Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Natural Gas Infrastructure Project Reviews
Federal RegisterMar 11, 2022
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. PL21-3-000]
Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Natural Gas Infrastructure Project Reviews
AGENCY:
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Interim policy statement.
SUMMARY:
This interim policy statement describes Commission procedures for evaluating climate impacts under NEPA and describes how the Commission will integrate climate considerations into its public interest determinations under the NGA.
DATES:
Public comments are due on or before April 4, 2022. Comments on the information collection are due May 10, 2022.
ADDRESSES:
Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed electronically at
http://www.ferc.gov
in acceptable native applications and print-to-PDF, but not in Scanned or picture format. For those unable to file electronically, comments may be filed by mail or hand-delivery to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. The Comment Procedures section of this document contains more detailed filing procedures.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Karin Larson (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8236,
Karin.Larson@ferc.gov
Eric Tomasi (Technical Information), Office of Energy Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8097,
Eric.Tomasi@ferc.gov
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1. The Commission is issuing this interim policy statement to explain how the Commission will assess the impacts of natural gas infrastructure projects on climate change in its reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). We seek comment on all aspects of the interim policy statement, including, in particular, on the approach to assessing the significance of the proposed project's contribution to climate change. Although the guidance contained herein is subject to revision based on the record developed in this proceeding, we will begin applying the framework established in this policy statement in the interim. Doing so will allow the Commission to evaluate and act on pending applications under sections 3 and 7 of the NGA without undue delay and with an eye toward greater certainty and predictability for all stakeholders.
I. Introduction
2. Climate change poses a severe threat to the nation's security, economy, environment, and to the health of individual citizens. Human-made greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including carbon dioxide and methane, are the primary cause of climate change.
1
GHG emissions are released in large quantities through the production, transportation, and consumption of natural gas. Accordingly, to fulfill its statutory responsibilities, it is critical that the Commission consider and document how its authorization of infrastructure projects under the NGA, particularly natural gas transportation facilities, will affect emissions of GHGs.
2
1
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations,
Summary for Policymakers
of Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis SPM-5 (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds.) (2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM.pdf
(IPCC Report).
2
See Sierra Club
v.
FERC,
867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (
Sabal Trail
) (requiring the Commission to consider the reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions resulting from natural gas projects).
3. This policy statement describes Commission procedures for evaluating climate impacts under NEPA, both those caused by a project's contribution to climate change and the impacts of climate change on the project, and describes how the Commission will integrate climate considerations into its public interest determinations under the NGA. For purposes of assessing the appropriate level of NEPA review, Commission staff will apply the 100% utilization or “full burn” rate for the proposed project's emissions to determine whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or an environmental assessment (EA). Commission staff will proceed with the preparation of an EIS, if the proposed project may result in 100,000 metric tons per year of CO
2
e or more.
3
As further described below, the Commission believes this estimate is appropriate because it captures Commission projects that may result in incremental GHG emissions that may have a significant effect upon the human environment.
4
This approach is consistent with the overall goal of NEPA to require a “hard look” at adverse environmental impacts and assess whether those can be minimized or avoided.
5
To appropriately assess possible mitigation, as further explained below, the Commission will determine a project's reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions based on a projection of the amount of capacity that will be actually used (projected utilization rate), as opposed to assuming 100% utilization, and any other factors impacting the quantification of project emissions. The Commission's NEPA analysis will examine any proposed measures to reduce reasonably foreseeable emissions.
3
Carbon dioxide equivalent is the combination of the emissions that contribute to climate change adjusted using each pollutant's global warming potential. This allows the Commission to aggregate all GHG emissions into a single value that accounts for each chemical's specific potential to trap heat in the atmosphere.
4
See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust
v.
FAA,
290 F.3d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“If
any
`significant' environmental impacts might result from the proposed agency action[,] then an EIS must be prepared
before
agency action is taken.” (quoting
Sierra Club
v.
Peterson,
717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983)));
Found. for N. Am. Wild Sheep
v.
U.S. Dep't of Agr.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1982) (“If substantial questions are raised whether a project may have a significant effect upon the human environment, an EIS must be prepared.”).
5
See
42 U.S.C. 4331(a); 4332(c).
4. When considering under the NGA whether a project is in the public interest, the Commission considers a project's impacts on climate change, and, accordingly, will consider proposals by the project sponsor to mitigate all or a portion of the project's climate change impacts, and the Commission may condition its authorization on the project sponsor further mitigating those impacts.
5. This policy statement does not establish binding rules and is intended to explain how the Commission will consider these issues when they arise.
6
6
Commissioner Danly's dissent claims that today's interim policy statement is “a substantive, binding rule that is subject to judicial review.” Danly Dissent at P 46. This interim document is intended to provide all interested entities with guidance as to how the Commission will approach application under NGA sections 3 and 7. It does not “impose[] an obligation, den[y] a right, or fix[] some legal relationship.”
Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co.
v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Parties that disagree with the approach outlined in the statement retain their full rights to litigate their concerns in any individual proceeding.
Cf. id.
(“Final agency action `marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process' and is `one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.') (quoting
Bennett
v.
Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)). In addition, Commissioner Danly speculates that “no project sponsor will believe that mitigation is optional or that submitting an application exceeding the Interim Policy Statement's 100,000 tpy threshold without a mitigation proposal would be anything other than a waste of time and money.” Danly Dissent PP 46-47. In response, we note only that the Commission will consider mitigation on a case-by-case basis and that we have not suggested that GHG emissions must be mitigated to insignificant levels in order for us to conclude that a proposed
project is required by the public convenience and necessity or consistent with the public interest.
II. Background
A. GHG Emissions and Climate Change
6. Climate change is the variation in the Earth's climate (including temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind, and other meteorological variables) over time. Climate change is driven by accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere due to the increased consumption of fossil fuels (
e.g.,
coal, petroleum, and natural gas) since the early beginnings of the industrial age and accelerating in the mid- to late-20th century.
7
The GHGs produced by fossil-fuel combustion are carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.
7
IPCC Report at SPM-5. Other forces contribute to climate change, such as agriculture, forest clearing, and other anthropogenically driven sources.
7. In 2017 and 2018, the U.S. Global Change Research Program
8
issued its Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volumes I and II.
9
This report and the recently released report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis, state that climate change has resulted in a wide range of impacts across every region of the country and the globe. Those impacts extend beyond atmospheric climate change and include changes to water resources, agriculture, ecosystems, human health, and ocean systems.
10
According to the Fourth Assessment Report, the United States and the world are warming, global sea level is rising and oceans are acidifying, and certain weather events are becoming more frequent and more severe.
11
These impacts have accelerated throughout the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century.
12
8
The U.S. Global Change Research Program is the leading U.S. scientific body on climate change. It comprises representatives from 13 federal departments and agencies and issues reports every 4 years that describe the state of the science relating to climate change and the effects of climate change on different regions of the United States and on various societal and environmental sectors, such as water resources, agriculture, energy use, and human health.
9
U.S. Global Change Research Program, Climate Science Special Report, Fourth National Climate Assessment | Volume I (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds) (2017),
https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf
; U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States (David Reidmiller et al. eds.) (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf
(USGCRP Report Volume II).
10
IPCC Report at SPM-5 to SPM-10.
11
USGCRP Report Volume II at 73-75.
12
See, e.g.,
USGCRP Report Volume II at 99 (describing accelerating flooding rates in Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities).
B. Council on Environmental Quality Guidance on Climate Change
8. In 2010, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued its first draft guidance on how federal agencies can consider the effects of GHG emissions and climate change under NEPA.
13
CEQ revised the draft guidance in 2014,
14
and issued final guidance in 2016.
15
Throughout the guidance's evolution, CEQ advised agencies to quantify GHG emissions and to consider both the extent to which a proposed project's GHG emissions would contribute to climate change and how a changing climate may impact the proposed project. The 2016 guidance, however, explicitly declined to establish a quantity or threshold of GHGs for determining whether a proposed project will have a significant impact on climate.
16
13
CEQ,
Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
(Feb. 18, 2010),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/20100218-nepa-consideration-effects-ghg-draft-guidance.pdf
.
14
Revised Draft Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA Reviews, 79 FR 77802 (Dec. 24, 2014).
15
CEQ,
Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews
(Aug. 1, 2016),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf
(2016 CEQ Guidance).
16
2016 CEQ Guidance at 9-10 (“This guidance does not establish any particular quantity of GHG emissions as `significantly' affecting the quality of the human environment or give greater consideration to the effects of GHG emissions and climate change over other effects on the human environment.”).
9. CEQ rescinded the 2016 guidance in April 2017, as directed by Executive Order 13783
Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,
17
and issued revised draft guidance in June 2019.
18
In January 2021, Executive Order 13990
Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis
revoked Executive Order 13783 and directed CEQ to rescind the 2019 draft guidance and to review, revise, and update the 2016 guidance.
19
CEQ has not yet issued an update to the 2016 guidance, but, in the interim, has directed agencies to consider all available tools and resources, including the 2016 guidance, in assessing GHG emissions and the climate change effects of proposed actions.
20
17
Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 FR 16576 (Apr. 5, 2017).
18
Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 84 FR 30097 (June 26, 2019).
19
Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 FR 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
20
Notice of Rescission of Draft Guidance, 86 FR 10252 (Feb. 19, 2021).
C. Previous Commission Policy on Consideration of Climate Change Under NEPA
10. Commission staff has addressed climate change in some fashion in its NEPA documents for at least a decade.
21
Commission staff's NEPA documents have included direct GHG emission estimates from project construction (
e.g.,
tailpipe emissions from construction equipment) and/or operation (
e.g.,
fuel combustion at compressor stations and gas venting and leaks).
22
Starting in late 2016, the Commission began to conservatively estimate indirect downstream GHG emissions by assuming full combustion of the maximum annual volume of gas that could be transported by the project.
23
For indirect upstream, production-related GHG emissions, Commission orders during that time period relied on Department of Energy studies to calculate broad estimates.
24
For upstream impacts, the Commission generally indicated that these analyses were not required by NEPA because the Commission lacked detailed information about the precise source of the gas to be transported, but provided estimates for informational purposes.
25
21
For details on GHG analysis in the Commission's NEPA documents through April 2018, see
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities,
83 FR 18020, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042, at PP 44-50 (2018) (2018 NOI).
22
See, e.g.,
Environmental Assessment for the Philadelphia Lateral Expansion Project, Docket No. CP11-508-000, at 24 (Jan. 18, 2012) (construction emissions); Environmental Assessment for the Minisink Compressor Project, Docket No. CP11-515-000, at 29 (Feb. 29, 2012) (operation emissions).
23
See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC,
158 FERC ¶ 61,046, at P 120 (2017);
Tex. E. Transmission, LP,
157 FERC ¶ 61,223, at P 41 (2016),
reh'g granted,
161 FERC ¶ 61,226 (2017).
24
See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC,
158 FERC ¶ 61,046 at PP 116-119.
25
With respect to upstream emissions, the D.C. Circuit subsequently noted that the Commission does not violate NEPA in not considering upstream GHG emissions where there is no evidence to predict the number and location of additional wells that would be drilled as a result of a project.
Birckhead
v.
FERC,
925 F.3d 510, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (
Birckhead
).
11. In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) in
Sierra Club
v.
FERC
(
Sabal Trail
)
26
found that downstream GHG emissions were an indirect effect of the Sabal Trail pipeline project and required the Commission to give a quantitative estimate of the downstream GHG emissions resulting from the burning of the natural gas to be
transported by the pipeline or explain why the Commission could not do so, and to discuss the significance of these emissions.
27
On remand, the Commission compared the estimated downstream GHG emissions from the project to state and national GHG emission inventories.
28
However, the Commission concluded that it could not determine whether those downstream GHG emissions were significant and rejected the use of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) tool to inform the Commission's analysis.
29
26
867 F.3d 1357.
27
Id.
at 1374.
28
Fla. Se. Connection, LLC,
164 FERC ¶ 61,099, at P 5 (2018).
29
Id.
No party petitioned for judicial review of the Commission's determination on remand.
12. In 2018, the Commission stated in
Dominion Transmission, Inc.
30
that end use consumption of gas and upstream production of gas were generally not reasonably foreseeable or causally related to the project (no party had identified the specific end use of the gas) and thus the Commission was not required to consider upstream or downstream emissions as indirect impacts under NEPA.
31
The Commission stated it would continue to “analyze upstream and downstream environmental effects when those effects are sufficiently causally connected to and are reasonably foreseeable effects of the proposed action.”
32
The Commission reiterated that without an accepted methodology it could not find whether a particular quantity of GHG emissions was significant.
33
30
163 FERC ¶ 61,128 (2018),
pet. dismissed, Otsego 2000
v.
FERC,
767 F.App'x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (unpublished opinion).
31
Id.
PP 41-44, 61-62.
32
Id.
P 44;
see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC,
163 FERC ¶ 61,190, at PP 61-62 (2018).
33
Dominion Transmission, Inc.,
163 FERC ¶ 61,128 at PP 67-70.
13. However, in
Birckhead,
the D.C. Circuit rejected the Commission's position that
Sabal Trail
is limited to the narrow facts of that case. While the court in
Birckhead
acknowledged that downstream emissions may not always be a foreseeable effect of natural gas projects, it rejected the notion that downstream GHG emissions are a reasonably foreseeable indirect effect of a natural gas project only if a specific end destination is identified.
34
The court further noted that the Commission should attempt to obtain information on downstream uses to determine whether downstream GHG emissions are a reasonably foreseeable effect of the project.
35
34
Birckhead,
925 F.3d at 518-19.
35
Id.
at 520.
14. In 2021, in
Northern Natural Gas Co.,
the Commission explained that it had reconsidered its position that it was unable to assess the significance of a project's GHG emissions or those emissions' contribution to climate change.
36
The Commission found that that project's reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions—construction and operation emissions only, as the project proposed no new capacity—would not significantly contribute to climate change.
37
Later in 2021, the D.C. Circuit further criticized the Commission's stance prior to
Northern Natural Gas Co.
that it was unable to assess the significance of a project's GHG emissions or those emissions' contribution to climate change, holding that the Commission failed to appropriately analyze the significance of three natural gas projects' contribution to climate change using “theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community,” such as the SCC tool.
38
36
174 FERC ¶ 61,189, at P 29 (2021).
37
Id.
PP 29-36.
38
Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera
v.
FERC,
6 F.4th 1321, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (
Vecinos)
(citing 40 CFR 1502.21(c), which requires an EIS to include an evaluation of impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community where the information relevant to the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts cannot be obtained because the means to obtain it are not known). The case is pending on remand with the Commission.
D. Certificate Policy Statement Notices of Inquiry
15. On April 19, 2018, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry (2018 NOI)
39
seeking information and stakeholder perspectives to help the Commission explore whether, and if so how, it should revise its approach for determining whether proposed projects are consistent with the public convenience and necessity under the currently effective policy statement on the certification of new interstate natural gas transportation facilities (Certificate Policy Statement).
40
The 2018 NOI included a background section discussing how the legal standards and historical context informed the creation of the Certificate Policy Statement in 1999, how the Commission's evaluations under the Certificate Policy Statement and under NEPA have evolved, and how changed circumstances since 1999 have required the present review.
41
Notably, the Commission sought input on whether, and if so how, the Commission should adjust its evaluation of the environmental impacts of a proposed project.
39
2018 NOI, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042.
40
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,
88 FERC ¶ 61,227 (1999),
clarified,
90 FERC ¶ 61,128,
further clarified,
92 FERC ¶ 61,094 (2000). The Commission must determine whether a proposed natural gas project is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity, as that standard is established in NGA section 7. 15 U.S.C. 717f.
41
2018 NOI, 163 FERC ¶ 61,042 at PP 5-50.
16. In response to the 2018 NOI, the Commission received more than 3,000 comments from stakeholders including landowners; tribal, federal, state, and local government officials; non-governmental organizations; consultants, academic institutions, and think tanks; natural gas producers, Commission-regulated companies, local distribution companies, and industry trade organizations; electricity generators and utilities; and others. Many comments addressed GHG emissions.
17. On February 18, 2021, the Commission issued a new, refreshed Notice of Inquiry (2021 NOI),
42
seeking comments to build upon the existing record established by the 2018 NOI. The Commission posed several updated questions relating to GHG emissions, including asking: How the Commission could consider upstream impacts from natural gas production and downstream end-use impacts; how the Commission should determine the significance of a project's GHG emissions' contribution to climate change; whether the NGA, NEPA, or another federal statute authorize or mandate the use of the SCC analysis by the Commission; how the Commission could determine whether a proposed project's GHG emissions could be offset by reduced GHG emissions resulting from the project's operations; and how the Commission could impose GHG emission limits or mitigation to reduce the significance of impacts from a proposed project on climate change.
43
42
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities,
174 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2021).
43
Id.
P 17.
18. With respect to determining significance, the 2021 NOI sought comment on (1) what type of metrics and models the Commission should consider in determining significance, (2) whether any level of emissions should be considered
de minimis,
and (3) how the SCC tool or other tools could factor into determining significance.
44
44
Id.
(citations omitted).
19. The public comment period for the 2021 NOI closed on May 26, 2021.
45
The Commission received over 35,000 comments and approximately 150
unique comment letters from a wide range of stakeholders, as noted above.
45
See
Notice Extending Time for Comments, Docket No. PL18-1-000 (Mar. 31, 2021) (extending the original comment deadline from April 26, 2021, to May 26, 2021).
20. Comments relevant to this policy statement are addressed in Section III below.
III. Statutory Authority/Obligations
A. NGA
21. Section 7 of the NGA authorizes the Commission to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of facilities transporting natural gas in interstate commerce.
46
The Commission does not have authority to regulate intrastate transportation facilities or other facilities that affect interstate transportation, such as those used for the production, gathering, or local distribution of natural gas. Congress did not displace state authority over such subjects.
47
46
15 U.S.C. 717f.
47
NGA section 1(b) states that Commission authority applies to interstate transportation of natural gas and sales for resale, “but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”
Id.
717(b).
22. Section 3(a) of the NGA provides for federal jurisdiction over the siting, construction, and operation of facilities used to import or export gas.
48
To date, the Commission has exercised section 3 authority to authorize: (1) LNG terminals located at the site of import or export and (2) the site and facilities at the place of import/export where a pipeline crosses an international border.
49
Additionally, NGA section 3(e) states that “[t]he Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG terminal.”
50
48
The 1977 Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7151(b)) placed all section 3 jurisdiction under the Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy subsequently delegated authority to the Commission to “[a]pprove or disapprove the construction and operation of particular facilities, the site at which such facilities shall be located, and with respect to natural gas that involves the construction of new domestic facilities, the place of entry for imports or exit for exports.” Department of Energy Delegation Order No. 00-004.00A, section 1.21A (May 16, 2006).
49
In addition to pipelines that cross the international border with Canada and Mexico, the Commission has also asserted authority over the portions of subsea pipelines planned to cross the “border” of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the U.S. and the Bahamas.
See, e.g., Tractebel Calypso Pipeline, LLC,
106 FERC ¶ 61,273 (2004),
vacated, Calypso U.S. Pipeline, LLC,
137 FERC ¶ 61,098 (2011).
50
15 U.S.C. 717b(e)(1).
23. Both NGA sections 7 and 3 authorize the Commission to attach terms and conditions to its authorization.
51
Courts have interpreted these provisions broadly and given the Commission latitude in deciding what types of mitigation to require.
52
In issuing authorizations, the Commission has required project sponsors to comply with conditions to prevent or mitigate project impacts on environmental resources.
53
51
Id.
717f(e) (“The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.”);
see also id.
717b(a) (stating that the Commission may “grant such application, in whole or in part, with such modification and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may find necessary or appropriate”);
id.
717b(e)(3)(A) (providing the authority to approve an application for an LNG Terminal, “in whole or part, with such modifications and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission find[s] necessary or appropriate”).
52
See Twp. of Bordentown
v.
FERC,
903 F.3d 234, 261 n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Commission's authority to enforce any required remediation is amply supported by provisions of the NGA);
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1374 (holding that the Commission has legal authority to mitigate reasonably foreseeable indirect effects).
53
See, e.g., Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC,
161 FERC ¶ 61,042, at app. A (2017),
on reh'g,
164 FERC ¶ 61,100 (2018).
B. NEPA
24. NEPA and its implementing regulations require agencies, before taking or authorizing a major federal action that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment, to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed action and disclose their analyses to the public by preparing an EIS.
54
Alternatively, agencies can first prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) for a proposed action that is not likely to have significant effects or when the significance is unknown, to determine whether an EIS is necessary for a particular action.
55
Depending on the outcome of the EA, agencies can either prepare an EIS or issue a finding of no significant impact.
56
54
42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C); 40 CFR 1502.3;
see Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.
v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (discussing the twin aims of NEPA).
55
40 CFR 1501.5, 1508.1(h).
56
40 CFR 1508.1(
l
) (defining a finding of no significant impact as a document that briefly presents the reasons why an action that is not otherwise categorically excluded under § 1501.4 will not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an EIS will therefore not be prepared).
25. Previous CEQ regulations and court cases have examined a proposed project's “context” and “intensity” or the severity of the impact as factors for determining what constitutes a significant effect.
57
In assessing significance, Commission staff considers, for each resource, the duration of the impact as well as the geographic, biological, or social context in which the effects would occur, and the intensity (
e.g.
severity) of the impact.
58
This analysis may draw on both qualitative and quantitative information.
59
Using both types of data, the Commission routinely makes significance determinations for impacts to various resources from natural gas projects.
60
57
Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents & Assocs., Inc.
v.
Pierce,
719 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating there is “no hard and fast definition of `significant' ” but considering the proposed project's context in assessing whether a finding of no significance impact was reasonable). The regulations implementing NEPA previously addressed the term “significantly,” but that provision was removed by amendments effective September 14, 2020 and replaced with 40 CFR 1501.3(b). “Whether a project has significant environmental impacts, thus triggering the need to produce an EIS, depends on its `context' (region, locality) and `intensity' (`severity of impact').”
Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n
v.
Semonite,
916 F.3d 1075, 1082 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting 40 CFR 1508.27 (2018)),
amended in part by
925 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The new 40 CFR 1501.3(b) calls for agencies to consider the “potentially affected environment and degree of the effects of the action” and to consider the short-term, long-term, beneficial, and adverse effects, and effects on public safety and those that would violate laws.
58
See, e.g.
Final EIS for the Alaska LNG Project, Docket No. CP17-178-000, at 4-1.
59
See Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1371 (“The EIS also gave the public and agency decisionmakers the qualitative and quantitative tools they needed to make an informed choice for themselves. NEPA requires nothing more.”).
60
See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125, at P 79 (describing how the final EIS for the Atlantic Sunrise Project concluded that the project would result in adverse impacts that would be mitigated to less than significant levels),
order on reh'g,
161 FERC ¶ 61,250 (2017),
petition denied sub nom., Allegheny Def. Project
v.
FERC,
964 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020);
see also infra
note 61;
see also Magnum Gas Storage, LLC,
134 FERC ¶ 61,197, at P 115 (2011) (explaining that “`significantly,' as used in NEPA, requires considerations of both context and intensity, which varies with the setting of each proposed action.”).
26. In evaluating whether an impact is significant, the Commission determines whether “it would result in a substantial adverse change in the physical environment.”
61
In making that determination, the Commission considers available evidence, giving that evidence such weight as it deems appropriate using its experience, judgment, and expertise.
62
Notably,
NEPA does not require that the studies, metrics, and models on which an agency relies be universally accepted or otherwise uncontested.
63
Instead, NEPA permits agencies to rely on the best available evidence, quantitative and qualitative, even where that evidence has certain limitations when assessing the significance of their actions,
64
and an agency's determination is entitled to deference.
65
61
N. Nat. Gas Co.,
174 FERC ¶ 61,189, at P 32 (citing
Magnum Gas Storage, LLC,
134 FERC ¶ 61,197 at P 114 (“[A]n impact was considered to be significant if it would result in a substantial adverse change in the physical environment or natural condition and could not be mitigated to less-than-significant level.”)).
62
See, e.g., Tex. LNG Brownsville LLC,
169 FERC ¶ 61,130, at P 56 (2019) (“Due to the relatively undeveloped nature of the project area, the visual sensitivity of nearby recreation areas, and the lack of feasible visual screening measures, the Final EIS concluded that the project would result in a
significant impact on visual resources when viewed from the adjacent Laguna Atascosa National Wildlife Refuge.”),
order on reh'g,
170 FERC ¶ 61,139, at P 32 (2020),
remanded on other grounds, Vecinos,
6 F.4th 1321; Final EIS for the Alaska LNG Project, Docket No. CP17-178-000, at ES-4 (Mar. 2020) (explaining the significant, long-term to permanent project impacts from the loss of thousands of acres of permafrost from construction that would permanently alter hydrology and vegetation within and past the project footprint).
63
Sierra Club
v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
753 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is clearly within the expertise and discretion of the agency to determine proper testing methods.”);
see also Hughes River Watershed Conservancy
v.
Johnson,
165 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Agencies are entitled to select their own methodology as long as that methodology is reasonable. The reviewing court must give deference to an agency's decision.”).
64
See Spiller
v.
White,
352 F.3d 235, 244 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting petitioner's contention that the significance determination must be objective, factual, and quantitative and should not involve any qualitative judgment calls).
65
See La. Crawfish Producers Ass'n-W.
v.
Rowan,
463 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2006) (NEPA-related decisions are accorded a considerable degree of deference);
Spiller
v.
White,
352 F.3d at 244 n.5 (“We should note that our deference to the [l]ead [a]gencies['] fact-finding and conclusions includes deference to their judgment as to whether any particular environmental impact of the proposed pipeline rises to the level of significance”);
Powder River Basin Res. Council
v.
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
37 F.Supp. 3d 59, 74 (D.D.C. 2014) (agencies are afforded discretion to use their expertise to determine the best method to evaluate the significance of an impact to a particular resource, so long as that method is reasonable).
27. In addition to determining whether its actions may significantly affect the quality of the human environment, NEPA requires the Commission to consider whether there are steps that could be taken to mitigate any adverse environmental consequences.
66
While NEPA is a procedural statute and does not require a federal agency to reject a proposed project with significant adverse effects or take action to mitigate adverse effects,
67
an agency may require mitigation of impacts as a condition of its permitting or approval,
68
and the Commission routinely does so.
69
66
Robertson
v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (“To be sure, one important ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences.”).
67
Id.
at 352 (“There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other.”).
68
Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact,
76 FR 3843, 3848 (Jan. 21, 2011).
69
See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC,
170 FERC ¶ 61,045, at P 66, app. (2020) (conditioning certificate authority on site-specific mitigation measures when crossing abandoned mine lands, including the management and disposal of contaminated groundwater, and mitigation measures for acid mine drainage);
PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC,
170 FERC ¶ 61,198, at PP 29-30, app. A (2020) (conditioning certificate authority on mitigation of construction impacts on karst features);
Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC,
161 FERC ¶ 61,042 at app. A (conditioning certificate authority on the mitigation of construction impacts on karst features and on a nearby inn and mitigation of impacts from the discovery of invasive aquatic species during construction);
Port Arthur LNG, LP,
115 FERC ¶ 61,344, at PP 68-71, app. A (conditioning sections 3 and 7 authority on the mitigation of construction impacts on aquatic resources and wetlands),
order on reh'g,
117 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2006),
vacated,
136 FERC ¶ 61,196 (2011).
IV. Discussion
A. Quantifying GHG Emissions and Determining Significance
28. Consistent with CEQ regulations,
70
the Commission will quantify a project's GHG emissions that are reasonably foreseeable and have a reasonably close causal relationship to the proposed action, including those effects that occur at the same time and place as the proposed action and effects that are later in time or farther removed in distance from the proposed action. This will include GHG emissions resulting from construction and operation of the project
71
as well as, in most cases, GHG emissions resulting from the downstream combustion of transported gas.
72
70
40 CFR 1508.1(g) (defining the effects or impacts that must be considered when conducting a review under NEPA).
71
Emissions quantification also includes loss of carbon storage/sinks through land use conversions, forest clearing, wetland conversions, etc.
72
As discussed below, the vast majority of all natural gas consumed in the United States is combusted.
See infra
note 101.
29. The Commission will consider all evidence in the record relating to a project's estimated GHG emissions,
73
utilization rate, or offsets: Estimates presented by project sponsors, as well as opposing evidence from other parties. Going forward, in determining the level of GHG emissions attributed to a project, the Commission will estimate a project's GHG emissions based on a projection of what amount of project capacity will be actually used (projected utilization rate), as opposed to assuming 100% utilization.
74
The Commission will also consider evidence of factors expected to reduce or offset the estimated direct or reasonably foreseeable downstream emissions of the project.
73
Additionally, the Commission will consider evidence regarding whether certain emissions associated with a proposed project, such as upstream and downstream emissions, are reasonably foreseeable.
74
See Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,
178 FERC ¶ 61,107, at P 55 (2022) (explaining that project sponsors are encouraged to provide the Commission with information on estimated utilization rates and the intended end use of gas to demonstrate project need).
1. Categories of Emissions
30. CEQ regulations implementing NEPA require agencies to consider effects or impacts that “are reasonably foreseeable and have a reasonably close causal relationship to the proposed action . . . including those effects that occur at the same time and place as the proposed action . . . and may include effects that are later in time or farther removed in distance for the proposed action . . . .”
75
A “but for” causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency responsible for a particular effect,
76
and effects should not be considered if they are the “product of a lengthy causal chain.”
77
Further, effects to be considered do not include those that the agency has no ability to prevent due to its limited statutory authority or would occur regardless of the proposed action.
78
Regarding reasonable foreseeability, courts have found that an impact is reasonably foreseeable if it is “sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision.”
79
Although courts have held that NEPA requires “reasonable forecasting,”
80
an agency “is not required to engage in speculative analysis”
81
or “to do the impractical, if
not enough information is available to permit meaningful consideration.”
82
75
40 CFR 1508.1(g).
76
Id.
§ 1508.1(g)(2);
see also U.S. Dep't of Transp.
v.
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (
Pub. Citizen
) (finding that “NEPA requires `a reasonably close causal relationship' between the environmental effect and the alleged cause” in order “to make an agency responsible for a particular effect under NEPA” (quoting
Metro. Edison Co.
v.
People Against Nuclear Energy,
460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (
Metro. Edison Co.
))).
77
40 CFR 1508.1(g)(2);
see also Metro. Edison Co.,
460 U.S. at 774 (finding that “[s]ome effects that are `caused by' a change in the physical environment in the sense of `but for' causation,” will not fall within NEPA if “the causal chain is too attenuated”).
78
40 CFR 1508.1(g)(2);
see also Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. at 770 (“[W]here an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant `cause' of the effect.”).
79
EarthReports, Inc.
v.
FERC,
828 F.3d 949, 955 (DC Cir. 2016) (citations omitted);
see also Sierra Club
v.
Marsh,
976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1992).
80
N. Plains Res. Council, Inc.
v.
Surface Transp. Bd.,
668 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Selkirk Conservation All.
v.
Forsgren,
336 F.3d 944, 962 (9th Cir. 2003)).
81
Id.
at 1078.
82
Id.
(quoting
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr.
v.
U.S. Forest Serv.,
451 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006)).
31. As discussed below, the Commission proposes to:
• Consider direct emissions of a project a reasonably foreseeable effect;
• Find that an NGA section 3 export facility project is not the legally relevant cause of upstream and downstream emissions;
83
83
EarthReports, Inc.
v.
FERC,
828 F.3d at 955 (citing
Sierra Club
v.
FERC,
827 F.3d 36, 47, 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (
Freeport
).
• Consider on a case-by-case basis whether downstream emissions are a reasonably foreseeable effect of an NGA section 7 interstate project; and
• Consider on a case-by-case basis whether upstream emissions are a reasonably foreseeable effect of an NGA 7 project.
a. Direct Emissions
32. Several commenters assert that the Commission must consider fugitive emissions from the transportation of gas.
84
New Jersey Conservation Foundation, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (Sabin Center), The Watershed Institute, Clean Air Council, PennFuture, and New Jersey League of Conservation Voters (collectively, New Jersey Conservation Foundation) argue that natural gas leakage from both pipeline operation and natural gas production is worse than combustion because methane has a higher global warming potential than carbon dioxide.
85
84
See, e.g.,
Egan Millard 2021 Comments at 3; New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 21; Shayna Gleason 2021 Comments at 2.
85
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 21.
33. As the Commission has long held, direct GHG emissions from the project's short-term construction
86
and long-term operational activities
87
are an effect of the proposed project. Under current Commission regulations, the project sponsor provides an estimate of construction emissions and an estimate of the project's potential operational emissions, including fugitive emissions from both pipeline and aboveground facilities, in its application for Commission authorization.
88
86
Construction emissions include emissions from gasoline- and diesel-powered construction equipment.
87
Operational emissions include emissions from combustion units at compressor stations and fugitive leaks from compressor stations, meter/valve stations, and the pipeline.
88
The project sponsor provides emissions information in Resource Report No. 9. 18 CFR 380.12(k). Operational emissions are also estimated in the project's air permit application, which is typically submitted to the state agency with delegated Clean Air Act authority. Further, the Commission's guidance manual for NGA certificate applications instructs project sponsors to provide the GHGs in tons per year for the construction and operation of the proposed project.
See
Guidance Manual for Environmental Report Preparation for Applications Filed under the NGA, Volume I, at 4-123, 4-125 to 4-127 (Guidance Manual).
b. Downstream Emissions
34. Some commenters argue that the Commission must consider the downstream emissions of natural gas projects,
89
including fugitive emissions.
90
In contrast, other commenters generally assert that the Commission should not consider downstream emissions, or at most, should only do a qualitative assessment of downstream emissions, because they are not reasonably foreseeable impacts or do not have a close causal relationship under NEPA to gas transportation.
91
89
See, e.g.,
Food and Water Watch 2021 Comments at 1; New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 19; Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and the District of Columbia (Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al.) 2018 Comments at 12-17.
90
For example, the Massachusetts PipeLine Awareness Network states that the Commission should consider fugitive emissions from the distribution and burning of transported gas. Massachusetts PipeLine Awareness Network 2021 Comments at 2;
see also, e.g.,
Egan Millard 2021 Comments at 3; Shayna Gleason 2021 Comments at 2.
91
See, e.g.,
American Petroleum Institute (API) Technical Conference Comments at 3-5 (stating the Commission and developers cannot accurately forecast downstream emissions due to lack of knowledge of the end use of the gas, variability in utilization rates and regulatory requirements, and unpredictable changes in supply and demand, among other factors); Boardwalk Pipeline Partners LP (Boardwalk) Technical Conference Comments at 21; Enbridge Gas Pipelines (Enbridge) Technical Conference Comments at 11, 25-26; Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) 2021 Comments at 58-60; The Williams Companies, Inc. (Williams) 2021 Comments at 37-38; Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA) 2018 Comments at 15-16.
35. As discussed above, in August 2017, the D.C. Circuit issued
Sabal Trail,
which involved a greenfield pipeline project that would deliver all gas transported by the project to specific gas-fired generating plants. The D.C. Circuit found that downstream emissions from the use of the transported natural gas were an indirect, reasonably foreseeable effect of the proposed pipeline and that in the circumstances of that case—where the vast majority of throughput on the proposed project was destined for a limited number of specifically identified electric generation facilities—the downstream GHG emissions could be reasonably quantified by the Commission.
92
92
The court concluded “that the EIS for the Southeast Market Project should have either given a quantitative estimate of the downstream greenhouse emissions that will result from burning the natural gas that the pipelines will transport or explained more specifically why it could not have done so.”
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1374.
36. The D.C. Circuit reiterated this determination in two subsequent cases. First, in
Birckhead,
the court rejected the claim that downstream emissions are only a foreseeable effect in factual circumstances akin to
Sabal Trail, i.e.,
where all transported gas will be burned at specifically identified destinations, but also rejected the argument that downstream emissions are always a foreseeable effect of a natural gas certificate project.
93
Then, in
Allegheny Defense Project
v.
FERC,
94
the court stated that the downstream emissions of a project designed to deliver gas into large interstate pipeline systems, which in turn deliver gas to 16 states, are an indirect effect of the project.
95
93
Birckhead,
925 F.3d at 518-20 (criticizing the Commission for not attempting to obtain data on downstream uses).
94
932 F.3d 940 (DC Cir. 2019).
95
Id.
at 945-46.
37. INGAA and others read the Supreme Court's
Public Citizen
decision as requiring an agency to consider an environmental effect only when the agency has the authority to control the outcome and note that the Commission has no authority to regulate the end use (or production) of natural gas.
96
INGAA states that attempting to regulate downstream (or upstream) activities would invade the jurisdiction of other regulators, that most projects will not result in reasonably foreseeable downstream GHG emissions like those in
Sabal Trail,
and thus, downstream emissions should only be considered on a case-by-case basis.
97
INGAA suggests the Commission look for guidance to
Center for Biological Diversity
v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
98
which criticizes
Sabal Trail
as “breezing past . . . statutory limits and precedents . . . clarifying what effects are cognizable under NEPA.”
99
96
See, e.g.,
INGAA 2021 Comments at 50-51.
97
INGAA 2021 Comments at 49-51, 57;
see also
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 14 (adding that NEPA's requirements would exclude downstream emissions occurring after a “long and attenuated chain of intermediate causal factors, as when natural gas is transported to an interconnect for further shipment on the interstate grid, eventually reaching end-use consumers only through a long intermediate path”).
98
941 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2019) (
Center for Biological Diversity
).
99
Id.
at 1300 (citing
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. 752 and
Metro. Edison Co.,
460 U.S. 766).
38. Given that data show that the vast majority of consumed gas is ultimately combusted,
100
there appears to be a
substantial likelihood of GHG emissions from the end-use combustion of transported gas as a result of a natural gas project proposed under NGA section 7.
101
However, as contemplated by the court in
Birckhead,
there may be circumstances where downstream emissions are not a foreseeable effect of an authorized project, and the court stated that each project must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
102
Accordingly, project sponsors may submit any evidence they believe indicates that downstream emissions are not a reasonably foreseeable effect of a proposed project.
100
U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
December 2021 Monthly Energy Review
24, 101 (2021) (reporting
that, in 2020, 1,036 Bcf of natural gas had a non-combustion use compared to 30,476 Bcf of total consumption),
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf
;
see also
Jayni Hein et al., Institute for Policy Integrity,
Pipeline Approvals and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
25 (2019) (explaining that, in 2017, 97% of all natural gas consumed was combusted).
101
See Birckhead,
925 F.3d at 518;
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1371-72.
102
Birckhead,
925 F.3d at 518-19 (rejecting, in
dicta,
that downstream emissions are always a foreseeable effect of a proposed certificate project).
39. We disagree with commenters' assertions that
Public Citizen
prohibits the Commission from considering downstream GHG emissions. The question is not whether the Commission has regulatory authority over downstream emissions. Rather, as the
Sabal Trail
court reasoned in applying
Public Citizen,
the Commission “has no obligation to gather or consider environmental information [only] if it has no statutory authority
to act on that information.
”
103
Because the Commission can reject a section 7 certificate based on the project's environmental impacts, including GHG emissions, the court held that the Commission was required to consider downstream emissions resulting from the Sabal Trail project's construction.
104
For section 7 projects—unlike section 3 projects, described below—there is no independent decision, such as the DOE authorization critical in
Freeport,
to “break the NEPA causal” chain.
105
Accordingly, the Commission's authorization for section 7 projects is a “legally relevant cause” of the emissions, meeting
Public Citizen'
s direction that “NEPA requires `a reasonably close causal relationship' between the environmental effect and the alleged cause,” analogous to the “familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law.”
106
103
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1372-73 (emphasis in original) (explaining
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. 752).
104
See id.
at 1373 (“Because FERC could deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment, the agency is a `legally relevant cause' of the direct and indirect environmental effects of pipelines it approves.” (quoting
Freeport,
827 F.3d at 47).
105
Freeport,
827 F.3d at 47.
106
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. at 767 (quoting
Metro. Edison Co.,
460 U.S. at 774).
40. The Commission finds this and subsequent direction from the D.C. Circuit more instructive than
Center for Biological Diversity,
which determined that a specific effect was too tenuous to be considered in analysis of a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers discharge permit for mining activities under the Clean Water Act.
107
107
See Center for Biological Diversity,
941 F.3d at 1292 (describing whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers legally declined to address, in issuing discharge permits for phosphate mining, the effects of a radioactive byproduct of fertilizer production (phosphogypsum), where the phosphogypsum is neither a byproduct of dredging and filling or phosphate mining or beneficiation). The court criticized the reasoning in
Sabal Trail
but also observed that the “causal relationship between the agency action and the putative downstream effect was much closer [in
Sabal Trail
] than it is here” and that the Commission's scope of statutory authority is “much broader” than that of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Id.
at 1299-1300.
41. However, for proposed export projects under NGA section 3, the Commission will not consider downstream GHG emissions an effect requiring analysis under NEPA regulations. The Department of Energy, not the Commission, has sole authority to license and consider the environmental impacts of the export of any natural gas.
108
As courts have explained, the Commission need not consider the effects of downstream transportation, consumption, or combustion of exported gas because the Department of Energy's “independent decision to allow exports . . . breaks the NEPA causal chain and absolves the Commission of responsibility to include [these considerations] in its NEPA analysis.”
109
108
Freeport,
827 F.3d at 47 (holding that the Commission does not have to address the indirect effects of the anticipated export of natural gas because the Department of Energy, not the Commission, has sole authority to license and consider the environmental impacts of the export of any natural gas going through LNG facilities);
Freeport,
827 F.3d at 62-63 (same);
EarthReports, Inc.
v.
FERC,
828 F.3d at 956 (same);
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1372 (explaining
Freeport
).
109
Freeport,
827 F.3d at 48.
c. Upstream Emissions
42. Some commenters state that the Commission must consider the upstream GHG emissions of natural gas projects, including fugitive emissions from production,
110
to assess the project's total impact on climate change.
111
Other commenters argue that upstream emissions are not a reasonably foreseeable effect of a natural gas transportation project, and therefore should not be considered by the Commission.
112
Some commenters focus on how to obtain sufficient information to account for upstream GHG emissions. For example, EPA recommends that the Commission require project sponsors to provide available information on reasonably foreseeable induced production demand. EPA states that environmental documents under NEPA should disclose this information as well as items such as the proposal's regionally known hydrocarbon accumulations and a decline curve analysis to allow for appropriate regional and local impact analysis.
113
110
See, e.g.,
Egan Millard 2021 Comments at 3; Shayna Gleason 2021 Comments at 2.
111
See, e.g.,
Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law (Policy Integrity) Technical Conference Comments at 17; Food and Water Watch 2021 Comments at 1; New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 19.
112
See, e.g.,
Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 21; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 11, 25-26; TC Energy Corporation (TC Energy) Technical Conference Comments at 5; Williams Technical Conference Comments at 4; INGAA 2021 Comments at 56-57; Williams 2021 Comments at 37-38.
113
EPA 2021 Comments at 5.
43. In various NGA section 7 proceedings, the Commission has considered upstream emissions on a case-by-case basis—sometimes acknowledging it is difficult to quantify upstream emissions due to several unknown factors, including the location of the supply source and whether transported gas will come from new or existing production.
114
The Commission will continue to consider on a case-by-case basis whether the environmental effects resulting from natural gas production are either likely caused by a proposed NGA section 7 project or reasonably foreseeable consequences of our approval of such projects. To the extent known, project sponsors are encouraged to submit information on the reasonably foreseeable upstream impacts caused by the project or an explanation as to why there are none for Commission consideration.
114
See Birckhead,
925 F.3d at 516-18.
See, e.g., Double E Pipeline, LLC,
173 FERC ¶ 61,074, at P 97 (2020);
Cent. N.Y. Oil & Gas Co., LLC,
137 FERC ¶ 61,121, at PP 81-101 (2011),
order on reh'g,
138 FERC ¶ 61,104, at PP 33-49 (2012),
petition for review dismissed sub nom., Coal. for Responsible Growth
v.
FERC,
485 F.App'x 472, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion);
see also Adelphia Gateway, LLC,
169 FERC ¶ 61,220, at P 243 (2019),
order on reh'g,
171 FERC ¶ 61,049, at P 89 (2020).
2. Calculating GHG Emissions
44. To calculate operational emissions, project sponsors should continue to follow the existing guidance outlined in section 4.9.1.3 of the Commission's Guidance Manual for Environmental Report Preparation for
Applications Filed under the NGA.
115
However, under this policy statement, for purposes of assessing the impact of a project's GHG emissions on climate change, the Commission will consider operational GHG emissions calculated based on a projected utilization rate for the project, as described below.
116
115
We note that thresholds for Clean Air Act and state air permits are typically based on the regulated source's potential to emit, or the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit any air pollutant under its physical and operational design, rather than its actual emissions, and that air permits themselves are expressed in potential to emit.
See
40 CFR 70.2. This policy statement does not apply to any other air pollutants than GHGs. For all other air pollutants, we will continue to evaluate a project's air quality impacts based on its potential to emit.
116
See infra
section III.A.2.a.
45. Additionally, the Commission recognizes that there may be other factors that might serve to reduce a proposed project's climate impacts. For example, the installation of emission-reduction technology or purchase of offsets by downstream users would reduce the impacts. Thus, to enable the Commission's use of the best estimate of a project's GHG emissions, project sponsors are encouraged to calculate project GHG emissions using a projected utilization rate and submit evidence of any other factors that might impact a project's net emissions such as the factors identified by commenters below.
46. Commenters recommend that the Commission consider factors that might impact a project's net emissions, such as (1) whether the transported gas will phase out use of a more carbon-intensive energy source, like coal or fuel oil, and will prevent the use of more carbon-intensive energy sources in the future; (2) whether the pipeline will transport gas that would otherwise be transported by vehicles, thereby reducing the emissions from transporting the gas; (3) whether the proposed project will transport gas volumes that would have otherwise been delivered to the same consumers through a different pipeline or may ultimately end up transporting fuel blends including renewable natural gas or hydrogen; (4) whether the project sponsor will purchase offsets to counter project emissions; or (5) whether the project may be backed by a local distribution company serving customer demand in states with established emissions caps.
117
INGAA states that in the absence of reliable and verifiable predictive models to the contrary, the requirement of reasonable foreseeability arguably dictates that the Commission cannot adopt any default assumption that a natural gas infrastructure project will increase (rather than decrease, or leave unchanged) net global GHG emissions, and that at minimum, the Commission would have to provide a rational justification for any such assumption.
118
By contrast, New Jersey Conservation Foundation and others contend that the Commission should consider whether the project may be displacing renewable energy sources, thereby increasing GHG emissions.
119
117
See, e.g.,
American Gas Association (AGA) Technical Conference Comments at 28, 40; API Technical Conference Comments at 3; Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 23 (stating that the Commission should rely on local distribution companies' air permits to determine GHG emissions); Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 31-34; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 5-6 (Commissioner Kelliher, Principal at Three Acorns, was a panelist at the GHG Technical Conference on Panel 1.); INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 17-18 (suggesting the net emissions analysis must be undertaken on a global level); Kinder Morgan Entities (Kinder Morgan) Technical Conference Comments at 12-15; National Grid Gas Companies Technical Conference Comments at 3-7 (describing the Distributed Infrastructure Solution that it has developed in coordination with the State of New York); Williams Technical Conference Comments at 7-8; Charles River Associates 2021 Comments at 4-5; Ohio Environmental Council 2021 Comments at 3.
See
Environmental Assessment for the Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P. (Iroquois) Enhancement by Compression Project, Docket No. CP20-48-000, at B-110 (Sept. 30, 2020) (citing Iroquois' end-use GHG analysis that projected greater GHG emissions if the project was not built under scenarios where the energy needs of all new buildings are met by fuel oil as opposed to gas supplied by the project). One industrial end user expresses concern about the potential of integrating renewable natural gas due to concerns about pipeline integrity or increased costs. American Forest and Paper Association and Process Gas Consumers Group (collectively, American Forest) Technical Conference Comments at 13-14.
118
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 19.
119
See, e.g.,
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 23.
47. INGAA and other commenters strongly urge the Commission to calculate a project's downstream emissions, if at all, based on the likely utilization rate of the proposed project, instead of relying on a full-burn estimate.
120
120
See, e.g.,
Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 12, 29-30; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 5-6; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 15-16 (describing an analysis it commissioned concluding that in 2020, the maximum utilization on an average annual basis for any of the pipeline “corridors” between different regions is not higher than 65% and it is over 50% only for 7 of the 30 regional corridors); TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 18; Charles River Associates 2021 Comments at 6; INGAA 2021 Comments at 58;
see also
Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 3, 23; Williams Technical Conference Comments at 7. API, on the other hand, asserts that use of utilization estimates or emissions data forces the Commission to pick winners among competing pipeline projects and asserts that such decisions are best made by market forces after the Commission authorizes a project. API Technical Conference Comments at 3-4.
48. Conversely, New Jersey Conservation Foundation and others argue the Commission must calculate direct, downstream, and upstream GHG emissions by assuming the maximum authorized operating conditions, unless, some add, the project sponsor can demonstrate otherwise.
121
Further, other commenters propose their own methods of how to calculate the downstream emissions of a proposed project.
122
New Jersey Conservation Foundation urges the Commission to recommend or require the use of specified emissions factors to calculate project emissions.
123
Some commenters argue that the Commission must, beyond asking project sponsors, require certain information to be provided, conduct independent research, or otherwise compile missing information.
124
Dr. Susan F. Tierney states that the Commission should articulate a default methodology, set of assumptions, and sources of data (suggesting multiple sources including data from the U.S. Department of Energy's National Energy Technology Laboratory's 2019 life-cycle estimates of GHG emissions for the natural gas supply chain) to establish a default maximum emissions rate, which could then be supplemented by an applicant's own estimate or an intervenor's alternative estimate.
125
121
See, e.g.,
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 21-22; Public Interest Organizations 2018 Comments at 91; Washington State Department of Commerce and Washington State Department of Ecology 2018 Comments at 6. Public Interest Organizations' 2018 comments represent 63 entities including Natural Resources Defense Council.
122
See, e.g.,
Charles River Associates 2021 Comments at 6-8 (proposing a regional analysis to estimate downstream emissions of a gas project).
123
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 22.
124
See, e.g.,
Berkshire Environmental Action Team 2021 Comments at 3; North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality 2018 Comments at 5-8.
125
Dr. Susan F. Tierney, Senior Advisor with the Analysis Group, Inc., was a panelist at the GHG Technical Conference on Panel 1. Dr. Susan F. Tierney Technical Conference Statement at 4-10. The applicant could supplement its estimate with an alternative estimate, and intervenors could also submit estimates.
a. Projected Utilization Rate
49. In previous environmental documents and certificate orders, the Commission has disclosed a project's operational emissions
126
and estimates
of downstream emissions
127
by assuming a 100% utilization rate estimate of the project (
e.g.,
the maximum capacity is transported 365 days per year, 24 hours a day and fully combusted downstream). This represents the maximum potential downstream GHG emissions. However, most projects do not operate at 100% utilization at all times. In fact, many projects are designed to address peak demand. For example, traditionally, in the Northeast, demand for gas is highest in the winter months, resulting in high utilization rates during those months due to heating needs, but lower in the summer, resulting in low annual utilization rates.
128
126
See
Environmental Assessment for the Lake City 1st Branch Line Abandonment and Capacity Replacement Project, Docket No. CP20-504-000, at 51-53 (Feb. 2021);
see also
Environmental Assessment for the Philadelphia Lateral Expansion Project, Docket No. CP11-508-000, at 24 (Jan. 18, 2012) (construction emissions); Environmental Assessment for the Minisink Compressor Project,
Docket No. CP11-515-000, at 29 (Feb. 29, 2012) (operation emissions).
127
See Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC,
161 FERC ¶ 61,042 at P 305.
128
Some commenters point out that daily pipeline load factors vary significantly based on seasonal trends.
See, e.g.,
Charles River Associates 2021 Comments at 3; Williams 2021 Comments at 46.
50. Because in most instances a 100% utilization rate estimate does not accurately capture the project's climate impacts, estimated emissions that reflect a projected utilization rate will provide more useful information. The project's projected utilization rate may be calculated using, for example:
• Expected utilization data from project shippers;
• Historical usage data;
129
129
We note that for a greenfield pipeline project, historic data will not be available. In those cases, the project sponsor could use data from other similar projects or regional data.
• Demand projections;
• An estimate of how much capacity will be used on an interruptible basis.
51. The project sponsor is encouraged to file its projected utilization rate, as well as its justification for the rate and any supporting evidence, in its application for authorization under NGA section 3 or 7. The Commission will also consider evidence submitted by commenters and protesters in support of or opposition to the projected utilization rate.
b. Other Evidence Considered
52. Further, the Commission will consider any other evidence in the record that impacts the quantification of the project's reasonably foreseeable emissions. For example, the Commission will consider: Evidence of a net-reduction in GHG emissions where the use of transported gas displaces the use of a higher emitting alternative fuel;
130
evidence of anticipated changes in downstream usage rates over time; evidence of any real, verifiable, and measurable reduction efforts taken by the pipeline or downstream users to reduce their GHG emissions or offset their impacts;
131
and evidence that a project would displace zero-emissions electric generation. Further, other agencies, notably the EPA, have proposed regulations that may impact the emission of methane from Commission-regulated facilities.
132
If such regulations are adopted, the Commission will consider them when examining project GHG emissions. Similarly, the Commission will consider evidence from commenters and protestors supporting or challenging such estimates and assumptions.
130
For instance, in a downstream end-use analysis, Iroquois projected that its Enhancement by Compression project could result in net GHG reductions when considering the alternative fuel that may be used (
e.g.,
fuel oil for heating) by the end use customer in the event that gas is not available. Iroquois Gas Transmission, LP, Downstream GHG Report, Docket No. CP20-48-000 (filed May 19, 2020).
131
For example, the Commission may consider evidence that a downstream user purchases credits to offset its GHG emissions from the consumption of transported gas. The Commission will consider downstream user's mitigation measures according to the criteria outlined in
infra
section III.C.3 for applicant-proposed mitigation measures. With regards to construction and operational emissions, project sponsors should continue to provide evidence of measures that minimize emissions, such as using low-sulfur diesel fuel and limiting equipment idling during construction, as outlined in the Guidance Manual. Guidance Manual at 4-124. However, as described
supra
section III.A.2.a, operational emissions should now be calculated based on the project's projected utilization rate.
132
See, e.g.,
Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 86 FR 63,110 (Nov. 15, 2020).
B. Level of Review and Significance
53. Under NEPA, an agency must prepare an EIS for every “major [f]ederal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”
133
To determine whether an EIS is necessary for a particular action, the agency may prepare an EA,
134
described as a “concise public document” providing “sufficient evidence and analysis,” to determine whether to prepare an EIS or issue a finding of no significant impact.
135
133
42 U.S.C. 4332(C); 40 CFR 1502.3.
134
40 CFR 1501.5, 1508.1(h).
135
See
40 CFR 1501.3, 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.1(h), (l).
54. To assess significance, the Commission determines whether the impact “would result in a substantial adverse change in the physical environment,”
136
which, as discussed, is based on considerations of the severity of adverse environmental impacts. In making that determination, the Commission uses its experience, judgment, and expertise to give record evidence appropriate weight.
137
The Commission found that “there is nothing about GHG emissions or their resulting contribution to climate change that prevents us from making that same type of significance determination.”
138
136
See Magnum Gas Storage, LLC,
134 FERC ¶ 61,197 at P 114 (“[A]n impact was considered to be significant if it would result in a substantial adverse change in the physical environment or natural condition and could not be mitigated to less-than-significant level.”).
137
For example, for an impact where there are no established federal standards, the Commission makes qualitative assessments to determine whether a proposed project would have a significant impact on a particular resource.
See, e.g., Tex. LNG Brownsville LLC,
169 FERC ¶ 61,130 at P 56 (“Due to the relatively undeveloped nature of the project area, the visual sensitivity of nearby recreation areas, and the lack of feasible visual screening measures, the Final EIS concluded that the project would result in a significant impact on visual resources when viewed from the adjacent Laguna Atascosa National Wildlife Refuge.”);
Alaska Gasline Dev. Corp.,
171 FERC ¶ 61,134, at PP 25, 89 (describing how the final EIS for the Alaska LNG Project found that construction and operation of the project would have significant impacts on resources such as permafrost, wetlands, forests, and caribou, but less than significant impacts on resources such as scrub and herbaceous plant communities),
order on reh'g,
172 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2020);
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC,
158 FERC ¶ 61,125 at P 79 (describing how the final EIS for the Atlantic Sunrise Project concluded that the project would result in adverse impacts that would be mitigated to less than significant levels).
138
N. Nat. Gas Co.,
174 FERC ¶ 61,189 at P 32.
55. Specifically, in
Northern Natural Gas Co.,
the Commission explained that:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained that a proposed interstate natural gas pipeline's reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions are relevant to whether the pipeline is required by the public convenience and necessity. A rigorous review of a project's reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions is also an essential part of the Commission's responsibility under NEPA to take a “hard look” at a project's environmental impacts. Determining the significance of the impacts from a proposed project's GHG emissions informs the Commission's review in a number of important respects, including its decision whether to prepare an environmental impact statement.
139
139
174 FERC ¶ 61,189 at P 30 (citations omitted).
56. To date, no federal agency, including the Commission, has established a threshold for determining what level of project-induced GHG emissions is significant. The Commission received a number of comments, discussed below, offering perspectives on whether and at what level it should assess the significance of a proposed project's GHG emissions.
1. Comments
57. The Commission received relevant comments in response to both the 2018 and 2021 NOIs on whether the Commission should: Determine
significance at all; set a specific significance threshold and at what level; and/or use various inventories, goals, and tools to set the threshold.
a. Whether the Commission Should Determine Significance
58. Numerous commenters (Delaware Riverkeeper, Food and Water Watch, North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, Sabin Center, and others) argue that the Commission should make a significant impact determination based on a project's GHG emissions, which they argue would include the project's associated upstream and downstream emissions. Some commenters, for example the Sabin Center in 2018, direct the Commission to the NEPA regulation at 40 CFR 1508.27 (that was removed by amendments effective September 14, 2020), which provides that “significantly” as used in NEPA requires considerations of both the context of the action and the intensity of the impacts associated with any proposal.
140
140
See, e.g.,
Sabin Center 2018 Comments at 8-9.
59. In contrast, some regulated entities and other commenters express concern about the Commission determining the significance of a project's impacts on the basis of GHG emissions, especially upstream and downstream emissions. For example, INGAA and others (Energy Infrastructure Council, Williams, etc.) argue that the Commission should, at most, engage in a qualitative discussion of downstream GHG emissions because net GHG emissions are not reasonably foreseeable, and that the Commission should not assess the significance of upstream or downstream emissions.
141
Commenters such as Boardwalk state that the Commission cannot reject a project because of downstream GHG emissions or consider upstream GHG emissions, may only include a general disclosure of downstream emissions in limited circumstances (such as where all end use is known), and should generally decline to assess significance and only engage in a qualitative discussion.
142
141
See, e.g.,
INGAA 2021 Comments at 58-64. INGAA's 2021 comments update its 2018 position that the Commission should not presume that all GHG emissions are significant and should instead make a reasoned judgment whether: (1) A meaningful assessment can be made with reasonable effort based upon available information and (2) if so, whether a meaningful judgment can be formed regarding if the contribution of GHGs is likely to have a significant impact on the resource as a whole. INGAA 2018 Comments at 81-84.
142
Boardwalk 2021 Comments at 77-78, 86-90, 92-93. These comments are generally echoed by the Energy Infrastructure Council. Energy Infrastructure Council 2021 Comments at 15-16, 22-27.
60. Commenters argue that the Commission lacks the ability to make a significance determination and has no objective basis upon which to evaluate the impacts of GHG emissions associated with any specific proposed project.
143
Other commenters state that setting any significance threshold would be arbitrary
144
and potentially outside of the Commission's authority or jurisdiction.
145
143
See, e.g.,
Enbridge 2021 Comments at 103.
144
See, e.g.,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2021 Comments at 9.
145
See, e.g.,
API 2021 Comments at 29-32; NGSA 2021 Comments at 21-22; TC Energy 2021 Comments at 52-56; U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2021 Comments at 9.
61. Finally, commenters state that the Commission should defer to other agencies, such as CEQ or EPA, in setting a significance threshold, citing: The lack of a national energy policy or federal GHG limits; the EPA's existing authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act; the direction of Executive Orders 13990 and 14008, which commenters say direct EPA to examine its own GHG emissions standards; and the ongoing Interagency Work Group efforts on the SCC.
146
A few industry commenters also caution against creating uncertainty or a moving target for industry while waiting for a significance threshold to be established.
147
146
See, e.g.,
Cheniere Energy Inc. 2021 Comments at 14-16; Enbridge 2021 Comments at 104; Williams 2021 Comments at 35-38. Energy Transfer LP and the NGSA also cite CEQ's recent NEPA regulatory update and direction to agencies to propose revisions to their NEPA procedures by September 14, 2023. Energy Transfer LP 2021 Comments at 14; NGSA 2021 Comments at 19-20. The Commission's current regulations provide that the Commission will comply with CEQ's regulations except where those regulations are inconsistent with the statutory requirements of the Commission. 18 CFR 380.1. Therefore, any action taken by the Commission in a future rulemaking pursuant to CEQ's regulatory update does not prevent the Commission from issuing this policy statement.
147
See, e.g.,
BHE Pipeline Group 2021 Comments at 8-10; Cheniere Energy Inc. 2021 Comments at 17-18.
b. What the Threshold Should Be
62. Some commenters argue that the Commission should consider any net increase in GHG emissions as significant.
148
Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia (Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al.) argues that any investment in pipeline infrastructure is inconsistent with new national emissions reductions targets and thus, project emissions can be significant on that basis alone, even if they represent a small share of national emissions, or that emissions are significant if they impede the ability of a state to meet its clean energy goals.
149
148
Ohio Environmental Council 2021 Comments at 3.
149
Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2021 Comments at 6-11. The 2021 commenters are made up of a slightly different group of state attorneys general than those filing comments in 2018.
63. A few commenters suggest specific numerical thresholds. The Sabin Center recommends that the Commission assess the magnitude of GHG emissions impacts using EPA's quantification threshold of 25,000 tons per year of CO
2
e to identify major emitters under the Clean Air Act, social cost of GHG tools to assign a dollar value to the potential impacts of the emissions, and EPA's GHG Equivalencies Calculator as a comparison tool.
150
One commenter cites to EIS examples where the Commission stated that monetized benefits of $8 million and $28 million would be “significant” for local economies and suggests that gross climate damages between roughly $8 and $20 million should be considered significant.
151
150
Sabin Center 2018 Comments at 8-9.
151
Environmental Defense Fund, Food & Water Watch, Policy Integrity, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and Western Environmental Law Center (EDF) 2021 Comments at 14-15.
64. Conversely, a few commenters state that emissions from all individual projects could be considered
de minimis
and individually too small to impact climate change.
152
Others urge the Commission away from taking a bright line approach to determining significance,
153
while Driftwood Pipeline LLC urges that significance, if appropriate, requires the Commission to disclose a clear threshold.
154
152
See, e.g.,
Competitive Enterprise Institute 2021 Comments at 4, 6.
153
See, e.g.,
Enbridge 2021 Comments at 108; Russo on Energy 2021 Comments at 17-18.
154
Driftwood Pipeline LLC 2021 Comments at 3.
65. CEQ points the Commission to its 2016 guidance as an existing resource to help agencies assess GHG emissions and the effects of climate change in NEPA reviews.
155
155
CEQ 2021 Comments at 1.
c. Use of Inventories, Climate Goals, Programmatic Analyses, Etc. in Determining Significance
66. Some commenters recommend that the Commission use state, regional, and global GHG reduction goals to provide context and/or define
significance of GHG emissions.
156
For example, Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. comments that the Commission already analyzes whether a proposed pipeline project is consistent with various energy and climate policies and goals and that this can be used as a metric for evaluating significance.
157
Others argue that the Commission's analysis of a proposed project's public benefits should weigh the effect of project GHG emissions on states' and the nation's abilities to comply with climate and clean energy laws and policies, such as specific energy and climate change action plans and policies.
158
The Ohio Environmental Council recommends that the Commission consider the total proposed upstream and downstream GHG emissions of all gas projects pending in any given year, giving weight to the total possible GHG emissions that could be locked in by those projects and comparing this total with international goals.
159
156
See, e.g.,
Delaware Riverkeeper Network & Berks Gas Truth 2021 Comments at 62; Ron Schaaf and Deb Evans 2021 Comments at 8; California Public Utilities Commission 2018 Comments at 11-12.
157
Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2018 Comments at 17-20.
158
See, e.g.,
Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2018 Comments at 17-20; Franklin Governments 2018 Comments at 2.
159
Ohio Environment Council 2018 Comments at 12-13.
67. Other commenters suggest alternative means or tools for assessing significance. For example, commenters suggest that the Commission should use a “Climate Test.”
160
Patricia Weber comments that the Commission should use such a test to determine if a project is viable in a scenario where the climate goals of the Paris agreement are met using climate and global energy market models. One commenter urges the Commission to examine acres of wetlands that will be lost due to climate impacts of proposed projects as a proxy for significance.
161
Some commenters suggest the Commission consider a programmatic or regional analysis of pipelines.
162
160
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) also suggests the Commission use its forthcoming “Climate Test,” which is a tool being developed by NRDC to quantify the consistency of individual infrastructure projects with climate goals. NRDC 2021 Comments at 6. However, NRDC has not filed additional information on its “Climate Test.”
161
Healthy Gulf 2021 Comments at 14.
162
E.g.,
Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2021 Comments at 8-11; EPA 2021 Comments at 1; Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2018 Comments at 12-17.
68. EDF comments that a comparison of a project's emissions to international, state, or regional carbon budgets, or assessing geophysical impacts such as increases in carbon dioxide levels, global temperatures, or sea levels can be misleading and trivialize the project's impacts.
163
163
EDF 2021 Comments at 9-12, 16.
69. Some industry commenters state that any comparison of direct or indirect emissions should be made to global GHG inventories, not national or state inventories.
164
However, Williams states that, while the Commission should consider only direct construction and operation emissions, the Commission should compare those emissions against national GHG inventories and not against international agreements or regional targets.
165
Others oppose use of a regional analysis of GHG emissions from pipeline projects.
166
164
See, e.g.,
Boardwalk 2021 Comments at 82-83; NGSA 2021 Comments at 15. Enbridge states that comparison to these inventories would be arbitrary, but that such an approach could help contextualize the GHG emissions for the Commission and the public. Enbridge 2021 Comments at 105, 108-109.
165
Williams 2021 Comments at 38.
166
See, e.g.,
Competitive Enterprise Institute 2021 Comments at 3-4.
d. Use of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
70. Several commenters generally argue for a monetization of climate damages using the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas (SC-GHG) tools
167
to determine significance.
168
EDF recommends that the approach should be consistent with the Commission's practices for determining the significance of other monetized effects, such as economic impacts.
169
Public Interest Organizations comment that an established numerical significance threshold is not necessary, but if one is established, it should be used in tandem with the SCC tool and should not be based solely on one metric, especially not on a comparison to global emissions. Rather, they urge a holistic review of how a proposed project's impacts weigh against any benefits.
170
EDF states that if the climate damages exceeded monetized project benefits, the Commission could reject the project.
171
167
The SC-GHG collectively includes the values for the SCC, the social cost of methane (SCM), and social cost of nitrous oxide (SCN).
168
See, e.g.,
Policy Integrity Technical Conference Comments at 22-26; EPA 2021 Comments at 6; Ohio Environmental Council 2021 Comments at 2; Public Interest Organizations 2021 Comments at 43-45; Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. 2018 Comments at 17-22; EDF 2018 Comments at 8-11. The 2018 EDF comments were filed by a slightly different set of entities than in 2021. Public Interest Organizations' 2021 comments represent 53 entities including Natural Resources Defense Council.
169
EDF 2021 Comments at 14-16.
170
Public Interest Organizations 2021 Comments at 43-45, 50-53, 60.
171
EDF 2021 Comments at 9.
71. Conversely, other commenters oppose use of the SCC tool in determining significance
172
or of using the SCC tool at all.
173
The Attorneys General of Missouri, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia (Attorneys General of Missouri et al.) contends that the NGA does not allow use of the SCC tool to calculate speculative damages and that its use is contrary to the Commission's public interest responsibilities. Further, they argue that NEPA does not permit the use of the SCC because NEPA does not allow agencies to rely on conclusions that are speculative or reflect substandard or outdated science.
174
172
See, e.g.,
Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 32-40 (stating the Commission should use the SCC tool only as a qualitative comparison tool).
173
See, e.g.,
American Forest Technical Conference Comments at 9; Competitive Enterprise Institute Technical Conference Comments at 1-2, 7-35; Enbridge 2021 Comments at 111; Energy Infrastructure Council 2021 Comments at 24-25; Williams 2021 Comments 41-43.
174
Attorneys General of Missouri et al. 2021 Comments at 2-7. A similar group, consisting of the Attorneys General of Missouri, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming (Attorneys General of Missouri et al.), also submitted comments in response to the Commission's technical conference,
see infra
section III.C.1, extensively critiquing potential use of the SCC. Attorneys General of Missouri et al. Technical Conference Comments at 3-15. Mr. Kirk Frost also provided comments on use of the SCC, urging the Commission to use the tool to assess GHG emissions impacts. Kirk Frost December 23, 2021 Technical Conference Comments at 4.
72. Public Interest Organizations state that, while neither the NGA nor NEPA explicitly reference the SCC tool, there is nothing in these or other federal statutes that would prohibit its use.
175
New Jersey Conservation Foundation notes that President Biden's Executive Order 13990 supports the use of the SC-GHG tools by agencies to capture the full costs of GHG emissions as accurately as possible.
176
New Jersey Conservation Foundation states that following issuance of Executive Order 13990, the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (GHG IWG) published interim SC-GHG values, which the Commission should use.
177
175
Public Interest Organizations 2021 Comments at 58.
176
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 23-24 (citing Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 FR 7037, 7040 (Jan. 25, 2021)).
177
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 24.
73. CEQ notes that it was working with representatives on the GHG IWG to develop additional guidance regarding the application of the SC-GHG tools in decision-making processes, including NEPA analysis.
178
NGSA and API urge the Commission to wait for this review to be completed.
179
NGSA further states that it would be inappropriate for the Commission to develop a likely conflicting approach for utilizing the SCC tool.
180
API states that it would violate principles of consistency for the Commission to apply the interim SC-GHG values to current proposals (
i.e.,
for the remainder of this year), knowing that these values may change and lead to different treatment for future proposals.
181
EPA states that in cases where the Commission determines that a monetary comparison between benefits and costs is appropriate, the Commission should take into account established practices for benefit-cost analyses (
e.g.,
the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-4 and references therein). If the Commission chooses to use the SC-GHG tools, EPA states that it should disclose all assumptions and levels of uncertainty associated with the analysis.
182
178
CEQ 2021 Comments at 2.
C.f. Louisiana
v.
Biden,
No. 21-cv-1074-JDC-KK (W.D. La.) Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (Feb. 11, 2022).
179
API 2021 Comment at 24-25; NGSA 2021 Comments at 20-21.
180
NGSA 2021 Comments at 20-21.
181
API 2021 Comment at 25, 27-28.
182
EPA 2021 Comments at 2-3.
74. The Public Interest Organizations state that monetizing impacts using the SCC tool provides the public and decisionmakers with accessible figures useful in determining whether a project is in the public interest and allows the Commission to easily compare project harms and economic benefits, whereas other metrics can misleadingly minimize climate impacts due to inadequate contextualization.
183
183
Public Interest Organizations 2021 Comments at 58.
75. Kinder Morgan asserts that the SCC tool relies on inputs or assumptions that introduce too much uncertainty.
184
Similarly, Attorneys General of Missouri et al. contends that the SCC tool is too speculative and arbitrary to hold up to the hard-look requirement under NEPA.
185
Rebutting this, EDF emphasizes that the GHG IWG's methodology is rigorous and based on the best available data and economic practices, such as utilizing a 300-year time horizon.
186
INGAA states that the significant variation in output among GHG IWG's interim values shows that discount rates reflect a high level of uncertainty in the models and that an agency's chosen discount rate wields an outsized influence on the end result.
187
INGAA states that the Commission should: (1) Only use the SCC tool within the NEPA evaluation, not the NGA evaluation; (2) use the SCC tool as a relative, but not absolute, measure; (3) use the SCC tool only as a threshold indicator; and (4) place any SCC estimates in the proper context.
188
184
Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 34-35.
185
Attorneys General of Missouri et al. 2021 Comments at 9.
186
EDF 2021 Comments at 21.
187
INGAA 2021 Comments at 67.
188
INGAA 2021 Comments at 70-73.
76. New Jersey Conservation Foundation recommends that the Commission use all of the GHG IWG's interim values provided for the SC-GHG tools (GHG IWG recommends using a discount rate of 3%, but also provides values associated with discount rates of 2.5% and 5%).
189
189
New Jersey Conservation Foundation 2021 Comments at 24;
see also
EDF 2021 Comments at 6-7.
77. Boardwalk and Kinder Morgan argue that the Commission should only use the SCC tool as a qualitative tool.
190
Boardwalk further asserts that there should not be any triggering levels that would result in adverse action by the Commission or a significance determination. Boardwalk contends that the use of trigger levels would create substantial regulatory uncertainty. Kinder Morgan and Williams also express concern that the SCC tool yields inherently one-sided GHG data if it is applied to a project in a manner that monetizes only the project's GHG costs and not the corresponding project benefits.
191
Energy Infrastructure Council asserts that the SCC tool is meaningless without a standard or threshold for significance and its use requires a monetized cost-benefit analysis of an entire project.
192
190
Boardwalk 2021 Comments at 103; Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 32-33.
191
Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 32-33; Williams 2021 Comments at 44-45.
192
Energy Infrastructure Council 2021 Comments at 26-27.
78. Kinder Morgan states that the SCC tool was not designed for project-specific analysis but could be used as a screening tool in a qualitative analysis. If the Commission uses the SCC tool, Kinder Morgan recommends that it should explain why and how it was used.
193
This explanation should include information about the SCC's function, its mechanism, its embedded limitations and assumptions, and the specific reason for its application in a given circumstance. Kinder Morgan states that this type of explanation is vital to avoid misleading the public about the purpose of the SCC calculation and the meaning of its results.
194
Spectra Energy Partners, LP and Seneca Resources Corporation contend that the Commission has no basis to designate a particular SCC dollar amount as significant, and any such designation would be arbitrary and could not meaningfully inform the Commission's decision making or the public.
195
Additionally, Kinder Morgan states that the Commission should not use the SCC tool to determine mitigation measures or conditions because no statute requires that the Commission implement mitigation based on calculations from such a tool.
196
193
Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 42.
194
Id.
195
Seneca Resources Corp. 2018 Comments at 9; Spectra Energy Partners, LP 2018 Comments at 87.
196
Kinder Morgan 2021 Comments at 42.
2. Appropriate Level of NEPA Review and Significance Determination
79. To determine the appropriate level of NEPA review, the Commission is establishing a significance threshold of 100,000 metric tons or more per year of CO
2
e. In calculating this emissions estimate, Commission staff will apply the 100% utilization or “full burn” rate for natural gas supplies delivered by the proposed project and will prepare an EIS if the estimated emissions from the proposed project may exceed the 100,000 metric tons per year threshold.
80. An emissions threshold of 100,000 metric tons per year of CO
2
e captures the majority of annual emissions generated by Commission authorized projects, including those that may result in incremental GHG emissions over a long duration that may have a significant effect upon the human environment. Establishing a threshold for NEPA purposes also provides Commission staff, industry, and other stakeholders clarity regarding whether a particular project will result in the preparation of either an EA or an EIS. We believe that such clarity ultimately benefits both the regulated community and public by ensuring certainty regarding the Commission's process for reviewing applications for natural gas infrastructure.
81. In its NEPA document, staff will estimate the proposed project's GHG emissions based on all relevant evidence submitted in the record—including the project's utilization rate, offsets, and mitigation. A project with estimated emissions of 100,000 metric tons per year of CO
2
e or greater will be presumed to have a significant effect, unless record evidence refutes that
presumption.
197
While the 100,000 metric ton presumption will serve as a guidepost, facilitating transparent, predictable analysis of a proposed project's contribution to climate change, our analysis will continue to consider all evidence in the record on a case-by-case basis. As part of that analysis, the Commission will continue to consider any emerging tools as well as any forthcoming frameworks or analysis issued by CEQ or other agencies on this issue. Finally, as noted at the outset, we encourage commenters to address this approach to assessing significance—including the 100,000 metric ton CO
2
e threshold.
197
When examining a project's GHG emissions, the Commission will consider record evidence of the construction, operational, and, where determined to be reasonably foreseeable, downstream and upstream GHG emissions that reoccur annually over the life of the project.
a. Commission Authority To Establish a Threshold
82. Section 3 of the NGA requires the Commission to approve an application for the exportation or importation of natural gas unless the proposal “will not be consistent with the public interest.”
198
Similarly, under section 7, the Commission must find a proposed project is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.
199
The Commission has long regarded section 3's “public interest” standard and section 7's “public convenience and necessity” standard as substantially equivalent.
200
In considering applications under section 3 or section 7, the Commission must “evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest.”
201
The Commission has recognized from its earliest decisions that it may consider the end use of gas as a factor in assessing the public interest
202
and has long considered the impact of natural gas combustion on air pollution.
203
198
15 U.S.C. 717b(a).
199
Id.
717f(c), (e).
200
Distrigas Corp.
v.
FPC,
495 F.2d 1057, 1065 (D.C. Cir.).
201
Atl. Ref. Co.
v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of State of N.Y.,
360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959).
202
See, e.g., Hope Nat. Gas Co.,
4 FPC 59, 59, 66-67 (1944) (stating that “considerations of conservation are material to the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity under section 7” and authorizing a project in large part because of the particular end use of the gas);
see N. Nat. Gas Co.,
15 FPC 1634, 1641 (1956) (Connole, Comm'r, dissenting) (contending that the Commission has “long held that considerations of conservation, inferior and superior uses, and related matters are relevant to determining whether the public convenience and necessity require the issuance of a certificate”).
203
Transwestern Pipeline Co.,
36 FPC 176, 185-186, 189-191 (1966) (citing
FPC
v.
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
365 U.S. 1 (1961) (
Transco
), for the proposition that the “end use of gas was properly of concern to [the Commission], and made it clear that air pollution was a relevant consideration”).
Cf. Am. La. Pipe Line Co.,
16 FPC 897, 899-900 (1956) (“[T]here is a public need for and will be a public benefit from [the proposed] natural-gas service . . . . This need and benefit arise from the facts, among others, . . . that natural gas is a clean, convenient and efficient fuel.”).
83. As discussed above, the courts have interpreted the Commission's obligations under NEPA to require analysis of downstream GHG emissions for NGA section 7 certificate projects, but do not require an analysis of either downstream or upstream GHG emissions for section 3 export projects.
204
As also discussed above, the Commission has previously acknowledged that upstream emissions for NGA section 7 certificate projects may be difficult to quantify. However, as noted, the Commission will continue to consider on a case-by-case basis whether GHG emissions from upstream production activities are a reasonably foreseeable and causally connected result of a proposed project.
205
204
See supra
PP 34-37.
205
See supra
P 42.
84. Contrary to the suggestion of some commenters, the Commission would not intrude into another agency's domain by establishing a significance threshold. The Commission does not propose to set an emissions standard that projects will be expected to meet; rather, the threshold would be an indication of potential significance for purposes of the Commission's review of a project's environmental impacts under NEPA and trigger the preparation of an EIS.
206
206
The Commission notes that CEQ and EPA are undertaking initiatives that may culminate in the establishment of a significance threshold for GHG emissions or that may further impact the Commission's determination of GHG significance in its NEPA analysis. If CEQ or EPA issues any future guidance regarding the evaluation of GHG emissions, the Commission may adjust its methods for determining the significance of GHG emissions consistent with that guidance.
85. As discussed above, NEPA requires the Commission to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of a proposed action and to prepare an EIS disclosing its analysis to the public where its action may significantly affect the quality of the human environment, or to prepare an EA for a proposed action that is not likely to have significant effects or when the significance is unknown to determine if an EIS is necessary. We note that neither EPA nor CEQ raise objections to the Commission determining the significance of GHG emissions; in fact, EPA points to Executive Order 14008, which directs the federal government to prioritize assessment, disclosure, and mitigation of climate pollution and climate-related risks, in response to the Commission's query on how it could determine the significance of a project's GHG emissions.
207
207
EPA 2021 Comments at 6.
86. As discussed above, NEPA requires the Commission to determine whether a project would have any significant effects on the environment, including the effects of GHG emissions on the climate.
208
Moreover, courts have rejected the claim that under the NEPA framework, the determination of whether an impact is significant must not involve any subjective judgment calls.
209
208
See supra
PP 23-25.
209
Spiller
v.
White,
352 F.3d at 244 n.5.
87. We are establishing a uniform GHG emissions threshold because GHG emissions affect climate to the same degree, regardless of the location or specifics of a particular project. Establishing such a threshold will provide the Commission a workable and consistent path forward to analyze proposed projects. Further, a numerical threshold is a clear, consistent standard that can be easily understood and applied by the regulated community and interested stakeholders.
b. Rationale for an Emissions Threshold of 100,000 Metric Tons per Year
88. Human impact on the warming of the global climate system is unequivocal.
210
Even if deep reductions in GHG emissions are achieved, the planet is projected to warm by at least 1.5 degrees Celsius (°C) by 2050.
211
This level of warming will present major global consequences. For example, extreme temperature events that may have occurred once in 10 years on average in a climate without human influence will occur 4.1 times as frequently and be 1.9 °C hotter.
212
Agricultural and ecological drought events that may have occurred once in 10 years on average across drying regions in a climate without human influence will occur twice as frequently.
213
Warming beyond 1.5 °C presents even more severe consequences. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that “[w]ith every additional increment of global warming, changes in extremes continue to become larger.”
214
For example, every subsequent 0.5 °C of warming “causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves (
very likely
), and heavy precipitation
(
high confidence
), as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (
high confidence
).”
215
Because of the dire effects at stake, even relatively minor GHG emissions pose a significant threat, 100,000 metric tons per year of project GHG emissions will capture all natural gas projects that have what we believe to be the potential for causing significant impacts on climate, given the typical lifespans of authorized projects. For a single natural gas project with a lifespan of 30 years, this threshold represents a total of three million metric tons of GHG emissions.
210
IPCC Report at SPM-5.
211
See
IPCC Report at SPM-17.
212
IPCC Report at SPM-23.
213
IPCC Report at SPM-23.
214
IPCC Report at SPM-19.
215
IPCC Report at SPM-19 (emphasis in original).
89. Based on an internal review of natural gas projects from 2008 to 2021, a 100,000 metric tons per year threshold will cover the vast majority of potential GHG emissions from natural gas projects authorized by the Commission. For context, projects that likely have 100,000 metric tons per year or more of GHG emissions include projects transporting an average of 5,200 dekatherms per day and projects involving the operation of one or more compressor stations or LNG facilities.
90. Outside the NEPA context, other federal and state agencies that have established thresholds to evaluate or regulate GHG emissions from an analysis of the emissions from regulated sources. Most notably, in 2012, EPA issued the Tailoring Rule to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources of air pollution under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
216
and Title V
217
permitting programs
218
and proposed to phase in the regulation of GHG emissions in two steps. Under Step 1, sources already subject to the PSD permitting program for at least one non-GHG pollutant (“anyway” sources) were required to utilize best available control technology (BACT) for GHG emissions
219
if they increased net GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tons per year of CO
2
e.
216
The PSD permitting program is part of the New Source Review program, which requires new stationary sources and major modifications to existing major sources to obtain preconstruction permits. PSD is designed to prevent air quality deterioration in regions that are attaining the National Ambient Air Quality Standards by requiring major sources or major modifications to install the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). Major sources under the PSD program are defined as facilities that emit or have the potential to emit 250 tons per year of any criteria air pollutant or 100 tons per year of any criteria air pollutant for specific types of facilities listed in the statute. 42 U.S.C. 7479(1). The six criteria pollutants are carbon monoxide, ground-level ozone, lead, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide. 40 CFR pt. 50.
217
The Title V program requires major stationary sources to obtain a single operating permit that consolidates all of the permitting requirements in the Clean Air Act into a single permit, including PSD, New Source Performance Standards, and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. Major sources under the Title V program are defined as any stationary facility that emits or has the potential to emit 100 tons per year of any hazardous air pollutant, except GHGs. 42 U.S.C. 7602(j). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 originally designated over 180 chemicals as hazardous air pollutants, and EPA has the authority to modify the list through rulemaking. 42 U.S.C. 7412(b)-(c).
218
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and the Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 FR 31514 (June 3, 2010) (Tailoring Rule).
219
BACT is used to minimize emissions based on the maximum degree of control that the facility can achieve as determined by the permitting authority on a case-by-case basis. BACT may be a design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, such as add-on control equipment, fuel cleaning or treatment, or innovative fuel combustion techniques. Note that BACT for minimizing GHG emissions at natural gas facilities is limited.
91. Under Step 2, EPA expanded the Tailoring Rule by requiring a new source or a major modification to an existing source to obtain PSD and/or Title V permits based on GHG emissions alone. Sources that had the potential to emit at least 100,000 tons per year of CO
2
e would become newly subject to the PSD and/or Title V requirements, even if they did not exceed the statutory threshold for any other pollutant. Additionally, modifications to an existing source already subject to PSD and/or Title V that increased net GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tons per year of CO
2
e would be subject to PSD requirements regardless of whether there was an increase in the emissions of any other pollutant.
220
220
EPA also planned a Step 3 to further reduce the threshold, although not below 50,000 tons per year of CO
2
e. The Supreme Court struck down relevant portions of the Tailoring Rule before EPA finalized Step 3.
92. In setting the 75,000 tons and 100,000 tons per year of GHGs thresholds, EPA considered the administrative burden of permitting the estimated number of additional facilities under each threshold and the percentage of total national stationary source GHG emissions that would be covered under the threshold.
221
For example, under Step 1, EPA estimated a 5% increase in the total annual cost to run the permitting programs and that approximately 65% of GHG emissions would be covered. Under Step 2, EPA estimated that approximately 550 new sources would become subject to the PSD and Title V programs, increasing total annual costs to run the programs by 42% and covering 67% of GHG emissions. EPA further found that lowering the threshold to 50,000 or 25,000 tons per year of CO
2
e would drastically increase both the number of new facilities requiring permits and the cost of administering the programs but would only marginally increase the percentage of GHG emissions covered to 70% and 75%, respectively.
221
Tailoring Rule, 75 FR at 31533-80.
93. In 2014, the Supreme Court invalidated portions of the Tailoring Rule, holding that EPA may not use GHG emissions as the sole basis for determining whether a source is subject to a PSD or Title V permitting requirements.
222
While the Supreme Court's ruling struck down Step 2 of the Tailoring Rule, it upheld Step 1 and allowed EPA to continue to regulate GHG emissions from “anyway” sources. Notably, the decision did not discuss EPA's methodology for establishing the thresholds; it only ruled that deviating from the 100 and 250 tons per year statutory thresholds in the Clean Air Act when requiring sources to newly obtain PSD or Title V permits based solely on GHG emissions under Step 2 was impermissible.
222
Util. Air Regul. Grp.
v.
EPA,
573 U.S. 302, 320 (2014).
94. Further, at least two agencies in California that are directed to determine the significance of GHG emissions and climate impacts of proposed projects under the California Environmental Quality Act have also proposed or established thresholds of significance based on an analysis of regulated sources. First, in 2008, the California Air Resources Board (California ARB) proposed finding a less than significant impact for a proposed industrial project that, with mitigation, emits no more than 7,000 metric tons per year of CO
2
e from non-transportation sources, including combustion and fugitive emissions.
223
Second, the South Coast Air Quality Management District (South Coast AQMD) adopted an interim GHG significance threshold of 10,000 metric tons of CO
2
e per year for stationary
sources of air pollution in 2008.
224
Both California ARB and South Coast AQMD found that their thresholds would capture approximately 90% of emissions from their respective regulated sources.
225
223
California ARB, Preliminary Draft Staff Proposal, Recommended Approaches for Setting Interim Thresholds for Greenhouse Gases under the California Environmental Quality Act (Oct. 24, 2008) (CEQA Proposed Interim Thresholds). In addition, California ARB proposed to require these projects to meet performance standards for construction-related emissions and transportation to support a finding of less than significant impacts. CEQA Proposed Interim Thresholds at attach. A.
224
South Coast AQMD, Interim CEQA GHG Significance Threshold for Stationary Sources, Rules and Plans (Dec. 5, 2008),
http://www.aqmd.gov/docs/default-source/ceqa/handbook/greenhouse-gases-(ghg)-ceqa-significance-thresholds/ghgboardsynopsis.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
225
Id.
at 4; CEQA Proposed Interim Thresholds at attach. A.
95. Like EPA and the California agencies, we are basing our threshold on an analysis of regulated sources. Although we are adopting a conceptually similar methodology in establishing our threshold, we note that our approach will cover a larger number of emissions than the threshold established by EPA in the Tailoring Rule. EPA's thresholds of 75,000 and 100,000 tons per year accounted for only 65% and 67% of emissions from EPA-regulated sources, respectively, whereas our proposed threshold of 100,000 metric tons per year would deem nearly three-quarters of Commission-regulated natural gas project, which collectively account for roughly 99% of GHG emissions from Commission-regulated natural gas projects, to have a significant impact on climate change.
3. Other Metrics
96. As noted above, commenters argue for and against the use of various existing GHG inventories or goals as a comparison tool to determine significance. Comparison to an existing GHG inventory or goal presents substantially different percentages based on the chosen goal (international, state, regional, or local). Because different projects may have different potential purposes and the purpose of a project may be characterized to support or oppose a particular viewpoint, we do not believe that tying the Commission's significance determination for a proposed project's GHG emissions to a particular inventory or goal is appropriate. However, we recognize that this type of comparison can be helpful to inform the Commission's analysis and the public, especially when presented using a consistent metric across proposed projects under consideration by the Commission. We note that many commenters reference the SC-GHG as one tool. To the extent permitted by law,
226
the Commission could consider the SC-GHG in the future.
226
Currently, two pending court cases challenge use of the IWG's interim values by federal agencies.
Mo.
v.
Biden,
—— F. Supp. 3d ——, 2021 WL 3885590 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2021), appeal filed, No. 21-3013 (8th Cir.);
La.
v.
Biden,
No. 21-cv-1074-JDC-KK (W.D. La).
C. Mitigation
97. Federal agencies can use mitigation to minimize the potential adverse environmental effects of their actions,
227
and mitigation is used by the Commission in reviewing NGA sections 3 and 7 proposals.
228
227
Mitigation is measures that avoid, minimize, or counterbalance effects caused by a proposed action by: (1) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action; (2) minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation; (3) rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment; (4) reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action; and/or (5) compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments. 40 CFR 1508.1.
228
As discussed
supra
P 26, NEPA contains no substantive requirement that environmental impacts be mitigated or avoided, however, the environmental document must include a mitigation discussion that provides “sufficient detail” to indicate that environmental impacts have been fairly evaluated.
S. Fork Band Couns. of W. Shoshone of Nev.
v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior,
588 F.3d 718, 727 (9th Cir. 2009);
see also Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n
v.
U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
222 F.3d 677, 681 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that mitigation measures proposed in an EIS “need not be legally enforceable, funded, or even in final form to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements”).
98. The NGA grants the Commission broad authority to attach reasonable terms and conditions to NGA section 7 certificates of public convenience and necessity and NGA section 3 authorizations.
229
The Commission has consistently exercised this authority to attach environmental conditions that mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of a proposed project, and the Commission is not precluded from utilizing this authority to require a project sponsor to mitigate all, or a portion of, the impacts related to a proposed project's GHG emissions. Therefore, consistent with the discussion provided herein, going forward project proponents are encouraged to propose mitigation that will minimize climate impacts. The Commission will consider any mitigation measures proposed by the project sponsor on a case-by-case basis when balancing the need for a project against its adverse environmental impacts and may require additional mitigation as a condition of an NGA section 3 authorization or section 7 certificate.
229
See supra
P 22;
see also
15 U.S.C. 717b(e)(3)(A) (providing the authority to approve an application for an LNG Terminal, “in whole or part, with such modifications and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission find[s] necessary or appropriate”).
1. Technical Conference on GHG Mitigation
99. On November 19, 2021, the Commission held a Commission staff-led technical conference to discuss methods project sponsors may use to mitigate the effects of direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions resulting from Natural Gas Act sections 3 and 7 authorizations.
230
Representatives from industry, academia, non-governmental organizations, and state regulatory commissions participated as panelists, with discussion topics including: How the Commission could determine the quantity of reasonably foreseeable GHG emissions resulting from a project proposed under section 3 or 7 of the NGA and the appropriate level of mitigation for such emissions; types of mitigation measures a project sponsor could employ to reduce the amount of GHG emissions associated with a proposed project; and methods for the continued verification and accounting of GHG mitigation during project operation, as well as cost impacts to the industry from implementing GHG mitigation measures and how project sponsors might recover those costs.
230
See
Transcript of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Natural Gas Act Sections 3 and 7 Authorizations, Docket No. PL21-3-000 (issued Dec. 22, 2021) (Technical Conference Transcript).
100. In addition to the panelists' written statements, the Commission received over 20 comments in response to the technical conference. The Commission considered these statements and comments in developing the mitigation policy described below.
2. Authority To Require Mitigation
101. Some commenters state that the Commission has broad authority under the NGA to place conditions in certificate authorizations requiring pipeline companies to mitigate GHG impacts,
231
while others argue that the Commission does not have authority under the NGA or NEPA to impose mitigation measures,
232
especially
measures to mitigate upstream or downstream GHG emissions.
233
Specifically, commenters argue that the Commission's authority under NGA section 7(e) to place conditions on a certificate is limited by the statutory purpose to regulate interstate transportation to ensure reliable access to plentiful natural gas at reasonable prices.
234
Commenters further assert that the Commission has no authority to establish environmental policy and that the Commission cannot use its conditioning authority to indirectly mitigate an effect that it has no authority to directly mitigate.
235
231
See, e.g.,
Policy Integrity Technical Conference Comments at 2; Policy Integrity 2021 Comments at 14-15, 21; Public Interest Organizations 2021 Comments at 71-72;
see also
American Forest Technical Conference Comments at 4-5, 7-10 (stating that to the extent the courts have clarified the Commission's duty to consider GHG emissions and require mitigation for such impacts, that it supports the Commission considering mitigation on a case-by-case basis to avoid the uncertainty posed by the threat of litigation and the possibility of a court vacating the project's certificate).
232
See, e.g.,
Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 7; Dr. Jason Scott Johnston Technical Conference Comments at 1; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 4; API 2021 Comments at
29-30;
see also
Williams Technical Conference Comments at 17 (claiming that there is no reasonable basis for the Commission to require project sponsors to submit mitigation proposals with their applications because the technical conference demonstrated a lack of evidentiary support for any specific mitigation methods, offered no specific proposals regarding the levels of fees, offsets, or caps, and proposed no concrete and cost-effective means to mitigate emissions).
233
API Technical Conference Comments at 5; Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 10; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. (collectively, Con Edison) Technical Conference Comments at 5; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 1; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 6-7; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 8; API 2021 Comments at 31; INGAA 2021 Comments at 74-83; TC Energy 2021 Comments at 56-58.
234
See, e.g.,
Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 1 (citing
NAACP
v.
FPC,
425 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1976));
id.
at 8-9 (asserting that the proper place to consider GHG emissions (direct only) is under the Commission's balancing test, where a project sponsor may choose to voluntarily offset emissions); TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 8; INGAA 2021 Comments at 74-76.
235
See, e.g.,
Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 11-13 (arguing that
Transco
does not authorize the Commission to indirectly regulate upstream and downstream emissions); Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 5, 16, 21; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 4; INGAA 2021 Comments at 76-77.
102. Commenters also claim that any attempt to mitigate indirect GHG emissions would infringe on the regulatory authority of other federal and state agencies and result in back-door regulation of energy policy.
236
Specifically, commenters state that any attempt by the Commission to mitigate upstream or downstream GHG emissions would interfere with state resource decisions and usurp issues of national energy and environmental policy that Congress vested in other federal authorities.
237
For example, commenters argue that Congress has delegated authority to the EPA and state agencies to regulate GHGs under the CAA.
238
Even if the Commission had the authority to impose mitigation measures for upstream or downstream GHG emissions, commenters argue that the Commission must first establish that those GHG emissions are reasonably foreseeable and have a sufficiently close causal connection (akin to proximate causation under tort law)
239
to the authorization of a project under NEPA, and if not, should not be considered for mitigation purposes.
240
Lastly, commenters question reliance on
Sabal Trail
to support the Commission's authority to impose mitigation.
241
236
See, e.g.,
API Technical Conference Comments at 2, 4; Edison Electric Institute (EEI) Technical Conference Comments at 9-10; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 18-19, 23-24; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 5; Attorneys General of Missouri et al. Technical Conference Comments at 3 (citing
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.
v.
FERC,
621 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir, 2010)); TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 6-7; Boardwalk 2021 Comments at 10. Commenters further argue that the NGA was not enacted to comprehensively regulate the natural gas industry, but instead to fill a regulatory gap over interstate gas transportation and sales; therefore, Congress left the regulation of upstream production and downstream consumption to the states. Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 16-17; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 2 (citing
NAACP
v.
FPC,
425 U.S. at 669-70;
State of Cal.
v.
Southland Royalty Co.,
436 U.S. 519, 523 (1989);
ONEOK, Inc.
v.
Learjet, Inc.,
575 U.S. 373, 378, 384-85 (2015);
ANR Pipeline Co.
v.
FERC,
876 F.2d 124, 132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
237
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 8; Boardwalk 2021 Comments at 107; Con Edison Technical Conference Comments at 6-7 (stating that the state regulators are the best positioned to determine and impose mitigation measures for upstream and downstream GHG emissions); INGAA 2021 Comments at 77-79.
238
American Public Gas Association (APGA) Technical Conference Comments at 5-6; EEI Technical Conference Comments at 9-10; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 23-24; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 9-10.
239
Specifically, commenters argue that the Commission should rely on
Center for Biological Diversity,
which states that “the legal analysis in
Sabal Trail
is questionable at best” and that “[i]t fails to take seriously the rule of reason announced in
Public Citizen
or to account for the untenable consequences of its decision.”
Center for Biological Diversity,
941 F.3d at 1300;
see also
AGA Technical Conference Comments at 13-14; Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 16-17; Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 3; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 12-13; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 13-14.
240
API Technical Conference Comments at 4; EEI Technical Conference Comments at 6; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 14; Williams Technical Conference Comments at 5.
241
See
AGA Technical Conference Comments at 12-13 (arguing that the Commission should not rely on this statement of dicta because the issue of mandatory mitigation was not at issue in this case; rather, the court only addressed whether the Commission is, in some circumstances, required by NEPA to include a discussion of downstream GHG emissions when conducting its environmental review); Boardwalk Technical Conference Comments at 16 (same); Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 20 (same); Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 3-4 (same); TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 12 (same).
103. We disagree with contentions that the Commission does not have the authority under the NGA or NEPA to require mitigation of GHG emissions by a project sponsor. The D.C. Circuit stated in
Sabal Trail,
that “the [Commission] has legal authority to mitigate” greenhouse-gas emissions that are an indirect effect of authorizing a pipeline project.
242
And, as early as 1961, the Supreme Court recognized that the Commission's predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, had the authority to consider downstream uses, and specifically, the impact of end-users combusting transported gas on air quality, as part of its public convenience and necessity determination under the NGA.
243
Both NGA sections 3 and 7 authorize the Commission to attach “such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.”
244
Pursuant to this authority, the Commission has conditioned NGA section 7 certificates and section 3 authorizations on mitigation of impacts of the proposed project.
245
Moreover, courts have interpreted this provision broadly and given the Commission latitude in deciding what types of mitigation to require.
246
242
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1374.
243
Transco,
365 U.S. at 17;
see also NAACP
v.
FPC,
425 U.S. at n.6 (stating that the Commission has the authority to consider conservation and environmental issues under the NGA's public interest determination).
See Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,
178 FERC ¶ 61,107 at PP 71-72.
244
15 U.S.C. 717f(e);
see also id.
717b(e)(3)(A) (providing the authority to approve an application for an LNG Terminal, “in whole or part, with such modifications and upon such terms and conditions as the Commission find[s] necessary or appropriate.”).
245
For examples where the Commission has conditioned approval of natural gas projects on mitigation of adverse impacts,
see supra
note 69.
246
See Twp. of Bordentown
v.
FERC,
903 F.3d at 261 n.15 (concluding that the Commission's authority to enforce any required remediation is amply supported by provisions of the NGA);
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1374 (holding that the Commission has legal authority to mitigate reasonably foreseeable indirect effects).
104. Regarding claims that the Commission cannot mandate mitigation of downstream emissions because those emissions are outside the Commission's jurisdiction, we recognize, as many commenters assert, that the Commission does not have the statutory authority to impose conditions on downstream users or other entities outside the Commission's jurisdiction, such as production, gathering, and local distribution entities.
247
Rather, the Commission encourages each
project sponsor
to propose measures to mitigate the impacts of reasonably foreseeable
GHG emissions associated with its proposed project, and will consider such mitigation proposals in assessing the extent of a project's adverse impacts.
248
247
See generally Tex. Pipeline Ass'n
v.
FERC,
661 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Commission lacked authority to require “major non-interstate pipelines” to post certain flow information).
248
As described
supra
in section III.A.2.b, the Commission will consider GHG emission mitigation and reduction efforts taken by non-jurisdictional entities, including downstream users, when quantifying the reasonably foreseeable project GHG emissions. However, the project sponsor's GHG mitigation plan should only include its own proposed mitigation efforts.
105. We note that the Supreme Court's ruling in
Public Citizen
does not preclude the Commission from requiring project sponsors to mitigate reasonably foreseeable upstream or downstream emissions. As discussed previously,
249
the Commission may consider downstream GHG emissions under
Public Citizen,
which states that “NEPA requires `a reasonably close causal relationship' between [an] environmental effect and the alleged cause,” analogous to the “familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law” and does not require an agency to gather or consider information regarding environmental harms if it lacks authority to act on that information.
250
As directed by
Public Citizen,
decisionmakers should “look to the underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”
251
Here, the NGA “broadly instruct[s]” the Commission to consider “the public convenience and necessity” when evaluating proposed interstate pipeline applications, balancing public benefits against adverse effects, including adverse environmental effects,
252
and we have noted that the Commission has consistently exercised its broad conditioning authority under the NGA to attach environmental conditions that mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of a proposed project.
253
NEPA requires an agency to consider the environmental impacts of its actions, including steps that could be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences,
254
although it does not require a federal agency to take action to mitigate those adverse effects.
255
As CEQ recognizes, an agency may, however, require mitigation of impacts under its authority as a condition of its permitting or approval.
256
Thus, as the D.C. Circuit held in
Sabal Trail,
the Commission can deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment, because the agency is the “legally relevant cause” of the direct and reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of the pipelines it approves.
257
Accordingly, the Commission may consider the end use of gas and the impact of natural gas combustion on air pollution as a factor in assessing the public interest.
258
However, as detailed below, the Commission's priority is for project sponsors to mitigate, to the greatest extent possible, a project's direct GHG emissions. The Commission also encourages project sponsors to propose mitigation of reasonably foreseeable indirect emissions, and will take such proposals into account in assessing the extent of a project's adverse impacts.
249
See supra
section III.A.1.b.
250
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. at 767, 770 (quoting
Metro. Edison Co.,
460 U.S. at 774);
see Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1372.
251
Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. at 767 (quoting
Metro. Edison Co.,
460 U.S. at 774 n.7).
252
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1373 (citing
Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety
v.
FERC,
762 F.3d 97, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty.
v.
FERC,
783 F.3d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
253
See supra
P 97.
254
Robertson
v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. at 351 (“To be sure, one important ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences.”).
255
Id.
at 352 (“There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other.”);
S. Fork Band Couns. of W. Shoshone of Nev.
v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior,
588 F.3d at 727 (NEPA does not require that agencies mitigate significant environmental harms).
256
Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact,
76 FR 3843, 3848.
257
Sabal Trail,
867 F.3d at 1373 (distinguishing
Public Citizen
).
258
See supra
P 80.
3. Mitigation Measures
106. The Commission encourages the project sponsor to propose measures to mitigate the direct GHG emissions of its proposed project to the extent these emissions have a significant adverse environmental impact.
259
INGAA describes three possible levels of mitigation—to zero, to a level of below significance, and to an amount to be determined by use of the SCC—but dismisses each as unworkable, improperly adopting broad policy judgements, and reliant on a one-sided and imprecise methodology, respectively.
260
The Commission plans to evaluate proposed mitigation plans on a case-by-case basis and is not mandating a standard level of mitigation. We also encourage project sponsors to proposed measures to mitigate the reasonably foreseeable upstream or downstream emissions associated with their projects.
259
The Attorneys General of Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia (Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al.) recommends that the Commission include reasonable, binding mitigation measures that incorporate any applicable state or federal regulations or permit conditions. Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. Technical Conference Comments at 6. The technical conference commenters are made up of a slightly different group of state attorneys general than those filing comments in 2018 or 2021. As explained below, the Commission is only considering mitigation measures that reduce emissions beyond those associated with regulatory requirements in this policy statement.
260
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 21-27;
see also
Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 12-13, 35-38 (recommending the Commission await direction from Congress in choosing a mitigation level, especially if requiring project sponsors to mitigate to less than significant levels and noting that mitigation to zero is not practicable if downstream or upstream emissions are included).
107. The Commission will consider the project's impact on climate change, including the project sponsor's mitigation proposal, as part of its public interest determination under NGA section 3 or 7.
261
When making the public interest determination, the Commission will assess the adequacy of the project sponsor's proposed mitigation on a case-by-case basis and will consider the project's impact on climate change as one of many factors.
262
Further, the Commission may require additional mitigation of a project's direct GHG emissions as a condition of the authorization, should the Commission deem a project sponsor's proposed mitigation inadequate to support the public interest determination.
261
Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. urges the Commission to consider the impacts of any mitigation measures on environmental justice communities. Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. Technical Conference Comments at 5-6.
262
Jennifer Danis, Senior Fellow with the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and a panelist at the GHG Technical Conference on Panel 1, recommends that the Commission should not consider the effect of any mitigation measures in its public interest determination but should only consider mitigation measures once the Commission has determined that public convenience and necessity absolutely requires the project. Jennifer Danis Technical Conference Statement at 8-11. As explained in the Certificate Policy Statement, the Commission considers all factors, including the extent to which adverse impacts are mitigated, to determine whether a project is in the public convenience and necessity.
Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,
178 FERC ¶ 61,107 at PP 70, 93-95.
108. Also we note that NEPA does not preclude the Commission from approving a project with significant adverse impacts.
263
If a project's emissions equal or exceed the 100,000
metric tons per year significance threshold and the project sponsor's proposed mitigation will reduce the project's GHG emissions below that threshold, the Commission will consider that mitigation in determining whether it can make a finding of no significant impact.
263
See supra
section II.B.
109. While the Commission has broad authority to require mitigation of GHG emissions by a project sponsor, we are not mandating here any particular form of mitigation.
264
A project sponsor is free to propose any mechanism to mitigate the project's GHG emissions.
265
However, in order to ensure that any GHG emissions reduction mechanisms achieve real, verifiable, and measurable reductions, any proposed mechanisms should:
264
Commenters emphasize the need for flexibility in assessing mitigation measures.
See, e.g.,
Enbridge Pre-Conference Comments at 9; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 46-47 (suggesting that, depending on a variety of factors, the applicant may or may not be able to propose appropriate mitigation at the time of the project application); Hon. Joseph T. Kelliher Technical Conference Comments at 11 (recommending alternatives to imposing mitigation requirements such as revising the Commission's 2015 Modernization Policy Statement, issuing a new GHG policy statement that either allows limited section 4 rate filings to recover costs or clarifies the level of shipper support required to support establishment of a tracker surcharge and recommending that such a policy address lost and unaccounted-for fuel, or implementing a fast track certificate process for project sponsors that voluntarily commit to mitigate direct GHG emissions); INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 30; Magnolia LNG LLC Technical Conference Comments at 2; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 5, 21 (arguing against the Commission requiring marked-based mitigation measures). A few commenters either oppose use of the SCC in determining a required level of mitigation for project emissions, Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 6, 38-39, or urge the Commission to use the SCC to monetize the impacts of any GHGs that are not able to be mitigated, Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. Technical Conference Comments at 7. As described above, the Commission does not propose to mandate any particular level or type of mitigation.
265
For example, Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, proposed to offset the operational emissions of the Mountain Valley Pipeline Project by purchasing carbon offset credits equivalent to 90% of GHG emissions associated with the project's operations in its first 10 years of service from a new methane abatement project located at a mine in southwest Virginia. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, Carbon Offset Commitment for Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Operations, Docket No. CP21-57-000 (filed July 12, 2021).
a. Be both real and additional—the emissions reductions would not have otherwise happened unless the proposed reduction mechanism was implemented, and the associated reductions occur beyond regulatory requirements;
266
266
Regulatory requirements include those imposed by the Commission and other federal and state regulatory agencies. However, project sponsors may include participation in voluntary regulatory programs that reduce GHG emissions.
b. be quantifiable—any emissions reductions must be calculated using a transparent and replicable methodology;
c. be unencumbered—seller has clear ownership of or exclusive rights to the benefits of the GHG reduction; and
d. be trackable—the project sponsor must also propose means for the Commission to monitor and track compliance with the proposed mitigation measures for the life of the project.
110. Commenters express concerns with how the Commission will determine whether mitigation measures are verifiable or how the Commission will monitor or track compliance with mitigation measures in a way that avoids double counting emissions reductions.
267
Commenters point out that other federal agencies and states are already monitoring GHG emissions from certificated projects, such as EPA's GHG Reporting Rule, so a Commission-designed monitoring scheme would be duplicative and unnecessary.
268
EEI recommends that the Commission explore interagency agreements or memorandums of understanding (MOU) with agencies like EPA and PHMSA to avoid redundancies and clarify mitigation responsibilities,
269
while INGAA states that such agreements or MOUs would be insufficient.
270
267
See, e.g.,
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 38-39. Dr. Carl Pechman, Director of the National Regulatory Research Institute and a panelist at the GHG Technical Conference on Panel 3, provides extensive comments on how the Commission could establish accounting protocols and offset tracking. Dr. Carl Pechman Technical Conference Statement at 1-15.
268
APGA Technical Conference Comments at 8-9; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 48-49; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 40-41; TC Energy Technical Conference Comments at 5-6, 22-23. Similarly, commenters state that the Commission should defer to other agencies, such as the EPA and state environmental agencies, that are already taking regulatory action regarding emissions, express concern over the potential for inconsistent mitigation requirements between agencies, and/or point to EPA's methane regulation proposal to reduce GHG emissions from new, reconstructed, modified, and existing facilities in the oil and gas source category under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. APGA Technical Conference Comments at 5; EEI Technical Conference Comments at 10-11; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 30-32; NGSA Technical Conference Comments at 6-7. Conversely, one commenter encourages the Commission to use resources from the EPA's pending rulemaking. Attorneys General of Massachusetts et al. Technical Conference Comments at 6-7 (referencing Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 86 FR 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021)).
269
EEI Technical Conference Comments at 12-14.
270
INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 40-41.
111. We believe it best not to mandate mitigation based on a specific volume or proportion of emissions. Encouraging project sponsors to submit proposed mitigation measures as opposed to mandating a certain level of mitigation for all projects allows the Commission to consider a project sponsor's proposed mitigation plan in comparison to the project's benefits, such as fuel switching or providing reliable gas service, when making a public interest determination and allows project sponsors the flexibility to choose what mitigation measures work best for their individual project. Moreover, we recognize that determining an appropriate amount of mitigation, particularly for downstream uses, depends on a variety of complex factors, some of which may not be known at the time of an application, such as state and local climate change policies, the interconnected nature of the natural gas pipeline system, long-term changes in natural gas supply sources, changes in demand for natural gas over time, individual companies' long-term goals to reduce GHG emissions, the availability of renewable energy credits or other carbon offsets, and the potential for future action by other federal agencies.
271
271
See, e.g.,
Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 86 FR 63110 (Nov. 15, 2020).
112. Similarly, we believe it best to allow project sponsors to demonstrate that their proposed mitigation measures are verifiable and propose means for the Commission to monitor or track the proposed measures through the life of the project. This approach allows project sponsors to take advantage of existing monitoring programs and tailor verification and tracking to their chosen mitigation proposals and prevents the Commission from needing to establish a new monitoring program.
4. Opportunities for Mitigation
113. While project sponsors are free to propose any type of mitigation mechanism, the following are examples of mitigation mechanisms project sponsors may consider.
a. Market-Based Mitigation
114. Project sponsors may mitigate the GHG emissions of a proposed project through participation in one (or more) of the various types of carbon offset markets. Sponsors could, for example, purchase renewable energy credits, participate in a mandatory compliance market (if located in a state that requires participation in such a market), or participate in a voluntary carbon market.
i. Renewable Energy Credits
115. Renewable energy credits (REC) are tradeable, market-based
commodities that provide proof that one megawatt hour of electricity was generated from a renewable source and delivered to the grid. RECs legally convey the attributes of renewable electricity generation to their owner. While state or regional RECs may be traded on financial exchanges that typically meet state or regional guidelines, they are not limited by geographic boundaries—RECs can be purchased independently from electricity and can be matched with energy consumption.
272
272
For more information, see EPA Green Power Partnership,
Offsets and RECs: What's the Difference
(Feb. 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03/documents/gpp_guide_recs_offsets.pdf.
116. Commenters argue that the Commission may not require RECs because unlike offsets, RECs pertain only to the use of electric power and are therefore not appropriate for upstream or downstream mitigation, do not mitigate or compensate for GHG emissions, and are not denominated in carbon dioxide (CO
2
) or CO
2
e, thus, they cannot represent any specific amount of avoided or reduced emissions.
273
Enbridge also states that in most instances, project sponsors will not qualify to purchase RECs under existing state programs.
274
While RECs may not represent a 100% offset per unit of GHG emitted, RECs do represent a decrease in GHG emissions from overall energy use and production, and we will consider them.
273
Enbridge Pre-Conference Comments at 6-7; Enbridge Technical Conference Comments at 42-46; Enbridge 2021 Comments at 145-148; INGAA Technical Conference Comments at 33.
274
Enbridge 2021 Comments at 23, 148 n. 406 (stating that the lack of a federal REC program coupled with the patchwork of state and regional, as well as voluntary and mandatory, REC programs brings into question whether project sponsors could participate in these existing programs).
ii. Mandatory Compliance Market Participation
117. The compliance market is a mandatory offset program regulated by national, regional, or provincial law and mandates CO
2
and GHG emission reduction requirements. Under this framework an allowance, which is an authorization for an entity to emit GHG emissions, is created. Allowances are generated and traded for regulatory compliance and are priced as a commodity based on supply and demand, regardless of project type.
118. A prime example of an existing, domestic compliance market is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI is a cooperative effort by eleven Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states
275
to limit CO
2
emissions at certain electric power generators. Each region involved in RGGI has an established emissions budget (cap) and each
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