Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention
Federal RegisterAug 31, 2022
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 68
[EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174; FRL-5766.6-01-OLEM]
RIN 2050-AH22
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention
AGENCY:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
ACTION:
Proposed rule.
SUMMARY:
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing to amend its Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations as a result of Agency review. The proposed revisions include several changes and amplifications to the accident prevention program requirements, enhancements to the emergency preparedness requirements, increased public availability of chemical hazard information, and several other changes to certain regulatory definitions or points of clarification. These proposed amendments seek to improve chemical process safety; assist in planning, preparedness, and responding to RMP-reportable accidents; and improve public awareness of chemical hazards at regulated sources.
DATES:
Comments must be received on or before October 31, 2022.
Public Hearings:
EPA will hold virtual public hearings on September 26, 2022; September 27, 2022; and September 28, 2022, at
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/virtual-public-hearings-risk-management-program-safer-communities-chemical-accident.
Please refer to the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this preamble for additional information on the public hearings.
ADDRESSES:
You may send comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174, by any of the following methods:
•
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/
(our preferred method). Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
•
Mail:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Docket Center, EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174 Docket, Mail Code 28221T, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460.
•
Hand delivery or courier (by scheduled appointment only):
EPA Docket Center, WJC West Building, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004. The Docket Center's hours of operations are 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays).
Instructions:
All submissions received must include the Docket ID No. for this rulemaking. Comments received may be posted without change to
https://www.regulations.gov/,
including any personal information provided. For detailed instructions on sending comments and more information on the rulemaking process, see the “Public Participation” heading of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section of this preamble. For further information on EPA Docket Center services and the current status, please visit us online at
https://www.epa.gov/dockets.
The virtual hearings will be held at
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/virtual-public-hearings-risk-management-program-safer-communities-chemical-accident.
The hearing on September 26, 2022, will convene at 9:00 a.m. (local time) and will conclude at 12:00 p.m. (local time). The hearing on September 27, 2022, will convene at 1:00 p.m. (local time) and will conclude at 4:00 p.m. (local time). The hearing on September 28, 2022, will convene at 5:00 p.m. (local time) and will conclude at 8:00 p.m. (local time). Refer to the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
section below for additional information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Deanne Grant, Office of Emergency Management, Mail Code 5104A, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; telephone number: 202-564-1096; email: g
rant.deanne@epa.gov
or Veronica Southerland, Office of Emergency Management, Mail Code 5104A, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; telephone number: 202-564-2333; email:
southerland.veronica@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Preamble acronyms and abbreviations.
EPA uses multiple acronyms and terms in this preamble. While this list may not be exhaustive, to ease the reading of this preamble and for reference purposes, the EPA defines the following terms and acronyms here:
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACC American Chemistry Council
AN ammonium nitrate
ANPI Apache Nitrogen Products Inc.
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
AQMD Air Quality Management Districts
ASSP American Society of Safety Professionals
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BSEE Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
CAA Clean Air Act
CAAA Clean Air Act Amendments
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDR Chemical Data Reporting
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CGA Compressed Gas Association
CSB Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIR California Department of Industrial Relations
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
EHS Extremely Hazardous Substances
EJ Environmental Justice
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FR Federal Register
FRS Facility Registry Service
GDC General Duty Clause
GMARD Guide for Making Acute Risk Decisions
HF hydrofluoric acid
HHC highly hazardous chemical
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IIAR International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration
IPAWS Integrated Public Alert & Warning System
ISD inherently safer design
IST inherently safer technology
LEPC local emergency planning committee
LPG liquefied petroleum gas
MACT Maximum Achievable Control Technology
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NASTTPO National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials
NESHAP National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NJAC New Jersey Administrative Code
NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NSPS New Source Performance Standards
NTTAA National Technology Transfer Advancement Act
OCA offsite consequences analysis
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PHA process hazard analysis
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
PSM process safety management
RAGAGEP recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RFI request for information
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RMP Risk Management Program or risk management plan
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SCCAP Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention
SDS Safety Data Sheet
SEMS Safety and Environmental Management Systems
SOCMA Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates
STAA safer technology and alternatives analysis
TCPA Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act
TEPC Tribal emergency planning committee
TNT trinitrotoluene
TQ threshold quantity
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Organization of this document.
The information in this preamble is organized as follows:
I. Public Participation
A. Written Comments
B. Comment Headings
C. Participation in Virtual Public Hearings
II. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
B. What action is the Agency taking?
C. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
D. What are the costs and benefits of this action?
1. Summary of Estimated Costs
2. Baseline Damages
3. Summary of Estimated Benefits
III. Background
A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program
B. Events Leading to This Action
C. EPA's Authority To Revise the RMP Rule
IV. Proposed Action
A. Prevention Program
1. Hazard Evaluation Amplifications
a. Introduction
b. Natural Hazards
c. Power Loss
d. Stationary Source Siting
e. Hazard Evaluation Recommendation Information Availability
f. Summary of Proposed Regulatory Text
2. Prevention Program Provisions
a. Safer Technologies and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)
i. Background on IST/ISD
ii. Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)
iii. Recent Public Input on STAA
iv. Recent Public Input on HF
v. STAA Applicability
vi. Accident Frequency
vii. Accident Severity
viii. Discussion of Prior STAA Analysis
ix. STAA Technology Transfer
x. Alternative Options
xi. Proposed Revisions to Regulatory Text
xii. Process Hazard Analysis (40 CFR 68.67)
b. Root Cause Analysis
i. Root Cause Analysis Background
ii. Recent Public Comments on Root Cause Analysis
iii. Investigation Timeframe
iv. Proposed Revisions to Regulatory Text
v. “Near Miss” Definition
c. Third-Party Compliance Audits
i. Third-Party Compliance Audits in Previous RMP Rulemakings
ii. Recent Public Input on Third-Party Compliance Audits
iii. Proposed Third-Party Compliance Audit Requirements
d. Employee Participation
i. Introduction
ii. Recommendation Decisions
iii. Stop Work Authority
iv. Accident and Non-Compliance Reporting
B. Emergency Response
1. Review of Emergency Response Notification, Detection, and Response
a. Concerns About Notification of Accidents
b. Release Detection
c. Emergency Response Guidance
2. Proposed Modifications and Amplifications of Emergency Response Requirements
a. Proposed Regulations to Address Community Notification of RMP Accidents
b. Community Emergency Response Plan Amplifications
3. Emergency Response Exercises
a. Proposed Amendments to the Emergency Response Requirements
b. Field Exercise Frequency
c. Exercise Evaluation Reports
C. Information Availability
1. Recent Public Input on Information Availability
2. Information Availability in the 2017 Amendments and the 2019 Reconsideration Rule
3. Proposed Regulatory Revisions
a. Request for Comment on Potential Non-Rule RMP Access Policy Changes
b. Current Data Availability of Risk Management Plan Information
c. Other EPA Facility Hazardous Substance Registries
d. Balancing Security Risks and Community Right-to-Know
D. Other Areas of Technical Clarification
1. Process Safety Information
2. Program 2 and 3 Requirements for Compliance With RAGAGEP
3. Retention of Hot Work Permits
4. Storage Incident to Transportation
5. Retail Facility Exemption
6. RAGAGEP
E. Compliance Dates
V. Additional Considerations
VI. Statutory and Executive Orders Reviews
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments
G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)
J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations
I. Public Participation
A. Written Comments
Submit your comments, identified by Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174, at
https://www.regulations.gov
(our preferred method), or the other methods identified in the
ADDRESSES
section, above. Once submitted, comments cannot be edited or removed from the docket. EPA may publish any comment received to its public docket. Do not submit to EPA's docket at
https://www.regulations.gov
any information you consider to be confidential business information or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Multimedia submissions (audio, video,
etc.
) must be accompanied by a written comment. The written comment is considered the official comment and should include discussion of all points you wish to make. EPA will generally not consider comments or comment contents located outside the primary submission (
i.e.,
on the web, cloud, or other file sharing system). For additional submission methods, the full EPA public comment policy, information about confidential business information or multimedia submissions, and general guidance on making effective comments, please visit
https://www.epa.gov/dockets/commenting-epa-dockets.
Due to public health concerns related to COVID-19, the EPA Docket Center and Reading Room are open to the public by appointment only. Our Docket Center staff also continues to provide remote customer service via email, phone, and webform. Hand deliveries or couriers will be received by scheduled appointment only. For further information and updates on EPA Docket Center services, please visit us online at
https://www.epa.gov/dockets.
EPA continues to carefully and continuously monitor information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), local area health departments, and its Federal partners so that it can respond rapidly as conditions change regarding COVID-19.
B. Comment Headings
Commentors should review the discussions in the preamble and may comment on any matter that is addressed by the proposed rule. For comments submitted through postal mail or
https://www.regulations.gov,
EPA is requesting commenters to identify their comments on specific issues by using the appropriate number and comment headings listed below to make it simpler for the Agency to
process your comment. If your comment covers multiple issues, please use all the heading numbers and names that relate to that comment. As an example of this optional method, where one individual comment relates to issue #1 and a second individual comment pertains to issues #2 and #3, a set of comments would be submitted as follows:
1. Natural Hazards—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.1.b):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Whether EPA should develop additional guidance for assessing natural hazards.
• Natural hazard resources such as databases, checklists, or narrative discussions, as well as commenters' recommendations for regional versus national, or sector-specific guidance.
• Whether to specify geographic areas most at risk from climate or other natural events by adopting the list of areas exposed to heightened risk of wildfire, flooding, storm surge, or coastal flooding and if this approach would simplify implementation.
• If the Agency should require sources in areas exposed to heightened risk of wildfire, flooding, storm surge, coastal flooding, or earthquake, to conduct hazard evaluations associated with climate or earthquake as a minimum, while also requiring all sources to consider the potential for natural hazards unrelated to climate or earthquake in their specific locations.
2. Power Loss—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.1.c):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• The proposed provision to require air pollution control or monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of accidental releases from RMP-regulated processes to have standby or backup power and any potential safety issues associated with it.
3. Stationary Source Siting—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.1.d):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
4. Hazard Evaluation Recommendation Information Availability—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.1.e):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Whether EPA should require declined hazard evaluation recommendations to be included in narrative form, whether the Agency should provide specific categories of recommendations for facilities to choose from when reporting or allowing the owner or operator to post this information online and provide a link to their information within their RMP.
• Methods to provide justification for declining relevant hazard evaluation recommendations, the proposed approach or alternative categories.
5. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.2.a):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Industry understanding of the practicability assessment, and how this might differ from the findings identified in the PHA.
• Additional benefits provided by the practicability assessment.
• EPA's definition of the practicability assessment.
• How to determine if a facility is within a 1-mile radius and if EPA should use locational data provided by facilities, or develop a standard definition (
e.g.,
1 mile to the facility fenceline or 1 mile to the regulated process location).
• Information that should be collected in a STAA clearinghouse.
• The proposed STAA applicability criteria and alternatives.
• Whether EPA should reinstate the 2017 rule provisions requiring STAA for all NAICS 324 and 325 processes.
• Whether the proposal to limit the STAA provisions to NAICS 324 and 325 regulated processes within 1 mile of another NAICS 324 and 325 regulated facility is appropriate or if another distance (
e.g.,
3 miles) would be appropriate, and the rationale for proposed distance alternatives.
• Other industries for which STAA should be required and how EPA might justify extending these provisions to other industries.
• What other information or consideration EPA can use to assess probability of an accident in other industries without accident history data as well as what specific chemicals or processes may merit the most focus, and how EPA may require STAA requirements for industries without a history of accidents.
• If the Agency should only require the STAA as part of the PHA, without the additional practicability assessment.
• For any cited costs of implementing the STAA as part of the PHA, documentation to support cost estimates.
• For any cited costs of implementing the practicability assessment of the STAA provisions, documentation to support cost estimates.
6. Root Cause Analysis—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.2.b):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• A potential definition of “near miss” that would address difficulties in identifying the variety of incidents that may occur at RMP facilities that could be near misses that should be investigated.
• A universal “near miss” definition, as well as comments on strengths and limitations of the definition provided by NJDEP and how the definition may clarify requirements for incident investigations.
7. Third Party Compliance Audits—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.2.c):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Proposed independence criteria modified from the 2017 rule.
• Whether the selected auditor should be mutually approved by the owner or operator and employees and their representatives, and if direct participation from employees and their representative should be required when a third party conducts an audit.
• Whether EPA should require declined findings be included in narrative form, or whether the Agency should provide specific categories of findings for facilities to choose from when reporting.
8. Employee Participation—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.A.2.d):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Whether there should be a representative number or percentage of employees and their representatives involved in these recommendations decision teams as well as the development of other process safety elements as outlined in 40 CFR 68.83(b).
• Relevant sources that have provided useful guidance in making risk decisions.
• Whether owners and operators should distribute an annual written or electronic notice to employees that employee participation plans and other RMP information is readily accessible upon request and provide training for those plans and how to access the information.
9. Proposed Modifications and Amplifications to Emergency Response Requirements—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.B.2):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• Additional information that is useful to share when notifying the public of RMP-accidental releases.
• Impediments to accessing community emergency response plans and potential solutions to having the plans more accessible within the scope of the RMP rule.
10. Emergency Response Exercises—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.B.3):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
11. Information Availability—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.C.3):
• The Agency's proposed approach.
• If the 6-mile radius for requesting information is appropriate. For alternative distances, information on the justification for these alternative distances.
• Specific information on the increased likelihood of security threats arising from dissemination of this information.
• Which data elements, or combinations of elements, may pose a security risk if released to the public (provided in Section 10 of the Technical Background Document).
• For each element or combination of elements identified as a potential security risk: (1) Specific comments on why the element or combination of elements presents a security risk and (2) documentation or basis for these security claims, such as expert studies, intelligence assessments, a prior incident, documented security threat, or near miss incident.
12. Other Areas of Technical Clarification—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section IV.D):
• The Agency's proposed approaches.
• For revisions to “storage incident to transportation” definition, the proposed 48-hour time frame, suggestions for other appropriate time frames, and any safety concerns that may arise from transportation containers being exempt from the RMP rule when disconnected for less than 48 hours.
13. Regulatory Impact Analysis—EPA requests comment on the following (See Section II.D):
• The assumptions and information used in the analysis, including burden estimates and the likelihood of adopting safer alternatives.
• The estimated costs of the proposed provisions and whether these costs should accrue to this proposal.
• Cost data or studies related to the cost of practicability studies for conversion of hydrofluoric acid alkylation units to safer technologies.
• The estimated benefits of the proposed provisions.
14. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
• The number of small entities potentially affected by the proposed provisions of this rule.
• The estimated cost impacts on small entities by the proposed provisions of this rule.
15. OTHER—Any comments not falling under one of the preceding categories should be identified using `OTHER' as the comment header.
C. Participation in Virtual Public Hearings
Please note that because of current CDC recommendations, as well as State and local orders for social distancing to limit the spread of COVID-19, EPA cannot hold in-person public meetings at this time.
EPA will begin pre-registering speakers for the hearing upon publication of this preamble in the
Federal Register
(FR). To register to speak at the virtual hearings, please see the online registration form available at
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/virtual-public-hearings-risk-management-program-safer-communities-chemical-accident
or contact Deanne Grant at 202-564-1096 or
grant.deanne@epa.gov
to register to speak at the virtual hearings. The last day to pre-register to speak at the hearings will be September 22, 2022, EPA will post a general agenda for the hearings that will list pre-registered speakers in approximate order at
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/virtual-public-hearings-risk-management-program-safer-communities-chemical-accident.
EPA will make every effort to follow the schedule as closely as possible on the day of the hearings; however, please plan for the hearings to run either ahead of schedule or behind schedule.
Each commenter will have 3 minutes to provide oral testimony. EPA encourages commenters to provide EPA with a copy of their oral testimony electronically (via email) by emailing it to Deanne Grant at
grant.deanne@epa.gov.
EPA also recommends submitting the text of your oral comments as written comments to the rulemaking docket.
EPA may ask clarifying questions during the oral presentations but will not respond to the presentations at that time. Written statements and supporting information submitted during the comment period will be considered with the same weight as oral comments and supporting information presented at the public hearings.
Please note that any updates made to any aspect of the hearings are posted online at
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/forms/virtual-public-hearings-risk-management-program-safer-communities-chemical-accident.
While EPA expects the hearings to go forward as set forth above, please monitor the Agency's website or contact Deanne Grant, 202-564-1096,
grant.deanne@epa.gov,
to determine if there are any updates. EPA does not intend to publish a document in the
Federal Register
announcing updates.
If you require the services of a translator or special accommodations such as audio description, please pre-register for the hearings with Deanne Grant and describe your needs by September 19, 2022. EPA may not be able to arrange accommodations without advanced notice.
II. General Information
A. Does this action apply to me?
This rule applies to those facilities (referred to as “stationary sources” under the Clean Air Act, or CAA) that are subject to the chemical accident prevention requirements at 40 CFR part 68. This includes stationary sources holding more than a threshold quantity (TQ) of a regulated substance in a process. Nothing in this rule would impact the scope and applicability of the General Duty Clause in CAA 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(1). See 40 CFR 68.1. Table 1 provides industrial sectors and the associated North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for entities potentially affected by this action. The Agency's goal is to provide a guide on entities that might be affected by this action. However, this action may affect other entities not listed in this table. If you have questions about the applicability of this action to a particular entity, consult the person(s) listed in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section of this preamble.
Table 1—Entities Potentially Affected by the Proposed Rule
Sector
NAICS codes
Number of
facilities
Chemical uses
Administration of environmental quality programs (
i.e.,
governments, government-owned water)
92, 2213 (government-owned)
1,449
Use chlorine and other chemicals for water treatment.
Agricultural chemical distributors/wholesalers
11, 424 (except 4246, 4247)
3,315
Store ammonia for sale; some in NAICS 111 and 115 use ammonia as a refrigerant.
Chemical manufacturing
325
1,502
Manufacture, process, store.
Chemical wholesalers
4246
317
Store for sale.
Food and beverage manufacturing
311, 312
1,571
Use (mostly ammonia) as a refrigerant.
Oil and gas extraction
211
719
Intermediate processing (mostly regulated flammable substances and flammable mixtures).
Other
21 (except 211), 23, 44, 45, 48, 491, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 71, 72, 81, 99
246
Use chemicals for wastewater treatment, refrigeration, store chemicals for sale.
Other manufacturing
313, 314, 315, 326, 327, 33
375
Use various chemicals in manufacturing process, waste treatment.
Other wholesale
421, 422, 423
39
Use (mostly ammonia) as a refrigerant.
Paper manufacturing
321, 322
55
Use various chemicals in pulp and paper manufacturing.
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing
324
156
Manufacture, process, store (mostly regulated flammable substances and flammable mixtures).
Petroleum wholesalers
4247
367
Store for sale (mostly regulated flammable substances and flammable mixtures).
Utilities/water/wastewater
221 (non-government-owned water)
519
Use chlorine (mostly for water treatment) and other chemicals.
Warehousing and storage
493
1,110
Use (mostly ammonia) as a refrigerant.
Total
11,740
B. What action is the Agency taking?
The purpose of this action is to propose changes to the RMP rule in order to improve safety at facilities that use and distribute hazardous chemicals. The RMP regulations have been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in the United States. However, EPA believes that revisions could further protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through advancement of process safety based on lessons learned. These proposed revisions are a result of review of the existing RMP regulations and information gathered from the 2021 virtual public listening sessions (hereinafter referred to as the “2021 listening sessions”).
1
1
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Rule Retrospection Under Executive Order 13990; Virtual Public Listening Sessions; Request for Public Comment; EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0001.
C. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 112(r) of the CAA as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). Each modification of the RMP rule that EPA proposes in this document is based on EPA's rulemaking authority under CAA section 112(r)(7) (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)). When promulgating rules under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A) and (B), EPA must follow the procedures for rulemaking set out in CAA section 307(d) (see CAA sections 112(r)(7)(E) and 307(d)(1)(C)). Among other things, CAA section 307(d) sets out requirements for the content of proposed and final rules, the docket for each rulemaking, opportunities for oral testimony on proposed rulemakings, the length of time for comments, and judicial review.
D. What are the costs and benefits of this action?
1. Summary of Estimated Costs
Approximately 11,740 facilities have filed current risk management plans with EPA and are potentially affected by the proposed rule. Table 1 presents the number of facilities according to the latest RMP reporting as of December 31, 2020, by industrial sector and chemical use. These facilities range from petroleum refineries and large chemical manufacturers to water and wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum wholesalers and terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of other sources, including Federal installations, that use RMP-regulated substances. Among the stationary sources potentially affected, the Agency has determined that 2,911 are regulated private sector small entities and 630 are small government entities.
Table 2 presents a summary of the annualized costs estimated in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA).
2
In total, EPA estimates annualized costs of $75.8 million at a 3% discount rate and $76.7 million at a 7% discount rate.
2
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention: Proposed Rule (April 19, 2022).
Table 2—Summary of Estimated Annualized Costs Over a 10-Year Period
[Millions, 2020 dollars]
Cost elements
Total
undiscounted
Total
discounted
(3%)
Total
discounted
(7%)
Annualized
(3%)
Annualized
(7%)
Third-party Audits
$102.7
$87.6
$72.1
$10.3
$10.3
Root Cause Analysis
7.3
6.2
5.1
0.7
0.7
Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis
518.2
442.0
364.0
51.8
51.8
Backup Power for Perimeter Monitors
0.4
0.4
0.4
** 0.0
** 0.0
Employee Participation Plan
8.6
7.3
6.0
0.9
0.9
Community Notification System
38.0
32.4
26.7
3.8
3.8
Information Availability
30.3
25.8
21.3
3.0
3.0
Rule Familiarization
46.5
45.2
43.5
5.3
6.2
Total Cost *
751.8
646.8
538.8
75.8
76.7
* Totals may not sum due to rounding.
** Totals are zero due to rounding, Unrounded totals are $44,600 at 3% and $52,200 at 7% discount rates.
The largest annualized cost of the proposed rule is the safer technologies and alternatives analysis (STAA) provision ($51.8 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), followed by third-party audits ($10.3 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), rule familiarization ($5.3 million at a 3% discount rate and $6.2 million at a 7% discount rate), and information availability ($3.0 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates). The remaining provisions impose annualized costs under $1 million, including employee participation ($0.9 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), root cause analysis ($0.7 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), and emergency backup power for perimeter monitors (less than $0.1 million at both 3% and 7% discount rates).
The Agency has determined that among the 2,911 potentially regulated private sector small entities so impacted, 2,822, or 96.9 percent, may experience an impact of less than one percent with an average small entity cost of $10,618; and 84, or 2.9 percent, may experience an impact of between one and three percent of revenues with an average small cost entity of $108,921. Among the 630 small government entities potentially affected, 488, or 77 percent would incur costs of less than $1,000; 109, or 17 percent costs ranging from $1,000 to $2,000; 18, or 3 percent costs ranging from $2,000 to $3,000; and only one would incur costs greater than $10,000, and EPA estimated that for the rule to have a larger than one percent impact on this entity, it would need to have revenue of less than $103 per resident. For detailed costs by provision and NAICS code see Chapter 8 of the RIA.
EPA seeks further information on the estimated costs of these provisions and whether these costs should accrue to this proposal. EPA particularly requests cost data or studies related to the cost of practicability studies for conversion of hydrofluoric acid alkylation units to safer technologies. For more information see Chapter 4 of the RIA.
2. Baseline Damages
Accidents and chemical releases from RMP facilities occur every year. They cause fires and explosions, damage to property, acute and chronic exposures of workers and nearby residents to hazardous materials and result in serious injuries and fatalities. EPA is able to present data on the total damages that currently occur at RMP facilities each year. EPA presents the data based on a 5-year baseline period, summarizes RMP accident impacts and, when possible, monetizes them. EPA expects that some portion of future damages would be prevented through implementation of a final rule. Table 3 presents a summary of the quantified damages identified in the analysis.
Table 3—Summary of Quantified Damages
[Millions, 2020 dollars]
Unit
value
5-year
total
Average/
year
Average/
accident
On site
Fatalities
$9.3
$111.6
$22.32
$0.23
Injuries
0.05
27.50
5.50
0.06
Property Damage
2,031
406.20
4.16
Onsite Total
2,170.10
434.02
4.45
Off site
Fatalities
9.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
Hospitalizations
0.045
1.40
0.28
0.003
Medical Treatment
0.001
0.13
0.03
0.0003
Evacuations *
0.00
14.16
2.83
0.029
Sheltering in Place *
0.00
9.39
1.88
0.019
Property Damage
191.53
38.31
0.39
Offsite Total
216.61
43.32
0.44
Total
2,386.71
477.34
4.89
* The unit value for evacuations and for sheltering in place are less than $300 so when expressed in rounded millions the value represented in the table is zero.
In total, EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility accidents of $477.3 million per year. These damages are divided into onsite and offsite categories where possible. EPA estimated total, average annual onsite damages from chemical releases at RMP facilities of $434.0 million. The largest monetized category was property damage, valued at $406.2 million. The next largest impacts were onsite fatalities ($22.3 million) and injuries ($5.5 million).
EPA estimated total, average annual offsite damages of $43.3 million. Property damage again was the highest value category, estimated at approximately $38.3 million. In decreasing order, the next largest average annual offsite impact was from evacuations ($2.8 million), then sheltering in place ($1.9 million), hospitalizations ($0.3 million), and medical treatment ($0.03 million).
3. Summary of Benefits
EPA anticipates that promulgation and implementation of this proposed rule would result in a reduced frequency and magnitude of damages from releases, including damages that are quantified in Table 3 such as fatalities, injuries, property damage, hospitalizations, medical treatment, sheltering-in-place and so on. EPA also expects that the proposed rule provisions would reduce baseline damages that are not quantified in Table 3 such as lost productivity, responder costs, property value reductions, damages from catastrophes, and so on. Although EPA was unable to quantify the reductions in damages that may occur as a result of the proposed rule provisions, EPA expects that a portion of future damages would be prevented by the proposed rule. Table 4 summarizes four broad social benefit categories related to accident prevention and mitigation, including prevention of RMP accidents, mitigation of RMP accidents, prevention and mitigation of non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities, and prevention of major catastrophes. The table explains each and identifies ten associated specific benefit categories, ranging from avoided fatalities to avoided emergency response costs.
Table 4—Summary of Social Benefits of Proposed Rule Provisions
Broad benefit category
Explanation
Specific benefit categories
Accident Prevention
Prevention of future RMP facility accidents
• Reduced Fatalities.
• Reduced Injuries.
• Reduced Property Damage.
Accident Mitigation
Mitigation of future RMP facility accidents
• Fewer People Sheltered-in-Place.
• Fewer Evacuations.
• Avoided Lost Productivity.
Non-RMP Accident Prevention and Mitigation
Prevention and mitigation of future non-RMP accidents at RMP facilities
• Avoided Emergency Response Costs.
• Avoided Transaction Costs.
Avoided Catastrophes
Prevention of rare but extremely high consequence events
• Avoided Property Value Impacts.*
• Avoided Environmental Impacts.
Information Availability
Provision of information to the public and emergency responders
• Improved Efficiency of Property Markets.
• Improved Resource Allocation.
* These impacts partially overlap with several other categories.
EPA seeks further information on the estimated benefits of these provisions. For more information see Chapter 6 of the RIA.
III. Background
A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program
EPA originally issued the RMP regulation in two stages. The Agency published the list of regulated substances and TQs in 1994: “List of Regulated Substances and Thresholds for Accidental Release Prevention; Requirements for Petitions Under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act as Amended” (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994), hereinafter referred to as the “list rule.”
3
The Agency published the RMP final regulation, containing risk management requirements for covered sources, in 1996: “Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7)” (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996), hereinafter referred to as the “1996 RMP rule.”
4 5
Subsequent modifications to the list rule and the 1996 RMP rule were made as discussed in the 2017 amendments rule published in 2017 (“Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act”; 82 FR 4594, January 13, 2017, at 4600, hereinafter referred to as the “2017 amendments rule”). Prior to development of EPA's 1996 RMP rule, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard in 1992 (57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992), as required by section 304 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), using its authority under 29 U.S.C. 653. The OSHA PSM standard can be found in 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.119. Both the OSHA PSM standard and EPA's RMP rule aim to prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental chemical releases through implementation of management program elements that integrate technologies, procedures, and management practices. In addition to requiring implementation of management program elements, the RMP rule requires any covered source to submit (to EPA) a document summarizing the source's risk management program—called a risk management plan (or RMP).
3
Documents and information related to development of the list rule can be found in the EPA docket for the rulemaking, docket number A-91-74.
4
Documents and information related to development of the 1996 RMP rule can be found in EPA docket number A-91-73.
5
40 CFR part 68 applies to owners and operators of stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a regulated substance within a process. The regulations do not apply to chemical hazards other than listed substances held above a TQ within a regulated process.
EPA's risk management program requirements include conducting a worst-case scenario analysis and a review of accident history, coordinating emergency response procedures with local response organizations, conducting a hazard assessment,
documenting a management system, implementing a prevention program and an emergency response program, and submitting a risk management plan that addresses all aspects of the risk management program for all covered processes and chemicals. A process at a source is covered under one of three different prevention programs (Program 1, Program 2, or Program 3) based directly or indirectly on the threat posed to the community and the environment. Program 1 has minimal requirements and is for processes that have not had an accidental release with offsite consequences in the last 5 years before submission of the source's risk management plan, and that have no public receptors within the worst-case release scenario vulnerable zone for the process. Program 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1, has the most requirements, and applies to processes covered by the OSHA PSM standard or classified in specified industrial sectors. Program 2 has fewer requirements than Program 3 and applies to any process not covered under Programs 1 or 3. Programs 2 and 3 both require a hazard assessment, a prevention program, and an emergency response program, although Program 2 requirements are less extensive and more streamlined. For example, the Program 2 prevention program was intended to cover in many cases simpler processes at smaller businesses and does not require the following process safety elements: management of change, pre-startup review, contractors, employee participation, and hot work permits. The Program 3 prevention program is fundamentally identical to the OSHA PSM standard and designed to cover those processes in the chemical industry.
B. Events Leading to This Action
On January 13, 2017, EPA published amendments to the RMP rule (82 FR 4594). The 2017 amendments rule was prompted by E.O. 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,”
6
which directed EPA (and several other Federal agencies) to, among other things, modernize policies, regulations, and standards to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities. The 2017 amendments rule contained various new provisions applicable to RMP-regulated facilities addressing prevention program elements (safer technology and alternatives analysis (“STAA”); incident investigation root cause analysis; and third-party compliance audits), emergency response coordination with local responders (including emergency response exercises), and availability of information to the public. EPA received three petitions for reconsideration of the 2017 amendments rule under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B).
7
In December 2019, EPA finalized revisions to the RMP regulations to reconsider the rule changes made in January 2017 (“Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act,” 84 FR 69834, December 19, 2019, hereinafter referred to as the “2019 reconsideration rule”). The 2019 reconsideration rule rescinded certain information disclosure provisions of the 2017 amendments rule, removed most new accident prevention requirements added by the 2017 rule, and modified some other provisions of the 2017 amendments rule. The rule changes made by the 2019 reconsideration rule reflect the current RMP regulations to date. There are petitions for judicial review of both the 2017 amendments and the 2019 reconsideration rules. The 2019 reconsideration rule challenges are being held in abeyance until October 3, 2022, by which time the parties must submit motions to govern. The case against the 2017 amendments rule is in abeyance pending resolution of the 2019 reconsideration rule case.
6
Available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security.
7
Available at
https://www.epa.gov/petitions/petitions-office-land-and-emergency-management.
On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued E.O. 13990, “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis.”
8
E.O. 13990 directed Federal agencies to review existing regulations and take action to address priorities established by the current Administration, which include bolstering resilience to the impacts of climate change and prioritizing environmental justice (EJ). As a result, EPA was tasked to review the current RMP regulations.
8
Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-protecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climate-crisis/.
While the Agency reviewed the RMP rule under E.O. 13990, the E.O. did not specifically direct EPA to publish a solicitation for comment or information from the public. Nevertheless, EPA held virtual public listening sessions on June 16 and July 8, 2021, and had an open docket for public comment (86 FR 28828; May 28, 2021). In the request for public comment, the Agency asked for information on the adequacy of revisions to the RMP regulations completed since 2017, incorporating consideration of climate change risks and impacts into the regulations and expanding the application of EJ. EPA received a total of 27,828 public comments in response to the request for comments. This includes 27,720 received at
regulations.gov
,
9
35 provided during the listening session on June 16, 2021,
10
and 73 provided during the listening session on July 8, 2021.
11
Most of the comments received in the docket were copies of form letters related to four different form letter campaigns. The remaining comments included 302 submissions containing unique content. Of the 302 unique submissions, a total of 163 were deemed to be substantive (
i.e.,
the commenters presented both a position and a reasoned argument in support of the position). Information collected through these comments has informed the review.
9
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312.
10
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0011.
11
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0020.
EPA seeks comment on the proposed amendments. Any suggestions for alternative options should include an appropriate rationale and supporting data for the Agency to be able to consider it for a final action. To the extent submitted comments will repeat or rely on material submitted in the docket used for the 2017 amendments rule or the 2019 reconsideration rule, include the relevant material in the submitted comment with a specific reference to the portion of the material cited as support.
C. EPA's Authority To Revise the RMP Rule
Congress granted EPA authority to establish accident prevention rules under two provisions in CAA section 112(r)(7). Under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A), EPA may set rules addressing the prevention, detection, and correction of accidental releases of substances listed by EPA by rule (“regulated substances” listed in the Tables 1 through 4 to 40 CFR 68.130). Such rules may include requirements related to monitoring, data collection, training, design, equipment, work practice, and operations. In promulgating its regulations, EPA may draw distinctions between types, classes, and kinds of facilities by taking into consideration various factors including size and location. This section also indicates that EPA has discretion regarding the date rules will take effect. Regulations become effective “as determined by the Administrator,
assuring compliance as expeditiously as practicable.”
Under CAA section 112(r)(7)(B), Congress directed EPA to develop “reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance” that provide for the prevention and detection of accidental releases and the response to such releases “to the greatest extent practicable.” Congress required an initial rulemaking under this subparagraph by November 15, 1993. Section 112(r)(7)(B) sets out a series of mandatory subjects to address, interagency consultation requirements, and discretionary provisions that allowed EPA to tailor requirements to make them reasonable and practicable. The regulations needed to address “storage, as well as operations” and emergency response after accidental releases, and EPA was to use the expertise of the Secretaries of Labor and Transportation in promulgating the regulations. This provision gave EPA the discretion to recognize differences in factors such as “size, operations, processes, class, and categories of sources” and the voluntary actions taken by owners and operators of regulated sources to prevent and respond to accidental releases (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)). At a minimum, the regulations had to require any stationary source with more than a threshold quantity of regulated substances to prepare and implement a risk management plan (RMP). Such an RMP needed to provide for compliance with rule requirements under CAA section 112(r) and include a hazard assessment with release scenarios, an accident history, a release prevention program, and a response program (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)). Plans were to be registered with EPA and submitted to various planning entities (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(iii)). These initial rules had to apply to sources 3 years after promulgation or 3 years after a substance was first listed for regulation under CAA section 112(r) (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)). EPA fulfilled its initial obligations under section 112(r)(7)(B) with the 1996 RMP rule, but the agency views section 112(r)(7)(B) to give EPA continuing authority to improve the RMP regulations to achieve the statutory directives.
In addition to the direction to use the expertise of the Secretaries of Labor and Transportation in CAA section 112(r)(7)(B), the statute more broadly requires EPA to consult with these secretaries when carrying out the authority of CAA section 112(r)(7) and to “coordinate any requirements under [CAA section 112(r)(7)] with any requirements established for comparable purposes by” OSHA (CAA section 112(r)(7)(D)). This consultation and coordination language derives from and expands upon provisions on hazard assessments in the bill that passed in the Senate as its version of what eventually became the 1990 CAAA, section 129(e)(4) of S.1630. The Senate committee report on this language notes that the purpose of the coordination requirement is to ensure that “requirements imposed by both agencies to accomplish the same purpose are not unduly burdensome or duplicative.”
12
The mandate for coordination in the area of safer chemical processes was incorporated into CAA section 112(r)(7)(D). In the same legislation, Congress directed OSHA to promulgate a process safety standard that became the PSM standard (see CAAA of 1990 section 304).
12
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989: Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Together with Additional and Minority Views, to Accompany S.1630
(December 20, 1989),
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645.
EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-0645.
EPA used its authority under CAA section 112(r)(7) to issue the 1996 RMP rule (61 FR 31668; June 20, 1996), the 2017 amendments rule (82 FR 4594; January 13, 2017), and the 2019 reconsideration rule (84 FR 69834; December 19, 2019). The Agency is also implementing this authority in this proposed rulemaking. These proposed amendments address three requirements of the Risk Management Program: accident prevention program requirements, emergency preparedness requirements, and information availability requirements. The prevention program provisions in this rule address the prevention and detection of accidental releases and include the following topics: stationary source siting, safer technologies and alternatives analysis (STAA), root cause analysis incident investigation, third-party compliance auditing, and employee participation. The emergency response provisions in this rule modify existing provisions that provide for owner or operator responses to accidental releases. The information availability provisions discussed in this document generally assist in the development of emergency response procedures and measures to protect human health and the environment after an accidental release (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)).
13
When determining which amendments would result in the prevention and detection of accidental releases of regulated substances to the greatest extent practicable, EPA took into consideration multiple factors including—but not limited to—the size of the facility, the quantity of the substances handled, and the location of the facility in relation to other RMP facilities in accordance with both CAA sections 112(r)(7)(A) and (B)(i). The rule distinguishes among classes and categories of sources by industry and process type, as well as likelihood of an accidental release that may impact a community. This rulemaking action therefore proposes substantive amendments to 40 CFR part 68 and is authorized by CAA section 112(r)(7)(A) and (B), as explained herein.
13
Incident investigation, compliance auditing, and STAA are also authorized as release prevention requirements pertaining to stationary source design, equipment, work practice, recordkeeping, and reporting. Information disclosure is also authorized as reporting (CAA section 112(r)(7)(A)).
In considering whether it is legally permissible for EPA to modify provisions of the RMP rule while continuing to meet its obligations under CAA section 112(r), the Agency notes that it has made discretionary amendments to the 1996 RMP rule several times without dispute over its authority to issue discretionary amendments. (See 64 FR 964, January 6, 1999; 64 FR 28696, May 26, 1999; 69 FR 18819, April 9, 2004.) According to the decision in
Air Alliance Houston
v.
EPA,
906 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2018), “EPA retains the authority under Section 7412(r)(7) [CAA section 112(r)(7)] to substantively amend the programmatic requirements of the [2017 RMP amendments] . . . subject to arbitrary and capricious review” (906 F.3d at 1066). Therefore, EPA is authorized to modify the provisions of the current RMP regulations if it finds that it is reasonable to do so.
14
14
See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. Association of the United States, Inc.
v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983). In addressing the standard of review to reconsider a regulation, the Supreme Court stated that the rescission or modification of safety standards “is subject to the same test” as the “agency's action in promulgating such standards [and] may be set aside if found to be `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' ” (463 U.S. at 41, quoting 5 U.S.C. 706). The same standard that applies to the promulgation of a rule applies to the modification or rescission of that rule.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that agencies have broad discretion to reconsider a regulation at any time so long as the changes in policy are “permissible under the statute, . . . there are good reasons for [them], and that the agency
believes
[them] to be better” than prior policies. (See
Federal Communications Commission
v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); emphasis
in quote original).
15
As explained in detail above, the policy changes proposed in this action are permissible under the statute. Additionally, there are good reasons for the policies adopted in this rule. Accidental releases remain a significant concern to communities and cost society more than $477 million yearly.
16
The risk of being impacted by an accidental release is even more apparent in communities where multiple RMP facilities are in close proximity to residential areas. Lowering the probability and magnitude of accidents by putting more of a focus on prevention reduces the risks posed by these RMP facilities, which is one of the objectives of the present RMP proposed amendments.
15
The full quote from Fox states: “But [the Agency] need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are
better
than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency
believes
it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates” (
Federal Communications Commission
v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. at 515; emphasis original).
16
A full description of costs and benefits for this proposed rule can be found in the Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention: Proposed Rule (April 19, 2022). This document is available in the docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174).
In the 2019 reconsideration rule, the Agency justified rescinding the prevention program provisions of the 2017 amendments rule, STAA, incident investigation, root cause analysis, and third party compliance audits based on two main rationales: (1) That a case-by-case compliance-driven approach to oversight focusing on problematic sources (generally, sources that have had releases) could obtain many of the accident-reduction benefits of a rule without broadly burdening sources that were less likely to have a release under regulatory mandates, and (2) that the Agency was being consistent with the OSHA PSM prevention provisions. The Agency discusses each rationale in turn below.
The conclusion in the 2019 reconsideration rule that a case-by-case, compliance-driven approach relying on traditional tools such as compliance outreach and administrative and judicial enforcement could provide many of the same benefits as a rule without imposing broad burdens rested upon an observation that accidents are declining and concentrated among few sources, allowing for concentrated compliance oversight. See 84 FR 69843-44 (Dec. 19, 2019). While focusing on accident and impact rates, the rate analysis did not account for the likelihood that low-probability, high consequence events could impact trends. Thus, in the 2019 reconsideration rule, EPA acknowledged the decline in yearly total count of accidents and accident rates. For the 2017 amendments rule and 2019 reconsideration rule, EPA analyzed accidents for the periods 2004 to 2013, and 2014 to 2016, respectively.
17
Using a yearly average for the 2017 amendments rule (2004-2013) and the 2019 reconsideration rule (2014-2016), in 2019 EPA found declining yearly averages for every metric of onsite and offsite damage.
18
As part of this proposed rule, EPA analyzed accidents from 2016 to 2020.
19
The impacts of high consequence RMP-reportable accident events between 2017 and 2020 demonstrate the impact of low-probability, high consequence events on annual averages. For example, using the same methods used in the 2019 rule, current data show the average annual rate of those seeking medical treatment increased by 230% (10 per year in the 2019 reconsideration rule and 33 per year for this proposed rule); evacuations increased by 75% (1,868 per year versus 3,268 per year) and accidents resulting in sheltering in place increased by 18% (12,534 per year versus 14,845 per year). The more current data since the 2019 analyses shows that reliance on a declining trend in accidents and impacts to conduct selective, often post-incident oversight may prove insufficiently effective over time and make it difficult to stay ahead of reversals in trends.
17
Exhibit 6-2, Page 77, EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-2089.
18
The exception being a higher annual average offsite property damage for the period of 2014-2016 as compared to 2004-2013.
19
In the RIA for this proposed rule, EPA includes 2016 again to account for accidents not reported prior to the 2019 reconsideration rule analysis.
Recent accidents also highlight EPA's improper reliance on only annual count of total accidents to address the low-probability, high-consequence nature of accidental releases. For example, while the annual count of accidents decreased overall between 2016 and 2020, in 2019, the TPC Group explosion and fire in Port Neches, Texas, reported the largest number of persons ever evacuated (n=50,000) as a result of an RMP-reportable incident, as well as $153 million in offsite property damage. Large events are rare, but to the extent that CAA 112(r) was intended as a prevention program for large catastrophic releases, selective oversight through a “compliance-driven” approach that relies heavily on determining if the facility was compliant with accident prevention regulations after an accident occurred would not meet the goal of preventing the initial accident. The RMP rule must be broader based, and rule-driven in order to have stationary sources handling dangerous chemicals work to prevent potentially catastrophic incidents.
Additionally, the 2019 reconsideration rule failed to acknowledge that mostly relying on relief like post-accident settlement, particularly at those industries that already have a history of frequent accidents, entails significant transaction costs, delays, and uncertainty of obtaining necessary prevention improvements. While such delays and transaction costs are inherent in compliance oversight and the enforcement process, the failure of the 2019 reconsideration rule to address this important limitation on the feasibility and utility of a “compliance-driven” approach is a flaw in the determination made in 2019 that such an approach is a reasonable substitute for a rule-driven approach to prevention. While enforcement of the RMP regulation has and will continue to occur, EPA expects under a rule-drive approach most facilities will proactively make the necessary prevention improvements to be in compliance with the rule to avoid enforcement. The 2019 reconsideration rule does not acknowledge that settlements often involve compromises, and that, in the course of settlement, EPA cannot always obtain all appropriate relief. The history of one of EPA's largest enforcement actions under the RMP rule involving Chevron's operations illustrates many of these points. EPA's enforcement engagement with Chevron began shortly after a fire at the Richmond, CA, refinery in August 2012. Subsequent accidents at Chevron refineries in El Segundo, CA, and Pascagoula, MS, led EPA to investigate all five Chevron refineries in the United States, including refineries in Salt Lake City, UT and Kapolei, HI (no longer owned by Chevron). EPA concluded a final civil judicial settlement with Chevron in October 2018, more than 6 years after the investigation began.
20
20
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Chevron Settlement Information Sheet, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/chevron-settlement-information-sheet.
Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, even when individual facilities have not yet experienced an accident, certain classes of facilities are more likely to have accidents near communities. Communities surrounding these classes of facilities would benefit from rule-based prevention prior to
incidents, rather than the case-by-case oversight approach of the 2019 reconsideration rule.
Regarding alignment with OSHA PSM prevention provisions, the 2019 reconsideration rule indicated that the 2017 amendments rule only represented a departure from PSM requirements. The 2019 reconsideration rule acknowledged there were no legal requirements to defer to OSHA in rulemaking, or for EPA and OSHA to proceed on identical timelines in making changes to the RMP rule and PSM standard, and that some divergence between the RMP rule and PSM standard may at times be necessary given the agencies' separate missions. See 83 FR 24863-64. While EPA, in the 2019 reconsideration rule, decided to take a traditional approach of maintaining consistency with OSHA PSM because benefits were recognized at that time, EPA now believes the benefits of a rule-based prevention for certain high-risk classes of facilities could help prevent high consequence accidents that affect communities, such as the TPC Group explosion. Furthermore, the statute's consult-and-coordinate requirements are to ensure the agencies are working together to ensure rules are compatible and not conflicting. The proposed prevention program provisions presented today are compatible and do not conflict with the prevention provisions of OSHA PSM, as detailed further in the discussions of each provision.
In contrast to the 2019 approach, the approach taken in this proposal for the prevention program provision, STAA, incident investigation root cause analysis, and third-party compliance audits, refines the focused regulatory approach found in the 2017 amendments rule, and proposes provisions modified from those in the 2017 amendments rule, to better identify risky facilities to prevent accidental releases before they can occur. As explained in further detail in following sections of this preamble, EPA therefore maintains that by taking a rule-based, prevention-focused approach in this action rather than the 2019 reconsideration rule's compliance-driven, mostly post-incident, approach, the proposed rule revisions could further protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through PSM advancement without undue burden. Similarly, other proposed modifications to approaches adopted in 2019 to information disclosure and emergency response will also better balance security concerns with improved community awareness and lead to better community preparedness for accidents.
21
To the extent that both approaches are reasonable, the approach of this proposed rule would be more protective, and thus provide for release prevention, detection, and response “to the greatest extent practicable” among the reasonable approaches.
21
The term “information disclosure” refers to specific provisions adopted in 2017 that the 2019 reconsideration rule rescinded. EPA uses the term “information availability” in the current rulemaking to mean the broader set of measures the Agency is adopting today.
IV. Proposed Action
The RMP rule has been effective in preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in the United States and protecting human health and the environment from chemical hazards, but major accidents continue to occur. More importantly, even though there has been a long-term trend of reducing accidents and the gravity of accidents, this trend can be improved to further protect human health and the environment.
Below EPA presents several proposed amendments for consideration and public comment. Many of these amendments would better focus new prevention program elements on particular classes of facilities than the 2017 amendments rule, and promote more information availability, employee participation and emergency response measures than the 2019 reconsideration rule. As a result of the changes in this proposal, the Agency, as described in further detail below, considered the possibility of potential reliance interests associated with portions of the 2019 reconsideration rule. The Agency views these proposed measures and other aspects of this proposed rule as integrated and reinforcing. As discussed below, some of the proposed rule changes focus enhanced prevention measures like STAA and third-party auditing on individual sources and classes of sources with a history of accidental releases. Were the proposed rule adopted, EPA believes that many if not most sources are likely to respond to this approach of triggering requirements based on accident history by undertaking enhanced prevention measures to comply with the rule and avoid accidents. However, some sources may try to evade these enhanced accident prevention requirements by avoiding reporting incidents that trigger additional requirements. The employee participation, public information availability, and emergency response measures would make it more difficult to evade the accident history-triggered requirements by leveraging workers and the public in facility oversight. Thus, in addition to the merits of each proposed provisions as considered in isolation, the proposed rule changes can be seen as complementary to each other. Adopting these provisions together will help ensure owners and operators have these complementing measures in place to prevent or minimize accidental release of their regulated substances to protect human health and the environment. Nevertheless, while many of the provisions reinforce each other, EPA also views each one as merited on its own if it ultimately adopted, and thus severable should there be judicial review.
A. Prevention Program
1. Hazard Evaluation Amplifications
a. Introduction
A hazard evaluation is defined as the identification of individual hazards of a system, determination of the mechanisms by which they could give rise to undesired events, and evaluation of the consequences of these events on health (including public health), environment, and property. These evaluations often use qualitative techniques to pinpoint weaknesses in the design and operation of facilities that could lead to incidents.
22
Current requirements exist within the RMP rule to conduct these evaluations. RMP hazard evaluation regulations require, among other things, owners or operators with Program 2 processes to conduct hazard reviews under 40 CFR 68.50(a) that identify: (1) The hazards associated with the process and regulated substances; (2) opportunities for equipment malfunctions or human errors that could cause an accidental release; (3) the safeguards used or needed to control the hazards or prevent equipment malfunction or human error; and (4) any steps used or needed to detect or monitor releases. Owners or operators with Program 3 processes are required to conduct process hazard analyses (PHAs) under 40 CFR 68.67(c) that address: (1) The hazards of the process; (2) the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences; (3) engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships, such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases (acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation
with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors); (4) consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; (5) stationary source siting; (6) human factors; and (7) a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls. The hazard evaluation requirements are key to understanding how to operate safely and prevent accidents and the release of hazardous substances.
22
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), “CCPS Process Safety Glossary,” accessed January 28, 2022,
https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/glossary?title=hazard+evaluation#views-exposed-form-glossary-page.
In developing the initial 1996 RMP rule, the Agency recognized that many workplace hazards also threaten public receptors and that most accident prevention steps taken to protect workers also protect the public and the environment. Consequently, EPA adopted and built on much of the existing accident prevention language from OSHA's PSM standard, including the process hazard analysis (PHA) language from 29 CFR 1910.119(e). EPA's understanding of the PHA was based on OSHA's:
23
a PHA analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals, and major spills of hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions (routine and nonroutine), and external factors that might impact the process. These considerations assist in determining the hazards and potential failure points or failure modes in a process. OSHA pointed to detailed industry guidance that serves as the basis for understanding what hazards are widely recognized as threats to safe chemical process operations. For example, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) developed the publication “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures,”
24
which EPA and OSHA agree generally addresses the most common categories of hazards relevant to facilities that handle hazardous chemicals.
23
See 58 FR 54190, October 20, 1993, p. 54204.
24
CCPS,
CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition
(New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2008).
While EPA and OSHA have not explicitly added language in their regulations on certain hazard evaluation elements that were assumed implicit and recognized as hazards among industry, EPA seeks to emphasize that some hazards should be explicitly addressed by facilities to further protect human health and the environment. EPA is not proposing additional regulatory requirements from what already exists in the RMP regulations, rather EPA is proposing adding regulatory text to emphasize that natural hazards and loss of power are among the hazards that must be addressed in hazard reviews and PHAs. EPA is also proposing to emphasize that facility siting should be addressed in hazard reviews, and to explicitly define the facility siting requirement for Program 2 and Program 3 hazard evaluations. EPA seeks to better reflect its longstanding regulatory requirement rather than impose additional regulatory requirements (and potential additional costs) that diverge from the OSHA PSM regulatory requirements. EPA has coordinated with OSHA throughout the development of this proposed rule to ensure the intent of adding specificity to these hazard evaluation requirements is consistent with the intent and meaning of the OSHA PSM standard to avoid inconsistencies between the two regulatory programs.
b. Natural Hazards
Natural hazards (
e.g.,
extreme temperatures, high winds, floods, earthquakes, wildfires) are hazards for chemical facilities because they have the potential to initiate accidents and challenge hazardous chemical process equipment and operations. If not properly managed, these hazards can trigger chemical accidents that threaten human health and the environment. EPA believes many facilities with RMP processes are generally managing natural hazards well; however, some RMP accidents are still being reported as linked to natural hazards. Climate change increases the threat of extreme weather as a natural hazard. Therefore, EPA is proposing to emphasize that natural hazards should explicitly be included in the hazards evaluated in hazard reviews and PHAs for Program 2 and Program 3 RMP-regulated processes. EPA believes making more explicit this already-existing accident prevention program requirement
25
will ensure the threats of natural hazards are properly evaluated and managed to prevent or mitigate releases of RMP-regulated substances at covered facilities.
25
Existing requirements of the hazards to be evaluated in hazard evaluations are found at 40 CFR 68.50(a) for Program 2 processes and at 40 CFR 68.67(a)-(c) for Program 3 processes.
CCPS' “Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures”
26
includes external events as a hazard evaluation category that should be addressed. It defines these as events external to the system/plant caused by: (1) A natural hazard (
e.g.,
earthquake, flood, tornado, extreme temperature, lightning) or (2) a human induced event (aircraft crash, missile, nearby industrial activity, fire, sabotage,
etc.
). At the time of initial RMP rule development, EPA had not explicitly added language about considering external events to the rule. However, EPA did acknowledge that sources must consider the hazards created by external events. In the 1996 RMP final rule Response to Comments,
27
EPA indicated the following: “As part of a properly conducted PHA, sources would normally consider whether a process is vulnerable to damage caused by external events, such as earthquakes, floods, high winds, and evaluate the potential consequences if such events damaged the integrity of the process.” To further express this expectation, EPA's RMP guidance states: “Natural Events and Other Outside Influences: Whichever [hazard review/process hazard analysis] approach you use, you should consider reasonably anticipated external events as well as internal failures. If you are in an area subject to earthquakes, hurricanes, or floods, you should examine whether your process would survive these natural events without releasing the substance. In your hazard review, you should consider the potential impacts of lightning strikes and power failures.”
28
In comments submitted during the 2021 listening sessions,
29
some industry trade associations stated that the current provisions of the RMP rule are sufficient to protect against climate-related impacts.
30
Specifically, one industry trade association remarked that “under requirements in the current program, the impact of severe weather events such as storms and flooding on operations and consequently the risk they pose for an accidental release, must already be considered and addressed in the plans submitted to EPA.”
31
26
CCPS,
CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 3rd Edition
(New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2008).
27
A-91-73-IX-C-1-Volume-1[H], pp. 9-23.
28
EPA, General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Distributors, Ch. 6: Prevention Programs (2004), pp. 6-10 to 6-11,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/chap-06-final.pdf.
29
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312.
30
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0005; 0045.
31
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0005.
Despite this general knowledge that natural hazards are process hazards that should be evaluated and addressed during hazard reviews and PHAs, EPA's recent review of the RMP National Database indicates that when reporting accidents, some RMP facilities report “natural” and “unusual weather conditions” as the respective initiating event or as a contributing factor to their
accidents.
32
According to the Agency's data from 2004-2020, facilities reported 38 RMP-reportable accidents as having a natural cause as the initiating event of their accident and another 46 RMP-reportable accidents as having unusual weather conditions as a contributing factor of their accident.
33
32
These fields are options when reporting accidents on RMP reports. Description of these options: EPA,
Risk Management Plan: RMP*eSubmit User's Manual
(2019), pp. 76-77.
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-03/documents/rmpesubmit_user_guide_-_march_2019_final_0.pdf.
33
Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
In addition to these natural hazard-linked accidents, RMP data indicate that the locations of many RMP facilities leave them exposed to natural hazards. In a review of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Storm Events Database from the last two decades, EPA generally found that extreme weather events are common in counties with RMP facilities. For example, during 2000-2020, over 90 percent of counties with RMP facilities experienced flooding, 1 in 4 counties with RMP facilities suffered damage from hurricanes, and counties with RMP facilities have on average experienced 30 floods (over one per year) and 40 extreme winter weather events (approximately two per year), such as blizzards. Some counties with RMP facilities also experience extreme weather events much more often than average. For instance, many regions in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were impacted by more than 30 hurricanes over the prior 20 years. Similarly, regions of northern California and Oregon suffered from over 500 days of wildfires during the same period.
34
34
Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
With new studies showing that the threat of natural hazards is increasing, actions to ensure natural hazards are evaluated and properly managed are critical. A recent report by the Center for Progressive Reform, Earthjustice, and the Union of Concerned Scientists—entitled “Preventing `Double Disasters”
35
—indicates that one-third of RMP facilities are at risk of climate-related events, such as wildfire, flooding, hurricane storm surge, and/or coastal flooding. This finding is nearly identical to the estimate of the Government Accountability Office in its recent report, “Chemical Accident Prevention: EPA Should Ensure Regulated Facilities Consider Risks from Climate Change.”
36
The 2018 National Climate Assessment
37
and several publications from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which are authoritative sources for the impacts of climate change on the severity and frequency of weather events, found that there is a scientific consensus that the future holds increased risks of more severe and frequent extreme weather events, including tropical cyclones, coastal flooding, wildfire, tornados, severe thunderstorms, and extreme precipitation. EPA must consider the increased risk to RMP facilities.
35
David Flores, et al.,
Preventing “Double Disasters”
(2021),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/preventing-double-disasters%20FINAL.pdf.
36
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Chemical Accident Prevention: EPA Should Ensure Regulated Facilities Consider Risks from Climate Change
(2022),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104494.pdf.
37
U.S. Global Change Research Program,
Fourth National Climate Assessment
(2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) and many public listening session commenters identified the August 2017 Arkema Inc. chemical plant fire in Crosby, Texas, as a significant accident caused by natural hazards.
38
39
40
Flooding from Hurricane Harvey disabled the refrigeration system at the Arkema plant, which allowed the temperature of organic peroxides to increase and spontaneously combust. Twenty-one people sought medical attention from reported exposures to the fumes. More than 200 residents living near the facility were evacuated and could not return home for a week. While this part of the Arkema facility was not an RMP-regulated process, the increased occurrence of extreme-weather-caused events like this highlight the importance of ensuring proper evaluation of natural hazards on process operations.
38
CSB, “Arkema Inc. Chemical Plant Fire,” last modified May 24, 2018,
https://www.csb.gov/arkema-inc-chemical-plant-fire-/.
39
Center for Progressive Reform,
Preventing Double Disasters
(2021),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0035.
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0035-10.
40
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0004; 0080, 0081.
As a result of the Arkema incident, CSB developed a safety alert that includes guidance for chemical plants during extreme weather events.
41
In the final report on the Arkema incident,
42
CSB recommended CCPS develop broad and comprehensive guidance to help companies assess their U.S. facility risk from potential extreme weather events. As a result, CCPS produced the monograph, “Assessment of and Planning for Natural Hazards.”
43
In addition to outlining the importance of rising threats, it outlines resources that many of its member companies—many of which have RMP-regulated processes—have successfully used to identify natural hazards, gather data and identify equipment to be addressed in natural hazard assessments, and evaluate and meet design criteria of equipment according to recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).
41
CSB,
2020 Hurricane Season: Guidance for Chemical Plants during Extreme Weather Events
(n.d.),
https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/extreme_weather_-_final_w_links.pdf.
42
CSB, “Arkema Inc. Chemical Plant Fire,” last modified May 24, 2018,
https://www.csb.gov/arkema-inc-chemical-plant-fire-/.
43
CCPS,
CCPS Monograph: Assessment of and Planning For Natural Hazards
(American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2019),
https://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/html/536181/NaturalDisaster-CCPSmonograph.html.
With climate change-related natural hazards as a global concern, other countries are also expanding efforts to address natural hazards at chemical facilities. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Programme on Chemical Accidents started work on natural hazards triggering technological accidents (“NaTech”) risk management in 2008 in partnership with the European Commission Joint Research Center, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The project aimed to investigate NaTech prevention, preparedness, and response to chemical accidents; exchange experience across countries; and provide guidance on NaTech risk management. Studies, databases, and information continue to be collected and published to help countries manage this increasing threat.
44
44
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Risks from Natural Hazards at Hazardous Installations (Natech),” accessed January 28, 2022,
https://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/chemical-accidents/risks-from-natural-hazards-at-hazardous-installations.htm.
While well-prepared hazard evaluations under the RMP rule already address NaTech, EPA is proposing to emphasize that natural hazards, including those associated with climate change, be explicitly addressed in RMP Program 2 hazard reviews and Program 3 PHAs. EPA is proposing to make language changes that include requiring hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(5) and 68.67(c)(8) to address external events such as natural hazards, including those caused by climate change or other triggering events that could lead to an accidental release.
EPA is also proposing to define natural hazards in a way that is similar
to the description used by CCPS. Under the proposed rule, natural hazards would be defined as naturally occurring events with the potential for negative impacts, including meteorological hazards due to weather and climactic cycles, as well as geological hazards. EPA seeks comment on this approach.
EPA continues to expect facilities to utilize all available resources to properly evaluate what natural hazards could potentially trigger accidental releases from their regulated processes. EPA understands that natural hazards and process operations vary throughout the United States. However, because the RMP rule is performance-based, EPA believes that all regulated RMP facilities can be successful in addressing natural hazards within their risk management programs. Because natural hazards continue to be a factor in RMP accidents and present a growing threat to process safety at RMP facilities, a requirement to evaluate and control natural hazards should be explicitly stated in the RMP regulation. While EPA will continue to rely on available industry guidance to evaluate compliance with this provision, the Agency requests public comment on whether EPA should develop additional guidance (beyond the Agency's existing RMP general guidance for risk management programs)
45
to help regulated facilities comply with this provision. EPA is particularly interested in comments related to suggested information resources such as databases, checklists, or narrative discussions, as well as commenters' recommendations for regional versus national, or sector-specific guidance.
45
EPA, “Guidance for Facilities on Risk Management Programs (RMP),” last modified December 20, 2021,
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/guidance-facilities-risk-management-programs-rmp#general.
As an alternative to the preferred approach, EPA seeks comment on whether to specify areas most at risk from climate or other natural events by adopting the list of areas exposed to heightened risk of wildfire, flooding, storm surge, or coastal flooding identified in, “Preventing Double Disasters,” discussed above. EPA could also add areas prone to earthquake to this list of areas, which presents a significant risk of NaTech that is unrelated to climate. Would this more definite, but limited, approach be easier to implement for stationary sources? Would this be simpler for public oversight by providing a specific reference such that all parties would know whether there is a heightened risk for a potential climate or earthquake impact at a facility? Should the Agency require sources in these areas to conduct hazard evaluations associated with climate or earthquakes as a minimum, while also requiring that all sources consider the potential for natural hazards unrelated to climate or earthquakes in their specific locations?
c. Power Loss
Whether caused by a natural hazard or some other event, power loss at hazardous chemical facilities can lead to a variety of negative impacts. Pumps and compressors may stop running, stirrers may quit mixing, lights may go out, and instruments and controls may malfunction. These equipment outages can lead to tank overflows, runaway chemical reactions, temperature or pressure excursions, or other process upsets which could lead to a spill, explosion, or fire. Even if there is no immediate release, thermal shock or other factors could result in a delayed effect that compromises the mechanical integrity of equipment during subsequent operations. When power is restored even after a brief interruption, some equipment may automatically restart before process operations are ready, while other equipment may need to be reset and manually restarted. When a facility relies on electrical power for any aspect of its process operations, it is imperative to anticipate how power loss affects the safeguards that prevent releases of hazardous chemicals.
Power loss has resulted in serious accidents at RMP-regulated facilities. The aforementioned 2017 Arkema incident highlighted the hazard of power loss on process safety; other previous incidents have also highlighted this hazard and offered lessons on potential safeguards that could be applied to prevent accidental chemical releases. The accidents described below—all associated with power failure—are examples of these situations and their potential severity. They also highlight the in-depth evaluation needed to prevent loss of power from resulting in an accidental release.
On May 1, 2001, at General Chemical Corp., in Richmond, California, a truck struck a utility pole, causing a power interruption and total plant shutdown. Shortly after, sulfur dioxide and sulfur trioxide began to escape from a boiler exit flue. When power was restored a short time later, a steam turbine that was required to keep the boiler exit flue under negative pressure could not be immediately restarted. While the turbine could not be restarted, residents near the plant were instructed to remain indoors. Somewhere between 50 to 100 individuals sought medical attention following the release. Troubleshooting revealed that an automatically controlled governor valve had malfunctioned.
46
46
EPA,
Chemical Accidents from Electric Power Outages
(Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 2001),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/power.pdf.
On August 23, 2010, at the Millard Refrigerated Services in Theodore, Alabama, hydraulic shock caused a roof-mounted suction pipe to catastrophically fail, leading to the release of more than 32,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia. The hydraulic shock occurred during the restart of the plant's ammonia refrigeration system following a 7-hour power outage. Downwind of the ammonia release were crew members on the ships docked at Millard and over 800 contractors working outdoors at a clean-up site for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Nine ship crew members and 143 of the offsite contractors downwind reported exposure. Of the victims, 32 required hospitalization and four were placed in intensive care.
47
47
CSB, “Millard Refrigerated Services Ammonia Release,” last modified January 15, 2015,
https://www.csb.gov/millard-refrigerated-services-ammonia-release/.
National Response Center data also include information on 3,077 reported accidents from 2004-2020 that were associated with power loss.
48
While most of these incidents did not involve RMP chemicals, processes, or accidental releases as defined in CAA 112(r)(2), these events demonstrate a connection between the loss of power, loss of containment, and release into the environment.
48
Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
The European Union published a 2021 bulletin that presents lessons learned from incidents worldwide involving power supply failures. The findings point to the importance of understanding the scenarios triggered by a primary failure in external power supply systems, power loss attributed to failures of onsite electrical equipment or electrical components, and even failures of redundant power supplies. In addition to providing statistics on the effects of power outages at chemical facilities, data provided by the European Union indicate that power failures at hazardous sites have resulted in 21 fatalities and over 9,500 injuries worldwide since 1981, as well as significant property damage and production loss from resulting fires and explosions. The most catastrophic event in the study occurred in Sakai (Osaka),
Japan, in 1982. It killed six people, injured 9,080 others (of which 8,876 were offsite), and destroyed 1,788 buildings.
49
49
Chemical Accident Prevention & Preparedness
(European Commission, 2021),
https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/shorturl/minerva/mahb_bulletin_15_on_power_failuresfinalpubsypdf.
EPA has long recognized that loss of power can threaten hazardous chemical processes and cause accidental releases if not properly managed. While EPA did not specifically require power loss to be evaluated for Program 2 and Program 3 hazard reviews and PHAs, EPA and OSHA guidance has referred to it. In addition to acknowledging power failure in the Agency's “General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Distributors,”
50
in 2001 EPA issued the safety alert, “Chemical Accidents from Electric Power Outages.”
51
These guidelines warned RMP facilities that power outages and restarts could potentially trigger serious chemical accidents. The alert outlined some of the accidents previously discussed and warned that process operations must be evaluated for the consequences of power outages to ensure that the process remains safe. It also indicates that if there is critical equipment that needs to operate to ensure the safety of the process or work area, facilities should install backup power supplies and services.
50
EPA,
General Guidance on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Distributors, Ch. 6: Prevention Programs (2012),
pp. 6-10 to 6-11,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/chap-06-final.pdf.
51
EPA,
Chemical Accidents from Electric Power Outages
(Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 2001),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/power.pdf.
In 2008, OSHA published an interpretation letter
52
that addressed the concern about utility systems and their evaluation within the scope of PSM. OSHA indicated that the proper, safe functioning of all aspects of a process, whether they contain a highly hazardous chemical
53
or not, are important for the prevention and mitigation of catastrophic releases of highly hazardous chemicals. OSHA's position is that any engineering control (including utility systems) which does not contain a highly hazardous chemical (HHC) but can affect or cause a release of an HHC or interfere in the mitigation of the consequences of a release must be, at a minimum, evaluated, designed, installed, operated (with appropriate training and procedures), changed, and inspected/tested/maintained per OSHA PSM requirements. OSHA provided the example of an employer that identifies, through its PHA, that safe operation of its covered process relies on the electrical utility system. In response, the employer could determine that an uninterruptible power supply would be an appropriate safeguard against the loss of electrical utility to the process equipment.
52
OSHA, “Standard Interpretation 1910.119,” accessed January 28, 2022,
https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/2008-01-31.
53
Term similar to “RMP-regulated substance.”
EPA believes making more explicit this already-existing accident prevention program requirement, to evaluate hazards of the process
54
will ensure the threats of power loss are properly evaluated and managed to prevent or mitigate releases of RMP-regulated substances at covered facilities. EPA believes many facilities with RMP processes are managing the hazard of power loss. However, some recent RMP accidents are linked to power loss. EPA's review of RMP accident history data from 2004-2020 shows that at least 20 accident history reports have specifically indicated that power failure was a contributing factor to an accident. However, only 63 percent (310) and 44 percent (1,971) of facilities with Program 2 and Program 3 processes, respectively, have implemented backup power at their facilities, despite identifying that the loss of cooling, heating, electricity, and instrument air is a major potential hazard to their process operations.
55
56
54
Existing requirements of the hazards to be evaluated in hazard evaluations are found at 40 CFR 68.50(a) for Program 2 processes and at 40 CFR 68.67(a)-(c) for Program 3 processes.
55
EPA recognizes that not all RMP-regulated processes will need emergency backup power (for example, certain RMP-regulated storage processes).
56
Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
The frequency and severity of extreme weather events may exacerbate power failure events if the impacts of potential power failures are not identified, and control strategies are not implemented. Climate change poses long-term challenges because it affects the frequency, intensity, and duration of weather events that represent the largest source of disruptions to the U.S. electricity grid. New studies have shown that the threat of power loss is increasing for utility customers. The Department of Energy reported that an increase in extreme weather events has led to an increase in power outages in recent years. Specifically, the Department of Energy's U.S. Energy Information Agency's data showed that electric power for U.S. customers was interrupted for an average of 7.8 hours (470 minutes) in 2017, nearly double the average total duration of interruptions experienced in 2016. Data indicate that more major weather events, such as hurricanes and winter storms, occurred in 2017 than in previous years, and the total duration of power interruptions caused by major events was longer.
57
58
Recent major power outages also provide examples of this threat. In February 2021 in Texas, Winter Storm Uri left 4.5 million customers without power, some for several days.
59
In January 2022, one of the five worst winter storms in Virginia's history resulted in approximately 400,000 Dominion Energy customers experiencing a power outage when heavy snow and high winds impacted utility services.
60
Events like these also have the potential to impact hazardous chemical process operations.
57
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy,” last modified November 30, 2018,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37652#.
58
Department of Energy, “Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417) Annual Summaries,” accessed January 28, 2022,
https://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/OE417_annual_summary.aspx.
59
Chris Stipes, “New Report Details Impact of Winter Storm Uri on Texans,” University of Houston, last modified March 29, 2021,
https://uh.edu/news-events/stories/2021/march-2021/03292021-hobby-winter-storm.php.
60
Dominion Energy, “Dominion Energy Making Significant Progress Restoring Power, Preparing for Second Winter Storm,” last modified January 5, 2022,
https://news.dominionenergy.com/2022-01-05-Dominion-Energy-Making-Significant-Progress-Restoring-Power,-Preparing-for-Second-Winter-Storm.
Therefore, EPA is proposing to further emphasize loss of power in the hazards evaluated in hazard reviews and PHAs for Program 2 and Program 3 RMP-regulated processes. EPA believes further emphasis on these accident prevention program provisions will ensure that the risk of power failure is properly evaluated and managed to prevent or mitigate releases of RMP-regulated substances at covered facilities. EPA is proposing to include emphasizing that hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(3) and 68.67(c)(3) address standby or emergency power systems.
EPA expects facilities to continue to use available resources to properly evaluate whether power loss is a hazard to their process and, if so, implement appropriate controls to prevent or reduce that hazard. In addition to the hazard evaluation guidance offered by CCPS and other industry-specific resources, below are resources that broadly discuss options for evaluation of power loss and standby power:
•
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70: National Electrical Code.
61
61
NFPA,
NFPA 70, National Electric Code
(2020),
https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-
codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=70.
•
NFPA 110:
Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems.
62
62
NFPA,
NFPA 110, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems
(2022),
https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=110.
•
NFPA 1600:
Standard on Continuity, Emergency, and Crisis Management.
63
63
NFPA,
NFPA 1600, Standard on Continuity, Emergency, and Crisis Management
(2019),
https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1600.
•
3005.4-2020:
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Recommended Practice for Improving the Reliability of Emergency and Stand By Power Systems.
64
64
IEEE,
IEEE Recommended Practice for Improving the Reliability of Emergency and Stand By Power Systems
(2020),
https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/3005.4/6218/.
•
3006.7-2013:
IEEE Recommended Practice for Determining the Reliability of 7x24 Continuous Power Systems in Industrial and Commercial Facilities.
65
65
IEEE,
IEEE Recommended Practice for Determining the Reliability of 7x24 Continuous Power Systems in Industrial and Commercial Facilities
(2013),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6493367.
• National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), “Backup power cost of ownership analysis and incumbent technology,”
NREL,
NREL/TP-5400-60732, Golden, CO (2014).
66
66
Kurtz, J., et al.,
Backup Power Cost of Ownership Analysis and Incumbent Technology Comparison
(2014),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60732.pdf.
• NREL, “A comparison of fuel choice for backup generators,”
NREL,
NREL/TP-6A50-72509, Golden, CO (2019).
67
67
Ericson, S., and Olis, D.,
A Comparison of Fuel Choice for Backup Generators
(2019),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72509.pdf.
The Agency is concerned that the threat of extreme weather events has and will be used by some owners or operators to justify disabling equipment designed to monitor and detect chemical releases of RMP-regulated substances at their facility. EPA is concerned that air monitoring and control equipment is often removed from service before natural disasters to potentially prevent damage to equipment or, conceivably in some cases, evade monitoring requirements and therefore may not become operational again until much later, after the event or threat has passed. To prevent accidents, RMP owners or operators are required to develop a program that includes monitoring for accidental releases. EPA does not believe natural disasters should be treated as an exception to this requirement. A large-scale natural disaster may threaten multiple RMP facilities in a community simultaneously, leaving communities to endure the direct effects of a natural disaster without receiving warning of associated chemical releases. EPA wants to ensure RMP-regulated substances at covered processes are continually being monitored so that potential exposure to chemical substances can be measured during and following a natural disaster. Some industry standards already require continuous monitoring of process chemicals. For example, the International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration's (IIAR's) “Minimum Safety Requirements for Existing Closed Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems” requires facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems to provide a means for monitoring the concentration of an ammonia release in the event of a power failure.
68
While EPA is not requiring implementation of standby or emergency power for the entirety of an RMP process, EPA is proposing to require air pollution control or monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of accidental releases from RMP-regulated processes to have standby or backup power to ensure compliance with the intent of the rule. EPA seeks comment and data on this proposed provision, particularly on any potential safety issues associated with it.
68
IIAR, IIAR-9-2020 Minimum Safety Requirements for Existing Closed Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems 7.4.7.2.
d. Stationary Source Siting
The location of stationary sources, and the location and configuration of regulated processes and equipment within a source, can significantly affect the severity of an accidental release. The location of the stationary source in relation to public and environmental receptors may exacerbate the impacts of an accidental release, such as blast overpressures or concentrations of toxic gases, or conversely, it may allow such effects to dissipate prior to reaching receptors. Siting of processes and equipment within a stationary source can impact the surrounding community not only through the proximity of the accidental release to offsite receptors adjacent to the facility boundary (
e.g.,
people, infrastructure, environmental resources), but also through increasing the likelihood of a secondary “knock-on” release by compromising nearby processes. EPA is proposing to emphasize the requirement to consider stationary source siting in regulatory text to make sure that the intent of the requirement is properly incorporated in siting hazard evaluations.
The lack of sufficient distance between the source boundary and neighboring residential areas was a significant factor in the severity of several chemical accidents in the United States and internationally. The following are examples which illustrate the potential of such effects:
•
1984, Bhopal, India:
Union Carbide release of approximately 40 tons of methyl isocyanate into the air killed over 3,700 people. Most of the deaths and injuries occurred in a residential area near the plant.
69
69
Lees, Frank P.
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 5, Bhopal (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996).
•
1984, Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico:
Pemex liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank farm LPG pipeline rupture resulted in a large ground fire that spread to nearby LPG storage vessels, initiating a series of massive explosions. The cascading explosions and fires ultimately destroyed the entire facility and many nearby residences, resulting in over 500 fatalities and thousands of severe injuries.
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70
Lees, Frank P.
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
Volume 3, 2nd ed. Appendix 4, Mexico City (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996).
•
1994, Port Neal, Iowa, United States:
Terra Industries explosion involving ammonium nitrate (AN) killed four workers and damaged onsite ammonia tanks, creating an ammonia cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 2,500 people in nearby neighborhoods.
71
71
EPA. Chemical Accident Investigation Report: Terra Industries, Inc., Nitrogen Fertilizer Facility (2014),
https://archive.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/web/pdf/cterra.pdf.
•
2009, Belvidere, Illinois, United States:
NDK Crystal facility catastrophic rupture of a pressure vessel resulted in one public fatality and one public injury. A building fragment propelled by the force of the blast traveled nearly 650 feet and killed a member of the public at a highway rest stop parking lot. An 8,600-pound vessel fragment traveled 435 feet and impacted a neighboring business, injuring one offsite worker and causing significant property damage.
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72
CSB, “NDK Crystal Inc. Explosion with Offsite Fatality,” last modified November 14, 2013,
https://www.csb.gov/ndk-crystal-inc-explosion-with-offsite-fatality-/.
•
2013, West, Texas, United States:
West Fertilizer Company explosion involving AN damaged an apartment complex and a nursing home located approximately 450 feet and 600 feet, respectively, from the source of the explosion, resulting in 3 public fatalities
(out of a total of 15 people killed in the explosion). The explosion also caused over 260 injuries, as well as damage to over 350 homes and 3 schools located near the plant.
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73
CSB, “West Fertilizer Explosion and Fire,” last modified January 28, 2016,
https://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/.
• 2018, Superior, Wisconsin, United States: Superior Refining Company, LLC, explosion and subsequent fire in the refinery's fluid catalytic cracking unit resulted in 36 people (workers and community members) seeking medical attention. In addition, a portion of Superior, Wisconsin, had to be evacuated.
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CSB, “Husky Energy Refinery Explosion and Fire,” accessed January 28, 2022,
https://www.csb.gov/husky-energy-refinery-explosion-and-fire/.
• 2020, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, India: LG Polymers styrene release incident produced a toxic cloud that caused at least 11 fatalities and hundreds of injuries in the nearby community.
75
75
Doyle, Amanda, “Hundreds Hospitalized After Styrene Gas Leak in India,”
The Chemical Engineer,
last modified May 7, 2020,
https://www.thechemicalengineer.com/news/hundreds-hospitalised-after-styrene-gas-leak-in-india.
This list of accidents provides examples of the numerous accidents with offsite consequences resulting from the close proximity of industrial facilities to public receptors, demonstrating that selection of locations of processes and process equipment within a stationary source can impact the surrounding community. Communities are affected not only by the proximity of accidental releases to offsite receptors (
e.g.,
people, infrastructure, environmental resources) near the facility boundary, but also by the increased likelihood of subsequent releases from other nearby processes compromised by the initial release. As accidents continue to happen, EPA is proposing to emphasize the intent of the required siting evaluation to ensure protection of human health and the environment.
The OSHA PSM standard and RMP rule both require that facility siting be addressed as one element of a PHA (29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v), and 40 CFR 68.67(c)(5)). In response to comments on the proposed PSM rule, OSHA indicated that facility siting should always be considered during PHAs and therefore decided to emphasize this element by specifically listing siting evaluation in regulatory text.
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With the adoption of PHA regulatory text, EPA also recognized the offsite benefits of siting evaluations. EPA's approach to the siting requirement is consistent with its general approach to PSM in the 1996 RMP rule: sound, comprehensive PSM systems can protect workers, the public, and the environment.
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The Agency chose to include additional guidance in a frequently asked questions section of its website to not only indicate the Agency's expectations, but also to provide guidance on the RMP rule's coverage of facility siting evaluation to include consideration of offsite receptors. The guidance states: “The requirement to consider stationary source siting during the process hazard analysis means that you should consider the location of the covered vessels and evaluate whether their location creates risks for offsite public or environmental receptors, as well as onsite receptors. This analysis should consider the proximity of the vessels that could lead to a release of a regulated substance. The proximity of the vessels to onsite equipment or activities nearby will have been considered for OSHA; the proximity of the vessels in relation to offsite receptors will be considered if not already considered for OSHA. The analysis may be done qualitatively. The analysis addresses whether the location of the vessels creates risks that could be reduced by changing the location or taking other actions, such as installing mitigation systems.”
78
76
OSHA,
Final Rule on Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents,
29 CFR part 1910 (1992),
https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/federalregister/1992-02-24.
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61 FR 31687; June 20, 1996.
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EPA, “Is EPA's PHA Stationary Source Siting Requirement Analogous to OSHA's PSM?” accessed January 31, 2022,
https://www.epa.gov/rmp/epas-pha-stationary-source-siting-requirement-analogous-oshas-psm.
As with other aspects of the RMP rule, EPA expects regulated facilities to rely on industry guidance to help adequately address stationary source siting in PHAs. The following examples of relevant industry guidance on siting considerations are available to facility owners and operators:
• American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings.
79
79
API,
Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings, 3rd Edition
(December 2020),
https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/refinery-and-plant-safety/process-safety/process-safety-standards/rp-752.
• API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings.
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API,
Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings, 1st Edition
(June 2007),
https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/health-and-safety/refinery-and-plant-safety/process-safety/process-safety-standards/rp-753.
• CCPS Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions, Fires, and Toxic Releases.
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CCPS,
Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions, Fires, and Toxic Releases, 2nd Edition
(2012),
https://www.aiche.org/resources/publications/books/guidelines-evaluating-process-plant-buildings-external-explosions-fires-and-toxic-releases-2nd.
• CCPS Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities.
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82
CCPS,
Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities, 2nd Edition
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2018),
https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/books/guidelines-siting-and-layout-facilities-2nd-edition.
• NFPA Separation Distances in NFPA Codes and Standards.
83
83
Argo, Ted, and Evan Sandstrom,
Separation Distances in NFPA Codes and Standards
(The Fire Protection Research Foundation, 2014),
https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/Hazardous-materials/RFSeparationDistancesNFPACodesAndStandards.ashx.
The CCPS “Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities” addresses external factors influencing site selection, as well as factors internal to the source that could influence site layout and equipment spacing. The most recent edition of this CCPS publication was updated to address many developments in the last decade that have improved how companies survey and select new sites, evaluate acquisitions, and expand their existing facilities.
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The title was also updated to emphasize not only siting of buildings and unit operations within a facility, but also siting of facilities within a community. The guidance addresses identifying the process hazards and risks, selecting a facility location, selecting process unit layout within a facility, selecting equipment within a process unit, and managing changes.
84
CCPS,
Guidelines for Siting and Layout of Facilities, 2nd Edition
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2018),
https://www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/publications/books/guidelines-siting-and-layout-facilities-2nd-edition.
).
As an industry-specific example for siting, the Compressed Gas Association's (CGA's) “G-2.1—Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia,”
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among other things, requires facilities with anhydrous ammonia systems to apply specific location requirements for processes, such as tank loading and unloading operations, and equipment, such as ammonia storage containers, piping, and nurse wagons. It also includes specific minimum separation distances from storage containers to railroad mainlines, highways, lines of
adjoining properties, and places of public assembly and residential and institutional occupancy. Asmark Institute,
86
a well-known agricultural industry organization, developed an RMP Program 2 Hazard Review checklist as a resource for its industry to apply CGA G-2.1 and other applicable industry standards.
87
85
ANSI/CGA,
Requirements for the Storage and Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia (an American National Standard)
(2014),
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/cga/ansicga2014.
86
Asmark Institute,
https://www.asmark.org/.
87
Asmark Institute,
MyRMP Hazard Review Worksheet for Program 2 Facilities with Anhydrous Ammonia
(2015),
https://www.asmark.org/myRMP/Forms/P2AnhydrousWorksheet.pdf.
Despite enforcement and the consequences of catastrophic accidents, issues of siting continue to threaten process safety. For example, in 2018, EPA took an enforcement action against an agricultural anhydrous ammonia sales operation in Missouri that failed to identify the hazards associated with the proximity of the facility to a home and a nearby firehouse.
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In 2021, EPA took an enforcement action against a chemical manufacturing facility in Maine that did not address the facility's proximity to a nearby bay; lack of proximity to external trained emergency responders; and process layout—specifically, the proximity of shutdown valves to operations.
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Available at
https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Filings/E54E9167BD7A4EF6852582C0001BCFD5/$File/CAA-07-2018-0214%20United%20Cooperatives%20CAFO.pdf.
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Available at
https://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/D26E190D9B6DA9E18525875F006CA916/$File/CAA-01-2021-0070%20CAF)%20ViewPDF%20(8).pdf.
EPA reviewed data from OSHA PSM PHA enforcement actions. In 2018, 16 cases were filed where facility siting was cited as a serious violation
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that could cause an accident or illness that would most likely result in death or serious physical harm.
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One of those cases was also reported as an RMP accident that occurred on September 1, 2016, at the Brookshire Grocery Company's distribution center in Tyler, Texas. A failure in the piping on the roof of the cold storage building caused an ammonia leak. The leak caused 16 injuries and resulted in the evacuation of the building, the closure of a nearby intersection, and the need for nearby residents to shelter in place.
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Given the potential risk demonstrated by recurring accidents, EPA seeks to ensure that emphasis is placed on the importance of all aspects of a proper facility siting evaluation.
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Identified as a “serious” violation under OSHA in: OSHA, “Federal Employer Rights and Responsibilities Following an OSHA Inspection-1996,” accessed January 31, 2022,
https://www.osha.gov/publications/fedrites#:~:text=SERIOUS%3A%20A%20serious%20violation%20exists,have%20known%20of%20the%20violation.
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U.S. Department of Labor, “Data Catalog; OSHA Enforcement Data; osha_violation” accessed March 17, 2022,
https://enforcedata.dol.gov/views/data_summary.php.
92
Louanna Campbell, “Tyler Fire Marshal's Office Releases Cause of Ammonia Leak at Brookshire's Warehouse,” last modified September 5, 2017,
https://tylerpaper.com/news/local/tyler-fire-marshals-office-releases-cause-of-ammonia-leak-at-brookshires-warehouse/article_3a7581b2-63b9-57b9-96c2-0b163f546668.html.
In a 2014 RMP request for information (RFI),
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EPA requested comments on whether to consider stationary source location requirements for future rulemaking. EPA specifically asked whether it should amend the RMP rule to include more specific siting requirements as part of the PHA. Though EPA received comments on the issue, EPA chose not to move forward with additional action on siting in the amendment's final rule but indicated that the Agency would consider comments for a future rulemaking.
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EPA,
Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7),
Proposed rule, 79 FR 44603 (July 13, 2014), pp. 44603-44633,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/07/31/2014-18037/accidental-release-prevention-requirements-risk-management-programs-under-the-clean-air-act-section.
In response to the RFI, commenters opposed adding additional provisions to address stationary source siting, citing as rationale that:
• Existing facilities have limited flexibility to alter locations onsite.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0121; 0543, 0548, 0605, 0616, 0624.
• Specifying or requiring buffer or setback zones is a complicated issue and must be looked at differently for new and existing facilities.
95
95
EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543; 0546, 0584, 0616, 0632.
• EPA would be intruding on local zoning codes when establishing siting criteria.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543; 0584, 0614, 0616, 0624, 0626, 0646, 0667.
• Existing industry guidance is sufficient.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0121; 0543, 0546, 0605, 0620, 0624, 0640, 0665.
• Requiring additional siting requirements for both new and existing facilities could result in significant cost to the regulated entity.
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98
EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0624; 0626.
One opposing commenter specifically indicated that, to date, EPA has allowed for siting considerations to be included under performance-based elements of the RMP program. The commenter stated that any modification of the existing requirements would be inconsistent with a risk-based management system approach.
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Another commenter, although generally in opposition to new siting requirements, stated that for existing facilities, the owner/operator should demonstrate that other technologies, such as early detection, early communication, prevention measures, and mitigation measures, are applied to manage risk within acceptable levels. This commenter also stated that in some cases, it may be necessary to make process changes, and in unique cases where the risk cannot be abated, owners/operators should consider relocation of part or all facility operations.
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99
EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0691.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543.
There were also commenters who argued stationary source siting should be expanded in the RMP rule. For example, one commenter stated the PHA must address issues of co-location both in terms of adjacent facilities and in terms of vulnerable populations and infrastructure. This commenter stated that at a minimum, facilities must address hazards to and from adjacent facilities—including impacts that a release from their facility would have on other facilities and the impact that a release from other facilities would have on their facility—and further expansion should address buffer zones for nearby residents, hospitals, and infrastructure. The commenter argued that new facilities or expansion of facilities must consider the cumulative impacts from adjacent facilities and look at the threat that a release from the new facility or expansion would pose to other facilities, infrastructure, populations, and environmental resources.
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Additionally, CSB encouraged EPA to incorporate more explicit requirements for identifying, evaluating, and addressing facility siting during a PHA to assess both offsite consequences and onsite receptors within that stationary source that may be impacted by chemical fire, explosion, or release.
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101
EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0637.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0689.
EPA believes that many matters outlined in comments about the current stationary source siting provision, while not explicitly addressed within the current regulatory text, are implicit and mandatory. Therefore, at this time, EPA is only choosing to make more explicit what is required to be addressed in a stationary source siting evaluation. Rather than propose additional requirements, EPA is expounding on the current regulatory text to ensure that siting evaluations properly account for hazards resulting from the location of processes, equipment, building, and proximate facilities, and their effects on the surrounding community. In addition
to providing some detail on what is intended by the Program 3 regulatory text on stationary source siting, EPA is also proposing to revise language to Program 2 hazard evaluations to ensure that all RMP facilities with the potential to cause offsite consequences to public receptors account for these hazards. Therefore, EPA is proposing to amend regulatory text for Program 2 and Program 3 under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(6) and 68.67(c)(5), respectively, to define stationary source siting evaluation as inclusive of the placement of processes, equipment, buildings, and hazards posed by proximate facilities, and accidental release consequences posed by proximity to the public and public receptors. The proposed amendments would make more explicit the requirement that hazard evaluations for processes under both Program 2 (hazard review) and Program 3 (PHA) need to address the matters in the siting evaluation.
Because there is a breadth of guidance on siting, EPA believes there is adequate information available for facilities to comply with the proposed text. EPA expects facilities to continue to use available resources, including those previously mentioned, and any additional industry-specific guidance to properly evaluate siting hazards.
e. Hazard Evaluation Recommendation Information Availability
Ensuring that communities, local planners, local first responders, and the public have appropriate chemical facility hazard-related information is critical to the health and safety of responders and the local community. In this action, EPA is proposing ways to enhance information sharing and collaboration between chemical facility owners/operators, Tribal and local emergency planning committees (TEPCs/LEPCs), first responders, and the public in a manner that EPA believes balances security and proprietary considerations. In addition to the information accessibility provisions in section IV.C of this preamble, EPA is also proposing that recommendations resulting from hazard evaluations discussed in this section be included in a facility's risk management plan submitted under 40 CFR part 68, subpart G. Specifically, facilities would be required to implement recommendations or list in their risk management plans the recommendations from their natural hazard, loss of power, and siting evaluations that were not adopted and the justification for those decisions. EPA believes this will enable the public to ensure facilities have conducted appropriate evaluations to address potential hazards that can affect communities near the fenceline of facilities. In response to comments in the RFI on increased public disclosure of information, one commenter stated that it is important to help the public understand how the facilities address the hazard present in their community and keep the risk at or below the “acceptable level.” EPA believes that when local citizens have adequate information and knowledge about facility hazards, facility owners and operators may be motivated to further improve their safety in response to community pressure and oversight.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328-0543-27.
EPA is proposing to require facilities to list in section 7 (Program 3) and section 8 (Program 2) of their risk management plans, for each process, recommendations resulting from hazard evaluations of natural hazards, loss of power, and facility siting that the owner/operator chooses to decline. EPA realizes that the number of hazard evaluation recommendations may vary widely, depending on the complexity of the process or facility. Therefore, EPA seeks comments on the format of listing the recommendations, whether EPA should require recommendations to be included in narrative form, or whether the Agency should provide specific categories of recommendations for facilities to choose from when reporting. Another option would be to allow the owner or operator to post this information online and provide a link to the information within their risk management plan.
Regarding the requirement to provide justification for not implementing recommendations, EPA is proposing to allow facilities to choose from pre-selected categories. Under OSHA guidance, an employer may decline to adopt a PHA recommendation if, based upon adequate evidence, the employer can document that one or more of the following conditions is true:
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104
OSHA, Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals—Compliance Guidelines and Enforcement Procedures, 29 CFR 1910.119 (September 13, 1994),
https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL02-02-045_CH-1_20150901.pdf.
• The analysis upon which the recommendation is based contains material factual errors.
• The recommendation is not necessary to protect the health and safety of the employer's own employees, or the employees of contractors.
• An alternative measure would provide a sufficient level of protection.
• The recommendation is infeasible.
EPA is proposing to adopt these same categories in the risk management plan as justification for declined recommendations, with a modification to account for public receptors (
i.e.,
the recommendation is not necessary to protect public receptors). EPA seeks public comment on this approach and on alternative categories or methods to provide justification for declining relevant recommendations. EPA wants to ensure a balanced approach to providing beneficial data to the public as well as a straightforward method of reporting for facility owners/operators.
Proposed revisions to regulatory text include, requiring risk management plans under 40 CFR 68.170(e)(7) and 68.175(e)(8), reporting declined natural hazard, power loss, and siting hazard evaluation recommendations and their associated justifications in the risk management plan submitted to EPA.
f. Summary of Proposed Regulatory Text
EPA is proposing to emphasize that Program 2 hazard reviews and Program 3 PHAs identify and address natural hazards, loss of power, and facility siting (as described in this document) in order to effectively prevent or minimize accidental releases of regulated substances to protect human health and the environment. EPA is also proposing to require the owner or operator to report any recommendations arising from these evaluations that are declined, along with the owner or operator's justification for declining them, within the risk management plan submitted to EPA. A summary of the proposed regulatory text changes are described below:
• Hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(5) and 68.67(c)(8) to explicitly address external events such as natural hazards, including those caused by climate change or other triggering events that could lead to an accidental release.
• Hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(3) and 68.67(c)(3) to explicitly address standby or emergency power systems.
• Hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 68.50(a)(6) and 68.67(c)(5) to explicitly define stationary source siting as inclusive of the placement of processes, equipment, buildings within the facility, and hazards posed by proximate facilities, and accidental release consequences posed by proximity to the public and public receptors.
• Risk management plans under 40 CFR 68.170(e)(7) and 68.175(e)(8) to include declined natural hazard, power loss, and siting hazard evaluation recommendations and their associated justifications.
EPA realizes, and commenters have indicated in the past,
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that only a small number of facilities are responsible for a significant percentage of RMP accidents. EPA expects the proposed language will ensure that those owner/operators who are not properly evaluating these hazards will be explicitly required to do so, which will better ensure owner/operators do their due diligence in preventing or minimizing accidental releases of regulated substances to protect human health and the environment. EPA seeks comment on the proposed language or alternative language that will not unnecessarily expand the scope of hazard evaluations.
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EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-1628.
2. Prevention Program Provisions
The following section describes proposed modifications to the prevention program provisions of the RMP rule. Several of these changes address issues that have been the subject of both the 2017 amendments rule and the 2019 reconsideration rule, including safer technologies and alternatives analysis, root cause analysis incident investigations, and third-party audits. As detailed below, the Agency's preferred options for these topics adjust the scope of the provisions adopted and rescinded by the prior rulemakings. EPA also proposes new requirements for improved employee participation in prevention programs. The options proposed below should enhance community safety, especially in communities facing elevated probability of accidents, without unduly burdening overly broad classes of stationary sources.
a. Safer Technologies and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)
EPA is proposing a requirement in 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9) for some Program 3 regulated processes to consider and document the feasibility of applying safer technologies and alternatives as part of their PHA. This requirement applies to petroleum and coal products manufacturing processes (classified in NAICS code 324) and chemical manufacturing processes (NAICS code 325) that are located within 1 mile of another RMP-regulated facility with these same processes (classified in NAICS 324 and 325). EPA is also proposing that all facilities with petroleum and coal products processes (in NAICS 324) using hydrofluoric acid (HF) in an alkylation unit (approximately 45 facilities) consider safer alternatives to HF alkylation, regardless of proximity to another NAICS 324- or 325-regulated facility.
Current PHA requirements (40 CFR 68.67) under the RMP rule include some aspects of the hierarchy of controls analysis.
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As discussed in the proposed regulation that became the 2017 amendments rule, Program 3 processes are required to address process hazards using engineering and administrative controls since 1996. However, as EPA pointed out, there is no explicit requirement for owners and operators to address inherent safety—the first tier of the hierarchy of controls. EPA is proposing to expand upon these requirements by requiring the owners or operators to consider safer technology and alternative risk management measures that could eliminate or reduce risk from process hazards. In addition to engineering and administrative controls, owners and operators of facilities with Program 3 processes covered under this provision would have to consider the application of the following safer technology measures, in the following order: inherently safer technology (IST) or inherently safer design (ISD), passive safeguards, active safeguards, and procedural safeguards.
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Safety experts have developed a way to group types of controls in an order or “hierarchy of controls” that prefers those that are least likely to fail. As discussed in more detail in in section IV.A.2.a.i, below, controls that eliminate the hazard are preferred over those that do not require power or activation, which are preferred over those that do require power or activation, which are preferred over those that depend simply on rules of operation.
In this proposed regulation, EPA is not requiring facilities to implement identified inherent safety measures; rather, EPA is requiring owners and operators to include an evaluation, including the results of the STAA analysis, as part of the PHA requirements in 40 CFR 68.67(e), and, to document the feasibility of inherent safety measures based on more than cost alone. Submission of STAA analysis summaries to EPA is discussed in further detail under “STAA technology transfer.” Finally, EPA is proposing that a facility's STAA team include, and document the inclusion of, one member who works in the process and has expertise in the process being evaluated. EPA is also proposing to include a more comprehensive practicability assessment, in addition to the STAA evaluation requirements as part of the PHA. As part of this analysis, owners and operators would be required to identify, evaluate, and document the practicability of implementing inherent safety measures, including documenting the practicability of publicly available safer alternatives.
i. Background on IST/ISD
EPA discussed safer technology and alternatives at length in its proposed RMP rule amendments published in 2016. “Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act” (81 FR 13638, March 14, 2016). “Safer technology and alternatives” refers to risk reduction or risk management strategies developed through analysis using a hierarchy of process risk management strategies (or hierarchy of controls). In this context, the hierarchy of controls consists of controls that are inherent, passive, active, and procedural. STAA involves considering IST or ISD, which refer to strategies that permanently reduce or eliminate hazards associated with the materials and operations of a process. As discussed in EPA/OSHA's 2015 chemical safety fact sheet,
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the four major inherently safer strategies are: (1) substitution: replacing hazardous materials with less hazardous substances; (2) minimization: using smaller quantities of hazardous substances; (3) moderation: creating less hazardous conditions or using less hazardous forms or facility designs to minimize the impact of potential releases of hazardous materials or energy; and (4) simplification: designing facilities to eliminate unnecessary complexity and make operating errors less likely. Inclusion of IST/ISD in the RMP regulations is consistent with several CSB investigations that demonstrated that incidents could have been prevented or consequences mitigated by using IST/ISD.
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EPA and OSHA,
Chemical Safety Alert: Safer Technology and Alternatives
(June 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-06/documents/alert_safer_tech_alts.pdf.
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CSB, “Chevron Refinery Fire,” last modified January 28, 2015,
https://www.csb.gov/chevron-refinery-fire/.
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CSB, “Tesoro Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire,” last modified May 1, 2014,
https://www.csb.gov/tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire/.
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CSB, “Kleen Energy Natural Gas Explosion,” last modified June 28, 2010,
https://www.csb.gov/kleen-energy-natural-gas-explosion/.
111
CSB, “Bayer CropScience Pesticide Waste Tank Explosion,” last modified January 1, 2011,
https://www.csb.gov/bayer-cropscience-pesticide-waste-tank-explosion/.
In the supplemental proposed RMP rule for the initial requirements under CAA 112(r)(7), EPA solicited comments on requiring IST. “Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7)” (60 FR 13526, March 13, 1995) (1995 supplemental proposal). Prior to the 2017 final RMP amendments, however, EPA had never
required RMP facilities to conduct an STAA or implement identified IST/ISD. The 2017 amendments rule added a requirement to the PHA for regulated sources in specified industrial sectors to identify and address hazards at least every 5 years. Specifically, owners or operators of facilities with Program 3 regulated processes in NAICS codes 322 (paper manufacturing), 324 (petroleum and coal products manufacturing), and 325 (chemical manufacturing) were required to conduct an STAA as part of their PHA and evaluate and document the practicability of any IST identified. The provision was intended to reduce the risk of serious accidental releases by requiring facilities in these sectors to conduct a careful examination of potentially safer technology and designs that they could implement in lieu of, or in addition to, their current technologies. EPA adopted STAA based on recommendations from CSB and other engineering experts, as well as lessons learned from case studies and investigations of accidents. EPA identified the sectors covered by this requirement by using sector-wide accident rates. EPA believes that some of the practicability of implementation will be identified in the course of the PHA and that for many processes, owner/operators will already know if implementing a particular technology is practicable. EPA solicits comments on the industry understanding of the practicability assessment, and how this might differ from the findings identified in the PHA, as well as the additional benefit of such a provision.
In the 2019 rule completing the process of reconsidering the 2017 rule, EPA removed the new regulatory STAA requirement on all facilities in NAICS 322, 324, and 325 that are in the RMP program. “Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the CAA” (84 FR 69834, December 19, 2019) (2019 reconsideration rule), EPA analyzed accident history data in the RMP database, both nationally and in States and localities with programs that contained some or all the elements of the prevention program provisions. EPA discusses accident trends overall in Section III.C of this preamble. The analysis suggested that accident rates in jurisdictions that adopted STAA-like programs were not lower than national accident rates. Based on this assessment, EPA stated that STAA regulations would likely not be effective at reducing accidents if applied on a national scale, relative to the pre-2017 program. Instead, EPA decided to take a source-specific, compliance-driven approach, using oversight and enforcement tools to identify sources that would appear to benefit from STAA and to then seek STAA adoption at such sources.
ii. Hydrogen Fluoride
Hydrogen fluoride (HF) is an extremely toxic chemical that is lethal at 30 ppm. It is covered by RMP when more than 1,000 pounds are used in a process. HF is an extremely toxic chemical used for alkylation at 27 percent of facilities in NAICS 324 (45 of 163). HF has been the subject of recent catastrophic near-miss investigations by CSB. One of these investigations involved an explosion at the Husky Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin, wherein debris impacted processes at a further distance from the explosion than the refinery's HF storage tank.
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CSB also investigated a near-miss in Torrance, California, wherein the explosion of ExxonMobil's electrostatic precipitator resulted in debris landing near the refinery's modified HF tanks.
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112
CSB, “Husky Energy Refinery Explosion and Fire,” accessed February 10, 2022,
https://www.csb.gov/husky-energy-refinery-explosion-and-fire/.
113
CSB, “ExxonMobil Refinery Explosion,” last updated May 3, 2017,
https://www.csb.gov/exxonmobil-refinery-explosion-/.
There are recognized potentially safer alternatives available for HF alkylation that have been successfully implemented by refineries, such as sulfuric acid alkylation, ionic liquid alkylation, or solid acid catalyst alkylation.
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EPA contends that the practicability of these potentially safer alternatives is situation-specific and that owners and operators are usually in the best position to make these determinations. Phasing out HF or switching to an inherently safer alternative may require construction of a new alkylation unit. Depending on the production levels of the refinery, implementation of alternatives to HF alkylation could cost between $35 million and $900 million (see RIA, Appendix A).
114
Chevron, “Chevron and Honeywell Announce Start-up of World's First Commercial ISOALKY
TM
Ionic Liquids Alkylation Unit,” last modified April 13, 2021,
https://www.chevron.com/stories/chevron-and-honeywell-announce-start-up-of-isoalky-ionic-liquids-alkylation-unit.
115
United Steelworkers,
A Risk Too Great: Hydrofluoric Acid in U.S. Refineries
(April 2013),
https://www.usw.org/workplaces/oil/oil-reports/A-Risk-Too-Great.pdf.
iii. Recent Public Input on STAA
During EPA's 2021 listening sessions, approximately 245 commenters provided feedback on STAA. Many commenters, including individual commenters, professional associations, advocacy groups, labor organizations, an association of government agencies, and a Federal agency, supported EPA restoring the 2017 amendments rule requirement for facilities to assess safer technologies and substitute safer alternatives in their processes where feasible.
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A group of retired Federal agency officials said that facilities should share this analysis with communities and emergency responders, and EPA should establish a “publicly accessible clearinghouse of safer alternatives.”
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Individual commenters stated that STAAs should include an assessment of environmental justice, including the burden on surrounding communities,
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while another commenter stressed that STAAs would be very beneficial for communities with environmental justice concerns.
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An environmental advocacy group suggested that RMP facilities should be required to develop and submit a hazard reduction plan made by facility experts and workers that would start at the top of the hierarchy of controls and include considerations of an EPA-generated list of inherently safer chemicals.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0028; 0035, 0039, 0044, 0051, 0057, 0058, 0081, 0095, 0387, 0388.
117
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0004.
118
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0013; 0380.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0028.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0149.
Another advocacy group stated that it is interested in having facilities incorporate solutions data into STAAs and—along with a State regulatory agency, labor organizations, advocacy groups, and an individual commenter—supported requiring STAAs from every RMP facility in sectors such as water treatment, not just in oil manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, and paper manufacturing.
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A State regulatory agency mentioned that many safer technology alternative opportunities exist in other sectors and expressed that there should not be any limit on how many NAICS sectors are included.
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121
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0014; 0039, 0057, 0152.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0039.
An advocacy group suggested that EPA implement an even more robust alternatives analysis and implementation process than that of the STAA proposed during the 2017 amendments rule. The commenter said that, rather than basing the universe of facilities subject to the STAA requirement on the results of data analysis performed in 2017, EPA should require this type of assessment at all facilities. The commenter proposed that,
should EPA determine that “tiered protection should be implemented,” it should require IST assessment and implementation at facilities in sectors with known hazard elimination or reduction methods, in areas with climate risks and other natural hazard risks, in communities with more than one RMP facility, and at facilities that are using or storing the highest quantity and toxicity of regulated chemicals and are most accident-prone.
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123
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0170.
A few industry trade associations stated that STAAs and IST evaluations would not generate tangible safety outcomes beyond the current PHA requirements.
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One of the industry trade associations also discussed EPA's decision to limit the number of facilities covered by STAA provisions in the 2017 amendments rule, which the commenter described as lacking evidentiary support.
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An industry trade association that strongly opposed the STAA provision in the 2017 amendments rule supported its removal in the 2019 reconsideration rule, stating that such a STAA requirement would not improve the effectiveness of the rule in relation to protecting communities with environmental justice concerns; instead, it would divert resources.
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An industry trade association stated that some industries already adopt inherently safer processes and technologies without direction from EPA.
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124
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0037; 0053, 0071.
125
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0071.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0077.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0077.
iv. Recent Public Input on HF
During EPA's 2021 listening sessions, many commenters, including individual commenters and advocacy groups, discussed the dangers of HF and modified HF and argued that facilities should be required to transition to safer alternatives.
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An individual commenter said that HF is often located in facilities in communities with environmental justice concerns that are already exposed to many other hazards. A State elected official said that EPA should require refineries to evaluate the replacement of these chemicals and report their findings to EPA within a year.
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A form letter campaign recommended an amendment to 40 CFR 68.169 which, if implemented, would convert all HF refineries to safer alternatives within 4 years.
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A few individual commenters and an advocacy group expressed general support for this amendment.
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Another individual commenter in support of this amendment stated that over 40 refineries containing large quantities of HF endanger 19 million people, including children, young adults, unhoused people, and more.
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128
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0013; 0035, 0043, 0054, 0036, 0319, 0146, 0067, 0068, 0096.
129
EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0043.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0067.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0354; 0379, 0382, 0384.
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EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0380.
v. STAA Applicability
EPA is proposing to limit the applicability of the STAA provisions to sources in the petroleum and coal products manufacturing (NAICS 324) and chemical manufacturing (NAICS 325) sectors, located within 1 mile of another RMP-regulated 324 or 325 facility. EPA is also proposing that all facilities in NAICS 324 using HF in an alkylation unit (approximately 45 facilities) conduct an STAA for the use of safer alternatives compared to HF alkylation. EPA believes that while most sectors regulated under 40 CFR part 68 could identify safer technology and alternatives, sources involved in complex manufacturing operations have the greatest range of opportunities to identify and implement safer technologies and alternatives, particularly related to inherent safety. These sources generally produce, transform, and consume large quantities of regulated substances under sometimes extreme process conditions and using a wide range of complex technologies.
Multiple factors led EPA to propose focusing the STAA requirement on densely co-located petroleum refining and chemical manufacturing facilities (
i.e.,
facilities with processes in NAICS codes 324 and 325 that are within 1 mile of another facility in those NAICS codes). The distance of 1 mile represents the median distance of facilities with 324 and 325 NAICS processes that have had accidents in the period from 2016 to 2020 to the nearest facility with a process in these NAICS in 324 or 325. Facilities in these NAICS codes experience more frequent accidental releases (see IV.A.2.vi, below). In the period from 2016 to 2020, communities near densely co-located facilities in these NAICS codes have experienced more frequent accidents than communities near other facilities in these NAICS codes and have had more offsite impacts from releases than other communities have experienced (see IV.A.2.vii, below). Additionally, 80% of 324 and 325 facilities located within 1 mile of another 324/325 facility have toxic worst case release scenario distance to endpoints reaching or exceeding 1 mile. The proximity of densely co-located refining and chemical manufacturing facilities creates a greater risk of an accident at one facility impacting safety at the nearby facility, thereby increasing the potential for a release at the second facility (a “knock-on” release). Communities in areas with such densely co-located petroleum refining and chemical manufacturing facilities face overlapping vulnerability zones and a heightened risk of being impacted by an accidental release relative to other communities. The heightened risk of community impacts presented by densely co-located refineries and chemical manufacturers make it reasonable for EPA to propose the 1 mile criterion for additional prevention measures such as STAA. The 1 mile criterion also serves to limit the burden on portions of both the petroleum refining and chemical manufacturing industries relative to the 2017 amendments rule while promoting accident prevention to a greater extent than the approach taken in the 2019 reconsideration rule (see IV.A.2.viii, below).
EPA is proposing that all HF alkylation processes at petroleum refineries (NAICS 324) conduct a STAA review primarily due the recent incidents discussed above where HF was nearly released when there were explosions, fires, and other releases that could have triggered releases of HF. The recent incident involving Philadelphia Energy Solutions,
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where some of the HF stored apparently was released in a fire but a worse release was prevented by trained staff activating release mitigation systems close to the time the event started, raises the question of whether a more inherently safe process could have completely avoided a potential catastrophe, or whether reliance on operational procedures and trained staff is adequate. As mentioned above, there are recognized potentially safer alternatives available for HF alkylation that have been successfully implemented by refineries, such as sulfuric acid alkylation, ionic liquid alkylation, or solid acid catalyst alkylation. While EPA is not proposing that all existing refinery processes undergo STAA review, the process of HF alkylation, with several known alternatives and with recent incident
history, EPA believes may merit a rule-based prevention approach rather than selective oversight.
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CSB, “Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refinery Fire and Explosions,” last modified October 16, 2019,
https://www.csb.gov/philadelphia-energy-solutions-pes-refinery-fire-and-explosions-/.
vi. Accident Frequency
EPA notes that RMP facilities in the two selected sectors have been responsible for a relatively large number of accidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage.
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Although the per-facility accident rate between 2016 and 2020 for all regulated facilities was 3 percent (n = 382 facilities reporting at least one accident out of 12,855 unique facilities reporting between 2016 and 2020), the sector accident rates (number of unique facilities with accidents per sector divided by the number of unique
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