Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules on a Firm's System of Quality Control and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards

Federal RegisterJun 11, 2024

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-100277; File No. PCAOB-2024-02]

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rules on a Firm's System of Quality Control and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards

June 5, 2024.

Pursuant to section 107(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Act”), notice is hereby given that on May 24, 2024, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “Board” or the “PCAOB”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) the proposed rules described in items I and II below, which items have been prepared by the Board. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rules from interested persons.

I. Board's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rules

On May 13, 2024, the Board adopted

A Firm's System of Quality Control and Other Amendments to PCAOB Standards, Rules, and Forms

(collectively, the “proposed rules”). The text of the proposed rules appears in Exhibit A to the SEC Filing Form 19b-4 and is available on the Board's website at Docket 046 | PCAOB (pcaobus.org) and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Board's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rules

In its filing with the Commission, the Board included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rules and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rules. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Board has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements. In addition, the Board is requesting that the Commission approve the proposed rules, pursuant to section 103(a)(3)(C) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for application to audits of emerging growth companies (“EGCs”), as that term is defined in section 3(a)(80) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). The Board's request is set forth in section D.

A. Board's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rules

(a) Purpose

The Board adopted a new PCAOB quality control (“QC”) standard that it believes will lead registered public accounting firms (“firms”) to significantly improve their QC systems. An effective QC system protects investors by facilitating the consistent preparation and issuance of informative, accurate, independent, and compliant engagement reports. Properly conducted audits and other engagements enhance the confidence of investors and other market participants in the information firms report on.

The Board adopted an integrated, risk-based standard, QC 1000,

A Firm's System of Quality Control,

that mandates quality objectives and key processes for all firms' QC systems, with a focus on accountability and continuous improvement. The Board has designed QC 1000 to be applied by firms of varying size and complexity. If approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), the Board believes this new standard will lead firms to better serve investors by more consistently complying with the professional and legal requirements that apply to PCAOB engagements.

In connection with the adoption of QC 1000, the Board also adopted other changes to its standards, rules, and forms. QC 1000 and the other changes adopted substantially reflect the Board's November 2022 proposal,

1

but have been modified in response to commenter input.

1

See A Firm's System of Quality Control and Other Proposed Amendments to PCAOB Standards, Rules, and Forms,

PCAOB Rel. No. 2022-006 (Nov. 18, 2022) (“proposal” or “proposed standards”), available on the Board's website in Docket 046.

In a separate release, the Board also adopted a new auditing standard, AS 1000,

General Responsibilities of the Auditor in Conducting an Audit,

that addresses the general principles and responsibilities of the auditor.

2

This release includes references to AS 1000, where appropriate

2

See

General Responsibilities of the Auditor in Conducting an Audit and Amendments to PCAOB Standards, PCAOB Rel. No. 2024-004 (May 13, 2024) (“Auditor Responsibilities Release”).

Improving the Board's QC Standards

The Board strongly believes that an effective quality control system facilitates continuous improvement. Over time, the PCAOB's oversight experience suggests that firm QC systems fall short. For example, PCAOB inspectors observed that approximately 40% of the issuer audits they reviewed in 2022 had one or more deficiencies where the auditor failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion, an increase of six percentage points over the deficiency rate in 2021 and 11 percentage points over the rate in 2020.

3

In all those cases, auditors issued audit opinions without completing the audit work that PCAOB standards require for them to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements were free of material misstatement and/or whether the issuers maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting.

3

See Spotlight: Staff Update and Preview of 2022 Inspection Observations

(July 2023) (“2022 Inspection Observations Preview”), at 3,

available at https://assets.pcaobus.org/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/documents/spotlight-staff-preview-2022-inspection-observations.pdf?sfvrsn=1b116d49_4

.

Every step of this rulemaking—from the December 2019 concept release,

4

to the proposal, to adoption—has been informed by extensive research and outreach, as well as by PCAOB inspections and enforcement activities. The PCAOB's current QC standards were developed decades ago and issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) before the PCAOB was established. The auditing environment has changed significantly since that time, including evolving and greater use of technology, and increasing auditor use of outside resources, such as other accounting firms and providers of support services. Firms themselves have also changed significantly, as has the role of firm networks. And advances in internal control, quality management, and enterprise risk management suggest that factors such as active involvement of leadership, focus on risk, clearly defined objectives, objective-oriented processes, monitoring, and remediation of identified issues can contribute to more effective QC. These developments have, in part, led to PCAOB advisory groups' general support for strengthening the QC standards, including through risk-based elements and enhanced requirements for firm governance and leadership.

4

See Concept Release, Potential Approach to Revisions to PCAOB Quality Control Standards,

PCAOB Rel. No. 2019-003 (Dec. 17, 2019) (“concept release”), available on the Board's website in Docket 046.

Taking into account those considerations, as well as the comments the Board received on the concept release and proposal, the Board believes that improving PCAOB standards will lead firms to improve their QC systems. This should result in more consistent

compliance with applicable requirements, which ultimately better serves and protects investors. The specific improvements the Board adopted include:

• Emphasizing accountability, firm culture and the “tone at the top,” and firm governance through requirements for specified roles within and responsibilities for the QC system, including at the highest levels of the firm; quality objectives that link compensation to quality; and, for the largest firms, the requirement of an independent perspective in firm governance;

• Striking the right balance between a risk-based approach to QC—which should drive firms to proactively identify and manage the specific risks associated with their practice—and a set of mandates, including required risk assessment and other QC-related processes, quality objectives, and quality responses—which should assure that the QC system is designed, implemented, and operated with an appropriate level of rigor;

• Addressing changes in the audit practice environment, including the increasing participation of other firms and other outside resources, the role of firm networks, the evolving use of technology and other resources, and the increasing importance of internal and external firm communications;

• Broadening responsibilities for monitoring and remediation of deficiencies to create a more effective ongoing feedback loop that drives continuous improvement; and

• Requiring a rigorous annual evaluation of the firm's QC system and related reporting to the PCAOB, certified by key firm personnel, to underscore the importance of the annual evaluation of the QC system, reinforce individual accountability, and support PCAOB oversight.

Framework of the QC Standard

The Board carefully considered the characteristics of an appropriate framework for a PCAOB QC standard that could accomplish its regulatory goals. As a threshold issue, section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) provides that PCAOB QC standards must include requirements regarding certain specified matters, and also grants the Board broad authority to include such other requirements as it may prescribe in carrying out its investor protection mandate. The Board also considered how best to capture areas it had identified for improvement and how best to foster consistent, compliant implementation by the firms it regulates. Because the Board believes it is the best structure for accomplishing its goals, the Board adopted the QC 1000 framework as proposed.

The Board notes that the framework has commonalities with other international and domestic standards for firm QC systems, though it goes beyond those requirements in a number of areas, including with regard to firm governance of the largest firms, more specific requirements for monitoring and remediation and the evaluation of the QC system, an ethics and independence component aligned with SEC and PCAOB requirements, and more specific provisions addressing technology and externally communicated firm-level and engagement-level information and metrics. The Board believes that building on a well-understood basic framework, appropriately tailored and strengthened to address its legal and regulatory environment and its investor protection mandate, will enable firms to implement and comply with QC 1000 more effectively. In designing, implementing, and operating their QC systems, firms that are subject to both PCAOB standards and other international or domestic QC standards—which the Board believes constitute a very substantial majority of the firms that perform engagements under PCAOB standards—can leverage the work they have already done and the investments they have already made to comply with those other requirements.

QC 1000

The Board developed QC 1000 with a view to its statutory mandate to protect the interests of investors and the public interest, and the Board believes the new standard will facilitate the consistent preparation and issuance of informative, accurate, and independent engagement reports. The final standard provides a framework for a QC system that is grounded in an ongoing process of proactively identifying and managing risks to quality, with a feedback loop from ongoing monitoring and remediation that should drive continuous improvement, an explicit focus on firm governance and leadership, firm culture, and individual accountability, and specific direction in a number of areas that current PCAOB standards do not address directly.

QC 1000 primarily consists of:

Two process components

• The firm's risk assessment process

• The monitoring and remediation process

Six components that address aspects of the firm's organization and operations

• Governance and leadership

• Ethics and independence

• Acceptance and continuance of engagements

• Engagement performance

• Resources

• Information and communication

Requirements for evaluation of and reporting on the QC system

• Annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the QC system

• Reporting to the PCAOB on the QC system evaluation

The standard also includes requirements regarding individual roles and responsibilities in the QC system and documentation requirements.

Scalability

In the Board's view, the basic objectives of the QC system should be the same for all firms, but the scope of the QC standard and how it applies should take into account the wide disparities in nature and circumstances across registered firms, in particular the extent to which their practices include engagements required to be performed under PCAOB standards and the complexity of such engagements. The risks that firms face, and therefore the specific policies and procedures necessary to appropriately serve investor interests through an effective QC system, vary significantly from the largest firms, operating as part of global networks, to local firms or sole proprietorships. QC 1000 establishes a uniform basic structure to be used by all firms, within which firms will be required to pursue an approach to quality control that is appropriate in light of the risks associated with their particular PCAOB audit practice. Aspects of the new standard are risk-based, and to that extent inherently scalable. In addition, it imposes more stringent requirements for the largest firms in some areas, while enabling smaller firms to comply with the core requirements in ways that take into account these firms' size and the complexity of audits performed by them.

Scalability: Larger PCAOB Audit Practice

The Board believes that firms with a particularly extensive PCAOB audit practice (

i.e.,

those that issue audit reports for more than 100 issuers per year) should be subject to enhanced requirements, given such firms' greater complexity and the relatively greater public interest implicated by the fact that they audit companies that make up

a substantial majority of U.S. public market capitalization. The incremental requirements under QC 1000 for such firms include:

• An external oversight function for the QC system compose of one or more persons who can exercise independent judgment related to the QC system;

• A program for collecting and addressing complaints and allegations that includes confidentiality protections;

• An automated system to track investments that may bear on independence; and

• Required monitoring of in-process engagements.

Scalability: Smaller PCAOB Audit Practice

Many firms perform only a small number of PCAOB engagements per year and are subject to resource constraints that larger PCAOB audit practices do not face. The Board has addressed the particular needs of these firms in a number of ways, including:

• Providing that a single individual may be assigned more than one of the QC system oversight roles required under the standard; and

• Allowing firms that issue five or fewer engagement reports for issuers or broker-dealers in a year to include audits not performed under PCAOB auditing standards in some of their monitoring activities.

Scalability: Firms That Do Not Have Responsibilities in Relation to a PCAOB Engagement

All registered firms will be required to design a QC system that meets the requirements of QC 1000. Firms will be required to implement and operate the QC system in compliance with QC 1000 when they lead an engagement under PCAOB standards, play a substantial role in the preparation or furnishing of an audit report (as defined in PCAOB rules), or have current responsibilities under applicable professional and legal requirements regarding any such engagement. This approach reflects the Board's view that all firms that register with the PCAOB should be appropriately prepared to perform a PCAOB engagement, regardless of whether they are currently subject to requirements with respect to one, while limiting the costs of compliance in circumstances where the risk to investor protection is minimal.

Key Changes From the QC 1000 Proposal

Key changes from the proposal include:

• For the firms with larger PCAOB audit practices, the requirement to include an independent oversight function for their QC system has been refined. Under the final rule, the external quality control function (“EQCF”) will be composed of one or more persons who are not principals or employees of the firm and do not otherwise have a relationship with the firm that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment with regard to matters related to the QC system. The responsibilities of the EQCF may vary across firms but include, at a minimum, evaluating the significant judgments made and the related conclusions reached by the firm when evaluating and reporting on the effectiveness of its QC system.

• The final rule requires firms to report on their QC system evaluation to the PCAOB, but not to the audit committee, as proposed. Legal constraints limit our ability to require public disclosures about the effectiveness of firms' QC systems at the level that some investors have requested. While the final rule recognizes the impediments to requiring public disclosure of QC system evaluation, the Board remains committed to finding additional ways of providing public disclosure to better inform investors about firms and PCAOB audit engagements. To that end, we have separately proposed a set of firm-level and engagement-level metrics across 11 areas that would be reported publicly.

• The timing of the QC system evaluation and reporting has changed. Under the final rule, the evaluation date for the annual evaluation of the QC system is September 30, rather than November 30 as proposed, with Form QC due by November 30 rather than January 15 of the following year. This shift allows more time between the evaluation date and the filing date than we proposed, but still allows sufficient time to generally enable the firm's monitoring activities to identify deficiencies in calendar year-end engagements and the results of that monitoring to be included in the evaluation.

Other Changes to PCAOB Standards, Rules, and Forms

In connection with the adoption of QC 1000, the Board also adopted other changes to PCAOB standards, rules, and forms. These include, among other changes, expanding the auditor's responsibility to respond to deficiencies on completed engagements under an amended and retitled AS 2901,

Responding to Engagement Deficiencies After Issuance of the Auditor's Report,

and related amendments to AT No. 1,

Examination Engagements Regarding Compliance Reports of Brokers and Dealers,

and AT No. 2,

Review Engagements Regarding Exemption Reports of Brokers and Dealers;

and replacing the existing standard ET 102,

Integrity and Objectivity,

with a new standard, EI 1000,

Integrity and Objectivity,

to better align PCAOB ethics requirements with the scope, approach, and terminology of QC 1000.

Effective Date

If approved by the SEC, the final standard and related amendments to auditing standards, rules, and forms will take effect on December 15, 2025, with the initial evaluation of the QC system to be performed as of September 30, 2026, and initial reporting to the PCAOB by November 30, 2026. Firms will be permitted to elect to comply with the requirements of QC 1000, except reporting to the PCAOB on the annual evaluation of the QC system, before the effective date, at any point after SEC approval of the final standard and related amendments.

(b) Statutory Basis

The statutory basis for the proposed rules is Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley.

B. Board's Statement on Burden on Competition

Not applicable. The Board's consideration of the economic impacts of the proposed rules is discussed in section D below.

C. Board's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rules Received From Members, Participants or Others

The Board issued a concept release regarding potential changes to quality control standards for public comment in PCAOB Release No. 2019-003 (Dec. 17, 2019). The Board received 36 written comment letters on the concept release. The Board released the proposed rule amendment for public comment in PCAOB Release No. 2022-006 (Nov. 18, 2022). The Board received 43 written comment letters on its proposal. The Board has carefully considered all comments received. The Board's response to the comments it received and the changes made to the rules in response to the comments received are discussed below.

Background

This section presents background information on this rulemaking, including an overview of existing PCAOB QC requirements and current practice, a review of other developments

since the current QC requirements were adopted, a summary of relevant actions taken by other standard setters, a discussion of PCAOB research and outreach efforts related to QC, the December 2019 concept release and 2022 proposal, and a summary of the key areas the Board has identified for improvement of the QC standards.

Overview of Existing Requirements and Current Practice

1. Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Board to establish certain professional standards, including quality control standards, to be used by registered public accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of audit reports for issuers, brokers, and dealers.

5

Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley requires the PCAOB's QC standards to address:

5

See

sections 101(c)(2) and 103(a)(1) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7211(c)(2), 7213(a)(1). This release uses the terms “issuer,” “broker,” and “dealer” as defined in Sarbanes-Oxley.

See

section 2(a)(7) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7201(7) (defining “issuer”); Sections 110(3) and (4) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7220(3), (4) (defining “broker” and “dealer”);

see also

PCAOB Rules 1001(b)(iii), (d)(iii), (i)(iii) (defining “broker,” “dealer,” and “issuer,” respectively). Entities that are brokers or dealers or both are sometimes referred to herein as “broker-dealers.”

• Monitoring of professional ethics and independence from issuers, brokers, and dealers on behalf of which the firm issues audit reports;

• Consultation within the firm on accounting and auditing questions;

• Supervision of audit work;

• Hiring, professional development, and advancement of personnel;

• Acceptance and continuation of engagements;

• Internal inspection; and

• Such other requirements as the Board may prescribe.

6

6

See

section 103(a)(2)(B) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7213(a)(2)(B).

2. Current PCAOB QC Standards

Under current PCAOB standards, a QC system is a process to provide a firm with reasonable assurance that its personnel comply with applicable professional standards and the firm's standards of quality.

7

The QC system encompasses the firm's organizational structure and the policies adopted and procedures established to provide that reasonable assurance.

8

7

See

paragraph .03 of QC 20, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice.

8

See

QC 20.04.

Current PCAOB QC standards were adopted on an interim, transitional basis in 2003 from QC standards originally developed and issued by the AICPA.

9

They include three general QC standards that apply to all firms.

10

Beyond that, they also include certain requirements of membership in the AICPA's former SEC Practice Section (“SECPS”), which apply only to firms that were SECPS members immediately prior to the adoption of the PCAOB's interim QC standards. Below is an overview of the general QC standards and the SECPS member requirements.

9

See

PCAOB Rule 3400T, Interim Quality Control Standards; see also Establishment of Interim Professional Auditing Standards, PCAOB Rel. No. 2003-006 (Apr. 18, 2003).

10

Under PCAOB Rule 3400T(a), all firms are required to comply with QC standards as described in “the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board's Statements on Quality Control Standards, as in existence on April 16, 2003 (AICPA Professional Standards, QC §§ 20-40 (AICPA 2002)), to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board.”

a. General QC Standards

i. QC 20, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice

QC 20 provides that a firm should have a system of quality control that provides the firm with reasonable assurance that its personnel comply with applicable professional standards and the firm's standards of quality.

11

In the context of engagement performance, the system of quality control should also provide reasonable assurance that the work performed meets applicable regulatory requirements.

12

11

See

QC 20.03.

12

See

QC 20.17.

The firm's quality control policies and procedures should address the following elements:

• Independence, integrity, and objectivity;

• Personnel management;

• Acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements;

• Engagement performance; and

• Monitoring.

13

13

See

QC 20.07.

These elements of quality control are interrelated.

14

Policies and procedures should be established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance with respect to each of these elements of QC. An appropriate individual or individuals in the firm should be assigned responsibility for the design and maintenance of the various quality control policies and procedures.

15

These policies and procedures should be communicated in a manner that provides reasonable assurance that personnel will understand and comply.

16

Additionally, documentation should be prepared to demonstrate compliance with the firm's policies and procedures for the elements of quality control.

17

14

See

QC 20.08.

15

See

QC 20.22.

16

See

QC 20.23.

17

See

QC 20.25.

ii. QC 30, Monitoring a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice

QC 30 addresses how a firm should implement the monitoring element of quality control discussed in QC 20. Monitoring involves an ongoing consideration and evaluation of the following:

• The relevance and adequacy of the firm's policies and procedures;

• The appropriateness of the firm's guidance materials and any practice aids;

• The effectiveness of professional development activities; and

• Compliance with the firm's policies and procedures.

18

18

See

QC 30.02.

Under QC 30, monitoring procedures should enable the firm to obtain reasonable assurance that its system of quality control is effective.

19

A firm's monitoring procedures may include:

19

See

QC 30.03.

• Inspection procedures;

• Pre-issuance or post-issuance review of selected engagements;

• Analysis and assessment of:

• New professional pronouncements;

• Results of independence confirmations;

• Continuing professional education (“CPE”) and other professional development activities undertaken by firm personnel;

• Decisions related to acceptance and continuance of client relationships and engagements;

• Interviews of firm personnel;

• Determination of any corrective actions to be taken and improvements to be made in the quality control system;

• Communication to appropriate firm personnel of any weaknesses identified in the quality control system or in the level of understanding or compliance therewith; and

• Follow-up by appropriate firm personnel to ensure that any necessary modifications are made to the quality control policies and procedures on a timely basis.

20

20

See

QC 30.03.

The nature and extent of monitoring procedures generally depends on the firm's size and the nature and complexity of the firm's practice.

21

QC 30 provides that individuals in a small firm may perform monitoring procedures, including post-issuance review of engagement working papers, reports, and clients' financial

statements, with respect to their own compliance with the firm's QC policies and procedures, but only if such individuals are able to critically review their own performance, assess their own strengths and weaknesses, and maintain an attitude of continual improvement.

22

21

See, e.g.,

QC 30.05, .10, .11.

22

See

QC 30.09, .10.

iii. QC 40, The Personnel Management Element of a Firm's System of Quality Control—Competencies Required by a Practitioner-in-Charge of an Attest Engagement

QC 40 addresses the personnel management element of the quality control system. Personnel management includes hiring, assigning personnel to engagements, professional development, and advancement activities. Policies and procedures should be established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that:

• Those hired possess the appropriate characteristics to enable them to perform competently.

• Work is assigned to personnel having the degree of technical training and proficiency required in the circumstances. Personnel participate in general and industry-specific continuing professional education and other professional development activities that enable them to fulfill responsibilities assigned, and satisfy applicable professional education requirements of the AICPA, and regulatory agencies.

• Personnel selected for advancement have the qualifications necessary for fulfillment of the responsibilities they will be called on to assume.

23

23

See

QC 40.02.

A firm's policies and procedures related to personnel management should be designed to provide a firm with reasonable assurance that practitioners-in-charge of engagements (

i.e.,

engagement partners) possess the kinds of competencies that are appropriate given the circumstances of the client engagement.

24

Competencies are the knowledge, skills, and abilities that enable an engagement partner to be qualified to perform an engagement.

25

Competencies may be gained in various ways, including through relevant industry, governmental, and academic positions.

26

A firm's policies and procedures should ordinarily address the following competencies for an engagement partner:

24

See

QC 40.03.

25

See

QC 40.04.

26

See

QC 40.05.

• Understanding of the role of a system of quality control and a code of professional conduct;

• Understanding of the service to be performed;

• Technical proficiency;

• Familiarity with the industry;

• Professional judgment; and

• Understanding the organization's information technology systems.

27

27

See

QC 40.08.

Under QC 40, these competencies are interrelated.

28

When establishing policies and procedures related to competencies needed by an engagement partner, a firm may need to consider the requirements of policies and procedures established for other elements of quality control.

29

28

See

QC 40.09.

29

See

QC 40.10.

b. SECPS Member Requirements

The SECPS was a division of the AICPA for U.S. firms that audited public companies, which established incremental quality control requirements for its members. The SECPS requirements originally applied to all U.S. firms that audited public companies under AICPA standards. The SECPS ceased to exist following the establishment of the PCAOB.

Under PCAOB rules, certain SECPS requirements still apply to firms that were members of the SECPS as of April 16, 2003.

30

Based on current registration data, the SECPS member requirements apply to 201 (approximately 12% of) PCAOB-registered firms, including 11 of the 14 annually inspected firms in 2023.

30

PCAOB Rule 3400T(b) requires certain firms to comply with QC standards as described in “the AICPA SEC Practice Section's Requirements of Membership (d), (l), (m), (n)(1) and (o), as in existence on April 16, 2003 (AICPA SEC Practice Section Manual 1000.08(d), (j), (m), (n)(1) and (o)), to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board.” The note to Rule 3400T provides that those requirements “only apply to those registered public accounting firms that were members of the AICPA SEC Practice Section on April 16, 2003.” One of the SECPS member requirements, concerning concurring partner review, was superseded in 2009 by the PCAOB's adoption of AS 1220,

Engagement Quality Review.

i. Section 1000.08(d)—Continuing Professional Education of Audit Firm Personnel

Section 1000.08(d) requires SECPS member firms to ensure that all professionals residing in the United States, both CPAs and non-CPAs, participate in at least 20 hours of qualifying CPE every year and at least 120 hours every three years.

31

Professionals who devote at least 25% of their time to performing audit, review, or other attest engagements, or who have responsibility for supervision or review of such engagements, must obtain at least 40% of their CPE hours in subjects related to accounting and auditing.

32

31

See

SECPS 1000.08(d).

32

See

SECPS 1000.08(d).

Additional information on Section 1000.08(d)'s CPE requirements appears in SECPS Section 8000,

Continuing Professional Education Requirements Effective for Educational Years Beginning After May 31, 2002.

33

That information is summarized into three categories: (1) record-keeping for each professional to ensure that each professional adheres to all CPE requirements; (2) adherence to standards for CPE program sponsors for each program sponsored by the member firm; and (3) compliance with additional CPE requirements of the SECPS.

34

Appendix A to Section 8000 includes the AICPA policies related to CPE.

33

See

SECPS 1000.08(d) (referring, in a footnote, to Section 8000).

34

See

SECPS 8000.

ii. Section 1000.08(l)—Communication by Written Statement to All Professional Personnel of Firm Policies and Procedures on the Recommendation and Approval of Accounting Principles, Present and Potential Client Relationships, and the Types of Services Provided

Section 1000.08(l) requires SECPS member firms to communicate, through a written statement, to all professional firm personnel the broad principles that influence the firm's quality control and operating policies and procedures.

35

Periodic communication also must inform professional firm personnel that compliance with those principles is mandatory.

36

35

See

SECPS 1000.08(l). Section 1000.08(l) includes a cross-reference to Appendix H SECPS Section 1000.42,

Illustrative Statement of Firm Philosophy,

which provides an illustration of such a statement.

36

See id.

iii. Section 1000.08(m)—Notification of the Commission of Resignations and Dismissals From Audit Engagements for Commission Registrants

Section 1000.08(m) requires that, if an SECPS member firm has resigned, declined to stand for reelection, or been dismissed as the auditor of an SEC registrant and the registrant has not reported the change in auditors to the SEC in a timely filed Form 8-K, the member firm is to report that the client-auditor relationship has ceased directly, in writing, to the former SEC client and the SEC within five business days.

37

37

See

SECPS 1000.08(m). Section 1000.08(m) cross-references Appendix D SECPS Section 1000.38,

Revised Definition of an SEC Client,

which provides the definition of an SEC client, as well as Appendix I SECPS Section 1000.43,

Standard Form of Letter Confirming the Cessation of the Client-Auditor Relationship,

which provides a standard form of such report.

iv. Section 1000.08(n)—Audit Firm Obligations With Respect to the Policies and Procedures of Correspondent Firms and of Other Members of International Firms or International Associations of Firms

Section 1000.08(n) requires SECPS member firms that are members of, correspondents with, or similarly associated with international firms or international associations of firms to seek adoption of policies and procedures that are consistent with the objectives in Appendix K (SECPS Section 1000.45),

SECPS Member Firms With Foreign Associated Firms That Audit SEC Registrants.

38

38

See

SECPS 1000.08(n).

Appendix K was adopted with the intention of enhancing the quality of SEC filings by issuers whose financial statements are audited by foreign associated firms of SECPS member firms.

39

It requires SECPS member firms to seek adoption by their international organizations or individual foreign associated firms of certain policies and procedures, including:

39

See

SECPS 1000.45.01.

• Procedures to be performed on certain SEC filings by a filing reviewer who is knowledgeable in applicable accounting and auditing standards, independence requirements, and SEC rules and regulations;

• Inspection procedures for a sample of audit engagements performed by foreign associated firms for issuer clients, to be performed by inspection reviewers who are knowledgeable in the same areas as filing reviewers; and

• Policies and procedures under which disagreements between the filing or inspection reviewer and the audit partner-in-charge should be resolved in accordance with the policy of the international organization or the filing or inspection reviewer's firm.

40

40

See id.

v. Section 1000.08(o)—Policies and Procedures To Comply With Independence Requirements

Section 1000.08(o) requires SECPS member firms to have policies and procedures in place to comply with applicable independence requirements.

41

Section 1000.08(o) cross-references Appendix L, SECPS Section 1000.46,

Independence Quality Controls,

which requires firms to establish written policies

42

covering relationships with “restricted entities,” for example, relationships between the restricted entity and the member firm, its benefit plans, and its professionals.

43

These relationships include investments, loans, brokerage accounts, business relationships, employment relationships, proscribed services, and fee arrangements.

44

Firms should maintain a database that includes all restricted entities (“restricted entity list”) and make the restricted entity list available to the firm's professionals and to foreign associated firms.

45

41

See

SECPS 1000.08(o).

42

PCAOB rules do not mandate that writings be paper-based.

See, e.g.,

paragraph .04 of AS 1215,

Audit Documentation

(audit documentation may be in the form of paper, electronic files, or other media).

43

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirement 1).

44

See id.

45

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirements 4, 5, and 6).

A senior-level partner should be designated to oversee the independence policies and maintain and communicate the restricted entity list.

46

The policies and procedures also should require:

46

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirement 5).

• Reviewing the restricted entity list prior to obtaining any security;

• Obtaining independence certifications from the firm's professionals;

• Reporting violations of policies;

• Establishing a monitoring system; and

• Developing policies for potential sanctions for violations of the firm's policies and procedures or professional independence requirements.

47

47

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirement 7).

The policies and procedures should be made available to all professionals and a training program should be established to provide reasonable assurance that professionals understand the policies.

48

48

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirement 3).

3. Observations From Oversight Activities

In the course of conducting inspections of registered public accounting firms

49

and investigating potential violations of PCAOB standards and other related laws and rules governing audits of public companies and audits and attestation engagements of broker-dealers, the PCAOB may identify deficiencies in firms' execution of engagements and in firms' QC systems. Oversight activities also help the PCAOB to identify good practices, both for engagements and for QC systems. The PCAOB also considers information derived from the SEC's enforcement program.

49

The information on inspections and remediation efforts is limited to those firms that are subject to inspection by the PCAOB.

Over time, firms have implemented a number of changes to their QC systems to remediate deficiencies identified through the PCAOB's inspections program.

50

Examples of changes firms have made in response to the Board's inspections include:

51

50

Additional information about the PCAOB remediation process is available on the PCAOB website at

https://pcaobus.org/oversight/inspections/remediation/remediation_process

.

51

Examples are drawn from firms' Rule 4009 submissions. A Rule 4009 submission is a confidential submission prepared by a firm, pursuant to PCAOB Rule 4009,

Firm Response to Quality Control Defects,

concerning the ways in which a firm has addressed a QC criticism. For additional background, see

The Process for Board Determinations Regarding Firms' Efforts to Address Quality Control Criticisms in Inspection Reports,

PCAOB Rel. No. 104-2006-077 (Mar. 21, 2006).

•

Independence

—Creating automated links between the firm's tools for tracking subcontractors and evaluating and tracking business relationships to ensure that independence evaluations are complete and timely;

•

Engagement Performance

—Implementing new policies and procedures for engagement teams to focus on obtaining a thorough understanding of how issuers initiate, record, process, and report significant classes of transactions and how that information is recorded in the financial statements;

•

Resources

—Creating a committee to evaluate partner performance in relation to audit quality and establishing an accountability framework with penalties for negative audit quality events;

•

Monitoring and Remediation

—Adding new leadership positions to the internal inspection program, developing new analysis and reporting of internal inspection findings, and disseminating such findings more broadly; and

•

Monitoring and Remediation

—Adding in-process review and coaching programs to assist engagement teams in certain challenging areas, including internal control over financial reporting (“ICFR”) and accounting estimates.

Observations from PCAOB oversight activities have shown that improvements in quality controls can enhance the quality of engagements.

52

However, PCAOB inspections continue to identify deficiencies related to engagements and the operation of firm QC systems, suggesting that not all firms have made meaningful improvements in these areas. Moreover, the pervasiveness of recent findings regarding such

deficiencies—both in terms of the number of firms affected and the percentage of deficient engagements—suggests that an updated QC standard is needed to drive proactive, systemic, and consistent improvements in audit quality rather than just case-by-case improvements in response to firm-specific findings.

52

See, e.g., Spotlight: Staff Update and Preview of 2021 Inspection

Observations (Dec. 2022) (“2021 Inspection Observations Preview”), at 20-22,

available at https://assets.pcaobus.org/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/documents/staff-preview-2021-inspection-observations-spotlight.pdf?sfvrsn=d2590627_4

;

Staff Inspection Brief: Staff Preview of 2018 Inspections Observations

(May 6, 2019) (“2018 Inspection Observations Preview”), at 1-4,

available at https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/inspections/documents/staff-preview-2018-inspection-observations.pdf?sfvrsn=b5f8cb09_0

.

The following discussion summarizes recent observations from PCAOB inspections

53

and investigations of QC systems, including deficiencies and violations—instances of noncompliance with PCAOB requirements—and good practices that the Board believes support and strengthen QC systems. The Board has taken these observations into account in developing the final QC standard and related amendments, rules, and forms.

53

PCAOB inspections are designed to assess a firm's compliance with PCAOB standards and rules and other applicable regulatory and professional requirements with respect to the firm's QC system and in the portions of engagements selected for review. An inspection does not involve a review of all aspects of a firm's QC system. An inspection also does not necessarily involve a review of all of a firm's engagements, nor is it designed to identify every deficiency in the reviewed engagements. The inspection data are derived from PCAOB inspection reports. Part II of PCAOB inspection reports include criticisms of, and potential defects in, a firm's QC system, to the extent any are identified. The PCAOB includes, in Part II of its inspection reports, deficiencies observed in inspections of individual engagements when the results indicate that the firm's QC system does not provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel will comply with applicable professional standards and regulatory requirements. In evaluating whether engagement observations are indicative of QC deficiencies, PCAOB staff consider the nature, significance, and frequency of deficiencies; related firm methodology, guidance, and practices; and possible root causes.

a. QC Deficiencies and Violations Observed From Oversight Activities

PCAOB observations have generally revealed that while some firms have made improvements to their QC systems, the progress has been uneven. Even taking that progress into account, in roughly a third of the issuer audits the PCAOB inspected from 2020 to 2022, the auditor's opinion was not adequately supported.

54

This suggests that there is significant room for improvement in QC systems' ability to provide reasonable assurance that firm engagements are performed in accordance with applicable professional standards and regulatory requirements.

54

See

Figure 1 below, and accompanying text for an analysis of 2011-2022 inspections data.

As described below, the PCAOB's observations all too frequently indicate that firms' QC systems did not appear to provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel will comply with applicable professional standards in, among others, the areas of: (1) acceptance of engagements; (2) engagement performance; (3) independence, integrity, and objectivity; (4) personnel management; (5) monitoring; and (6) engagement quality reviews. Below are examples of the PCAOB's observations in these areas.

i. Acceptance of Engagements

A firm's QC system should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that it undertakes only those engagements that the firm can reasonably expect to be completed with professional competence.

55

This includes taking into consideration, among other things, the availability of resources to perform an engagement and the competence of those resources. The PCAOB has observed instances where a firm's lack of policies and procedures in the area of engagement acceptance and continuance resulted in accepting new engagements that were not completed with professional competence and resulted in numerous violations of PCAOB auditing standards.

56

55

See

QC 20.15.

56

See, e.g., In the Matter of WithumSmith+Brown, PC,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-010 (Feb. 20, 2024);

In the Matter of Jack Shama and Jack Shama, CPA,

PCAOB Rel.e No. 105-2024-004 (Jan. 23, 2024);

In the Matter of Shandong Haoxin Certified Public Accountants Co., Ltd., LIU Kun, MA Yao, SUN Penghuan, and ZHU Dawei,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-045 (Nov. 30, 2023);

In the Matter of Alfonse Gregory Giugliano, CPA,

SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (“AAER”) No. 4458 (Sept. 12, 2023);

In the Matter of Marcum LLP,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-005 (June 21, 2023);

In the Matter of Marcum LLP,

SEC AAER No. 4423 (June 21, 2023).

ii. Engagement Performance

A properly functioning QC system should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the work performed by engagement personnel meets applicable professional standards, regulatory requirements, and the firm's standards of quality.

57

A QC system cannot provide reasonable assurance if, for example, there are severe, frequent, or widespread deficiencies, or recurring instances of similar types of deficiencies at the engagement level. The PCAOB has observed deficiencies and violations in a range of areas of engagement performance, including, for example:

57

See

QC 20.17.

• Failure to identify and test controls that address risks of material misstatement or sufficiently evaluate review controls;

• Insufficient evaluation of significant assumptions or data used in developing an estimate;

58

58

See, e.g., WithumSmith+Brown, PC,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-010.

• Unwarranted reliance on data or reports used in testing an issuer's financial reporting controls or in substantive testing;

59

59

See, e.g., PKF O'Connor Davies, LLP,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-001.

• Engagement partners' failure to adequately supervise the engagement with due professional care, which contributed to not identifying deficiencies;

60

60

See, e.g., Alfonse Gregory Giugliano, CPA,

SEC AAER No. 4458;

In the Matter of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants, LLP,

SEC AAER No. 4342 (Sept. 29, 2022);

In the Matter of RSM,

SEC AAER No. 4346 (Sept. 30, 2022);

In the Matter of Mancera, S.C., Alejandro Valdez Mendoza, C.P., and Angel Radames Corral Nieblas, C.P.,

SEC AAER No. 4198 (Dec. 17, 2020);

In the Matter of Whitley Penn LLP, Susan Lunn Powell, CPA, Jeffry Shannon Lawlis, CPA, and John Griffin Babb, CPA,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2020-002 (Mar. 24, 2020);

In the Matter of David M. Burns, CPA,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-055 (Dec. 19, 2017);

In the Matter of BDO Auditores, S.L.P., Santiago Sañé Figueras, and José Ignacio Algás Fernández,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-039 (Sept. 26, 2017);

In the Matter of KPMG LLP and John Riordan, CPA,

SEC AAER No. 3888 (Aug. 15, 2017).

• Failure to implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that work is performed and documented;

61

and

61

See, e.g., WithumSmith+Brown, PC,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-010;

In the Matter of SW Audit,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-009 (Feb. 20, 2024);

Shama,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-004;

In the Matter of Haynie & Company,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-001 (Jan. 23, 2024);

Shandong Haoxin Certified Public Accountants Co., Ltd.,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-045;

In the Matter of Deloitte & Touche S.A.S.,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-025 (Sept. 26, 2023);

Marcum LLP,

SEC AAER No. 4423

; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Certified Public Accountants, LLP,

SEC AAER No. 4342;

In the Matter of HLB Mann Judd, Darryl Swindells, and Aidan Smith,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2020-008 (June 29, 2020);

In the Matter of Castillo Miranda y Compañía, S.C., Ignacio García Pareras, Juan Martín Gudiño Casillas, Luis Raúl Michel Domínguez, Juan Francisco Olvera Díaz, Carlos Rivas Ramos, and Bernardo Soto Peñafiel,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-028 (Oct. 31, 2019);

In the Matter of Deloitte Anjin LLC,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-025 (Oct. 31, 2019);

In the Matter of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Auditores Independentes,

PCAOB Rel. No 105-2016-031 (Dec. 5, 2016).

• Failure to ensure audits are performed under PCAOB standards and not another framework.

62

62

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of Dale Matheson Carr-Hilton LaBonte LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-021 (Dec. 14, 2021); In the Matter of WDM Chartered Professional Accountants and Mike Kao, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-016 (Sept. 30, 2021).

iii. Independence, Integrity, and Objectivity

A firm's QC system should also provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain independence—in fact and in appearance—in all required circumstances.

63

Observations relating to auditor independence have been recurring over the last several years.

64

Examples of these observations frequently have included:

63

See

QC 20.09.

64

See, e.g.,

2022 Inspection Observations Preview at 18; 2021 Inspection Observations Preview at 19; PCAOB,

Spotlight: Staff Update and Preview of

2020 Inspection Observations

(Oct. 2021) (“2020 Inspection Observations Preview”), at 12,

available at https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/documents/staff-preview-2020-inspection-observations-spotlight.pdf?sfvrsn=10819041_4

;

Spotlight: Staff Update and Preview of 2019 Inspection Observations

(Oct. 8, 2020) (“2019 Inspection Observations Preview”), at 7,

available at https://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/Staff-Preview-2019-Inspection-Observations-Spotlight.pdf; Staff Inspection Brief: Inspections Outlook for 2019

(Dec. 6, 2018) (“2019 Inspections Outlook”), at 2,

available at https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/inspections/documents/inspections-outlook-for-2019.pdf?sfvrsn=538b8bb7_2

.

• Violations of independence, including financial relationship and partner rotation requirements of 17 CFR 210.2-01;

65

65

See, e.g., In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, James G. Herring, Jr., CPA, James A. Young, CPA, and Curt W. Fochtmann, CPA,

SEC AAER No. 4239 (Aug. 2, 2021);

In the Matter of Raich Ende Malter & Co.,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-009 (Apr. 9, 2019);

In the Matter of Marcum LLP and Alfonse Gregory Giugliano, CPA,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-022 (Sept. 10, 2019);

In the Matter of Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-023 (Sept. 10, 2019).

• Noncompliance by firm personnel in reporting their financial relationships during the independence confirmation process;

• Independence violations related to the firm providing impermissible non-audit services;

66

66

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of Pricewaterhousecoopers LLP, SEC AAER No. 4084 (Sept. 23, 2019); In the Matter of RSM US LLP (f/k/a McGladrey LLP), SEC AAER No. 4066 (Aug. 27, 2019).

• Noncompliance with PCAOB Rule 3524,

Audit Committee Pre-approval of Certain Tax Services,

and PCAOB Rule 3526,

Communication with Audit Committees Concerning Independence;

67

67

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers, S.C., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-017 (Aug. 1, 2019); In the Matter of BDO Magyarorszag Konyvvizsgalo Kft., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-024 (Apr. 12, 2017).

• Improper inclusion of indemnification clauses in engagement letters, which impaired independence based on the general standard of independence prescribed by 17 CFR 210.2-01(b); and

• Failure to implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that firm personnel timely consult on complex, unusual, or unfamiliar independence issues.

68

68

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-014 (Mar. 28, 2024).

The PCAOB has also observed highly concerning, widespread instances where firm personnel have improperly shared answers on examinations required to obtain or maintain professional licenses.

69

The Board has acted decisively in responding to this conduct, which was prevalent both domestically and internationally.

70

The PCAOB has also observed instances where firm personnel have not acted with integrity by altering work papers

71

or failing to cooperate with the Board.

72

69

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of

Navarro Amper & Co.,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-025 (Apr. 10, 2024);

In the Matter of Imelda & Rekan,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-024 (Apr. 10, 2024);

In the Matter of KPMG Accountants N.V.,

PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-022 (Apr. 10, 2024);

In the Matter of

KPMG LLP (United Kingdom), PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-032 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, SEC AAER No. 4313 (June 28, 2022); In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-002 (Feb. 24, 2022); In the Matter of KPMG, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-008 (Sept. 13, 2021); In the Matter of KPMG LLP, SEC AAER No. 4051 (June 17, 2019).

70

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-044 (Nov. 30, 2023); In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-043 (Nov. 30, 2023); KPMG LLP (United Kingdom), PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-032 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-002 KPMG, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-008.

71

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of Jose Daniel Melendez Gimenez, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-035 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of Edgar Mauricio Ramirez Rueda, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-036 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of Marco Alexander Rodriguez Ramirez, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-037 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of KPMG S.A.S., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-034 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of Jonathan B. Taylor, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-025 (Oct. 18, 2022); Castillo Miranda y Compañía, S.C.PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-028 Deloitte Anjin LLC, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-025 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Auditores Independentes, PCAOB Rel. No 105-2016-031.

72

See, e.g.,

Shandong Haoxin Certified Public Accountants Co., Ltd., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-045 Jose Daniel Melendez Gimenez, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-035 Edgar Mauricio Ramirez Rueda, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-036 Marco Alexander Rodriguez Ramirez, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-037 Jose Daniel Melendez Gimenez, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-035 Castillo Miranda y Compañía, S.C., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-028 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Auditores Independentes, PCAOB Rel. No 105-2016-031.

These recurring deficiencies and violations suggest that some firms and their personnel either do not have the requisite understanding of applicable independence and ethics requirements, or, as evidenced by the systemic nature of certain of these violations, do not have appropriate controls in place to prevent violations.

73

73

See

2021 Inspection Observations Preview at 19; 2019 Inspections Outlook at 2.

iv. Personnel Management

The quality of a firm's work ultimately depends on the integrity, objectivity, intelligence, competence, experience, and motivation of personnel who perform, supervise, and review the work.

74

A firm's QC system should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel participate in general and industry-specific CPE and other professional development activities that enable them to fulfill responsibilities assigned and satisfy applicable CPE requirements.

75

A firm's QC system also should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel possess the appropriate characteristics to enable them to perform competently and that work is assigned to personnel having the degree of technical training and proficiency required in the circumstances.

76

74

See

QC 20.12.

75

See

QC 20.13c.

76

See

QC 20.13a. and b.

The PCAOB has observed deficiencies related to compliance with the firm's auditing policies and procedures.

77

The PCAOB also has observed deficiencies and violations where the firm did not assign personnel to engagements who had the training and proficiency required to perform audit work in accordance with PCAOB standards.

78

77

See

2022 Inspection Observations Preview at 18.

78

See, e.g.,

Jack Shama PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2024-004 ; In the Matter of Hall & Company Certified Public Accountants & Consultants, Inc., and Anthony J. Price, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-029 (Nov. 3, 2022); In the Matter of PKF O'Connor Davies, LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-001 (Jan. 25, 2022); In the Matter of WDM Chartered Professional Accountants, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-016 (Sept. 30, 2021); In the Matter of Grant Thornton LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-054 (Dec. 19, 2017); BDO Auditores, S.L.P., Santiago Sañé Figueras, and José Ignacio Algás Fernández, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-039.

v. Monitoring

A firm's QC system should provide the firm with reasonable assurance that its policies and procedures are suitably designed and effectively applied.

79

The PCAOB has observed situations where a firm's internal inspection procedures did not detect significant audit deficiencies or the firm did not make changes to address repeated identified audit deficiencies.

80

These deficiencies and violations were subsequently identified through SEC and PCAOB oversight.

81

79

See

QC 20.20.

80

See, e.g.,

2022 Inspection Observations Preview at 19.

81

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of KPMG Assurance and Consulting Services LLP and Sagar Pravin Lakhani, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-033 (Dec. 6, 2022); In the Matter of Friedman LLP, SEC AAER No. 4339 (Sept. 23, 2022); In the Matter of BMKR LLP and Joseph Mortimer, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-003 (Feb. 24, 2022); PKF O'Connor Davies, LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-001 WDM Chartered Professional Accountants, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-016 ; In the Matter of Haskell & White LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-006 (Aug. 13, 2021); In the Matter of RBSM LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-004 (Aug. 9, 2021); Castillo Miranda y Compañía, S.C., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-028 Marcum LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-022

Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-023 PricewaterhouseCoopers, S.C., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-017; In the Matter of Bharat Parikh & Associates Chartered Accountants, Bharatkumar Balmukund Parikh, FCA, and Anuj Bharatkumar Parikh, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2019-003 (Mar. 19, 2019); Grant Thornton, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-054.

vi. Engagement Quality Reviews

Both the PCAOB and SEC have identified deficiencies and violations in audit areas that require evaluation by the engagement quality reviewer (“EQR”),

82

which suggests the EQR did not perform the evaluation with due professional care.

83

Additionally, for certain broker-dealer audit and attestation engagements, the PCAOB has observed instances where engagement quality reviews were not performed or sufficiently documented

84

and policies and procedures did not provide reasonable assurance that engagement quality reviews were performed with due professional care.

85

82

See, e.g., Spotlight: Inspection Observations Related to Engagement Quality

Reviews (Oct. 2023),

available at https://assets.pcaobus.org/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/documents/eqr-spotlight.pdf?sfvrsn=95a345e6_4;

2022 Inspection Observations Preview at 19; 2021 Inspection Observations Preview at 20; 2018 Inspection Observations Preview, at 4; 2020 Inspection Observations Preview at 12.

83

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of RAM Associates & Company LLC and Parameswara K. Ramachandran, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-021 (Aug. 8, 2023); In the Matter of Total Asia Associates PLT, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-007 (June 23, 2023); In the Matter of RT LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2023-002 (Apr. 11, 2023); In the Matter of Donald R. Burke, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-012 (Sept. 29, 2021); RBSM LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-00; In the Matter of Cheryl L. Gore, CPA and Stanley R. Langston, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2021-020 (Dec. 14, 2021); Whitley Penn LLP, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2020-002; In the Matter of Helen R. Liao, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2020-014 (Sept. 24, 2020); In the Matter of Crowe Horwath LLP, Joseph C. Macina, CPA, and Kevin V. Wydra, CPA, SEC AAER No. 4007 (Dec. 21, 2018); In the Matter of BDO Auditores, S.L.P., PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2017-039.

84

See, e.g.,

In the Matter of Alvarez & Associates, Inc., Certified Public Accountants, and Vicente Alvarez, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-039 (Dec. 21, 2022); In the Matter of Citrin Cooperman & Company, LLP, Joseph Puglisi, CPA, Mark Schniebolk, CPA, and John Cavallone, CPA, PCAOB Rel. No. 105-2022-007 (May 11, 2022).

85

See Annual Report on the Interim Inspection Program Related to Audits of Brokers and Dealers,

PCAOB Rel. No. 2023-005 (Aug. 10, 2023) (“2022 Broker-Dealer Inspection Report”), at 31.

b. Good Practices Observed From Inspections

The following observations regarding good QC practices are based on inspections in recent years.

86

A good QC practice could be a procedure, technique, or methodology that is appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed in relation to a firm's size and the nature and complexity of the firm's practice. The Board has taken these observations into account in its consideration of QC 1000, while recognizing that the nature, extent, and formality of the design, implementation, and operation of QC systems can vary across firms.

86

See, e.g.,

2022 Inspection Observations Preview; 2021 Inspection Observations Preview; 2020 Inspection Observations Preview; 2019 Inspection Observations Preview; and 2018 Inspection Observations Preview.

i. Well-Defined QC System

A well-defined QC system includes all key elements of quality control and is supported by documentation that helps to promote firm personnel's understanding and consistent application of the firm's QC system. Helpful characteristics that the PCAOB has observed in some firms' QC systems include:

• Narratives and process flows that articulate how and where quality objectives fit within the QC processes and define risks posed to those quality objectives, including considering what could go wrong along the way;

87

and

87

See

2021 Inspection Observations Preview at 22; 2019 Inspection Observations Preview at 4.

• Developing risk and control matrices that include well-defined controls.

ii. Accountability for Audit Quality

Leadership involvement in and commitment to a firm's QC system sets the tone at the top and drives clear expectations regarding the importance of audit quality. The PCAOB observed positive behaviors where firms have placed an emphasis on the importance of audit quality through extending accountability beyond engagement partners to other key leaders at the firm, such as audit quality leaders, technical experts, and office leaders, through performance management processes.

88

88

See

2018 Inspection Observations Preview at 2.

iii. Root Cause Analysis of Identified Deficiencies

Identifying causal factors for engagement and QC deficiencies (

i.e.,

root cause analysis) can enable a firm to determine the appropriate response to and remediation of deficiencies and modify policies and procedures to prevent similar occurrences in the future. The PCAOB has observed that thorough root cause analyses drive better remediation of identified deficiencies. If root cause analysis is performed by a centralized team, having a defined process to share data and lessons learned outside of the root cause analysis team may further enhance the performance of a firm's QC system.

Through its inspection activities the PCAOB has observed that some firms' root cause analysis programs have significantly evolved since the PCAOB was formed. The PCAOB has observed that some firms' approach to root cause analysis includes one or more of the following:

• Interviews with engagement teams and firm leadership;

• Use of proprietary tools to analyze large amounts of data;

• Root cause analysis training and the use of templates to facilitate consistency;

• Consideration of available performance metrics, such as engagement hours, training records, audit milestone dates, and partner experience years; and

• Consideration of positive quality events (

i.e.,

actions, behaviors, or conditions that resulted in positive outcomes, such as where aspects of the firm's QC system operated effectively or where no engagement deficiencies were identified for individual engagements) to identify whether such actions, behaviors, or conditions were present on engagements where QC deficiencies were identified.

iv. Timely Monitoring and Evaluation Activities

Timely and effective monitoring activities drive high-quality audits. The PCAOB has observed several good practices followed by some firms in their monitoring activities, including:

• Increased real-time monitoring of in-process audit engagements, for example, through pre-issuance reviews or coaching programs;

89

89

See

2020 Inspection Observations Preview at 4, 13.

• Formalized monitoring processes and actions for defined triggering events, including restatements, internal and external inspection results, and results of peer reviews; and

• Mature QC processes including internal self-certifications of the effectiveness of QC components and sub-components.

Other Developments Since the Adoption of Current PCAOB QC Standards

Since the PCAOB's current QC standards were first developed and issued, the auditing environment has changed significantly. The current QC standards were developed in the context of the self-regulatory peer-review system that existed before the establishment of the PCAOB. Therefore, they were not written with a view to inspection and enforcement by a regulator and do not address the current regulatory environment, including firms' responsibilities with respect to

information brought to their attention through the PCAOB inspection process.

Since the QC standards were established, there have been significant developments in the availability and use of technologies and data analytic techniques, the organizational structure and management of firms have changed, and some firms have significantly increased their focus on governance and quality control.

For example, there have been significant developments in the use of technology by firms in relation to QC activities and performing engagements. Some firms have made significant investments in internally developed tools for use in the audit. The increased availability of “off-the-shelf” technologies, such as analytical software packages, has made some tools more readily available for use by firms. Firms developing or acquiring new technology-based tools, making changes to existing tools, and training firm personnel on how and when to use such tools have had impacts on QC. Many of these tools may reduce risk, for example by reducing the possibility of human error and enabling the analysis of whole populations of transactions rather than samples. But they may also create new risks if they do not work as intended or are used incorrectly.

Furthermore, some firm management and organizational structures have evolved to include more focus on centralization and a globally consistent methodology. Some firms have increased their use of services and resources supplied by firm networks, affiliates, and third-party providers. For example, some global networks are increasingly imposing requirements on member firms regarding the use of methodologies, technology, and policies and procedures that are developed or established at the network level. Some firms have also increased their use of shared service centers to assist with QC activities or performing engagements. In addition, some firms have changed their governance structures either voluntarily or due to changes in legal requirements.

90

At the same time, some firms have begun to publish “transparency reports” that seek to inform the public about the firm's operations and quality control systems and practices.

90

See, e.g.,

the UK Financial Reporting Council,

Audit Firm Governance Code

(Apr. 2022)

available at https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5af7cdb7-a093-4da8-94d7-f4486596e68c/FRC-Audit-Firm-Governance-Code_April-2022.pdf

, and the Japan Financial Services Agency,

Audit Firm Governance Code

(Mar. 2017)

available at https://www.fsa.go.jp/news/28/sonota/20170331-auditfirmgc/3.pdf

.

Additionally, some firms have strengthened their approaches to firm governance and leadership, incentive systems, culture, and accountability. For example, some firms have added external parties to oversight roles. Some firms have also augmented their monitoring and remediation processes, including through implementing or enhancing ongoing monitoring activities and internal inspection processes, establishing processes for considering PCAOB inspection findings, performing root cause analysis, and increasing remediation efforts. Observations from PCAOB oversight activities have shown that improvements in quality controls can enhance the quality of audits.

91

However, as noted above, PCAOB oversight activities continue to identify pervasive deficiencies, suggesting that many firms have meaningful improvements to make.

91

See, e.g.,

2018 Inspection Observations Preview at 1-4.

There have also been notable advances in internal control, quality management, and enterprise risk management frameworks and approaches, including the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”) framework for internal control

92

and the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”) quality control standard ISO 9000:2015.

93

Many of these share important commonalities, stressing active involvement of leadership, focus on risk, clearly defined objectives, objective-oriented processes, monitoring, and remediation of identified issues. Academic research suggests that these frameworks improve company performance.

94

92

See, e.g.,

COSO,

Internal Control-Integrated Framework

(May 2013). An executive summary of COSO's internal control framework is available at

https://www.coso.org/_files/ugd/3059fc_1df7d5dd38074006bce8fdf621a942cf.pdf

.

93

More information about ISO 9000:2015 is available at

https://www.iso.org/standard/45481.html

.

94

See

Benefits of related frameworks below.

Actions by Other Standard Setters

Following is a brief description of the quality control standards adopted by the IAASB and the AICPA.

1. IAASB

The IAASB identified concerns related to its then effective QC standard, International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC) 1,

Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Statements, and Other Assurance and Related Services Engagements,

and decided to take steps to improve the standard. In December 2020, the IAASB released a suite of new quality management standards, including International Standard on Quality Management 1,

Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements

(“ISQM 1”),

95

which became effective on December 15, 2022.

96

95

In addition to ISQM 1, the IAASB adopted two other standards, International Standard on Quality Management 2,

Engagement Quality Reviews

(“ISQM 2”), and International Standard on Auditing 220 (Revised),

Quality Management for an Audit of Financial Statements

(“ISA 220 (Revised)”). ISQM 2 operates at the firm level, and is analogous to PCAOB AS 1220,

Engagement Quality Review.

ISA 220 (Revised) operates at the engagement level and deals with the engagement partner's and the engagement team's responsibilities for quality management for an audit of financial statements. Similar topics are addressed in PCAOB standards in AS 1201,

Supervision of the Audit Engagement.

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ISQM 1 sets forth eight components of a QC system that operate in an iterative and integrated manner, as well as other requirements.

See

IAASB Fact Sheet,

Introduction to ISQM 1, Quality Management for Firms that Perform Audits or Reviews of Financial Statements, or Other Assurance or Related Services Engagements

(Dec. 2020),

available at https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/IAASB-ISQM-1-Fact-Sheet.pdf

.

2. AICPA

In May 2022, the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA adopted new quality management standards designed to improve a firm's risk assessment and audit quality, including Statement on Quality Management Standards (SQMS) No. 1,

A Firm's System of Quality Management

(“SQMS 1”).

97

The AICPA's quality management standards closely align with the IAASB's quality management standards, adapted for private companies in the United States. The new AICPA standards will become effective on December 15, 2025.

97

The AICPA's other QC standards are SQMS No. 2, Engagement Quality Reviews; Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 146, Quality Management for an Engagement Conducted in Accordance With Generally Accepted Auditing Standards; and Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review Services (SSARS) No. 26, Quality Management for an Engagement Conducted in Accordance With Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services.

PCAOB Outreach and Research

The Board and its advisory groups have long considered the potential for improvements to PCAOB QC standards. For example, in 2010, the Standing Advisory Group (“SAG”) discussed a potential QC rulemaking project, including considerations and potential challenges in designing and implementing a QC system.

98

In 2014,

the SAG discussed how QC standards may benefit from stronger requirements and other enhancements with respect to, for example, firm culture and tone at the top, firm risk assessment, and monitoring of the quality control system, including use of root cause analyses.

99

In 2018, the SAG discussed whether additional or more specific direction in the quality control standards with respect to governance and leadership would lead to enhancements in firm quality control systems.

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Advisory group members have generally supported including requirements concerning firm governance and leadership in PCAOB QC standards.

98

See

Briefing Paper for the Standing Advisory Group,

Designing and Implementing a System of Quality Control

(Oct. 13, 2010). An archive of SAG

meeting agendas, briefing papers, and webcasts is available at

https://pcaobus.org/about/advisory-groups/archive-advisory/standing-advisory-group/sagmeetingarchive

. The materials for the Oct. 13-14, 2010, SAG meeting are available at

https://pcaobus.org/news-events/events/event-details/standing-advisory-group-meeting_476

.

99

See

Briefing Paper for the Standing Advisory Group,

Initiatives to Improve Audit Quality—Root Cause Analysis, Audit Quality Indicators, and Quality Control Standards

(June 24, 2014) (“June 2014 SAG Briefing Paper”). The materials for the June 24-25, 2014, SAG meeting are

available at https://pcaobus.org/news-events/events/event-details/pcaob-standing-advisory-group-meeting_772

.

100

See

Briefing Paper for the Standing Advisory Group,

Quality Control: Governance and Leadership

(Nov. 29, 2018). The materials for the Nov. 29, 2018, SAG meeting are

available at https://pcaobus.org/news-events/events/event-details/standing-advisory-group-meeting_1137

.

Rulemaking History

On December 17, 2019, the Board issued the concept release to explore the possibility of revising PCAOB QC standards. The concept release described an approach similar to the approach taken by the then-proposed ISQM 1, with certain differences and alternative requirements to specifically address the PCAOB's objectives, including establishing requirements that:

• Align with U.S. Federal securities law, SEC rules, and other PCAOB standards and rules;

• Retain important topics in current PCAOB QC standards;

• Address specific emerging risks and problems observed through PCAOB oversight activities; and

• Provide more definitive direction to prompt appropriate implementation of certain requirements.

101

101

See

Concept Release at 6.

The Board received 36 comment letters in response to the concept release.

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Commenters included firms and related groups, investors and related groups, academics, trade groups, and others.

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The comment letters received in response to the concept release are available on the Board's website in Docket 046.

On November 18, 2022, the Board issued a proposal to supersede current PCAOB QC standards with an integrated, risk-based standard, QC 1000,

A Firm's System of Quality Control,

that would apply to all registered firms. The Board received 42 comment letters in response to the proposal.

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Commenters included firms and related groups, investors and related groups, academics, trade groups, and others. The Board has considered all comments in developing the final standard and related amendments, and commenter input is included where relevant in the discussion that follows.

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The comment letters received in response to the proposal are available on the Board's website in Docket 046. In addition to 42 letters received from commenters, Docket 046 includes an analysis prepared by the PCAOB Office of Economic and Risk Analysis.

Areas of Improvement to the QC Standards

Taking into account the foregoing considerations, as well as careful consideration of comments received, the Board adopted changes to its QC standards that it believes will drive significant improvements in firms' QC systems, by:

• Emphasizing accountability, firm culture and the “tone at the top,” and firm governance through requirements for specified roles within and responsibilities for the QC system, including at the highest levels of the firm; quality objectives that link compensation to quality; and, for the largest firms, the requirement of an independent perspective on firm governance;

• Striking the right balance between a risk-based approach to QC—which should drive firms to proactively identify and manage the specific risks associated with their practice—and a set of mandates, including mandatory quality objectives; mandatory processes for risk assessment, monitoring and remediation, and QC system evaluation; and specific requirements in key areas—which should assure that the QC system is designed, implemented and operated with an appropriate level of rigor;

• Addressing changes in the audit practice environment, including the increasing participation of other firms and other outside resources, the role of firm networks, the evolving use of technology and other resources, and the increasing importance of internal and external firm communications;

• Broadening responsibilities for monitoring and remediation of deficiencies to encourage an ongoing feedback loop that drives continuous improvement; and

• Requiring a rigorous annual evaluation of the firm's QC system and related reporting to the PCAOB, certified by key personnel, to underscore the importance of the annual evaluation of the QC system, reinforce individual accountability, and support PCAOB oversight.

In the Board's view, the basic objectives of the QC system should be the same for all firms, but the scope of the QC standard and how it applies should take into account wide disparities in nature and circumstances across registered firms, in particular the extent to which their practices include engagements required to be performed under PCAOB standards, and the complexity of such engagements. The risks that firms face, and therefore the specific policies and procedures necessary to appropriately serve investor interests through an effective QC system, vary significantly from the largest firms, operating as part of global networks, to local firms or sole proprietorships. The scalability of the new QC standard is discussed in greater detail below.

QC 1000: Basic Structure, Terminology, and Scalability

Basic Structure

1. Considerations Informing the Structure of QC 1000

Informed by its observations and assessment of changes to auditing practice, the Board believes it is critical that its new QC standard strikes an appropriate balance between risk-based elements, which should drive firms to proactively identify and manage the specific risks associated with their practice, and a set of mandates to assure that the QC system is designed, implemented, and operated with an appropriate level of rigor. Moreover, the Board believes the new QC standard should foster a proactive approach to QC that drives continuous improvement. Based in part on its observations, the Board also believes its new standard should include specific requirements for some important areas of the QC system that are addressed more generally in current PCAOB QC standards, such as firm governance and leadership, technology and other firm resources, and firm communications.

QC 1000 addresses all the areas of QC that Sarbanes-Oxley requires PCAOB QC standards to address, which the Board believes will provide a robust framework for a firm's QC system. It incorporates eight components, which are based on mandatory elements and

mandatory processes that create a basic structure applicable to all firms. For example, as discussed in more detail below, QC 1000 establishes mandatory, outcome-based quality objectives and mandatory processes for risk assessment and monitoring and remediation. Within the structure created by these mandates, firms will develop their own policies and procedures based on the specific risks created by their circumstances and practice. QC 1000 also includes requirements for annual evaluation of the QC system and reporting to the PCAOB on that evaluation, which the Board believes will add rigor and accountability to the firm's evaluation of whether the QC system has met its objectives, and will strengthen the feedback loop that drives continuous improvement.

The structure itself addresses areas that current PCAOB standards do not directly address, such as firm governance and leadership, technology and other firm resources, and firm communications. In addition, to the extent it is principles-based and focused on the specific risks faced by the firm, the structure is inherently scalable and can be applied to firms of all sizes and circumstances.

The structure of QC 1000 has commonalities with the structure of ISQM 1 and SQMS 1. While the approach taken in ISQM 1 and SQMS 1 has informed the Board's thinking, the Board has carefully analyzed every aspect of that approach and considered where to align and where to further strengthen the PCAOB standard by including alternative or incremental provisions that the Board believes will better serve investor protection and the public interest. The Board believes that building on a well-understood basic framework, appropriately tailored and strengthened to address its legal and regulatory environment and its investor protection mandate, will enable firms to implement and comply with QC 1000 more effectively. In designing, implementing, and operating their QC systems, firms that are subject to both PCAOB standards and IAASB or AICPA QC standards—which the Board believes constitute a very substantial majority of firms that perform engagements under PCAOB standards

104

—can leverage the work they have already done and the investments they have already made to comply with those other requirements.

104

See

below for a discussion of the assumptions regarding the baseline.

Many commenters, including firms and related groups, were generally supportive of structuring QC 1000 in a manner similar to the structure of ISQM 1 and SQMS 1. However, several commenters, including firms and related groups, suggested that further alignment should be considered, and any differences should be minimized. Several commenters suggested that firms would be subject to at least two different quality management/quality control systems, and commented that this would be impractical for firms to operate. The Board does not believe that QC 1000 conflicts with the requirements of other standard setters or that anything prevents firms from developing a single QC system for their entire practice that satisfies both PCAOB requirements and other professional standards to which the firm is subject. The Board acknowledges certain differences between QC 1000 and the quality management standards set by other standard setters, in particular areas where QC 1000 establishes additional or more stringent requirements. However, the Board believes that quality responses developed by firms under QC 1000 can be considered by firms for the purposes of other quality management standards to which they are subject, reducing the need for two or more separate QC systems.

One investor-related group did not support the framework of the standard, arguing that ISQM 1 is a process-driven and compliance-oriented framework that does not encourage firms to meaningfully enhance their QC systems for the benefit of investors. Another investor expressed concern regarding the reliance on ISQM 1 in the development of QC 1000 on the basis that it does not always reflect the best interests of investors. The Board continues to believe that a common basic structure among quality control standards is beneficial. This is not only cost beneficial, but it also supports a firm's ability to operate a single, consistent QC system over its whole practice, which the Board believes ultimately supports audit quality. Where appropriate, QC 1000 goes beyond ISQM 1 to incorporate more detailed or more stringent provisions that are specifically relevant to the U.S. regulatory environment and investors.

Several commenters supported a principles-based approach to QC 1000. However, some commenters suggested that the specified quality responses throughout the standard impose prescriptive requirements that are not consistent with maintaining a principles-based approach. Others expressed a different perspective, suggesting that the standard was too principles-based, providing the firms with too much flexibility in designing, implementing, and operating their QC systems. For example, an investor expressed concern that a principles-based approach does not always reflect the best interests of investors. Other investor-related groups expressed concerns that a principles-based approach allows audit firms to conduct their own risk assessment and design their own controls to manage risks, including making the determination of whether QC deficiencies exist and are remediated without any public awareness or accountability. One of these investor-related groups suggested that an emphasis on a risk-based approach will result in little to no change at the largest auditing firms as they believe that this approach is already embedded in their QC systems. Another investor-related group commented that the proposed standard set the bar too low and failed to focus on audit quality and accountability such that it would only perpetuate the status quo.

The Board has retained the approach as proposed. The Board believes that QC 1000 strikes the right balance between mandatory and risk-based elements. As discussed in more detail below, QC 1000 establishes a mandatory minimum set of outcome-based quality objectives that apply to all firms. Firms generally cannot omit or modify any of the quality objectives set out in the standard. Therefore, firms do not determine the criteria by which their QC systems will be assessed, only the means by which they will meet those criteria. Moreover, QC 1000 establishes requirements with which all firms will have to comply for roles and responsibilities within the QC system and the firm's risk assessment process, monitoring and remediation process, and evaluation process, as well as specified quality responses applicable to all firms in areas that the Board believes justify a more prescriptive approach. It also includes evaluation and reporting requirements that the Board believes will add accountability and rigor to the annual evaluation.

Within that framework, QC 1000 requires firms to develop the policies and procedures they need to achieve the quality objectives and the overall objective of the QC system. The Board believes this more principles-based aspect of the standard will prompt firms to identify and focus on the most relevant risks to quality in the context of their own practice and will make QC 1000 appropriately scalable. This approach also allows for the standard to be operable by firms of all sizes. Smaller PCAOB audit practices can scale down their responses to fit the risks associated

with a small practice, and as the practice grows, the firm can scale up to respond to new quality risks. In addition, the Board believes that this approach will make it less likely that the standard will need to be amended in the future in response to changes in the auditing environment, including the use of technology.

2. Components of the QC System

Under QC 1000, the QC system consists of eight components that are designed to be highly integrated:

Two process components:

• The firm's risk assessment process

• The monitoring and remediation process

Six components that address aspects of the firm's organization and operations:

• Governance and leadership

• Ethics and independence

• Acceptance and continuance of engagements

• Engagement performance

• Resources

• Information and communication

The risk assessment process applies to these six components, requiring firms to:

• Establish outcome-based “quality objectives,” including those specified throughout the standard (

i.e.,

the desired outcomes to be achieved by the firm with respect to that component);

105

105

“Quality objectives” are defined in QC 1000.A10.

• Identify and assess “quality risks” to the quality objectives;

106

106

“Quality risks” are defined in QC 1000.A12.

• Design and implement “quality responses” (

i.e.,

policies and procedures to address quality risks);

107

and

107

“Quality responses” are defined in QC 1000.A11.

• Establish policies and procedures to monitor internal and external changes that may require modifications to the quality objectives, quality risks, or quality responses.

The monitoring and remediation process applies to all of the components of the QC system, including monitoring and remediation itself (

i.e.,

firms are required to identify and remediate deficiencies that are observed in their monitoring and remediation activities).

The firm is also required to evaluate and report on its QC system annually, based on the results of its monitoring and remediation activities.

The following diagram illustrates the structure of the firm's QC system under QC 1000:

BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

EN11JN24.000

BILLING CODE 8011-01-C

3. Quality Objectives, Quality Risks, and Quality Responses, Including Specified Quality Responses

For each of the six components to which the risk assessment process applies, QC 1000 specifies required quality objectives. While QC 1000 provides some flexibility with regard to the quality risks that firms are required to identify and the quality responses that firms are required to develop to address those risks, it does not provide the same flexibility with regard to quality objectives. Instead, quality objectives that will apply to all firms are specified in the standard. Firms can establish additional quality objectives—indeed, they are required to do so if necessary to achieve the objective of the QC system—but they generally cannot omit or modify any of the quality objectives set out in the standard. The Board believes that, for many firms, the quality objectives specified in the standard are likely to be comprehensive, and does not expect in the current environment that additional quality objectives would generally be necessary. However, the Board also recognizes that the nature and circumstances of a firm and its engagements will vary and the environment may change. Accordingly, firms are required to establish additional quality objectives, if necessary.

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The quality objectives established by this standard set forth a floor rather than a ceiling.

108

See

“The Firm's Risk Assessment Process” below.

Firms are required to identify and assess quality risks to the achievement of the established quality objectives. They are required to develop quality responses to address the assessed quality risks. Quality responses are defined as policies and procedures

designed and implemented by the firm to address quality risks; policies are statements of what should, or should not, be done to address an assessed quality risk, and procedures are actions to implement and comply with policies. As proposed, the definition of quality responses provided that policies “may be documented or explicitly stated in communications.” In the final rule, that sentence was eliminated to avoid confusion or potential conflict with the documentation requirements set out in QC 1000.81-83.

The correspondence across quality objectives, quality risks, and quality responses is generally not one-to-one. Most quality objectives are likely to have multiple quality risks. Some quality risks may affect one or more quality objectives, either within a single component or across several components, and may require multiple quality responses. Some quality responses may address multiple quality risks.

Quality responses would typically be specific to the firm, to respond to its particular assessed quality risks. QC 1000 also includes some specified quality responses, which are mandatory for the firms to which they apply. Specified quality responses carry requirements from current PCAOB standards into QC 1000 or provide new requirements that the Board believes are important to a firm's QC system. The specified quality responses are not intended to be comprehensive; on the contrary, for most of the components of the firm's QC system, the standard includes only a few specified quality responses, and for the engagement performance component there are none. As a result, the specified quality responses alone will not be sufficient to enable the firm to achieve all established quality objectives; firms are required to design and implement their own quality responses. Both the specified quality responses and the quality responses the firm designs and implements on its own are critical in addressing quality risks. The following graphic illustrates the relationship between all quality responses (

i.e.,

the quality responses necessary to achieve all established quality objectives) and the specified quality responses established in QC 1000:

EN11JN24.001

Terminology

This section discusses some of the terminology used throughout QC 1000. Appendix A to QC 1000 defines several terms used in the standard.

Two commenters indicated that the proposed terminology was understandable and appropriate, but most commenters on the topic requested that the terminology used in QC 1000 be consistent with the terminology used by other standard setters, primarily to avoid potential confusion and ensure that the process of evaluating the QC system and the conclusion reached as to its effectiveness would be the same under both standards. The Board continues to believe that its proposed terminology is necessary to capture the basic concepts used in QC 1000, which differ in some respects from the concepts used by other standard setters, particularly as regards “other participants,” as the Board has defined that term, and the annual QC system evaluation process, which is grounded in the concepts of “engagement deficiency,” “QC deficiency,” and “major QC deficiency.” While this

approach will result in an incremental burden for firms that seek to comply with other QC standards as well as QC 1000, the Board believes that the burden is justified. The Board also believes that, just as firms can perform audits under different auditing standards, they can learn to implement and operate a QC system under different QC standards. Accordingly, with the clarifications described below, the Board adopted the terminology substantially as proposed.

1. Applicable Professional and Legal Requirements

As discussed in more detail below, compliance with applicable professional and legal requirements is a fundamental concept under QC 1000, driving the objective of the QC system as well as many quality objectives and specified quality responses. The proposed standard defined “applicable professional and legal requirements” as

• Professional standards, as defined in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(vi);

• Rules of the PCAOB that are not professional standards; and

• To the extent related to the obligations and responsibilities of accountants or auditors or to the conduct of engagements, rules of the SEC, other provisions of U.S. Federal securities law, and other applicable statutory, regulatory, and other legal requirements.

Two commenters supported the definition as proposed. One commenter recommended including the profession's ethical standards explicitly. Two commenters stated the phrase “other applicable statutory, regulatory, and other legal requirements” could be read broadly and extend beyond regulations that directly bear on the conduct of audit engagements. Another commenter suggested amending the definition of “professional standards” in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(vi) to refer to “quality control standards” rather than “quality control policy and procedures.”

In response to comments, the Board made changes to the third, more general clause of the definition. As one commenter suggested, the Board expanded the definition to explicitly mention ethics laws and regulations.

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While the definition as proposed encompassed applicable ethics requirements, the Board believes an express reference will help to remind firms and individuals of the centrality of ethics considerations. The Board also refined the definition to make clear that it encompasses statutory, regulatory, and other legal requirements beyond professional standards and other PCAOB rules “[t]o the extent related to the obligations and responsibilities of accountants or auditors in the conduct of

engagements

or in relation to the QC system.” This change is designed to limit the breadth of the definition to the relevant circumstances.

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These include those arising under state law or the law of other jurisdictions (

e.g.,

obligations regarding client confidentiality).

See

QC 1000 footnote 10.

The phrase “quality control policies and procedures,” used in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(vi), is drawn from section 110(5) of Sarbanes-Oxley. The Board believes its rule should continue to align with that statutory provision.

This definition captures all professional and legal requirements specifically related to engagements under PCAOB standards of issuers and SEC-registered broker-dealers, including relevant accounting, auditing, and attestation standards, PCAOB and SEC rules, other provisions of Federal securities law, other relevant laws and regulations (

e.g.,

state law and rules governing accountants), applicable ethics law and rules, and other legal requirements related to the obligations and responsibilities of accountants or auditors in the conduct of the firm's engagements or in relation to the QC system.

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It does not encompass requirements that apply to businesses generally, such as tax laws, safety regulations, and employment law.

110

For avoidance of doubt, the requirements relating to compliance with applicable professional and legal requirements are meant to make clear that, as relates to engagements subject to PCAOB standards, all applicable professional and legal requirements must be followed. The requirement does not suggest that application of “other applicable statutory, regulatory, and other legal requirements” could supersede rules of the SEC, other provisions of U.S. Federal securities law, rules of the PCAOB that are not professional standards, or PCAOB professional standards. On the contrary, requirements relating to “applicable professional and legal requirements” are meant to highlight the importance of adhering to other requirements when those requirements do not conflict with or abridge requirements of Federal securities laws, PCAOB rules, or PCAOB standards.

2. Engagement

The proposed standard defined “engagement” as (1) any audit, attestation, review, or other engagement under PCAOB standards performed by a firm, or (2) any engagement in which a firm “play[s] a substantial role in the preparation or furnishing of an audit report” as defined in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(ii).

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In the final standard, the term “engagement” encompasses the same scope as it did in the proposal—when the firm leads an engagement as lead auditor or practitioner, or plays a substantial role—but the definition has been restructured for clarity.

111

Generally, and as described in more detail in Rule 1001(p)(ii), a firm plays a substantial role in the preparation or furnishing of an audit report if (1) its engagement hours or fees constitute 20% or more of the total engagement hours or fees or (2) it performs the majority of the audit procedures with respect to a subsidiary or component whose assets or revenues constitute 20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues of the issuer, broker, or dealer.

The final standard defines “engagement” as any audit, attestation, review, or other engagement performed under PCAOB standards:

• Led by a firm; or

• In which a firm “play[s] a substantial role in the preparation or furnishing of an audit report” as defined in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(ii).

The definition covers not only circumstances in which the firm serves as the lead auditor or the “practitioner” for an attestation engagement, which is what is customarily meant by the term engagement, but also any substantial role work the firm undertakes. The Board's view is that this additional breadth is appropriate because playing a substantial role in an engagement for an issuer or broker-dealer is sufficient to require a firm to register with the PCAOB. The definition covers all engagements under PCAOB standards performed by the firm, whether the application of PCAOB standards is legally required (

e.g.,

for audits of issuers and broker-dealers) or undertaken pursuant to contractual agreement, where permitted but not required under SEC rules, or for any other reason.

Commenters on the definition of “engagement” generally supported it. One commenter requested clarification as to why the definition does not include work performed at less than a substantial role, given that the standard includes requirements regarding such work.

The Board defined “engagement” to exclude work performed on other firms' PCAOB engagements at less than a substantial role because it believes the auditor responsibilities associated with such work, and the risks posed by it, are materially different than the responsibilities and risks associated with a firm leading an engagement or playing a substantial role.

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QC 1000 contains provisions specifically applicable to work performed on other firms' PCAOB engagements at less than

a substantial role, which have been tailored to reflect those responsibilities and risks. The Board believes this tailored approach is appropriate.

112

PCAOB registration rules reflect this difference in risk profile: PCAOB registration is required for firms that lead engagements or play a substantial role in audits of issuers and broker-dealers, but not for work performed on other firms' engagements at less than a substantial role.

See

PCAOB Rule 2100,

Registration Requirements for Public Accounting Firms.

Also grounded in the Board's views on relative risk and the investor interests at stake, the concept of “engagement” marks an important distinction in the level of responsibility created under QC 1000: while all registered firms are required to design a QC system that complies with QC 1000, the threshold for a firm to implement and operate the QC system is when the firm has responsibilities under applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to a firm engagement. The distinction between scaled applicability under QC 1000 (for firms that do not have responsibilities with respect to engagements) and full applicability of QC 1000 (for firms that do perform engagements) is discussed in more detail below.

The Board notes, however, that just because work performed on other firms' PCAOB engagements at less than a substantial role is not considered an “engagement” does not mean it is disregarded under the QC system. This work, by itself, does not trigger the requirement to implement and operate the QC system under QC 1000. However, once a firm is required to implement and operate the QC system, the system will operate over all work performed by the firm under PCAOB standards, including work performed on other firms' PCAOB engagements at less than a substantial role. If a firm is required to implement and operate a QC system under QC 1000, the Board believes that the QC system should address every engagement under PCAOB standards in which the firm participates.

3. Firm Personnel

The proposed standard defined “firm personnel” as individual proprietors, partners, shareholders, members or other principals, accountants, and professional staff of a registered public accounting firm whose responsibilities include assisting with: (1) the performance of the firm's engagements; or (2) the design, implementation, or operation of the firm's QC system, including engagement quality reviews. Professional staff refers not only to employees, but also to other individuals who work under the firm's supervision or direction and control and function as the firm's employees. For example, secondees and leased staff would fall under the definition of “firm personnel.”

Two commenters agreed with the definition as proposed. Some firms and related groups objected to including non-employee contractors and consultants as firm personnel, in particular because they are not subject to the firm's performance evaluation or promotion process. These commenters suggested that such persons be classified as other participants instead. One commenter expressed concern about potential exposure due to the differences between QC 1000 and the definitions of employees with Federal, State, and local tax and labor laws.

The Board continues to believe it is appropriate for the definition of firm personnel to include individuals, such as non-employee contractors and consultants, who work under the firm's supervision or direction and control and function as the firm's employees. In light of the range of legal structures and arrangements used by firms in acquiring and deploying staff, the Board believes a definition based exclusively on legal employment would be too narrow. Instead, the final rule retains an approach based on the functional role played by the individual rather than a specific legal relationship.

When the firm is identifying quality risks to quality objectives that include firm personnel, it may identify different risks associated with non-employee contractors and consultants than other firm personnel, and accordingly would have to develop different policies and procedures for them. For example, non-employee contractors and consultants may be evaluated through the contracting process to determine whether the firm should retain them instead of through the firm's formal evaluation framework.

While the Board expresses no view on any tax or labor law consequences, it notes that the definition does not conflate “firm personnel” with employees. On the contrary, the Board acknowledges that firm personnel includes some non-employees.

Some commenters, generally firms and related groups, were opposed to the definition including anyone who “assists with” engagements or the quality control system, as it may include administrative staff. The Board revised the definition of firm personnel to clarify that “professional staff does not include persons engaged only in clerical or ministerial tasks,” which aligns with the definition of “Person Associated With a Public Accounting Firm (and Related Terms)” in PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i).

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By aligning the QC 1000 definition of “firm personnel” with the definition of “Person Associated with a Public Accounting Firm (and Related Terms)” in this regard, the Board does not mean to suggest that only “firm personnel” can be associated persons. “Other participants” can also be associated persons.

4. Other Participants

Over the years, audits of issuers have increasingly involved the use of entities and individuals outside the firm in performing audit procedures and evaluating audit evidence. In the context of amending the standards governing the involvement of other auditors in an audit, the Board discussed the increasing prevalence and importance of the use of other audit firms and individual accountants outside the firm, such as an EQR not employed by the firm, and the use of auditor-engaged specialists.

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While it may be beneficial, and in many cases essential, to use other participants in some engagements, these arrangements can pose risks because other participants may not be subject to the same quality controls as firm personnel (for example, with regard to personnel assignments, training, supervision, and monitoring).

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See

Planning and Supervision of Audits Involving Other Auditors and Dividing Responsibility for the Audit with Another Accounting Firm, PCAOB Rel. No. 2022-002 (June 21, 2022), at 13; Amendments to Auditing Standards for Auditor's Use of the Work of Specialists, PCAOB Rel. No. 2018-006 (Dec. 20, 2018), at 10-15.

With respect to work performed in connection with the firm's QC system or the performance of its engagements, QC 1000 defines “other participants” as accounting firms (foreign or domestic, registered or unregistered), accountants, and other professionals

115

or organizations, other than firm personnel, whose responsibilities include assisting with the performance of the firm's engagements or the design, implementation, or operation of the firm's QC system, including engagement quality reviews.

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115

In this context, “professionals” refers broadly to workers who perform other than clerical or ministerial tasks.

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It should be noted that “referred-to auditors,” as that term is defined in the amendments to AS 2101,

Audit Planning,

adopted in PCAOB Rel. No. 2022-002, are not “other participants” under QC 1000 because the referred-to auditor performs its own engagement and does not participate in the engagement of the lead auditor.

Some commenters expressed concerns with the use of “other participants” throughout the standard. Many commenters said the proposed responsibilities of the firm with regard to other participants were too broad. A few commenters suggested removing the reference to other participants from certain specified quality responses and allowing firms to tailor their responses to quality objectives for other participants. Some commenters were

specifically concerned about the inclusion of internal auditors and external specialists in the standard through other participants, and believe they are adequately addressed in other standards. Some commenters argued that other participants should not be included in another firm's quality control system because they are covered by their own firm's quality control system.

Some commenters suggested bifurcating the definition into other participants whose responsibilities include assisting with the performance of the firm's engagements and other participants whose responsibilities include assisting with the design, implementation, and operation of the firm's QC system, on the basis that this would enhance clarity regarding to whom the requirements apply. One commenter said the policies and procedures related to other participants would differ depending on the type of other participant (for example, an internal auditor providing direct assistance differs from an auditor, specialist, or engagement quality reviewer) and QC 1000 imposes the same requirements for each type. One commenter supported the definition. One commenter agreed with separately defining “other participants” and “third-party providers.”

The final standard reflects the Board's view that, in designing, implementing, and operating its QC system, the firm will have to address not only firm personnel but also other auditors

117

and other professionals or organizations that the firm uses in connection with the firm's QC system or the performance of its engagements. References to other participants are included throughout QC 1000 in a tailored and context-specific way that recognizes the key roles that other participants play.

117

See

AS 1205,

Part of the Audit Performed by Other Independent Auditors,

and AS 1201 (which takes effect for audits of financial statements for fiscal years ending on or after Dec. 15, 2024).

The Board recognizes that some other participants may be covered by their own firm's quality control system, and that fact may inform the firm's risk assessment with respect to their participation. But the firm's own QC system must address all the work done on the firm's engagements and in connection with the design, implementation, and operation of the firm's QC system itself, regardless of who does it.

Commenters correctly pointed out that specific performance standards exist related to the use of certain types of other participants in an audit, such as other auditors,

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internal auditors,

119

and specialists,

120

but that does not mean that QC over their use in the firm's engagements is unnecessary. In part, the QC system operates to assure compliance with those specific audit standards. But it must also provide more general assurance about the performance of audits in which those types of other participants are involved. For example, the Board expects that the firm's policies and procedures would cover, if applicable, engaging specialists, determining their compliance with ethics and independence requirements, and communicating with them as part of the firm's quality control system.

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See, e.g.,

AS 1201, and AS 1206, Dividing Responsibility for the Audit with Another Accounting Firm.

119

See, e.g.,

AS 2605, Consideration of the Internal Audit Function.

120

See, e.g.,

AS 1210, Using the Work of an Auditor-Engaged Specialist.

The Board does not believe it is necessary for QC 1000 to bifurcate other participants between those that participate in engagements and those that are involved with the QC system. Just because a quality objective or other provision of QC 1000 refers to all types of other participants in the same way does not mean that the firm should respond by treating all types of other participants in the same way. On the contrary, the firm's policies and procedures addressing other participants should differentiate based on the types and roles of other participants to the extent necessary to be responsive to the firm's quality risks. When designing quality responses, the firm will address the specific risks posed by the other participants and their responsibilities within the firm's engagements and QC system. For example, a firm that uses a network as a resource in many areas, such as independence tracking and monitoring, engagement performance, information and communication, and monitoring and remediation, would have many quality risks and quality responses related to their use of the network. A smaller firm that only uses one individual from outside the firm as an engagement quality reviewer may have fewer quality risks and quality responses related to other participants to address in its quality control system.

The following diagram provides QC 1000's definitions of “firm personnel” and “other participants” and provides examples of each type:

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As noted in the diagram, the persons performing some roles, such as an EQR or personnel at shared service centers, may be firm personnel or other participants, depending on their relationship to the firm. For example, an EQR employed by the firm would be considered firm personnel, whereas an EQR contracted from outside the firm that is not functioning as a firm employee would be an other participant. Similarly, personnel at shared service centers may be firm personnel (if they are employed by the firm or function as firm employees) or other participants (if they are personnel of another organization, such as a network affiliate).

5. Networks

QC 1000 acknowledges that networks of firms may be structured in a variety of ways and could include arrangements between firms for sharing knowledge; developing and implementing consistent policies, tools, and methodologies; conducting multi-location engagements; or executing other types of business or administrative matters. Through its oversight activities, the PCAOB has observed that some networks provide or require use of a wide range of resources and services and may involve various levels of personnel, composed of a mix of the firm's national and local office personnel. Some examples of resources and services that networks provide include:

• Audit methodologies;

• Technology tools;

• Training;

• Risk management activities;

• Consultations on accounting, auditing, and SEC matters;

• Preventive engagement-level monitoring and coaching;

• Support for inspections; and

• Root cause analysis and remediation.

Since networks may involve a wide variety of different arrangements and different degrees of coordination and cooperation across firms, rather than attempting to define the term “network,” QC 1000 describes these types of arrangements in more general terms.

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Under the standard, networks may include a combination of registered and unregistered accounting firms and other entities.

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In the standard, references to a “network” encompass all of the memberships and affiliations that registered firms must report to the PCAOB in Item 5.2 of their annual report on Form 2, including certain networks, arrangements, alliances, partnerships, and associations.

See

Item 5.2, PCAOB Form 2 (describing reporting requirements for memberships, affiliations, and similar arrangements).

6. Third-Party Providers

Commenters on this topic supported the definition of third-party providers as proposed.

The standard addresses resources used by the firm that are sourced from third-party providers. Third-party providers are individuals or organizations, other than other participants, as defined above, that provide resources to the firm that are specifically designed for use in the performance of engagements or to assist in the operation of its QC system.

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The following diagram provides QC 1000's definition of “third-party providers” and several examples of them:

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Providers of resources that are not specifically designed for use in the performance of engagements or to assist in the operation of firms' QC systems (

e.g.,

general word processing and spreadsheet software) are not “third-party providers” as the Board has defined that term.

EN11JN24.003

Scalability

The approximately 1,600 firms registered with the PCAOB differ significantly based on their nature and circumstances:

• Approximately 53% of firms are located in foreign jurisdictions, representing 89 foreign jurisdictions;

• Approximately 20% of total firms, and 40% of firms located in foreign jurisdictions, belong to one of six global networks that contain the largest number of registered, non-U.S. firms that share resources such as methodology and monitoring activities;

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The six global networks that contain the largest number of registered, non-U.S. firms as reported on Form 2s filed in 2023 are: BDO International Limited, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, Ernst & Young Global Limited, Grant Thornton International Limited, KPMG International Cooperative, and PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (the member firms of these networks are collectively referred to herein as “GNFs”).

• Approximately 60 firms are sole proprietorships;

• Approximately 650 firms, or 41% of firms, performed an engagement under PCAOB standards for an issuer or broker-dealer during the 12 months ended June 2023;

• Approximately 70 only played a substantial role in such engagements in the past year;

• Approximately 140 performed audits of only broker-dealers in the past year;

• Approximately 130 firms that did not perform an engagement under PCAOB standards for an issuer or broker-dealer in 2022 did perform such an engagement in the past five years; and

• Approximately 51% of firms have not performed an engagement under PCAOB standards for an issuer or broker-dealer in the past five years.

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The data were obtained from Audit Analytics and publicly available data from the PCAOB's Registration, Annual and Special Reporting (RASR)

available at https://rasr.pcaobus.org

. The PCAOB does not collect information about whether registered firms perform engagements under PCAOB standards other than for issuers and broker-dealers. Firms may be engaged, for example, in connection with the audit of a reporting company that does not meet the Sarbanes-Oxley definition of “issuer” described in footnote 2 above, in connection with certain offerings of securities that are exempt from registration under the Securities Act (

e.g.,

offerings under Regulation A, Regulation D, or Regulation Crowdfunding), pursuant to a contractual obligation such as a loan covenant, or on an entirely voluntary basis.

While the Board believes the basic objectives of the QC system ought to be the same across all firms, the Board believes the QC standard needs to be appropriately scalable, so that firms of different sizes and characteristics can appropriately design their QC system to address the risks associated with their own practice.

The specific policies and procedures necessary to achieve the objectives of the QC system may vary significantly across firms, depending on their size, the types of engagements they perform, and other factors. The Board believes that QC 1000 is sufficiently principles-based and scalable that firms will be able to pursue an approach to QC that is appropriate in light of their specific circumstances.

In the Board's view, firms that perform engagements under PCAOB standards should generally be subject to the same QC requirements. In particular, the Board does not believe the historical distinction between firms that were members of the SECPS in 2003 and those that were not has continuing relevance in determining the QC standards that should apply today. Accordingly, the Board eliminated that distinction. As discussed in more detail below, QC 1000 incorporates certain SECPS requirements, making them applicable to all firms, and eliminates others. However, the Board also believes there are specific areas, such as firm governance, where firms with larger PCAOB audit practices should be subject to enhanced requirements. QC 1000 includes several requirements that apply only to the firms that meet the statutory threshold for annual PCAOB inspection.

The Board is aware that there is a significant number of registered firms that do not perform engagements under PCAOB standards every year—they only participate in other firms' engagements at less than the level of a substantial role or have no involvement in issuer or broker-dealer engagements. The Board believes that the risk to investor protection is minimal if the firm is not performing engagements under PCAOB standards for issuers and SEC-registered broker-dealers, and that it is appropriate to provide for more limited QC obligations in those circumstances. Under QC 1000, all registered firms are required to design a QC system but only firms that are subject to applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to a PCAOB engagement are required to implement and operate the QC system.

1. Scaled Applicability vs. Full Applicability

The Board created a fundamental distinction in QC 1000 between the obligation to design a QC system in compliance with the standard, which will apply to all firms,

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and the obligation to implement and operate an effective QC system, which, broadly speaking, will apply only to firms that perform engagements under PCAOB standards.

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QC 1000.06, discussed below, sets out the requirements for QC system design.

Under the standard, firms are required to implement and operate an effective QC system—that is, comply with all provisions of QC 1000—at all times that the firm is required to comply with applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to any of the firm's engagements.

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126

QC 1000.07.

As noted above, many registered firms do not perform engagements every year. However, a firm that is not currently performing any engagements may nevertheless have to comply with applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to a previous or future firm engagement. For example, procedures for the acceptance of a new engagement have to be performed before the engagement is conducted. Responsibilities may also arise with respect to completed engagements long after the issuance of the auditor's report—for example, if the issuer requests the auditor's consent to include its report in a registration statement, if an engagement deficiency is identified that requires remediation, or if the auditor becomes aware of facts that may have existed at the date of the auditor's report which may have affected the report. In the Board's view, whenever a firm has responsibilities under applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to an engagement, those responsibilities should be performed under a QC system that is implemented, is operating, and complies with PCAOB standards.

Importantly, if a firm is required to implement and operate an effective QC system, the firm would not necessarily have to implement and operate every QC policy or procedure that it has designed. An effective QC system provides reasonable assurance that the firm is complying with “applicable” professional and legal requirements. The extent of “applicable” requirements could change depending on the firm's circumstances, and the QC system policies and procedures that the firm would have to implement and operate could change in response. For example, if a firm last performed an engagement (as defined in the standard) five or six years ago and has no current responsibilities with respect to any other firms' engagements, it might be subject only to requirements regarding

the retention of certain engagement-related documentation.

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In such a circumstance, an effective QC system—

i.e.,

a system that provides reasonable assurance that the firm is complying with applicable professional and legal requirements regarding such documentation—could be scaled back to address only engagement-related documentation retention, as well as ongoing evaluation, reporting, and documentation requirements with respect to the QC system itself. The Board asked in the proposing release whether it was clear how a firm's responsibilities under QC 1000 may change depending on the extent of applicable professional and legal requirements to which the firm is subject at a particular time, and commenters that responded on the issue were generally supportive.

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See

AS 1215; 17 CFR 210.2-06.

If the firm has no more responsibilities with respect to any engagement, the firm is required to continue operating the QC system until the next September 30 (the annual evaluation date). This would ensure that the firm would be required to evaluate and report on the QC system for any year during which the QC system was required to operate.

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128

QC 1000.07. The proposed requirements for evaluation of and reporting on the QC system are discussed below.

Firms that are not subject to the requirement to implement and operate the QC system are still subject to the requirement to design a QC system that complies with QC 1000.

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Paragraph .06 of QC 1000, discussed below, sets out the requirements for design of the QC system in more detail.

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The standard makes clear that any existing obligations under QC 1000 (for example, reporting obligations with respect to prior periods when the firm was required to implement and operate the QC system) would continue.

The Board believes it is appropriate to limit the application of the requirements of QC 1000 for firms that have no obligations under applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to firm engagements. Indeed, in those situations it is hard to see how a firm could, as a practical matter, “implement” or “operate” its QC system. Implementation and operation contemplate, among other things, the application of QC policies and procedures to the firm's engagements, monitoring of work performed on engagements, and identification and remediation of engagement deficiencies. Without “engagements,” as the standard defines that term, implementation and operation of a QC system would be largely hypothetical. Moreover, the population of firms that are subject only to the design requirements of QC 1000 is comprised entirely of firms that are not required to be registered with the PCAOB—because they do not participate in engagements under PCAOB standards or do so only below the level of a substantial role.

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If a firm requests leave to withdraw from PCAOB registration and is permitted to do so, the firm, upon its withdrawal from registration, would no longer be subject to an obligation to design, implement, or operate a QC system in accordance with QC 1000.

Many commenters, including firms and related groups, investor-related groups, academics, and others, did not support requiring firms that are not required to comply with applicable professional and legal requirements to design a QC system under QC 1000. Several of these commenters expressed concerns that this would be unnecessarily costly to those firms, or suggested that there could be challenges associated with implementing and operating a QC system based on hypothetical risks that could differ from the actual risks at the time the firm accepts and performs engagements pursuant to PCAOB standards. Some commenters suggested that this requirement may cause firms to deregister with the PCAOB, decline to assist U.S. firms in executing their global audits, or create a potential barrier to entry for new firms in the marketplace. One firm-related group commented that as this aspect of the proposal affects such a large number of firms, the potential political impacts deserve further consideration. The firm-related group further commented that foreign firms could see this as an accelerator to a decision to not service specific audit markets, which potentially impacts audit markets beyond the U.S., and that policy makers in other countries may view the potential for further market concentration more significantly.

Firms and a related group raising cost concerns with the proposed QC system design requirements suggested allowing firms that do not perform engagements the flexibility to design their QC system in accordance with another QC standard, such as ISQM 1 or SQMS 1. One of these firms further suggested that firms transitioning to performing engagements under PCAOB standards be given an additional six months to one year from their annual evaluation date to file their Form QC for the transition period. The firm asserted that even if a firm has complied with the design requirements, implementing and operating a QC system that complies with the standard would involve significant effort. Another firm suggested that it would be more appropriate to have a transition period for the registered public accounting firm to update their system of quality control to adhere to the incremental requirements of the PCAOB. An academic suggested that the design requirements for firms that have not performed and do not plan to perform engagements pursuant to PCAOB standards should be limited to client acceptance components. One firm suggested that the standard could include a requirement that firms are not allowed to perform an engagement under PCAOB standards until they have designed and implemented QC 1000. Other commenters suggested that registered firms that do not intend to conduct PCAOB audits should not be required to do anything under QC 1000.

Other commenters suggested a variety of approaches for when firms should be required to implement and operate a QC 1000-compliant QC system. One firm suggested that firms that only perform a substantial role in more than a certain threshold (presumably to be specified by the PCAOB) of PCAOB engagements could be permitted to comply with ISQM 1 instead of being subject to full applicability of QC 1000. Another commenter suggested that smaller firms (

e.g.,

triennially inspected firms with fewer than 100 issuer engagements) be permitted the option of complying with ISQM 1 or SQMS 1 as an alternative to QC 1000. Another firm suggested that the PCAOB should permit non-U.S. firms to comply with ISQM 1 rather than adopting QC 1000. Another commenter suggested that the criteria for full applicability of the standard should be based on whether the engagements individually or in the aggregate involve a material amount of market capitalization. The commenter suggested that under such an approach, the requirement to operate the QC system could be optional for registered firms auditing companies with a smaller market capitalization.

Some commenters, including a firm, a firm-related group, and an investor, commented that the requirement to design a QC 1000-compliant QC system is appropriate for any registered firm, even if it is not performing engagements or playing a substantial role in other firms' engagements. One firm-related group agreed that whenever a firm has responsibilities under applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to an engagement, those responsibilities should be performed under a fully implemented and operating QC system that complies with

PCAOB standards. However, the commenter asked for clarification on the circumstances that trigger the need for a firm to implement and operate a QC system in compliance with QC 1000, and suggested targeted guidance in that area would be helpful.

The Board continues to believe that requiring all registered firms to design a QC system that complies with the standard, regardless of whether they have obligations with respect to engagements, is consistent with the PCAOB's statutory mandate and historical practice. Sarbanes-Oxley directs the PCAOB to include in its QC standards requirements related to numerous topics for “every” registered public accounting firm.

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The statute also directs the PCAOB that applications for registration with the PCAOB must contain “a statement of the quality control policies of the [applicant] for its accounting and auditing practices.”

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Consistent with that directive, as a condition to registration, applicants are required to furnish “a narrative, summary description, in a clear, concise and understandable format, of the quality control policies of the applicant for its accounting and auditing practices, including procedures used to monitor compliance with independence requirements,”

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and that description must provide an overview of the applicant's quality control policies regarding each element of quality control.

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Therefore, firms that register with the Board are already required to provide a summary of the design of their QC system regardless of whether they have obligations with respect to engagements.

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131

Section 103(a)(2)(B) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7213(a)(2)(B).

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Section 102(b)(2)(D) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. 7212(b)(2)(D).

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Item 4.1 of PCAOB Form 1 (“Applicant's Quality Control Policies”). The Board modified the information about QC required in Form 1.

See

below.

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See Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Registration with the Board,

PCAOB Rel. No. 2003-011F (Dec. 4, 2017) (Question #32),

available at https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/registration/information/documents/registration_faq.pdf?sfvrsn=c50d7356_0

. As part of this rulemaking the requirements in Form 1 are being amended.

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In a separate rulemaking, the Board proposed to create a new form, Form QC—Policies and Procedures (“Form QCPP”), to require that, once QC 1000 becomes effective, any firm that registered with the Board prior to the date that QC 1000 becomes effective must submit an updated statement of the firm's quality control policies and procedures pursuant to QC 1000.

See Firm Reporting,

Rel. No. 2024-003 (Apr. 9, 2024) at 41.

The Board also believes that requiring all firms to design a QC system that complies with all provisions of QC 1000, and not just limiting the requirement to certain components such as acceptance and continuance of engagements, is consistent with its investor protection mandate. While the Board acknowledges that there could be challenges associated with implementing and operating a QC system based on hypothetical risks, it continues to believe that it is important for registered firms to design a QC system based on the quality risks the firm likely would face if it were to perform engagements. Because registering with the PCAOB enables a firm to issue audit reports or play a substantial role on audits performed under PCAOB standards for issuers and broker-dealers, and because investors and companies considering engaging the firm could reasonably expect that any firm that could pursue such an engagement would already have a PCAOB-compliant QC system designed and ready for implementation and operation, the Board believes that imposing a design requirement on all registered firms promotes its mission of protecting investors and promoting the public interest.

As discussed in more detail below, QC 1000 includes requirements that do not appear in other QC standards or that are more prescriptive or more specifically tailored to the PCAOB's legal and regulatory environment than the provisions of ISQM 1 or SQMS 1. Because of these key differences, the Board does not believe that a QC system design based on ISQM 1 or SQMS 1, as suggested by some commenters, would be sufficient. Furthermore, the Board believes that compliance with ISQM 1 may not be the regulatory baseline within certain jurisdictions. The PCAOB has observed other standard setters and regulators adopt variations of ISQM 1, which typically include more detailed and stringent requirements.

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Therefore, the Board believes that audit firms within some jurisdictions will already have to design and operate a QC system that goes beyond the requirements of ISQM 1, and it would not be appropriate for the Board to permit compliance with a less stringent quality system than the one required in the local regulatory environment. Similarly, the Board does not believe that it would be appropriate for it to permit firms to comply with their locally applicable variation of ISQM 1 as this would result in the PCAOB requiring and managing compliance with a multitude of different QC standards.

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See, e.g.,

International Standard on Quality Management (UK) 1, adopted by the Financial Reporting Council (March 2023).

The Board also continues to believe that, whenever a firm has responsibilities under applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to a firm engagement, those responsibilities should be performed under a QC system that is implemented, is operating, and complies with PCAOB standards. Given the unique features of QC 1000, compliance with ISQM 1 or SQMS 1 would not, in the Board's view, be an adequate substitute, nor would the Board's regulatory purposes be served by providing firms with an extended compliance period after they take on an engagement.

The Board does not believe that this requirement will result in disruption to competition in the audit market. Firms that are subject to applicable professional and legal requirements with respect to engagements, including substantial role engagements, are required to implement and operate a QC 1000-compliant QC system. If a registered firm that has not led an engagement or played a substantial role in the past anticipates the possibility of transitioning to performing engagements, the Board believes the requirement to design a QC system that complies with QC 1000 will facilitate timely implementation and operation of their QC 1000 QC system, which will in turn facilitate appropriate performance of the engagements; appropriate monitoring and, if necessary, remedial action; and timely evaluation and reporting on Form QC.

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QC 1000 shares a basic structure and approach with ISQM 1 and SQMS 1, so designing for the incremental features unique to QC 1000 should not be unduly burdensome for firms that are subject to either or both of those other QC standards (which the Board believes will be the case for a very substantial majority of firms that are in a position to perform PCAOB engagements).

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The Board understands that the actual quality risks the firm faces when it takes on an engagement may differ from the hypothetical risks considered in designing the QC system. QC 1000 requires the firm to establish policies and procedures to monitor, identify, and assess changes to conditions, events, and activities that indicate modifications to the firm's quality objectives, quality risks, or quality responses may be needed, and to make timely modifications as needed.

See

QC 1000.22-23.

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See

Section D.

The Board does not believe that QC 1000 conflicts with the requirements of other standard setters or that anything prevents firms from developing a single QC system for their entire practice that satisfies both PCAOB requirements and other professional standards to which the firm is subject. The Board

acknowledges certain differences between QC 1000 and the quality management standards set by other standard setters, in particular areas where QC 1000 establishes additional or more stringent requirements. However, the Board believes that quality responses developed by firms under QC 1000 can be considered by firms for the purposes of other quality management standards to which they are subject, reducing the need for two or more separate QC systems.

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Firms participating in a PCAOB engagement below the level of a substantial role do not require registration with the PCAOB. If such a firm does not lead and does not plan to lead engagements or play a substantial role in engagements pursuant to PCAOB standards, then the Board believes that the firm should assess whether the costs of complying with the design requirement are commensurate with their perceived benefit of being registered with the PCAOB.

2. Other Scalability Considerations

Aspects of QC 1000 are risk-based, which makes them inherently scalable. Firms are required to apply a risk-based approach to the design, implementation, and operation of the QC system in the context of their own audit practice. The standard provides that the firm will tailor the design of its QC system to its specific facts and circumstances, such as:

• The size and complexity of the firm;

• The types and variety of engagements it performs;

• The types of companies for which it performs engagements; and

• Whether it is a member of a network and, if so, the nature and extent of the network relationship.

Several commenters, including firms and a firm-related group, suggested that the proposed standard was too prescriptive. Many of these commenters suggested that, to promote further scalability, specified quality responses could be replaced with quality objectives to allow each firm to develop quality responses appropriate to the circumstances and risks for their firm. One of these firms stated that it disagreed with the notion in the proposing release that a specified quality response suggests that every firm has the same or similar quality risks and that the responses to those risks will also be the same or similar. Another firm suggested that the specified quality responses make the standard inherently less scalable and could be a barrier to entry for smaller firms. The firm further suggested that an overreliance on specified quality responses could discourage firms from performing robust risk assessments and developing tailored quality responses. Other commenters also suggested that more scalability could be incorporated into the standard through consideration of concepts such as professional judgment, relevance, or reliability. Some commenters suggested that further alignment of QC 1000 to ISQM 1 or SQMS 1 would promote further scalability. One firm stated that the standard was overly prescriptive and suggested that specific guidance be provided to small and medium-sized firms focused on operationality of the standard. Several commenters expressed concern that the prescriptive nature of QC 1000 would negatively affect smaller firms.

As discussed above, some specified quality responses carry requirements from current PCAOB standards into QC 1000, while others provide new requirements that the Board believes are important to a firm's QC system. The Board believes that this approach is appropriate and that the specified quality responses are required to address certain quality risks that are present in all firms that perform PCAOB engagements and to assure that the QC system is designed, implemented, and operated with an appropriate level of rigor. The inclusion of specified quality responses in the standard should not be interpreted to suggest that the Board believes all firms have the same or similar quality risks overall; the specific risks addressed by specified quality responses are likely a small subset of the overall population of quality risks identified by a firm, and the Board expects potentially wide variation in the full set of risks faced by different firms.

The Board believes that the standard incorporates the concepts of professional judgment, relevance and reliability where it is appropriate, for example, in the ability to exercise professional judgment in the determination of whether a major QC deficiency exists, or the discussion in the information and communication component noting that information would have to be both relevant and reliable such that it supports the operation of the firm's QC system and the performance of the firm's engagements in accordance with applicable professional and legal requirements. The Board continues to believe that the inclusion of prescriptive requirements in certain areas promotes its mission of protecting investors and promoting the public interest.

An investor-related group commented that it supports a risk-based approach up to a point, but it expressed concern that the standard placed too much emphasis on scalability and recommended the development of a set of minimum requirements for the establishment of quality control systems. Another commenter stated that the PCAOB should not let scalability concerns get in the way of driving change and improving quality, further suggesting that smaller-firm considerations should not get in the way of doing the right thing for the largest audit firms. One commenter suggested more specific requirements relating to the audits of broker-dealers, commenting that a high deficiency rate in broker-dealer audits suggests the need for more specific requirements with respect to audits of broker-dealers, such as requirements for specific expertise in the conduct of broker-dealer audits, or, to the extent that the broker-dealer is a subsidiary of an issuer, requirements relating to coordination between the broker-dealer audit team and the audit team of the issuer parent company.

The final standard establishes a set of minimum requirements that all firms must follow in the establishment of their QC system. As discussed in more detail below, while QC 1000 provides some flexibility with regard to the quality risks that firms identify and the quality responses that firms develop to address those risks, it does not provide the same flexibility with regard to quality objectives or specified quality responses. Instead, quality objectives and specified quality responses that will apply to all firms are specified in the standard. Firms can establish additional quality objectives—indeed, they are required to do so if necessary to achieve the reasonable assurance objective—but they generally cannot omit or modify any of the quality objectives or specified quality responses set out in the standard.

Within a uniform basic structure to be used by all firms, QC 1000 reflects a risk-based, scalable approach, particularly in the risk assessment process and the monitoring and remediation process. The nature and extent of these processes would be commensurate with the firm's quality risks and would therefore vary across firms in nature, scope, and complexity. The Board believes it is crucial that the standard be scalable so that firms of different sizes and characteristics can appropriately design their QC system to address the risks associated with their own practice, including specific risks relating to the types of companies that they audit, such as broker-dealers. The Board believes that an appropriate balance between quality objectives and specified quality responses is the best approach to improve quality across firms of all sizes that perform engagements pursuant to PCAOB standards, whether these be issuer or broker-dealer engagements. Similarly, the form, content, and extent of required documentation related to the QC system will be driven by a firm's nature and circumstances. QC 1000 contains both provisions that scale down, by tailoring for smaller PCAOB audit practices, and provisions that scale up, by focusing on risks faced by the largest firms.

Some provisions of QC 1000 focus particularly on firms with a smaller PCAOB audit practice. These include:

• Depending on the nature and circumstances of the firm (including its size and structure), a single individual may be assigned more than one of the QC system oversight roles required under the standard; and

• If the firm issued engagement reports with respect to five or fewer engagements for issuers, brokers, and dealers during the prior calendar year, engagement monitoring activities may include monitoring audits not performed under PCAOB auditing standards. For firms with this number of engagements performed under PCAOB standards, the Board understands that requiring a firm to annually monitor its engagements that are performed under PCAOB standards increases the likelihood of the same partner being inspected every year under QC 1000. The Board believes this could disincentivize partners from serving as the engagement partner and ultimately affect competitive conditions in the market.

Other provisions of QC 1000 impose incremental requirements on firms that issued audit reports for more than 100 issuers in the prior calendar year, including:

• An external oversight function for the QC system composed of one or more persons who are not partners, shareholders, members, other principals, or employees of the firm;

• A program for collecting and addressing complaints and allegations that includes confidentiality protections;

• An automated system for identifying investments in securities that might impair independence; and

• A requirement to perform in-process monitoring of engagements.

These incremental requirements specifically target and respond to potential quality risks that the Board believes are more likely to arise in audit practices of a certain size and complexity. Firms that audit fewer than 100 issuers may still determine that the incremental requirements are an appropriate quality response for quality risks that they have identified specific to their firm, but these are not mandatory for these smaller PCAOB audit practices to promote scalability of the standard.

Several commenters, including firms, suggested that the threshold for any incremental requirements be raised to 500 issuers, to align with the existing SECPS requirement that firms that audit more than 500 SEC registrants have an automated system to identify investment holdings of partners and managers that might impair independence.

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One of these firms also suggested a dual-threshold approach that would consider both the number of issuers audited and the market capitalization of the issuers. Two commenters, including an investor-related group and an academic, suggested that there should not be a threshold for incremental requirements, and all requirements of the standard should apply to all firms regardless of the size of the firm. The academic suggested that the incremental requirements may give rise to actual or perceived differences in audit quality between larger audit firms that issue audit reports for more than 100 issuers and smaller audit firms that issue audit reports for fewer than 100 issuers. One firm suggested that the incremental requirements only apply to those firms subject to annual inspection under the PCAOB's rules (in case the 100-issuer threshold for regular inspection in Rule 4003,

Frequency of Inspections,

ever were changed), and another firm suggested that these should only apply to the top six firms.

139

See

SECPS 1000.46 (requirement 4).

Two investor-related groups suggested that if the final standard does include a threshold for certain incremental requirements, the threshold should relate to the market capitalization of the issuers that the firm's audit practice covers rather than the number of issuer audit reports the firm issues. Other commenters were also supportive of a market capitalization-based threshold.

Several commenters suggested that the nature of the firm's audit practice be taken into consideration when determining the applicability of the incremental requirements, and that just looking to the number of issuers may not be an appropriate measure for the size or complexity of the audit practice. One commenter suggested that the proportion of the PCAOB audits to the size of the practice within a firm is also a relevant factor to consider. Some commenters suggested that imposing a threshold of 100 issuers could impose a barrier to entry for firms that wish to expand their audit practices beyond 100 issuers and, as a result, firms may manage their practice to stay below the 100-issuer threshold.

The Board believes that requiring certain incremental requirements of firms with larger PCAOB audit practices is appropriate and that the complexities inherent to larg

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