Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds
Federal RegisterFeb 28, 2020
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Part 44
[Docket No. OCC-2020-0002]
RIN 1557-AE67
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 248
[Docket No. R-1694]
RIN 7100-AF70
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 351
RIN 3064-AF17
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 75
RIN 3038-AE93
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 255
[Release No. BHCA-8; File No. S7-02-20]
RIN 3235-AM70
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds
AGENCY:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
ACTION:
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY:
The OCC, Board, FDIC, SEC, and CFTC (together, the agencies) are inviting comment on a proposal that would amend the regulations implementing section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act). Section 13 contains certain restrictions on the ability of a banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board to engage in proprietary trading and have certain interests in, or relationships with, a hedge fund or private equity fund. The proposed amendments are intended to continue the agencies' efforts to improve and streamline the regulations implementing section 13 of the BHC Act by modifying and clarifying requirements related to the covered fund provisions.
DATES:
Comments must be received on or before April 1, 2020.
ADDRESSES:
Interested parties are encouraged to submit written comments jointly to all of the agencies. Commenters are encouraged to use the title “Proposed Revisions to Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds” to facilitate the organization and distribution of comments among the agencies. Commenters are also encouraged to identify the number of the specific question for comment to which they are responding. Comments should be directed to:
OCC:
You may submit comments to the OCC by any of the methods set forth below. Commenters are encouraged to submit comments through the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please use the title “Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds” to facilitate the organization and distribution of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal—“Regulations.gov
Classic or Regulations.gov
Beta”
:
Regulations.gov Classic:
Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/.
Enter “Docket ID OCC-2020-0002” in the Search Box and click “Search.” Click on “Comment Now” to submit public comments. For help with submitting effective comments please click on “View Commenter's Checklist.” Click on the “Help” tab on the
Regulations.gov
home page to get information on using
Regulations.gov
, including instructions for submitting public comments.
Regulations.gov Beta:
Go to
https://beta.regulations.gov/
or click “Visit New
Regulations.gov
Site” from the
Regulations.gov
Classic homepage. Enter “Docket ID OCC-2020-0002” in the Search Box and click “Search.” Public comments can be submitted via the “Comment” box below the displayed document information or by clicking on the document title and then clicking the “Comment” box on the top-left side of the screen. For help with submitting effective comments please click on “Commenter's Checklist.” For assistance with the
Regulations.gov
Beta site, please call (877) 378-5457 (toll free) or (703) 454-9859 Monday-Friday, 9 a.m.-5 p.m. ET or email
regulations@erulemakinghelpdesk.com.
•
Email:
regs.comments@occ.treas.gov
.
•
Mail:
Chief Counsel's Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-218, Washington, DC 20219.
•
Hand Delivery/Courier:
400 7th Street SW, Suite 3E-218, Washington, DC 20219.
•
Fax:
(571) 465-4326.
Instructions:
You must include “OCC” as the agency name and “Docket ID OCC 2020-0002” in your comment. In general, the OCC will enter all comments received into the docket and publish the comments on the
Regulations.gov
website without change, including any business or personal information that you provide such as name and address information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
•
Viewing Comments Electronically—Regulations.gov Classic or Regulations.gov Beta:
Regulations.gov Classic:
Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/.
Enter “Docket ID OCC-2020-0002” in the Search box and click “Search.” Click on “Open Docket Folder” on the right side of the screen. Comments and supporting materials can be viewed and filtered by clicking on “View all documents and comments in this docket” and then using the filtering tools on the left side of the screen. Click on the “Help” tab on the
Regulations.gov
home page to get information on using
Regulations.gov
. The docket may be viewed after the close of the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
Regulations.gov Beta:
Go to
https://beta.regulations.gov/
or click “Visit New
Regulations.gov Site
” from the
Regulations.gov
Classic homepage. Enter “Docket ID OCC-2020-0002” in the Search Box and click “Search.” Click on the “Comments” tab. Comments can be viewed and filtered by clicking on the “Sort By” drop-down on the right side of the screen or the “Refine Results” options on the left side of the screen. Supporting materials can be viewed by clicking on the “Documents” tab and filtered by clicking on the “Sort By” drop-down on the right side of the screen or the “Refine Results” options on the left side
of the screen. For assistance with the
Regulations.gov
Beta site, please call (877) 378-5457 (toll free) or (703) 454-9859 Monday-Friday, 9 a.m.-5 p.m. ET or email
regulations@erulemakinghelpdesk.com
.
The docket may be viewed after the close of the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
•
Viewing Comments Personally:
You may personally inspect comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 20219. For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening in order to inspect comments.
Board:
You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1694; RIN 7100-AF70, by any of the following methods:
•
Agency Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
•
Email: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Include docket and RIN numbers in the subject line of the message.
•
Fax:
(202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
•
Mail:
Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551.
All public comments will be made available on the Board's website at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm
as submitted, unless modified for technical reasons or to remove personally identifiable information at the commenter's request. Accordingly, comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper form in Room 146, 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC:
You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-AF17 by any of the following methods:
•
Agency Website: https://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html.
Follow instructions for submitting comments on the Agency website.
•
Mail:
Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: Comments/Legal ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
•
Hand Delivered/Courier:
Comments may be hand-delivered to the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street, NW, building (located on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
•
Email: comments@FDIC.gov.
Include the 3064-AF17 on the subject line of the message.
•
Public Inspection:
All comments received must include the agency name and RIN 3064-AF17 for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without change to
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/,
including any personal information provided. Paper copies of public comments may be ordered from the FDIC Public Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington, VA 22226 or by telephone at (877) 275-3342 or (703) 562-2200.
CFTC:
You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3038-AE93 and “Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds,” by any of the following methods:
•
Agency Website: https://comments.cftc.gov.
Follow the instructions on the website for submitting comments.
•
Mail:
Send to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
•
Hand Delivery/Courier:
Same as Mail above.
Please submit your comments using only one method. All comments must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied by an English translation. Comments will be posted as received to
www.cftc.gov
and the information you submit will be publicly available. If, however, you submit information that ordinarily is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, you may submit a petition for confidential treatment of the exempt information according to the procedures set forth in CFTC Regulation 145.9.1. The CFTC reserves the right, but shall have no obligation, to review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse or remove any or all of your submission from
www.cftc.gov
that it may deem to be inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language. All submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the public comment file and will be considered as required under the Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under the Freedom of Information Act.
SEC:
You may submit comments by the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the SEC's internet comment form (
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml
); or
Send an email to
rule-comments@sec.gov.
Please include File Number S7-02-20 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-02-20. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The SEC will post all comments on the SEC's website (
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml
). Comments are also available for website viewing and printing in the SEC's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that the SEC does not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the SEC or SEC staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any materials will be made available on the SEC's website. To ensure direct electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the “Stay Connected” option at
www.sec.gov
to receive notifications by email.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC:
Roman Goldstein, Risk Specialist, Treasury and Market Risk Policy, (202) 649-6360; Tabitha Edgens, Counsel; Mark O'Horo, Senior Attorney, Chief Counsel's Office, (202) 649-5490; for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW, Washington, DC 20219.
Board:
Flora Ahn, Special Counsel, (202) 452-2317, Gregory Frischmann, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-2803, Kirin Walsh, Attorney, (202) 452-3058, or Sarah Podrygula, Attorney, (202) 912-4658, Legal Division, Elizabeth
MacDonald, Manager, (202) 475-6316, Cecily Boggs, Senior Financial Institution Policy Analyst, (202) 530-6209, Jinai Holmes, Lead Financial Institution Policy Analyst, (202) 452-2834, Division of Supervision and Regulation; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, Washington, DC 20551.
FDIC:
Bobby R. Bean, Associate Director,
bbean@fdic.gov,
Andrew D. Carayiannis, Senior Policy Analyst,
acarayiannis@fdic.gov,
or Brian Cox, Senior Policy Analyst,
brcox@fdic.gov,
Capital Markets Branch, (202) 898-6888; Michael B. Phillips, Counsel,
mphillips@fdic.gov,
or Benjamin J. Klein, Counsel,
bklein@fdic.gov,
Legal Division, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20429.
CFTC:
Cantrell Dumas, Special Counsel, (202) 418-5043,
cdumas@cftc.gov;
Jeffrey Hasterok, Data and Risk Analyst, (646) 746-9736,
jhasterok@cftc.gov,
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight; Mark Fajfar, Assistant General Counsel, (202) 418-6636,
mfajfar@cftc.gov,
Office of the General Counsel; Stephen Kane, Research Economist, (202) 418-5911,
skane@cftc.gov,
Office of the Chief Economist; Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
SEC:
Matthew Cook, Senior Counsel, Benjamin Tecmire, Senior Counsel, and Jennifer Songer, Branch Chief at (202) 551-6787 or
IArules@sec.gov,
Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Overview of Proposal
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Qualifying Foreign Excluded Funds
B. Modifications to Existing Covered Fund Exclusions
1. Foreign Public Funds
2. Loan Securitizations
3. Public Welfare and Small Business Funds
C. Proposed Additional Covered Fund Exclusions
1. Credit Funds
2. Venture Capital Funds
3. Family Wealth Management Vehicles
4. Customer Facilitation
D. Limitations on Relationships With a Covered Fund
E. Ownership Interest
F. Parallel Investments
G. Technical Amendments
IV. Administrative Law Matters
A. Solicitation of Comments on Use of Plain Language
B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis Request for Comment on Proposed Information Collection
C. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
E. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
F. SEC Economic Analysis
G. SEC Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
I. Background
Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act),
1
also known as the Volcker Rule, generally prohibits any banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading or from acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a hedge fund or private equity fund (covered fund).
2
The statute expressly exempts from these prohibitions various activities, including among other things:
1
12 U.S.C. 1851.
2
Id.
• Underwriting and market making-related activities;
• Risk-mitigating hedging activities;
• Activities on behalf of customers;
• Activities for the general account of insurance companies; and
• Trading and covered fund activities and investments by non-U.S. banking entities solely outside the United States.
3
3
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1).
In addition, section 13 of the BHC Act contains an exemption that permits banking entities to organize and offer, including sponsor, covered funds, subject to certain restrictions, including that banking entities do not rescue investors in those funds from loss, and are not themselves exposed to significant losses due to investments in or other relationships with these funds.
4
4
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(G). Other restrictions and requirements include: (1) The banking entity provides bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory services; (2) the fund is organized and offered only to customers in connection with the provision of such services; (3) the banking entity does not have an ownership interest in the fund, except for a de minimis investment; (4) the banking entity complies with certain marketing restrictions related to the fund; (5) no director or employee of the banking entity has an ownership interest in the fund, with certain exceptions; and (6) the banking entity discloses to investors that it does not guarantee the performance of the fund.
Id.
Authority under section 13 of the BHC Act for developing and adopting regulations to implement the prohibitions, restrictions, and exemptions of section 13 is shared among the Board, the FDIC, the OCC, the SEC, and the CFTC (individually, an agency, and collectively, the agencies).
5
The agencies originally issued a final rule implementing section 13 in December 2013 (the 2013 rule), and those provisions became effective on April 1, 2014.
6
5
12 U.S.C. 1851(b)(2).
6
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds; Final Rule, 79 FR 5535 (Jan. 31, 2014).
The agencies published a notice of proposed rulemaking in July 2018 (the 2018 proposed rule or 2018 proposal) that proposed several amendments to the 2013 rule.
7
These proposed revisions sought to provide greater clarity and certainty about what activities are prohibited under the 2013 rule—in particular, under the prohibition on proprietary trading—and to better tailor the compliance requirements based on the risk of a banking entity's activities. The agencies issued a final rule implementing the amendments in November 2019 (the 2019 amendments), and those provisions became effective in January 2020.
8
7
Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 83 FR 33432 (July 17, 2018).
8
Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 84 FR 61974 (Nov. 14, 2019). The agencies refer to the regulations implementing section 13 of the BHC Act that are effective as of February 28, 2020 as the “implementing regulations.”
As part of the 2018 proposal, the agencies suggested targeted changes to the provisions of the 2013 rule relating to acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with a fund and sought comments on other aspects of the covered fund provisions beyond those changes for which specific rule text was proposed.
9
The 2019 amendments finalized those changes to the covered fund provisions for which specific rule text was proposed in the 2018 proposal. The agencies indicated they would continue to consider other aspects of the covered fund provisions and intended to issue a separate proposed rulemaking that specifically addresses those areas.
10
9
83 FR 33471-87.
10
84 FR 62016.
The staffs of the agencies also have addressed several questions concerning the regulations implementing section 13 through a series of staff Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).
11
In the 2018
proposal, the agencies requested comment on the effectiveness of the guidance provided in certain of these FAQs.
12
The agencies discussed comments received in the preamble to the 2019 amendments.
13
The proposed rule would not modify or revoke any previously issued staff FAQs, unless otherwise specified.
11
See https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/trading-volckerrule/volcker-rule-implementation-faqs.html
(OCC);
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm
(Board);
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/volcker/faq.html
(FDIC);
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-volcker-rule-section13.htm
(SEC);
https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/DF
_
28
_
VolckerRule/index.htm
(CFTC).
12
83 FR 33444-33446.
13
84 FR 61978-61980.
High-Level Summary of Comments on 2018 Proposal
14
14
This summary is not meant to be a comprehensive assessment of the comments received on the 2018 proposal and only reviews certain major areas of interest. Comments are discussed in greater detail throughout this
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
.
The agencies invited comment on all aspects of the 2018 proposal and received over 75 unique comments and approximately 3,700 comments from individuals using a version of a short form letter to express opposition to the 2018 proposed rule.
15
The preamble to the 2019 amendments reviewed comments relating to the proprietary trading provisions of the 2018 proposal and the covered fund provisions that were adopted as part of the 2019 amendments. The agencies generally deferred public consideration of comments received on other aspects of the covered fund provisions to a future proposed rulemaking.
15
84 FR 61976.
Various industry groups suggested maintaining the 2013 rule's base definition of covered fund, citing costs associated with complying with a new definition, while others supported an alternative definition. A number of industry groups and banks, and several Members of Congress, urged the agencies to amend the definition of covered fund to exclude certain funds, including the following: (1) Family wealth investment vehicles; (2) funds that extend credit to customers; (3) long-term investment funds that do not engage in any short-term proprietary trading; (4) venture capital funds; and (5) customer facilitation funds. Various public interest commenters objected to any additional exclusions, citing insufficient notice in the 2018 proposal and the potential for evasion of the 2013 rule.
Commenters also proposed modifying the 2013 rule's existing exclusions from the definition of covered fund. Numerous industry groups suggested revising the exclusion for foreign public funds to focus on the characteristics of the fund and foreign regulations, rather than imposing specific conduct requirements that are difficult to monitor and verify. Several industry groups made various suggestions for simplifying the loan securitization exemption, including expanding the securities an issuer is permitted to hold and permitting an issuer to hold up to a certain percent of assets in non-loan assets.
Finally, several bank and industry group commenters supported making the exemptions under section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act and the Board's Regulation W available under section 13(f) of the BHC Act. Several such commenters also supported exempting certain payment, clearing, and settlement services from the restrictions. A foreign bank industry group also recommended limiting the application of section 13(f) to the U.S. operations of foreign firms.
II. Overview of Proposal
The agencies are issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that proposes specific changes to the restrictions on covered fund investments and activities and other issues related to the treatment of investment funds in the implementing regulations (the proposal or the proposed rule). The proposed rule is intended to improve and streamline the covered fund provisions and provide clarity to banking entities so that they can offer financial services and engage in other permissible activities in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act.
To better limit the extraterritorial impact of the implementing regulations, the proposal would exempt the activities of certain funds that are organized outside of the United States and offered to foreign investors (qualifying foreign excluded funds) from the restrictions of the implementing regulations. In certain circumstances, some foreign funds that are not “covered funds” may be subject to the implementing regulations as “banking entities,” if they are controlled by a foreign banking entity, and thus could be subject to more onerous compliance obligations than are imposed on similarly-situated covered funds, even though the foreign funds have limited nexus to the United States. This provision would codify an existing policy statement by the Federal banking agencies that addresses the potential attribution to a foreign banking entity of the activities and investments of qualifying foreign excluded funds.
The proposal also would make modifications to several existing exclusions from the covered fund provisions, to provide clarity and simplify compliance with the requirements of the implementing regulations. First, the proposal would revise certain restrictions in the foreign public funds exclusion to more closely align the provision with the exclusion for similarly-situated U.S. registered investment companies. Second, the proposed rule would permit loan securitizations excluded from the rule to hold a small amount of non-loan assets, consistent with past industry practice, and codify existing staff-level guidance regarding this exclusion. In addition, the proposed rule would revise the exclusion for small business investment companies to account for the life cycle of those companies and would request comment on whether to clarify the scope of the exclusion for public welfare investments, including as it relates to rural business investment companies and qualified opportunity zone funds. Finally, the proposed rule would address concerns about certain components of the preamble to the 2013 rule related to calculating a banking entity's ownership interests in covered funds.
The agencies recognized in the preamble to the 2013 rule that the definition of “covered fund” was expansive
16
and, based on their experience implementing the rule, the agencies are now proposing several new exclusions from the covered fund provisions to address the potential over-breadth of the covered fund definition and related requirements. For example, the agencies recognize that the exclusions in the implementing regulations have inhibited banking entities' relationships with credit funds, and the proposed rule would create a new exclusion for such funds. Under the proposal, banking entities would be able to invest in and have certain relationships with credit funds that extend the type of credit that a banking entity may provide directly, subject to certain safeguards. Relatedly, the proposed rule would establish an exclusion from the definition of covered fund for venture capital funds. This provision would help ensure that banking entities can fully engage in this important type of development and investment activity, which may facilitate capital formation and provide important financing for small businesses, particularly in areas where such financing may not be readily available.
16
See
79 FR 5677.
The proposal also would include two new exclusions that would allow banking entities to provide certain traditional financial services via a fund structure, subject to certain safeguards.
First, the proposed rule would exclude from the definition of covered fund an entity created and used to facilitate a customer's exposures to a transaction, investment strategy, or other service. Second, the proposal would exclude from the covered fund definition wealth management vehicles that manage the investment portfolio of a family, and certain other persons, allowing a banking entity to provide integrated private wealth management services.
In addition, the proposed rule would permit a banking entity to engage in a limited set of covered transactions with a covered fund the banking entity sponsors or advises or with which the banking entity has certain other relationships. The implementing regulations generally prohibit all covered transactions between a covered fund and its banking entity sponsor or investment adviser. The agencies recognize that the existing restrictions have prevented banking entities from providing certain traditional banking services to covered funds, such as standard payment, clearing, and settlement services to related covered funds.
Lastly, the proposal would clarify certain aspects of the definition of ownership interest. Currently, due to the broad definition of ownership interest, some loans by banking entities to covered funds could be deemed to be ownership interests. The proposal would provide a safe harbor for bona fide senior loans or senior debt instruments to make clear that an “ownership interest” in a fund does not include such credit interests in the fund. In addition, the proposal would provide clarity about the types of credit rights that would be considered within the scope of the definition of ownership interest. Finally, the proposed rule would simplify compliance efforts by tailoring the calculation of a banking entity's compliance with the implementing regulations' aggregate fund limit and covered fund deduction, and provide clarity to banking entities regarding their permissible investments made alongside covered funds.
17
17
Separately, the agencies are proposing various technical edits to the implementing regulations.
See infra
III.G (Technical Amendments).
The agencies request comment regarding all aspects of the proposed rule. Specific requests for comment are included in the following sections. Comments on the proposal must be submitted to the agencies on or before April 1, 2020.
III. Discussion of the Proposal
A. Qualifying Foreign Excluded Funds
Since the adoption of the 2013 rule, a number of foreign banking entities, foreign government officials, and other market participants have expressed concern regarding instances in which certain funds offered and sold outside of the United States are excluded from the covered fund definition but still could be considered banking entities in certain circumstances (foreign excluded funds).
18
This situation may occur if a foreign banking entity controls the foreign fund. A foreign banking entity could be considered to control the fund based on common corporate governance structures abroad such as where the fund's sponsor selects the majority of the fund's directors or trustees, or otherwise controls the fund for purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act by contract or through a controlled corporate director. As a result, such a fund would be subject to the requirements of section 13 and the implementing regulations, including restrictions on proprietary trading, restrictions on investing in or sponsoring covered funds, and compliance obligations.
18
The 2013 rule generally excludes covered funds from the definition of “banking entity.” 2013 rule § _.2(c)(2)(i). However, because foreign excluded funds are not covered funds, they can become banking entities through affiliation with other banking entities.
The Federal banking agencies released a policy statement on July 21, 2017 (the 2017 policy statement) to address concerns about the possible unintended consequences and extraterritorial impact of section 13 and the 2013 rule for foreign excluded funds.
19
The 2017 policy statement noted that the staffs of the agencies were considering alternative ways in which the 2013 rule could be amended, or other appropriate action could be taken, to address any unintended consequences of section 13 and the 2013 rule for foreign excluded funds.
19
Statement regarding Treatment of Certain Foreign Funds under the Rules Implementing Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act (July 21, 2017),
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20170721a1.pdf.
For purposes of the 2017 policy statement, a “qualifying foreign excluded fund” meant, with respect to a foreign banking entity, an entity that:
(1) Is organized or established outside the United States and the ownership interests of which are offered and sold solely outside the United States;
(2) Would be a covered fund were the entity organized or established in the United States, or is, or holds itself out as being, an entity or arrangement that raises money from investors primarily for the purpose of investing in financial instruments for resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in financial instruments;
(3) Would not otherwise be a banking entity except by virtue of the foreign banking entity's acquisition or retention of an ownership interest in, or sponsorship of, the entity;
(4) Is established and operated as part of a bona fide asset management business; and
(5) Is not operated in a manner that enables the foreign banking entity to evade the requirements of section 13 or implementing regulations.
To provide additional time to consider this issue, the 2017 policy statement provided that the Federal banking agencies would not propose to take action during the one-year period ending July 21, 2018, against a foreign banking entity
20
based on attribution of the activities and investments of a qualifying foreign excluded fund to a foreign banking entity, or against a qualifying foreign excluded fund as a banking entity. To be eligible for this relief, the foreign banking entity's acquisition or retention of any ownership interest in, or sponsorship of, the qualifying foreign excluded fund must have met the requirements for permitted covered fund activities and investments solely outside the United States, as provided in section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act and § _.13(b) of the 2013 rule, as if the qualifying foreign excluded fund were a covered fund. The agencies extended this relief for an additional period of one year (until July 21, 2019) in the 2018 proposal.
21
On July 17, 2019, the Federal banking agencies released a policy statement (the 2019 policy statement) that further extended this period to July 21, 2021.
22
This additional time facilitates the agencies proposing the specific changes in the proposal to address this issue and will allow the public to submit comments in response to the proposal.
23
20
“Foreign banking entity” was defined for purposes of the 2017 policy statement to mean a banking entity that is not, and is not controlled directly or indirectly by, a banking entity that is located in or organized under the laws of the United States or any State.
21
83 FR 33444.
22
Statement regarding Treatment of Certain Foreign Funds under the Rules Implementing Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act (July 17, 2019),
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20190717a1.pdf.
23
The agencies did not propose any specific amendments to the 2013 rule in the 2018 proposal on this issue and instead requested comment on foreign excluded funds, the policy statements, and related issues.
See, e.g.,
83 FR 33442-46.
In response to questions in the 2018 proposal, several commenters urged the agencies to exclude controlled foreign funds offered solely outside the United States.
24
Many suggested that the agencies accomplish this by excluding these funds from the definition of banking entity.
25
Some commenters provided alternative proposals, including establishing a rebuttable presumption of compliance and making permanent the relief provided in the 2017 policy statement.
26
Several commenters suggested permitting foreign banking entities to opt to be treated as a covered fund, instead of a banking entity, and providing additional relief from the limitations on relationships with a covered fund, under section _.14.
27
One commenter suggested exempting from the definition of “banking entity” foreign excluded funds controlled by a non-U.S. banking entity as part of the non-U.S. banking entity's asset management activities or in connection with consumer derivative activities not marketed to U.S. residents.
28
One commenter opposed any type of exclusion for foreign excluded funds and argued that the 2013 rule as it stands is adequate in relation to the nexus between U.S. and foreign activities.
29
24
See, e.g.,
Institute of International Bankers (IIB); American Investment Council (AIC); American Bankers Association (ABA); Financial Services Agency/Bank of Japan (FSA/BOJ); Canadian Bankers Association (CBA); Federated Investors (FI); BVI; European Banking Federation (EBF); Japanese Bankers Association (JBA); and Credit Suisse (CS).
25
Id.
26
See, e.g.,
EBF and IIB.
27
See, e.g.,
EBF; CS; IIB; and CBA.
28
BVI.
29
Data Boiler.
To provide greater clarity and certainty to banking entities and qualifying foreign excluded funds, the agencies are proposing, pursuant to their authority under section 13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act, to exempt the activities of qualifying foreign excluded funds. Specifically, the agencies are proposing to exempt from the proprietary trading prohibition and covered fund restrictions the purchase or sale of a financial instrument by a qualifying foreign excluded fund and the acquisition or retention of any ownership interest in, or the sponsorship of, a covered fund by a qualifying foreign excluded fund, if any acquisition or retention of an ownership interest in, or sponsorship of, the qualifying foreign excluded fund by the foreign banking entity meets the requirements for permitted covered fund activities and investments solely outside the United States, as provided in section _.13(b) of the rule. Under the proposal, a qualifying foreign excluded fund has the same meaning as in the 2017 and 2019 policy statements as described above.
Section 13(d)(1)(H) and (I) of the BHC Act permit foreign banking entities to conduct certain trading and investing activities outside the United States, notwithstanding the restrictions under section 13(a) of the BHC Act. As indicated in the preamble to the 2013 rule, the purpose of these statutory provisions is to limit the extraterritorial application of section 13 as it applies to foreign banking entities.
30
30
79 FR 5655 n. 1518 (identifying statement of Sen. Merkley regarding how section 13(d)(1)(H) “recognize[s] rules of international comity by permitting foreign banks, regulated and backed by foreign taxpayers, in the course of operating outside of the United States to engage in activities permitted under relevant foreign law”). The agencies believe that the same rationale applies to section 13(d)(1)(I).
In addition, section 13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act gives the agencies rulemaking authority to exempt activities from the prohibitions of section 13, provided the agencies determine that the activity in question would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.
31
The agencies believe that the proposal described above would be consistent with the purposes of section 13(d)(1)(H) and (I) of the BHC Act and could promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and U.S. financial stability.
31
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(J).
Exempting the activities of qualifying foreign excluded funds in the circumstances described above would provide clarity and certainty to, and likely promote and protect the safety and soundness of, such banking entities. This relief would be limited to the asset management activities of these foreign funds, which are organized outside of the United States and operate pursuant to the local laws of foreign jurisdictions. Thus, if the activities of these foreign funds were subjected to the restrictions applicable to banking entities, generally, their asset management activities may be significantly disrupted, and the foreign banking entities may be at a competitive disadvantage to other foreign bank and non-bank market participants conducting asset management business outside of the United States. Exempting the activities of these foreign funds would also allow their foreign banking entity sponsors to continue to conduct their asset management business outside the United States as long as the foreign banking entity's acquisition of an ownership interest in or sponsorship of the fund meets the requirements in section _.13(b). Thus, the proposed exemption may have the effect of promoting the safety and soundness of these foreign funds and their sponsors, while at the same time limiting the extraterritorial impact of the implementing regulations, consistent with the purposes of section 13(d)(1)(H) and (I) of the BHC Act.
The proposed exemption would also promote and protect U.S. financial stability. While qualifying foreign excluded funds have very limited nexus to the U.S. financial system, they are permitted to invest in U.S. companies. Therefore, to the extent that these funds have any direct impact on U.S. financial stability, it would be to promote U.S. financial stability by providing additional capital and liquidity to U.S. capital markets. Because the proposed exemption would require that the foreign banking entity's acquisition of an ownership interest in or sponsorship of the fund meets the requirements in section _.13(b), the exemption would ensure that the risks of the investments made by these foreign funds would be booked to foreign entities in foreign jurisdictions, thus promoting and protecting U.S. financial stability. Additionally, subjecting such funds to the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act imposed on banking entities could precipitate disruptions in foreign capital markets, which could generate spillover effects in the U.S. financial system.
Question 1.
Should the agencies make any other amendments to §§ _.6 and _.13 or include any additional parameters on the proposed exemption? Why or why not?
Question 2.
Would the proposed amendments to §§ _.6 and _.13 address the concerns raised regarding unintended consequences and extraterritorial impact? Why or why not? If the amendments would not address these concerns, what other amendments should be made?
Question 3.
Is the proposed approach to addressing foreign excluded funds effective? Why or why not? If not, what alternative approach would better address these types of entities?
Question 4.
Would the use of the term “covered fund” in § _.13(b)(1) or in proposed § _.13(d)(2), together with the definition of “covered fund” in § _.10(b)(1), create any unintended consequences for foreign banking entities seeking to rely on the exemption for activities permitted by section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act? Why or why not? If so, what other alternatives should be considered to make the
exemption for activities permitted by section 13(d)(1)(I) of the BHC Act clear or more workable?
Question 5.
What impacts would the proposed amendments to §§ _.6 and _.13 have on the safety and soundness of banking entities, and on the financial stability of the United States? Would the activities permitted under the proposed amendments to §§ _.6 and _.13 of the regulations promote and protect safety and soundness and U.S. financial stability? Please explain.
B. Modifications to Existing Covered Fund Exclusions
1. Foreign Public Funds
In addition to the foreign excluded fund issues discussed above with respect to the banking entity definition, there are other foreign fund issues that arise under the covered fund definition. In order to provide consistent treatment between U.S. registered investment companies and their foreign equivalents, the implementing regulations exclude foreign public funds from the definition of covered fund. A foreign public fund is generally defined under the implementing regulations as any issuer that is organized or established outside of the United States and the ownership interests of which are (1) authorized to be offered and sold to retail investors in the issuer's home jurisdiction and (2) sold predominantly through one or more public offerings outside of the United States.
32
The agencies stated in the preamble to the 2013 rule that they generally expect that an offering is made predominantly outside of the United States if 85 percent or more of the fund's interests are sold to investors that are not residents of the United States.
33
The 2013 rule defines “public offering” for purposes of this exclusion to mean a “distribution,” as defined in § _.4(a)(3) of subpart B, of securities in any jurisdiction outside the United States to investors, including retail investors, provided that the distribution complies with all applicable requirements in the jurisdiction in which such distribution is being made; the distribution does not restrict availability to investors having a minimum level of net worth or net investment assets; and the issuer has filed or submitted, with the appropriate regulatory authority in such jurisdiction, offering disclosure documents that are publicly available.
34
32
See
2013 rule § _.10(c)(1);
see also
79 FR 5678 (“For purposes of this exclusion, the [a]gencies note that the reference to retail investors, while not defined, should be construed to refer to members of the general public who do not possess the level of sophistication and investment experience typically found among institutional investors, professional investors or high net worth investors who may be permitted to invest in complex investments or private placements in various jurisdictions. Retail investors would therefore be expected to be entitled to the full protection of securities laws in the home jurisdiction of the fund, and the [a]gencies would expect a fund authorized to sell ownership interests to such retail investors to be of a type that is more similar to a U.S. registered investment company rather than to a U.S. covered fund.”).
33
79 FR 5678.
34
2013 rule § _.10(c)(1)(iii).
The 2013 rule places an additional condition on a U.S. banking entity's ability to rely on the foreign public fund exclusion with respect to any foreign fund it sponsors.
35
The foreign public fund exclusion is only available to a U.S. banking entity with respect to a foreign fund sponsored by the U.S. banking entity if, in addition to the requirements discussed above, the fund's ownership interests are sold predominantly to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity, the issuer (or affiliates of the sponsoring banking entity or issuer), and employees and directors of such entities.
36
The agencies stated in the preamble to the 2013 rule that, consistent with the agencies' view concerning whether a foreign public fund has been sold predominantly outside of the United States, the agencies generally expect that a foreign public fund would satisfy this additional condition if 85 percent or more of the fund's interests are sold to persons other than the sponsoring U.S. banking entity and the specified persons connected to that banking entity.
37
35
Although the discussion of this condition generally refers to U.S. banking entities for ease of reading, the condition also applies to foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. banking entity.
See
2013 rule § _.10(c)(1)(ii) (applying this limitation “[w]ith respect to a banking entity that is, or is controlled directly or indirectly by a banking entity that is, located in or organized under the laws of the United States or of any State and any issuer for which such banking entity acts as sponsor”).
36
See
2013 rule § _.10(c)(1)(ii).
37
79 FR 5678.
In adopting the foreign public fund exclusion, the agencies' view was that it was appropriate to exclude these funds from the “covered fund” definition because they are sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies.
38
The agencies also expressed the view that the additional condition applicable to U.S. banking entities with respect to foreign funds that they sponsor was designed to treat foreign public funds consistently with similar U.S. funds and to limit the extraterritorial application of section 13 of the BHC Act, including by permitting U.S. banking entities and their foreign affiliates to carry on traditional asset management businesses outside of the United States, while also seeking to limit the possibility for evasion through foreign public funds.
39
38
Id.
39
Id.
Based on experience implementing the 2013 rule, as well as discussions with and comments received from regulated entities, it appears that some of the conditions of the foreign public fund exclusion may not be necessary to ensure consistent treatment of foreign public funds and registered investment companies. Moreover, some conditions may make it difficult for a non-U.S. fund to qualify for the exclusion or for a banking entity to validate whether a non-U.S. fund qualifies for the exclusion, resulting in certain non-U.S. funds that are similar to U.S. registered investment companies being treated as covered funds. For example, the requirement that the fund be authorized to be offered and sold to retail investors in the fund's home jurisdiction (the home jurisdiction requirement) disqualifies certain funds that are organized in one jurisdiction but only authorized to be sold to retail investors in another jurisdiction.
40
It appears that, for a variety of reasons, it is not uncommon for foreign retail funds to be organized in one jurisdiction and sold in another jurisdiction.
41
40
See, e.g.,
IIB; Bank Policy Institute (BPI); EBF; and JBA.
41
For example, commenters have noted that retail funds are sometimes organized in the Cayman Islands for tax considerations but only offered for sale in Japan.
See, e.g.,
BPI.
Additionally, the requirement that a fund be sold “predominantly” through one or more public offerings may cause certain compliance and monitoring difficulties.
42
This is because banking entities may have limited visibility into the distribution history of a third-party sponsored fund, or, in the case of a fund sponsored by the banking entity, the fund's interests may be sold through third-party distributors, and the precise pattern of distribution may be affected by market forces and changes in investor demand.
43
Also, the limitation on ownership of interests in a U.S. banking entity-sponsored foreign public fund by certain employees (including their immediate family members) of the sponsoring banking entity or fund may be difficult for banking entities to monitor for similar reasons, and imposes a requirement on foreign public funds that may not apply to similarly situated U.S. registered investment companies.
44
Finally, commenters have expressed concerns with the expectation stated in the preamble to the 2013 rule that for a U.S. banking entity-sponsored
foreign fund to satisfy the condition that it be “predominantly” sold to persons other than the sponsoring U.S. banking entity and certain persons connected to that banking entity, 85 percent of the ownership interests in the fund should be sold to such persons.
45
42
See, e.g.,
BPI.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g.,
IIB.
45
See, e.g.,
Investment Company Institute.
To address the concerns noted above related to the home jurisdiction requirement and the requirement that ownership interests be sold predominantly through public offerings, the agencies are proposing to replace those two requirements with a requirement that the fund is authorized to offer and sell ownership interests, and such interests are offered and sold, through one or more public offerings. The agencies are also proposing to modify the definition of “public offering” from the implementing regulations to add a new requirement that the distribution is subject to substantive disclosure and retail investor protection laws or regulations, to help ensure that funds qualifying for this exclusion are sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies. Additionally, the proposal would only apply the condition that the distribution comply with all applicable requirements in the jurisdiction where it is made to instances in which the banking entity acts as the investment manager, investment adviser, commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, or sponsor. This change is intended to address the potential difficulty that a banking entity investing in a third-party sponsored fund may have in determining whether the distribution of such fund complied with all the requirements in the jurisdiction where it was made.
The changes discussed above would seek to ensure that the exclusion remains limited to funds that are authorized to be sold to retail investors, but it would no longer require the fund to be authorized to be sold to retail investors in the jurisdiction where it is organized. Additionally, while the fund would still be required to be offered and sold through one or more public offerings (which would require, among other things, that the distribution be made in a jurisdiction outside the United States that subjects the foreign public fund to substantive disclosure and retail investor protection laws or regulations), the proposal would eliminate the requirement that it be sold “predominantly” through one or more public offerings. This change would eliminate the difficulty that banking entities have described in tracking the specific distribution patterns of ownership interests in such funds, and it would more closely align the treatment of foreign public funds with that of U.S. registered investment companies, which have no such requirement. The agencies believe the revised requirement would help ensure that the foreign public fund is sufficiently similar to a U.S. registered investment company.
To simplify the requirements of the exclusion and address concerns described by banking entities with the difficulty in tracking the sale of ownership interests to employees and their immediate family members, the proposal would eliminate the limitation on selling ownership interests of the issuer to employees (other than senior executive officers) of the sponsoring banking entity or the issuer (or affiliates of the banking entity or issuer). This change would also help to align the treatment of foreign public funds with that of U.S. registered investment companies, as the exclusion for U.S. registered investment companies has no such limitation. The proposal would continue to limit the sale of ownership interests to directors or senior executive officers of the sponsoring banking entity or the fund (or their affiliates), as the agencies believe that such a requirement would be simpler for a banking entity to track. As discussed in the preamble to the 2013 rule, this requirement is intended to prevent evasion of section 13 of the BHC Act.
46
46
79 FR 5678-79.
As reflected in the detailed questions that follow, the agencies request comment on all aspects of the proposed modifications to the foreign public fund exclusion, including whether the exclusion is effective in identifying foreign funds that may be sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies and permitting U.S. banking entities and their foreign affiliates to carry on traditional asset management businesses outside of the United States, without creating opportunities for evasion of the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act.
Question 6.
Are foreign funds that satisfy the proposed conditions in the foreign public fund exclusion sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies such that it is appropriate to exclude these funds from the covered fund definition? Why or why not? If these foreign funds are not sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies, how should the agencies modify the exclusion's conditions to permit only funds that are sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies to rely on it? Are there foreign funds that cannot satisfy the exclusion's proposed conditions but that are nonetheless sufficiently similar to U.S. registered investment companies such that it would be appropriate to exclude those foreign funds from the covered fund definition? If so, how should the agencies modify the exclusion's conditions to permit those funds to rely on it?
Question 7.
How effectively does the proposed replacement of the home jurisdiction requirement and the requirement that ownership interests be sold predominantly through public offerings with a requirement that the fund is authorized to offer and sell ownership interests, and such interests are offered and sold, through one or more public offerings address the concerns discussed above related to the compliance with these requirements? If such concerns are not addressed, how should the agencies further modify these requirements?
Question 8.
Is the additional condition added to the “public offering” definition requiring the distribution be subject to substantive disclosure and retail investor protection laws or regulations sufficiently clear and effective? If not, how should the agencies modify or clarify this requirement? Should the agencies further specify features of “substantive disclosure and retail investor protection laws or regulations?” Would it be clearer if the agencies identified particular types of laws or regulations that would meet this condition (
e.g.,
requirements for periodic filings with, and periodic examinations by, the appropriate regulatory authority; requirements for periodic reports to be distributed to retail investors; or a prohibition against fraud)?
Question 9.
In what ways, if any, is it difficult for a banking entity to determine whether a fund satisfies the implementing regulations' condition of the “public offering” definition requiring that the distribution comply with all applicable requirements in the jurisdiction in which the distribution is made? Should the agencies eliminate this requirement with respect to funds for which the banking entity does not serve as the investment manager, investment adviser, commodity trading advisor, commodity pool operator, or sponsor, as proposed, or should this requirement be otherwise modified? Would eliminating or modifying this requirement create an opportunity for evasion of the requirements of section 13? If so, how should the agencies address this concern?
Question 10.
As discussed above, the agencies propose to modify the
additional conditions on U.S. banking entity-sponsored foreign funds, which are intended in part to limit the possibility for evasion of section 13. In what ways, if any, would the proposed modifications, including the elimination of the limitations on certain employees owning interests in the fund, create an opportunity for evasion? How should the agencies modify these additional requirements to limit the possibility for evasion? Is the limitation on directors and senior executive officers owning interests in the fund necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of section 13? Why or why not? Should the agencies eliminate or modify this limitation? How difficult is it for banking entities to monitor and track this limitation? Commenters should address whether banking entities already track this information.
Question 11.
Is the proposed requirement that the fund's ownership interests are sold predominantly to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity or the issuer (or affiliates of the sponsoring banking entity or issuer), and directors and senior executive officers of such entities, necessary to prevent evasion of the requirements of section 13? If the requirement is not necessary to prevent evasion, how should the agencies eliminate or further modify this requirement? Should the agencies consider this condition satisfied if 75 percent (or some other percentage) of the ownership interests are sold to persons other than the sponsoring banking entity, the issuer (or affiliates of the sponsoring banking entity or issuer), and directors and senior executive officers of such entities? Why or why not?
Question 12.
Do the proposed changes to the foreign public fund exclusion, in the aggregate, increase opportunities for evasion of the requirements of section 13? If so, how should the agencies address these concerns? Should the agencies include a specific reservation of authority to prevent evasion through the foreign public fund exclusion, or are the anti-evasion provisions in § __.21 of the implementing regulations sufficient to address these concerns?
47
47
Section _.21 of the implementing regulations provides in part that whenever an agency finds reasonable cause to believe any banking entity has engaged in an activity or made an investment in violation of section 13 of the BHC Act or the implementing regulations, or engaged in any activity or made any investment that functions as an evasion of the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act or the implementing regulations, the agency may take any action permitted by law to enforce compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act and the 2013 rule, including directing the banking entity to restrict, limit, or terminate any or all activities under the 2013 rule and dispose of any investment.
2. Loan Securitizations
Section 13 of the BHC Act provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the ability of a banking entity . . . to sell or securitize loans in a manner otherwise permitted by law.”
48
To effectuate this statutory requirement, the 2013 rule excludes from the definition of covered fund loan securitizations that issue asset-backed securities and hold only loans, certain rights and assets, and a small set of other financial instruments (permissible assets).
49
The staffs of the agencies in June 2014 issued an FAQ explaining that assets other than permitted securities can be servicing assets for purposes of the loan securitization exclusion.
50
48
12 U.S.C. 1851(g)(2).
49
See
2013 rule § ____.10(c)(8). Loan is further defined as any loan, lease, extension of credit, or secured or unsecured receivable that is not a security or derivative. Implementing regulations § __.2(t).
50
Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ.
See supra
n. 11 and accompanying text.
See also, infra,
Leases and Servicing Assets for a discussion of the FAQ.
Since the adoption of the 2013 rule, several banking entities and other participants in the loan securitization industry have commented that the limited set of permissible assets has inappropriately restricted their ability to use the loan securitization exclusion. The agencies asked several questions regarding the efficacy and scope of the exclusion and the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ in the 2018 proposal.
51
Comments were focused on permitting small amounts of non-loan assets and clarifying the treatment of leases and related assets. The agencies are proposing to codify the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ and permit loan securitizations to hold a small amount of non-loan assets. The agencies also request comment on whether other revisions are necessary or appropriate to effectuate section 13 of the BHC Act, as described in greater detail below.
51
83 FR 33480-81.
Leases and Servicing Assets
The 2013 rule defines “loan” to include leases and permits loan securitizations to hold rights or other assets (servicing assets) that arise from the structure of the loan securitization or from the loans supporting a loan securitization.
52
Rights or other servicing assets are assets designed to facilitate the servicing of the assets underlying a loan securitization or the distribution of proceeds from those assets to holders of the asset-backed securities.
53
In response to confusion regarding the scope of these two provisions, the staffs of the agencies released the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ. Under this FAQ, a servicing asset may or may not be a security, but if the servicing asset is a security, it must be a permitted security under the rule.
52
2013 rule §§ ____.2(s); ____.10(c)(8)(i)(D), (v).
53
See, e.g.,
FASB Statement No. 156: Accounting for Servicing of Financial Assets, ¶ 61 (FAS 156).
Several commenters on the 2018 proposal supported codifying this FAQ, with one commenter encouraging the agencies to include specific examples of servicing assets.
54
However, one commenter suggested that the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ was sufficient and that the regulation need not be modified.
55
Another commenter suggested that the exclusion be expanded to cover leases and related assets, including operating or capital leases.
56
54
Structured Finance Industry Group (SFIG) and JBA.
55
Data Boiler.
56
SFIG.
The agencies propose codifying the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ to clarify the scope of the servicing asset provision.
57
However, the agencies are not proposing to separately list leases within the loan securitization exclusion because leases are included in the definition of loan and thus are permitted assets for loan securitizations under the current exclusion.
58
57
The proposal also clarifies that special units of beneficial interest and collateral certificates meeting the requirements of paragraph (c)(8)(v) of the exclusion that are securities need not meet the requirements of paragraph (c)(8)(iii) of the exclusion.
58
See
implementing regulations § _.2(t).
Question 13.
Does the proposed modification of the loan securitization exclusion sufficiently permit securitization of leases, servicing assets, and related assets, including leases that are security interests? Why or why not?
Limited Holdings of Non-Loan Assets
In the preamble to the 2013 rule, the agencies declined to permit loan securitizations to hold a certain amount of non-loan assets.
59
The agencies supported a narrow scope of permissible assets by noting that “the purpose underlying section 13 is not to expand the scope of assets in an excluded loan securitization beyond loans as defined in the final rule and the other assets that the agencies are specifically permitting in a loan securitization.”
60
59
79 FR 5687-88.
60
79 FR 5687.
Several commenters on the 2018 proposal disagreed with the agencies'
views and supported expanding the range of permissible assets in an excluded loan securitization.
61
Many commenters recommended allowing loan securitizations to hold up to five or ten percent of non-loan assets. Commenters suggested that a limited bucket of non-loan assets would be consistent with exclusions under the Investment Company Act, such as section 3(c)(5)(C) and rule 3a-7.
62
Commenters argued that banking entities would use such authority to incorporate into securitizations corporate bonds, interests in letters of credit, cash and short-term highly liquid investments, derivatives, and senior secured bonds that do not significantly change the nature and risk profile of the securitization.
63
One commenter suggested permitting additional non-loan assets so long as the securitization is “primarily backed by qualifying assets that are not impermissible securities or derivatives.”
64
61
E.g.,
Investment Adviser Association (IAA); Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA); ABA; SFIG; Goldman Sachs (GS); BPI; JBA; and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
62
BPI.
63
LSTA and JBA.
64
SFIG.
One commenter suggested that permitting loan securitizations to hold a small number of non-loan assets, typically fixed income securities, would decrease compliance burdens associated with analyzing fund assets and increase fund managers' flexibility in responding to market conditions and customer preferences.
65
One commenter also claimed that permitting non-loan holdings below a certain threshold would conform the rule with industry practice without requiring a wholesale redefinition of covered funds.
66
In addition, some commenters maintained that such an approach was consistent with the rule of construction because inclusion of small amounts of non-permissible assets was standard practice, particularly for international securitizations, and permitted by law.
67
In contrast, another commenter objected to allowing a limited amount of non-loan investments and suggested that permitting such investments would be contrary to the general purpose of section 13 of the BHC Act, which the commenter claimed was to divest banking entities of risky assets.
68
65
SFIG.
66
LSTA.
67
LSTA and SIFMA. Some of these commenters subsequently indicated that the loan securitization industry has evolved since the issuance of the 2013 rule and loan securitization issuers no longer include non-loan assets and might not include non-loan assets in a securitization even if the scope of non-loan assets permitted to be held was expanded.
68
Data Boiler.
After considering the comments received on the 2018 proposal, the agencies are proposing to allow a loan securitization vehicle to hold up to five percent of assets in non-loan assets. Authorizing loan securitizations to hold small amounts of non-loan assets could, consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act, permit loan securitizations to respond to market demand and reduce compliance costs associated with the securitization process without significantly increasing risk to banking entities and the financial system. The proposed limit on the amount of non-loan assets also would assuage potential concerns that allowing certain non-loan assets will lead to evasion, indirect proprietary trading, and other impermissible activities or excessive risk to the banking entity. Moreover, loan securitizations provide an important avenue for banking entities to fund lending programs, and allowing loan securitizations to hold a small amount of non-loan assets in response to customer and market demand may increase a banking entity's capacity to provide financing and lending.
Question 14.
Should the loan securitization exclusion permit loan securitization issuers to hold a certain percentage of non-loan assets? Why or why not? If so, should the maximum percentage of permissible non-loan assets be five or ten percent, or some other amount? Regardless of the non-loan asset limit, what should be the method of calculating compliance with the limit (
e.g.,
market value, par value, principal balance, or some other measure)? Would permitting loan securitization issuers to hold a certain percentage of non-loan assets further the statutory rule of construction in section 13(g)(2) of the BHC Act? If so, explain how.
Question 15.
In what ways, if any, should the agencies limit the type of permissible non-loan assets to certain asset classes or structures (
e.g.,
only debt securities or any permissible asset, such as a derivative)? Would the inclusion of certain financial instruments—such as derivatives and collateralized debt obligations—raise safety and soundness concerns? If so, should qualifying loan securitizations be permitted to hold such instruments and, if so, what restrictions should be placed on the holding of such instruments? What, if any, other restrictions should the agencies impose on non-loan assets to reduce the potential for evasion of the rule?
Cash Equivalents
The loan securitization exclusion permits issuers to hold certain types of contractual rights or assets directly arising from the loans supporting the asset-backed securities that a loan securitization relying on the exclusion may hold, including cash equivalents. In response to questions about the scope of the cash equivalent provision, the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ stated that “cash equivalents” means high quality, highly liquid investments whose maturity corresponds to the securitization's expected or potential need for funds and whose currency corresponds to either the underlying loans or the asset-backed securities.
69
To promote transparency and clarity, the proposal would codify this additional language in the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ regarding the meaning of “cash equivalents.”
70
The agencies are not requiring “cash equivalents” to be “short term,” because the agencies recognize that a loan securitization may need greater flexibility to match the maturity of high quality, highly liquid investments to its expected or potential need for funds.
69
See supra,
n. 11.
70
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(8)(iii)(A).
Question 16.
Should the agencies codify the cash equivalents language in the Loan Securitization Servicing FAQ? Why or why not?
3. Public Welfare and Small Business Funds
i. Public Welfare Funds
Section 13(d)(1)(E) of the BHC Act permits, among other things, a banking entity to make and retain investments that are designed primarily to promote the public welfare of the type permitted under 12 U.S.C. 24(Eleventh).
71
Consistent with the statute, the 2013 rule excludes from the definition of “covered fund” issuers that make investments that are designed primarily to promote the public welfare, of the type permitted under paragraph 11 of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C. 24).
72
The agencies noted in the preamble to the 2013 rule that excluding issuers in the business of making public welfare investments would give effect to the statutory exemption for these investments. The agencies further stated their belief that permitting a banking entity to sponsor and invest in entities that are in the business of making public welfare investments would result in banking entities being able to provide
valuable expertise and services to these entities and to provide funding and assistance to small businesses and low- and moderate-income communities. The agencies also stated their belief that excluding issuers that are in the business of making public welfare investments would allow banking entities to continue to provide capital to community-improving projects and, in some instances, promote capital formation.
73
71
See
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(E).
72
2013 rule § _.10(c)(11)(ii).
73
See
79 FR 5698.
In response to the 2018 proposal, the agencies received one comment stating that the 2013 rule's exclusion for funds that are designed primarily to promote the public welfare does not account for community development investments that are made through investment vehicles. The commenter recommended expressly excluding all investments that qualify for Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit, including direct and indirect investments in a community development fund, small business investment company (SBIC), or similar fund.
74
74
See
ABA.
The OCC's regulations implementing 12 U.S.C. 24(Eleventh) provide that investments that receive consideration as qualified investments under the regulations implementing the CRA (CRA-qualified investments) would also meet the public welfare investment requirements.
75
The 2013 rule did not expressly incorporate these implementing regulations into the exclusion for public welfare investments. The agencies are requesting comment on whether any change should be made to clarify that all permissible public welfare investments, under any agency's regulation, are excluded from the covered fund restrictions.
76
For example, the agencies understand that there may be uncertainty regarding how the exclusion for public welfare investments applies to community development investments that are made through fund structures—for example, an investment fund that invests exclusively in SBICs, that is designed to receive consideration as a CRA-qualified investment, and that would be considered a public welfare investment under applicable regulations.
75
See
12 CFR 24.3 (stating that, for national banks, an investment that would receive consideration under 12 CFR 25.23 as a “qualified investment” is a public welfare investment); 12 CFR 25.23 (describing the investment test under the regulations implementing the CRA for national banks).
76
A banking entity must have independent authority to make a public welfare investment. For example, a banking entity that is a state member bank may make a public welfare investment to the extent permissible under 12 U.S.C. 338a and 12 CFR 208.22.
In particular, the agencies request comment on the following:
Question 17.
Is the scope of the current public welfare investment fund exclusion properly calibrated? Why or why not? Under what circumstances, if any, have banking entities experienced compliance challenges under the covered fund provisions in Subpart C regarding investments in community development, public welfare, or similar funds that are designed to receive consideration as CRA-qualified investments?
Question 18.
Have banking entities avoided making investments that are designed to receive consideration as CRA-qualified investments because they believed that the investment may not satisfy the public welfare investment fund exclusion? If so, what factors have caused uncertainty as to whether an issuer qualifies for the exclusion for public welfare investment funds?
Question 19.
In what ways would it promote transparency, clarity, and consistency with other Federal banking regulations if the agencies explicitly exclude from the definition of covered fund any issuer that invests exclusively or substantially in investments that are designed to receive consideration as CRA-qualified investments? What policy considerations weigh for or against such an exclusion? What conditions should apply to such an exclusion?
Question 20.
Should the agencies establish a separate exclusion for CRA-qualified investments or incorporate such an exclusion into the exclusion for public welfare investments?
Question 21.
Rural Business Investment Companies (RBICs)—as defined under 203(l) and 203(m) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”)—are companies licensed under the Rural Business Investment Program (RBIP), a program created as a joint initiative between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Small Business Administration. The RBIP was designed to promote economic development and job creation in rural communities by investing in companies involved in the production, processing and supply of food and agriculture-related products. Under the implementing regulations, are many RBICs excluded from the definition of covered fund because of the public welfare exclusion or because of another provision?
77
Should the agencies provide an express exclusion from the definition of covered fund for RBICs, similar to the exclusion for SBICs? Are RBICs substantially similar to SBICs and public welfare companies that banking entities are permitted to make and retain investments in under section 13(d)(1)(E) of the BHC Act? Would excluding RBICs in the same manner that SBICs and public welfare companies are excluded from the definition of covered fund provide certainty regarding the covered fund status of RBICs or serve similar interests, as identified by commenters in response to the 2018 proposal?
77
Following enactment of the RBIC Advisers Relief Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-417 (2019), advisers to solely RBICs and advisers to solely SBICs are exempt from investment adviser registration pursuant to Advisers Act, section 203(b)(8) and 203(b)(7), respectively. The venture capital fund adviser exemption deems RBICs and SBICs to be venture capital funds for purposes of the registration exemption. 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(l). Accordingly, the agencies' proposed exclusion for certain venture capital funds discussed below,
see infra
section III.C.2, which would require that a fund be a “venture capital fund” as defined in the SEC regulations implementing the registration exemption, could apply to RBICs and SBICs to the extent that they satisfy the other elements of the proposed exclusion.
Question 22.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act established the “opportunity zone” program to provide tax incentives for long-term investing in designated economically distressed communities. The program allows taxpayers to defer and reduce taxes on capital gains by reinvesting gains in “qualified opportunity funds” (QOFs) that are required to have at least 90 percent of their assets in designated low-income zones. Do commenters believe that many or all QOFs are excluded from the definition of covered fund under the implementing regulations under the public welfare exclusion or another exclusion or exemption? Should the agencies provide an express exclusion from the definition of covered fund for QOFs? Are QOFs substantially similar to SBICs and public welfare companies that banking entities are permitted to make and retain investments in under section 13(d)(1)(E) of the BHC Act? Would excluding QOFs in the same manner that SBICs and public welfare companies are excluded from the definition of covered fund provide certainty regarding the covered fund status of QOFs or serve similar interests, as identified by commenters in response to the 2018 proposal?
ii. Small Business Investment Companies
Consistent with section 13 of the BHC Act,
78
the 2013 rule excludes from the definition of covered fund SBICs and issuers that have received notice from the Small Business Administration to
proceed to qualify for a license as a SBIC, which notice or license has not been revoked.
79
The agencies explained in the preamble to the 2013 rule that excluding SBICs from the definition of “covered fund” would give appropriate effect to the statutory exemption for investments in SBICs in a way that facilitates national community and economic development objectives.
80
78
See
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(E) (permitting investments in SBICs).
79
See
2013 rule § _.10(c)(11).
80
See
79 FR 5698.
In response to the 2018 proposal,
81
the agencies received three comments recommending revising the 2013 rule's exclusion for SBICs to clarify that SBICs that surrender their SBIC licenses when winding down may continue to qualify for the exclusion for SBICs.
82
Two of these commenters stated that SBICs often surrender their licenses during wind-down, which is when the fund focuses on returning capital to partners.
83
One commenter asserted that, during the wind-down phase of an SBIC's lifecycle, an SBIC license is neither necessary nor a prudent use of partnership funds.
84
One commenter noted that banking entities that are investors in SBICs generally do not control whether an SBIC surrenders its license. This could raise questions as to whether an issuer that a banking entity invested in when the issuer was an SBIC could become a covered fund for reasons outside the banking entity's control.
85
In contrast, another commenter suggested concerns about the SBIC exclusion generally.
86
81
89 FR 33432.
82
See
Small Business Investors Alliance (SBIA); Capital One et al.; and BB&T Corporation (BB&T).
83
See
SBIA and BB&T.
84
See
BB&T.
85
See
SBIA.
86
Data Boiler.
The agencies propose to revise the exclusion for SBICs to clarify how the exclusion would apply to SBICs that surrender their licenses during wind-down phases. The proposed rule would specify that the exclusion for SBICs applies to an issuer that was an SBIC that has voluntarily surrendered its license to operate as a small business investment company in accordance with 13 CFR 107.1900 and does not make new investments (other than investments in cash equivalents) after such voluntary surrender.
87
87
For purposes of this exclusion, “cash equivalents” would mean high quality, highly liquid investments whose maturity corresponds to the issuer's expected or potential need for funds and whose currency corresponds to the issuer's assets.
The agencies believe that continuing to apply the SBIC exclusion to an issuer that has surrendered its SBIC license is appropriate because, absent these revisions, banking entities may become discouraged from investing in SBICs due to concern that an SBIC may become a covered fund during its wind-down phase. As indicated by the statutory exemption for investments in SBICs, section 13 of the BHC Act was not intended to discourage investments in SBICs.
88
88
See
12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(E).
The proposed rule includes conditions designed to ensure that the revised exclusion is not abused. In particular, the requirement that an issuer that has voluntarily surrendered its license does not make new investments (other than investments in cash equivalents) after surrendering its license is intended to ensure that the exclusion would only apply to funds that are actually winding down and not funds that are making new investments (whether wholly new or as follow-on investments to existing investments) or that are engaged in speculative activities. In addition, the exclusion would only apply to an issuer that surrenders its SBIC license in accordance with 13 CFR 107.1900. The agencies note that surrendering a license under 13 CFR 107.1900 requires the prior written approval of the Small Business Administration. Furthermore, because the exclusion would only apply to an issuer that voluntarily surrenders its SBIC license, the exclusion would not extend to an issuer if its SBIC license has been revoked.
The agencies request comment on the proposed revisions to the exclusion for SBICs. Specifically, the agencies request comment on the following.
Question 23.
Should the agencies revise the SBIC exclusion as proposed? Why or why not? Would the proposed revisions to the SBIC exclusion appropriately address issuers that surrender their SBIC licenses? If not, what changes should be made to the proposal?
Question 24.
Should the proposed exclusion for issuers that surrender their SBIC licenses include a requirement that the issuer operate pursuant to a written plan to dissolve within a set period of time, such as five years? Why or why not? If so, what is the appropriate time period?
Question 25.
What additional restrictions, if any, should apply to the proposed exclusion for issuers that surrender their SBIC licenses?
Question 26.
What specific activities or investments, if any, should an issuer that surrenders its SBIC license be expressly permitted to engage in during wind-down phases, such as follow-on investments in existing portfolio companies and why? What conditions should apply to such activities or investments?
C. Proposed Additional Covered Fund Exclusions
1. Credit Funds
The agencies are proposing to create a new exclusion from the definition of “covered fund” under § _.10(b) for credit funds that make loans, invest in debt, or otherwise extend the type of credit that banking entities may provide directly under applicable banking law. In the preamble to the 2013 rule, the agencies declined to establish an exclusion from the definition of covered fund for credit funds.
89
The agencies cited concerns about whether such funds could be distinguished from private equity funds and hedge funds and the possible evasion of the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act through the availability of such an exclusion. In addition, the agencies suggested that some credit funds would be able to operate using other exclusions from the definition of covered fund in the 2013 rule, such as the exclusion for joint ventures or the exclusion for loan securitizations.
90
89
79 FR 5705. The agencies did not request comments specifically on credit funds in the associated 2011 proposed rule.
See
76 FR 68896-900.
90
Id.
In the 2018 proposal, the agencies issued a broad request for comment on whether to provide new exclusions from the definition of covered fund to more effectively tailor the 2013 rule.
91
Several commenters urged the agencies to establish an exclusion for funds that extend credit to customers in a manner similar to what banking entities are otherwise authorized to provide directly because the credit funds were not able to take advantage of the alternative exclusions noted by the agencies in the 2013 rule's preamble.
92
Commenters also offered specific suggestions relating to the scope, requirements of, and restrictions on such an exclusion.
91
83 FR 33471-72. The agencies did not request comments specifically on credit funds in the 2018 proposal.
92
E.g.,
SIFMA; GS; ABA; Financial Services Forum (FSF); and CS.
The agencies understand that many credit funds have not been able to utilize the joint venture and loan securitization exclusions
93
and are
proposing an exclusion for credit funds. A credit fund, for the purposes of the proposed exclusion, is an issuer whose assets consist solely of:
93
For example, one industry group commenter claimed that “no credit funds have been able to qualify for the exclusion for joint ventures, and very few have been able to qualify for the exclusion for loan securitization vehicles, because these exclusions simply were not tailored for credit funds. In particular, credit funds are generally
unable to satisfy the conditions of the loan securitization exclusion because credit funds do not typically issue asset-backed securities, credit funds are managed and to meet the needs of clients, credit funds typically invest in debt securities and warrants.” SIFMA.
• Loans;
• Debt instruments;
• Related rights and other assets that are related or incidental to acquiring, holding, servicing, or selling loans, or debt instruments; and
• Certain interest rate or foreign exchange derivatives.
94
94
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(i).
To ease compliance burdens, several provisions of the proposed exclusion are similar to and modeled on conditions in the loan securitization exclusion. For example, any related rights or other assets held that are securities must be cash equivalents, securities received in lieu of debts previously contracted with respect to loans held or, unique to the proposed credit funds exclusion, certain equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) received on customary terms in connection with the credit fund's loans or debt instruments.
95
Relatedly, any derivatives held by the credit fund must relate to loans, permissible debt instruments, or other rights or assets held and reduce the interest rate and/or foreign exchange risks related to these holdings.
96
The proposed exclusion also would be broader than the loan securitization exclusion, by providing that a credit fund would be able to transact in certain debt instruments.
97
95
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(i)(C).
96
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(i)(D).
97
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(i)(B).
As noted above, the proposed exclusion would permit the credit fund to receive and hold a limited amount of equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) that are received on customary terms in connection with the credit fund's loans or debt instruments.
98
The agencies understand that some banking entities are permitted to take as consideration for a loan to a borrower a warrant or option issued by the borrower—which allows the creditor to share in the profits, income, or earnings of the borrower—as an alternative or replacement to interest on an extension of credit.
99
To ensure that an extension of credit may be subject to similar conditions, regardless of form, the agencies believe that excluded credit funds should be able to hold certain equity instruments, subject to appropriate conditions. The agencies are inviting comment on the nature and scope of such conditions. Although the agencies are not proposing a specific quantitative limit on equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) in the proposed rule, the agencies expect that such a limit may be appropriate, and are considering imposing such a limit in a final rule. The agencies are thus soliciting comment, below, about the terms of any quantitative limit on equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities), and the method for calculating such a limit.
98
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(i)(C)(
1
)(
iii
).
99
See 12 CFR 7.1006.
See also
SIFMA.
The exclusion also would be subject to certain additional restrictions to ensure that the issuer is actually engaged in providing credit and credit intermediation and is not operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act.
100
Under the proposal, a credit fund would not be a covered fund, provided that:
100
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(iv)-(vi).
• The fund does not engage in activities that would constitute proprietary trading, as defined in § _.3(b)(1)(i) of the rule, as if the fund were a banking entity;
101
and
101
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(ii)(A). For the avoidance of doubt, a credit fund would not be able to elect a different definition of proprietary trading or trading account.
• The fund does not issue asset-backed securities.
102
102
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(ii)(B).
In addition, a banking entity would not be able to rely on the credit fund exclusion unless certain conditions were met. If a banking entity sponsors or serves as an investment adviser or commodity trading advisor to a credit fund, the banking entity would be required to provide disclosures specified in section __.11(a)(8), and ensure that the activities of the credit fund are consistent with safety and soundness standards that are substantially similar to those that would apply if the banking entity engaged in the activities directly.
103
Likewise, a banking entity would not be permitted to rely on the credit fund exclusion if it guarantees the performance of the fund,
104
or if the fund holds any debt securities, equity, or rights to receive equity that the banking entity would not be permitted to acquire and hold directly.
105
Furthermore, a banking entity's investment in and relationship with a credit fund would be required to comply with the limitations in section __.14 (except the banking entity would be permitted to acquire and retain any ownership interest in the credit fund), and the limitations in section __.15 regarding material conflicts of interest, high-risk investments, and safety and soundness and financial stability, in each case as though the credit fund were a covered fund.
106
A banking entity's investment in and relationship with a credit fund also would be required to comply with applicable safety and soundness standards.
107
Finally, a banking entity that invests in or has a relationship with a credit fund would continue to be subject to capital charges and other requirements under applicable banking law.
108
103
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(iii).
104
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(iv).
105
Id.
106
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(v)(A).
107
Proposed rule § _.10(c)(15)(v)(B).
108
For example, a banking entity's investment in or relationship with a credit fund could be subject to the regulatory capital adjustments and deductions relating to investments in financial subsidiaries or in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions, if applicable.
See
12 CFR 217.22.
The agencies believe that the proposed credit fund exclusion would (1) address the application of the covered fund provisions to credit-related activities in which banking entities are permitted to engage directly and (2) be consistent with and effectuate Congress's intent that section 13 of the BHC Act not limit or restrict banking entities' ability to sell loans.
109
The agencies also believe the proposed credit fund exclusion may effectively address concerns the agencies expressed in the preamble to the 2013 rule about the administrability and evasion of section 13 of the BHC Act. Banking entities already have experience using and complying with the loan securitization exclusion. Establishing an exclusion for credit funds based on the framework provided by the loan securitization exclusion would allow banking entities to provide traditional extensions of credit regardless of the specific form, whether directly via a loan made by a banking entity, or indirectly through an investment in or relationship with a credit fund that transacts primarily in loans and certain debt instruments.
109
12 U.S.C. 1851(g)(2).
The proposed credit fund exclusion limits the universe of potential funds that could rely on the exclusion by clearly specifying the types of activities those funds may engage in. Excluded credit funds could transact in or hold only loans, permissible debt instruments, and certain related rights or assets. These financial products, and the regulations delimiting the use thereof, are well-known and should not raise administrability and evasion concerns. Similarly, the requirement
that the credit fund not engage in activities that would constitute proprietary trading under section 13 of the BHC Act and implementing regulations should help to ensure that credit extensions that are bought and sold are held for the purpose of facilitating the extension of credit and not for the purpose of evading the requirements of section 13. Finally, the restrictions on guarantees and other limitations should eliminate the ability and incentive for either the banking entity sponsoring a credit fund or any affiliate to provide additional support beyond the ownership interest retained by the sponsor. Thus, the agencies expect that, together, the proposed criteria for the credit fund exclusion would prevent a banking entity having any incentive to bail out such funds in periods of financial stress or otherwise expose the banking entity to the types of risks that the covered fund provisions of section 13 were intended to address.
The agencies request comment on all aspects of the proposed credit fund exclusion.
Question 27.
Is the proposed rule's approach to a credit fund exclusion appropriate and effective? Why or why not? Do the conditions imposed on the proposed exclusion effectively address the concerns about administrability and evasion that the agencies expressed in the preamble to the 2013 rule?
Question 28.
What types of loans and permissible debt instruments or some subset of those assets, if any, should a credit fund be able to hold? Are the definitions used in the proposed exclusion appropriate and clear?
Question 29.
The agencies believe it could be appropriate to permit credit funds to hold a small amount of non-loan and non-debt assets, such as warrants or other equity-like interests directly related to the other permitted assets, subject to appropriate conditions. Should credit funds be able to hold small amounts of equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) received on customary terms in connection with the credit fund's loans or debt instruments? If so, what should be the quantitative limit on permissible non-loan and non-debt assets? Should the limit be five or ten percent of assets, or some other amount? How should such quantitative limit be calculated? Does the holding of a certain amount of equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) raise concerns that banking entities may use credit funds to evade the limitations and prohibitions in section 13 of the BHC Act? Why or why not? For example, under the proposal, could the holdings of an excluded fund be predominantly equity securities (or rights to acquire equity securities) received on customary terms in connection with the credit fund's loans or debt instruments? If so, how?
Question 30.
The proposed credit fund exclusion would permit excluded credit funds to hold related rights and other assets that are related or incidental to acquiring, holding, servicing, or selling loans or debt instruments, provided that each right or asset that is a security meets certain requirements. Should credit funds be allowed to hold such related rights and other assets? Are these assets necessary for the proper functioning of a credit fund? Are the requirements regarding rights or assets that are securities applicable to the holdings of credit funds or otherwise appropriate?
Question 31.
Is the list of permitted securities appropriately scoped, overbroad, or under-inclusive? Why or why not? Should the list of permitted securities be modified? If so, how and why?
Question 32.
The proposal provides that any interest rate or foreign exchange derivatives held by the credit fund adhere to certain requirements. Should credit funds be allowed to hold these, or any other type of derivatives? Are the requirements that the written terms of the derivatives directly relate to assets held and that the derivatives reduce the interest rate and/or foreign exchange risks related to the assets held applicable to the holdings of credit funds generally? Are such requirements otherwise appropriate? Why or why not?
Question 33.
Which safety and soundness standards, if any, should be referenced in the credit fund exclusion? Should the agencies reference the safety and soundness standards codified in the banking agencies' regulations,
e.g.,
12 CFR part 30, 12 CFR part 364, or other safety and soundness standards? Safety and soundness standards can vary depending on the type of banking entity. Is there a universally applicable standard that would be more appropriate, such as standards applicable to insured depository institutions?
Question 34.
Is the application of sections _.14 and _.15 to the proposed credit fund exclusion appropriate? Why or why not? Should a banking entity that sponsors or serves as an investment adviser to a credit fund be required to comply with the limitations imposed by both sections _.14(a) and (b)? Why or why not?
Question 35.
Is it appropriate to require a banking entity that sponsors or serves as an investment adviser or commodity trading advisor to a credit fund, to comply with the disclosure requirements of § _.11(a)(8), as if the credit fund were a covered fund? Why or why not?
Question 36.
Is the definition of proprietary trading in the credit fund exclusion appropriately scoped, overbroad, or under-inclusive? Why or why not? If the definition is not appropriately scoped, is there an alternative definition of proprietary trading? Should credit funds sponsored by, or that have as an investment adviser, a banking entity be able or be required to use the associated banking entity's definition of proprietary trading, for the purposes of this exclusion? Why or why not? Would such an approach impose undue compliance burdens? If so, what are such burdens?
Question 37.
Should the agencies establish additional provisions to prevent evasion of section 13 of the BHC Act? Why or why not? If so, what requirements would be appropriate and properly balance providing firms with flexibility to facilitate extensions of credit and ensuring compliance with section 13 of the BHC Act? For example, should the agencies impose quantitative limitations, additional capital charges, control restrictions, or other requirements on use of the credit fund exclusion?
Question 38.
The proposed exclusion for credit funds is similar to the current exclusion for loan securitizations. Should the agencies combine the proposed credit fund exclusion with the current loan securitization exclusion? If so, how? What would be the benefits and drawbacks of combining the exclusions or maintaining separate exclusions for each type of activity? If the two exclusions remain separate, should the proposed credit fund exclusion contain a requirement that a credit fund not issue asset-backed securities? Why or why not?
2. Venture Capital Funds
Under the implementing regulations, venture capital funds that invest in small businesses and start-up businesses that would be investment companies but for the exclusion contained in section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act are covered funds unless they otherwise qualify for an exclusion. The agencies are proposing to add an exclusion from the definition of “covered fund” under § _.10(b) of the rule that would allow banking entities to acquire or retain an ownership interest in, or sponsor, certain venture capital funds to the extent the banking entity is permitted to engage in such activities under otherwise applicable law. The exclusion
would be available with respect to “qualifying venture capital funds,” which the proposal defines as an issuer that meets the definition in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1 and that meets several additional criteria specified below.
Contemporaneous with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, multiple Members of Congress made statements indicating that section 13 of the BHC Act should not restrict the activities of venture capital funds.
110
Several of these Members of Congress noted that properly conducted venture capital funds do not present the same concerns at which section 13 of the BHC Act was directed and can promote the public interest and job creation.
111
In addition, in accordance with section 13(b)(1) of the BHC Act, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) released a report providing recommendations concerning implementation of section 13.
112
The FSOC Report noted that several commenters recommended excluding venture capital funds from the definition of “hedge fund” and “private equity fund” because the nature of venture capital funds is fundamentally different from such other funds and because they promote innovation.
113
The FSOC Report stated that the treatment of venture capital funds was a significant issue and noted that the SEC had recently proposed rules distinguishing the characteristics and activities of venture capital funds from other private funds.
114
The FSOC Report recommended that the agencies carefully evaluate the range of funds and other legal vehicles that rely on the exclusions contained in section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) and consider whether it would be appropriate for the regulations implementing section 13 to adopt a narrower definition in some cases.
115
110
See
156 Cong. Rec. E1295 (daily ed. July 13, 2010) (statement of Rep. Eshoo) (“the purpose of the Volcker Rule is to eliminate risk-taking activities by banks and their affiliates while at the same time preserving safe, sound investment activities that serve the public interest . . . Venture capital funds do not pose the same risk to the health of the financial system. They promote the public interest by funding growing companies critical to spurring innovation, job creation, and economic competitiveness. I expect the regulators to use the broad authority in the Volcker Rule wisely and clarify that funds . . . such as venture capital funds, are not captured under the Volcker Rule and fall outside the definition of `private equity.' ”); 156 Cong. Rec. S5904 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (recognizing “the crucial and unique role that venture capital plays in spurring innovation, creating jobs and growing companies” and that “the intent of the rule is not to harm venture capital investment.”); 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (confirming “the purpose of the Volcker rule is to eliminate excessive risk taking activities by banks and their affiliates while at the same time preserving safe, sound investment activities that serve the public interest” and stating “properly conducted venture capital investment will not cause the harms at which the Volcker rule is directed. In the event that properly conducted venture capital investment is excessively restricted by the provisions of section 619, I would expect the appropriate Federal regulators to exempt it using their authority under section 619[d][1](J) . . .”); 156 Cong. Rec. S6242 (daily ed. July 26, 2010) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown) (“One other area of remaining uncertainty that has been left to the regulators is the treatment of bank investments in venture capital funds. Regulators should carefully consider whether banks that focus overwhelmingly on lending to and investing in start-up technology companies should be captured by one-size-fits-all restrictions under the Volcker rule. I believe they should not be. Venture capital investments help entrepreneurs get the financing they need to create new jobs. Unfairly restricting this type of capital formation is the last thing we should be doing in this economy.”).
111
See
156 Cong. Rec. E1295 (daily ed. July 13, 2010) (statement of Rep. Eshoo); 156 Cong. Rec. S5904 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Boxer); 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 156 Cong. Rec. S6242 (daily ed. July 26, 2010) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).
112
See
Financial Stability Oversight Counsel, Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (Jan. 18, 2011),
available at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
(FSOC Report).
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See id.
In the 2011 proposed rule, the agencies requested comment on whether to exclude venture capital funds from the definition of “covered fund.”
116
The agencies received several comments supporting such an exclusion and two comments opposing such an exclusion,
117
but declined to explicitly exclude venture capital funds from the definition of “covered fund” in the 2013 rule.
118
The agencies indicated at the time that they did not believe the statutory language of section 13 supported providing an exclusion for venture capital funds.
119
The agencies explained that this view was based on an understanding that Congress treated venture capital funds as a subset of private equity funds in other contexts and that Congress did not adopt an express exclusion for venture capital funds in section 13 of the BHC Act.
120
Specifically, the agencies cited to Congressional reports related to section 402 of the Dodd-Frank Act that characterized venture capital funds as “a subset of private investment funds specializing in long-term equity investment in small or start-up businesses.”
121
The agencies further stated that it appeared that the activities and risk profiles for banking entities regarding sponsorship of, and investment in, private equity and venture capital funds were not readily distinguishable.
122
116
See
76 FR 68915.
117
See
79 FR 5703-04.
118
See id.
119
See id.
120
See id.
121
Id.
(quoting S. Rep. No. 111-176 (2010)).
See also
H. Rep. No. 111-517 (2010) (indicating that venture capital funds are subsets of “private funds”). However, the agencies did not address the difference in terminology that Congress used in section 402 of the Dodd-Frank Act (“private funds”) and section 619 (“hedge funds” and “private equity funds”). Nor did the agencies address the different statutory definitions of these terms. Section 402 defines “private fund” as “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.” Section 619 defines “hedge fund or private equity fund” as “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act,
or such similar funds as the [agencies] may, by rule . . . determine.”
(emphasis added).
122
See
79 FR 5704. The agencies do not believe the fact that Congress expressly distinguished these funds from other types of private funds in other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act is dispositive. In this context, we do not believe that the differences in how the terms private equity fund and venture capital fund are used in the Dodd-Frank Act prohibit this proposal. The agencies believe it is reasonable under the authority given to the agencies under the statute to exclude these funds from the definition of “covered fund.”
In 2017, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a report stating that the definition of “covered fund” is overly broad and that the covered fund provisions are not well-tailored to the objectives of section 13 of the BHC Act.
123
The report stated that changes to the covered fund provisions would “greatly assist in the formation of venture and other capital that is critical to fund economic growth opportunities.”
124
In the 2018 proposal, the agencies requested comment on whether to exclude from the definition of “covered fund” issuers that do not meet the definition of “hedge fund” or “private equity fund” in the SEC's Form PF.
125
The agencies noted that a venture capital fund, as defined in rule 203(
l
)-1 under the Advisers Act, is not a “private equity fund” or “hedge fund,” as those terms are defined in Form PF and requested comment on whether to include venture capital funds within the definition of “covered fund” if the agencies adopted a definition of covered fund based on the definitions in Form PF.
126
123
See
U.S. Department of the Treasury,
A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities: Banks and Credit Unions
at 77 (June 2017).
124
See id.
125
See
83 FR 33478.
126
See id.
In response to the 2018 proposal, the agencies received several comments
supporting excluding venture capital funds from the definition of covered fund.
127
Commenters stated that the legislative record does not indicate that Congress intended to restrict the activities of venture capital funds and that Members of Congress supported excluding venture capital funds from the definition of covered fund.
128
Commenters further stated that venture capital funds engage in long-term investments that promote growth, capital formation, and competitiveness.
129
Some commenters specifically recommended using the definition of “venture capital fund” in rule 203(
l
)-1 under the Advisers Act to determine the scope of a venture capital fund exclusion.
130
One commenter argued that venture capital funds should be treated the same as private equity funds.
131
Two commenters opposed excluding venture capital funds from the definition of covered fund.
132
In addition, several commenters opposed redefining “covered fund” using the definitions of “hedge fund” and “private equity fund” in Form PF.
133
Two commenters supported using the definitions in Form PF as a basis for excluding certain issuers from the definition of covered fund.
134
In addition, the agencies received several comments stating the rule should allow banking entities to invest in funds that engage only in long-term activities, including venture capital investments, that would be permissible for the banking entity to engage in directly.
135
127
See
ABA; BPI; IIB; SIFMA; Crapo et al.; Hultgren; Hensarling et al; National Venture Capital Association (NVCA); and Center for American Entrepreneurship (CAE).
128
See
ABA; BPI; Representative Hultgren; NVCA; and Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness (CCMC).
129
See
ABA; BPI; Representative Hultgren; NVCA; Representatives Hensarling et al.; and CAE.
130
See
Representative Hultgren and NVCA.
131
See
AIC.
132
See
Occupy the SEC and Data Boiler.
133
See, e.g.,
Americans for Financial Reform; AIC; and SIFMA.
134
See
Association for Corporate Growth and FI.
135
See e.g.,
ABA; NVCA; AIC; CCMC; and Committee on Capital Markets Regulation.
As discussed in detail below, the agencies are proposing to exclude from the definition of “covered fund” qualifying venture capital funds. The proposal would define a qualifying venture capital fund as an issuer that:
• Is a venture capital fund as defined in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1; and
• Does not engage in any activity that would constitute proprietary trading, under § _.3(b)(1)(i), as if it were a banking entity.
With respect to any banking entity that acts as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity trading advisor to the issuer, the banking entity would be required to:
• Provide in writing to any prospective and actual investor the disclosures required under § _.11(a)(8), as if the issuer were a covered fund; and
• Ensure that the activities of the issuer are consistent with safety and soundness standards that are substantially similar to those that would apply if the banking entity engaged in the activities directly.
In addition, a banking entity that relies on this exclusion would not, directly or indirectly, be permitted to guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the obligations or performance of the issuer. Finally, the proposed exclusion would require a banking entity's ownership interest in or relationship with a qualifying venture capital fund to:
• Comply with the limitations imposed in § _.14 (except the banking entity may acquire and retain any ownership interest in the issuer) and § _.15 of the implementing regulations, as if the issuer were a covered fund; and
• Be conducted in compliance with, and subject to, applicable banking laws and regulations, including applicable safety and soundness standards.
These requirements are intended to ensure that banking entity investments in qualifying venture capital funds are consistent with the purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act. First, a qualifying venture capital fund must be a venture capital fund as defined in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1. The SEC has defined “venture capital fund” as any private fund
136
that:
136
For purposes of 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1, “private fund” is defined as “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.” 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(29).
• Represents to investors and potential investors that it pursues a venture capital strategy;
• Immediately after the acquisition of any asset, other than qualifying investments or short-term holdings, holds no more than 20 percent of the amount of the fund's aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed capital in assets (other than short-term holdings) that are not qualifying investments, valued at cost or fair value, consistently applied by the fund;
• Does not borrow, issue debt obligations, provide guarantees or otherwise incur leverage, in excess of 15 percent of the private fund's aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed capital, and any such borrowing, indebtedness, guarantee or leverage is for a non-renewable term of no longer than 120 calendar days, except that any guarantee by the private fund of a qualifying portfolio company's obligations up to the amount of the value of the private fund's investment in the qualifying portfolio company is not subject to the 120 calendar day limit;
• Only issues securities the terms of which do not provide a holder with any right, except in extraordinary circumstances, to withdraw, redeem or require the repurchase of such securities but may entitle holders to receive distributions made to all holders pro rata; and
• Is not registered under section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 . . . , and has not elected to be treated as a business development company pursuant to section 54 of that Act . . . .
137
137
17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1(a).
“Qualifying investment” is defined in the SEC's regulation to be: (1) An equity security issued by a qualifying portfolio company that has been acquired directly by the private fund from the qualifying portfolio company; (2) any equity security issued by a qualifying portfolio company in exchange for an equity security issued by the qualifying portfolio company described in (1); or (3) any equity security issued by a company of which a qualifying portfolio company is a majority-owned subsidiary, as defined in section 2(a)(24) of the Investment Company Act, or a predecessor, and is acquired by the private fund in exchange for an equity security described in (1) or (2).
138
138
17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1(c)(3).
“Qualifying portfolio company,” in turn, is defined in the SEC's regulation to be a company that: (1) At the time of any investment by the private fund, is not reporting or foreign traded and does not control, is not controlled by or under common control with another company, directly or indirectly, that is reporting or foreign traded; (2) does not borrow or issue debt obligations in connection with the private fund's investment in such company and distribute to the private fund the proceeds of such borrowing or issuance in exchange for the private fund's investment; and (3) is not an investment company, a private fund, an issuer that would be an investment company but for the exemption provided by 17 CFR 270.3a-7, or a commodity pool.
139
The SEC explained that the definitions of “qualifying investment” and “qualifying portfolio company” reflect the typical characteristics of investments made by venture capital funds and that these
definitions work together to cabin the definition of venture capital fund to only the funds that Congress understood to be venture capital funds during the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
140
139
17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1(c)(4).
140
See
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 76 FR 39646, 39657 (Jul. 6, 2011).
In the preamble to the regulations adopting this definition of venture capital fund, the SEC explained that the definition's criteria distinguish venture capital funds from other types of funds, including private equity funds and hedge funds. For example, the SEC explained that it understood the criteria for “qualifying portfolio companies” to be characteristic of issuers of portfolio securities held by venture capital funds and, taken together, would operate to exclude most private equity funds and hedge funds from the venture capital fund definition.
141
The SEC also explained that the criteria for “qualifying investments” under the SEC's regulation would help to differentiate venture capital funds from other types of private funds, such as leveraged buyout funds.
142
Moreover, the SEC explained that these criteria reflect the Congressional understanding that venture capital funds are less connected with the public markets and therefore may have less potential for systemic risk.
143
The SEC further explained that its regulation's restriction on the amount of borrowing, debt obligations, guarantees or other incurrence of leverage was appropriate to differentiate venture capital funds from other types of private funds that may engage in trading strategies that use financial leverage and may contribute to systemic risk.
144
141
76 FR 39656.
142
See, e.g.,
76 FR 39653 (explaining that a limitation on secondary market purchases of a qualifying portfolio company's shares would recognize “the critical role this condition played in differentiating venture capital funds from other types of private funds”).
143
76 FR 39648 (“[T]he proposed definition of venture capital fund was designed to . . . address concerns expressed by Congress regarding the potential for systemic risk.”); 76 FR 39656 (“Congressional testimony asserted that these funds may be less connected with the public markets and may involve less potential for systemic risk. This appears to be a key consideration by Congress that led to the enactment of the venture capital exemption. As we discussed in the Proposing Release, the rule we proposed sought to incorporate this Congressional understanding of the nature of investments of a venture capital fund, and these principles guided our consideration of the proposed venture capital fund definition.”).
144
76 FR 39662.
See also
76 FR 39657 (“We proposed these elements of the qualifying portfolio company definition because of the focus on leverage in the Dodd-Frank Act as a potential contributor to systemic risk as discussed by the Senate Committee report, and the testimony before Congress that stressed the lack of leverage in venture capital investing.”).
The agencies believe the SEC's rationale for adopting this definition of venture capital fund could also support using this definition as the foundation for an exclusion from the definition of “covered fund.” First, this definition helps to distinguish the investment activities of venture capital funds from those of hedge funds and private equity funds, which was one of the agencies' primary concerns in declining to adopt an exclusion for venture capital funds in the 2013 rule. Second, this definition includes criteria reflecting the characteristics of venture capital funds that the agencies believe may pose less potential risk to a banking entity sponsoring or investing in venture capital funds and to the financial system—specifically, the smaller role of leverage financing and a lesser degree of interconnectedness with public markets.
145
These characteristics would help to address the concern expressed in the preamble to the 2013 rule that the activities and risk profiles for banking entities regarding sponsorship of, and investment in, venture capital fund activities are not readily distinguishable from those funds that section 13 of the BHC Act was intended to capture.
145
See supra
notes 106 and 107.
While the SEC's regulatory definition in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1 would form the base of the proposed exclusion for qualifying venture capital funds, the proposed exclusion includes additional criteria that would help promote the specific purposes of section 13 of the BHC Act. In particular, a qualifying venture capital fund would not be permitted to engage in any activity that would constitute proprietary trading under § _.3(b)(1)(i) as if the fund were a banking entity. This requirement would promote one of the purposes of the covered fund provisions in section 13 of the BHC Act, which was to prevent banking entities from circumventing the proprietary trading prohibition through fund investments.
146
Under this requirement, a qualifying venture capital fund could not engage in any activities that are principally for the purpose of short-term resale, benefitting from actual or expected short-term price movements, realizing short-term arbitrage profits, or hedging one or more of the positions resulting from such purchases or sales.
146
See, e.g.,
Treasury Report at 77 and FSOC Report at 6.
The agencies are considering an additional restriction for which they are seeking specific comment. Under this additional restriction, and notwithstanding 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1(a)(2), the venture capital fund exclusion would be limited to funds that do not invest in companies that, at the time of the investment, have more than a limited dollar amount of total annual revenue, calculated as of the last day of the calendar year. The agencies are considering what specific threshold would be appropriate. For example, the agencies are considering whether a limit of $50 million in annual revenue would be appropriate, or whether a higher or lower limit would help to appropriately differentiate venture capital funds from the types of funds that section 13 of the BHC Act was intended to address.
A banking entity that serves as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity trading advisor to a qualifying venture capital fund would be required to provide the disclosures required under § _.11 (a)(8) to prospective and actual investors in the fund. In addition, any banking entity that relies on the exclusion would not be permitted to, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume or otherwise insure the obligations or performance of the qualifying venture capital fund. These requirements would promote yet another goal of section 13 of the BHC Act, which was to prevent banking entities from bailing out funds that they sponsor or advise.
147
147
See
Treasury Report at 77 and FSOC Report at 6.
A banking entity that serves as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity trading advisor to a qualifying venture capital fund also must ensure the fund's activities are consistent with safety and soundness standards that are substantially similar to those that would apply if the banking entity engaged in the activities directly. Therefore, a banking entity could not rely on this exclusion to sponsor an investment fund that exposes the banking entity to the type of high-risk trading and investment activities that the covered fund provisions of section 13 of the BHC Act were intended to restrict. Further, a banking entity's investment in or relationship with a qualifying venture capital fund would be subject to § _14 (except the banking entity may acquire and retain any ownership interest in the fund in accordance with the terms of the exclusion) and § _.15 of the implementing regulations, as if the fund were a covered fund. These limitations would help to ensure that the risk a banking entity takes on as a result of its investment in or relationship with a qualifying venture capital fund remains appropriately limited. Like the
restrictions on guarantees described above, applying the requirements in § _.14 would restrict a banking entity that sponsors or advises the fund from providing additional support or bailing out the fund. Applying the requirements in § _.15 would ensure that the fund does not expose the banking entity to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies. In particular, to the extent a fund would expose a banking entity to a high-risk asset or high-risk trading strategy (or otherwise engage in proprietary trading), the fund would not be a qualifying venture capital fund. Therefore, prior to making an investment in a qualifying venture capital fund, a banking entity would need to ensure that the fund's investment mandate and strategy would satisfy the requirements of § _.15. In addition, a banking entity would need to monitor the activities of a qualifying venture capital fund to ensure it satisfies these requirements on an ongoing basis.
The agencies believe that qualifying venture capital funds meeting each of these requirements would not raise the type of concerns that were the target of section 13 of the BHC Act. The proposed exclusion, including incorporation of the SEC's regulatory venture capital fund definition in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1, should also address the concerns the agencies expressed in the preamble to the 2013 rule that the activities and risk profiles for banking entities regarding sponsorship of, and investment in, venture capital funds are not readily distinguishable from those of funds that section 13 of the BHC Act was intended to capture. Accordingly, the agencies believe the foregoing requirements could give effect to the language and purpose of section 13 of the BHC Act without allowing banking entities to evade the requirements of section 13. The agencies further believe that permitting banking entities to invest in and have certain relationships with qualifying venture capital funds would be consistent with statements by Members of Congress that were made contemporaneously with passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.
148
148
See supra
note 110.
The agencies believe that properly-conducted activities involving these types of venture capital funds could promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States. Qualifying venture capital funds could allow banking entities to diversify their permissible investment activities, and like other exclusions provided in the 2013 rule, allow banking entities to share the costs and risks of their permissible investment activities with third-party investors.
149
Investments in qualifying venture capital funds could allow banking entities to allocate available resources to a more diverse array of long-term investments in a broader range of geographic areas, industries and sectors than the banking entity may be able to access directly.
149
79 FR 5681.
Banking entity investments in qualifying venture capital funds may benefit the broader financial system by improving the flow of financing to small businesses and start-ups and thus may promote and protect the financial stability of the United States. Permitting these types of investments would be consistent with the Treasury Department's June 2017 report, which said such fund investments “can greatly assist in the formation of venture and other capital that is critical to fund economic growth opportunities.”
150
Similarly, the agencies recognized the economic benefits of allowing banking entities to make venture capital-style investments in the preamble to the 2013 rule, despite not adopting an exclusion for such funds.
151
Further, it is possible that permitting banking entities to extend financing to businesses through qualifying venture capital funds would allow banking entities to compete more effectively with non-banking entities that are not subject to the same prudential regulation or supervision as banking entities subject to section 13 of the BHC Act. In this respect, the proposal could allow a larger volume of permissible banking and financial activities to occur in the regulated banking system.
150
Treasury Report at 77.
151
79 FR 5704 (“While the final rule does not provide a separate exclusion for venture capital funds from the definition of covered fund, the [a]gencies recognize that certain venture capital investments by banking entities provide capital and funding to nascent or early-stage companies and small businesses and also may provide these companies expertise and services. Other provisions of the final rule or the statute may facilitate, or at least not impede, other forms of investing that may provide
the same or similar benefits.”
) (emphasis added).
In addition, it is widely noted that the availability of venture and other financing from funds is not uniform throughout the United States. In particular, it is noted that such funding is generally available on a competitive basis for companies with a significant presence in certain geographic regions (
e.g.,
the New York metropolitan area, the Boston metropolitan area and “Silicon Valley” and surrounding areas).
152
In this respect, the proposal could allow banking entities with a presence in and knowledge of the areas where venture capital and other types of financing are less readily available to businesses to provide this type of financing in those areas.
152
See, e.g.,
Richard Florida, Venture Capital Remains Highly Concentrated in Just a Few Cities, CityLab (Oct. 3, 2017),
available at https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/10/venture-capital-concentration/539775/;
PricewaterhouseCoopers & CB Insights, MoneyTree Report (Q3 2019),
available at: https://www.pwc.com/us/en/moneytree-report/assets/moneytree-report-q3-2019.pdf.
For all of these reasons, the agencies believe the proposal could promote the benefits of long-term investment that the agencies and Members of Congress have previously recognized, while also addressing the concerns that were the target of the funds prohibition in section 13 of the BHC Act. The agencies are seeking comment on whether to exclude other types of funds that, like qualifying venture capital funds, provide important capital to businesses through long-term investments and do not engage in proprietary trading and other activities that section 13 of the BHC Act was intended to prohibit.
The agencies are requesting comment on the proposal to exclude qualifying venture capital funds from the covered fund definition, in particular:
Question 39.
Is the proposed exclusion for qualifying venture capital funds appropriate? Why or why not?
Question 40.
Does the proposed exclusion for qualifying venture capital funds include the appropriate vehicles? Why or why not? If not, how should the agencies expand or narrow the vehicles for which banking entities would be permitted to make use of the exclusion? What modifications to the proposed exclusion would be appropriate and why?
Question 41.
Are the proposed conditions on the proposed exclusion for qualifying venture capital funds appropriate? Why or why not? If not appropriate, how should the agencies modify the conditions, and why?
Question 42.
Would permitting banking entities to invest in or sponsor a qualifying venture capital fund promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States? What data is available to support an argument that venture capital funds would or would not promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States?
Question 43.
Are the requirements for a qualifying venture capital fund sufficient to distinguish these types of funds from covered funds? Are there any additional standards or requirements that should apply to a
qualifying venture capital fund? If so, what are they and why should they apply?
Question 44.
Should the additional proposed revenue requirement be added to the venture capital fund exclusion to help ensure that the investments made by excluded venture capital funds are truly made in small and early-stage companies? Why or why not? If the additional restriction is added, is $50 million an appropriate annual revenue limit? If not, what would be an appropriate revenue limit? Is there a metric other than annual gross revenue, such as amount of time in operation, that would serve as a better indicator of whether an investment in a company should allow a venture capital fund to qualify for the exclusion?
Question 45.
Should the proposed venture capital fund exclusion require that 100 percent of the fund's holdings, other than short-term holdings, be in qualifying investments instead of the 80 percent that is required under 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1(a)(2)? Why or why not?
Question 46.
Are there provisions or conditions of the definition under rule 203(
l
)-1 under the Advisers Act that are inappropriate for purposes of determining an exclusion from the “covered fund” definition in § _.10? If so, please explain why the purposes of an exclusion from the “covered fund” definition should lead the agencies to exclude a provision or condition, such as paragraph (a)(2), of the definition under rule 203(
l
)-1 under the Advisers Act.
Question 47.
How would a banking entity ensure the activities of a qualifying venture capital fund are consistent with the safety and soundness standards that apply to the banking entity? Are the standards and requirements for a banking entity that acts as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity trading advisor to a qualifying venture capital fund appropriate to apply to a qualifying venture capital fund? Are there any additional standards or requirements that should apply to a banking entity that acts as a sponsor, investment adviser, or commodity trading advisor to a qualifying venture capital fund? If so, what are they, and why should they apply?
Question 48.
A banking entity that sponsors or advises a qualifying venture capital fund would be required to comply with the limitations imposed by §§ _.14 (except the banking entity may acquire and retain any ownership interest in the issuer) and _.15 of the 2013 rule, as if the qualifying venture capital fund were a covered fund. Is the application of these sections to the proposed venture capital fund exclusion appropriate? Why or why not?
Question 49.
Is it sufficiently clear what kind of assets or investments would result in a conflict of interest or an exposure to a high-risk asset or high-risk trading strategy in the context of a qualifying venture capital fund? Should the agencies provide additional parameters regarding the types of assets and strategies that could result in such exposure in this context?
Question 50.
Should the agencies exclude from the definition of covered fund, or otherwise permit the activities of, certain long-term investment funds that would not be qualifying venture capital funds? For example, should the agencies provide an exclusion for issuers (1) that make long-term investments that a banking entity could make directly, (2) that hold themselves out as entities or arrangements that make investments that they intend to hold for a set minimum time period, such as two years, (3) whose relevant offering and governing documents reflect a long-term investment strategy, and (4) that meet all other requirements of the proposed qualifying venture capital fund exclusion (other than that the issuers would be venture capital funds as defined in 17 CFR 275.203(
l
)-1)? Would the rationale for excluding qualifying venture capital funds also extend to such long-term investment funds? Why or why not? If the agencies were to adopt an exclusion for long-term investment funds, should the agencies impose safeguards on such an exclusion? If so, what safeguards should the agencies impose, and why? Would such an exclusion promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United States? If so, how?
Question 51.
Is there evidence that the covered fund provisions have caused banking entities to make more standalone direct balance sheet investments? If so, have these investments increased or decreased risk to banking entities?
Question 52.
Is there evidence that the covered fund provisions have negatively impacted the provision of financing? If so, is this impact non-uniform? For example, are effects more acute in certain geographic areas or in certain industries? To the extent negative effects are asymmetric by geography or otherwise, would the proposal effectively address these asymmetries? Is there evidence that the covered fund provisions have caused end-users to seek financing from non-banking entities? If so, would the proposed exclusion for qualifying venture capital funds help to address these impacts?
3. Family Wealth Management Vehicles
The agencies are proposing to exclude from the definition of “covered fund” under § _.10(b) of the rule any entity that acts as a “family wealth management vehicle.” The proposed family wealth management vehicle exclusion would be available to an entity that: (1) If organized as a trust, the grantor(s) of the entity are all family customers and, (2) if not organized as a trust, a majority of the voting interests in the entity are owned (directly or indirectly) by family customers; and the entity is owned only by family customers and up to 3 closely related persons of the family customers.
153
In response to the 2018 proposal, commenters raised concerns that family wealth management vehicles were not specifically excluded from the covered fund definition following the adoption of the 2013 rule or in the 2018 proposed rule.
154
Commenters stated that family wealth management vehicles are typically designed to facilitate family wealth management, estate planning, and other similar objectives and may take a variety of legal forms, including trusts, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and other pooled investment vehicles.
155
Commenters further stated that absent an exclusion from the covered fund definition, family wealth management vehicles could be restricted from obtaining various types of ordinary course banking and asset management services from a banking entity simply because they would receive those services through a family wealth management vehicle.
156
Commenters provided examples of these services, including investment advice, brokerage execution, financing, and clearance and settlement services.
157
A commenter also stated that family wealth management vehicles structured as trusts for the benefit of family members also often appoint banking entities, acting in a fiduciary capacity, as trustees for the trusts.
158
153
Under § _.10(c)(17)(iii)(A) of the proposed rule, “closely related person” would mean “a natural person (including the estate and estate planning vehicles of such person) who has a longstanding business or personal relationship with any family customer.”
154
See e.g.,
ABA; BPI; IAA; and SIFMA. These commenters stated that many family wealth management vehicles rely on the exclusions provided by sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act and would therefore be covered funds unless they satisfy the conditions for one of the 2013 rule's exclusions from the covered fund definition.
155
See e.g.,
IAA and SIFMA.
156
See e.g.,
BPI; IAA; and SIFMA.
157
See e.g.,
BPI and SIFMA.
158
See
SIFMA.
In the 2018 proposal, the agencies requested comment regarding whether the agencies should address the application of Super 23A in the context of family wealth management vehicles. One commenter responded that the agencies should incorporate the exemptions under Section 23A and Regulation W into the definition of “covered transaction.”
159
However, commenters also stated that incorporating the exemptions under Section 23A and Regulation W would still not permit banking entities to engage in the full range of transactions and services sought by family wealth management vehicles, including ordinary extensions of credit, and therefore the regulations would continue to unnecessarily impede traditional banking and asset management services.
160
Commenters further stated that incorporation of the exemptions would not eliminate the uncertainty and the associated burden for banking entities resulting from an analysis of the status of a family wealth management vehicle as a covered fund. The proposal is intended to allow banking entities to provide the full range of traditional customer-facing banking and asset management services to family wealth management vehicles and recognizes that a specific exclusion for family wealth management vehicles—rather than merely addressing the application of Super 23A—is necessary to address the issues related family wealth management vehicles more completely and effectively.
159
See id.
160
See e.g.,
BPI and SIFMA.
Similar to the customer facilitation vehicles discussed below, the agencies believe that the proposed exclusion for family wealth management vehicles would appropriately allow banking entities to structure services or transactions for customers, or to otherwise provide traditional customer-facing banking and asset management services, through a vehicle, even though such a vehicle may rely on section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act or would otherwise be a covered fund under the implementing regulations. The agencies have previously indicated their intent to avoid unintended results that might follow from a definition of “covered fund” that is inappropriately imprecise,
161
and believe that these commenters have identified such unintended results. The agencies believe that an exclusion for family wealth management vehicles would effectively tailor the definition of covered fund by permitting banking entities to continue to provide traditional banking and asset management services that do not involve the types of risks section 13 was designed to address. As the agencies noted in the preamble to the 2013 rule, section 13 and the implementing regulations were designed to permit banking entities to continue to provide client-oriented financial services, including asset management services.
162
In addition, the agencies believe that an exclusion for family wealth management vehicles is consistent with section 13(d)(1)(D), which permits banking entities to engage in transactions on behalf of customers, when those transactions would otherwise be prohibited under section 13. The proposed exclusion would similarly allow banking entities to provide traditional services to customers through vehicles used to manage the wealth and other assets of those customers and their families.
161
See
83 FR 33471; 79 FR 5670-71.
162
See
79 FR 5541 (describing the 2013 rule as “permitting banking entities to continue to provide, and to manage and limit the risks associated with providing, client-oriented financial services that are critical to capital generation for businesses of all sizes, households and individuals, and that facilitate liquid markets. These client-oriented financial services, which include underwriting, market making, and asset management services, are important to the U.S. financial markets and the participants in those markets.”).
Under the proposed exclusion, a family wealth management vehicle would include any entity that is not, and does not hold itself out as being, an entity or arrangement that raises money from investors primarily for the purpose of investing in securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in securities, provided that: (1) If the entity is a trust, the grantor(s) of the entity are all family customers and, (2) if the entity is not a trust, a majority of the voting interests are owned (directly or indirectly) by family customers and the entity is owned only by family customers and up to 3 closely related persons of the family customers. Under the proposed exclusion, a family customer would mean a family client, as defined in Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4) of the Advisers Act (17 CFR 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4)); or any natural person who is a father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law of a family client, spouse or spousal equivalent of any of the foregoing.
163
163
All terms defined in Rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1 of the Advisers Act (17 CFR 275.202(a)(11)(G)-1) have the same meaning in the proposed family wealth management exclusion.
In addition, a banking entity would rely on the proposed exclusion only if the banking entity (or an affiliate): (1) Provides bona fide trust, fiduciary, investment advisory, or commodity trading advisory services to the entity; (2) does not, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the obligations or performance of such entity; (3) complies with the disclosure obligations under § _.11(a)(8), as if such entity were a covered fund;
164
(4) does not acquire or retain, as principal, an ownership interest in the entity, other than up to 0.5 percent of the entity's outstanding ownership interests that may be held by the banking entity and its affiliates for the purpose of and to the extent necessary for establishing corporate separateness or addressing bankruptcy, insolvency, or similar concerns; (5) complies with the requirements of §§ _.14(b) and _.15, as if such issuer were a covered fund; and (6) complies with the requirements of 12 CFR 223.15(a), as if such banking entity and its affiliates were a member bank and the issuer were an affiliate thereof. The agencies believe that, collectively, the conditions on the proposed exclusion should help to ensure that family wealth management vehicles are used for customer oriented financial services provided on arms-length, market terms, and to prevent evasion of the requirements of section 13 of the BHC Act and the implementing regulations. In addition, these proposed conditions are based on existing conditions in other provisions of the implementing regulations,
165
which the
agencies believe should facilitate banking entities' compliance.
164
The obligations under § _.11(a)(8) of the proposed rule would apply in connection with the exemption for organizing and offering covered funds, which would typically require the preparation and distribution of offering documents. The agencies understand that offering documents may not be necessary in connection with most family wealth management vehicles given the vehicles' purpose and the requirement that interests in such vehicles be limited to family customers and up to 3 closely related persons of the family customers. Accordingly, the agencies believe that for purposes of the proposed exclusion, a banking entity could satisfy these written disclosure obligations in a number of ways, such as including them in the family wealth management vehicle's governing documents, in account opening materials or in supplementary materials. The condition reflects the agencies' interest in providing family customers with the substance of the disclosures, rather than a concern with the document in which they are provided. Similarly, the agencies expect the specific wording of the disclosures in § _.11(a)(8) of the proposed rule may need to be modified to accurately reflect the specific circumstances of the family wealth management vehicle.
165
See
implementing regulations § _.11(a)(5) (imposing, as a condition of the exemption for organizing and offering a covered fund, that a banking entity and its affiliates do not, directly or indirectly, guarantee, assume, or otherwise insure the obligations or performance of the covered fund or of any covered fund in which such covered fund
invests); § _.11(a)(8) (imposing, as a condition of the exemption for organizing and offering a covered fund, that the banking entity provide certain disclosures to any prospective and actual investor in the covered fund); § _.10(c)(2)(ii) (allowing, as a condition of the exclusion from the covered fund definition for wholly-owned subsidiaries, for the holding of up to 0.5 percent of outstanding ownership interests by a third party for limited purposes); and § _.14(b) (subjecting certain transactions with covered funds to section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act).
The agencies are not proposing to apply Super 23A to family wealth management vehicles because, as discussed above, the agencies understand that the application of Super 23A to family wealth management vehicles would prohibit banking entities from providing the full range of banking and asset management services to customers using these vehicles. However, the agencies are proposing to apply the prohibition on purchases of low-quality assets under the Board's regulations implementing section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 CFR 223.15(a)) to help ensure that the exclusion for family wealth management vehicles does not allow banking entities to “bail out” the vehicle.
The agencies believe that the proposed definition of a family wealth management vehicle appropriately distinguishes it from the type of entity that section 13 of the BHC Act intended to capture. The proposed definition would require that a family wealth management vehicle not raise money from investors primarily for the purpose of investing in securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trading in securities. This aspect of the definition would help to differentiate family wealth management vehicles from covered funds, which raise money from investors for this purpose. Defining “family customer” by building off of the definition of “family client” from rule 202(a)(11)(G)-1(d)(4) of Advisers Act (family office rule) may facilitate compliance by using a definition known in the financial services industry. At the same time, the agencies recognize that the purpose of the family wealth management exclusion differs from the purpose of the family office rule, and should be designed to capture the types of persons and entities to which banking entities have traditionally provided banking and asset management services, as these services do not expose banking entities to the types of risks that section 13 was intended to restrict and would facilitate banking entities' customer-facing financial services. Accordingly, the agencies believe it appropriate to include as “family customers” certain in-laws of the family clients as well as a limited number of persons closely related to the family customers.
Question 53.
Should the agencies exclude family wealth management vehicles from the definition of “covered fund” as proposed? Does the agencies' proposed definition of “family wealth management vehicle” include the appropriate vehicles? What, if any, modifications to the scope, definitions or conditions prescribed in the proposed exclusion should be made? Should the agencies provide any additional guidance or requirements regarding the conditions? For example, should the agencies provide additional guidance or requirements regarding the timing of the disclos
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.