerce would normally consider in selecting an amount of profit normally realized by exporters or producers in connection with the sale of same or similar merchandise in determining constructed value under the constructed value profit cap.
• Modify § 351.408(b) to update and enhance Commerce's selection of economically comparable countries as part of its nonmarket economy methodology in accordance with sections 773(c)(2)(B) and 773(c)(4)(A) of the Act. In addition to selecting a comparable economy based on
per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national income (GNI), Commerce could also consider factors including the size and composition of export activity in certain countries and the availability, accessibility, and quality of data from those countries as part of its analysis.
• Remove current § 351.502(d), (e), and (f) which state that integrally linked subsidies, agricultural subsidies and subsidies to small- and medium-sized businesses are not “specific” for purposes of determining the countervailability of a subsidy under the CVD law.
• Move § 351.502(g) covering disaster relief to § 351.502(d) and add that such relief includes pandemic relief.
• Amend § 351.502(e) to explain that subsidies that provide employment assistance to workers grouped in general categories (such as age, gender, and/or the existence of a disability, veterans, or unemployment status) will not be considered specific if those assistance programs are generally available to everyone hired within those categories without restrictions specific to individual industries.
• Remove § 351.502(f) and (g) entirely, as those provisions are no longer required with the other above-listed edits incorporated.
• Add § 351.503(b)(3) to address the general treatment of the balance or value of contingent liabilities/assets not otherwise covered in paragraph 503(a) as an interest-free provision of funds and calculate the benefit using a short-term commercial interest rate.
• Add § 351.505(a)(6)(iii) to provide an initiation standard for government-owned policy banks that would find the threshold for specificity met if a party can sufficiently allege that a policy bank provides loans pursuant to government policies or directives.
• Modify§ 351.505(b) to remove the term “otherwise” from the regulation to bring the language into conformity with other regulations addressing the treatment of long-term loans.
• Modify § 351.505(c) to remove paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) and update paragraph (c)(2) to be the only provision addressing long-term loans. The benefit for long-term loans would be calculated by determining the difference between what a party would have paid on a comparable commercial loan and the actual amount the party paid on a government loan during a period of investigation (POI) or review (POR), and then allocating the benefit amount to the relevant sales during the POI or POR. Consistent with the language of section 771(5)(E) of the Act, remove sentences in current § 351.505(c)(1) and (c)(2) that state that the present value in the year of receipt of the loan should never be permitted to exceed the principal of the loan in our calculations.
• Consistent with section 771(5)(E) of the Act, modify § 351.505(e) to remove the sentence “[i]n no event may the present value (in the year of receipt of the contingent liability loan) of the amounts calculated under this paragraph exceed the principal of the loan.”
• Modify § 351.509, the regulation addressing direct taxes, to add a clause stating that the calculation of a benefit under § 351.509(a)(1) applies to firms located in an area designated by the government as being outside the customs territory of the government.
• Modify § 351.511(a)(2)(i) to provide for the comparison of a government price to either an actual transaction in the country in question or to “actual sales from competitively run government auctions” in determining a benchmark price under the definition of “adequate remuneration.” In addition to defining actual transaction prices, modified § 351.511(a)(2)(i) would also define “competitively run government auctions.”
• Complete § 351.512, applicable to the purchase of goods, which is currently reserved. New § 351.512(a)(1) would provide that in general, where goods are purchased by the government from a firm, a benefit will exist if the goods are purchased for more than adequate remuneration. Proposed § 512(a)(2) would define adequate remuneration for this provision, including an explanation that Commerce will use ex-factory or ex-works comparison prices and the price paid to the firm for the good by the government in order to measure the benefit conferred to the recipient. Proposed § 512(a)(3) would explain that when the government is both a provider and purchaser of a good, Commerce will normally measure the benefit by comparing the price the government sold the good to a firm with the price the government paid when purchasing the good from the same firm. Proposed § 512(b) would state that date of receipt of the benefit will be at the time of receipt of payment for the purchased good, and § 351.512(c) would address the time period in which Commerce would allocate the benefit for the purchase of a good.
• Remove reserved § 351.521 titled “Import substitution subsidy,” because no such regulation is necessary in light of the definition of an import substitution subsidy found in section 771(5A)(C) of the Act.
• Replace § 351.521 with a new regulation addressing export subsidies which exempt, remit, or defer indirect taxes and import charges on capital goods and equipment. Proposed § 521(a)(1) would address the benefits received through an export subsidy that provides for the full or partial exemption or remission of an indirect tax or an import charge on the purchase or import of capital goods and equipment. Proposed § 521(a)(2) would address the benefits received through a deferral of indirect taxes or import charges. Proposed § 521(b) would explain the time of receipt of the benefit in the case of full or partial exemptions or remissions of indirect taxes or import charges, as well as the time of receipt of deferral of indirect taxes or import charges. Finally, proposed § 351.521(c) would explain that Commerce will allocate the benefit of a full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral to the year in which the benefit is considered to have been received.
• Delete and reserve § 351.522, as it addresses green light and green box subsidies that lapsed pursuant to section 771(5B)(G) of the Act.
• Revise § 351.525(b)(6)(iii), which addresses the attribution of subsidies to holding companies and their subsidiaries. Specifically, this proposed rule would remove the second sentence of the provision in § 351.525(b)(6)(iii), which states that if a holding company merely served as a conduit for the transfer of the subsidy from the government to a subsidiary of the holding company, Commerce will attribute the subsidy to products sold by the subsidiary. The agency would remove this language because it is proposing to modify the language in the regulation addressing the transfer of subsidies from cross-owned companies
in new proposed § 351.525(b)(6)(vi) to state that a transferred subsidy will be solely attributed to the products produced by the recipient of the transferred subsidy. This modification would apply to all cross-owned companies, including holding or parent companies.
• Revise § 351.525(b)(6)(iv), which currently addresses the attribution of subsidies to input suppliers. The proposed rule would revise the subheading to apply to input producers and divide the paragraph into § 351.525(b)(6)(iv)(A) and § 351.525(b)(6)(iv)(B). Proposed § 525(b)(6)(iv)(A) would use language similar to the current provision, addressing input producers that supply a downstream producer. Proposed § 525(b)(6)(iv)(B) would list several factors that Commerce may consider in determining if an input product is primarily dedicated to the production of the downstream product.
• Move current § 351.525(b)(6)(vi), the definition of cross-ownership, to a new § 351.525(b)(6)(vii).
• Move current § 351.525(b)(6)(v), covering the transfer of subsidies between corporations with cross-ownership producing different products, to § 351.525(b)(6)(vi) and modify it to address the transfer of subsidies from any cross-owned corporation. Under this modification, a transferred subsidy from a cross-owned corporation would be attributed solely to products produced by the recipient of the transferred subsidy.
• Modify § 351.525(b)(6)(v) to cover the attribution of subsidies to cross-owned corporations providing electricity, natural gas or other similar utility products. The regulation would provide that Commerce will attribute subsidies received by a provider of utility products to the combined sales of the cross-owned producer and the sales of products sold by the producer of subject merchandise if at least one of two identified conditions are met.
• Add a new § 351.525(b)(8) to propose that Commerce would not tie or attribute subsidies on a plant- or factory-specific basis.
• Add a new § 351.525(b)(9) to propose that a subsidy normally would be determined to be “tied” to a product or market when the authority providing the subsidy was made aware of, or had knowledge of, the intended use of the subsidy and so acknowledged the intended use of the subsidy prior to, or concurrent with, the approval or bestowal of the subsidy.
• Revise language in § 351.525(b)(1) to reflect that the attribution regulations now extend to § 351.525(b)(9) and add a sentence that states that Commerce may limit the number of cross-owned companies examined under this provision if the facts on the record and available resources warrant such a limitation.
• Revise § 351.525(c), which addresses the attribution of subsidies to trading companies, to address the formula for cumulating subsidies, both when the trading company exports the individually examined respondent's merchandise and when the trading company is the individually examined respondent itself.
• Add § 351.525(d) to explain Commerce's adjustment of the
ad valorem
subsidy rate when a country is experiencing high inflation, which is defined for this provision as an inflation rate greater than 25 percent per annum during the relevant period.
• Replace current § 351.526, which is no longer relevant, with language codifying Commerce's practice with respect to subsidy extinguishment from changes in ownership. Proposed § 526(a) would explain that, in general, Commerce will presume that non-recurring subsidies continue to benefit a recipient in full over a particular allocation period notwithstanding an intervening change in ownership. Proposed § 526(b) would set forth the criteria by which an interested party may rebut the presumption of the continuation of a benefit in full over the relevant allocation period. Furthermore, proposed § 526(c) would explain that if the presumption is rebutted, the full amount of the benefits from subsidies preceding the change in ownership would be found to be extinguished, including the benefits of concurrent subsidies meeting the criteria set forth in § 351.526(c)(2).
• Update § 351.104(a)(2)(iii), § 351.214(1)(1), § 351.214(l)(3)(iii), § 351.301(c)(1), and § 351.302(d)(1)(ii) to correct for cross-citations modified as a result of this Proposed Rule.
1. Revising Subpart A Heading to Part 351 To Include the Record of Proceedings, Cash Deposits, Nonmarket Economy Antidumping Rates, All-Others Rate, and Respondent Selection
Currently, Subpart A to part 351, which covers §§ 101-107, is titled “Scope and Definitions,” although it also covers administrative record requirements and proceedings, as well as cash deposits. In this Proposed Rule, Commerce proposes the revision of the cash deposit regulation, as well as the creation of two new regulations which codify the agency's separate rates and respondent selection practice and procedures. Accordingly, Commerce proposes changing the name of Subheading A to “Scope, Definitions, the Record of Proceedings, Cash Deposits, Nonmarket Economy Antidumping Rates, All-Others Rate, and Respondent Selection.”
2. Revising Commerce's Filing Requirements To Allow Citation of Preliminary and Final Issues and Decision Memoranda Issued Before the Implementation of Commerce's ACCESS Filing System Without Placing Them on the Record—§ 351.104(a)(7)
On March 25, 2024, Commerce issued a final rule which provided clarity and procedures for interested parties submitting documentation to the agency, explaining which documents may be cited without placing documents from other segments and proceedings on the record and which documents must be placed on the record to be considered by Commerce in its analysis and determinations.
2
Those modifications added § 351.104(a)(7), which currently states that interested parties citing to public versions of documents which were issued by Commerce in other segments or proceedings before the implementation of ACCESS must place copies of those documents on the record because such documents have no assigned ACCESS barcode number.
2
See Regulations Improving and Strengthening the Enforcement of Trade Remedies Through the Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, Final Rule,
89 FR 20766, 20768-20773 (March 25, 2024).
Commerce has reconsidered the scope of public documents to which § 351.104(a)(7) applies and has determined that public preliminary and final issues and decision memoranda issued in investigations and administrative reviews pursuant to §§ 351.205, 210 and 213 before ACCESS was implemented need not be subject the requirements of that provision. Accordingly, this proposed rule would remove the requirement that such memoranda be placed on the record to be considered. Citations to these memoranda, like all such citations relied upon by interested parties in submissions to Commerce, must be cited in full (albeit without an ACCESS barcode number) and, as set forth in § 351.104(a)(6), if Commerce determines that a citation is not cited in full, it may decline to consider and analyze the cited preliminary or final issues and decision memoranda in its preliminary and final determinations.
3. Explaining Commerce's Cash Deposit Procedures and Calculations Including Producer/Exporter Combination Rates, AD/CVD Hierarchies, and Effective Dates for Ministerial Errors—§ 351.107
Sections 703(d)(1)(B), 705(d), 733(d)(1)(B), 735(c), and 751 of the Act provide Commerce with the statutory authority to determine cash deposit rates and order the suspension of liquidation and collection of cash deposits in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and reviews. Specifically, sections 703(d)(1)(B) and 705(d) of the Act direct Commerce to determine cash deposit rates and issue instructions to CBP pursuant to preliminary and final determinations in CVD investigations, and sections 733(d)(1)(B) and 735(c) of the Act direct Commerce to determine cash deposit rates and issue instructions to CBP pursuant to preliminary and final determinations in AD investigations. With respect to section 751 of the Act, various provisions, such as sections 751(a)(1), 751(a)(2)(C), and 751(d), describe procedures by which Commerce instructs CBP to suspend liquidation of entries of merchandise, collect cash deposits, and revoke or terminate the collection of cash deposits pursuant to the results of different types of reviews. Commerce proposes a revision to § 351.107(a) that addresses Commerce's authority to take such actions under the Act.
Proposed § 351.107(b) would establish the general rule that Commerce will instruct CBP to suspend liquidation of merchandise subject to an AD or CVD proceeding and apply cash deposit rates determined in that proceeding to all applicable imported merchandise. Proposed § 351.107(b) would also establish that, in general, cash deposits should be calculated in proportion to the estimated value of the merchandise, as reported to CBP, on an
ad valorem
basis. This provision would be similar to the description of the final assessment of merchandise pursuant to AD and CVD proceedings on an
ad valorem
basis as already set forth in § 351.212(b).
In 1997, Commerce promulgated § 351.107 to provide guidance on the rules for calculating the cash deposit rate.
3
Since that rulemaking, Commerce has encountered several scenarios where the current § 351.107 did not provide guidance in applying a cash deposit rate or rates. For example, although the 1997 regulations provide for the assessment of entries on an
ad valorem
basis, the cash deposit regulations do not address the similar calculation of cash deposits. Over the years, relying on statutory and court guidance, Commerce developed various practices that are reflected in the proposed § 351.107 revision. Although Commerce normally instructs CBP to calculate cash deposits on an
ad valorem
basis, it has also at times instructed CBP to calculate cash deposit rates on a per-unit basis. Proposed § 351.107(c)(1) describes the exception to Commerce's normal
ad valorem
practice, stating that the calculation of cash deposits on a per-unit basis might be appropriate if the information normally used to calculate an
ad valorem
cash deposit rate is not available or the use of an
ad valorem
cash deposit rate is otherwise not appropriate. For example, it is Commerce's practice to calculate cash deposits on a per-unit basis when an
ad valorem
basis will result in an under-collection of duties.
4
3
See Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, Final Rule,
62 FR 27296, 27318-19 (May 19, 1997) (
1997 Final Rule
) (discussing the finalized cash deposits regulation).
4
See Certain Activated Carbon from the People's Republic of China Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2010-2011,
77 FR 67337, (November 9, 2012) and accompanying IDM (
Certain Activated Carbon from the People's Republic of China
IDM) at 34 (stating “the regulation, however, does not proscribe {Commerce} from resorting to other methods of calculating and assigning assessment and cash deposit rates, and the agency does so in certain circumstances . . . {Commerce} changed the cash deposit and assessment methodology from an ad valorem to a per-unit basis because the application of an ad valorem rate based on net U.S. price would yield an under-collection of duties due to Jacobi's undervaluing of its United States sales.”).
Accordingly, to ensure the proper calculation of the cash deposit rate, Commerce is codifying its practice of relying on reported unit measurements when relying on reported sales values would result in an inaccurate cash deposit rate because entered sales values are unknown, undervalued, or systematically understated.
5
The regulation explains that units to which a cash deposit rate may be applied include, but are not limited to, weight, length, volume, packaging (such as the type or size of packaging), and individual units of the product itself. Notably, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) has affirmed Commerce's use of a per-unit methodology.
6
5
See id.; see also 1-Hydroxyethylidene-1, 1-Diphosphonic Acid from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2016-2018,
84 FR 67925, (December 12, 2019) and accompanying IDM (
1-Hydroxyethylidene-1, 1-Diphosphonic Acid from the People's Republic of China
IDM) at Comment 5;
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People's Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission in Part,
75 FR 50992 (August 18, 2010), and accompanying IDM (
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People's Republic of China
IDM) at Comment 17; and
Honey from the People's Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission, In Part, of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
70 FR 38872 (July 6, 2005) and accompanying IDM (
Honey from the People's Republic of China
IDM) at Comment 7.
6
See Wuhan Bee Healthy Co.
v.
United States,
Slip Op. 2008-61 at 12 (CIT May 8, 2008) (
Wuhan Bee
).
Commerce normally calculates a cash deposit rate applicable to all imported subject merchandise exported by an examined exporter or produced by an examined producer. Proposed § 351.107(c)(2) would provide an exception whereby Commerce may apply a cash deposit rate determined in the current or a preceding examination only to imported merchandise both produced by an identified producer and exported by an identified exporter in a producer/exporter combination rather than all the subject merchandise exported by an examined exporter or produced by an examined producer. Commerce's regulations already provide for the application of cash deposit rates to certain producer/exporter combinations in current § 351.107(b); however, unlike the newly proposed paragraph, the current regulation addresses only merchandise where the producer and exporter are not the same entity. The CIT has held that Commerce has “broad discretion to determine when and how to administer combination rates” in order to prevent the evasion of the calculated cash deposit rates.
7
Accordingly, Commerce proposes to revise and clarify the producer/exporter combination provisions in the regulation, including the example set forth in proposed § 351.107(c)(2)(i).
7
See Tianjin Magnesium Int'l Co.
v.
United States,
772 F.Supp.2d 1322,1341 (CIT 2010) (stating, “Commerce has broad discretion to determine when and how to administer combination rates.”);
Lifestyle Enter., Inc.
v.
United States,
768 F. Supp.2d. 1314 (CIT 2011) (stating “Commerce has a duty to prevent circumvention of AD law and may do so by imposing combination rates.”).
To provide even greater clarity on the application of producer/exporter combinations, § 351.107(c)(2)(ii)(A) through (D) sets forth four examples in which Commerce would instruct CBP to apply a determined cash deposit rate to a producer/exporter combination. Specifically, Commerce would instruct CBP to collect cash deposits for producer/exporter combinations in (1) new shipper reviews;
8
(2) AD
investigations of exporters or producers from a nonmarket economy;
9
(3) scope, circumvention, and covered merchandise inquiries when Commerce has made a determination on a producer/exporter combination basis;
10
and (4) any additional segments Commerce deems appropriate based on the facts of the record.
11
8
See, e.g.,
Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Products From the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Review; 2014-2015,
81 FR 62712 (September 12, 2016), (“With respect to Hyundai Steel Company, the respondent in the new shipper review, the Department established a combination cash deposit rate for this company consistent with its practice, as follows . . .”).
9
See, e.g.,
Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod From the People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part,
79 FR 68860, 68861 (November 19, 2014) (“{Commerce} will instruct CBP to require a cash deposit equal to the weighted-average amount by which the normal value exceeds U.S. price, with the above-noted adjustments, as follows: (1) The rate for the exporter/producer combinations listed in the chart above will be the rate we have determined in this final determination.”).
10
See, e.g.,
Glycine from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Partial Affirmative Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order and Initiation of Scope Inquiry,
77 FR 21532, 21535 (April 10, 2012).
11
For an example of an additional appropriate usage of combination rates, in
Tung Mung Development Co.
v.
United States,
354 F. 3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
affirming Tung Mung Development Co.
v.
United States,
219 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (CIT 2002), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) affirmed Commerce's use of a combination rate in addressing middleman dumping—a situation in which a foreign producer sold merchandise for less than normal value to a foreign exporter, and the foreign exporter subsequently sold the merchandise for even less than normal value to the United States.
In addition, under another exception to Commerce's normal application of cash deposit rates to all imported subject merchandise exported by an examined exporter or produced by an examined producer, when Commerce determines in an AD or CVD investigation that a respondent should be excluded from an AD or CVD order, it is Commerce's long-standing practice to instruct CBP to apply that exclusion on a producer/exporter combination basis. Sections 703(b)(4)(A) and 733(b)(3) of the Act provide that Commerce shall disregard any countervailable subsidy rate and any dumping margin, respectively, that is zero or
de minimis
in the preliminary determination. Moreover, sections 705(c)(2) and 735(c)(2) of the Act provide that Commerce shall “terminate” the investigation, suspension of liquidation, and collection of cash deposits for the investigated exporter or producer when Commerce makes a negative determination based on a zero or
de minimis
countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin for that exporter or producer. In other words, when a zero or
de minimis
countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin is calculated for an exporter or producer based on particular investigated producer/exporter transactions, Commerce's long-standing enforcement of the Act has been to exclude future imports of merchandise from the disciplines of the AD or CVD order using those same investigated producer/exporter combinations. Proposed § 351.107(c)(3) would codify Commerce's practice of excluding the producer/exporter combination or combinations examined in the investigation that satisfy those statutory requirements and identifying that combination or combinations publicly in the
Federal Register
.
12
12
See Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet from Italy: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value (LTFV),
86 FR 13309 (March 8, 2021) (stating that “because the estimated weighted-average dumping margin for Laminazione is zero, entries of shipments of subject merchandise produced and exported by this company will not be subject to suspension of liquidation or cash deposit requirements.”);
see also Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet from Bahrain, Brazil, Croatia, Egypt, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Oman, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan and the Republic of Turkey: Antidumping Duty Orders,
86 FR 22139, 22141 (April 27, 2021) (finding that “because the estimated weighted average dumping margin is zero for subject merchandise produced and exported by Laminazione Sottile S.p.A., entries of shipments of subject merchandise from this producer/exporter combination are excluded from the antidumping duty order on subject merchandise from Italy.”).
Commerce's current regulations address the exclusion of producers, exporters, and combinations of nonproducing exporters and producers in current § 351.204(e)(1)-(3). For purposes of clarity, Commerce proposes to move the paragraphs found in current § 351.204(e)(1) through (3) to proposed § 351.107(c)(3)(i) through (iii) and update the language and examples to better reflect Commerce's practices and procedures in applying a producer/exporter combination in exclusions from AD and CVD investigations and orders. Commerce proposes recognizing that in a preliminary determination, with respect to entries of subject merchandise for which a producer/exporter combination has been preliminarily determined to have an individual weighted-average dumping margin or individual net countervailable subsidy rate of zero or
de minimis,
as long as that producer/exporter combination is identified in the
Federal Register
, Commerce would not instruct CBP to suspend liquidation of entries of subject merchandise or collect cash deposits. Similarly, with respect to final determinations, proposed § 315.107(c)(3)(ii) states that (1) Commerce would instruct CBP to exclude a producer/exporter combination identified in the
Federal Register
from an AD or CVD order and (2) resellers of subject merchandise cannot benefit from an exclusion applicable to a producer/exporter combination determined in an investigation.
Commerce is also proposing the addition of a fourth paragraph to § 351.107(c) to address cash deposit instructions that require the use of a certification. Commerce added § 351.228 to the regulations in 2021 to require certifications by importers and other interested parties regarding whether merchandise is subject to an AD or CVD order.
13
In accordance with that provision, in certain instances certifications are required to accompany the payment of cash deposits. Proposed § 351.107(c)(4) would add a paragraph that states that the agency may instruct CBP to apply a cash deposit requirement that reflects the record information and effectuates the administration and purpose of the certification.
14
13
See Regulations to Improve Administration and Enforcement of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws,
86 FR 52300, 52383 (Sept. 20, 2021).
14
See,
e.g.,
Certain Uncoated Paper From Brazil, the People's Republic of China, and Indonesia: Affirmative Final Determinations of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Orders and Countervailing Duty Orders for Certain Uncoated Paper Rolls, 86 FR 71025, 71027 (December 14, 2021) (“Commerce is continuing to impose a certification requirement . . . , in order to not be subject to cash deposit requirements, the importer is required to meet the certification and documentation requirements described in Appendix IV for merchandise from Brazil, Appendix VI for merchandise from China, and VII for merchandise from Indonesia.”).
Current § 351.107(c)(1) provides guidance for applying cash deposit rates where entry documents do not identify the producer of subject merchandise. That paragraph is no longer necessary under this proposed rule because proposed § 351.107(d) and (e) would set forth cash deposit hierarchies that provide more detailed guidance regarding the application of cash deposit rates. Specifically, the hierarchies set forth in proposed § 351.107(d) and (e) would address the situation in which a producer and exporter each have different AD or CVD cash deposit rates and CBP must determine the rate to apply in collecting cash deposits regarding a given entry of subject merchandise. When the entry documents do not identify a specific party (
i.e.,
a producer or exporter) in a step of the proposed cash deposit hierarchy, the subsequent step of the proposed cash deposit hierarchy would apply. When the entry documents do not identify any party for which the Secretary has established a current cash deposit rate, CBP would be instructed to apply the all-others rate or nonmarket economy entity rate to entries of the subject merchandise, pursuant to sections 705(c)(5) and 735(c) of the Act
and proposed § 351.108(b) and § 351.109(f) of Commerce's regulations. These provisions apply only when Commerce has not previously established a combination cash deposit rate for the producer and exporter in question under § 351.107(c)(2).
Commerce routinely articulates a cash deposit hierarchy for market and nonmarket antidumping proceedings in its determinations based on the factors listed in proposed § 351.107(d)
15
and proposes to codify the antidumping market and nonmarket cash deposit hierarchies under paragraphs (d)(1)(i) and (ii), respectively.
15
See, e.g.,
Methionine From Spain: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances,
86 FR 38985, 38986 (July 23, 2021) (“we will instruct CBP to require a cash deposit equal to the estimated weighted-average dumping margin or the estimated all-others rate, as follows: (1) The cash deposit rate for the respondent listed above will be equal to the company-specific estimated weighted-average dumping margin determined in this final determination; (2) if the exporter is not a respondent identified above, but the producer is, then the cash deposit rate will be equal to the company-specific estimated weighted-average dumping margin established for that producer of the subject merchandise; and (3) the cash deposit rate for all other producers and exporters will be equal to the all-others estimated weighted-average dumping margin.”) and
Glass Containers From the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
85 FR 58333, 58337 (September 18, 2020) (“Commerce will instruct CBP to require a cash deposit equal to the weighted-average amount by which the normal value exceeds U.S. price as follows: (1) The cash deposit rate for the exporter/producer combinations listed in the table above will be the rate identified in the table; (2) for all combinations of Chinese exporters/producers of subject merchandise that have not received their own separate rate, the cash deposit rate will be the cash deposit rate established for the China-wide entity; and (3) for all non-Chinese exporters of subject merchandise which have not received their own separate rate, the cash deposit rate will be the cash deposit rate applicable to the Chinese exporter/producer combination that supplied that non-Chinese exporter.”).
The antidumping duty order cash deposit hierarchy for a market economy proceeding proposed in § 351.107(d)(1)(i) includes three steps for determining the applicable cash deposit rate for a given entry of subject merchandise. Commerce would first determine if it has already determined a cash deposit rate for the exporter and, if so, instruct CBP to apply that cash deposit rate to the exporter's entries of subject merchandise. When such an exporter-specific cash deposit rate does not exist, proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(i)(B) would provide that if a cash deposit rate exists for the producer in question, Commerce would instruct CBP to apply that rate to the entries of subject merchandise at issue. If the first and second steps do not yield a result (
i.e.,
Commerce has not previously established a cash deposit rate for either the exporter or the producer of subject merchandise), under proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(i)(C) Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the all-others rate determined in the investigation of the underlying proceeding, pursuant to section 735(c) of the Act and proposed § 351.109(f), as the cash deposit rate for the entries of subject merchandise in question.
For proceedings involving a nonmarket economy country, proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(ii) would apply. First, under proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(A), if Commerce has already established a cash deposit rate for the exporter, such as in an investigation, the agency would instruct CBP to apply it to the entries of subject merchandise in question. If Commerce has not established a cash deposit rate for the exporter, pursuant to proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(B) Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the cash deposit established for the nonmarket economy entity pursuant to proposed § 351.108(a) to the entries at issue.
Next, proposed § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C) would addresses entries of subject merchandise resold in the United States through a third-country reseller under proceedings involving a nonmarket economy country. In that situation, Commerce would normally instruct CBP to apply the cash deposit rate applicable to either the nonmarket economy country exporter that supplied the subject merchandise to the reseller or to an applicable producer/exporter combination, as warranted.
Finally, proposed § 351.107(d)(2) would provide an exception to the two AD cash deposit hierarchies pursuant to which based on unique facts in an underlying proceeding. Commerce might determine that an alternative cash deposit rate (
i.e.,
a cash deposit rate not identified under proposed paragraph § 351.107(d)(1)) is the most appropriate cash deposit rate to apply to the entries in question, and accordingly instruct CBP to apply that alternative cash deposit rate.
In addition to the AD cash deposit hierarchies set forth in proposed § 351.107(d), proposed § 351.107(e) would establish a new CVD cash deposit hierarchy that applies when the producer and exporter in question have differing cash deposit rates. Under proposed § 351.107(e)(1)(i), when a cash deposit rate is established for both the producer and exporter of subject merchandise, Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the higher of the two rates for the entry of subject merchandise in question. If that step does not apply and a cash deposit rate exists for the producer but not the exporter of subject merchandise, Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the producer's cash deposit rate to the entries in question under proposed § 351.107(e)(1)(ii). If that step does not apply and a cash deposit rate exists for the exporter but not the producer of subject merchandise, Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the exporter's cash deposit rate to the entries of subject merchandise at issue under proposed § 351.107(e)(1)(iii). Finally, if none of those rates exist, Commerce would instruct CBP to apply the all-others rate determined in the investigation to the entries of subject merchandise at issue under proposed § 351.107(e)(1)(iv).
Just as with the AD cash deposit hierarchies' exception found in proposed § 351.107(d)(2), if Commerce determines that a cash deposit rate other than that resulting from the CVD cash deposit hierarchy should apply based on the unique facts in the underlying proceeding, then under proposed § 351.107(e)(2) Commerce might instruct CBP to use an alternative methodology in applying cash deposit rates to entries of subject merchandise.
Proposed § 351.107(f) would address effective dates for amended preliminary and final determinations and results of review upon the correction of a ministerial error, in accordance with sections 703, 705(e), 733, and 735(e) of the Act and § 351.224(e) through (g) of Commerce's regulations. When Commerce amends a preliminary or final determination in an investigation and the amendment increases the dumping margin or the countervailable subsidy rate, proposed § 351.107(f)(1) would provide that the new cash deposit rate would be applied to entries made on or after publication of the amended determination.
16
16
See Urea Ammonium Nitrate Solutions from the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: Amended Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
87 FR 12935, 12936 (March 8, 2022) (“Because these amended rates result in increased cash deposit rates, they will be effective on the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register
.”).
On the other hand, under proposed § 351.107(f)(2), when Commerce's amends a preliminary or final determination in an investigation and that amendment results in a decrease of the dumping margin or the countervailable subsidy rate, then the new cash deposit rate would be retroactive to the date of publication of the original preliminary or final determination, respectively.
17
17
See Raw Honey from Brazil: Amended Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
86 FR 71614, 71615 (December 17, 2021) (“Because these amended rates result in
reduced cash deposit rates, they will be effective retroactively to . . . the date of publication of the Preliminary Determination.”).
Furthermore, under proposed § 351.107(f)(3), when Commerce amends the final results of an administrative review, the effective date of the amended cash deposit rate would be retroactive to entries following the date of publication of the original final results of review, regardless of whether the dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate increases or decreases.
18
18
See Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Cut-to Length Plate from Belgium; Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
2018-2019, 86 FR 21274 (April 22, 2021) (“The following cash deposit requirements will be effective retroactively for all shipments of the subject merchandise entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after March 24, 2021, the publication date of the
Final Results
of this administrative review.”).
In addition to amended cash deposit rates made pursuant to ministerial error corrections under paragraphs § 351.107(f)(1) through (3), Commerce may also make such amendments as a result of litigation when alleged or disputed ministerial errors are at issue. In those circumstances, as reflected in proposed § 351.107(f)(4), the effective date of the amended cash deposit rates may differ from those resulting from the application of § 351.107(f)(1) through (3). Furthermore, proposed § 351.107(f)(4) explains that the applicable effective date following litigation will normally be identified in a
Federal Register
notice. In most cases, in accordance with the statute, such amendments pursuant to litigation will be prospective in application.
4. Describing and Modifying Commerce's Separate Rates Practice and Procedures for Nonmarket Economy Country Antidumping Proceedings—§ 351.108
Section 771(18)(A) of the Act defines a nonmarket economy country as any foreign country which Commerce determines “does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.” Further, section 771(18)(C)(i) of the Act states that “{a}ny determination that a foreign country is a nonmarket economy country shall remain in effect until revoked” by Commerce.
For over three decades, in antidumping proceedings involving nonmarket economy countries, Commerce has repeatedly determined that legally distinct entities are in a sufficiently close relationship to the government to be considered part of a single entity (
i.e.,
the government-controlled entity).
19
Reflecting that dynamic, current § 351.107(d) states that “{i}n an antidumping proceeding involving imports from a nonmarket economy country, `rates' may consist of a single dumping margin applicable to all exporters and producers.”
19
See Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Postponement of Final Determination, and Extension of Provisional Measures,
83 FR 6335 (Jan 5, 2018), and accompanying Preliminary Decision Memorandum, dated December 18, 2017, at “Separate Rates” (
Polyester Staple Fiber from the PRC PDM
). For an example of a Commerce determination finding a country is a non-market economy,
see Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Aluminum Foil From the People's Republic of China: Affirmative Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less-Than-Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination,
82 FR 50858, 50861 (November 2, 2017).
In the 1991
Sparklers from China
investigation,
20
Commerce established a separate rate test, which it further developed in a subsequent 1994 investigation on
Silicon Carbide from China.
21
Under the separate rate test, if an entity can demonstrate that the foreign government does not have either legal (
de jure
) control or control in fact (
de facto
) over the entity's export activities, it may receive a separate rate. Commerce's separate rate test has been affirmed as in accordance with law and otherwise acknowledged multiple times by the Federal Circuit.
22
20
See Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sparklers from the People's Republic of China,
56 FR 20588, 20589 (May 6, 1991) (
Sparklers from China
).
21
See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Silicon Carbide from the People's Republic of China,
59 FR 22585, 22586-22587 (May 2, 1994) (
Silicon Carbide from China
).
22
See Diamond Sawblades Mfrs. Coal.
v.
United States,
866 F.3d 1304, 1310-11 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
see also Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co.
v.
United States,
848 F.3d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co.
v.
United States,
777 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and
Canadian Solar Int'l LTD
v.
United States,
68 F. 4th 1267, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Over the past decade, Commerce has modified its practice pursuant to a series of CIT decisions and remand redeterminations. For example, in
Advanced Technology,
the CIT held that Commerce's traditional separate rate practice was deficient because it failed to recognize the authority that a government may hold over an entity's commercial activities when it owns a significant portion of that entity.
23
Accordingly, consistent with the Court's holdings on this issue, it is now Commerce's practice to conclude that when a government holds a majority ownership share, either directly or indirectly, in a respondent exporting entity, the majority holding in and of itself demonstrates that the government exercises, or has the potential to exercise, control over the entity's operations generally.
24
This may include control over, for example, the selection of management, a key factor in determining whether an entity has sufficient independence in its export activities to merit a separate rate. Consistent with normal business practices, Commerce would expect any majority shareholder, including a government, to have the ability to control, and an interest in controlling, the operations of the entity, including the selection of management and the strategic and financial decisions of the entity. Thus, under Commerce's current separate rate practice, if a foreign government holds a majority ownership share of a respondent exporting entity, Commerce will not grant that entity a separate rate.
23
See Advanced Technology & Materials Co., Ltd.
v.
United States,
885 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1349-1357 (CIT 2012), affirmed in
Advanced Technology & Materials Co., Ltd.
v.
United States,
Case No. 2014-1154 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
24
See, e.g., Polyester Staple Fiber from the PRC
PDM at “Separate Rates.”
As described below, Commerce is now proposing to codify Commerce's separate rate practice in § 351.108. Although a government in a nonmarket economy country may own or control entities located both within and outside of a nonmarket economy country, the proposed regulation addresses only the application of Commerce's separate rate practice to entities located within the nonmarket economy country. In addition, Commerce is also proposing to modify its separate rate practice in § 351.108 to address additional real-world factors through which a foreign government can control or influence production decisions, pricing and sales decisions, and export behavior. Finally, Commerce is proposing the codification and modification of separate rate application and certification requirements.
Proposed § 351.108(a) would provide that if Commerce determines that entities located in a nonmarket economy country are subject to government control (
i.e.,
in a sufficiently close relationship to be considered part of a single entity, the government-controlled entity), absent evidence on the record indicating otherwise, Commerce will assign such entities a single antidumping duty deposit rate. This paragraph replaces current § 351.107(d) and clarifies that the single cash deposit or assessment rate is called “the nonmarket economy entity rate.”
Proposed § 351.108(b) would provide that an entity may receive its own rate, separate from the nonmarket economy entity rate, if it demonstrates to
Commerce that it was sufficiently independent from the control of the nonmarket economy government with respect to its commercial and export activities during the relevant period of investigation or review to justify the application of a separate rate. The regulation would then set forth the circumstances and criteria which Commerce would consider in determining if the application of a separate rate is warranted based on record information.
The first circumstance pertains to nonmarket economy government ownership and control. When a government, at any level, owns an entity, either directly or indirectly, the proposed regulation describes certain situations in which no separate rate will be permitted. The first ownership situation, set forth in § 351.108(b)(1)(i), as described above and consistent with Commerce's current practice, is when the government has a majority share, described as “over fifty percent ownership,” of the entity. If the government owns more than fifty percent of an entity subject to an antidumping proceeding, Commerce will not determine that the entity is separate from government control and will not calculate a separate rate for that entity.
In addition, proposed § 351.108(b)(1)(ii) sets forth a modification to Commerce's practice in addressing four specific situations in which the government has an ownership interest which is fifty percent or less of an entity but still has the ability to control or influence the entity's production and commercial decisions. Under those specific situations, in accordance with this Proposed Rule, Commerce would not determine that the entity is separate from government control and thus would not calculate a separate rate for that entity.
Under the first circumstance, set forth in proposed § 351.108(b)(1)(ii)(A), if the government's ownership share provides it with a greater degree of control or influence over the entity's production and commercial decisions than an ownership share of that amount would normally entail absent such special treatment, and Commerce concludes that the degree of control or influence of the entity is significant,
25
the entity would not be eligible for a separate rate. Such special shares in a company are sometimes referred to as “golden shares.”
26
When a government owns such special shares it may have the ability to exercise a disproportionate level of influence or control over an entity's decisions central to Commerce's calculations.
25
A determination that the degree of control or influence is “significant” would be based on a case-by-case analysis and dependent on consideration of the government's, as well as other shareholder's, abilities to control or influence the entity's production and commercial decisions. For example, the government may own one percent of the shares of an entity and still make certain production or commercial decisions for the entity despite disagreement by the owners of the other ninety-nine percent of shares. The significance of the degree of control or influence by the government would be entirely dependent on the facts on the record before Commerce.
26
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance on State-owned Enterprises, 17-16 (2015) (“Some borderline cases need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. For example, whether a “golden share” amounts to control depends on the extent of the powers it confers on the state.”) and (“{M}inority ownership by the state can be considered as covered by the Guidelines if corporate or shareholding structures confer effective controlling influence on the state (
e.g.,
through shareholders' agreements.”).
See also id.
at 63 (“Any special rights or agreements that diverge from generally applicable corporate governance rules, and that may distort the ownership or control structure of the SOE, such as golden shares and power of veto, should be disclosed.”).
Under the second circumstance, set forth in proposed § 351.108(b)(1)(ii)(B), if the government has the authority to veto or control an entity's production and commercial decisions, Commerce would find the entity at issue ineligible for a separate rate. Such authority can have an outsized effect on the production and commercial decisions made by an entity, so Commerce has concluded it would be inappropriate to find an entity eligible for a separate rate if the government holds veto power or control over these decisions.
Under the third circumstance, as set forth in proposed § 351.108(b)(1)(ii)(C), if government officials, employees, or representatives hold positions of authority in the entity, including as members of the board of directors or other governing authorities in the entity, that have the ability to make or influence production and commercial decisions for the entity, then Commerce would find the entity at issue ineligible for a separate rate.
Likewise, under the forth circumstance, set forth in proposed § 351.108(b)(1)(ii)(D), if the entity is obligated by law, its foundational documents (such as its articles of incorporation), or other
de facto
requirements to maintain one or more officials, employees, or representatives of the government in positions of power (including as members of the board of directors or other governing authorities in the entity, which have the ability to make or influence production and commercial decisions for the entity at issue), then Commerce would not calculate a separate rate for the entity in that situation. Unlike the scenario described in § 351.108(b)(1)(ii)(C), there is no requirement in this paragraph that a government official, employee, or representative actually hold such an influential position in the entity, only that information on the record shows that the entity is required to have a government official, employee, or representative hold such a position. Whether there is the potential for a government official, employee or representative taking a position of power, or the government official, employee or representative actually holds such a position of power, both situations are means by which the government could exercise an outsized amount of influence or control over the entity.
27
Boards of directors generally control many of an entity's production and commercial decisions, so if the entity is required to have a government representative on a board of directors, for example, then it is reasonable to conclude that the government representative on the board could also exercise control, or could have the potential to exercise control, over the entity's production and pricing decisions.
27
Id.
at 14 (“Examples of an equivalent degree of control” to the state “being the ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares” would include, “for instance, cases where legal stipulations or corporate articles of association ensure continued state control over an enterprise or its board of directors in which it holds a minority stake.”).
It is Commerce's observation over many years of administering AD and CVD proceedings that government entities who own the same percentage of shares of a company as non-government entities do not always have the same influence over company decisions as the non-government entities. In fact, Commerce has observed that governments that have ownership interest in companies and have officials, employees, or representatives in positions of power within those companies frequently hold greater influence over company decisions than those without the institutional, political and resource backing of the government.
28
Furthermore, it is also Commerce's observation that government representatives often do not
have the entity's profits as their primary motivating factor, unlike most non-government share-holders.
29
28
This observation is most notable in Commerce's CVD proceedings involving China. Commerce has observed that the Chinese government has certain ownership interests which allow it to influence certain companies and individuals.
See, e.g.,
Commerce Memorandum, “Countervailing Duty Administrative Review of Steel Racks from the People's Republic of China: Public Bodies Analysis Memo,” dated August 2, 2022 (ACCESS Barcode 4270527-01—4270527-10), at 16-20.
29
Likewise, Commerce has also observed in China CVD proceedings that profit is frequently not the government representatives' primary motivating factor in making share-holder decisions.
See, e.g.,
Commerce Memorandum, “Countervailing Duty Administrative Review of Steel Racks from the People's Republic of China: Analysis of China's Financial System,” dated August 3, 2022 (ACCESS Barcode 4270869-01—4270869-13) at 3-7; 17-19.
To be clear, Commerce is not proposing that any of these factors, standing alone without some amount of government ownership, would result in a denial of a separate rate. However, if the government has a minority ownership in the entity and one of these four factors exists as well, then, as with majority ownership, there exists the ability or potential for the nonmarket economy government to exercise control over the entity's operations in general, thereby warranting a determination that no separate rate should be calculated for that entity.
Under proposed § 351.108(b)(2) and (3), if an entity demonstrates that there is no majority government ownership of the entity or there is fifty percent or less government ownership and the criteria listed in § 351.108(b)(1)(ii) do not exist, Commerce would then apply its analysis to determine the existence or absence of
de jure
or
de facto
nonmarket economy government control. In addition to the three factors historically considered by Commerce in applying its
de jure
analysis (the absence of restrictive stipulations by the government associated with an individual entity's business and export licenses, legislative enactments decentralizing government control of companies, and other formal measures by the government decentralizing control of companies) and the four factors historically considered by Commerce in applying its
de facto
analysis (whether export prices are set by or are subject to the approval of a government agency, whether the entity has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements without government involvement, whether the entity has autonomy from the government in making decisions regarding the selection of its management, and whether the entity retains the proceeds of its export sales and makes independent decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of losses), Commerce is also proposing the consideration of three additional relevant factors for purposes of applying a separate rate.
First, under proposed § 351.108(b)(2)(i), as part of the
de jure
analysis, an entity would be required to demonstrate that there is no legal requirement that one or more officials, employees, or representatives of the government serve as officers of the entity, members of the board of directors, or other governing authorities in the entity which make or influence export activity decisions.
Similarly, under proposed § 351.108(b)(3)(i), as part of the
de facto
analysis, if an entity has demonstrated that the factors listed in § 351.108(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (2) do not apply to the entity, it would be required to demonstrate that there are no government officials, employees, or representatives actually serving in such leadership roles in the entity. Similar to the inclusion of government representatives in company positions that allow them to make or influence production or commercial decisions discussed above when there is partial government ownership, these factors are included in the
de jure
and
de facto
analyses to consider if government officials, employees, or representatives, regardless of government ownership of entity, may be in a position to control or influence an entity's export activities.
Furthermore, Commerce proposes in § 351.108(b)(3)(vi) that a sixth factor be included in its
de facto
analysis, allowing Commerce to consider “any additional evidence on the record suggesting that the government has no direct or indirect influence over the entity's export activities.” It is not Commerce's intention in this Proposed Rule to provide an exhaustive list of examples of additional evidence that might indicate
de facto
government influence over export activities, and such a determination would be left to Commerce to determine based on the information on the record on a case-by-case basis. However, one example of means by which a government could influence an entity's export activities that is not articulated in the regulation is through threats, coercion, or intimidation. If the administrative record showed that the government participated in or sanctioned threats, coercion, or intimidation of an entity, either directly or indirectly, and those actions impacted, or likely influenced, the entity to modify its export activities, Commerce would deny separate rate treatment to an entity under this provision. Governments can influence the export activities of companies through a variety of
de facto
means, such as through company decision-making when the government is an owner of shares in a company, when there are “insiders” within the company who directly work for the entity but take orders from the government, or when decision-making is made under duress associated with government-directed threats, coercion, and intimidation.
30
This provision is intended to make certain that all such relevant
de facto
scenarios are captured and considered in Commerce's separate rate
de facto
analysis.
30
Commerce does not intend to provide an exhaustive list of types of threats, coercion or intimidation which governments may use on an entity or an entity's colleagues, associates, friends and family members to control or influence an entity's export behavior. Some obvious examples involve bodily harm (kidnapping, defenestration, muggings), harm to property (arson, vehicular damage, personal property damage), blackmail, threats to living welfare (such as threats to employment and access to housing, electricity, heating, internet and medical care), or cyber-attacks, but there are many additional examples which do not fall into these categories and would still be considered threats, coercion or intimidation which could control or influence an entity's export decisions under Commerce's
de facto
analysis.
In addition, proposed § 351.108(c) would explain that if a company is located in a nonmarket economy and is subject to a nonmarket economy country proceeding, but is wholly owned by a market economy foreign entity, then the application of the separate rate analysis codified in paragraph (b) would be unnecessary to determine whether it is independent of nonmarket economy government control.
31
The paragraph would clarify that for an entity to be wholly owned by a market economy foreign entity, the foreign entity must be both incorporated and headquartered in a market economy country or countries. Thus, for purposes of this provision, if a foreign entity is incorporated in a market economy country but headquartered in a nonmarket economy country, Commerce would not consider the company located in the nonmarket economy to be wholly owned by a market economy foreign entity. Likewise, if the foreign entity is headquartered in a market economy but incorporated in a nonmarket economy country, Commerce would not consider the company located in the nonmarket economy to be wholly owned by a market economy foreign entity, for purposes of this provision. In either of those situations, Commerce would conduct its separate rate analysis of the company located in the nonmarket economy under the understanding that the company is from the nonmarket economy country. The reason for this requirement is simple: Commerce does not want companies to evade the application of its separate rates analysis when those companies are owned by entities either headquartered or
incorporated in a nonmarket economy country and may be controlled by the nonmarket economy government.
31
See Polyester Staple Fiber from the PRC PDM
at “Separate Rates.”
Proposed § 351.108(d)(1) and (2) would codify the requirement that separate rate applications and certifications be submitted by each entity seeking a separate rate. In antidumping investigations, new shipper reviews, and administrative reviews in which an entity has not previously been assigned a separate rate, the entity must file a separate rate application, the form of which, pursuant to the proposed regulation, Commerce would make available to the public. In administrative reviews in which an entity already has been assigned a separate rate, under proposed § 351.108(d)(3), the entity would instead file a certification attesting that it had entries for which liquidation was suspended during the period of review and that it otherwise continued to meet the criteria for obtaining a separate rate.
Under these provisions, for new shipper reviews and administrative reviews, Commerce has included a proposed requirement that interested parties submitting an application must provide documentary evidence of an entry with the separate rate applications for which liquidation was suspended during the period of review in § 351.108(d)(2). Commerce would not consider separate rate applications in new shipper reviews and administrative reviews if it is possible that no entry was suspended during the period of review for a particular entity, because without entries to which Commerce could assess duties there would be no purpose for a separate rate analysis. Furthermore, § 351.108(d)(3) would explain that if the agency determined in a previous segment of the proceeding that certain exporters and producers should be treated as a single entity, then a separate rate certification in a subsequent administrative review must identify and certify the required information for all of the companies comprising that single entity.
Commerce is also proposing in § 351.108(d)(1), (2), and (3) that all separate rate applications and certifications
32
be filed with Commerce no later than fourteen days following publication of the notice of initiation of an investigation or review in the
Federal Register
. This would be a change from the current thirty-day deadline.
33
The current thirty-day deadline delays Commerce from selecting respondents in its nonmarket economy proceedings because Commerce cannot select respondents for individual examination until it first determines the pool of exporters who have satisfied the separate rate analysis. Likewise, until Commerce selects respondents, it cannot issue respondent questionnaires. Commerce has determined that by revising the deadline for submitting separate rate applications and certifications to Commerce to fourteen days, Commerce will be able to select respondents sooner in its investigations and reviews, and thereby provide more time for Commerce to conduct its proceedings.
32
Separate rate application and certification forms are available on Commerce's website, which is recognized in Commerce's nonmarket economy AD initiation notices.
See, e.g., Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews,
87 FR 35165, 35166-67 (June 9, 2022) (“The Separate Rate Certification form will be available on Commerce's website at
https://enforcement.trade.gov/nme/nme-sep-rate.html
on the date of publication of this
Federal Register
notice.”).
33
See, e.g., Glass Wine Bottles from Chile, the People's Republic of China, and Mexico: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations,
89 FR 4911, 4914 (Jan 25, 2024).
The last proposed provision of § 351.108 is paragraph (e), which would require entities that have submitted separate rate applications or certifications, and then are subsequently selected to be examined as an individually examined respondent, respond to all sections of Commerce's antidumping questionnaire in order to be eligible for a separate rate. In other words, all entities filing a separate rate application or certification must be prepared to fully participate in Commerce's proceedings if they are selected to be individually examined respondents.
5. Including Procedures for Selecting Respondents, Calculating an All-Others Rate, Calculating a Rate for Unexamined Respondents, and Selecting Voluntary Respondents—§ 351.109
Sections 777A(c)(1) and 777A(e)(1) of the Act direct Commerce to determine an individual weighted-average dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate for each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise. However, Commerce may limit its examination to a reasonable number of exporters or producers under sections 777A(c)(2) and 777A(e)(2) of the Act if it determines that it is not practicable to determine an individual weighted-average dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or review.
In addition, sections 703(d)(1)(A), 705(c)(5), 733(d)(1)(A), and 735(c)(5) of the Act set forth the general rules and exceptions which Commerce applies in investigations for determining the rate applied to all exporters and producers not individually examined in the investigation, known as all-others rate, in both the preliminary and final determinations.
Finally, section 782(a) provides that in investigations and administrative reviews in which Commerce has limited the number of exporters or producers examined, or determined a single-country wide rate, Commerce may select voluntary respondents for examination if certain criteria are satisfied.
The current regulations do not address the all-others rate and provide little guidance about limiting examination of exporters and producers; what guidance does exist in the regulation applies only in investigations. The current voluntary respondent regulation at § 351.204(d) applies only to investigations, does not provide details about voluntary respondent submission deadlines, and does not reference Commerce's practice for selecting voluntary respondents when there is more than one voluntary respondent treatment request on the record. Commerce is therefore proposing the addition of § 351.109 to its regulations to address and clarify each of these issues.
Proposed § 351.109(a) would introduce each of these concepts, including Commerce's respondent selection practice. Commerce's statutory authority to engage in respondent selection is built on the proposition “that the largest exporters by volume are assumed to be representative of the non-selected respondents.”
34
The Act creates this assumption of representativeness by explicitly addressing the impracticability of individually examining a large number of respondents and the expectation that Commerce use the rates calculated for the mandatory respondents as the basis for the rate for firms not selected for individual examination.
35
34
See PrimeSource Bldg. Prod., Inc.
v.
United States,
581 F. Supp. 3d 1331 (CIT 2022) (“Consistent with this assumption, the cases also stand for the proposition that Commerce is expected to use the mandatory respondents' rates to determine the antidumping duty rate to be assigned to the non-selected respondents.”).
35
See
sections 777A(c)(2) and 777A(e)(2)(A) of the Act.
Commerce's respondent selection practice is not a means to gauge whether a potential respondent is willing to participate in an investigation or review, but rather whether Commerce can effectively examine a reasonable number of producers and exporters, as
Congress intended, to calculate an accurate dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate.
36
The Act explicitly allows Commerce to focus its resources on individual examination of certain respondents and, in doing so, allows Commerce to decline to examine others.
37
In codifying Commerce's respondent selection practice, the agency seeks to promote transparency and efficiency when conducting administrative reviews and investigations involving a large number of known exporters and producers of subject merchandise.
36
See Parkdale Int'l
v.
United States,
475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
Rhone Poulenc, Inc.
v.
United States,
899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
37
Id.
Sections 777A(c)(1) and 777A(e)(1) of the Act direct Commerce to determine an individual weighted-average dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate for each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise in an investigation
38
or administrative review, where practicable, and Commerce has proposed codifying that language in § 351.109(b).
38
For investigations, specifically, current § 351.204(c) reflects this general rule. Proposed § 351.109(b) would replace that provision, as explained below, and would apply equally to administrative reviews, consistent with the language of sections 777A(c)(1) and 777A(e)(1) of the Act.
However, in many of Commerce's investigations and administrative reviews, there are a large number of exporters and producers of the merchandise under investigation or review, and therefore Commerce normally does not have the resources to examine “each known exporter and producer.”
39
Accordingly, Commerce limits the exporters or producers under examination consistent with sections 777A(c)(2) and 777A(e)(2) of the Act.
40
In doing so, Commerce normally issues a respondent selection memorandum that provides its respondent selection analysis, which has been affirmed by the CIT as in accordance with law.
41
39
See, e.g.,
Commerce Memorandum, “2020-2021 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates: Selection of Respondents for Individual Examination,” dated March 18, 2022, (ACCESS Barcode 4222983-1).
40
Id.
41
See Mid Continent Nail Corp.
v.
United States,
949 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1274 (CIT 2013) (
Mid Continent Nail Corp.
) (affirming “Commerce's decision not to conduct individual reviews of all respondents was properly based on the agency's determination that the proceeding here involved a “large number” of exporters and producers.”).
Proposed § 351.109(c) would codify Commerce's long-standing respondent selection analysis, whereby Commerce determines based on record information whether it is practicable to determine individual dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates for every exporter or producer. If it is not practicable to do so because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in an investigation or review, in accordance with proposed § 351.109(c)(1), Commerce would then determine the exporters or producers to be examined based on either a sample of exporters or producers that is statistically valid based on record information or the number of respondents that can be reasonably examined based on the largest volume of exports of subject merchandise from the exporting country.
Notably, the Act does not provide guidance as to how Commerce should reach a statistically valid result or how Commerce must account for the largest volume of subject merchandise that can reasonably be examined.
42
Moreover, the Act does not require Commerce to use only the two aforementioned methodologies in limiting its examination.
43
Rather, the Act grants Commerce discretion in reaching a “reasonable number” of respondents for individual examination, accounting for any practicability concerns that may affect Commerce's ability to examine multiple respondents.
44
42
See Shanxi Hairui Trade Co.
v.
United States,
503 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1320 (CIT 2021),
aff'd,
39 F.4th 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“The statute authorizes Commerce to employ a statistically valid sampling method when choosing respondents to investigate, but does not instruct Commerce as to how to reach a statistically valid result in calculating the sample rate . . .”);
Pakfood Pub. Co.
v.
United States,
753 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343 (CIT 2011),
aff'd,
453 F. App'x 986 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“{Commerce}turns to issuing Q & V questionnaires or other sources of information when the CBP data for the subject merchandise in question does not provide sufficient or adequate data for the Department's respondent selection purposes.”).
43
See United States
v.
Rodgers,
461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (“The word “may,” when used in a statute, usually implies some degree of discretion . . . {but} can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute.”).
44
See Mid Continent Nail Corp.,
949 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (“{N}either the statute nor the legislative history makes any reference to “reasonable volume” (only “the largest volume of the subject merchandise . . . that can be reasonably examined.”));
see also Husteel Co.
v.
United States,
98 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1331 (CIT 2015) (citing
Mid Continent Nail Corp.,
949 F. Supp. 2d at 1272) (“{N}othing herein should be understood to suggest that Commerce's discretion to choose between the two methodologies . . . is wholly unfettered, or that `representativeness' could never constrain Commerce's ability to . . . affect a determination as to whether a specific number of exporters and producers is “reasonable” given the facts of a particular case.”).
When Commerce determines to limit the number of exporters or producers for individual examination based on the largest volume of exports of subject merchandise from the exporting country, proposed § 351.109(c)(2)(i)-(iv) would provide the factors Commerce will consider as part of its analysis. Under § 351.109(c)(2)(i), Commerce would first select the data source to determine the largest exporters or producers of subject merchandise. Normally, Commerce's selection would be based on information derived from CBP, but Commerce may use another reasonable means of selecting potential respondents in an investigation or review, such as quantity and value questionnaires. Under § 351.109(c)(2)(ii), Commerce would then select the largest exporters or producers of the subject merchandise. Normally, that analysis would be conducted based on the volume of imports of subject merchandise. However, the analysis may instead be conducted based on the value of imported products, depending on the product and record information.
Under proposed § 351.109(c)(2)(iii), once the list of exporters or producers with the largest number of imports, either through volume or value, is compiled, Commerce would next determine if the number of exporters or producers on the list is too large to practically individually examine each known exporter and producer of subject merchandise. This provision lists the factors which Commerce might consider in making such a determination, including the amount of resources and detailed analysis which would be necessary for Commerce to examine each potential respondent's information, the current and future workload of the office administering the proceeding, and Commerce's overall current resource availability.
Under proposed § 351.109(c)(2)(iv), if Commerce determines that the number of exporters is too large to practically individually examine each known exporter or producer of the subject merchandise, Commerce would then determine the number of exporters or producers which can be reasonably examined. Under this provision, Commerce would first consider the total and relative volumes (or values) of entries of subject merchandise for each potential respondent derived from the data source considered in § 351.109(c)(2)(ii), then rank potential respondents by the total volume or value of entries into the United States during the relevant period. Lastly, Commerce would determine how many respondents it can reasonably examine based on that information and select the exporters or producers with the largest
volume or values of entries consistent with that number.
In addition, proposed § 351.109(c)(2)(v) would address situations in which one or more selected potential respondents do not respond to Commerce's questionnaires or elect to withdraw from participation in the segment of the proceeding soon after filing questionnaire responses, or, early in the segment of a proceeding, Commerce determines that they are no longer participating in the investigation or administrative review
45
or that their U.S. sales are not
bona fide
sales of subject merchandise.
46
In each of those cases, when Commerce is selecting respondents based on the largest exporter or producers, Commerce proposes, at its discretion, to select the exporter or producer with the next largest volume or values to replace the respondents initially selected for examination.
47
45
See, e.g., Fresh Garlic from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of the Changed Circumstances Review,
80 FR 57579 (September 24, 2015), and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum at Comment 4 (analyzing the additional burdens of selecting another respondent following the withdrawal of a selected respondent);
see also Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co.
v.
United States,
83 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1362 (CIT 2015),
aff'd,
839 F.3d 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“{T}o the prevention of abuse where Commerce expends resources to initiate an individual examination—and the respondent seeks to withdraw its participation when it changes its mind about the benefit of such examination and prefers the `all others' rate instead—is a reasonable basis on which Commerce may decline to abort its examination.”).
46
Commerce has a long history of reviewing only
bona fide
sales in investigations, administrative reviews and new shipper reviews.
See, e.g., Windmill Int'l Pte
v.
United States,
193 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1312-1314 (CIT 2002) (affirming Commerce's rescission of an administrative review because it determined that the respondent's sale of two cut-to-length carbon steel plates to the United States was not “commercially reasonable and was atypical of the normal business practices between Windmill and the United States purchaser.”). Therefore, the language as proposed will have Commerce select respondents only from those exporter or producers with
bona fide
sales to the United States. In determining if a sale is
bona fide,
Commerce may consider the factors listed in section 751(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act and § 351.214(k).
47
Although this provision would apply when Commerce selects respondents based on the largest exporters or producers of subject merchandise, it could also select further respondents when using a sampling methodology to select a respondent for individual examination, although in that case Commerce need not select additional exporters or producers based on the volume or value of imports.
With respect to proposed § 351.109(d), it is important to recognize that current § 351.204(c) states that Commerce “may decline to examine a particular exporter or producer if that exporter or producer and the petitioner agree.” Commerce proposes to move this provision to new § 351.109(d) and revise it to become a waiver provision.
48
Accordingly, the proposed new paragraph states that Commerce may waive individual examination of an exporter or producer if both the selected respondent and petitioner file waiver requests for that exporter or producer no later than five days after Commerce has selected respondents. If Commerce determines to provide such a waiver and had selected the waived respondent based on an analysis of the largest exporters or producers, proposed § 351.109(d) provides that Commerce could select the next largest exporter or producer to replace the waived respondent.
48
See Oregon Steel Mills Inc.
v.
United States,
862 F.2d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (recognizing that Congress intended to allow Commerce the authority to avoid the investigative burden associated with an administrative review in situations where the domestic industry has no continued interest in proceeding).
Proposed § 351.109(e) restates Commerce's expressed authority under section 777A(e)(2)(B) of the Act to calculate a single country-wide subsidy rate for all exporters and producers if it is not practicable to determine individual countervailable subsidy rates due to the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or review.
49
49
See, e.g., Honey from Argentina: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment with Final Antidumping Determination on Honey from the People's Republic of China,
66 FR 14521, (March 13, 2001) (“Commerce determined that it would not be practicable to investigate alleged countervailable subsidies received by individual honey producers and exporters in Argentina.”) and
Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
67 FR 15545, 15547 (April 2, 2002).
Section (f) of proposed § 351.109 would set forth the calculation of the all-others rate set forth for final determinations in sections 705(c)(5) and 735(c)(5) of the Act and generally described for preliminary determinations in sections 703(d)(1)(A) and 733(d)(1)(A) of the Act. As the Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (SAA) explains, these provisions allow for Commerce to “calculate individual dumping margins for those firms selected for examination and an `all others' rate to be applied to those firms not selected for examination.”
50
According to the SAA, the goal of the “all others” rate is to reflect the actual dumping margin or countervailing subsidy rate of the non-selected respondents as accurately as possible.
51
50
See
Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. 103-316 (1994) (SAA) at 873, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4200.
51
Id.
Proposed sections 351.109(f)(1)(i) and (ii) would set forth the general rule for determining the all-others rate as reflected in sections 705(c)(5)(A)(i) and 735(c)(5)(A)(i) of the Act. Those provisions state that, in general, the all-others rate will be equal to the weighted average of the dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates calculated for those exporters and producers that are individually investigated, exclusive of any zero and
de minimis
margins, and any margins determined entirely on the basis of the facts available.
52
52
See
sections 705(c)(5) and 735(c)(5) of the Act;
see also MacLean-Fogg Co.
v.
United States,
753 F.3d 1237, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “{t}o establish the all-others rate, Commerce first discarded the AFA rate assigned to the three mandatory respondents—correctly so . . .”).
However, Commerce has encountered two common scenarios in which the application of the general rule for determining the all-others rate would not be appropriate or would have negative consequences based on the facts on the record. Accordingly, Commerce proposes to codify these exceptions in new § 351.109(f)(2)(i) and (ii). In one scenario, if Commerce determines that only one examined respondent's countervailable subsidy rate or weighted-average dumping margin satisfies the criteria set forth in sections 705(c)(5) and 735(c)(5) of the Act, respectively, Commerce applies that countervailable subsidy rate or weighted-average dumping margin as the all-others rate.
53
That scenario and practice would be codified in § 351.109(f)(2)(i).
54
53
See Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc.
v.
United States,
321 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1321 (CIT 2018) (“Applying the statutory method, Commerce excluded the PRC-wide rate assigned to {a mandatory respondent} and relied on the only other calculated rate, in {the} segment, that was not zero,
de minimis,
or based entirely on facts available or AFA . . .”).
54
Id.
In the other common scenario, Commerce calculates dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates for two or more individually investigated exporters or producers and then determines that if it were to calculate an all-others rate using the actual, weighted-average dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates based on the entities' proprietary information, the resulting all-others rate would inadvertently divulge each respondent's proprietary information to the other individually investigated exporter or producer. This can occur, for example, when Commerce determines the all-others rate by determining a weighted-
average of the rates calculated for two exporters or producers, because each respondent can often figure out their competitor's proprietary information through the resulting weighted-average rate.
55
55
See MacLean-Fogg Co.
v.
United States,
100 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1360-61 (CIT 2015) (recognizing that Commerce's practice “is to take both averages and compare each to the actual weighted-average (using BPI available to the agency), in order to arrive at the nearest approximation of the all-others rate contemplated by” the statute.) (
MacLean-Fogg Co.
).
Over time, Commerce has implemented a practice to address such a situation, which the agency proposes to codify in § 351.109(f)(2)(ii)(A)-(C). Specifically, Commerce first calculates the weighted average of the dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates for the individually-investigated respondents using their reported data, including business proprietary data, then calculates a simple average of the individually-investigated respondents' dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates, as well as a weighted-average dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate based on the respondents' publicly-ranged data.
56
Once Commerce has both the simple average and publicly-ranged weighted-average margins or rates, Commerce compares them to the margins or rates calculated using the companies' proprietary information.
57
If the simple average is numerically closer to the weighted-average margin or rate using the proprietary information, Commerce would use the simple average for the all-others rate.
58
If the weighted-average margin or rate based on publicly-ranged information is closer to the weighted-average margin or rate based on proprietary data, then that margin or rate, instead, would be the margin or rate Commerce applies to the all-other exporters and producers.
59
56
Id.; see, e.g.,
Aluminum Extrusions from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2010 and 2011,
79 FR 634 (January 2, 2014), and accompanying IDM (
Aluminum Extrusions from the People's Republic of China; 2010 and 2011
IDM) at Comment 3; and
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India: Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination,
78 FR 33344 (June 4, 2013), and accompanying PDM, unchanged in
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination,
78 FR 50385 (August 19, 2013).
57
See MacLean-Fogg Co.,
100 F. Supp. 3d at 1360-61.
58
Id.
59
Id.
In addition, sections 705(c)(5)(A)(ii) and 735(c)(5)(A)(ii) of the Act provide for an exception to the general all-others rule, which would be reflected in proposed § 351.109(f)(2)(iii). Those provisions of the Act state that if the calculated rates for all selected respondents are zero,
de minimis,
or based entirely on facts available under section 776 of the Act, Commerce may use “any reasonable method to establish an all-others rate for exporters and producers not individually examined.”
60
The Act and proposed regulation emphasize that one reasonable method Commerce may use under this exception includes “averaging the estimated weighted average dumping margins or countervailable subsidy rates determined for the individually investigated exporters and producers” using rates that are zero,
de minimis,
or based entirely on facts available.
61
The SAA provides that “the expected method is for Commerce to weight-average such rates to determine the non-selected respondents' rate.”
62
However, the SAA also states that if the expected method “is not feasible, or if it results in an average that would not be reasonably reflective of potential dumping margins for non-investigated exporters or producers, Commerce may use other reasonable methods.”
63
60
Sections 705(c)(5)(A)(ii) and 735(c)(5)(A)(ii) of the Act.
61
Id.
62
See
SAA at 873.
63
Id.
Over the many years Commerce has applied its nonmarket economy country methodology, when the agency has determined that the nonmarket economy country entity has not participated in its proceedings or acted to the best of its ability in providing necessary information, Commerce has consistently applied a nonmarket economy country rate consisting of a single dumping margin applicable to all exporters and producers not receiving a “separate rate” in accordance with the facts available and adverse facts available provisions of sections 776(a) and (b) of the Act and current § 351.107(d).
64
Commerce has consistently explained that a nonmarket economy country entity is a singular entity, a nonmarket economy country rate is not an all-others rate, and the all-others rate provision in the Act does not apply in AD investigations covering nonmarket economy countries.
65
To provide clarity to the public, Commerce proposes § 351.109(f)(3), which would explain both that the rate determined for a nonmarket economy country entity is not an all-others rate and that unlike an all-others rate, which may not be increased or decreased in subsequent segments of an AD proceeding, a nonmarket economy country entity rate may be modified in subsequent segments of a proceeding if the nonmarket economy country entity is selected for examination.
66
64
See, e.g., 1,1,1,2-Tetrafluroethane from the People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
79 FR 62597 (October 20, 2014), and accompanying IDM at Comment 1.
65
See Thuan An Prod. Trading & Serv. Co.
v.
United States,
348 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1349 (CIT 2018) (explaining that Commerce should have instead advanced the rationale “that the {nonmarket economy} entity is an individual entity, and therefore {} should be considered an individually investigated rate,” rather than attempting to distinguish an {nonmarket economy} entity rate from an individually investigated rate and the all-others rate).
66
See, e.g., Aluminum Extrusions from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2012-2013,
79 FR 78784 (December 31, 2014), and accompanying IDM at Comment 3.
As explained above, the provisions in the Act that address the all-others rate calculation apply only to CVD and market economy country AD investigations. However, Commerce has a long-standing practice of looking to the all-others provision in the Act for guidance in determining a rate to apply to respondents that have not been individually examined in nonmarket economy country AD proceedings, market economy country AD administrative reviews, and CVD administrative reviews. Specifically, in nonmarket economy country AD investigations and administrative reviews, Commerce has taken guidance from the all-others rate provision to calculate a rate for non-selected companies who have satisfied Commerce's separate rate requirements but have not been individually investigated or examined during a POI or POR because, like market economy exporters or producers subject to an all-others rate, these companies will not be individually-examined during the relevant period of examination.
67
In other words, a company that demonstrates its entitlement to separate rate status in a nonmarket economy country AD investigation or review receives either an individual rate (as a mandatory or voluntary respondent) or a separate rate (if not selected for individual examination) based on a
weighted-average of the rates calculated for the individually investigated or examined respondents.
68
67
See, e.g., Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2010-2011,
78 FR 35245, (June 12, 2013), and accompanying IDM at Comment 4 (citing
Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd.
v.
United States,
647 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (CIT 2009) (“To determine the dumping margin for non-mandatory respondents in {nonmarket economy} cases (that is, to determine the `separate rates' margin), Commerce normally relies on the `all others rate' provision of {the statute}.”). Commerce is now proposing to add a new regulation, § 351.108, which sets forth the separate rates requirements in this Proposed Rule.
68
See Viet I-Mei Frozen Foods Co.
v.
United States,
839 F.3d 1099, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming Commerce's practice of establishing differing treatment between the nonmarket economy entity rate and the separate rate respondents.);
see also Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries
v.
United States,
821 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when all individually examined exporters are assigned
de minimis
margins or countervailable rates, the “expected method” is for Commerce to assign a separate rate by taking the average of the de minimis margins or countervailable subsidy rates assigned to the individually examined respondents).
Similarly, in AD administrative reviews of market economy countries and CVD reviews, Commerce will normally apply the weighted-average margin or rate of the individually examined respondents to those exporters or producers not selected for individual examination, despite a request for individual review, because, like market economy exporters or producers subject to an all-others rate, those non-selected exporters or producers will not be individually examined during the relevant POR.
69
69
See, e.g., Stainless Steel Bar from India: Final Results of Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order; 2017- 2018,
84 FR 56179, (October 21, 2019), and accompanying IDM at Comment 7 (“Generally, Commerce looks to section 735(c)(5) of the Act, which provides instructions for calculating the all-others rate in an investigation, for guidance when calculating the rate for companies that were not selected for individual review in an administrative review.”);
see also Circular Welded Carbon Steel Pipes and Tubes from the Republic of Turkey: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review and Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, in Part; Calendar Year 2017,
84 FR 56173 (October 21, 2019), and accompanying IDM at 5 (explaining Commerce's application of the all-others rate in a CVD context).
Proposed § 351.109(g) would codify Commerce's practice of determining a dumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate to apply to respondents not individually investigated or examined under each of those scenarios, and would provide, in particular, that in each of these investigations and reviews, Commerce may use a simple average instead of a weighted-average in its calculations if the use of a weighted-average margin or rate would result in the release of one exporter's or producers' business proprietary information to another.
70
70
See, e.g., Aluminum Extrusions from the People's Republic of China: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2010 and 2011
IDM at Comment 3.
Lastly, proposed § 351.109(h) covers the selection of voluntary respondents. Under section 782(a) of the Act, even when Commerce limits the number of respondents selected as mandatory respondents, an exporter or producer may still obtain its own margin or rate as a voluntary respondent if its voluntary respondent submissions are timely and the number of exporters or producers subject to an investigation or review is not so large that any additional individual examination of such exporters or producers would be unduly burdensome for Commerce and inhibit the timely completion of the investigation or review.
71
Although current § 351.204(d) references how a firm may request voluntary respondent status under section 782(a) of the Act, the regulation does not address the order in which a voluntary respondent may be selected or the filing deadlines applicable to voluntary respondents. Accordingly, in transferring the current voluntary respondent provisions from § 351.204(d) to proposed § 351.109(h), Commerce has proposed to add additional provisions covering voluntary respondents.
71
See
sections 782(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act;
see also
SAA at 843 (“Commerce may decline to analyze voluntary responses because it would be unduly burdensome and would preclude the completion of timely investigations or reviews.”);
and Grobest & I-Mei Indus. (Vietnam) Co.
v.
United States,
853 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1365 (CIT 2012) (citing
Longkou Haimeng Machinery Co., Ltd.
v.
United States
, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1353 (CIT 2012) (“When Commerce can show that the burden of reviewing a voluntary respondent would exceed that presented in the typical antidumping or countervailing duty review, the court will not second guess Commerce's decision on how to allocate its resources.”) (
Longkou Haimeng Machinery
))
Grobest & I-Mei Indus. (Vietnam
).
Specifically, as proposed, current § 351.204(d)(1)-(3) would be moved to new § 351.109(h)(1), (2) and (3)(i). In addition, Commerce has added two new provisions. First, § 351.109(h)(3)(ii) states that if more than one exporter or producer seeks voluntary respondent treatment, and Commerce determines to examine one or more voluntary respondents individually, it will select voluntary respondents based on the chronological order in which the requests were filed correctly on the record.
72
This approach is consistent with Commerce's current voluntary respondent selection policy.
73
72
If a voluntary respondent request is submitted on the record but is later determined to have been submitted incorrectly, then this provision would not apply to that exporter or producer and Commerce would select the next exporter or producer as a voluntary respondent which filed its voluntary respondent request correctly on the record.
73
See, e.g.,
Commerce Memorandum, “Administrative Review of the Countervailing Duty Order on Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Respondent Selection,” dated April 26, 2022, (ACCESS Barcode 4235480-01), at 8-10 (“Commerce will select voluntary respondents based on the order in which the requests are received.”).
In addition, Commerce proposes adding § 351.109(h)(4), which addresses the timing of voluntary respondent submissions. The provision would explain that the deadlines for voluntary respondent submissions would generally be the same as deadlines for submissions by individually investigated respondents. Furthermore, it would provide that if there are two or more individually investigated respondents with different deadlines for a submission, such as when one gets an extension of time which is longer than the extension of time granted to another (or none at all), then the voluntary respondent will normally be required to file its submission to Commerce by the earliest deadline required of the respondents selected for individual examination.
6. Revising References to Persons Examined, Treatment of Voluntary Respondents, and Exclusion From AD and CVD Orders—§ 351.204
Section 351.204 applies to certain general procedures and policies in an investigation once Commerce determines that a petition is sufficient under § 351.203. The current version includes paragraphs covering the period of investigation, § 351.204(b); the selection of persons to be examined, § 351.204(c); the treatment of voluntary respondents not selected for individual examination, § 351.204(d); and the exclusion of certain exporters and producers from an AD or CVD order, § 351.204(e).
Commerce proposes revising § 351.204 in accordance with both its proposed revisions of the cash deposit regulation, § 351.107, and the creation of a new respondent selection and all-others regulation, § 351.109, as discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this Proposed Rule.
Revising and simplifying § 351.204 is the logical outgrowth of the proposed revisions to part 351. Commerce may limit its examination of potential respondents not only in investigations, but in administrative reviews as well. Accordingly, it is reasonable to have the respondent selection provision appear in a regulation that applies to administrative reviews as well as investigations. Accordingly, Commerce proposes moving the parts of current § 351.204(c) that apply to both investigations and administrative reviews, including the waiver provision and the statutory reference to a single country-wide subsidy rate, to new § 351.109. Commerce proposes to retain language in current § 351.204(c) that applies only to investigations, while adding new language in that provision that references the more general respondent selection provision,
§ 351.109(c). Commerce also proposes to revise § 351.213(f) pertaining to administrative reviews to reflect similar respondent selection language for that segment of an AD or CVD proceeding.
Second, the same issue applies to the selection of voluntary respondents, pursuant to section 782(a) of the Act: Commerce may select voluntary respondents in both investigations and administrative reviews. Accordingly, Commerce proposes moving the general voluntary respondent selection provision from current § 351.204(d) to new § 351.109(h). Likewise, Commerce proposes to add a sentence to § 351.204(c) that references new § 351.109(h) and states that Commerce may determine to examine voluntary respondents in investigations. Similar language appears in revised § 351.213(f) to indicate that voluntary respondents may be selected in administrative reviews.
Third, with the revision of the cash deposit regulation, § 351.107, Commerce concludes that it would be logical to also revise and move current §§ 351.204(e)(1) through (3) to that regulation. Commerce proposes language in new § 351.107(c)(3) to address scenarios in which Commerce would apply a producer/exporter cash deposit combination or combinations in excluding producers and exporters from AD or CVD investigations and orders as currently addressed in § 351.204(e)(1) through (3)).
With the changes being proposed to current § 351.204(d) and (e), Commerce therefore proposes renumbering § 351.204(e)(4) to § 351.204(d), retitling the subsection, “Requests for exclusions from countervailing duty orders based on investigations conducted on an aggregate basis” and removing § 351.204(e) entirely.
Finally, with these modifications to § 351.204(c) and (d), Commerce also proposes updating the heading of the regulation and updating the introductory paragraph, § 351.204(a), to reflect those changes. As proposed, the new heading would be “Period of investigation; requests for exclusions from countervailing duty orders based on investigations conducted on an aggregate basis.” Revised paragraph (a), as proposed, would reference the rules regarding the period of investigation and exclusion requests for countervailing duty investigations conducted on an aggregate basis.
7. Clarifying That Assessment Rates May Be Calculated on an
Ad Valorem
or a Per-Unit Basis—§ 351.212(b)(ii)
Section 731 of the Act directs Commerce to impose duties on imported merchandise “that is being, or likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value.” Section 751(a)(2)(C) of the Act states that an AD margin “shall be the basis for the assessment of antidumping duties on entries of merchandise covered by the determination and for {cash} deposits of estimated duties.” The cash deposit rate is based on an estimated AD rate and applied to future entries,
74
whereas the assessment rate is based on the final, accurate AD margin for the relevant period and is applied to entries made during the period covered by an administrative review.
75
74
See
section 773(d)(1)(B);
see also Koyo Seiko Co.
v.
United States,
258 F.3d 1340, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (
Koyo Seiko Co.
).
75
See
section 751(a)(2);
see also Koyo Seiko Co.,
258 F.3d at 1347-48.
The Act, however, does not require any particular method for calculating an assessment rate.
76
Commerce acknowledged this discretion in the
1997 Final Rule,
stating that “neither the Act nor the AD Agreement specifies whether sales or entries are to be reviewed, nor do they specify how {Commerce} must calculate the amount of duties to be assessed.”
77
In calculating an assessment rate, the Federal Circuit in
Torrington
held that the Act simply requires that the difference between the foreign market value and United States price serve as the basis for assessed duties.
78
76
See
section 751(a)(2) of the Act.
77
1997 Final Rule,
62 FR at 27314 (internal citations omitted).
78
Torrington Co.
v.
United States,
44 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
see also Koyo Seiko Co.,
258 F.3d at 1346.
Commerce's regulations codify its assessment calculation methodology. Currently, the regulation under § 351.212(b) broadly states that “the Secretary will normally calculate an assessment rate for each importer of subject merchandise covered by the review.”
79
The regulations explain that the assessment rate is determined by “dividing the dumping margin found on the subject merchandise examined by the entered value of such merchandise for normal customs duty purposes.”
80
This assessment rate method is also known as an
ad valorem,
or a percentage of value, basis.
79
19 CFR § 351.212(b).
80
Id.
Commerce also calculates an assessment rate on a per-unit basis, however, when an
ad valorem
basis will result in an under-collection of duties, such as when entered sales values are unknown, undervalued, systematically understated, or otherwise unreliable.
81
As explained above with respect to the proposed revised cash deposit regulation, § 351.107(c), units upon which an assessment rate may be calculated include, but are not limited to, weight, length, volume, packaging (such as the type and size of packaging), and individual units of the product itself. The CIT has affirmed this practice, holding that “although Commerce normally calculates assessment rates on an
ad valorem
basis, it has discretion to revise the assessment methodology and adopt a reasonable method for ensuring an accurate collection of total duties due.”
82
81
See Certain Activated Carbon from the People's Republic of China
IDM at 34 (stating “the regulation, however, does not proscribe [Commerce] from resorting to other methods of calculating and assigning assessment and cash deposit rates, and the agency does so in certain circumstances . . . {Commerce} changed the cash deposit and assessment methodology from an ad valorem to a per-unit basis because the application of an ad valorem rate based on net U.S. price would yield an under-collection of duties due to Jacobi's undervaluing of its United States sales.”);
see also 1-Hydroxyethylidene-1, 1-Diphosphonic Acid from the People's Republic of China
IDM at Comment 5;
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People's Republic of China
IDM at Comment 17; and
Honey from the People's Republic of China
IDM at Comment 7.
82
See Wuhan Bee,
Slip Op. 2008-61 at 12.
Commerce is therefore proposing dividing current § 351.212(b) into paragraphs (i) and (ii), the first paragraph applicable to assessment rates determined on an
ad valorem
basis and the second applicable to assessment rates determined on a per-unit basis.
8. Recognizing That Commerce May Select Respondents and Voluntary Respondents Practice in Administrative Reviews—§ 351.213(f)
As discussed above, Commerce is proposing revisions to its regulations in § 351.109 to reflect its practice of limiting the number of exporters or producers examined when it is not practicable to examine each known exporter producer in both investigations and administrative reviews. Furthermore, Commerce is also proposing moving and revising provisions covering voluntary respondent selection from § 351.204(d), which covers only investigations, to § 351.109(h), because Commerce may select voluntary respondents in both investigations and administrative reviews, as affirmed by the CIT.
83
83
See Qingdao Qihang Tyre Co.
v.
United States,
308 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1363 (CIT 2018) (affirming Commerce's determination in an administrative review to individually examine two respondents based on the statutory authority to examine the “exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably examined.”);
see also Grobest & I-Mei Indus. (Vietnam),
853 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 (citing
Longkou
Haimeng Machinery Co.,
581 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (“When Commerce can show that the burden of reviewing a voluntary respondent would exceed that presented in the typical antidumping or countervailing duty review, the court will not second guess Commerce's decision on how to allocate its resources.”).
In proposed and updated § 351.204(c), Commerce would acknowledge that in investigations, specifically, the agency may limit the number of exporters or producers examined, and, in accordance with section 782(a) of the Act, Commerce may also determine to examine voluntary respondents in investigations. Likewise, in § 351.214(f) similar proposed language would recognize that in administrative reviews, Commerce may both limit the number of exporters or producers examined and select voluntary respondents. The language proposed for both provisions references the criteria and procedures set forth in § 351.109(c), to limit selection of exporters and producers, and § 351.109(h), to select voluntary respondents, in investigations and administrative reviews.
As mentioned above, the current regulation does not address Commerce's respondent selection process during administrative reviews and the practicality of individually examining multiple respondents in an administrative review when faced with a large number of exporters and producers. Accordingly, the proposed changes to § 351.109 and § 351.213(f) would provide clarity on that issue. Furthermore, although current § 351.213(f) allows for the examination of voluntary respondents in administrative reviews, the reference to § 351.109(h) in the proposed revision would make the regulation consistent with the other aforementioned proposed changes to the regulations.
9. Revising Header to Section 214 Identify Expedited Reviews Separately From New Shipper Reviews—§ 351.214
Commerce proposes modifying the heading of § 351.214, which currently reads “New shipper reviews under section 751(a)(2)(B) of the Act,” by adding to it the phrase “and expedited reviews in countervailing duty proceedings.” Section 751(a)(2)(B) of the Act provides Commerce the authority to determine dumping margins and countervailing duty rates for exporters and producers that did not export subject merchandise to the United States during the period of investigation, referred to as “new shipper reviews,” and § 351.214 contains several provisions with respect to the conduct and administration of new shipper reviews. However, current paragraph (l) of § 351.214 does not relate to new shipper reviews but instead provides procedures for conducting expedited reviews of exporters not selected for individual examination in CVD investigations. Expedited reviews in CVD investigations are not derived from, or related to, section 751(a)(2)(B) of the Act. Accordingly, Commerce has determined that the revision of the section heading to reflect that a proceeding separate from new shipper reviews is also covered by § 351.214 would provide clarity.
In addition, the Federal Circuit recently held that the “individualized-determination provisions” of section 777A(e) of the Act, along with the “regulatory-implementation authority” of section 103(a) of the URAA, explicitly provide Commerce with the authority to promulgate § 351.214(l).
84
The Court held that this regulatory provision “provides one procedure for giving effect to the primary policy of providing individual-company rate determinations” and that the “SAA itself makes the connection between the expedited-review process at issue” and the addition of section 777A(e) to the Act in the URAA.
85
Commerce proposes modifying the heading to § 351.214 to make it consistent with the holding in
COALITION
v.
U.S..
84
Comm. Overseeing Action for Lumber Int'l Trade Investigations or Negots.
v.
United States,
66 F.4th 968, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (
COALITION
v.
U.S.
).
85
Id.
(explaining that “{u}nder a heading, `Company-Specific Subsidy Rates and Expedited Reviews,' the SAA states: `Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement provides that any exporter whose exports are subject to a CVD order, but which was not actually investigated for reasons other than a refusal to cooperate, shall be entitled to an expedited review to establish an individual CVD rate for that exporter.'” (citing SAA at 941). The Federal Circuit further noted that the SAA also states that “{s}everal changes must be made to the [Tariff] Act to implement the requirements of Article 19.3” and that one subsection of the SAA explained that the URAA “eliminates the presumption in favor of a single country-wide CVD rate and amends section 777A of the Act to establish a general rule in favor of individual CVD rates for each exporter or producer individually investigated.” (citing SAA at 941)).
10. Revising Requirements for Submissions of Rebuttal Factual Information; Modifying Deadlines Concerning the Submission of Information Pertaining to Factors of Production and Benchmarks for Measuring the Adequacy of Remuneration—§ 301(b)(2), (c)(3)(i) and (c)(3)(ii)
Commerce proposes to revise one of its reporting regulations, § 351.301(b)(2), to require greater detail from interested parties. Specifically, § 351.301(b)(2), explains that if factual information is being provided to rebut, clarify, or correct factual information on the record, the submitter must identify the information already on the record that is being rebutted, clarified, or corrected. Current § 351.301(b)(2) does not, however, instruct the submitter to summarize the information being provided under this paragraph or describe how that new factual information rebuts the information already on the record.
86
This omission creates a burden on both Commerce and interested parties to understand why the information being provided under this paragraph is being submitted and how it is particularly relevant to the information already on the record.
86
See Saha Thai Steel Pipe Pub. Co. Ltd.
v.
United States,
663 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1373 (CIT 2023).
Accordingly, to provide clarity to all parties regarding the submission of factual information being provided to rebut, clarify, or correct information already on the record, Commerce is proposing to revise § 351.301(b)(2) to specify that the submitter must also provide a narrative summary explaining how the specific factual information being provided rebuts, clarifies, or corrects the identified factual information already on the record.
In addition, Commerce is proposing an additional modification to its reporting regulation, § 351.301, to update deadlines for filing certain information on the record. Current § 351.301(c)(3)(i) and (ii) establish time limits for interested parties to submit factual information to value factors of production under § 351.408(c) or to measure the adequacy of remuneration under § 351.511(a)(2) in AD and CVD investigations, administrative reviews, new shipper reviews, and changed circumstances reviews.
Currently, the submissions are due no later than 30 days before the scheduled dates of preliminary determinations and results of review. However, these submissions sometimes contain hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of information that Commerce needs to analyze in a short amount of time prior to issuing a preliminary determination or the preliminary results. The large volume of information often contained in these submissions makes it difficult for Commerce to meet its statutory deadlines to determine the appropriate surrogate values or benchmarks.
In addition, since the 30-day deadlines were codified, Commerce has experienced a large increase in AD and CVD proceedings and orders which it must administer. In order to effectively administer and enforce the AD and CVD
laws, Commerce therefore proposes modifying these time limits to allow Commerce additional time to more fully analyze these voluminous submissions for purposes of its preliminary decisions.
Specifically, Commerce proposes revising § 351.301(c)(3)(i) to create both a subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (B) covering investigations. Under the proposal, Commerce would revise the time limit for parties to submit factual information to value factors of production under § 351.408(c) in AD investigations to no later than 60 days before the scheduled date of the preliminary determination and proposes revising § 351.301(c)(3)(i)(B) to increase the time limit for parties to submit factual information to measure the adequacy of remuneration under § 351.511(a)(2) in CVD investigations to no later than 45 days before the scheduled date of the preliminary determination. Commerce recognizes that the statutory deadline for the issuance of a preliminary determination in a CVD investigation
87
is shorter than the preliminary determination in an AD investigation,
88
which is the reason the agency is proposing a change of 15 fewer days in the time limit for CVD investigations.
87
See
section 703(b)(1) (requiring Commerce to issue a preliminary CVD determination within 65 days after the date of initiation).
See also
§ 351.205(b)(1).
88
See
section 733(b)(1)(A) (requiring Commerce to issue a preliminary AD determination within 140 days after the date of initiation).
See also
351.205(b)(1).
Furthermore, for administrative reviews, new shipper reviews, and changed circumstances reviews, Commerce proposes revising § 351.301(c)(3)(ii) to require parties to submit factual information to value factors of production under § 351.408(c) or to measure the adequacy of remuneration under § 351.511(a)(2) no later than 60 days before the scheduled date of the preliminary results of review.
Commerce recognizes that in requiring such factual information to be submitted earlier in the proceeding, interested parties will have a shorter period of time in which to supply potential surrogate and benchmark information in AD and CVD proceedings. However, Commerce believes that the proposed deadlines will still be sufficient for interested parties to gather, prepare and submit that information, while also improving Commerce's ability to reach accurate and appropriate preliminary determinations in its proceedings.
11. Allowing the Provision of Business Proprietary Information to CBP Employees Investigating Negligence, Gross Negligence, or Fraud—§ 351.306(a)(3)
As amended in 2015, section 777(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act states that Commerce may disclose proprietary information “to an officer or employee of the United States Customs Service who is directly involved in conducting an investigation regarding negligence, gross negligence or fraud under this title.” Current § 351.306(a)(3) states that Commerce may disclose business proprietary information to “an employee of U.S. Customs and Border Protection” involved in conducting “a fraud investigation.” However, the Act now includes “negligence” and “gross negligence” investigations.
89
89
See
section 413(a) of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-125), 130 Stat. 122 (2016).
Accordingly, Commerce is proposing amendments to § 351.306(a)(3) to expand the covered investigations to negligence and gross negligence investigations as well as fraud investigations. These proposed changes would bring § 351.306(a)(3) into conformity with section 777(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act as amended in 2015.
12. Updating the Facts Available Regulations, Including Adding Language From the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015—§ 351.308(g), (h), and (i)
On June 29, 2015, the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (TPEA) was signed into law. Among other changes, TPEA amended provisions of section 776 of the Act,
90
which governs Commerce's authority to rely on facts otherwise available in conducting AD and CVD proceedings.
90
See
TPEA of 2015, Public Law 114-27, 129 Stat. 362, 384 (2015), § 502, codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677(e).
Current § 351.308 addresses Commerce's practices and procedures arising out of section 776 of the Act, but there are certain aspects of Commerce's practice, and sections of the 2015 amendments, that are not currently reflected in Commerce's regulations.
First, when applying facts available pursuant to section 776(a) of the Act, there are cases in which Commerce determines that information is missing or unreliable to the extent that the application of total facts available is warranted to all of a exporter's or producer's calculations and should be applied in determining the antidumping margin or countervailable subsidy rate as a whole.
91
However, in other cases, Commerce may determine that only certain information is missing or unreliable and, given the facts on the record, it is appropriate to apply only partial facts available to a portion of its antidumping or countervailing duty analysis and calculations for a particular exporter or producer.
91
See, e.g., Fine Denier Polyester Staple Fiber from India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2018-2019,
86 FR 29249 (June 1, 2021), and accompanying IDM at Comment 1.
The CIT and the Federal Circuit have upheld Commerce's practice to apply “partial” and “total” facts available under section 776 of the Act.
92
While the Act does not explicitly reference total or partial facts available,
93
courts have recognized and affirmed Commerce's authority to use partial facts available when there are discrete gaps in the information and total facts available when none of a party's information is available, useable, or reliable.
94
Accordingly, Commerce proposes adding § 351.308(g) to codify Commerce's long-standing practice to apply either partial or total facts available in implementing sections 776(a) and (b) of the Act.
92
See, e.g., Mukand, Ltd.
v.
United States,
767 F.3d 1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (
Mukand II
) (affirming Commerce's application of total adverse facts available when respondent's sales and cost data was unusable),
affirming
Slip Op. 13-00041 (CIT March 25, 2013);
Kawasaki Steel Corp.
v.
United States,
110 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (CIT 2000) (affirming Commerce's application of partial adverse facts available with respect to certain information needed to calculate respondent's constructed export price).
93
See Mukand II,
Slip Op. 13-00041 (CIT March 25, 2013),
aff'd,
767 F.3d 1300.
94
See id.
In addition, Commerce also proposes adding paragraphs (h) and (i) to § 351.308 to reflect changes incorporated into section 776 of the Act by the TPEA. The TPEA amended section 776(c) of the Act to provide that when Commerce relies on information obtained in the course of an AD or CVD investigation or review pursuant to subsection (c)(1), Commerce is not required to corroborate any dumping margin or countervailing duty applied in a separate segment of the same proceeding pursuant to subsection (c)(2).
95
Accordingly, Commerce proposes adding paragraph (h) to reflect that Commerce is not required to conduct a corroboration analysis when applying margins or rates derived from separate segments of the same proceeding pursuant to section 776(c)(2) of the Act.
95
See
section 776(c)(2) of the Act.
Furthermore, the TPEA created section 776(d) of the Act, which
addresses Commerce's authority to select from among the facts otherwise available when applying an adverse inference.
96
Sections 776(d)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act provide that when applying an adverse inference in a CVD proceeding, Commerce may use a countervailable subsidy rate applied for the same or a similar program in a CVD proceeding involving the same country and if none exists, Commerce may use a countervailable subsidy rate for a subsidy program from a proceeding that Commerce considers reasonable. Furthermore, section 776(d)(1)(B) provides that when applying an adverse inference in AD proceedings, Commerce may use any dumping margin from any segment of the proceeding under the applicable antidumping order. In addition, when selecting from the subsidy rates or dumping margins specified in section 776(d)(1) of the Act, section 776(d)(2) of the Act authorizes Commerce to apply the highest rate or margin, based on the evaluation of the situation that resulted in Commerce applying an adverse inference.
96
Id.
Finally, sections 776(d)(3)(A) and (B) of the Act provide that when using an adverse inference in selecting among the facts otherwise available, Commerce is not required to estimate what the countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin would have been if the interested party found to have failed to cooperate under section 776(b)(1) had cooperated nor to demonstrate that the countervailable subsidy rate or dumping margin reflects an alleged commercial reality of the interested party.
In light of these modifications made to section 776 of the Act in the TPEA, Commerce proposes adding § 351.308(i)(1), (2), and (3) to reflect the facts available language set forth in sections 776(d)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act.
13. Revising Case Brief and Rebuttal Brief Regulation To Include Executive Summaries—§ 351.309(c)(2) and (d)(2)
Current § 351.309(c)(2) and (d)(2) of Commerce's regulations address the filing requirements of case briefs and rebuttal briefs, including an “encouragement” by the agency that parties “provide a summary of the arguments not to exceed five pages and a table of statutes, regulations, and cases cited.” Such summaries were intended to enable the reader to quickly ascertain the main arguments presented by interested parties. However, since that language was codified in the regulation, Commerce has found that many such summaries submitted in briefs and rebuttal briefs have been so general as to be of limited use to interested parties and Commerce officials. Furthermore, the absence of shorter and more succinct summaries for each of the issues raised in interested parties' case and rebuttal briefs has resulted in Commerce officials spending considerable time paraphrasing interested parties' briefs and arguments in shorter summation for use in final decision memoranda.
Therefore, starting in November 2023, Commerce revised the instructions it provided to interested parties in the “Public Comment” section of its notices of preliminary determination and preliminary results
97
to request that interested parties provide at the beginning of their briefs a public executive summary for each issue raised in those submissions, defining an “issue” as an argument that Commerce would normally address in comments in its final issues and decision memoranda. Furthermore, since November 2023, Commerce requested that interested parties limit their executive summary of each issue in briefs and rebuttal briefs to no more than 450 words (not including citations). Commerce explained in its preliminary notices that it has requested that parties submit such summaries so that those summaries can appear in Commerce's issues and decision memoranda.
98
This approach relieves the agency of the effort and time it takes to paraphrase interested parties' arguments and also helps assure interested parties that Commerce is reflecting their arguments accurately in the agency's issues and decision memoranda.
97
See, e.g., Thermal Paper from the Republic of Korea: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2021-2022,
88 FR 83384, 83386 (November 29, 2023);
Refillable Stainless Steel Kegs from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Revie,; 2021-2022,
88 FR 85230, 85231 (December 7, 2023); and
Stilbenic Optical Brightening Agents from Taiwan: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 2022,
89 FR 7361, 7362 (February 2, 2024) (
Brightening Agents from Taiwan Preliminary Results
).
98
See, e.g., Brightening Agents from Taiwan Preliminary Results,
89 FR at 7362.
Commerce explained in those notices that it was, and is, Commerce's intent to use the executive summaries as the basis of the comment summaries included in the final decision memoranda that will accompany the final results of review.
99
However, there may be instances in which Commerce will need to revise an interested party's executive summary for purposes of context, simplicity, or clarity.
100
99
See id.,
89 FR at 7362.
100
For example, Commerce may determine to remove or revise lengthy footnotes when it places executive summaries in its issues and decision memoranda if it determines that lengthy and argumentative footnotes were an attempt to avoid the word length restrictions for executive summaries requested in the regulation.
Consistent with that new policy, Commerce is proposing revising § 351.309(c)(2) and (d)(2) to request the inclusion of an executive summary for each argument raised in the brief and rebuttal brief. The regulation provides that executive summaries should be no more than 450 words in length, not counting supporting citations. With respect to supporting citations, the new regulatory language is clear that, in general, interested parties may include all relevant citations, including prior Commerce decisions and Federal Court holdings, without concern about the 450-word length.
In the past, Commerce has “encouraged” interested parties to include a general summary in their case and rebuttal brief. Commerce proposes replacing that term with the term “request” and eliminating the reference to a general summary. The revised provision would request that parties supply a table of contents listing each issue; a table of authorities, include statutes, regulations, administrative cases, dispute panel decisions, and court holdings cited; and an executive summary for each argument raised in the brief. The change from “encouraged” to “request” is intentional, as Commerce's ability to effectively administer that AD and CVD laws is improved when parties submit tables of contents, tables of authorities, and an executive summary for each argument raised in the brief.
101
In addition, the inclusion of a table of contents is consistent with Commerce's practice, and the inclusion on the list of administrative cases and dispute panel decisions to be cited in a table of authorities is intended to provide additional clarity, as those sources are frequently cited in briefs and rebuttal briefs.
101
For purposes of this Proposed Rule, Commerce is emphasizing that if interested parties fail to provide the succinct 450-word public executive summaries, pursuant to this revised provision, Commerce may request that those parties resubmit their entire brief or rebuttal brief with an executive summary.
Finally, Commerce has proposed removing from its list of requested (formerly encouraged) information the five-page summaries, for the reasons explained above. Commerce does not find that five-page summaries are generally helpful, although Commerce
will not prohibit the submission of such summaries if interested parties wish to continue to supply them.
14. Revising To Include Practice of Collapsing Affiliated Producers and Non-Producers—§ 351.401(f)
When affiliated producers share ownership, management, or have intertwined operations, there is a significant potential for the manipulation of the prices or production of the subject merchandise. Commerce has a longstanding and court-affirmed practice of “collapsing” certain affiliated entities and treating them as a single entity for purposes of its AD calculations.
102
As currently written, § 351.401(f)(1) codifies Commerce's practice of collapsing affiliated producers who “have production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities” where “there is a significant potential for the manipulation of price or production.” Section 351.401 (f)(2) identifies the factors Commerce may consider in determining whether there is significant potential for the manipulation of price or production.
102
See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from Brazil,
69 FR 76910 (December 23, 2004), and accompanying IDM (
Shrimp from Brazil
IDM) at Comment 5;
see also Rebar Trade Action Coalition
v.
United States,
398 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1366-1371 (CIT 2019) (
Rebar Trade Action Coalition
);
Queen's Flowers de Colombia
v.
United States,
981 F. Supp. 617, 622 (CIT 1997) (
Queen's Flowers
); and
Viraj Group.
v.
United States,
476 F.3d 1349, 1355-58 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
By collapsing affiliated producers and calculating a single weighted-average dumping margin for the combined entity, the current regulation discourages producers subject to antidumping duties from shifting their production or sales to affiliated producers to evade those duties.
103
103
See Rebar Trade Action Coalition,
475 F. Supp. at 1368.
However, affiliated non-producers such as exporters, importers, and producers can also manipulate and influence prices and costs through their mutual relationships.
104
Accordingly, to prevent manipulation of the prices and costs used in its dumping analysis, and prevent the evasion of duties, Commerce has in several AD proceedings collapsed non-producers with both producers and non-producers, and the CIT has affirmed Commerce's authority to do so.
105
Although the Act does not expressly address collapsing, the CIT has held that Commerce's collapsing practice, as applied to both affiliated producers and non-producers, effectuates the basic purpose of the Act: to calculate accurate dumping margins and to prevent the evasion of duties.
106
104
See Shrimp from Brazil
IDM at Comment 5.
105
See NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc.
v.
United States,
971 F. Supp. 586, 591-92 (CIT 1997) (
NAACO Materials
);
Queen's Flowers,
981 F. Supp. at 617-622;
and Echjay Forgings,
475 F. Supp. 3d. at 1360 (CIT 2020) (citing
Hontex Enterprises Inc. d/b/a Louisiana Packing Company
v.
United States of America,
248 F. Supp. 2d. 1323 (CIT 2003)).
106
See Queen's Flowers,
981 F. Supp. at 622.
As such, Commerce proposes revising § 351.401(f) to explicitly address the ability of the agency to collapse producers and non-producers when it determines that there is a significant potential for the manipulation of prices or production between two or more affiliated parties.
107
107
See United States Steel Corp.
v.
United States,
179 F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1135 (CIT 2016).
In practice, Commerce has found the (f)(2) factors in the current regulation instructive in determining whether to collapse non-producer affiliated parties. For example, applying the factors of § 351.401(f) relevant to non-producers, Commerce has collapsed producers with affiliated resellers and exporters.
108
Accordingly, Commerce proposes modifying § 351.401(f) to reflect Commerce's longstanding practice of collapsing affiliated parties, rather than only affiliated producers, by changing references to “affiliated producers” to “affiliated parties.” Further, Commerce proposes moving discussion of whether affiliated parties have or will have access to production facilities for similar or identical products from paragraph (f)(1) to a newly created paragraph (f)(3). If applicable, paragraph (f)(3) would require Commerce to consider if any of those facilities would require substantial retooling in order to restructure manufacturing priorities. This modification would ensure that § 351.401(f) centers Commerce's collapsing analysis on whether there is a significant potential for manipulation of prices, production, or other commercial activities—a factor relevant to producers and non-producers alike.
109
Finally, paragraph (f)(2), with a few minor modifications, would continue to describe the factors Commerce may consider in determining whether there is a significant potential for manipulation.
108
See Shrimp from Brazil
IDM at Comment 5;
see also Certain Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipes and Tubes from India: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
75 FR 33578, 33580-33581 (June 14, 2010), unchanged in
Certain Welded Carbon Steel Standard Pipes and Tubes from India: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
75 FR 69626 (November 15, 2010); and
Certain Preserved Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission, in Part, of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review,
70 FR 54361 (September 14, 2005), and accompanying IDM at Comment 9.
109
See Shrimp from Brazil
IDM at Comment 5;
see also Rebar Trade Action Coalition,
475 F. Supp. at 1367.
15. Addressing the Submission of Multinational Corporation Provision Allegations and Clarification That the Provision Does Not Apply to Nonmarket Economy Countries—§ 351.404(g)
Section 773(d) of the Act enumerates the factors necessary for Commerce to determine whether to apply the special rule for certain multinational corporations in determining normal value for purposes of its AD calculations. Current § 351.301(c) sets forth the time limits for submissions of various allegations, arguments, and factual information relevant to that determination, but it does not refer to allegations that the special rule for certain multinational corporations should be applied given the facts on the record. In the past, Commerce has articulated in its communications to outside parties that the deadlines of § 351.301(c)(2)(i) should apply to such allegations,
110
and Commerce is proposing to codify that understanding in new § 351.404(g)(1).
110
See
Commerce's Letter, “Multinational Corporation Provision,” dated April 9, 2021 (ACCESS barcode: 4108533-01) at 2 n. 9 (stating “Commerce intends to clarify in its initiation notices for subsequent proceedings that the applicable deadline for all interested parties to file an MNC allegation is established by 19 CFR 351.301(c)(2)(i).”).
Under section 773(d) of the Act, the special rule for certain multinational corporations requires a determination concerning market viability and the basis fo
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.