New Car Assessment Program

Federal RegisterMar 9, 2022

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002]

New Car Assessment Program

AGENCY:

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION:

Request for comments (RFC).

SUMMARY:

NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) provides comparative information on the safety performance of new vehicles to assist consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and to encourage safety improvements. In addition to star ratings for crash protection and rollover resistance, the NCAP program recommends particular advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies and identifies the vehicles in the marketplace that offer the systems that pass NCAP performance test criteria for those systems. This notice proposes significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by proposing to add four more ADAS technologies to those NHTSA currently recommends. The new technologies are blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Other plans on updating NCAP are discussed in the Supplementary Information.

DATES:

Comments should be submitted no later than May 9, 2022.

ADDRESSES:

Comments should refer to the docket number above and be submitted by one of the following methods:

•

Federal Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.

•

Mail:

Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

•

Hand Delivery:

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.

•

Instructions:

For detailed instructions on submitting comments, see the Public Participation heading of the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section of this document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change to

https://www.regulations.gov,

including any personal information provided.

•

Privacy Act:

Anyone can search the electronic form of all comments received in any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the

Federal Register

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or at

https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to

https://www.regulations.gov

or the street address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For technical issues, you may contact Ms. Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New Car Assessment Program, Office of Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: 202-366-1810). For legal issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office of Chief Counsel (Telephone: 202-366-2992). You may send mail to either of these officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington, DC 20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This notice also proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance criteria for the four currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP to enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle models and to harmonize with other consumer information programs. Second, this notice describes (but does not propose at this time) how NHTSA could rate vehicles equipped with these ADAS technologies and requests comment on how best to develop this rating system. Third, NHTSA seeks (but does not propose at this time) to provide a crash avoidance rating at the point of sale on a vehicle's window sticker, consistent with the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, and discusses ways of implementing the program, including a potential process for updating such information. Fourth, as part of a new NHTSA approach to NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a “roadmap” of the Agency's plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years and presents the roadmap for comment. Fifth, as another first for NCAP, NHTSA is considering utilizing NCAP to raise consumer awareness of certain safety technologies that may have the potential to help people make safe driving choices. This information may be of particular interest to parents or other caregivers shopping for a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or parents wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program. The proposal on ADAS technologies and the aforementioned initiatives pave the way for the Agency to focus on a much broader safety strategy, including fulfilling not only the 2015 FAST Act directive but also the recent mandates included in Section 24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, to improve road safety for motor vehicle occupants as well as other vulnerable road users.

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

II. Background

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program

A. Lane Keeping Technologies

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)

a. Haptic Alerts

b. False Positive Tests

c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications

2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies

1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)

a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions

b. Test Procedure Harmonization

2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)

C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)

D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies

1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)

2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)

a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)

b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)

c. Current State of AEB Technology

d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study

e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing

f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing

g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing

h. Regenerative Braking

3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice

a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-to-Collision

b. False Positive Test Scenarios

c. Procedure Clarifications

d. Expand Testing

e. AEB Strikeable Target

IV. ADAS Rating System

A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers

1. Star Rating System

2. Medals Rating System

3. Points-Based Rating System

4. Incorporating Baseline Risk

B. ADAS Rating System Concepts

1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature

2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet—Concept 1

3. Select Test Conditions to Meet—Concept 2

4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data—Concept 3

5. Overall Rating

V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)

VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP

VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices

A. Driver Monitoring Systems

B. Driver Distraction

C. Alcohol Detection

D. Seat Belt Interlocks

E. Intelligent Speed Assist

F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist

VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System

A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept

B. Baseline Risk Concept

C. Half-Star Ratings

D. Decimal Ratings

E. Rollover Resistance Test

IX. Other Activities

A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data

B. Website Updates

C. Database Changes

X. Economic Analysis

XI. Public Participation

XII. Appendices

I. Executive Summary

NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA's mission to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S. roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA programs, has contributed to significant reductions in motor vehicle fatalities. In the decade prior to the 1978 start of NCAP, fatalities from motor vehicle crashes exceeded 50,000 annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still lost their lives on U.S. roads. Passenger vehicle occupant fatalities decreased from 32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.

This reduction is notable, particularly in light of the fact that the total number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. has increased over time. However, during that same timeframe, pedestrian fatalities increased by 33 percent, from 4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.

Furthermore, a statistical projection of traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021 shows that an estimated 20,160 people died in motor vehicle traffic crashes—the highest number of fatalities during the first half of the year since 2006, and the highest half-year percentage increase in the history of data recorded by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS).

In addition, the projected 11,225 fatalities during the second quarter of 2021 represents the highest second quarter fatalities since 1990, and the highest quarterly percentage change (+23.1 percent) in FARS data recorded history. Preliminary data reported by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) show that VMT in the first half of 2021 rebounded from a large pandemic-related dip that occurred in the first half of 2020, increasing by 173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 percent increase over the comparable period in 2020. The fatality rate for the first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 fatalities per 100 million VMT, up from the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the first half of 2020. Early evidence suggests that these fatality rates have increased as a result of increases in risky behaviors like driving and riding while unbelted, impaired driving, and speeding.

Although there have been notable gains in automotive safety over the past fifty years, far more work must be done.

Traffic Safety Facts 2019 “

A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data.”

U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Traffic Safety Facts 2000 “

A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates System.”

U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2021, October),

Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the First Half (January-June) of 2021.

(Traffic Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 813 199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

See

https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalities-during-pandemic.

This notice discusses how NCAP can support NHTSA's mission through its multi-faceted initiatives and broad safety strategies to address vehicle safety involving motor vehicle occupants, other vulnerable road users, and safe driving choices to further reduce injuries and fatalities occurring on the nation's roads. As stated in the Department of Transportation's National Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to update NCAP are expected to emphasize safety features that protect people both inside and outside of the vehicle, and may include consideration of pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of impacts to pedestrians (

e.g.,

specific considerations for children), and automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to benefit bicyclists and pedestrians. In a first-of-its-kind focus—especially relevant in light of increases in fatalities caused by risky driving behaviors—this notice seeks comment on how automakers could encourage consumers to choose safety technologies that could prevent risky behaviors from occurring in the first place. This notice also proposes significant upgrades to NCAP by adding four additional crash avoidance technologies (also termed ADAS throughout this notice) to the program, increasing the stringency of the tests for currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP for enhanced evaluation of their current capabilities, and exploring, for the first time, expanding NCAP to include safety for road users outside of the vehicle. Finally, this document presents a roadmap of NHTSA's current plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years.

Many of these efforts align with Section 24213 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

and signed on November 15, 2021. First, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(a) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because NHTSA intends for the addition of the four technologies proposed in this RFC to “finalize the proceeding for which comments were requested” on December 16, 2015.

Specifically, the finalization of this RFC will close the December 16, 2015 proceeding and notice. While NHTSA has future plans described in the roadmap that the Agency discussed in the December 16, 2015 notice, none are considered an extension of the December 16, 2015 proceeding, though all information previously collected by NHTSA may be used in the development of future notices.

(Pub. L. 117-58).

Id.

at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). This is the notice that will be finalized once the final decision notice for today's RFC is published.

Second, this RFC fulfills portions of the requirements in Section 24213(b) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that mandates the Agency “publish a notice, for the purposes of public comment, to establish a means for providing consumer information relating to advanced crash-avoidance technologies” within one year of enactment that includes: (1) An appropriate methodology for determining which advanced crash avoidance technologies should be included in the information, (2) performance test criteria for use by manufacturers in evaluating those technologies, (3) a distinct rating system involving each technology, and (4) updating overall vehicle ratings to include the new rating. Through this RFC, NHTSA is proposing four additional advanced crash avoidance technologies

for inclusion in NCAP, proposing the test criteria for evaluating the advanced crash avoidance technologies, and seeking comment on the future development of a crash avoidance rating system. NHTSA described in detail why it chose the four

technologies that it did and how those technologies meet NHTSA's established criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since NHTSA is proposing the addition of four advanced crash avoidance technologies and test criteria for evaluating those technologies, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements for fulfillment of the Advanced Crash Avoidance section of Sec. 24213(b).

This notice refers to the advanced crash avoidance technologies as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) technologies.

Section 24213(b) of the law also requires that the Agency publish a notice “to establish a means for providing to consumers information relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other vulnerable road user safety technologies” within one year of enactment. This notice must meet requirements very similar to the advanced crash avoidance notice mentioned above. Since NHTSA is today proposing to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in the program and is including test criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements for fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User Safety section of Sec. 24213(b). The remaining requirements will be fulfilled once NHTSA proposes and then finalizes a new rating system for the crash avoidance technologies in NCAP. The law also requires that NHTSA submit reports to Congress on its plans for fulfilling the abovementioned requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill these reporting requirements in a timely manner.

Third, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a roadmap for implementation of NCAP changes that covers a term of ten years, with five year mid-term and five year long-term components, and with updates to the roadmap at least once every four years to reflect new Agency interests and public comments. The first roadmap must be completed within one year of the law's enactment. Once finalized, the roadmap on future updates to NCAP proposed in this RFC in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year roadmap requirement, as some proposed initiatives will be considered in NCAP in the first five years while others will be proposed in the second half of the ten-year plan. The details and analysis of this fulfillment are available in the Roadmap section of this RFC.

Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will fulfill a provision in Section 24213(c) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that requires NHTSA to make the roadmap available for public comment and to consider the public comments received before finalizing the roadmap. These provisions are in accordance with the Agency's current practice for updating NCAP and will be followed to finalize the roadmap. Section 24213(c) of the Law also requires that NHTSA identify opportunities where NCAP would “benefit from harmonization with third-party safety rating programs.” The Agency is taking steps to harmonize with existing consumer information rating programs where possible, and when appropriate, as noted in various sections of this RFC.

Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law requires the Agency to engage with stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints not less than annually to develop future roadmaps. Again, this provision is in accordance with the Agency's current practice.

Components of the Notice

There are six main parts to this notice:

1. Proposes to add four new ADAS technologies to NCAP and updates to current NCAP test procedures,

2. Discusses the Agency's plan to develop a new rating system for advanced driver assistance technologies,

3. Describes steps to list the crash avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of sale,

4. Describes roadmap of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in phases over the next ten years,

5. Requests comments on expanding NCAP to provide consumer information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior, and

6. Discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.

Each of the aforementioned aspects of the notice are described in greater detail that follows. First, the notice discusses in detail the Agency's proposed upgrade to add four more ADAS technologies to those currently recommended by NHTSA through NCAP and that are highlighted on the NHTSA website. Since 2010, NCAP has recommended four kinds of ADAS technologies to prospective vehicle purchasers, and has identified to shoppers the vehicles that have these technologies and that meet NCAP performance test criteria.

The current technologies are forward collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) (with the latter two collectively referred to as “automatic emergency braking).

This notice proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance criteria for LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to (1) enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle models, (2) reduce test burden, and (3) harmonize with other consumer information programs. This notice also describes and proposes four more ADAS technologies: Blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking.

NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a recommended technology when NHTSA has data verifying that the technology meets the minimum performance requirements set by NHTSA for acceptable performance. If a vehicle's ADAS is reported to have satisfied the performance requirements using the test methods specified by the Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system to indicate on the NHTSA website that the vehicle is equipped with the technology. Each year, NHTSA also selects a sample of vehicles from that model year to verify ADAS system performance by performing its own tests.

https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies.

These four new ADAS technologies are candidates for NCAP because data indicate they satisfy NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in the program. The prerequisites are: (1) The update to the program addresses a safety need; (2) there are system designs (countermeasures) that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) existing or new system designs have safety benefit potential; and (4) a performance-based objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance. In order to address (1), a safety need, the Agency inherently looks first to address injuries and fatalities stemming from “high-frequency and high-risk crash types”—as these crashes command the largest safety need and thus may also afford the biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does not calculate relative costs and benefits when considering inclusion in NCAP as it is a non-regulatory consumer information program. NHTSA discusses in this notice how each of the proposed ADAS technologies meets the four prerequisites. As explained in detail in this notice, the four new ADAS technologies proposed in NCAP are the only technologies that the Agency believes meet the four prerequisites for inclusion at this time. Each technology has demonstrated the ability to successfully mitigate high frequency and high-risk crash types. With the proposal to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking, NCAP would be expanded, for the first time, to include safety for people outside of the vehicle.

Second, this notice discusses the Agency's plan to develop a future rating system for new vehicles based on the availability and performance of all the NCAP-recommended crash avoidance technologies. Currently, NCAP only

recommends crash avoidance technologies to shoppers, and identifies the vehicles that offer the recommended technologies that pass NCAP system performance criteria. Unlike its crashworthiness and rollover protection programs that offer a combined rating based on vehicle performance in frontal, side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash avoidance program does not currently have a rating system to differentiate the performance of ADAS technologies. NHTSA seeks to remedy this by developing a rating system for ADAS technologies to provide purchasers improved data with which to compare and shop for vehicles, and to spur improved vehicle performance. Accordingly, this document seeks public input on how best to develop this rating system.

Third, this notice announces NHTSA's steps to list the crash avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of sale, as directed by the FAST Act.

NHTSA requests comment on ideas for the Monroney label information. Research is underway to maximize the effectiveness of the information in informing purchasing decisions. A follow-on notice will propose the crash avoidance rating system and explain how NHTSA would use the ratings. NHTSA will consider the comments received on this notice in conjunction with the information gained from the consumer research, to develop a proposal for a revised label. To help shoppers make more informed purchasing decisions, NHTSA also plans to provide fuel economy and greenhouse gas rating information with the NHTSA safety ratings, not only at the point of sale but also on the NHTSA website.

This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to require vehicle manufacturers to include crash avoidance information next to the crashworthiness information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney labels).

Fourth, as part of a new approach to advancing NCAP, NHTSA has developed a roadmap of the Agency's current plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years. The roadmap sets forth NHTSA's near-term and longer-term strategies for upgrading NCAP. The roadmap takes a gradual approach, which contemplates NHTSA's issuing proposed upgrades in phases, as the technologies mature to readiness for proposed inclusion in NCAP. Following a proposal will be a final decision document that responds to comments and provides NHTSA's decisions for that phase of NCAP updates, including the lead time provided for the implementation. The roadmap presents an estimated timeframe of the phased request for comment (RFC) notices.

Fifth, this notice also considers expanding NCAP to provide consumer information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior. The Agency is examining the possibility of expanding NCAP to include technologies that promote NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe driving behaviors, such as distracted and impaired driving, riding in a vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. NHTSA currently uses many approaches to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, including high visibility enforcement and advertising campaigns like “Click it or Ticket” and “Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving.” These campaigns have succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, human causes of crashes and there is some evidence that their success has reached a plateau. NHTSA is considering how NCAP can promote technologies that would reduce unsafe driving or riding behavior like distracted and impaired driving, speeding, or riding in a vehicle unrestrained by targeting the human behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. This information may be of particular interest to parents or other caregivers who are shopping for a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or caregivers wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke.

Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole. NHTSA requests comment on the Agency's ideas for revising the 5-star safety ratings program. This document also discusses ways NHTSA would like to update the existing ADAS technology program components, outlines challenges the Agency has encountered relating to manufacturer self-reported data, and proposes possible solutions to those problems. Lastly, the RFC discusses (1) updates to the NCAP website to improve the dissemination of vehicle safety information to consumers and (2) the development of an NCAP database to modernize the operational aspects of the program, including a new vehicle information submission process for vehicle manufacturers.

This RFC includes numbered questions throughout the notice that highlight specific topics on which NHTSA seeks comments. Although several questions may be posed un-numbered within the body of certain sections, these un-numbered questions are reiterated at the conclusion of the topic discussion and in Appendix B. To help ensure that NHTSA is able to address all comments received, the Agency requests that commenters provide corresponding numbering in their responses.

II. Background

NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 in response to Title II of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972. When the program first began providing consumers with vehicle safety information derived from frontal crashworthiness testing, attention within the industry to vehicle safety was relatively new. Today's consumers are much more interested in vehicle safety, and this has become one of the key factors in vehicle purchasing decisions.

Vehicle manufacturers have responded to these consumer demands by offering safer vehicles that incorporate enhanced safety features. This has resulted in improved vehicle safety performance in NCAP, which has historically translated into higher NCAP star ratings.

See

www.regulations.gov,

See

www.regulations.gov,

Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for a report of “New Car Assessment Program 5-Star Quantitative Consumer Research.”

Over the years, NHTSA began to incorporate ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program. In 2007, NHTSA, for the first time, issued an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS technologies in NCAP.

Later, based on feedback received from written and oral comments, NHTSA published a final decision

expanding NCAP to include certain ADAS technologies and specific performance thresholds that a NHTSA-recommended ADAS system must meet. Beginning with model year 2011, the Agency began recommending on its website forward collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability control (ESC),

and identified to shoppers which vehicles have the technologies that meet NCAP's performance requirements. NHTSA updated NCAP further to include crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic braking support (DBS)

technologies, beginning with model year 2018 vehicles.

72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC included a request for comments on a NHTSA report titled, “The New Car Assessment Program (NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future Enhancements.”

73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).

ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the technology became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, “Electronic stability control.” NHTSA also included rear video systems in its list of recommended technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to 2017 and removed that technology from its list when it became mandated under FMVSS No. 111, “Rear Visibility.”

This RFC continues those efforts. Through several notices and public meetings, NHTSA has continued discussions with stakeholders about which technologies should be included in NCAP and the minimum performance thresholds those technologies should meet. NHTSA has set forth in Appendix C to this RFC a detailed history of the requests for comment, public meetings, and other relevant events that underlie this notice.

The last RFC NHTSA published to discuss potential changes to NCAP was published in 2015. It was broad in subject matter and sought comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques for evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and stimulating further vehicle safety developments.

On the crashworthiness front, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new frontal oblique test and on using more advanced crash test dummies in all tests. The RFC also sought comment about establishing a new crash avoidance rating category and including nine advanced crash avoidance technologies. Additionally, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new pedestrian protection rating category involving the use of adult and child head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and adding two new pedestrian crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on combining the three categories (crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and pedestrian protection) into one overall 5-star rating. NHTSA also received comments at two public hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. The numerous comments received on the RFC are discussed in a section below.

80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).

In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a third public meeting to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the Agency plan the future of NCAP.

The Agency has also been working to finalize its research efforts on pedestrian crash protection, advanced anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover risk curve. As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA plans to upgrade the NCAP crashworthiness program in phases over the next several years with the knowledge it has acquired from the research programs.

October 1, 2018.

III. ADAS Performance Testing Program

ADAS technologies have the potential to increase safety by preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of crashes that might otherwise lead to injury and death. NCAP currently conducts performance verification tests for four ADAS technologies: Forward collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB and DBS are collectively referred to as automatic emergency braking (AEB). Vehicles that are equipped with one or more of these systems and pass NCAP's performance test requirements are listed as “Recommended” on NHTSA's website. When the Agency first began recommending FCW and LDW systems for model year 2011 vehicles, the fitment rate for these systems was less than 0.2 percent (where “fitment rate” means the percent of vehicles equipped with a particular ADAS system). For model year 2018 vehicles, 38.3 percent were equipped with FCW and 30.1 percent were equipped with LDW.

Providing vehicle safety information through NCAP can be an effective approach to advance the deployment of safer vehicle designs and technology in the U.S. market, inform consumer choices, and encourage adoption of new technologies that have life-saving potential.

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

With this notice, NHTSA is proposing to incorporate four additional ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program: Lane keeping support (LKS), pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), blind spot warning (BSW), and blind spot intervention (BSI). Each of these technologies meets the Agency's established criteria for inclusion in NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a safety need; (2) system designs exist that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the technology provides the potential for safety benefits; and (4) a performance-based objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance.

Details about how each of the proposed ADAS technologies addresses a safety need (criterion 1) will be discussed immediately below, while the remaining criteria will be discussed in the relevant sections under each technology.

78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013).

To gain an understanding of the safety need that current ADAS technologies may address, NHTSA analyzed crash data for 84 mutually exclusive pre-crash scenarios.

The pre-crash scenarios used in the Agency's analysis were devised using a typology

concept

published by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe), which categorizes crashes into dynamically distinct scenarios based on pre-crash vehicle movements and critical events. As detailed in the referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA mapped the pre-crash scenario typologies to twelve currently available ADAS technologies

believed to potentially address certain pre-crash scenarios by assisting the driver to avoid or mitigate a crash. These mappings served to define the corresponding crash populations (

i.e.,

target crash populations).

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

A typology is the study or analysis of something, or the classification of something, based on types or categories.

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: FCW, DBS, CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist (LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/merge warning, PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert.

Since several ADAS technologies presently available on passenger vehicles

are designed to mitigate the same crash scenarios, NHTSA first grouped the technologies with similar design intent into categories. The five technology categories that resulted from this grouping process include: (1) Forward collision prevention, (2) lane keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) forward pedestrian impact, and (5) backing collision avoidance. As shown in Table A-6, these categories address the following high-level crash types: (1) Rear-end; (2) rollover, lane departure, and road departure; (3) lane change/merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, respectively. Of the original 84 pre-crash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 relevant pre-crash scenario typologies to the five resulting technology categories that represented these crash types.

Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, crossovers, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and vans having a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.

The forward collision prevention category included three ADAS technologies: Forward collision warning, crash imminent braking, and dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and

DBS, respectively). The lane keeping category included lane departure warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS),

and lane centering assist (LCA). The blind spot detection category included blind spot warning (BSW),

blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning. The forward pedestrian impact avoidance category included pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the backing collision avoidance category included rear automatic braking (RAB) and rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). These ADAS technologies are characterized as SAE International (SAE) Level 0-1

driving automation systems.

The study uses the term “lane keeping assist” (LKA), but NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses the term “lane keeping support” throughout this document instead.

Similarly, the study uses the term “blind spot detection” (BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot warning (BSW) throughout this document instead.

SAE International (2018),

Taxonomy and definitions for terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor vehicles

(SAE J3016). Level 0: No Automation—The full-time performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems. Level 1: Driver Assistance—The driving mode-specific execution by a driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic driving task.

NHTSA derived target crash populations for each of the five technology categories using 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS GES) data sets, which serve as records of police-reported fatal and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on the nation's roads. For a given technology category, we compiled data for each of the corresponding pre-crash scenarios to generate target crash populations surrounding the number of crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and property-damage-only vehicles (PDOVs).

See Table 1 for a breakdown of target crash populations for each technology category.

PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injury-producing crashes (

i.e.,

crashes in which vehicles only incur property damage and no occupants incur injury).

Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT HS 812 653.

Table 1—Summary of Target Crashes by Technology Group

Safety systems

Crashes

Fatalities

MAIS 1-5 injuries

PDOVs

1. FCW/DBS/CIB

1,703,541 (29.4%)

1,275 (3.8%)

883,386 (31.5%)

2,641,884 (36.3%)

2. LDW/LKA/LCA

1,126,397 (19.4%)

14,844 (44.3%)

479,939 (17.1%)

863,213 (11.9%)

3. BSW/BSI/LCM

503,070 (8.7%)

542 (1.6%)

188,304 (6.7%)

860,726 (11.8%)

4. PAEB

111,641 (1.9%)

4,106 (12.3%)

104,066 (3.7%)

6,985 (0.1%)

5. RAB/RvAB

RCTA

148,533 (2.6%)

74 (0.2%)

35,268 (1.3%)

231,317 (3.2%)

Combined

3,593,18 (62%)

20,841 (62.2%)

1,690,963 (60.3%)

4,604,125 (63.3%)

It is important to note that target crash populations for the five technology categories covered 62 percent of all crashes. Crossing path crashes, which also represented a large crash population and a significant number of fatalities, were not part of our analysis because we are not aware of a currently available ADAS technology that can effectively mitigate this crash type.

However, there are emerging safety countermeasures that hold potential to address some portion of these crashes in the future and these technologies will be considered for NCAP as they mature. These include intersection safety assist (ISA) systems that use onboard sensors with a wide field of view (

e.g.

, cameras, lidar, radar) as well as vehicle communications systems.

Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes

also had a relatively high target population and fatality rate,

but were not included because, aside from electronic stability control (ESC) systems, which are mandated,

the Agency is not aware of an ADAS technology that effectively prevents this crash type and also meets NHTSA's criteria for inclusion in NCAP at this time.

In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 5,480,886 light vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 through 2015, crossing path crashes, which totaled 1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all light vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all fatalities (25,350).

NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are currently available on a small number of light vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA testing has shown that current-generation ISA systems have only limited capabilities and therefore would not effectively mitigate intersection-related crashes at this time—which is one of the requirements in the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technologies have the potential to address crossing path crashes, but, while NHTSA remains strongly interested in these technologies, they are not included in the current roadmap. NHTSA is continuing to consider the various issues that bear upon the deployment path of V2X, including technological evolution and regulatory changes to the radio spectrum environment.

Crash scenarios were categorized by the first sequence of a crash event. Target crashes for a technology (

e.g.,

lane-keeping crashes) were a collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to the technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle scenario was defined as crashes where the first event was initiated by a passenger vehicle, and the event was coded as jackknife or traction loss. This crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those included in the lane-keeping crashes.

Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are about 1% of crashes and associated with 3% of fatalities.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126.

In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent (470,733) of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) occurring from 2011 through 2015 as control loss crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all fatal crashes (25,350) were due to control loss.

Of the pre-crash typologies included in NHTSA's March 2019 study, rear-end collisions were found to be the most common crash type with an annual average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end collisions represented 29.4 percent of all annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by lane keeping typologies (1,126,397 crashes or 19.4 percent), and those relating to blind spot detection (503,070 crashes or 8.7 percent). Backing crashes (148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all crashes, followed by forward pedestrian crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent.

Rear-end collisions also had the highest number of Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS)

1-5 injuries at 883,386, which represented 31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries (2,806,260) in Table A-1. Lane keeping crashes had the second highest number of injuries at 479,939 (17.1 percent), as shown in Table A-2, and blind spot crashes had the third highest at 188,304 (6.7 percent), as shown in Table A-3. These typologies were followed by forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7

percent and backing crashes at 1.3 percent, as shown in Table A-4.

The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification system for assessing impact injury severity developed and published by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and is used for coding single injuries, assessing multiple injuries, or for assessing cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 = maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (

i.e.,

the highest single AIS for a person with one or more injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury.

The study uses the term “impacts” but for consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term “crashes” in this paragraph.

The Agency notes that the highest number of serious injuries (

i.e.,

MAIS 3-5 injuries) were recorded for lane keeping crashes (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).

NHTSA found that the lane keeping technology category, represented by rollover, lane departure, and road departure crashes, included the highest number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 percent of all fatalities (33,477), as shown in Table A-2. This was followed by the forward pedestrian impact category, which included 4,106 pedestrian fatalities (12.3 percent), as shown in Table A-4. The forward collision prevention category, made up of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 fatalities (3.8 percent), as shown in Table A-1.

The blind spot detection technology category, represented by lane change/merge crashes, accounted for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown in Table A-3. This was followed by backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown in Table A-5, which defined the backing collision avoidance category. The Agency notes that forward pedestrian crashes, which comprised the forward pedestrian impact category, ranked second highest for fatalities, and were the deadliest based on frequency of fatalities per crash.

Similarly, the study uses the term “impacts” but for consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term “crashes” in this paragraph.

In selecting the ADAS technologies to include in this proposal, the Agency wanted not only to target the most frequently occurring crash types, but also prioritize the most fatal and highest risk crashes. Based on the target crash populations studied, NHTSA believes that those represented by the forward collision prevention, lane keeping, blind spot detection, and forward pedestrian impact technology categories account for the most significant safety need.

The Agency notes that ADAS technologies representing the backing collision avoidance category (

i.e.,

RAB, RvAB, and RCTA) are not being proposed for this program update. The backing collision avoidance category did not appear in the top third for number of crashes, number of fatalities, or number of MAIS 1-5 injuries. This may be due, in part, to the fact that a significant part of this crash target population is addressed by FMVSS No. 111, “Rear visibility.”

The Agency needs additional time to assess all available real-world data and study the effects of the recent full implementation of FMVSS No. 111 prior to considering adoption of ADAS technologies designed to prevent backing crashes in NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency acknowledges that it previously proposed adding rear automatic braking (RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 notice, it is continuing to make changes to the RAB test procedure published in support of that proposal to address the comments received. Thus, it is not proposing to add this technology to NCAP at this time. The Agency may propose adding to NCAP ADAS technologies that address the backing pre-crash typologies as the Agency continues to analyze the real-world data and refine test procedure revisions.

49 CFR 571.111.

See

79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 2014).

Units of measure contained within this notice include meters (m), kilometers (km), millimeters per second (mm/s), meters per second (m/s), kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), inches per second (in./s), feet per second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), seconds (s), and kilograms (kg).

A. Lane Keeping Technologies

A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes

from the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Study (NMVCCS)

identified that 42 percent of lane departure crashes (

i.e.,

where the driver left the lane of travel prior to the crash) resulted in a rollover and 37 percent resulted in an opposite direction crash.

Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to assess lane keeping technologies,

25th International Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles,

Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.

The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVVCS) was a nationwide survey of 5,471 crashes involving light passenger vehicles, with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, which were investigated by the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA over a 2.5-year period from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007.

After analyzing NHTSA's 2019 target population study, NHTSA believes that lane keeping technologies such as lane departure warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS), and lane centering assist (LCA), can address ten pre-crash scenarios including the prevention or mitigation of roadway departures and crossing the centerline or median (

i.e.,

opposite direction crashes). These pre-crash scenarios represented on average 1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 percent of all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 fatalities and 479,939 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-2. This equals 44.3 percent of all fatalities and 17.1 percent of all injuries recorded.

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

When only serious injuries (

i.e.,

MAIS 3-5 injuries) were considered, lane keeping crashes represented the highest number of non-fatal injuries (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).

NCAP currently provides information on the performance of LDW, one of the lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW was introduced in the program in 2010 for model year 2011 vehicles.

At the time, the fitment rate for LDW was less than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it was 30.1 percent.

Although the adoption rate for LDW has increased over this period, it has not increased as significantly as the fitment rate for forward collision warning (FCW), which saw an approximate 40 percent increase over the same time period. A possible explanation regarding the lower fitment rate for LDW will be discussed in the next section. A second lane keeping ADAS technology that the Agency believes is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS may provide additional safety benefits that LDW cannot and may more effectively address the number of fatalities and injuries related to lane departure crashes.

73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)

Lane departure warning is a NHTSA-recommended technology that is currently included in NCAP to mitigate lane departure crashes. LDW systems are used to help prevent crashes that result when a driver unintentionally allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane of travel. These systems often use camera-based sensors to detect lane markers, such as solid lines (including those marked for bike lanes), dashed lines, or raised reflective indicators such as Botts' Dots, ahead of the vehicle.

Lane departure alerts are presented to the driver when the system detects that the vehicle is laterally approaching or crossing the lane markings. The alert may be visual, audible, and/or haptic in

nature. Visual alerts may show which side of the vehicle is departing the lane, and haptic alerts may be presented as steering wheel or seat vibrations to alert the driver. It is expected that an LDW alert will warn the driver of the unintentional lane shift so the driver can steer the vehicle back into its lane. When a turn signal is activated, the LDW system acknowledges that the lane change is intentional and does not alert the driver.

Note that performance of LDW systems may be adversely affected by precipitation or poor roadway conditions due to construction, unmarked intersections, faded/worn/missing lane markings, markings covered with water, etc.

As NHTSA continues its assessment of LDW systems under NCAP, it plans to use the current NCAP test procedure titled, “Lane Departure Warning System Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping Support Performance Documentation,” dated February 2013.

This protocol assesses the system's ability to issue an alert in response to a driving situation intended to represent an unintended lane departure and to quantify the test vehicle's position relative to the lane line at the time of the LDW alert. In NCAP's LDW tests, a test vehicle is accelerated from rest to a test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a straight line parallel to a single lane line comprised of one of three marking types: Continuous white lines, discontinuous (

i.e.,

dashed) yellow lines, or discontinuous raised pavement markers (

i.e.,

Botts' Dots). The test vehicle is driven such that the centerline of the vehicle is approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane edge. This path must be maintained, and the test speed must be achieved, at least 61.0 m (200 ft.) prior to the start gate. Once the driver reaches the start gate, he or she manually inputs sufficient steering to achieve a lane departure with a target lateral velocity of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with respect to the lane line. The driver of the vehicle does not activate the turn signal at any point during the test and does not apply any sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal. The test vehicle is driven at constant speed throughout the maneuver. The test ends when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m (1.7 ft.) over the edge of the lane line marking. The scenario is performed for two different departure directions, left and right, and for all three lane marking types, resulting in a total of six test conditions. Five repeated trials runs are performed per test condition.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013, February).

Lane departure warning system confirmation test and lane keeping support performance documentation.

See

http://www.regulations.gov,

Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0135.

LDW performance for each test trial is evaluated by examining the proximity of the vehicle with respect to the edge of a lane line at the time of the LDW alert. The LDW alert must not occur when the lateral position of the vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon,

is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane line (

i.e.,

the line edge closest to the vehicle when the lane departure maneuver is initiated), and must occur before the lane departure exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To pass the test, the LDW system must satisfy the pass criteria for three of the first five valid individual trials

for each combination of departure direction and lane line type (60 percent) and for 20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent).

The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the vehicle's axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer edge of the vehicle's tire in the Y-direction (lateral), and the ground in the Z-direction (vertical).

Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with the same subject vehicle.

NCAP's LDW test conditions represent pre-crash scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed in real-world lane departure crashes. In its independent review of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed that approximately 40 and 30 percent of fatalities in fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.

Similarly, the data indicated 64 and 63 percent of injuries resulted from road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, that occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Although travel speed was unknown or not reported for a high percentage of crashes in FARS and GES,

when travel speed was reported, approximately 6 and 9 percent of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at travel speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, the data showed 22 and 25 percent of the police-reported non-fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe's data review indicates that speeding is prevalent in lane departure relevant pre-crash scenarios, but most road departure- and opposite direction-related fatalities and injuries did not occur on highways. For instance, 79 percent of road departure-related fatal crashes and 89 percent of road departure-related police-reported injuries occurred on roads that were not highways. Similarly, for opposite direction-related crashes, 87 percent of fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did not occur on highways. Because highway driving speeds are on average much higher than non-highway speeds, the Volpe data about a high percentage of crashes occurring at speeds under 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears accurate. The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears to address a large portion of the travel speeds where the crashes are occurring.

For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent of the travel speed data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES. For opposite direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES.

Furthermore, 62 percent of road departure-related fatalities and 76 percent of road departure-related injuries occurred on straight roads, thereby aligning with NCAP's test procedure. For opposite direction-related crashes, 69 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of police-reported injuries occurred on straight roads.

In its December 2015 notice,

NHTSA expressed concern that the safety benefits afforded by LDW technology were being diminished due to false activations. Several studies referenced in that notice had found that drivers were choosing to disable their vehicle's LDW system because it was issuing alerts too frequently. The Agency was also concerned about missed detections resulting from tar lines reflecting sun light or covered with water and other unforeseen anomalies that cause unreliable driver warnings. To address these issues and improve consumer acceptance, NHTSA requested comment in 2015 on whether to revise certain aspects of NCAP's LDW test procedure. Specifically, the Agency solicited comment on whether it is feasible to (1) award NCAP credit to LDW systems that only provide haptic alerts, and (2) develop additional test scenarios to address false activations and missed detections. The Agency also proposed to tighten the inboard lane tolerance for its LDW test procedure from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0 ft.). In doing this, an LDW alert could only occur within a window of +0.3 to −0.3 m (+1.0 to −1.0 ft.) with respect to the inside edge of the lane line to pass NCAP's LDW procedure. This proposal effectively increased the space in which a vehicle could operate within a lane before triggering of an LDW alert was permitted. Each of these topics are

discussed in detail in the sections that follow.

80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).

a. Haptic Alerts

With respect to haptic warnings, NHTSA mentioned in its December 2015 notice that these alerts may offer greater consumer acceptance compared to audible alerts, and thus improve the effectiveness of LDW alerts if the driver does not view the alerts as a nuisance and disengage the system. In response to the notice, commenters generally did not support a haptic alert requirement. Some commenters suggested that requiring a specific feedback type would unnecessarily limit the manufacturer's flexibility to issue warnings to the driver, particularly when considering the potential effectiveness of different feedback types and the need to optimize human-machine interface (HMI) designs to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch suggested the Agency should allow all warning options to promote the availability of such systems in a greater number of vehicles, which should ultimately increase consumer awareness and encourage vehicle safety improvements. Advocates stated that the Agency should provide details on the effectiveness of the different types of sensory feedback (visual, auditory, haptic) to justify its decision to encourage one warning type over another. Consumers Union (CU) suggested awarding credit for all LDW feedback types and awarding additional points or credit for haptic alerts to encourage this feedback type in the future. The Automotive Safety Council (ASC) acknowledged that haptic warnings may improve driver acceptance of LDW systems but suggested that false activations must also be reduced to realize improved consumer acceptance and additional safety benefits.

In a large-scale telematics-based study conducted by UMTRI

for NHTSA on LDW usage, researchers investigated driver behavior in reaction to alerts. Two types of vehicles were included in the study: Vehicles with audible-only alerts and vehicles where the driver had the option to select either an audible or haptic alert. When the latter was available, the driver selected the haptic warning 90 percent of the time. Otherwise, the LDW system was turned “off” 38 percent of the time and thus was not providing alerts. For the system that only provided the audible warning, the LDW was turned “off” 71 percent of the time.

Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K., Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., and Lobes, K. (2016, February),

Large-scale field test of forward collision alert and lane departure warning systems

(Report No. DOT HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Based on the findings from the UMTRI's research, NHTSA concludes that haptic alerts improve driver acceptance of LDW systems. However, the Agency is not certain if an increase in driver acceptance will translate to an improvement in the overall efficacy of the LDW system in reducing crashes. Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to hinder optimization of HMI designs given the increasing number of ADAS technologies available in vehicles today. Therefore, the Agency has decided not to require a specific alert modality for LDW warnings in its related NCAP test procedure at this time, but is requesting comment on whether this decision is appropriate. Although NHTSA has limited data on the effectiveness of the various alert types, it has some concern (similar to the one raised for FCW) that certain LDW systems, such as those that may provide only a visual alert, may be less effective than other alert options in medium or high urgency situations.

Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey, R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September),

Human factors for connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings

(Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

b. False Positive Tests

In responding to the 2015 RFC, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers asserted that additional false positive test requirements were not needed even though they acknowledged NHTSA's concern regarding the effect of nuisance alerts on consumer acceptance. Specifically, the Alliance

stated that vehicle manufacturers will optimize their systems to minimize false positive activations for consumer acceptance purposes, and thus such tests will not be necessary. Similarly, Honda stated that vehicle manufacturers must already account for false positives when considering marketability and HMI. The manufacturer also indicated that it would be difficult for the Agency to create a valid false positive test procedure that is robust and repeatable. Mobileye, Bosch, and MTS Systems Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, Mobileye explained that it would be hard to reproduce the exact test conditions, especially with respect to weather, over multiple test locations. Also, Bosch stated that the specialized tests required to address the Agency's concern may not be truly representative of all real-world driving situations that the system encounters. MTS suggested that, alternatively, a new test could be added to NCAP's LDW test procedure that would evaluate whether an LDW system can inform the driver that it is no longer able to issue warnings due to poor environmental conditions or other reasons.

After submitting individual comments on the 2015 RFC, the Alliance and Global Automakers merged to form the Alliance for Automotive Innovation. This document addresses the individual comments from the organizations that were then the Alliance and Global Automakers.

Given the concerns expressed regarding repeatability and reproducibility of test conditions, and the fact that the Agency's data do not currently support adoption of a false positive assessment for lane keeping technologies, NHTSA continues to monitor the consumer complaint data related to false positives to help inform an appropriate next step.

With respect to the recommendation from MTS, the Agency recognizes that vehicle manufacturers install LDW telltales on the instrument panel that illuminate to inform drivers when the system is operational. The systems are typically operational when the vehicle's travel speed has reached a preset activation threshold speed and the lane markings and environmental conditions are appropriate. The telltale will disappear if those conditions are not met to inform the driver that the system is no longer operational. In such a state, the system will not provide an alert if the vehicle departs the travel lane. Given this feature, NHTSA has decided a test to inform the driver that the system is no longer issuing warnings is unnecessary at this time.

c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications

Support was varied with respect to NHTSA's proposal in the December 2015 notice to modify the LDW test requirements to reduce the leeway for system activation inside of a lane line from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0 ft.). Global Automakers stated that the proposed change was “unduly prescriptive” and recommended that the Agency retain the existing lane line tolerance. The organization explained that research showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 s to react to a warning.

Citing NCAP's LDW test procedure, which requires a steering input having a target lateral velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./s), the trade association remarked that this requirement equates to a necessary warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 to 2.4 ft.) to ensure that 90 percent of drivers can react in time to prevent a

lane departure. Advocates agreed that nuisance notifications are a concern for driver acceptance, but noted that the Agency provided little information about the effectiveness of LDW systems meeting the proposed criteria. Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS commented that some of the more robust systems that are currently available should be able to comply with the narrower specification. However, ASC suggested that the Agency may want to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes before finalizing the requirements to ensure that narrowing the lane line tolerances translates to a reduction in false positive alerts, and thus higher consumer acceptance for LDW systems. Mobileye stated that the tolerance reduction should increase the required accuracy and quality of lane keeping systems. MTS remarked that systems meeting the tighter specification will produce higher driver satisfaction, and, in turn, system use, compared to those that meet only the current requirements. Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) also supported the tolerance revision. Consumers Union (CU) agreed with others that the narrowed lateral tolerance should reduce the issuance of false alerts on main roadways but cautioned the Agency that this change may not effectively address false alerts on secondary or curved roads, as vehicles not only tend to approach within one foot of lane lines, but also may cross them. The group suggested that false alert conditions be subject to speed limitations or GPS-based position sensors to avoid “over activation” on secondary or curved roads.

Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. (2012, April 16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane Departure Warning System using ASSTREET.

SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars—Electron. Electr. Syst.

5(1):133-145, 2012,

https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-0289.

Given NHTSA's goal of reducing nuisance notifications to increase consumer acceptance of LDW systems and the statements from several commenters that current LDW systems can meet the proposed reduced test specification, the Agency believes it is reasonable to propose adopting the reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).

In addition to the comments received pertaining to the lane line tolerance, the Agency also received several suggestions to adopt additional test scenarios for NCAP's LDW test procedure or make alternative procedural modifications. Similar to CU's suggestion above for curved roads, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add inner and outer curve scenarios that allow a larger tolerance for the inner lane boundary than that permitted on a straight road. The company further recommended that the Agency add road edge detection scenarios, including curbs and non-structural delimiters such as gravel or dirt, to reflect real-world conditions and crash scenarios more accurately. Similarly, Bosch suggested that NHTSA consider introducing road edge detection requirements in addition to lane markings since not all roads have lane markings. Additionally, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA alter the Botts' Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, raised markers that mark lanes) to align with California detail #13, which is more common, and modify the test procedure to include Botts' Dots on both sides of the lane or Botts' Dots and a solid line, as these are the most frequently observed marking pairings.

The Agency appreciates suggestions from commenters and agrees that there is merit to considering other procedural modifications for NCAP's lane departure test procedure(s). As will be discussed in the next section, the Agency is planning to conduct a feasibility study to determine whether curved roads can be considered for inclusion in NCAP test procedures to evaluate LKS systems objectively. NHTSA also plans to perform research to assess how lane keeping system performance on a test track compares to real-world data for different combinations of curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing. Additionally, the Agency recognizes that the European NCAP program (Euro NCAP) has adopted a road edge detection test that is conducted in a similar manner to their “lane keep assist” tests (described in the next section), but the road edge detection test does not use lane markings. Although NHTSA believes the number of vehicles equipped with an ability to recognize and respond to road edges not defined with a lane line is presently low, it has identified roadways where this capability could prevent crashes. Therefore, the Agency is requesting comment on whether a road edge detection test for either LDW and/or LKS is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP. In consideration of the lane markings currently assessed, the Agency proposes to remove the Botts' Dots test scenario from the current LDW test, as the lane marking type is being removed from use in California.

At this time, the Agency believes the traditional dashed and solid lane marking tests would be sufficient.

Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-century, will disappear from freeways, highways,

The Orange County Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.

Although NHTSA has tentatively decided not to adopt additional false activation requirements for this NCAP upgrade, the Agency is still concerned about the low effectiveness of LDW and its lack of consumer acceptance stemming from nuisance alerts and missed detections.

When NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,

LDW was selected because it met NCAP's four established criteria: (1) The technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) the system design of LDW had the potential to mitigate the crash problem; (3) safety benefits were projected, and (4) test procedures and evaluation criteria were available to ensure an acceptable performance level. At the time, the Agency estimated that existing LDW systems were 6 to 11 percent effective in preventing lane departure crashes. Although the system's effectiveness was relatively low, NHTSA cited the large number of road departure and opposite direction crashes occurring on the nation's roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ injuries, as reasons to include LDW in NCAP. Several recent studies have provided varying results with respect to LDW effectiveness.

73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).

In a 2017 study,

the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) concluded that LDW systems were effective in reducing three types of passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, side-swipes, and head-on) by 11 percent, which is the same rate NHTSA originally estimated. Importantly, IIHS also concluded that LDW systems reduce injuries in those same types of crashes by 21 percent. In its recent study of real-world effectiveness of crash avoidance technologies in GM vehicles,

UMTRI found that LDW systems showed a 3 percent reduction for applicable crashes that was determined to be not statistically significant. Conversely, the active safety technology, LKS (which also included lane departure warning capability), showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in applicable crashes.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, August 23),

Lane departure warning, blind spot detection help drivers avoid trouble, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lines-lane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-help-drivers-avoid-trouble.

Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance Technology Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.

Other studies that examined driver deactivation rates also suggest that LDW effectiveness may be lower than originally estimated. In a survey of Honda vehicles brought into Honda

dealerships for service,

IIHS researchers found that for 184 models equipped with an LDW system, only a third of the vehicles had the system activated. Furthermore, in its telematics-based study on LDW usage,

UMTRI found that, overall, drivers turned off LDW systems 50 percent of the time. However, in Consumer Reports' August 2019 survey of more than 57,000 CR subscribers, the organization found that 73 percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LDW technology. In fact, 33 percent said that the system had helped them avoid a crash, and 65 percent said that they trusted the system to work every time.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, January 28), Most Honda owners turn off lane departure warning,

Status Report, Vol. 51, No. 1,

page 6.

Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K., Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C., and Lobes, K. (2016, February),

Large-scale field test of forward collision alert and lane departure warning systems

(Report No. DOT HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Consumer Reports (2019, August 5),

Guide to lane departure warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.

In light of these findings, the Agency believes that, in addition to LDW, there is merit to adopting an active lane keeping system, such as lane keeping support (LKS), in NCAP. As an enhanced active system, LKS offers the steering and/or braking capability necessary to guide a vehicle back into its lane without consumer action and should therefore further enhance safety benefits beyond those that can be realized by LDW. A detailed discussion pertaining to LKS technology is provided in the following section.

2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)

LDW systems warn a driver that their vehicle is unintentionally drifting out of their travel lane, while lane keeping support (LKS) systems are designed to actively guide a drifting vehicle back into the travel lane by gently counter steering or applying differential braking. During an unintended lane departure where the driver is not using the turn signal, LKS systems help to prevent: “Sideswiping” where a vehicle strikes another vehicle in an adjacent lane that is travelling in the same direction; opposite direction crashes where a vehicle crosses the centerline and strikes another vehicle travelling in the opposite direction; and road departure crashes where a vehicle runs off the road resulting in a rollover crash or an impact with a tree or other object. LKS systems may also help to prevent unintended lane departures into designated bicycle lanes in situations where the system's speed threshold is met.

LKS systems typically utilize the same camera(s) used by LDW systems to monitor the vehicle's position within the lane, and determine whether a vehicle is about to drift out of its lane of travel unintentionally. In such instances, LKS automatically intervenes by: Braking one or more of the vehicle's wheels; steering; or using a combination of braking and steering so that the vehicle returns to its intended lane of travel. LKS is one of two active lane keeping technologies mentioned in the Agency's March 2019 report,

with the other being lane centering assist (LCA). LKS assists the driver by providing short-duration steering and/or braking inputs when a lane departure is imminent or underway, whereas LCA provides continuous assistance to the driver to keep their vehicle centered within the lane.

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

As discussed in the previous section, UMTRI evaluated the real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies, including LDW and LKS.

The results of the LKS study (which also included lane departure warning functionality) showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in applicable crashes. Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 74 percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LKS technology, and 35 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash. Sixty-five percent of owners said that they trusted the system to work every time.

Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash Avoidance Technology Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.

Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5),

In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA did not propose including LKS technology as part of the update to NCAP. However, many commenters recommended that the Agency consider including the technology. For instance, Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS systems have the potential to prevent or mitigate a greater number of collisions involving injuries and fatalities than LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi recommended that the Agency adopt LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC adding that Euro NCAP has included LKS in its Lane Support Systems test protocol since 2016.

The ASC, Bosch, and Continental noted the maturity of LKS technology and stated that such systems were already widely available in vehicles produced at the time. Other proponents of adopting LKS technology in NCAP include the National Safety Council (NSC), ZF TRW, and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that the Agency adopt both active lane keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and lane centering systems (termed LCA in this notice) due to the high frequency of fatal road departure crashes. Honda also supports the active safety benefits of LKS and the system's potential to help prevent crashes. NSC suggested that the Agency include LKS, as it would complement LDW, which is already in the program, similar to the way the warning component of FCW complements the active safety functionality of AEB.

The ASC argued that data from the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) have shown no statistically significant difference in collision claim frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW compared to those without, and questioned whether LDW systems are effective in reducing crashes or fatalities.

European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2015, November),

Test Protocol—Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0.

As mentioned previously, the Agency agrees with commenters that there is merit to adopting LKS technology in NCAP. However, NHTSA believes an LDW system integrated with LKS may be a better approach for the Agency to consider rather than replacing LDW with LKS. NHTSA believes, as NSC commented, that an integrated approach (inclusive of passive and active safety capabilities for lane support systems) would be similar to what the Agency is proposing for frontal collision avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later in this notice.

NHTSA is considering the adoption of certain test methods (

e.g.,

those for “lane keep assist”) contained within the Euro NCAP Test Protocol—Lane Support Systems (LSS)

to assess technology design differences for LKS. Since the test speeds and road configurations specified in this protocol are similar to those stipulated in the Agency's LDW test procedure, the Agency believes Euro NCAP's test protocol will sufficiently address the lane keeping crash typology previously detailed for LDW.

European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019, July),

Test Protocol—Lane Support Systems, Version 3.0.2.

See section 7.2.5, Lane Keep Assist tests.

Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure includes a series of “lane keep assist”

trials that are performed with iteratively increasing lateral velocities towards the desired lane line. Each “lane keep assist” trial begins with the subject vehicle (SV) (

i.e.,

the vehicle being evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 mph) down a straight lane delineated by a single solid white or dashed white line. Initially, the SV path is parallel to the lane line, with an offset from the lane line that depends on the lateral velocity used later in the maneuver. Then, after a short period of steady-state driving, the direction of travel of the SV is headed towards the lane line using a path defined by a 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) radius curve. The lateral velocity of the SV's approach towards the lane line (from both the left and right directions) is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) in 0.1 m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments until acceptable LKS performance is no longer realized. Acceptable LKS performance occurs when the SV does not cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).

NHTSA conducted a limited assessment of five model year 2017 vehicles equipped with LKS systems. The Agency used a robotic steering controller to maximize the repeatability and minimize variability associated with manual steering inputs. For this study, NHTSA also used a slightly modified and older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure from what was discussed above. Specifically, the lateral velocity of the SV's approach towards the lane line was increased from 0.1 m/s to 1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./s increments) to assess how LKS systems would perform at higher velocities. In addition, LKS performance was considered acceptable (when compared to Euro NCAP's assessment criteria at the time of NHTSA's testing) for instances where the SV did not cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).

At the time of testing, an older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure was available. This version stipulated a lane keep assist assessment criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). See

Assessment Protocol—Safety Assist, Version 7.0

(2015, November).

A preliminary analysis of the five tested vehicles identified performance differences between the vehicles depending on the lateral velocity used during the test. Some vehicles only engaged a steering response at lower lateral velocities and others continued to provide a steering input as the lateral velocity was increased.

The maximum excursion over the lane marking after an LKS activation was also found to be inconsistent, particularly as lateral velocity increased. These preliminary findings suggested that there are performance differences in how vehicle manufacturers are designing their systems for a given set of operating conditions.

Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Shain, K. (2019), Applying lane keeping support test track performance to real-world crash data,

26th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference,

Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 19-0208.

The results from these tests, as measured by the maximum excursions over the lane marking, were compared to the measured shoulder width of roads where fatal road departure crashes occurred. The analysis identified roadways where the shoulder width of the roadway was less than the 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) maximum excursion limit (

e.g.,

certain rural roadways) used in the Agency's testing. It was observed that only vehicles displaying robust LKS performance, including at higher lateral velocities, would likely prevent the vehicle from departing the travel lane on these roadways. However, most of the roadway departure crashes were on roads where the shoulder width exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On these roadways, assuming the LKS was engaged, the lane departure could have been avoided. However, some vehicles did not perform well, with several exhibiting no system intervention, and others exceeding the maximum excursion limit as the lateral velocity was increased. To supplement these initial findings, additional LKS testing has since been conducted and is undergoing analysis.

Since the analysis showed that most fatal crashes identified in the study were on roadways having shoulder widths that exceeded the current Euro NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.), NHTSA believes that adopting the Euro NCAP criterion may provide significant safety benefits, but is requesting comment on whether an even smaller excursion limit may be more appropriate. Furthermore, as the study also identified fatal crashes where lane markers were not present on the side of the roadway where a departure occurred (such that LKS would not provide any benefit unless it had the capability to identify the edge of the roadway), the Agency is also requesting comment (as mentioned previously) on adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to NCAP so that it may begin to address crashes that occur where lane markings may not be present.

Based on the findings from NHTSA's LKS testing, which showed differences in LKS performance at greater lateral velocities, the Agency is concerned about LKS performance at higher travel speeds when the vehicle first transitions from a straight to a curved road where lateral velocity may inherently be high. In its independent analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 percent of fatal road departure crashes and 26 percent of fatal opposite direction crashes occurred at known travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). The analysis also showed that 55 percent of fatal road departure crashes and 67 percent of opposite direction crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph).

Furthermore, the study revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 percent and 13 percent of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively.

Since NHTSA does not currently have data to show that LKS system performance at Euro NCAP's current test speed of 72 kph (44.7 mph) would be indicative of system performance when tested at higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting comment on whether it would be beneficial to incorporate additional, higher test speeds to assess the performance of lane keeping systems in NCAP.

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

For data where the travel speed was known, 63 and 65 percent of the data is unknown or not reported in FARS for road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively. For road departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 1 percent of the posted speed data is unknown or not reported in FARS.

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

To date, NHTSA has only performed test track LKS evaluations using the straight road test configuration specified in the Euro NCAP test procedure. However, the Agency recognizes that a significant portion of road departure and opposite direction crashes resulting in fatalities and injuries occur on curved roads. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data set

showed that for road departure crashes, 37 percent of fatalities and 20 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. For opposite direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities and 31 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how LKS performance observed during straight road trials performed on a test

track would correlate to real-world system performance on curved roads. However, NHTSA believes, based on on-road performance testing experience of newer model year vehicles, that some current system designs include provisions to address lane departures on curved roads. The Agency observed that some LKS systems engage by providing limited operation throughout a curve—which may offer little (if any) safety benefits. However, other more sophisticated LKS systems maintain engagement longer and offer more directional authority throughout a curve. These systems may provide additional safety gains because the driver has more time to re-engage (

i.e.,

restore effective manual control of the vehicle).

Ibid.

In NHTSA's study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes

from NMVCCS, crashes that occurred on curved roads

where the driver departed the travel lane were analyzed. The analysis showed that, unlike for straight roads where LKS systems may provide smaller corrective steering inputs to prevent the vehicle from departing the lane, LKS systems would have to provide sustained lateral correction (

i.e.,

corrective steering) on a curved road to prevent the vehicle from departing the lane.

25th International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles,

Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.

It should be noted that the paper identified crashes where lane markings were not present on the side of the departure.

Furthermore, in fleet testing of select model year 2012 through 2018 vehicles equipped with LDW and LKS (referenced in the report as LKA), Transport Canada

found variability in test results and generally unpredictable system behavior on curved roads. Thus, Transport Canada stated that it was not possible to gather enough data to assess the potential safety benefits associated with the technology.

Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, G., & Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: Could partial automation make our roads safer?

26th International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles,

Eindhoven, Netherlands, June 2019, Paper Number 19-0339.

To address these unknowns and further understand the potential effectiveness of LKS systems in the real world, the Agency is considering additional research to study whether testing on curved roads should be considered for objective evaluation of LKS systems, and collect a combination of test track and real-world data to quantify how LKS systems will operate when exposed to different combinations of curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing (

e.g.,

at curve onset or midway through the curve).

With respect to LDW and LKS, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:

(1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? Why or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-only warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test criteria? If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert modalities (such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective at re-engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If so, which one(s) and why?

(2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure, should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program entirely and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test procedure instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW and LKS capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW test if both systems are to be assessed separately. What tolerances would be appropriate for each test, and why?

(3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to address lane departures (

e.g.,

when a driver is distracted).

To help re-engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must be provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?

Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), Prevalence of driver physical factors leading to unintentional lane departure crashes,

Traffic Injury Prevention,

18(5), 481-487,

https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2016.1247446.

(4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts' Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this lane marking type is being removed from use in California?

If not, why?

Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-century, will disappear from freeways, highways,

The Orange County Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.

(5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.) over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited shoulder width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance would be appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for LDW in addition to LKS? Why or why not?

(6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane line it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer indication of when an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the baseline tests performed without LKS, a process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS protocol. This is because the small curve radius allows the desired SV lateral velocity to be more quickly established; requires less initial lateral offset within the travel lane; and allows for a longer period of steady state lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS test procedure? Why or why not?

(7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?

(8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?

(9) The LKS and “Road Edge” recovery tests defined in the Euro NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system performance, and that this range is representative of the lateral velocities associated with unintended lane departures (

i.e.,

not an intended lane change). However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also specifies a range of lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./s) be used to represent unintended lane departures during “Emergency Lane Keeping—Oncoming vehicle” and “Emergency Lane Keeping—Overtaking vehicle” tests. To encourage the most robust LKS system performance, should NHTSA consider a combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure ranges, lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?

(10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the

Agency correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral velocities on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why or why not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does not exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared to a vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-engage? If not, why?

(11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane departure when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker on the side not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a secondary lane departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion limit established for the first side. To prevent potential secondary lane departures, should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP “lane keep assist” evaluation criteria to be consistent with language developed for NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why not? NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity period. To assess whether this occurs, a second lane line is required (only one line is specified in the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a second lane line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why not?

(12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the LKS test speed be increased, or does the current test speed adequately indicate performance at higher speeds, especially on straight roads? Why or why not?

(13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently contains many test conditions (

i.e.,

line type and departure direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, should the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for only one departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to assure comparable system performance for the other direction? Or, should the Agency consider adopting only the most challenging test conditions? If so, which conditions are most appropriate? For instance, do the dashed line test conditions provide a greater challenge to vehicles than the solid line test conditions?

(14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for the LKS tests, and why?

(15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so, what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?

B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies

NHTSA's 2019 target population study showed that blind spot detection technologies such as blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning (LCM) (which is essentially a BSI warning system), can help prevent or mitigate five pre-crash lane change/merge scenarios. These pre-crash movements represented, on average, 503,070 crashes annually, or 8.7 percent of all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 542 fatalities and 188,304 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-3. This equated to 1.6 percent of all fatalities and 6.7 percent of all injuries recorded.

Wang, J.-S. (2019, March),

Target crash population for crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles

(Report No. DOT HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Currently, NCAP does not include any ADAS technology that is designed to address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. NHTSA requested comment on the inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade to the program in its 2015 notice. Although the Agency did not recommend BSI for inclusion at that time, the Agency is proposing that both BSW and BSI technologies be adopted as part of this program update.

Although the target population for blind spot detection technology may not be as large as the populations for AEB or lane keeping technologies, NHTSA believes there is merit to including blind spot technologies in NCAP. Consumer Reports found in its 2019 survey that 82 percent of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, 60 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 68 percent stated that they trusted the system to work every time.

The Agency believes the technology's high consumer acceptance rate, in addition to its potential safety benefits discussed later in this section, supports its inclusion in the Agency's signature consumer information program.

Monticello, M. (2017, June 29),

The positive impact of advanced safety systems for cars: The latest car-safety technologies have the potential to significantly reduce crashes,

Consumer Reports,

https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-for-cars/.

1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)

A BSW system is a warning-based driver assistance system designed to help the driver recognize that another vehicle is approaching, or being operated within, the blind spot of their vehicle in an adjacent lane. In these driving situations, and for all production BSW systems known to NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically presented to the driver, and is most relevant to a driver who is contemplating, or who has just initiated, a lane change. Depending on the system design, additional BSW features may be activated if the system is presenting an alert and then the driver operates their turn signal indicator.

BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or ultrasonic-based sensors, or some combination thereof, as their means of detection. These sensors are typically located on the sides and/or rear of a vehicle. BSW alerts may be auditory, visual (most common), or haptic. Visual alerts are usually presented in the side outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the mirror housing, or at the base of the front a-pillars inside the vehicle. When another vehicle enters, or approaches, the driver's blind spot while operating in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert will typically be continuously illuminated. However, if the driver engages the turn signal in the direction of the adjacent vehicle while the visual alert is present, the visual alert may transition to a flashing state and/or be supplemented with an additional auditory or haptic alert (

e.g.,

beeping or vibration of the steering wheel or seat, respectively).

NHTSA requested comment on a draft research blind spot detection (BSD) test procedure (referred to in this notice as BSW) published on November 21, 2019

to assess systems' performance and capabilities in blind spot related pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure exercises the BSW system in two different scenarios on the test track: the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test, and the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. These two tests assess whether the BSW system displays a warning when other vehicles, referred to as principal other

vehicles (POVs), are within the driver's blind spot. The test occurs without activation of the tested vehicle's, referred to as the subject vehicle (SV), turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV turn signals are to be activated at any point during any test trial. A short description of each test scenario and the requirements for a passing result is provided below:

84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).

• Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test—The POV and SV are driven parallel to each other at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) such that the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV in the outbound lanes of a three-lane straight road. After 2.5 s of steady-state driving, the POV enters (

i.e.,

converges into) the SV's blind zone

by making a single lane change into the lane immediately adjacent to the SV using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of steady-state driving resumes for at least another 2.5 s and then the POV exits (

i.e.,

diverges from) the SV's blind zone by returning to its original travel lane using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). This test is repeated for a POV approach from both the left and the right side of the SV.

SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular regions that extend to the side and rear of the SV. Each rectangle is 8.2 ft. (2.5 m) wide and is represented by lines parallel to the longitudinal centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m) from the outermost edge of the SV's body excluding the side view mirror(s). The rearward projection begins at the rearmost part of the SV side mirror housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is dependent on the relative speed between the SV and POV. The blind zone is fully described in the test procedure.

—To pass a test trial: during the converge lane change, the BSW alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after any part of the POV enters the SV blind zone and must remain on while any part of the POV resides within the SV blind zone; and during the diverge lane change, the BSW alert may remain active only when the lateral distance between the SV and POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW alert shall not be active once the lateral distance between the SV and POV exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.).

• Straight Lane Pass-by Test—The POV approaches and then passes the SV while being driven in an adjacent lane. For each trial, the SV is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) whereas the POV is traveling at one of four constant speeds—80.5, 88.5, 96.6, or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). The lateral distance between the two vehicles, defined as the closest lateral distance between adjacent sides of the polygons used to represent each vehicle, shall nominally be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the duration of the trial. This test is repeated for a POV approach towards the SV from an adjacent lane to the left and to the right of the SV.

—To pass a test trial, the BSW alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after the front-most part of the POV enters the SV blind zone and remain on while the front-most part of the POV resides behind the front-most part of the SV blind zone. The BSW alert shall not be active once the longitudinal distance between the front-most part of the SV and the rear-most part of the POV exceeds the BSW termination distance specified for each POV speed.

For the BSW tests, each scenario is tested using seven repeated trials for each combination of approach direction (left and right side of the SV) and test speed. This translates to a total of 14 tests overall for the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. NCAP is proposing that to pass the NCAP system performance requirements, the SV must pass at least five out of seven trials conducted for each approach direction and test speed.

The proposed BSW tests represent pre-crash scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed in real-world lane change crashes. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data set showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.

For crashes where the travel speed was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 14 percent of fatalities and 24 percent of injuries occurred at speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.

Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding was a factor in only 18 percent of the fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries. This suggests that posted speed corresponds well to travel speed in most lane change crashes.

88 89

The posted speed limit was either not reported or was unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.

The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 60 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 68 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

It was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a factor in 3 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 7 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.

As noted earlier, market research conducted by Consumer Reports (CR) indicated that BSW systems are desirable in consumer interest surveys of various ADAS technologies. In fact, CR found not only that an overwhelming majority of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, but also that 60 percent of them believed BSW technology had helped them avoid a crash. However, in its study to evaluate the real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies in model year 2013-2017 General Motors' (GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM's Side Blind Zone Alert produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change crashes. When the Side Blind Zone Alert technology was combined with an earlier generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.

UMTRI attributed this increase to substantially longer vehicle detection ranges for the Lane Change Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system compared to GM's earlier generation Side Blind Zone Alert system.

An Agency study of three BSW-equipped vehicles also showed that that currently available BSW systems may likely exhibit differences in detection capabilities and operating conditions such that their effectiveness estimates could vary significantly.

For instance, one vehicle's system may simply augment a driver's visual awareness whereas another may effectively prevent crashes by warning of higher speed lane change events. In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, Bosch provided similar insight. The company stated that some BSW systems may only provide benefit for shorter detection distances, such as 7 m (23.0 ft.) rearward, whereas other systems may provide detection for distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) rearward, which would help the driver avoid collisions with vehicles approaching from the rear in adjacent lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans to study these performance differences in its testing.

Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C. A. (2019),

Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting systems,

The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.

For GM's Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in the vehicle's rear bumper are utilized to warn the driver of vehicles approaching from the rear on either the left or right side.

Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van Buskirk, T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July),

Blind spot monitoring in light vehicles—System performance

(Report No. DOT HS 812 045), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW tests in NCAP in accordance with the Agency's BSW test procedure. The Agency believes that the Straight Lane Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates incrementally higher test speeds for the POV, could be used to distinguish between vehicles that have basic versus advanced BSW capability. For instance, an SV that can only satisfy the BSW activation criteria when the POV approaches with a low relative velocity may be considered as having basic BSW capability, whereas a vehicle that can look further rearward, to sense a passing vehicle travelling at a much higher speed, may be considered to have superior BSW capability. NHTSA believes such an assessment is important because when one vehicle encroaches into the adjacent lane of the other, the crashes associated with higher speed differentials can be expected to be more severe than those that occur when the two vehicle speeds are more similar. Furthermore, the capability of a vehicle to detect when another vehicle has entered an extended rear zone could be important for the application of other ADAS technologies such as blind spot intervention (BSI) or SAE

Level 2 partial driving automation

systems that incorporate automatic lane change features. Therefore, the Agency believes that long-range vehicle detection may not only increase the effectiveness of blind spot technologies such as BSI, but also enhance capabilities and robustness of other ADAS applications. For these reasons, NHTSA is proposing (later in this notice) the incorporation of BSI technology in NCAP to encourage the proliferation of such systems along with sensing strategies that offer a greater field of view.

SAE International (2018),

SAE J3016_201806: Taxonomy and definitions for terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor vehicles,

Warrendale, PA,

www.sae.org.

The sustained driving automation system of both the lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion control with the expectation that the driver supervises the driving automation system.

Commenters to NHTSA's December 2015 notice overwhelmingly supported the addition of BSW in NCAP. In fact, many commenters suggested the Agency expand the testing requirements to encompass additional test targets, such as motorcycles, and test conditions. Several commenters also recommended that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test procedure with International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. Each of these topics will be discussed below.

a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions

Commenters, including the ASC, Continental, Bosch, NSC, and others, recommended that the Agency expand the BSW testing requirements to include motorcycle detection. Delphi, MTS, Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW), and CU suggested that NHTSA evaluate a vehicle's ability to detect bicycles in addition to motorcycles. Similarly, Subaru suggested that changes to the Straight Lane Pass-by Test should be made to address motorcycle detection. MTS and MCW added that motorcycle riders and bicyclists are more vulnerable to serious and fatal injuries compared to occupants of motor vehicles. A few commenters were not supportive of adding a motorcycle detection test in NCAP. Global Automakers and Hyundai stated that although it was a reasonable goal for the future, no standardized test devices currently existed at the time. Similarly, Honda and the Alliance recommended that the Agency focus on vehicle detection as a first step since no standard test procedure exists for motorcycle detection. The Alliance added that since the location of a motorcycle within a lane can vary greatly, test procedures would need to specify motorcycle behavior and reasonable detection distances. Furthermore, MTS stated that the position of the motorcycle POV within the lane (near, center, far) should be specified, and the radar cross section and projected area of the motorcycle should be considered as well.

NHTSA agrees that BSW systems capable of detecting motorcycles would improve safety. A review of the 2011 through 2015 FARS and GES data sets

showed that there were 106 fatal crashes and nearly 5,100 police-reported crashes annually, on average, for same direction lane change crashes involving a vehicle and motorcycle. In comparison, as mentioned earlier, there were 542 fatalities and 503,070 police-reported crashes annually, on average, for lane change crashes involving motor vehicles. These data show that more occupants of motor vehicles die in lane changing crashes than do motorcyclists. However, the fatality rate for motorcyclists is greater than that for vehicle occupants.

Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., Yanagisawa, M., & Najm, W. (2018, September), Pre-Crash Scenario Characteristics of Motorcycle Crashes for Crash Avoidance Research (Report No. DOT HS 812 902), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In Press

At this time, the Agency has decided to prioritize testing of BSW systems on motor vehicles for NCAP. NHTSA believes that performing BSW testing on light vehicles, particularly at higher POV closing speeds, and for active safety systems (as will be discussed next), should encourage development of robust sensing systems, which may improve the detection of other objects such as motorcycles. That being said, the Agency has planned an upcoming research project designed to address injuries and fatalities for other vulnerable road users, specifically motorcyclists. The Agency will continue to observe the development of BSW technology and is likely to include test procedures for motorcycle detection in NCAP at a later date if the technology meets the four prerequisites mentioned above.

Several commenters offered additional suggestions for ways NHTSA could expand the BSW test procedure. MCW suggested that the Agency adopt test scenarios that address curved roads and low light conditions. CU proposed that the Agency should assess whether BSW systems provide a clear indication to the driver that the system is not operating since sensors are sometimes rendered inoperable in poor weather or when blocked.

As with all the ADAS technologies, NHTSA recognizes that there is a need to understand and assure crash mitigation performance of BSW systems under all practical situations that the driver and vehicle will encounter in the real world. However, such comprehensive testing is not always practical within the scope of the NCAP program. Thus, for technologies that met the four principles for inclusion in NCAP, the Agency primarily attempted to address the most frequently occurring, most fatal, and most injurious pre-crash scenarios when prioritizing tests to add to the program. When ADAS technologies penetrate the fleet in sufficient numbers, then the Agency can evaluate how these systems are performing in the real world and adjust the system performance criteria accordingly to address additional test conditions, such as those mentioned by MCW. Regarding CU's suggestion, the Agency believes, after reviewing vehicle owner's manuals, that most vehicle manufacturers are including provisions in their system designs to provide a malfunction indicator to the driver if the system is no longer operational because the sensors are blocked or due to severe weather conditions.

NHTSA has also considered Bosch's request to expand the definition of BSW to encourage adoption of systems that provide longer detection distances. NHTSA believes, as discussed above,

that by using higher POV closing speeds to assess BSW system performance, it may effectively drive enhanced blind spot system capabilities such as those required for other rearward-looking ADAS applications, like BSI, or automatic lane change functions.

b. Test Procedure Harmonization

Several commenters suggested that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test procedure with International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard 17387:2008,

Intelligent transport systems—Lane change decision aid systems (LCDAS)—Performance requirements and test procedures

or with various aspects of this standard. Global Automakers and Hyundai commented that NHTSA should shift the forward edge of the blind zone rearward from the outside rearview mirrors to the eye point of a 95th percentile person, as specified in ISO 17387. Hyundai stated that the ISO procedure is designed such that when the POV is in-line with the SV driver's eye ellipse, the driver's peripheral vision allows him/her to see the POV without the assistance of BSW systems. The ASC, Continental, and Subaru also suggested that the Agency align the warning zones in the Agency's BSW test procedure with those specified in ISO 17387.

The Agency does not agree with commenters' suggestion to adopt the ISO procedure for defining the forward edge of the blind zone as measured using the eye ellipse from a seated 95th percentile person. NHTSA believes that the blind zone should be defined not by a specific seated individual but by the vehicle's characteristics, since a real-world blind spot for any particular vehicle would differ depending on the size characteristics of the individual driving the vehicle at the time. Since people vary in size, they will sit in different seating positions and have different seating preferences. For instance, a 95th percentile male will be seated more rearward whereas a 5th percentile female will be seated more forward. In addition, drivers have personal preferences for adjusting their side view mirrors that may not be considered optimal and may not provide a full field of view when checking the mirrors to make change lanes. For these reasons, the Agency tentatively concludes that it is more appropriate and better for the safety of consumers to set the forward plane of the blind zone at the rearmost part of the side view mirrors, as specified in its BSW test procedure. This approach should not only best accommodate a wide variety of driver sizes and seating positions, but also reduce test complexity when defining the blind zone.

2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)

Blind spot intervention (BSI) systems are similar to AEB and LKS systems in that they provide active intervention to help the driver avoid a collision with another vehicle. BSW systems alert a driver that a vehicle is in his/her blind spot, whereas BSI systems activate when the BSW alert is ignored, and intervene either by automatically applying the vehicle's brakes or providing a steering input to guide the vehicle back into the unobstructed lane. With their active capability, BSI systems can help a driver avoid collisions with other vehicles that are approaching the vehicle's blind spot, in addition to preventing crashes with vehicles operating within the vehicle's blind spot.

Like BSW systems, BSI systems utilize rear-facing sensors to detect other vehicles that are next to or behind the vehicle in adjacent lanes. Depending on the design of these systems, BSI activation may or may not require the driver to operate his/her turn signal indicator during a lane change. Furthermore, some BSI systems may only operate if the vehicle's BSW system is also enabled.

As discussed earlier, UMTRI found that GM's BSW system, Side Blind Zone Alert, produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change crashes. However, when Side Blind Zone Alert was combined with a later generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.

Given BSI is only now penetrating the fleet, NHTSA is unaware of any effectiveness studies for this technology. However, as discussed earlier, the Agency believes that active safety technologies are more effective than warning technologies. The UMTRI study concluded that AEB is more effective than FCW alone and that LKS is more effective than LDW. The Agency believes the same relationship will likely hold true for blind spot systems, and that BSI will be more effective than BSW alone. NHTSA also believes, as mentioned above, that adopting ADAS technologies such as BSI should also encourage development of enhanced BSW system capabilities (

e.g.,

motorcycle and bicycle detection), and may increase the robustness of other ADAS applications.

Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C.A. (2019),

Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting systems,

The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.

NHTSA is proposing to use its published draft test procedure titled, “Blind Spot Intervention System Confirmation Test,”

to evaluate the performance of vehicles equipped with BSI technology in NCAP. The Agency's test procedure consists of three scenarios: Subject Vehicle (SV) Lane Change with Constant Headway, SV Lane Change with Closing Headway, and SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False Positive Assessment. In the first two scenarios, an SV initiates or attempts a lane change into an adjacent lane while a single POV is residing within the SV's blind zone (Scenario 1), or is approaching it from the rear (Scenario 2). The third scenario is used to evaluate the propensity of a BSI system to activate inappropriately in a non-critical driving scenario that does not present a safety risk to the occupants in the SV. In each of the tests, the POV is a strikeable object with the characteristics of a compact passenger car. The system performance requirements stipulate that the SV may not contact the POV during the conduct of any test trial. NHTSA is requesting comment on the number of trials that are appropriate for each test. Each of these scenarios, along with the proposed evaluation criteria, is detailed below:

84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).

The Agency notes that these test scenario descriptions assume the SV is operating in SAE Automation Level 0 or Level 1 operation with only the Automatic Cruise Control (ACC) enabled. Though the Agency's BSI test procedure has provisions to evaluate vehicles operating in SAE Automation Levels 2 or 3. Test scenario descriptions for these evaluations are not discussed herein.

• SV Lane Change with Constant Headway—The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane adjacent and to the left of the SV also traveling at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with a constant longitudinal offset such that the front-most part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV. After a short period of steady-state driving, the SV driver engages the left turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all pre-SV lane change test validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change into the POV's travel lane. The SV driver then releases the steering wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve during the lane change. To meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene so as to prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of the POV. Additionally, the SV

BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity period.

• SV Lane Change with Closing Headway Scenario—The POV is driven at a constant speed of 80.5 kph (50 mph) towards the rear of the SV in an adjacent lane to the left of the SV, which is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph). During the test, the SV driver engages the turn signal indicator when the POV is 4.9 ± 0.5 s from a vertical plane defined by the rear of the SV and perpendicular to the SV travel lane. Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change into the POV's travel lane. The SV driver then releases the steering wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve. To meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene to prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of the POV. Additionally, the SV BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity period.

• SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False Positive Assessment Test—The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane that is two lanes to the left of the SV's initial travel lane with a constant longitudinal offset such that the front-most part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV, which is also travelling at 72.4 kph (45 mph). The SV driver engages the left turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all pre-SV lane change test validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 1.0 ± 0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change into the left adjacent lane (the one between the SV and POV). For this test, the driver does not release the steering wheel. Since the lane change will not result in an SV-to-POV impact, the SV BSI system must not intervene during any valid trials. To determine whether a BSI intervention occurred, the SV yaw rate data collected during the individual trials performed in this scenario are compared to a baseline composite. After being aligned in time to the baseline, the difference between the data must not exceed 1 degree/second within the test validity period.

The proposed crash-imminent BSI test scenarios represent pre-crash scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed in real-world lane change crashes. As discussed in the BSW crash statistics section, Volpe showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.

Furthermore, approximately 14 percent of fatalities and 24 percent of injuries were reported for crashes that occurred at known travel speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.

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The posted speed limit was either not reported or was unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.

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The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 65 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 67 percent of lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.

NHTSA has conducted a series of tests utilizing its proposed BSI test procedure. Since BSI systems are not widely available in the fleet, the Agency selected vehicles in order to cover as many manufacturers as possible that have implemented this technology. All vehicles selected for BSW testing also underwent BSI testing. Test reports related to both test programs can be found in the docket for this notice. For the purposes of this testing, the Agency used the Global Vehicle Target (GVT) Revision G to represent the POV, which is specified in the BSI test procedure as a strikeable object.

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When the BSI technology assessment is incorporated into NCAP, the Agency plans to use the GVT Revision G as a strikeable target to be consistent with Euro NCAP's ADAS test procedures that specify a strikeable target. In the context of testing BSW and BSI technologies in NCAP to address lane change crashes, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:

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The GVT is a three-dimensional surrogate that resembles a white hatchback passenger car. It is currently used by other consumer organizations, including Euro NCAP, and vehicle manufacturers in their internal testing of ADAS technologies. See Section III.D.2. of this notice for an expanded discussion of the GVT.

(16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible or haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should it continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from the blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why not?

(17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's BSW capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings when the POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the blind zone) for varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?

(18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why or why not?

(19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions (

e.g.,

test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side of the SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios and test conditions to address the real-world safety problem adequately, or could it test only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden in NCAP? For instance, should the Agency consider incorporating only the most challenging test conditions into NCAP, such as the ones with the greatest speed differential, or choose to perform the test conditions having the lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency consider only performing the test conditions where the POV passes by the SV on the left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to assure the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?

(20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input on whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer satisfaction? Why or why not?

(21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each test condition (

i.e.,

test speed and POV approach direction). Is this an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test scenario, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each of the two tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?

(22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction with activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn signal is not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated from the heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention? Should the SV's LKS system be switched off during conduct of the Agency's BSI evaluations? Why or why not?

C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)

Another important ADAS technology NHTSA proposes to include in its upgrade of NCAP is pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB).

PAEB systems function similar to AEB systems but detect pedestrians instead of vehicles. PAEB uses information from forward-looking sensors to issue a warning and actively apply the vehicle's brakes when a pedestrian, or sometimes a cyclist, is in front of the vehicle and the driver has not acted to avoid the impending impact. Similar to AEB, PAEB systems typically use cameras to determine whether a pedestrian is in imminent danger of being struck by the vehicle, but some systems may use a combination of cameras, radar, lidar, and/or thermal imaging sensors.

Many pedestrian crashes occur when a pedestrian is in the forward path of a driver's vehicle. Four common pedestrian crash scenarios include when the vehicle is:

1. Heading straight and a pedestrian is crossing the road;

2. Turning right and a pedestrian is crossing the road;

3. Turning left and a pedestrian is crossing the road; and

4. Heading straight and a pedestrian is walking along or against traffic.

These four crash scenarios are defined as Scenarios S1-S4, respectively, by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) Consortium.

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Carpenter, M.G., Moury, M.T., Skvarce, J.R., Struck, M. Zwicky, T. D., & Kiger, S.M. (2014, June),

Objective tests for forward looking pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems: Final report

(Report No. DOT HS 812 040), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Two of these scenarios, S1 and S4, are included in NHTSA's draft research PAEB test procedure, published on November 21, 2019, and referenced herein as the 2019 PAEB test procedure.

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The S1 scenario represents a pedestrian crossing the road in front of the vehicle, while the S4 scenario represents a pedestrian moving with or against traffic along the side of the road in the path of the vehicle. Both test scenarios are repeated for multiple pedestrian impact locations. The S1 and S4 crash scenarios were chosen for inclusion in NHTSA's 2019 PAEB test procedure because a review of pedestrian crashes from the 2011 through 2012 GES and FARS data sets

104

found that, on average, these two pre-crash scenarios (S1 and S4) accounted for approximately 33,000 (52 percent) of vehicle-pedestrian crashes and 3,000 (90 percent) fatal vehicle-pedestrian crashes with a light-vehicle striking a pedestrian as the first event. Furthermore, these crashes accounted for 67 percent of MAIS 2+ and 76 percent of MAIS 3+ injured pedestrians.

105

The 2019 PAEB test procedure only considered daylight test conditions for both the S1 and S4 crash scenarios.

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84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).

104

Yanagisawa, M., Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., & Najm, W.G. (2017, April),

Estimation of potential safety benefits for pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems

(Report No. DOT HS 812 400), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

105

As explained previously, the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification system for assessing impact injury severity. AIS ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 = maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (

i.e.,

the highest single AIS for a person with one or more injuries).

The Agency's 2019 PAEB test procedure does not include CAMP scenario S2 (vehicle turning right and a pedestrian crossing the road), and CAMP scenario S3 (vehicle turning left and a pedestrian crossing the road). In response to the December 2015 notice, several commenters stated that addressing these scenarios with available technology may generate a significant number of false positive detections. Such false detections could have the unintended consequences of causing hazardous situations (

e.g.,

unexpected sudden braking while turning in traffic) that could lead drivers to disable their PAEB systems, or even lead to an increase in rear-end collisions. The commenters explained that the S2 and S3 test scenarios require more sophisticated algorithms as well as more robust test methodologies than those required for scenarios S1 and S4. However, ZF TRW mentioned that ADAS sensors designed to meet Euro NCAP's Vulnerable Road Users test procedures would have increased fields of view (FOV), which should improve their effectiveness in turning scenarios. Others stated that the articulating mannequins may not be representative of a real human for all sensing technologies in turning scenarios. Most commenters indicated that it was more appropriate to focus on the scenarios affording the most significant safety benefits first—S1 and S4. Commenters stated that adding the S2 and S3 scenarios would be more practical when the technology matures. NHTSA will continue to evaluate PAEB systems to assess the feasibility of expanding the suite of PAEB tests as technological advancements are made. The Agency will consider adding these test scenarios (S2 and S3) to NCAP in the future once the Agency has repeatable and reliable test data to support their inclusion.

In the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the S1 test scenario includes seven different test conditions—S1a, S1b, S1c, S1d, S1e, S1f, and S1g. For these tests, the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 kph (24.9 mph). Additionally, the SV also travels at 16 kph (9.9 mph) for test conditions S1a, S1b, S1c, and S1d. A pedestrian mannequin crosses perpendicular to the subject vehicle's line of travel at 5 kph (3.1 mph) for all test conditions, except for S1e, in which the mannequin crosses at 8 kph (5.0 mph). In test condition S1a, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian mannequin walking from the nearside (

i.e.,

the passenger's side of the vehicle) with 25 percent overlap of the vehicle.

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In test conditions S1b and S1c, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside with 50 percent and 75 percent overlap of the vehicle, respectively. In test condition S1d, the SV encounters a crossing child pedestrian mannequin running from behind parked vehicles from the nearside with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle. In test condition S1e, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian running from the “offside” (

i.e.,

the driver's side of the vehicle) with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle. In test condition S1f, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside that stops short (−25% overlap) of entering the vehicle's path. In test condition S1g, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside that clears the vehicle's path (125% overlap).

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Overlap is defined as the percent of the vehicle's width that the pedestrian would traverse prior to impact if the vehicle's speed and pedestrian's speed remain constant.

The S4 test scenario in the 2019 PAEB test procedure includes three different test conditions—S4a, S4b, and S4c. In this test scenario, the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 kph (24.9 mph) and/or 16 kph (9.9 mph) (for test conditions S4a and S4b) and a pedestrian mannequin moves parallel to the flow of traffic at 5 kph (3.1 mph) (for test condition S4c) or is stationary (for test condition S4a and S4b) in front of the SV. For all S4 test conditions, the SV is aligned to impact the pedestrian at 25 percent overlap. In test condition S4a, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian standing in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing away from the approaching SV. In test condition S4b, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian standing in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing towards the approaching SV. In test condition S4c, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian walking in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing away from the approaching SV.

The Agency is proposing to make several changes to the 2019 PAEB test procedure for the purpose of adopting it for use in NCAP. These changes involve the pedestrian mannequins, test speeds and included test conditions, the specified lighting conditions, and the number of test trials required to be conducted for each test condition.

The first change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB test procedure concerns the pedestrian targets. As was recommended by several commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice, the Agency proposes to utilize state-of-the-art mannequins with articulated, moving legs, instead of the posable child and adult pedestrian test mannequins specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure. NHTSA believes that the articulating pedestrian targets are more representative of walking pedestrians and expects that these more realistic targets will encourage development of PAEB systems that detect, classify, and respond to pedestrians more accurately and effectively. In turn, this should allow manufacturers to improve the effectiveness of current PAEB systems. The Agency also recognizes that adopting the child and adult articulating targets would harmonize with other major consumer information-focused entities that use articulating mannequins, such as Euro NCAP and IIHS. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law mandated that NHTSA identify opportunities where NCAP would “benefit from harmonization with third-party safety rating programs,” and the Agency believes that the pedestrian mannequins represent one such opportunity.

The second change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB test procedure for incorporation into NCAP involves test speeds. The test speeds specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure correspond to a relatively small percentage of crashes that result in pedestrian injuries and fatalities. Volpe's analysis of 2011-2015 FARS and GES crash data sets showed that 9 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 25 percent of pedestrian injuries resulted from crashes that occurred on roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 88 percent of fatalities and 43 percent of injuries occurred for crashes on roadways with posted speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25 mph).

107 108

For crashes that occurred on roadways where the travel speed was known, 6 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 19 percent of pedestrian injuries were reported for travel speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 36 percent of fatalities and 7 percent of injuries occurred for travel speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25 mph).

109

NHTSA notes that speeding was a factor in only 5 percent of the fatal pedestrian crashes, which suggests that the posted speed could correlate closely with the travel speed of the vehicle prior to impact with the pedestrian.

110 111

107

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

108

The posted speed limit was either not reported or was unknown in 4 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 29 percent of pedestrian crashes that resulted in injuries.

109

The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in 59 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 72 percent of pedestrian crashes that resulted in injuries.

110

Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., & Azeredo, P. (2019, August),

Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data

(Report No. DOT HS 812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

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In 4 percent of pedestrian crashes, it was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a factor.

As Volpe's analysis focused on 2011-2015 FARS and GES crash data sets, it is likely that most vehicles studied were not equipped with PAEB systems. Recently, IIHS studied approximately 1,500 police-reported crashes involving a wide variety of 2017-2020 model year vehicles from various manufacturers to examine the effects of PAEB systems on real-world pedestrian crashes.

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In this study, the Institute found that “pedestrian AEB was associated with a 32 percent reduction in the odds of a pedestrian crash on roads with speed limits of 25 mph or less and a 34 percent reduction on roads with 30-35 mph limits, but no reduction at all on roads with speed limits of 50 mph or higher. . .”. These findings highlight the limitations of existing PAEB systems and the importance of adopting higher test speeds for PAEB testing (where feasible) to encourage additional safety improvement.

112

Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February),

Effects of automatic emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk,

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,

https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.

To establish feasible speed thresholds for adoption in its PAEB test procedure, the Agency conducted a series of tests on a selection of MY 2020 vehicles from various manufacturers to assess the operational range and performance of current PAEB systems. Vehicles for the PAEB characterization tests were selected with the intent of testing a variety of vehicle makes, types, sizes; global and domestic products; and forward-facing sensor types (camera only, stereo camera, fused camera plus radar, etc.) for a given manufacturer and across all manufacturers.

For the purpose of this study, the Agency used the 2019 PAEB test procedure, but employed the articulating mannequins in lieu of the posable mannequins and expanded the test procedure specifications to include increased vehicle test speeds for the S1b, S1d, S1e, S4a, and S4c test conditions. For these tests, the SV speed was incrementally increased to identify when each SV reached its operational limits and did not respond to the pedestrian target. Before the tests were initiated, the maximum test speeds for the S1 and S4 scenarios were set to 60 kph (37.2 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph), respectively.

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These maximum speeds are consistent with Euro NCAP's AEB Vulnerable Road User test protocol and correspond to up to 74 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 65 percent of injurious pedestrian crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, per Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS and GES analysis of posted speed data.

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When no or late intervention occurred for a vehicle and test condition (

i.e.,

combination of test scenario and speed), NHTSA repeated the test condition at a test speed that was 5 kph (3.1 mph) lower. This reduced speed defined the system's upper capabilities.

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These test speeds represent the maximum test speeds potentially utilized for a given test condition. The actual speeds used for a given combination of vehicle and test condition depended on observed PAEB system performance.

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European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). (2019, July).

TEST PROTOCOL—AEB VRU systems

3.0.2.

A test matrix of the PAEB characterization study regarding test speed is provided below.

• Full PAEB test series (includes S1 a-g and S4 a-c)

Daytime light conditions, articulating dummies, and additional SV test speeds in kph (mph) for S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4—Complete Matrix of the PAEB Characterization Study

Scenario

S1a

S1b

S1c

S1d

S1e

S1f

S1g

S4a

S4b

S4c

Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph)

16.0/9.9

40.0/24.9

16.0/9.9

20.0/12.4

16.0/9.9

40.0/24.9

16.0/9.9

20.0/12.4

40.0/24.9

50.0/31.1

40.0/24.9

16.0/9.9

40.0/24.9

16.0/9.9

40.0/24.9

16.0/9.9

40.0/24.9

30.0/18.6

60.0/37.3

50.0/31.1

40.0/24.9

60.0/37.3

50.0/31.1

70.0/43.5

60.0/37.3

80.0/49.7

The Agency's characterization testing showed that many MY 2020 vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid impacting the pedestrian mannequins at higher test speeds than those specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure. In fact, several vehicles repeatably achieved full crash avoidance at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) or higher for the assessed S1 and S4 test conditions. Test reports related to this testing can be found in the docket for this notice.

In light of these results, NHTSA is proposing to increase the maximum SV test speed from the 40 kph (24.9 mph) specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for all PAEB test conditions the Agency is proposing to include in NCAP. These include S1a-e and S4a-c. The Agency notes that it is not proposing to include PAEB false positive test conditions (

i.e.,

S1f and S1g) in NCAP at this time, but is requesting comment on whether the omission of these test conditions is appropriate. NHTSA also notes that 60 kph (37.3 mph) is the maximum vehicle speed Euro NCAP uses to assess PAEB performance for test conditions that are similar to, if not identical to, some of those proposed for use in NCAP, namely S1a, c, d, and e, and S4c. Adopting this higher test speed will also drive improved PAEB system performance to address a larger portion of real-world fatalities and injuries.

The Agency is also proposing a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for all of the proposed test scenarios. Although this speed is lower than the minimum test speed used in the 2019 PAEB test procedure and in its characterization testing (

i.e.,

16 kph (9.9 mph)), it is the minimum test speed specified in Euro NCAP's pedestrian tests, with the exception of Euro NCAP's Car-to-Pedestrian Longitudinal Adult (CPLA) scenario. The minimum vehicle test speed for the CPLA scenario, which is similar to the Agency's PAEB S4c test scenario, is 20 kph (12.4 mph).

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As stated earlier, in accordance with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the Agency is taking steps to harmonize with existing consumer information rating programs where possible and when appropriate. NHTSA also believes that reducing the minimum test speed to 10 kph (6.2 mph) will assure PAEB system functionality for crashes that may still cause injuries.

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One difference in the Agency's proposed S4c test condition and Euro NCAP's CPLA test condition is the amount of pedestrian overlap with the vehicle at the lower speed (NHTSA uses a 25 percent overlap while a 50 percent overlap is used in Euro NCAP's CPLA test). NHTSA believes that for the 25 percent overlap condition in S4c, a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) is appropriate and does not see a reason to deviate from the minimum test speed (10 kph (6.2 mph)) proposed for the other PAEB test conditions.

In an effort to harmonize with other consumer information programs on vehicle safety, NHTSA is also proposing to adopt Euro NCAP's approach to assessing vehicles' PAEB system performance by incrementally increasing the SV speed from the minimum test speed for a given scenario to the maximum. The Agency is proposing 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments for this progression in test speed. In their comments to the December 2015 notice, Global Automakers and Mobileye encoura

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