Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to the U.S. Navy Training and Testing Activities in the Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Study Area

Federal RegisterDec 23, 2019

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

50 CFR Part 218

[Docket No. 191211-0106]

RIN 0648-BI85

Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to the U.S. Navy Training and Testing Activities in the Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing Study Area

AGENCY:

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION:

Final rule; notification of issuance of Letters of Authorization.

SUMMARY:

NMFS, upon request from the U.S. Navy (Navy), issues these regulations pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to govern the taking of marine mammals incidental to the training and testing activities conducted in the Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) Study Area over the course of seven years, effectively extending the time period from November 13, 2023, to November 13, 2025. In August 2018, the MMPA was amended by the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 to allow for seven-year authorizations for military readiness activities, as compared to the previously allowed five years. The Navy's activities qualify as military readiness activities pursuant to the MMPA as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004. These regulations, which allow for the issuance of Letters of Authorization (LOAs) for the incidental take of marine mammals during the described activities and timeframes, prescribe the permissible methods of taking and other means of effecting the least practicable adverse impact on marine mammal species or stocks and their habitat, and establish requirements pertaining to the monitoring and reporting of such taking.

DATES:

Effective from December 23, 2019 to November 13, 2025.

ADDRESSES:

Copies of the Navy's applications, NMFS' proposed rule for these regulations, NMFS' proposed and final rules and subsequent LOAs for the associated five-year AFTT Study Area regulations, other supporting documents cited herein, and a list of the references cited in this document may be obtained online at:

www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-mammal-protection/incidental-take-authorizations-military-readiness-activities.

In case of problems accessing these documents, please use the contact listed here (see

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Wendy Piniak, Office of Protected Resources, NMFS, (301) 427-8401.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Purpose of Regulatory Action

These regulations, issued under the authority of the MMPA (16 U.S.C. 1361

et seq.

), extend the framework for authorizing the take of marine mammals incidental to the Navy's training and testing activities (which qualify as military readiness activities) from the use of sonar and other transducers, in-water detonations, air guns, impact pile driving/vibratory extraction, and the movement of vessels throughout the AFTT Study Area, which includes areas of the western Atlantic Ocean along the East Coast of North America, portions of the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.

NMFS received an application from the Navy requesting to extend NMFS' existing MMPA regulations (50 CFR part 218, subpart I; hereafter “2018 AFTT regulations”) that authorize the take of marine mammals incidental to Navy training and testing activities conducted in the AFTT Study Area to cover seven years of the Navy's activities, instead of five. Take is anticipated to occur by Level A harassment and Level B harassment as well as a very small number of serious injuries or mortalities incidental to the Navy's training and testing activities.

Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA (16 U.S.C. 1371(a)(5)(A)) directs the Secretary of Commerce (as delegated to NMFS) to allow, upon request, the incidental, but not intentional taking of small numbers of marine mammals by U.S. citizens who engage in a specified activity (other than commercial fishing) within a specified geographical region if, after notice and public comment, the agency makes certain findings and issues regulations that set forth permissible methods of taking pursuant to that activity, as well as monitoring and reporting requirements. Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA and the implementing regulations at 50 CFR part 216, subpart I, provide the legal basis for issuing this final rule and the subsequent LOAs. As directed by this legal authority, this final rule contains mitigation, monitoring, and reporting requirements.

Summary of Major Provisions Within the Final Rule

Following is a summary of the major provisions of this final rule regarding the Navy's activities. Major provisions include, but are not limited to:

• The use of defined powerdown and shutdown zones (based on activity);

• Measures to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of ship strikes, especially for North Atlantic right whales (

Eubalaena glacialis

) (NARW);

• Operational limitations in certain areas and times that are biologically important (

i.e.,

for foraging, migration, reproduction) for marine mammals;

• Implementation of a Notification and Reporting Plan (for dead, live stranded, or marine mammals struck by a vessel); and

• Implementation of a robust monitoring plan to improve our understanding of the environmental effects resulting from Navy training and testing activities.

Additionally, the rule includes an adaptive management component that allows for timely modification of mitigation or monitoring measures based on new information, when appropriate.

Background

The MMPA prohibits the “take” of marine mammals, with certain exceptions. Sections 101(a)(5)(A) and (D) of the MMPA direct the Secretary of Commerce (as delegated to NMFS) to allow, upon request, the incidental, but not intentional, taking of small numbers of marine mammals by U.S. citizens who engage in a specified activity (other than commercial fishing) within a specified geographical region if certain findings are made and either regulations are issued or, if the taking is limited to harassment, a notice of a proposed authorization is provided to the public for review and the opportunity to submit comments.

An authorization for incidental takings shall be granted if NMFS finds that the taking will have a negligible impact on the species or stocks and will not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of the species or stocks for taking for subsistence uses (where relevant). Further, NMFS must prescribe the permissible methods of taking and other means of effecting the least practicable adverse impact on the affected species or stocks and their habitat, paying particular attention to rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of similar significance, and on the availability of such species or stocks for taking for certain subsistence uses (referred to in this rule as “mitigation measures”); and requirements pertaining to the monitoring and reporting of such takings. The MMPA defines “take” to mean to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass,

hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal. The

Analysis and Negligible Impact Determination

section below discusses the definition of “negligible impact.”

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 (2004 NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-136) amended section 101(a)(5) of the MMPA to remove the “small numbers” and “specified geographical region” provisions indicated above and amended the definition of “harassment” as it applies to a “military readiness activity” to read as follows (Section 3(18)(B) of the MMPA): (i) Any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild (Level A Harassment); or (ii) Any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of natural behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered (Level B Harassment). In addition, the 2004 NDAA amended the MMPA as it relates to military readiness activities such that least practicable adverse impact shall include consideration of personnel safety, practicality of implementation, and impact on the effectiveness of the military readiness activity.

More recently, section 316 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 (2019 NDAA) (Pub. L. 115-232), signed on August 13, 2018, amended the MMPA to allow incidental take rules for military readiness activities under section 101(a)(5)(A) to be issued for up to seven years. Prior to this amendment, all incidental take rules under section 101(a)(5)(A) were limited to five years.

Summary of Request

On November 14, 2018, NMFS issued a five-year final rule governing the taking of marine mammals incidental to Navy training and testing activities conducted in the AFTT Study Area (83 FR 57076; hereafter “2018 AFTT final rule”). Previously, on August 13, 2018, and towards the end of the time period in which NMFS was processing the Navy's request for the 2018 regulations, the 2019 NDAA amended the MMPA for military readiness activities to allow incidental take regulations to be issued for up to seven years instead of the previous five years. The Navy's training and testing activities conducted in the AFTT Study Area qualify as military readiness activities pursuant to the MMPA, as amended by the 2004 NDAA. On November 16, 2018, the Navy submitted an application requesting that NMFS extend the 2018 AFTT regulations and associated LOAs such that they would cover take incidental to seven years of training and testing activities instead of five, extending the expiration date from November 13, 2023 to November 13, 2025. A revised application correcting the estimated takes due to ship shock trials (Table 5.1-2) was submitted to NMFS by the Navy on January 18, 2019.

In its November 16, 2018, application, as revised on January 18, 2019 (hereafter “2019 Navy application”), the Navy proposed no changes to the nature of the specified activities covered by the 2018 AFTT final rule, the level of activity within and between years will be consistent with that previously analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule, and all activities will be conducted within the same boundaries of the AFTT Study Area identified in the 2018 AFTT final rule. Therefore, the training and testing activities (

e.g.,

equipment and sources used, exercises conducted) and the mitigation, monitoring, and reporting measures are identical to those described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule. The only changes included in the Navy's request were to conduct those same activities in the same region for an additional two years. In its request, the Navy included all information necessary to identify the type and amount of incidental take that may occur in the two additional years so NMFS could determine whether the analyses and conclusions regarding the impacts of the proposed activities on marine mammal species and stocks previously reached for five years of activities remain applicable for seven years of identical activity.

The purpose of the Navy's training and testing activities is to ensure that the Navy meets its mission mandated by Federal law (10 U.S.C. 8062), which is to maintain, train, and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas. The Navy executes this responsibility by establishing and executing training programs, including at-sea training and exercises, and ensuring naval forces have access to the ranges, operating areas (OPAREAs), and airspace needed to develop and maintain skills for conducting naval activities. The Navy's mission is achieved in part by conducting training and testing within the AFTT Study Area.

The 2019 Navy application reflects the same compilation of training and testing activities presented in the Navy's June 16, 2017, initial rulemaking and LOA application (hereafter “2017 Navy application”) and the 2018 AFTT regulations that were subsequently promulgated, which can be found at:

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-mammal-protection/incidental-take-authorizations-military-readiness-activities.

These activities are deemed by the Navy necessary to accomplish military readiness requirements and are anticipated to continue into the reasonably foreseeable future. The 2019 Navy application and this rule cover training and testing activities that will occur over seven years, including the five years already authorized under the 2018 AFTT regulations, with the regulations valid from the publication date of this final rule through November 13, 2025.

Summary of the Regulations

NMFS is extending the incidental take regulations and associated LOAs through November 13, 2025, to cover the same Navy activities covered by the 2018 AFTT regulations. The 2018 AFTT final rule was recently published and its analysis remains current and valid. In its 2019 application, the Navy proposed no changes to the nature (

e.g.,

equipment and sources used, exercises conducted) or level of the specified activities within or between years or to the boundaries of the AFTT Study Area. The mitigation, monitoring, and reporting measures are identical to those described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule. The regulatory language included at the end of this final rule, which will be published at 50 CFR part 218, subpart I, also is the same as the AFTT 2018 regulations, except for a small number of minor, technical changes. No new information has been received from the Navy, or otherwise become available to NMFS, since publication of the 2018 AFTT final rule that significantly changes the analyses supporting the 2018 findings. Where there is any new information pertinent to the descriptions, analyses, or findings required to authorize incidental take for military readiness activities under MMPA section 101(a)(5)(A), that information is provided in the appropriate sections below.

Because the activities included in the 2019 Navy application have not changed and the analyses and findings included in the documents provided and produced in support of the 2018 AFTT final rule remain current and applicable, this final rule relies heavily on and references to the applicable information and analyses in those documents. Below is a list of the primary documents referenced in this final rule. The list indicates the short name by which the document is referenced in this final rule, as well as

the full titles of the cited documents. All of the documents can be found at:

www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-mammal-protection/incidental-take-authorizations-military-readiness-activities

and

https://www.public.navy.mil/usff/environmental/Pages/aftt.aspx.

• NMFS March 13, 2018, Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) proposed rule (83 FR 10954; hereafter “2018 AFTT proposed rule”);

• NMFS November 14, 2018, Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) final rule (83 FR 57076; hereafter “2018 AFTT final rule”);

• NMFS May 13, 2019, Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) proposed rule (84 FR 21126; hereafter “2019 AFTT proposed rule”);

• Navy June 16, 2017, MMPA rulemaking and LOA application (hereafter “2017 Navy application”);

• Navy January 18, 2019, MMPA rulemaking and LOA extension application (hereafter “2019 Navy application”); and

• September 14, 2018, Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) Final Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS/OEIS) (hereafter “2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS”).

Description of the Specified Activity

The Navy requested authorization to take marine mammals incidental to conducting training and testing activities. The Navy has determined that acoustic and explosives stressors are most likely to result in impacts on marine mammals that could rise to the level of harassment. A small number of serious injuries or mortalities are also possible from vessel strikes or exposure to explosive detonations. Detailed descriptions of these activities are provided in Chapter 2 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS and in the 2017 and 2019 Navy applications.

Overview of Training and Testing Activities

The Navy routinely trains in the AFTT Study Area in preparation for national defense missions. Training and testing activities and components covered in the 2019 Navy application are described in detail in the

Overview of Training and Testing Activities

sections of the 2018 AFTT proposed rule and the 2018 AFTT final rule and Chapter 2 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS. Each military training and testing activity described meets mandated Fleet requirements to deploy ready forces. The Navy proposed no changes to the specified activities described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule. The boundaries of the AFTT Study Area (see Figure 1.2-1 of the 2019 Navy application); the training and testing activities (

e.g.,

equipment and sources used, exercises conducted); manner of and amount of vessel movement; and standard operating procedures presented in this final rule are identical to those described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Dates and Duration

The specified activities will occur at any time during the seven-year period of validity of the regulations. The number of training and testing activities are described in the

Detailed Description of the Specified Activities

section (Tables 1 through 4).

Specified Geographical Region

The geographic extent of the AFTT Study Area is identical to that described in the 2018 AFTT final rule. The AFTT Study Area (see Figure 2-1 of the 2019 Navy application) includes areas of the western Atlantic Ocean along the east coast of North America, the Gulf of Mexico, and portions of the Caribbean Sea. The AFTT Study Area begins at the mean high tide line along the U.S. coast and extends east to the 45-degree west longitude line, north to the 65-degree north latitude line, and south to approximately the 20-degree north latitude line. The AFTT Study Area also includes Navy pierside locations, bays, harbors, and inland waterways, and civilian ports where training and testing occurs. The AFTT Study Area generally follows the Commander Task Force 80 area of operations, covering approximately 2.6 million nautical miles squared (nmi

; approximately 6.7 million kilometers squared) of ocean area, and includes designated Navy range complexes and associated operating areas (OPAREAs) and special use airspace. While the AFTT Study Area itself is very large, the vast majority of Navy training and testing occurs in designated range complexes and testing ranges.

A Navy range complex consists of geographic areas that encompass a water component (above and below the surface) and airspace, and may encompass a land component where training and testing of military platforms, tactics, munitions, explosives, and electronic warfare systems occur. Range complexes include established OPAREAs, which may be further divided to provide better control of the area for safety reasons. Additional detail on range complexes and testing ranges was provided in the

Duration and Location

section of the 2018 AFTT proposed rule; please see the 2018 AFTT proposed rule or the 2017 Navy application for more information.

Description of Acoustic and Explosive Stressors

The Navy uses a variety of sensors, platforms, weapons, and other devices, including ones used to ensure the safety of Sailors and Marines, to meet its mission. Training and testing with these systems may introduce acoustic (sound) energy or shock waves from explosives into the environment. The specific components that could act as stressors by having direct or indirect impacts on the environment are described in detail in the

Description of Acoustic and Explosive Stressors

section of the 2018 AFTT final rule and Chapter 2 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS. The Navy proposed no changes to the nature of the specified activities and, therefore, the acoustic and explosive stressors are identical to those described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Other Stressor—Vessel Strike

Vessel strikes are not specific to any particular training or testing activity, but rather a limited, sporadic, and incidental result of Navy vessel movement within the AFTT Study Area. Navy vessels transit at speeds that are optimal for fuel conservation or to meet training and testing requirements. The average speed of large Navy ships ranges between 10 and 15 knots and submarines generally operate at speeds in the range of 8-13 knots, while a few specialized vessels can travel at faster speeds. By comparison, this is slower than most commercial vessels where full speed for a container ship is typically 24 knots (Bonney and Leach, 2010).

Should a vessel strike occur, it would likely result in incidental take from serious injury and/or mortality and, accordingly, for the purposes of the analysis we assume that any ship strike would result in serious injury or mortality. The Navy proposed no changes to the nature of the specified activities, the training and testing activities, the manner of or amount of vessel movement, and standard operating procedures. Therefore, the description of vessel strikes as a stressor is the same as those presented in the

Other Stressor—Vessel Strike

sections of the 2018 AFTT proposed rule and 2018 AFTT final rule.

Detailed Description of the Specified Activities

The Navy's specified activities are presented and analyzed as a representative year of training to

account for the natural fluctuation of training cycles and deployment schedules in any seven-year period. In the 2018 AFTT final rule, NMFS analyzed activities based on the Navy conducting three years of a representative level of activity and two years of a maximum level of activity. For the purposes of this rulemaking, the Navy presented and NMFS analyzed activities based on the additional two years of training and testing consisting of one additional year of a maximum level of activity and one year of a representative level of activity consistent with the pattern set forth in the 2018 AFTT final rule, the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS, and the 2017 Navy application.

Training Activities

The number of planned training activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities remains identical to those presented in Table 4 of the 2018 AFTT final rule, and are not repeated here. The number of planned training activities that could occur over the seven-year period are presented in Table 1. The table is organized according to primary mission areas and includes the activity name, associated stressors applicable to these regulations, sound source bin, number of activities, and locations of those activities in the AFTT Study Area. For further information regarding the primary platform used (

e.g.,

ship or aircraft type) see Appendix A (Navy Activity Descriptions) of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS.

Table 1—Training Activities Analyzed for Seven-Year Period in the AFTT Study Area

Stressor category

Activity name

Activity description

Source bin

7-Year number of activities

Location

Major Training Exercise—Large Integrated Anti-Submarine Warfare

Acoustic

Composite Training Unit Exercise

Aircraft carrier and its associated aircraft integrate with surface and submarine units in a challenging multi-threat operational environment in order to certify them for deployment

ASW1, ASW2, ASW3, ASW4, ASW5, HF1, LF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF11, MF12

VACAPES RC Navy Cherry Point RC JAX RC.

Major Training Exercises—Medium Integrated Anti-Submarine Warfare

Acoustic

Fleet Exercises/Sustainment Exercise

Aircraft carrier and its associated aircraft integrates with surface and submarine units in a challenging multi-threat operational environment in order to maintain their ability to deploy

ASW1, ASW2, ASW3, ASW4, HF1, LF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF11, MF12

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Integrated/Coordinated Training—Small Integrated Anti-Submarine Warfare Training

Acoustic

Naval Undersea Warfare Training Assessment Course

Multiple ships, aircraft, and submarines integrate the use of their sensors to search for, detect, classify, localize, and track a threat submarine in order to launch an exercise torpedo

ASW1, ASW3, ASW4, HF1, LF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF12

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Integrated/Coordinated Training—Medium Coordinated Anti-Submarine Warfare Training

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tactical Development Exercise

Surface ships, aircraft, and submarines coordinate to search for, detect, and track submarines

ASW1, ASW3, ASW4, HF1, LF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF11, MF12

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Integrated/Coordinated Training—Small Coordinated Anti-Submarine Warfare Training

Acoustic

Group Sail

Surface ships and helicopters search for, detect, and track threat submarines

ASW2, ASW3, ASW4, HF1, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF11, MF12

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Amphibious Warfare

Explosive

Naval Surface Fire Support Exercise—At Sea

Surface ship crews use large-caliber guns to support forces ashore; however, the land target is simulated at sea. Rounds are scored by passive acoustic buoys located at or near the target area

266

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Acoustic

Anti-submarine Warfare Torpedo Exercise—Helicopter

Helicopter aircrews search for, track, and detect submarines. Recoverable air launched torpedoes are employed against submarine targets

MF4, MF5, TORP1

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-submarine Warfare Torpedo Exercise—Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Maritime patrol aircraft aircrews search for, track, and detect submarines. Recoverable air launched torpedoes are employed against submarine targets

MF5, TORP1

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Torpedo Exercise—Ship

Surface ship crews search for, track, and detect submarines. Exercise torpedoes are used

ASW3, MF1, TORP1

112

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Torpedo Exercise—Submarine

Submarine crews search for, track, and detect submarines. Exercise torpedoes are used

ASW4, HF1, MF3, TORP2

JAX RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Exercise—Helicopter

Helicopter aircrews search for, track, and detect submarines

MF4, MF5

168

2,590

Other AFTT Areas.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Exercise—Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Maritime patrol aircraft aircrews search for, track, and detect submarines

ASW5, ASW2, MF5

630

1,232

3,675

322

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Exercise—Ship

Surface ship crews search for, track, and detect submarines

ASW1, ASW3, MF1, MF11, MF12

* 35

* 770

* 35

* 3,080

* 385

* 1,540

Northeast RC.

Other AFTT Areas.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Exercise—Submarine

Submarine crews search for, track, and detect submarines

ASW4, HF1, MF3

308

126

Other AFTT Areas.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Expeditionary Warfare

Explosive

Maritime Security Operations—Anti-Swimmer Grenades

Small boat crews engage in force protection activities by using anti-swimmer grenades to defend against hostile divers

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Mine Warfare

Acoustic

Airborne Mine Countermeasure—Mine Detection

Helicopter aircrews detect mines using towed or laser mine detection systems

HF4

462

2,219

2,597

1,708

10,780

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Civilian Port Defense—Homeland Security Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Exercise

Maritime security personnel train to protect civilian ports against enemy efforts to interfere with access to those ports

HF4, SAS2, E2, E4

Beaumont, TX; Boston, MA; Corpus Christi, TX; Delaware Bay, DE; Earle, NJ; GOMEX RC, Hampton Roads, VA; JAX RC, Kings Bay, GA; NS Mayport, Morehead City, NC; Port Canaveral, FL; Savannah, GA; Tampa Bay, FL; VACAPES RC, Wilmington, NC.

Acoustic

Coordinated Unit Level Helicopter Airborne Mine Countermeasure Exercise

A detachment of helicopter aircrews train as a unit in the use of airborne mine countermeasures, such as towed mine detection and neutralization systems

HF4

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Mine Countermeasures—Mine Neutralization—Remotely Operated Vehicle

Ship, small boat, and helicopter crews locate and disable mines using remotely operated underwater vehicles

HF4, E4

924

497

4,410

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Mine Countermeasures—Ship Sonar

Ship crews detect and avoid mines while navigating restricted areas or channels using active sonar

HF4

154

371

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Mine Neutralization—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Personnel disable threat mines using explosive charges

E4, E5, E6, E7

112

140

119

112

3,668

Lower Chesapeake Bay.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Surface Warfare

Explosive

Bombing Exercise Air-to-Surface

Fixed-wing aircrews deliver bombs against surface targets

E9, E10, E12

469

3,038

756

2,303

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Gunnery Exercise Surface-to-Surface Boat Medium-Caliber

Small boat crews fire medium-caliber guns at surface targets

182

896

1,820

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Gunnery Exercise Surface-to-Surface Ship Large-Caliber

Surface ship crews fire large-caliber guns at surface targets

E3,E5

357

245

525

Other AFTT Areas.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Gunnery Exercise Surface-to-Surface Ship Medium-Caliber

Surface ship crews fire medium-caliber guns at surface targets

287

231

1,127

504

2,247

Other AFTT Areas.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Integrated Live Fire Exercise

Naval forces defend against a swarm of surface threats (ships or small boats) with bombs, missiles, rockets, and small-, medium- and large-caliber guns

E1, E3, E6, E10

VACAPES RC.

JAX RC.

Explosive

Missile Exercise Air-to-Surface

Fixed-wing and helicopter aircrews fire air-to-surface missiles at surface targets

E6, E8, E10

714

364

616

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Missile Exercise Air-to-Surface—Rocket

Helicopter aircrews fire both precision-guided and unguided rockets at surface targets

714

644

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Missile Exercise Surface-to-Surface

Surface ship crews defend against surface threats (ships or small boats) and engage them with missiles

E6, E10

112

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Sinking Exercise

Aircraft, ship, and submarine crews deliberately sink a seaborne target, usually a decommissioned ship (made environmentally safe for sinking according to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards), with a variety of munitions

TORP2, E5, E8, E9, E10, E11

SINKEX Box.

Acoustic

Elevated Causeway System

A temporary pier is constructed off the beach. Supporting pilings are driven into the sand and then later removed

Impact hammer or vibratory extractor

Lower Chesapeake Bay.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Acoustic

Submarine Navigation

Submarine crews operate sonar for navigation and object detection while transiting into and out of port during reduced visibility

HF1, MF3

1,183

588

161

NSB New London.

NSB Kings Bay.

NS Mayport.

NS Norfolk.

Port Canaveral, FL.

Acoustic

Submarine Sonar Maintenance

Maintenance of submarine sonar systems is conducted pierside or at sea

MF3

462

238

602

326

Other AFTT Areas.

NSB New London.

JAX RC.

NSB Kings Bay.

NS Norfolk.

Northeast RC.

Port Canaveral, FL.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Submarine Under Ice Certification

Submarine crews train to operate under ice. Ice conditions are simulated during training and certification events

HF1

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Surface Ship Object Detection

Surface ship crews operate sonar for navigation and object detection while transiting in and out of port during reduced visibility

HF8, MF1K

532

1,134

NS Mayport.

NS Norfolk.

Acoustic

Surface Ship sonar Maintenance

Maintenance of surface ship sonar systems is conducted pierside or at sea

HF8, MF1

350

840

1,645

840

JAX RC.

NS Mayport.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

NS Norfolk.

VACAPES RC.

The number of training activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities remains identical to those presented in Table 4 of the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Locations given are areas where activities typically occur. However, activities could be conducted in other locations within the Study Area. Where multiple locations are provided within a single cell, the number of activities could occur in any of the locations, not in each of the locations.

* For Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Exercise—Ship, 50 percent of requirements are met through synthetic training or other training exercises.

Notes:

GOMEX: Gulf of Mexico; JAX: Jacksonville; NS: Naval Station; NSB: Naval Submarine Base; NSWC: Naval Surface Warfare Center; RC: Range Complex; VACAPES: Virginia Capes.

Testing Activities

The number of planned testing activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities are identical to those presented in Tables 5 through 7 of the 2018 AFTT final rule, and are not repeated here. Similar to the 2017 Navy application, the Navy's planned testing activities presented here are based on the level of testing activities anticipated to be conducted into the reasonably foreseeable future, with adjustments that account for changes in the types and tempo (increases or decreases) of testing activities to meet current and future military readiness requirements. The number of planned testing activities that could occur for the seven-year period are presented in Tables 2 through 4. The number of ship shock trials for the seven-year period will remain the same as the number covered by the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Naval Air Systems Command

The Naval Air Systems Command testing activities that could occur over the seven-year period within the AFTT Study Area are presented in Table 2.

Table 2—Naval Air Systems Command Testing Activities Analyzed for Seven-Year Period in the AFTT Study Area

Stressor category

Activity name

Activity description

Source bin

7-Year number of activities

Location

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Torpedo Test

This event is similar to the training event torpedo exercise. Test evaluates anti-submarine warfare systems onboard rotary-wing (

e.g.,

helicopter) and fixed-wing aircraft and the ability to search for, detect, classify, localize, track, and attack a submarine or similar target

MF5, TORP1

209

523

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Test—Helicopter

This event is similar to the training event anti-submarine warfare tracking exercise—helicopter. The test evaluates the sensors and systems used to detect and track submarines and to ensure that helicopter systems used to deploy the tracking system perform to specifications

MF4, MF5, E3

442

1,368

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Northeast RC

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Anti-Submarine Warfare Tracking Test—Maritime Patrol Aircraft

The test evaluates the sensors and systems used by maritime patrol aircraft to detect and track submarines and to ensure that aircraft systems used to deploy the tracking systems perform to specifications and meet operational requirements

ASW2, ASW5, E1, E3, MF5, MF6

133

101

279

175

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Kilo Dip

Functional check of a helicopter deployed dipping sonar system prior to conducting a testing or training event using the dipping sonar system

MF4

200

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Sonobuoy Lot Acceptance Test

Sonobuoys are deployed from surface vessels and aircraft to verify the integrity and performance of a production lot or group of sonobuoys in advance of delivery to the fleet for operational use

ASW2, ASW5, HF5, HF6, LF4, MF5, MF6, E1, E3, E4

1,120

Key West RC.

Mine Warfare

Acoustic

Airborne Dipping Sonar Minehunting Test

A mine-hunting dipping sonar system that is deployed from a helicopter and uses high-frequency sonar for the detection and classification of bottom and moored mines

HF4

144

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Airborne Mine Neutralization System Test

A test of the airborne mine neutralization system evaluates the system's ability to detect and destroy mines from an airborne mine countermeasures capable helicopter. The airborne mine neutralization system uses up to four unmanned underwater vehicles equipped with high-frequency sonar, video cameras, and explosive and non-explosive neutralizers

154

215

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Airborne Sonobuoy Minehunting Test

A mine-hunting system made up of a field of sonobuoys deployed by a helicopter. A field of sonobuoys, using high-frequency sonar, is used to detect and classify bottom and moored mines

HF6

364

168

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Surface Warfare

Explosive

Air-to-Surface Bombing Test

This event is similar to the training event bombing exercise air-to-surface. Fixed-wing aircraft test the delivery of bombs against surface maritime targets with the goal of evaluating the bomb, the bomb carry and delivery system, and any associated systems that may have been newly developed or enhanced

140

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Air-to-Surface Gunnery Test

This event is similar to the training event gunnery exercise air-to-surface. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircrews evaluate new or enhanced aircraft guns against surface maritime targets to test that the guns, gun ammunition, or associated systems meet required specifications or to train aircrews in the operation of a new or enhanced weapon system

295

890

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Air-to-Surface Missile Test

This event is similar to the training event missile exercise air-to-surface. Test may involve both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft launching missiles at surface maritime targets to evaluate the weapon system or as part of another system's integration test

E6, E9, E10

234

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Rocket Test

Rocket tests evaluate the integration, accuracy, performance, and safe separation of guided and unguided 2.75-inch rockets fired from a hovering or forward-flying helicopter

121

233

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Other Testing Activities

Acoustic

Undersea Range System Test

Following installation of a Navy underwater warfare training and testing range, tests of the nodes (components of the range) will be conducted to include node surveys and testing of node transmission functionality

MF9, BB4

JAX RC.

The number of testing activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities are identical to those presented in Table 5 of the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Locations given are areas where activities typically occur. However, activities could be conducted in other locations within the Study Area.

Notes:

GOMEX: Gulf of Mexico; JAX: Jacksonville; NSWC: Naval Surface Warfare Center; RC: Range Complex; VACAPES: Virginia Capes.

Naval Sea Systems Command

The Naval Sea Systems Command testing activities that could occur over the seven-year period within the AFTT Study Area are presented in Table 3.

Table 3—Naval Sea Systems Command Testing Activities Analyzed for Seven-Year Period in the AFTT Study Area

Stressor category

Activity name

Activity description

Source bin

7-year

number of

activities

Location

Anti-Submarine Warfare

Acoustic

Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission Package Testing

Ships and their supporting platforms (

e.g.,

helicopters, unmanned aerial systems) detect, localize, and attack submarines

ASW1, ASW2, ASW3, ASW5, MF1, MF4, MF5, MF12, TORP1

294

182

JAX RC.

Newport, RI.

NUWC Newport.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

At-Sea Sonar Testing

At-sea testing to ensure systems are fully functional in an open ocean environment

ASW3, ASW4, HF1, LF5, M3, MF1, MF1K, MF3, MF5, MF9, MF11, TORP2

JAX RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

JAX RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, VACAPES RC.

offshore Fort Pierce, FL, GOMEX RC, JAX RC, SFOMF, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

NUWC Newport.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Pierside Sonar Testing

Pierside testing to ensure systems are fully functional in a controlled pierside environment prior to at-sea test activities

ASW3, HF1, HF3, HF8, M3, MF1, MF1K, MF3, MF9, MF10

NSB New London, NS Norfolk, Port Canaveral, FL.

Bath, ME.

NSB New London.

NSB Kings Bay.

Newport, RI.

NS Norfolk.

Pascagoula, MS.

Port Canaveral, FL.

PNS.

Acoustic

Submarine Sonar Testing/Maintenance

Pierside testing of submarine systems occurs periodically following major maintenance periods and for routine maintenance

HF1, HF3, M3, MF3

112

168

Norfolk, VA.

PNS.

Acoustic

Surface Ship Sonar Testing/Maintenance

Pierside and at-sea testing of ship systems occur periodically following major maintenance periods and for routine maintenance

ASW3, MF1, MF1K, MF9, MF10

JAX RC.

NS Mayport.

NS Norfolk.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Torpedo (Explosive) Testing

Air, surface, or submarine crews employ explosive and non-explosive torpedoes against artificial targets

ASW3, HF1, HF5, HF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF6, TORP1, TORP2, E8, E11

GOMEX RC, offshore Fort Pierce, FL, Key West RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC,.

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Torpedo (Non-Explosive) Testing

Air, surface, or submarine crews employ non-explosive torpedoes against submarines or surface vessels. When performed on a testing range, these torpedoes may be launched from a range craft or fixed structures and may use artificial targets

ASW3, ASW4, HF1, HF6, MF1, MF3, MF4, MF5, MF6, TORP1, TORP2, TORP 3

210

GOMEX RC.

offshore Fort Pierce, FL.

JAX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

NUWC Newport.

VACAPES RC

Acoustic

Countermeasure Testing

Countermeasure testing involves the testing of systems that will detect, localize, track, and attack incoming weapons including marine vessel targets. Testing includes surface ship torpedo defense systems and marine vessel stopping payloads

ASW3, HF5, TORP1, TORP2

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, NUWC Newport, VACAPES RC, Key West RC.

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

Mine Warfare

Acoustic, Explosive

Mine Countermeasure and Neutralization Testing

Air, surface, and subsurface vessels neutralize threat mines and mine-like objects

E4, E11

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic, Explosive

Mine Countermeasure Mission Package Testing

Vessels and associated aircraft conduct mine countermeasure operations

HF4, SAS2, E4

133

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

NSWC Panama City.

SFOMF.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Mine Detection and Classification Testing

Air, surface, and subsurface vessels and systems detect, classify, and avoid mines and mine-like objects. Vessels also assess their potential susceptibility to mines and mine-like objects

HF1,HF4, HF8, MF1, MF1K, MF9

359

GOMEX RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

NSWC Panama City.

Riviera Beach, FL.

SFOMF.

VACAPES RC.

Surface Warfare

Explosive

Gun Testing—Large Caliber

Crews defend against targets with large-caliber guns

E3, E5

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, Key West RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Navy Cherry Point RC.

Northeast RC.

231

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Gun Testing—Medium-Caliber

Airborne and surface crews defend against targets with medium-caliber guns

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, Key West RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

714

NSWC Panama City.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Missile and Rocket Testing

Missile and rocket testing includes various missiles or rockets fired from submarines and surface combatants. Testing of the launching system and ship defense is performed

E6, E10

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, Key West RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Northeast RC.

154

VACAPES RC.

Unmanned Systems

Acoustic, Explosive

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Testing

Testing involves the development or upgrade of unmanned underwater vehicles. This may include testing of mine detection capabilities, evaluating the basic functions of individual platforms, or complex events with multiple vehicles

ASW4, FLS2, HF1, HF4, HF5, HF6, HF7, LF5, MF9, MF10, SAS1, SA2, SAS3, VHF1, E8

112

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, NUWC Newport.

287

GOMEX RC.

175

JAX RC.

1,018

NSWC Panama City.

2,158

NUWC Newport.

Riviera Beach, FL.

294

SFOMF.

Vessel Evaluation

Explosive

Large Ship Shock Trial

Underwater detonations are used to test new ships or major upgrades

E17

GOMEX RC, JAX RC, VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Surface Warfare Testing

Tests capability of shipboard sensors to detect, track, and engage surface targets. Testing may include ships defending against surface targets using explosive and non-explosive rounds, gun system structural test firing and demonstration of the response to Call for Fire against land-based targets (simulated by sea-based locations)

E1, E5, E8

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

Key West RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Undersea Warfare Testing

Ships demonstrate capability of countermeasure systems and underwater surveillance, weapons engagement, and communications systems. This tests ships' ability to detect, track, and engage underwater targets

ASW3, ASW4, HF4, HF8, MF1, MF1K, MF4, MF5, MF9, MF10, TORP1, TORP2

JAX RC, VACAPES RC.

JAX RC, Navy Cherry Point RC, SFOMF, VACAPES RC.

GOMEX RC.

JAX RC.

VACAPES RC.

Explosive

Small Ship Shock Trial

Underwater detonations are used to test new ships or major upgrades

E16

JAX RC, VACAPES RC.

Acoustic

Submarine Sea Trials—Weapons System Testing

Submarine weapons and sonar systems are tested at-sea to meet integrated combat system certification requirements

HF1, M3, MF3, MF9, MF10, TORP2

Offshore Fort Pierce, FL, GOMEX RC, JAX RC, SFOMF, Northeast RC, VACAPES RC.

JAX RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Other Testing Activities

Acoustic

Insertion/Extraction

Testing of submersibles capable of inserting and extracting personnel and payloads into denied areas from strategic distances

MF3, MF9

1,848

Key West RC.

NSWC Panama City.

Acoustic

Acoustic Component Testing

Various surface vessels, moored equipment, and materials are tested to evaluate performance in the marine environment

FLS2, HF5, HF7, LF5, MF9, SAS2

231

SFOMF.

Acoustic

Semi-Stationary Equipment Testing

Semi-stationary equipment (

e.g.,

hydrophones) is deployed to determine functionality

AG, ASW3, ASW4, HF5, HF6, LF4, LF5, MF9, MF10, SD1, SD2

1,330

Newport, RI.

NSWC Panama City.

NUWC Newport.

Acoustic

Towed Equipment Testing

Surface vessels or unmanned surface vehicles deploy and tow equipment to determine functionality of towed systems

HF6, LF4, MF9

252

NUWC Newport.

Acoustic

Signature Analysis Operations

Surface ship and submarine testing of electromagnetic, acoustic, optical, and radar signature measurements

ASW2, HF1, LF4, LF5, LF6, M3, MF9, MF10

413

JAX RC.

SFOMF.

The number of testing activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities are identical to those presented in Table 6 of the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Notes:

JEB LC-FS: Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story; NS: Naval Station; NSB: Naval Submarine Base; NSWC: Naval Surface Warfare Center; NUWC: Naval Undersea Warfare Center; PNS: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; SFOMF: South Florida Ocean Measurement Facility Testing Range.

Office of Naval Research

The Office of Naval Research testing activities that could occur over the seven-year period within the AFTT Study Area are presented in Table 4.

Table 4—Office of Naval Research Testing Activities Analyzed for Seven-Year Period in the AFTT Study Area

Stressor category

Activity name

Activity description

Source bin

7-Year number of activities

Location

Acoustic and Oceanographic Science and Technology

Acoustic, Explosive

Acoustic and Oceanographic Research

Research using active transmissions from sources deployed from ships and unmanned underwater vehicles. Research sources can be used as proxies for current and future Navy systems

AG, ASW2, BB4, BB5, BB6, BB7, LF3, LF4, LF5, MF8, MF9, MF14, E1

GOMEX RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

Other AFTT Areas.

Acoustic

Emerging Mine Countermeasure Technology Research

Test involves the use of broadband acoustic sources on unmanned underwater vehicles

BB1, BB2, SAS4

JAX RC.

Northeast RC.

VACAPES RC.

The number of testing activities that could occur annually and the duration of those activities are identical to those presented in Table 7 of the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Notes:

GOMEX: Gulf of Mexico; JAX: Jacksonville, Florida; RC: Range Complex; VACAPES: Virginia Capes

Summary of Acoustic and Explosive Sources Analyzed for Training and Testing

Tables 5 through 8 show the acoustic source classes and numbers, explosive source bins and numbers, airgun sources, and pile driving and removal activities associated with the Navy's planned training and testing activities over the seven-year period in the AFTT Study Area that were analyzed in the 2019 Navy application and for this final rule. The annual numbers for acoustic source classes, explosive source bins, and airgun sources, as well as the annual pile driving and removal activities associated with Navy training and testing activities in the AFTT Study Area are identical to those presented in Tables 8 through 11 of the 2018 AFTT final rule, and are not repeated here. Consistent with the periodicity in the 2018 AFTT final rule, the Navy included the addition of two pile driving/extraction activities for each of the two additional years.

Table 5 describes the acoustic source classes (

i.e.,

low-frequency (LF), mid-frequency (MF), and high-frequency (HF)) that could occur over seven years under the planned training and testing activities. Acoustic source bin use in the activities would vary annually. The seven-year totals for the planned training and testing activities take into account that annual variability.

Table 5—Acoustic Source Classes Analyzed and Number Used for Seven-Year Period for Training and Testing Activities in the AFTT Study Area.

Source class category

Bin

Description

Unit

7-Year total

Training

Testing

Low-Frequency (LF):

Sources that produce signals less than 1 kHz

LF3

LF sources greater than 200 dB

9,156

LF4

LF sources equal to 180 dB and up to 200 dB

6,797

140

LF5

LF sources less than 180 dB

12,264

LF6

LF sources greater than 200 dB with long pulse lengths

1,104

280

Mid-Frequency (MF):

Tactical and non-tactical sources that produce signals between 1-10 kHz

MF1

Hull-mounted surface ship sonars (

e.g.,

AN/SQS-53C and AN/SQS-61)

36,833

23,358

MF1K

Kingfisher mode associated with MF1 sonars

819

1,064

MF3

Hull-mounted submarine sonars (

e.g.,

AN/BQQ-10)

14,604

8,799

MF4

Helicopter-deployed dipping sonars (

e.g.,

AN/AQS-22 and AN/AQS-13)

4,196

3,797

MF5

Active acoustic sonobuoys (

e.g.,

DICASS)

47,340

38,663

MF6

Active underwater sound signal devices (

e.g.,

MK84)

8,986

MF8

Active sources (greater than 200 dB) not otherwise binned

2,436

MF9

Active sources (equal to 180 dB and up to 200 dB) not otherwise binned

52,128

MF10

Active sources (greater than 160 dB, but less than 180 dB) not otherwise binned

6,088

39,830

MF11

Hull-mounted surface ship sonars with an active duty cycle greater than 80%

6,495

9,968

MF12

Towed array surface ship sonars with an active duty cycle greater than 80%

2,658

9,716

MF14

Oceanographic MF sonar

10,080

High-Frequency (HF):

Tactical and non-tactical sources that produce signals between 10—100 kHz

HF1

Hull-mounted submarine sonars (

e.g.,

AN/BQQ-10)

13,504

2,772

HF3

Other hull-mounted submarine sonars (classified)

34,275

215

HF4

Mine detection, classification, and neutralization sonar (

e.g.,

AN/SQS-20)

41,717

179,516

HF5

Active sources (greater than 200 dB) not otherwise binned

13,624

280

HF6

Active sources (equal to 180 dB and up to 200 dB) not otherwise binned

15,254

HF7

Active sources (greater than 160 dB, but less than 180 dB) not otherwise binned

8,568

HF8

Hull-mounted surface ship sonars (

e.g.,

AN/SQS-61)

140

14,587

Very High-Frequency Sonars (VHF):

Non-tactical sources that produce signals between 100—200 kHz

VHF1

VHF sources greater than 200 dB

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):

Tactical sources (

e.g.,

active sonobuoys and acoustic counter-measures systems) used during ASW training and testing activities

ASW1

MF systems operating above 200 dB

4,251

5,740

ASW2

MF Multistatic Active Coherent sonobuoy (

e.g.,

AN/SSQ-125)

10,572

35,842

ASW3

MF towed active acoustic countermeasure systems (

e.g.,

AN/SLQ-25)

34,275

21,737

ASW4

MF expendable active acoustic device countermeasures (

e.g.,

MK 3)

2,994

24,043

ASW5

MF sonobuoys with high duty cycles

4,244

4,316

Torpedoes (TORP):

Source classes associated with the active acoustic signals produced by torpedoes

TORP1

Lightweight torpedo (

e.g.,

MK 46, MK 54, or Anti-Torpedo Torpedo)

399

6,122

TORP2

Heavyweight torpedo (

e.g.,

MK 48)

560

2,600

TORP 3

Heavyweight torpedo (

e.g.,

MK 48)

640

Forward Looking Sonar (FLS):

Forward or upward looking object avoidance sonars used for ship navigation and safety

FLS2

HF sources with short pulse lengths, narrow beam widths, and focused beam patterns

8,568

Acoustic Modems (M):

Systems used to transmit data through the water

MF acoustic modems (greater than 190 dB)

4,436

Swimmer Detection Sonars (SD): Systems used to detect divers and sub- merged swimmers

SD1—SD2

HF and VHF sources with short pulse lengths, used for the detection of swimmers and other objects for the purpose of port security

1,232

Synthetic Aperture Sonars (SAS):

Sonars in which active acoustic signals are post-processed to form high-resolution images of the seafloor

SAS1

MF SAS systems

6,720

SAS2

HF SAS systems

33,600

24,584

SAS3

VHF SAS systems

6,720

SAS4

MF to HF broadband mine countermeasure sonar

6,720

Broadband Sound Sources (BB):

Sonar systems with large frequency spectra, used for various purposes

BB1

MF to HF mine countermeasure sonar

6,720

BB2

HF to VHF mine countermeasure sonar

6,720

BB4

LF to MF oceanographic source

10,884

BB5

LF to MF oceanographic source

4,704

BB6

HF oceanographic source

4,704

BB7

LF oceanographic source

840

H = hours; C = count (

e.g.,

number of individual pings or individual sonobuoys).

Note:

dB = decibel

Table 6 describes the number of air gun shots that could occur over seven years under the planned training and testing activities.

Table 6—Training and Testing Air Gun Sources Quantitatively Analyzed in the AFTT Study Area

Source class category

Bin

Unit

7-Year total

Training

Testing

Air Guns (AG):

Small underwater air guns

4,228

C = count. One count (C) of AG is equivalent to 100 air gun firings.

The annual numbers for airgun sources associated with Navy training and testing activities in the AFTT Study Area are identical to those presented in Table 9 in the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Table 7 summarizes the impact pile driving and vibratory pile removal activities that could occur during a 24-hour period. Annually, for impact pile driving, the Navy will drive 119 piles, two times a year for a total of 238 piles. Over the seven-year period of the rule, the Navy will drive a total of 1,666 piles by impact pile driving. Annually, for vibratory pile removal, the Navy will remove 119 piles, two times a year for a total of 238 piles. Over the seven-year period of the rule, the Navy will remove a total of 1,666 piles by vibratory pile removal.

Table 7—Summary of Pile Driving and Removal Activities per 24-Hour Period in the AFTT Study Area

Method

Piles per

24-hour

period

Time per pile

(minutes)

Total

estimated

time of

noise per

24-hour

period

(minutes)

Pile Driving (Impact)

Pile Removal (Vibratory)

Table 8 describes the number of in-water explosives that could be used in any year under the planned training and testing activities. Under the activities, bin use would vary annually, and the seven-year totals for the planned training and testing activities take into account that annual variability.

Table 8—Explosive Source Bins Analyzed and Number Used for Seven-Year Period for Training and Testing Activities Within the AFTT Study Area

Bin

Net

explosive

weight

(lb.)

Example

explosive

source

7-Year Total

Training

Testing

0.1-0.25

Medium-caliber projectile

53,900

160,880

>0.25-0.5

Medium-caliber projectile

1,486

>0.5-2.5

Large-caliber projectile

32,144

20,162

>2.5-5

Mine neutralization charge

913

5,330

>5-10

5-inch projectile

10,052

9,275

>10-20

Hellfire missile

4,214

276

> 20-60

Demo block/shaped charge

>60-100

Light-weight torpedo

154

231

>100-250

500 lb. bomb

462

E10

>250-500

Harpoon missile

630

566

E11

>500-650

650 lb. mine

E12

>650-1,000

2,000 lb. bomb

126

E16

>7,250-14,500

Littoral Combat Ship full ship shock trial

E17

>14,500-58,000

Aircraft carrier full ship shock trial

Net Explosive Weight refers to the equivalent amount of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) the actual weight of a munition may be larger due to other components.

The annual numbers for explosive source bins associated with Navy training and testing activities in the AFTT Study Area are identical to those presented in Table 11 in the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Note:

Shock trials consist of four explosions each. In any given year there could be 0-3 small ship shock trials (E16) and 0-1 large ship shock trials (E17). Over a 7-year period, there could be three small ship shock trials (E16) and one large ship shock trial (E17) which is the same amount of ship shock trial events that could occur over the original five-year period. Therefore, there is no increase in ship shock trial events under this final rule.

Vessel Movement

Vessel movements associated with the planned activities include both surface and sub-surface operations. Vessels used as part of the activities include ships, submarines, unmanned vessels, and boats ranging in size from small, 22 feet (ft) (7 meters (m)) rigid hull inflatable boats to aircraft carriers with lengths up to 1,092 ft. (333 m). Large Navy ships greater than 60 ft (18 m) generally operate at speeds in the range of 10 to 15 kn for fuel conservation. Submarines generally operate at speeds in the range of 8 to 13 kn in transits and less than those speeds for certain tactical maneuvers. Small craft, less than 60 ft (18 m) in length, have much more variable speeds (dependent on the mission). For small craft types, sizes and speeds vary during training and testing. Speeds generally range from 10 to 14 kn. While these speeds for large and small crafts are representative of most events, some vessels need to temporarily operate outside of these parameters. A full description of Navy vessels that are used during training and testing activities and will be used under the seven-year period of this rule can be found in the 2017 Navy application and Chapter 2 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS.

The manner in which Navy vessels will be used during training and testing activities, the speeds at which they operate, the number of vessels that will be used during various activities, and the locations in which Navy vessel movement will be concentrated within the AFTT Study Area are identical to those analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule. The only change related to the Navy's request regarding Navy vessel movement is the vessel use associated with the additional two years of Navy activities.

Standard Operating Procedures

For training and testing to be effective, personnel must be able to safely use their sensors and weapon systems as they are intended to be used in a real-world situation and to their optimum capabilities. While standard operating procedures are designed for the safety of personnel and equipment and to ensure the success of training and testing activities, their implementation often yields additional benefits on environmental, socioeconomic, public health and safety, and cultural resources. Because standard operating procedures are essential to safety and mission success, the Navy considers them to be part of the planned activities and has included them in the environmental analysis. Details on standard operating procedures were provided in the 2018 AFTT proposed rule; please see the 2018 AFTT proposed rule, the 2017 Navy application, and Chapter 2 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS for more information. The Standard Operating Procedures for the seven-year period will be identical to those in place under the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Comments and Responses

On February 1, 2019, we published a notice of receipt (NOR) of the Navy's application in the

Federal Register

(84 FR 1069), and requested comments and information related to the Navy's request. The review and comment period for the NOR ended on March 4, 2019. We reviewed and considered all comments and information received on the NOR in development of the proposed rule. We published a proposed rule in the

Federal Register

on May 13, 2019 (84 FR 21126), with a 30-day comment period. In that proposed rule, we requested public input on the request for authorization described therein, our analyses, and the proposed authorizations and requested that interested persons submit relevant information, suggestions, and comments. During the 30-day comment period, we received eight comment letters. Of this total, one submission was from the Marine Mammal Commission (hereafter “Commission”), one letter was from an organization or individual acting in an official capacity (

e.g.,

non-governmental organization (NGO)) and six submissions were from private citizens. NMFS has reviewed and considered all public comments received on the proposed rule and issuance of the LOAs. All relevant comments and our responses are described below. We provide no response to specific comments that addressed species or statutes not relevant to our proposed authorization under section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA (

e.g.,

comments related to sea turtles).

The majority of the six comment letters from private citizens expressed general opposition toward the Navy's proposed training and testing activities and requested that NMFS not issue the LOAs, but without providing information relevant to NMFS' decisions. These comments appear to indicate a lack of understanding of the MMPA's requirement that NMFS “shall issue” requested authorizations when certain findings (see the

Background

section) are met; therefore, these comments were not considered further. The remaining comments are addressed below.

Both the Commission and NGO included their comments submitted on the 2018 AFTT proposed rule. The Commission did not reiterate their 2018 AFTT proposed rule recommendations in their comment letter but maintained that the recommendations that NMFS did not incorporate into the 2018 AFTT final rule are still relevant and pertain

to the extension of the five-year rule and asked that they be reviewed again in the course of considering the new seven-year rule. The NGO attached their 2018 AFTT proposed rule comment letter and their comments on the Notice of Receipt of the 2019 Navy application. They stated that “most of the issues raised [in their 2018 AFTT proposed rule comment letter] were not adequately addressed in the 2018-2023 Final Rule” and asked that NMFS renew consideration of their prior comments. To the extent they raised concerns with how “most” issues were addressed previously, it did not identify which issues those were. NMFS reviewed, considered, and responded to all comments received on the 2018 AFTT proposed rule and issuance of the proposed LOAs. Please see the 2018 AFTT final rule

Comments and Responses

section for a summary of the comments received and NMFS' responses to these comments. As the NGO resubmitted their comments on the Notice of Receipt of the 2019 Navy Application, we respond to those comments below.

Comment 1:

Commenters noted that NMFS did not propose to authorize beaked whale mortalities subsequent to MFA sonar use for any of the Navy's Phase III activities and states that that approach is inconsistent with the tack taken for both the Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP) I and Phase II activities. The Commenters noted that for the previous final rule for AFTT (78 FR 73009; December 4, 2013), NMFS authorized up to 10 beaked whale mortality takes during the five-year period of the final rule (78 FR 73067; December 4, 2013). They noted that NMFS justified authorizing those mortalities by stating that, although NMFS and the Navy do not anticipate any beaked whale strandings to occur and no strandings have ever been reported in the AFTT Study Area, NMFS cannot conclude with certainty the degree to which mitigation measures would eliminate or reduce the potential for serious injury or mortality (78 FR 73043; December 4, 2013). The Commenters stated that this justification is still applicable. The Commenters asserted that NMFS indicated that steep bathymetry, multiple hull-mounted platforms using sonar simultaneously, constricted channels, and strong surface ducts are not all present together in the AFTT Study Area during the specified activities (83 FR 57116; November 14, 2018), and that NMFS specified that it did not authorize beaked whale mortalities in the 2018 AFTT final rule based on the lack of those factors and the lack of any strandings associated with Navy sonar use in the AFTT Study Area (83 FR 57116; November 14, 2018). The Commenters stated that this does not comport with NMFS' acknowledgement in the 2018 AFTT proposed rule that all five of those factors are not necessary for a stranding to occur (83 FR 11012; March 13, 2018). They go on to state that “NMFS still cannot conclude with certainty the degree to which mitigation measures would eliminate or reduce the potential for serious injury or mortality. This is especially true for a species that is cryptic and difficult for researchers, let alone Navy Lookouts, to observe visually in order to implement mitigation measures, and while passive acoustic monitoring could readily detect beaked whales, it is not used by the Navy as part of its mitigation measures involving MFA sonar.” Given that the potential for beaked whale mortalities cannot be obviated, the Commenters recommend that NMFS authorize at least 10 mortality takes of beaked whales subsequent to MFA sonar use, consistent with the AFTT Phase II final rule (83 FR 57076).

Response:

NMFS does not disregard the fact that it is possible for naval activities using hull-mounted tactical sonar to contribute to the death of marine mammals in certain circumstances (that are not present in the AFTT Study Area) via strandings resulting from behaviorally mediated physiological impacts or other gas-related injuries. NMFS included a discussion in the 2018 AFTT proposed and final rules of these potential causes and outlines the few cases where active naval sonar (in the U.S. or, largely, elsewhere) has either potentially contributed to or (as with the Bahamas example) been more definitively causally linked with marine mammal strandings. As noted, there are a suite of factors that have been associated with these specific cases of strandings directly associated with sonar (steep bathymetry, multiple hull-mounted platforms using sonar simultaneously, constricted channels, strong surface ducts,

etc.

). The Commenters are incorrect, however, in implying that NMFS found all these features must be present together. While not all of these factors must be present for a beaked whale stranding to occur, steep bathymetry and constricted channels specifically are not present in the AFTT Study Area, and surface ducts are not consistently present at any location. Further, in addition to the mitigation and monitoring measures in place (visual monitoring, passive acoustic monitoring when practicable,

etc.,

see the 2018 AFTT final rule

Mitigation

and

Monitoring

sections for a full description of these measures) the Navy minimizes active sonar military readiness activities when these features are present (in other areas outside of the AFTT Study Area) to the maximum extent practicable to meet specific training or testing requirements. Additionally, there have never been any strandings associated with Navy sonar use in the AFTT Study Area, including in the five years of Navy activities since the 2013 authorizations referenced by the Commenters. For these reasons as well as the other reasons discussed more fully in the 2018 AFTT final rule (

e.g.,

mitigation measures, monitoring,

etc.

), NMFS does not anticipate that the Navy's AFTT training and testing activities will result in beaked whale strandings and mortality, and none are authorized.

Comment 2:

Commenters stated that NMFS cannot amend the existing five-year rule without undertaking a new negligible impact analysis for the full seven years of AFTT activity. They stated that while the Navy has not proposed any changes in activity parameters for the take that NMFS previously authorized, the addition of two years of explosives, sonar, and other disruptive activities alters the scope of that previous analysis. They go one to state that barring a negligible impact finding predicated on seven years of activity, taking into account the full extent of mortality, injury, and significant behavioral disruption that that entails, NMFS cannot amend the rule as the Navy has requested.

Response:

NMFS agrees and conducted a negligible impact analysis for the full seven years of Navy training and testing activity in the AFTT Study Area in both the 2019 AFTT proposed rule and this final rule. Please see the

Analysis and Negligible Impact Determination

section below.

Comment 3:

Commenters stated that NMFS must rigorously assess cumulative impacts on the same populations from other authorized and reasonably foreseeable activities, including the five large-scale seismic surveys that NMFS authorized in November, 2018 as well as the additional five years of oil and gas exploration that BOEM included in its 2014 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Atlantic seismic, to which NMFS tiered its November environmental assessments. They note that NMFS has repeatedly recognized the importance of accounting for cumulative effects of human activity on marine mammal populations, including

the cumulative effects of acoustic disturbance and masking, but that despite this NMFS has made its negligible impact findings as though each authorized activity were taking place in a vacuum, resulting in an acoustic environment where the same populations are repeatedly harmed. The Commenters note that at particular risk are range-restricted populations that are resident off Cape Hatteras; as well as species already suffering from poor individual fitness, most notably the North Atlantic right whale.

Response:

We recognize the need to address total impacts from the Navy's activities, and that the total impacts of the Navy's training and testing activities could be greater than the impacts of any one particular activity. The total impacts of the Navy's training and testing activities were evaluated for each species and stock in the

Group and Species-Specific Analyses

section of the

Analysis and Negligible Impact Determination

section of this rule and the 2018 AFTT final rule. See also the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS, which evaluated the impacts of a maximum amount of activities, and which NMFS has adopted as the basis for its Record of Decision for the issuance of the final rule and LOAs.

As described in the 2019 AFTT proposed rule and this final rule along with the 2018 AFTT final rule, the preamble for NMFS' implementing regulations under section 101(a)(5) (54 FR 40338; September 29, 1989) explains in responses to comments that the impacts from other past and ongoing anthropogenic activities are incorporated into the negligible impact analysis via their impacts on the environmental baseline. Consistent with that direction, NMFS here has factored into its negligible impact analyses the impacts of other past and ongoing anthropogenic activities via their impacts on the baseline (

e.g.,

as reflected in the density/distribution and status of the species, population size and growth rate, and relevant stressors (such as incidental mortality in commercial fisheries, UMEs, or oil spills)). See the

Analysis and Negligible Impact Determination

section of this rule and the 2018 AFTT final rule.

Our 1989 final rule for the MMPA implementing regulations also addressed how cumulative effects from unrelated activities would be considered. There we stated that such effects are not considered in making findings under section 101(a)(5) concerning negligible impact, but that NMFS would consider cumulative effects that are reasonably foreseeable when preparing a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis and also that reasonably foreseeable cumulative effects would be considered under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for ESA-listed species.

The cumulative effects of the incremental impact of the proposed action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (as well as the effects of climate change) were evaluated against the appropriate resources and regulatory baselines in the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OIES. The best available science and a comprehensive review of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions (including the potential for oil and gas exploration in the Atlantic, as the commenter notes) was used to develop the Cumulative Impacts analysis. This analysis is contained in Chapter 4 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OIES. As required under NEPA, the level and scope of the analysis is commensurate with the scope of potential impacts of the action and the extent and character of the potentially-impacted resources (

e.g.,

the geographic boundaries for cumulative impacts analysis for some resources are expanded to include activities outside the AFTT Study Area that might impact migratory or wide-ranging animals), as reflected in the resource-specific discussions in Chapter 3 (Affected Environment and Environmental Consequences) of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS. The 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS considered the proposed training and testing activities alongside other actions in the region whose impacts may be additive to those of the proposed training and testing. Past and present actions are also included in the analytical process as part of the affected environmental baseline conditions presented in Chapter 3 of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS. The 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS did so in accordance with 1997 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance. Per the guidance, a qualitative approach and best professional judgment are appropriate where precise measurements are not available. Where precise measurements and/or methodologies were available they were used. Guidance from CEQ states it “is not practical to analyze cumulative effects of an action on the universe; the list of environmental effects must focus on those that are truly meaningful.” Further, the U.S. EPA reviewed the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS and rated the document as LO—lack of objections—which means it did not identify any environmental impact requiring substantive changes to the proposal. Information on the NEPA analysis is provided in Section 4.1.1 (Determination of Significance).

Comment 4:

Commenters stated that NMFS should rigorously review its adaptive management procedures for military readiness activities for transparency, enforceability, and effectiveness, to strengthen their integrity for a seven-year authorization cycle. They particularly noted the need to ensure that research required, or simply recommended, by NMFS during the rulemaking process is actually completed by the Navy, as adaptive management cannot proceed if the underlying research to resolve uncertainties is not performed.

Response:

NMFS has rigorously reviewed its adaptive management procedures for military readiness activities for transparency, enforceability, and effectiveness and continues to do so on an annual basis. In addition to the comprehensive written reports provided by the Navy and reviewed by NMFS, NMFS holds dual-purpose annual Monitoring and Adaptive Management meetings with the Navy that address all of the concerns the commenter raises. First, the Navy annually convenes the researchers conducting the monitoring studies required by the MMPA rules for Navy Training and Testing (along with NMFS and Commission staff) to discuss their work and results, allowing for direct meaningful discourse between the researchers on the ground and regulators, as well as the opportunity for the researchers to highlight challenges and recommendations for future work. Second, NMFS, the Commission, and Navy staff meet to specifically discuss: (1) Exercise Reports detailing the non-classified extent of activities conducted, associated mitigation implemented, and marine mammals detected; (2) the list of monitoring projects and which are finishing, continuing, or newly starting; (3) new science potentially applicable in an adaptive management context, and; (4) whether any changes to monitoring or mitigation are appropriate pursuant to the Adaptive Management provisions.

Comment 5:

Commenters stated that NMFS must improve its negligible impact analysis and mitigation in issuing a new rule. They note that the Navy's application proposed no substantial changes in its take estimation, impact assessment, or mitigation measures, notwithstanding the issues raised during the previous rulemaking by Commenters.

Response:

NMFS reviewed, considered, and responded to all comments received on the 2018 AFTT proposed rule and issuance of the proposed LOAs. Please see the 2018

AFTT final rule

Comments and Responses

section for a summary of the comments received and NMFS' responses to these comments. The 2019 AFTT proposed rule and this final rule contain thorough and complete analysis of the incidental take that is estimated or has the potential to occur from the Navy's activities, along with analysis of appropriate mitigation measures under the least practicable adverse impact standard. All analysis, including the negligible impact analysis for each species and stock, has been updated from the 2018 AFTT final rule as appropriate based on the Navy's application, any new information, and in consideration of all comments received.

Comment 6:

Commenters stated that NMFS presents a flawed updated vessel strike analysis. The Commenters stated that the Navy made its take authorization request based on a Poisson distribution using ship-strike data (from strikes involving Navy vessels only) between 2009 and 2018 in the AFTT Study Area, as well as historical at-sea days in the AFTT Study Area from 2009-2018 and estimated potential at-sea days for the period from 2018-2025 covered by the requested regulations. This distribution predicted the probabilities of a specific number of strikes over the 2018-2025 period. The Commenters go on to state that in its take analysis, NMFS considered two factors in addition to those included in the Navy's request: (1) the relative likelihood of hitting members of one stock versus another, based on available data from all vessel strikes enumerated in the agency's Stock Assessment Reports (SARs); and (2) whether the Navy has ever definitively struck an individual from a particular stock and, if so, how many times. The Commenters stated that, thus in determining vessel strike probability, the agency's analysis only factors in vessel strikes reported by the Navy, rather than more objectively taking into account the total number of Navy ships that will be operating in the AFTT Study Area. The Commenters stated that some conditions the Navy operates in, including darkness and high sea states, would likely make it impossible to detect every vessel strike that occurred. In addition, some of the features of military vessels that NMFS notes as reducing vessel strike probability, such as the use of marine mammal Lookouts, would also only be effective in periods of good visibility. Therefore, the agency should not use the number of vessel strikes reported by the Navy as the basis for its vessel strike analysis. The Commenters stated that NMFS instead should analyze the likelihood of a ship hitting a particular stock in the AFTT Study Area (as based on the SARs) and the total number of Navy vessels, or the total amount of Navy vessel time spent operating within the AFTT Study Area.

Response:

The Commenters are correct in stating that the Navy requested incidental takes due to vessel strikes based on probabilities derived from a Poisson distribution using Navy ship strike data between 2009 and 2018 in the AFTT Study Area (the time period from when current vessel strike mitigation measures were instituted until the Navy conducted the analysis for the 2019 Navy application, with no new ship strikes occurring since this analysis), as well as historical at-sea days in the AFTT Study Area from 2009-2018 and estimated potential at-sea days for the period from 2018 to 2025 covered by the requested regulations. NMFS concurs with the Navy that it is appropriate to use Navy ship strike data in this analysis, rather than all known ship strikes (as presented in the SARs), because there are key differences between Navy vessels and commercial vessels, as described in the

Authorized Take from Vessel Strikes

section, which reduce the potential of ship strikes by Navy vessels and provide confidence that any ship strike that did occur would be detected and reported. The Navy also implements mitigation measures (Lookouts, passive sonar when practicable,

etc.

) that are not implemented by commercial vessels. While visibility is decreased in certain situations, such as nighttime as described by the commenters, ships operated by or for the Navy have personnel assigned to stand watch at all times, day and night, when underway for safety of navigation, collision avoidance, range clearance, and man-overboard precautions. After sunset and prior to sunrise, watch personnel employ night visual search techniques, which can include the use of night vision devices. The Navy is able to detect if a whale is struck due to the diligence of standard watch personnel and Lookouts stationed specifically to observe for marine mammals while a vessel is underway, day and night. These measures make it highly unlikely that a Navy vessel would strike a whale, dolphin, porpoise, or pinniped without detecting and reporting it and, accordingly, NMFS is confident that the Navy's reported strikes are accurate and appropriate for use in the analysis.

NMFS uses all available information to determine the likelihood of vessel strike to a particular stock. As the commenter correctly asserts, NMFS considered two factors in addition to those considered in the Navy's request: (1) The relative likelihood of hitting one stock versus another based on available strike data from all vessel types as denoted in the SARs and (2) whether the Navy has ever definitively struck an individual from a particular stock and, if so, how many times. For a detailed description of the methods used to analyze the likelihood of vessel strikes, see the

Authorized Take from Vessel Strikes

section. However, the analysis does take into account the total number of Navy ships that will be operating in the AFTT Study Area. The estimated potential at-sea days for the period from 2018 to 2025 takes into account both the number of vessels and the number of days each vessel will operate in the AFTT Study Area. In other words, the number of vessel at-sea days directly reflects the number of vessels. Indeed this metric does exactly what the commenter suggests, which is that NMFS “analyze the likelihood of a ship hitting a particular stock in the AFTT Study Area (as based on the SARs) and the total number of Navy vessels,

or the total amount of Navy vessel time spent operating within the AFTT Study Area.”

Comment 7:

Commenters stated that NMFS' adjustment of injury and mortality numbers for “mitigation effectiveness” remains arbitrary. The Commenters noted that in the 2018 AFTT final rule, NMFS stated that the Navy quantitatively assessed the effectiveness of its monitoring-based mitigation on a per-scenario basis using four factors: (1) Species sightability; (2) a Lookout's ability to observe the range to permanent threshold shift and range to mortality; (3) the portion of time when mitigation could be observed during periods of poor visibility or at night; and (4) the ability of sound sources to be positively controlled (

i.e.,

powered down) (83 FR 57076, 57115; November 14, 2018). The Commenters noted that NMFS then concluded that the Navy adequately accounted for mitigation effectiveness in its adjustment of take. The Commenters stated that while NMFS explained its support of the Navy's approach, as requested in these Commenters' comments on the 2018 AFTT proposed rule, the adjustments the Navy makes to account for reduced mitigation effectiveness at night or during periods of poor visibility still overestimate the potential level of mitigation effectiveness. The Commenters provided the following example to support this statement: “If a scenario occurs in a high sea state (Beaufort sea

state of 4 or higher), then the Navy applies a visibility reduction factor of 0.25. However, the probability of sighting a North Atlantic right whale, for example, changed by a factor of 0.628 (95 percent CI: 0.428-0.921) for every unit increase in sea state. From the findings of Baumgartner

et al.

(2003), we would expect a reduction in detection probability of North Atlantic right whales by up to 84.5 percent based on an average Beaufort Sea State of 4, relative to ideal sighting conditions (

i.e.,

Beaufort Sea State = 0). The reduction of the effectiveness of a Navy lookout watching for North Atlantic right whales in Beaufort Sea State 4, would therefore be significantly greater than the 0.25 factored into the Navy's analysis.” The Commenters reiterated their caution to NMFS against creating an under-supported, nonconservative adjustment for avoidance in the current AFTT final rule.

Response:

As described in the technical report titled “Quantifying Acoustic Impacts on Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles: Methods and Analytical Approach for Phase III Training and Testing” (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2018), the Navy conservatively factored mitigation effectiveness (

i.e.,

underestimated mitigation effectiveness) into its quantitative analysis process. To calculate a mitigation effectiveness score for each scenario, the Navy multiplied the Species Sightability Factor, g(0), by a Visibility Factor [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1], then by an Observation Area Factor [0, 0.5, 1], and lastly by a Positive Control Factor [0, 0.5, 1]. Using a logistic regression model, Baumgartner

et al.

(2003) presented evidence to suggest there is an effect of sea state on the probability of sighting that changes by a factor of 0.628 for every unit increase in sea state. However, the authors did not suggest that the 0.628 factor should be applied to further reduce g(0) values that already consider sea state. The North Atlantic right whale g(0) value used by the Navy already takes into account perception bias (including sea state). Therefore, the Navy's approach to calculating mitigation effectiveness is more conservative than what is being suggested by Baumgartner

et al.

(2003) because the Navy reduced mitigation effectiveness twice based on sea state: once by using g(0) values that already incorporate perception bias, and again by multiplying g(0) by additional visibility factors. Another example of how the Navy's method for calculating mitigation effectiveness is conservative is that the Navy assigns worst-case scores (instead of typical-case scores) to each effectiveness factor. For example, the Navy assigns a visibility reduction factor of 0.25 if a scenario has the “potential” to occur in Beaufort sea state 4 or higher, even if it typically occurs in Beaufort sea state 3 or lower. Similarly, the Navy assigns another visibility reduction factor of 0.25 or 0.50 if the scenario “could” occur at night, rounding up to the most conservative reduction factor based on percent chance of nighttime occurrence.

Below is a simplified hypothetical calculation for a scenario involving hull-mounted mid-frequency active sonar. The furthest average range to a potential permanent threshold shift (PTS) exposure for the largest source bin used in this scenario, MF1, is 192 m. The hypothetical scenario uses a positive control sound source, would rarely occur in a Beaufort 4 sea state, and has a 10 percent chance of occurring at night. Lookouts are able to observe the entire range to PTS (192 m around the ship) for the duration of the scenario. This hypothetical scenario has 10 model-estimated PTS impacts.

Mitigation Effectiveness = Species Sightability [vessel sightability g(0) of 0.645 (Palka 2006)] × Visibility [1 − (0.25 reduction for sea state + 0.25 reduction for night) = 0.50] × Observation Area [1] × Positive Control [1] = 0.323

Number of animals assumed sighted by Lookouts = Mitigation Effectiveness [0.323] × Model-Estimated Impacts [10 model-estimated PTS impacts] = 3.23 (rounded down to 3)

This hypothetical calculation results in 3 out of 10 marine mammals being sighted by Lookouts within the average range to PTS (192 m from the ship). Mitigation measures would be implemented for these three individuals, and therefore, these animals would not be exposed to PTS-level impacts. The Navy corrects the category of predicted impact for these three animals (

i.e.,

shifts the level of three impacts from PTS to temporary threshold shift (TTS)), but does not modify the total number of impacts predicted from the scenario.

For reasons detailed in the technical report, the small range to PTS and close proximity to the observation platform would in reality result in a much higher likelihood that Lookouts would detect more than three marine mammals within 192 m from the ship hull. For example, the Species Sightability reduction factors, g(0), are based on values obtained during line-transect surveys, where each primary observer looks for marine species in the forward 90-degree quadrant on their side of the survey platform out to the limit of the available optics (

i.e.,

the horizon). In this example, Navy Lookouts would focus their observations directly on the sea space in front of the ship in an area several degrees of magnitude smaller than that used to calculate species sightability. However, as previously described, the Navy's approach to estimating marine mammal impacts integrates a host of conservative assumptions to ensure that potential impacts are overestimated instead of underestimated.

Description of Marine Mammals and Their Habitat in the Area of the Specified Activities

Marine mammal species and their associated stocks that have the potential to occur in the AFTT Study Area are presented in Table 9 along with the best/minimum abundance estimate and associated coefficient of variation value. Some marine mammal species, such as manatees, are not managed by NMFS, but by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and therefore not discussed below. Consistent with the 2018 AFTT final rule, the Navy anticipates the take of individuals of 39 marine mammal species by Level A harassment and Level B harassment incidental to training and testing activities from the use of sonar and other transducers, in-water detonations, air guns, and impact pile driving/vibratory extraction activities. The Navy requested authorization for nine serious injuries or mortalities combined from four marine mammal stocks during ship shock trials, and four takes of large whales by serious injury or mortality from vessel strikes over the seven-year period.

We presented a detailed discussion of marine mammals and their occurrence in the AFTT Study Area, inclusive of important marine mammal habitat (

e.g.,

critical habitat), biologically important areas (BIAs), national marine sanctuaries (NMSs), and unusual mortality events (UMEs) in the 2018 AFTT proposed rule and 2018 AFTT final rule; please see these rules and the 2017 and 2019 Navy applications for additional information. There have been no changes to important marine mammal habitat, BIAs, NMSs, or Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531

et seq.;

ESA) designated critical habitat since the issuance of the 2018 AFTT final rule; therefore the information that supports our determinations here can be found in the 2018 AFTT proposed and final rules. NMFS has reviewed and incorporated into this rule the most recent Stock Assessment Reports (SARs) (Hayes

et al.,

2019, which can be found

at:

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-mammal-protection/marine-mammal-stock-assessment-reports-region

); updated information on relevant UMEs (see below); and new scientific literature (see the

Potential Effects of Specified Activities on Marine Mammals and their Habitat

section), and determined that none of these nor any other new information changes our determination of which species or stocks have the potential to be affected by the Navy's activities or the pertinent information in the

Description of Marine Mammals and Their Habitat in the Area of the Specified Activities

section in the 2018 AFTT proposed and final rules. Therefore, the information presented in those sections of the 2018 proposed and final rules remains current and valid.

As described in the 2018 AFTT final rule, the species carried forward for analysis are those likely to be found in the AFTT Study Area based on the most recent data available, and do not include stocks or species that may have once inhabited or transited the area but have not been sighted in recent years and therefore are extremely unlikely to occur in the AFTT Study Area (

e.g.,

species which were extirpated because of factors such as nineteenth and twentieth century commercial exploitation).

The species not carried forward for analysis (addressed in more detail in the

Description of Marine Mammals and Their Habitat in the Area of the Specified Activities

section of the 2018 AFTT final rule) include the bowhead whale, beluga whale, and narwhal, as these would be considered extralimital and are not part of the AFTT Study Area seasonal species assemblage. Additionally, for multiple bottlenose dolphin stocks, there was no potential for overlap with any stressors from Navy activities; therefore, there would be no adverse effects (or takes), and those stocks were not considered further. Specifically, with the exception of the Mississippi Sound, Lake Borgne, Bay Boudreau stock of bottlenose dolphins (which is addressed in the

Analysis and Negligible Impact Determination

section below), there is no potential for overlap of any Navy stressor with any other bay, sound, or estuary stocks in the northern Gulf of Mexico. Also, the following bottlenose dolphin stocks for the Atlantic do not have any potential for overlap with Navy activity stressors (or take), and therefore are not considered further: Northern South Carolina Estuarine System, Charleston Estuarine System, Northern Georgia/Southern South Carolina Estuarine System, Central Georgia Estuarine System, Southern Georgia Estuarine System, Biscayne Bay, and Florida Bay stocks. For the same reason, bottlenose dolphins off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were also not considered further.

Table 9—Marine Mammals Potentially Present in the AFTT Study Area

Common name

Scientific name

Stock

ESA/MMPA Status

Stock Abundance

Best/minimum population

Occurrence in AFTT study area

Open ocean

Large marine ecosystems

Inland waters

Order Cetacea

Suborder Mysticeti (baleen whales)

Family Balaenidae (right whales):

Bowhead whale

Balaena mysticetus

Eastern Canada-West Greenland

Endangered, strategic, depleted

7,660 (4,500-11,100)

Labrador Current

Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, West Greenland Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

North Atlantic right whale

Eubalaena glacialis

Western

Endangered, strategic, depleted

451 (0)/445

Gulf Stream, Labrador Current, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Gulf of Mexico (extralimital)

NA.

Family Balaenopteridae (rorquals):

Blue whale

Balaenoptera musculus

Western North Atlantic (Gulf of St. Lawrence)

Endangered, strategic, depleted

Unknown/440

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico (strandings only)

NA.

Bryde's whale

Balaenoptera brydei/edeni

Northern Gulf of Mexico and NSD

Endangered, strategic

33 (1.07)/16

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Fin whale

Balaenoptera physalus

Western North Atlantic

Endangered, strategic, depleted

1,618

(0. 33)/1,234

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

West Greenland

Endangered, strategic, depleted

4,468 (1,343-14,871)

Labrador Current

West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Gulf of St. Lawrence

Endangered, strategic, depleted

328 (306-350)

Gulf of St. Lawrence

Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Scotian Shelf

NA.

Humpback whale

Megaptera novaeangliae

Gulf of Maine

896 (0)/896

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Minke whale

Balaenoptera acutorostrata

Canadian Eastern Coastal

2,591 (0.81)/1,425

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Caribbean Sea, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

West Greenland

16,609 (range: 7,172-38,461)/NA

Labrador Current

West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Sei whale

Balaenoptera borealis

Nova Scotia

Endangered, strategic, depleted

357 (0.52)/236

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, Southeast Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Labrador Sea

Endangered, strategic, depleted

Unknown

Labrador Current

Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Family Physeteridae (sperm whale)

Suborder Odontoceti (toothed whales)

Sperm whale

Physeter macrocephalus

North Atlantic

Endangered, strategic, depleted

2,288 (0.28)/1,815

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

Endangered, strategic, depleted

763 (0.38)/560

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Endangered, strategic, depleted

Unknown

North Atlantic Gyre

Caribbean Sea

NA.

Family Kogiidae (sperm whales)

Pygmy and dwarf sperm whales

Kogia breviceps

and

Kogia sima

Western North Atlantic

3,785 (0.47)/2,598

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

186 (1.04)/90

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Family Monodontidae (beluga whale and narwhal)

Beluga whale

Delphinapterus leucas

Eastern High Arctic/Baffin Bay

21,213 (10,985-32,619)

Labrador Current

West Greenland Shelf

NA.

West Greenland

10,595 (4.904-24,650)

West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Narwhal

Monodon monoceros

Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Family Ziphiidae (beaked whales)

Blainville's beaked whale

Mesoplodon densirostris

Western North Atlantic

7,092 (0.54)/4,632

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

149 (0.91)/77

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Cuvier's beaked whale

Ziphius cavirostris

Western North Atlantic

6,532 (0.32)/5,021

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

74 (1.04)/36

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Strategic

Unknown

Caribbean Sea

NA.

Gervais' beaked whale

Mesoplodon europaeus

Western North Atlantic

7,092 (0.54)/4,632

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast United States Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

149 (0.91)/77

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Northern bottlenose whale

Hyperoodon ampullatus

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Sowerby's beaked whale

Mesoplodon bidens

Western North Atlantic

7,092 (0.54)/4,632

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

True's beaked whale

Mesoplodon mirus

Western North Atlantic

7,092 (0.54)/4,632

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Family Delphinidae (dolphins)

Atlantic spotted dolphin

Stenella frontalis

Western North Atlantic

44,715 (0.43)/31,610

Gulf Stream

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Strategic

Unknown

Caribbean Sea

NA.

Atlantic white-sided dolphin

Lagenorhynchus acutus

Western North Atlantic

48,819 (0.61)/30,403

Gulf Stream, Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Clymene dolphin

Stenella clymene

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

129 (1.0)/64

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Common bottlenose dolphin

Tursiops truncatus

Western North Atlantic Offshore

77,532 (0.40)/56,053

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf

NA.

Western North Atlantic Northern Migratory Coastal

Strategic, depleted

6,639 (0.41)/4,759

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Long Island Sound, Sandy Hook Bay, Lower Chesapeake Bay, James River, Elizabeth River.

Western North Atlantic Southern Migratory Coastal

Strategic, depleted

3,751 (0.06)/2,353

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Lower Chesapeake Bay, James River, Elizabeth River, Beaufort Inlet, Cape Fear River, Kings Bay, St. Johns River.

Western North Atlantic South Carolina/Georgia Coastal

Strategic, depleted

6,027 (0.34)/4,569

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Kings Bay, St. Johns River.

Northern North Carolina Estuarine System

Strategic

823 (0.06)/782

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Beaufort Inlet, Cape Fear River.

Southern North Carolina Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Beaufort Inlet, Cape Fear River.

Northern South Carolina Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Charleston Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Georgia/Southern South Carolina Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Central Georgia Estuarine System

Strategic

192 (0.04)/185

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Southern Georgia Estuarine System

Strategic

194 (0.05)/185

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Kings Bay, St. Johns River.

Western North Atlantic Northern Florida Coastal

Strategic, depleted

877 (0.49)/595

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Kings Bay, St. Johns River.

Jacksonville Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Kings Bay, St. Johns River.

Western North Atlantic Central Florida Coastal

Strategic, depleted

1,218 (0.35)/913

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Port Canaveral.

Indian River Lagoon Estuarine System

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

Port Canaveral.

Biscayne Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Florida Bay

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico Continental Shelf

51,192 (0.10)/46,926

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Gulf of Mexico Eastern Coastal

12,388 (0.13)/11,110

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Gulf of Mexico Northern Coastal

7,185 (0.21)/6,044

Gulf of Mexico

St. Andrew Bay, Pascagoula River.

Gulf of Mexico Western Coastal

20,161 (0.17)/17,491

Gulf of Mexico

Corpus Christi Bay, Galveston Bay.

Northern Gulf of Mexico Oceanic

5,806 (0.39)/4,230

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Laguna Madre

Strategic

80 (1.57)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Nueces Bay/Corpus Christi Bay

Strategic

58 (0.61)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Copano Bay/Aransas Bay/San Antonio Bay/Redfish Bay/Espiritu Santo Bay

Strategic

55 (0.82)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Matagorda Bay/Tres Palacios Bay/Lavaca Bay

Strategic

61 (0.45)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

West Bay

32 (0.015)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Galveston Bay/East Bay/Trinity Bay

Strategic

152 (0.43)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Sabine Lake

Strategic

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Calcasieu Lake

Strategic

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Vermilion Bay/West Cote Blanche Bay/Atchafalaya Bay

Strategic

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Terrebonne Bay/Timbalier Bay

3,870 (0.15)/3,426

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Barataria Bay Estuarine System

Strategic

2,306 (0.09)/2,138

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Mississippi River Delta

Strategic

332 (0.93)/170

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Mississippi Sound, Lake Borgne, Bay Boudreau

Strategic

3,046 (0.06)/2,896

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Mobile Bay/Bonsecour Bay

Strategic

122 (0.34)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Perdido Bay

Strategic

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Pensacola Bay/East Bay

Strategic

33 (0.80)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Choctawhatchee Bay

Strategic

179 (0.04)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

St. Andrew Bay

Strategic

124 (0.57)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

St. Joseph Bay

Strategic

152 (0.08)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

St. Vincent Sound/Apalachicola Bay/St. George Sound

Strategic

439 (0.14)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Apalachee Bay

Strategic

491 (0.39)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Waccasassa Bay/Withlacoochee Bay/Crystal Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

St. Joseph Sound/Clearwater Harbor

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Tampa Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Sarasota Bay/Little Sarasota Bay

158 (0.27)/126

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Pine Island Sound/Charlotte Harbor/Gasparilla Sound/Lemon Bay

Strategic

826 (0.09)/Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Caloosahatchee River

Strategic

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Estero Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Chokoloskee Bay/Ten Thousand Islands/Gullivan Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Whitewater Bay

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Florida Keys (Bahia Honda to Key West)

Strategic

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Strategic

Unknown

Caribbean Sea

NA.

False killer whale

Pseudorca crassidens

Western North Atlantic

Strategic

442 (1.06)/212

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Fraser's dolphin

Lagenodelphis hosei

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

Unknown

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Killer Whale

Orcinus orca

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre, Labrador Current

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast United States Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

28 (1.02)/14

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Long-finned pilot whale

Globicephala melas

Western North Atlantic

5,636 (0.63)/3,464

Gulf Stream

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Melon-headed Whale

Peponocephala electra

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

2,235 (0.75)/1,274

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Pantropical spotted-dolphin

Stenella attenuate

Western North Atlantic

3,333 (0.91)/1,733

Gulf Stream

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

50,880 (0.27)/40,699

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Pygmy Killer Whales

Feresa attenuata

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

152 (1.02)/75

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Risso's dolphin

Grampus griseus

Western North Atlantic

18,250 (0.46)/12,619

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast United States Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

2,442 (0.57)/1,563

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Rough-toothed dolphin

Steno bredanensis

Western North Atlantic

136 (1.00)/67

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Caribbean Sea Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

624 (0.99)/311

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Short-finned pilot whale

Globicephala macrorhynchus

Western North Atlantic

28,924 (0.24)/23,637

Northeast Continental Shelf, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

2,415 (0.66)/1,456

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Strategic

Unknown

Caribbean Sea

NA.

Spinner dolphin

Stenella longirostris

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Gulf Stream, North Atlantic Gyre

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

11,441 (0.83)/6,221

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands

Strategic

Unknown

Caribbean Sea

NA.

Striped dolphin

Stenella coeruleoalba

Western North Atlantic

54,807 (0.30)/42,804

Gulf Stream

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf

NA.

Northern Gulf of Mexico

1,849 (0.77)/1,041

Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea

NA.

Short-beaked common dolphin

Delphinus delphis

Western North Atlantic

70,184 (0.28)/55,690

Gulf Stream

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

White-beaked dolphin

Lagenorhynchus, albirostris

Western North Atlantic

2,003 (0.94)/1,023

Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Family Phocoenidae (porpoises)

Harbor porpoise

Phocoena phocoena

Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy

79,883 (0.32)/61,415

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard Sound, Long Island Sound, Piscataqua River, Thames River, Kennebec River.

Gulf of St. Lawrence

Unknown

Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Newfoundland

Unknown

Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Greenland

Unknown

Labrador Current

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, West Greenland Shelf

NA.

Order Carnivora

Suborder Pinnipedia

Family Phocidae (true seals):

Gray seal

Halichoerus grypus

Western North Atlantic

27,131 (0.19)/23,158

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard Sound, Long Island Sound, Piscataqua River, Thames River, Kennebeck River.

Harbor seal

Phoca vitulina

Western North Atlantic

75,834 (0.15)/66,884

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

Chesapeake Bay, Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard Sound, Long Island Sound, Piscataqua River, Thames River, Kennebeck River.

Harp seal

Pagophilus groenlandicus

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf

NA.

Hooded seal

Cystophora cristata

Western North Atlantic

Unknown

Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Scotian Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, West Greenland Shelf

Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard Sound, Long Island Sound, Piscataqua River, Thames River, Kennebec River.

Notes:

CV coefficient of variation; ESA: Endangered Species Act; MMPA: Marine Mammal Protection Act; NA: not applicable.

Taxonomy follows (Committee on Taxonomy, 2016).

Stock designations for the U.S. EEZ and abundance estimates are from Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico SARs prepared by NMFS

(Hayes et al.,

2019) and the final 2018 SARs, unless specifically noted.

Populations or stocks defined by the MMPA as “strategic” for one of the following reasons: (1) the level of direct human-caused mortality exceeds the potential biological removal level; (2) based on the best available scientific information, numbers are declining and species are likely to be listed as threatened species under the ESA within the foreseeable future; (3) species are listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA; (4) species are designated as depleted under the MMPA.

Stock abundance, CV, and minimum population are numbers provided by the Stock Assessment Reports

(SARs; Hayes et al.,

2019). The stock abundance is an estimate of the number of animals within the stock. The CV is a statistical metric used as an indicator of the uncertainty in the abundance estimate. The minimum population estimate is either a direct count (

e.g.,

pinnipeds on land) or the lower 20th percentile of a statistical abundance estimate.

Occurrence in the AFTT Study Area includes open ocean areas—Labrador Current, North Atlantic Gyre, Gulf Stream, and coastal/shelf waters of seven large marine ecosystems—West Greenland Shelf, Newfoundland-Labrador Shelf, Scotian Shelf, and Northeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Southeast U.S. Continental Shelf, Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and inland waters of Kennebec River, Piscataqua River, Thames River, Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, Buzzards Bay, Vineyard Sound, Long Island Sound, Sandy Hook Bay, Lower Chesapeake Bay, James River, Elizabeth River, Beaufort Inlet, Cape Fear River, Kings Bay, St. Johns River, Port Canaveral, St. Andrew Bay, Pascagoula River, Sabine Lake, Corpus Christi Bay, and Galveston Bay.

The bowhead whale population off the West Coast of Greenland is not managed by NMFS and, therefore, does not have an associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent highest density interval were presented in (Frasier

et al.,

2015).

The West Greenland stock of minke whales is not managed by NMFS and, therefore, does not have an associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent confidence interval were presented in (Heide-Jørgensen

et al.,

2010).

The Labrador Sea stock of sei whales is not managed by NMFS and, therefore, does not have an associated Stock Assessment Report. Information was obtained in (Prieto

et al.,

2014).

The West Greenland stock of fin whales is not managed by NMFS and, therefore, does not have an associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent confidence interval were presented in (Heide-Jørgensen

et al.,

2010).

The Gulf of St. Lawrence stock of fin whales is not managed by NMFS and, therefore, does not have an associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent confidence interval were presented in (Ramp

et al.,

2014).

Photo identification catalogue count of 440 recognizable blue whale individuals from the Gulf of St. Lawrence is considered a minimum population estimate for the western North Atlantic stock (Waring

et al.,

2010).

Estimates include both the pygmy and dwarf sperm whales in the western North Atlantic (Waring

et al.,

2014) and the northern Gulf of Mexico (Waring

et al.,

2013).

Beluga whales in the Atlantic are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent confidence interval for the Eastern High Arctic/Baffin Bay stock were presented in (Innes e

t al.,

2002).

Beluga whales in the Atlantic are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report. Abundance and 95 percent confidence interval for the West Greenland stock were presented in (Heide-Jørgensen

et al.,

2009).

NA = Not applicable. Narwhals in the Atlantic are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report.

Estimates for these western North Atlantic stocks are from Waring

et al.

(2014) and the northern Gulf of Mexico stock are from (Waring

et al.,

2013) as applicable.

Estimate includes undifferentiated

Mesoplodon

species.

Estimate includes Gervais' and Blainville's beaked whales.

Estimate may include sightings of the coastal form.

Estimates for these Gulf of Mexico stocks are from SARs.

These Bryde's whales span the mid- and southern Atlantic and have not been designated as a stock (NSD) under the MMPA and therefore have no associated Stock Assessment Report.

Estimates for these stocks are from Waring

et al.,

(2015).

Estimates for these western North Atlantic stocks are from (Waring

et al.,

2007).

Harbor porpoise in the Gulf of St. Lawrence are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report.

Harbor porpoise in Newfoundland are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report.

Harbor porpoise in Greenland are not managed by NMFS and have no associated Stock Assessment Report.

Unusual Mortality Events (UMEs)

An UME is defined under section 410(6) of the MMPA as a stranding that is unexpected; involves a significant die-off of any marine mammal population; and demands immediate response. The six active UMEs with ongoing investigations in the AFTT Study Area that inform our analysis are discussed below. The impacts to Barataria Bay bottlenose dolphins from the closed Northern Gulf of Mexico UME (discussed in the 2018 AFTT proposed rule) associated with the Deep Water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico are thought to be persistent and continue to inform population analyses. The other more recent UMEs closed several years ago, and little is known about how the effects of those events might be appropriately applied to an impact assessment several years later.

North Atlantic Right Whale (NARW) UME

NOAA declared an UME for NARWs from January 1, 2017, to the present. The current total number of mortalities included in the event is approximately 30 whales, including potentially 21 NARW carcasses (1 carcass from 2019 is currently unconfirmed) from Canada in 2017 and 2019 and nine carcasses in the United States (5 in 2017; 3 in 2018; 1 in 2019). In 2017, 17 right whale mortalities were documented, in 2018, three right whale mortalities were documented, and in the summer and fall of 2019 (as of October 24, 2019) an additional 10 right whale mortalities have been documented (9 confirmed, 1 unconfirmed). Of the 12 NARW carcasses found in Canadian waters in 2017, six were necropsied and died as a direct result of human activities (either confirmed, probable, or suspect), from either rope entanglements (2) or vessel strikes (4) (Daoust

et al.,

2017). Of the eight carcasses found in U.S. waters in 2017-2018, the cause of death was determined in six whales, with deaths attributable to either rope entanglement (5) or vessel strikes (1) (Sharp

et al.,

2019). Eight carcasses were not able to be examined. Of the 10 whales documented in 2019, 8 carcasses were able to be examined at some level. Of the examined whales, three had evidence of vessel strikes and one had evidence of entanglement, the results from the remaining four whales are pending. Daoust

et al.

(2018) also concluded there were no oil and gas seismic surveys authorized in the months prior to or during the period over which these mortalities occurred, as well as no blasting or major marine development projects. Navy was consulted as to sonar use and they confirmed none was used in the vicinity of any of the strandings.

As part of the UME investigation process for NARW, NOAA assembled an independent team of scientists (Investigative Team) that coordinates with the Working Group on Marine Mammal Unusual Mortality Events to review the data collected, sample future whales that strand, and determine the next steps for the investigation. For more information on this UME, please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-life-distress/2017-2019-north-atlantic-right-whale-unusual-mortality-event#causes-of-the-north-atlantic-right-whale-ume.

While data are not yet available to statistically estimate the population's trend beyond 2015, three lines of evidence indicate the population is still in decline. First, calving rates in 2016, 2017, and 2018 were low. Only five new calves were documented in 2017 (Pettis

et al.,

2017a), well below the number needed to compensate for expected mortalities (Pace

et al.,

2017), and no new calves were reported for 2018. Long-term photographic identification data indicate new calves rarely go undetected, so these years likely represent a continuation of the low calving rates that began in 2012 (Kraus

et al.,

2007; Pace

et al.,

2017). So far in 2019, seven calves have been documented. Second, the abundance estimate for 2016 is 451 individuals, down approximately 1.5 percent from 458 in 2015. Third, since January, 2017, approximately 30 NARWs have died in what has been declared an UME as discussed above (Meyer-Gutbrod

et al.,

2018; NMFS, 2017).

Humpback Whale UME Along the Atlantic Coast

NOAA declared an UME for humpback whales from January 1, 2016, to the present, along the Atlantic coast from Maine through Florida. As of October 24, 2019, 107 humpback strandings have occurred (26, 34, 25, and 22 whales in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively). As of April 2019, partial or full necropsy examinations have been conducted on 43 cases, or approximately half of the 92 strandings (at that time). Of the 43 whales examined, approximately 20 had evidence of blunt force trauma or pre-mortem propeller wounds indicative of vessel strike and approximately 6 had evidence of entanglements. NOAA, in coordination with our stranding network partners, continues to investigate the recent mortalities and environmental conditions, and conduct population monitoring to better understand the recent humpback whale mortalities. At this time, vessel parameters (including size) are not known for each vessel-whale collision that led to the death of a whale. Therefore, NOAA considers all sizes of vessels to be a potential risk for whale species in highly trafficked areas. The Navy has investigated potential strikes and confirmed that it had none. Please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-life-distress/2016-2019-humpback-whale-unusual-mortality-event-along-atlantic-coast

for more information on this UME.

Minke Whale UME Along the Atlantic Coast

NOAA declared an UME for minke whales from January 1, 2017, to the present, along the Atlantic coast from Maine through Florida. As of October 24, 2019, 75 strandings have occurred (27, 30, and 18 whales in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively). As of April 1, 2019, full or partial necropsy examinations have been conducted on 33 whales. Preliminary findings on several of the whales have shown evidence of human interactions, primarily fisheries interactions, or infectious disease. These findings are not consistent across all of the whales examined, and final diagnostic results are still pending for many of the cases. Please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-life-distress/2017-2019-minke-whale-unusual-mortality-event-along-atlantic-coast

for more information on this UME.

Northeast Pinniped UME Along the Atlantic Coast

NOAA declared an UME on August 30, 2018, due to increased numbers of harbor seal and gray seal strandings along the U.S. coasts of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts during July and August of 2018. Strandings remained elevated in these three states and expanded south to Virginia primarily in late 2018 to early 2019 with additional cases on-going throughout 2019. In December 2018 and early 2019, harp and hooded seals began stranding as these seals migrated from Canada into U.S. waters and have been included in the investigation. From July 1, 2018, to October 24, 2019, 2,964 seals have stranded with approximately 95 percent of the seals stranding in Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Full or partial necropsy examinations have been conducted on many of the seals and samples have been collected for testing. Based on testing conducted so far, the main pathogen found in the seals is phocine distemper virus, with

most positive cases stranded in 2018 and early 2019. Active phocine distemper virus infections have only been detected in harbor and gray seals to date. Please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/new-england-mid-atlantic/marine-life-distress/2018-2019-pinniped-unusual-mortality-event-along

for more information on this UME.

Southwest Florida Bottlenose Dolphin UME Along the Gulf of Mexico

NOAA declared an UME in the summer of 2018 due to elevated bottlenose dolphin mortalities occurring along the Southwest coast of Florida including Collier, Lee, Charlotte, Sarasota, Manatee, Hillsborough, and Pinellas counties. From July 1, 2018, to October 24, 2019, 193 dolphins have been confirmed stranded in this event. Stranding network partners have conducted full or partial necropsy examinations on several dolphins, with positive results for the red tide toxin (brevetoxin) indicating this UME is primarily related to the severe bloom of a red tide that occurred in the area from November, 2017 through February, 2019. Please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/southeast/marine-life-distress/2018-2019-bottlenose-dolphin-unusual-mortality-event-southwest

for more information on this UME.

Bottlenose Dolphin UME Along the Northern Gulf of Mexico

NMFS declared an UME in the spring of 2019 due to elevated bottlenose dolphin strandings occurring in the Northern Gulf of Mexico including Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and the panhandle of Florida (Alabama border through Franklin County). From February 1, 2019 to October 24, 2019, 320 dolphins have stranded, which is approximately three times higher than the average. Testing is underway of tissue samples for morbillivirus, harmful algal bloom toxins and other common causes of stranding. Please refer to

https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/marine-life-distress/2019-bottlenose-dolphin-unusual-mortality-event-along-northern-gulf

for more information on this UME.

Potential Effects of Specified Activities on Marine Mammals and Their Habitat

We provided a full discussion of the potential effects of the specified activities on marine mammals and their habitat in our 2018 AFTT proposed rule and 2018 AFTT final rule. In the

Potential Effects of Specified Activities on Marine Mammals and Their Habitat

sections of the 2018 AFTT proposed and final rules, NMFS provided a description of the ways marine mammals may be affected by the same activities that the Navy will be conducting during the seven-year period analyzed in this rule in the form of serious injury or mortality, physical trauma, sensory impairment (permanent and temporary threshold shifts and acoustic masking), physiological responses (particularly stress responses), behavioral disturbance, or habitat effects. Therefore, we do not repeat the information here, all of which remains current and applicable, but refer the reader to those rules and the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS (Chapter 3, Section 3.7

Marine Mammals

) which NMFS participated in the development of via our cooperating agency status and adopted to meet our NEPA requirements.

NMFS has reviewed new relevant information from the scientific literature since publication of the 2018 AFTT final rule. Summaries of new scientific literature since publication of the 2018 AFTT final rule are presented below.

Southall

et al.

(2019a) evaluated Southall

et al.

(2007) and used updated scientific information to propose revised noise exposure criteria to predict onset of auditory effects in marine mammals (

i.e.,

PTS and TTS onset). Southall

et al.

(2019a) note that the quantitative processes described and the resulting exposure criteria (

i.e.,

thresholds and auditory weighting functions) are largely identical to those in Finneran (2016) and NOAA (2016 and 2018). However they differ in that the Southall

et al.

(2019a) exposure criteria are more broadly applicable as they include all marine mammal species (rather than those only under NMFS jurisdiction) for all noise exposures (both in air and underwater for amphibious species), and that while the hearing group compositions are identical they renamed the hearing groups.

In continued investigations of pinniped hearing, Kastelein

et al.

(2019a) exposed two female captive harbor seals to 6.5 kHz continuous, sinusoidal tones for 60 minutes (cumulative sound exposure levels (SELs) of 159-195 dB re: 1 µPa

s), then measured TTS using behavioral (psychoacoustic) methods at the center frequency of the fatiguing sound (6.5 kHz) and 0.5 and 1 octave above that frequency (9.2 and 13 kHz). Susceptibility to TTS was similar in both individuals tested. At cumulative SELs below 179 dB re: 1 µPa

s, maximum TTS was induced at the center frequency (6.5 kHz), and at cumulative SELs above 179 dB re: 1 µPa

s, maximum TTS was induced at 0.5 octave above the center frequency (9.2 kHz). The highest TTSs were produced in the one-half octave band above the exposure frequency. Both seals recovered within 1-2 hours for up to 6 dB of TTS. One seal showed 19 dB of TTS after a dB re: 1 µPa

s exposure and recovered within 24 hours. Overall, this study combined with previous work showed that for harbor seals, recovery times are consistent for similar-magnitude TTS, regardless of the type of fatiguing sound exposure (impulsive, continuous noise band, or sinusoidal wave), and that susceptibility to TTS in the fatiguing frequency range tested (2.5-6.5 kHz) varies little with hearing frequency. The two harbor seals in this study (and Kastelein

et al.,

2012) had similar susceptibility to TTS as the seal in Kastak

et al.

(2005). The authors note that more fatiguing sound frequencies need to be tested in harbor seals to produce equal TTS curves, for generating weighting functions that can be used to develop exposure criteria for broadband sounds in the marine environment (Houser

et al.,

2017). To determine the distances at which Helicopter Long Range Active Sonar (HELRAS) signals (~1.3-1.4 kHz) can be detected, Kastelein

et al.

(2019b) measured hearing thresholds using behavioral (psychoacoustic) techniques to simulated HELRAS signals in two captive harbor seals. Both seals showed similar thresholds (51 dB re: 1 µPa rms, approximately 4 dB lower than the detection thresholds for the same individuals in Kastelein

et al.,

2009) to previously obtained data for stimuli having the same center frequencies, which suggests that the harmonics present within HELRAS sources do not impact hearing threshold and that a tonal audiogram can be used to estimate the audibility of more complex narrow-band tonal signals in harbor seals.

Recent studies on the behavioral responses of cetaceans to sonar examine and continue to demonstrate the importance of not only sound source parameters, but exposure context (

e.g.,

behavioral state, presence of other animals and social relationships, prey abundance, distance to source, presence of vessels, environmental parameters,

etc.

) in determining or predicting a behavioral response.

• Kastelein

et al.

(2018) examined the role of sound pressure level (SPL) and duty cycle on the behavior of two captive harbor porpoises when exposed to simulated Navy mid-frequency sonar (53C, 3.5 to 4.1 kHz). Neither harbor porpoise responded to the low duty cycle (2.7 percent) at any of the five SPLs presented, even at the maximum received SPL (143 dB re: 1 µPa). At the

higher duty cycle (96 percent), one porpoise responded by increasing his respiration rate at a received SPL of greater than or equal to 119 dB re: 1 µPa, and moved away from the transducer at a received SPL of 143 dB re: 1 µPa. Kastelein

et al.

(2018) observed that at the same received SPL and duty cycle, harbor porpoises respond less to 53C sonar sounds than 1-2 kHz, 6-7 kHz, and 25 kHz sonar signals observed in previous studies, but noted that when examining behavioral responses it is important to take into account the spectrum and temporal structure of the signal, the duty cycle, and the psychological interpretation by the animal.

• To investigate the effect of signal to noise ratio (SNR) on behavioral responses, Kastelein

et al.

(2019c) observed respiration rates (an indicator of behavioral response) of two captive harbor porpoises when exposed to simulated 30-minute playbacks of Navy mid-frequency sonar (53C, 3.5 to 4.1 kHz, 96 percent duty cycle), in noise simulating sea state 6 conditions. No behavioral responses were observed when the porpoises were exposed to sonar signals at an SPL of 117 dB re: 1 µPa (SNR equal to 49 dB re: 1 Hz). Both porpoises responded when exposed to sonar signals at an SPL of 122 dB re: 1 µPa (SNR equal to 54 dB re: 1 Hz), however in quiet conditions one porpoise responded at similar levels (Kastelein

et al.

2018), suggesting the behavioral responses of harbor porpoises to sonar signals are not affected in sea state 6 ambient noise conditions.

• Wensveen

et al.

(2019) examined the role of sound source (simulated sonar pulses) distance and received level in northern bottlenose whales in an environment without frequent sonar activity using multi-scaled controlled exposure experiments. They observed behavioral avoidance of the sound source over a wide range of distances (0.8-28 km) and estimated avoidance thresholds ranging from received SPLs of 117-126 dB re: 1 µPa. The behavioral response characteristics and avoidance thresholds were comparable to those previously observed in beaked whale studies; however, they did not observe an effect of distance on behavioral response and found that onset and intensity of behavioral response were better predicted by received SPL.

• Joyce

et al.

(2019) presented movement and dive behavior data from seven Blainville's beaked whales (

Mesoplodon densirostris

) that were satellite tagged prior to naval sonar exercises using mid-frequency active sonar (MFAS, 3-8kHz) at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) in the Bahamas. Five of the seven tagged were displaced 28-68 km after the onset of sonar exposure and returned to the AUTEC range 2-4 days after exercises ended. Three of the individuals for which modeled received SPLs were available during this movement showed declining received SPLs from initial maxima of 145-172 dB re: 1 μPa to maxima of 70-150 dB re: 1 μPa after displacements. Tagged individuals exhibited a continuation of deep diving activity consistent with foraging during MFAS exposure periods, but data also suggested that time spent on deep dives during initial exposure periods was reduced. These findings provide additional data for ongoing Population Consequences of Acoustic Disturbance assessments of disturbance as authors note that previous studies have suggested foraging dives may be lost in response to MFAS exposure, which could cause a decrease in energy intake and have potential effects on vital parameters. The data presented by Joyce

et al.

(2019) support the initial potential loss of foraging time, however they also suggest that Blainville's beaked whales may have the ability to partially compensate for this loss (assuming they have ample recovery times between dives) by increasing time spent at foraging depths following displacement.

• When conducting controlled exposure experiments on blue whales Southall

et al.

(2019b) observed that after exposure to simulated and operational mid-frequency active sonar, more than 50 percent of blue whales in deep-diving states responded to the sonar, while no behavioral response was observed in shallow-feeding blue whales. The behavioral responses they observed were generally brief, of low to moderate severity, and highly dependent on exposure context (behavioral state, source-to-whale horizontal range, and prey availability). Blue whale response did not follow a simple exposure-response model based on received sound exposure level.

• In a review of the previously published data (included in the 2018 AFTT EIS/OEIS analysis) on the potential impacts of sonar on beaked whales, Bernaldo de Quirós

et al.

(2019) suggested that the effect of mid-frequency active sonar on beaked whales varies among individuals or populations, and that predisposing conditions such as previous exposure to sonar and individual health risk factors may contribute to individual outcomes (such as decompression sickness).

Having considered this information, we have determined that there is no new information that substantively affects our analysis of potential impacts on marine mammals and their habitat that appeared in the 2018 AFTT final rule, all of which remains applicable and valid for our assessment of the effects of the Navy's activities during the seven-year period of this rule.

Estimated Take of Marine Mammals

This section indicates the number of takes that NMFS is authorizing, which are based on the amount of take that NMFS anticipates could occur or is likely to occur, depending on the type of take and the methods used to estimate it, as described below. NMFS coordinated closely with the Navy in the development of their incidental take application, and agrees that the methods the Navy has put forth described herein and in the 2018 AFTT proposed and final rules to estimate take (including the model, thresholds, and density estimates), and the resulting numbers are based on the best available science and appropriate for authorization. The number and type of incidental takes that could occur or are likely to occur annually remain identical to those authorized in the 2018 AFTT regulations.

Takes are predominantly in the form of harassment, but a small number of serious injuries or mortalities are also authorized. For military readiness activities, the MMPA defines “harassment” as (i) Any act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild (Level A harassment); or (ii) Any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing disruption of natural behavioral patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered (Level B harassment).

Authorized takes will primarily be in the form of Level B harassment, as use of the acoustic and explosive sources (

i.e.,

sonar, air guns, pile driving, explosives) is more likely to result in behavioral disruption (rising to the level of a take as described above) or temporary threshold shift (TTS) for marine mammals than other forms of take. There is also the potential for Level A harassment, however, in the form of auditory injury and/or tissue damage (the latter from explosives only) to result from exposure to the sound sources utilized in training and testing activities. Lastly, a limited number of serious injuries or mortalities could occur for four species of mid-frequency

cetaceans during ship shock trials and no more than four serious injuries or mortalities total (over the seven-year period) of mysticetes (except for blue whales, Bryde's whales, and North Atlantic right whales) and North Atlantic sperm whales could occur through vessel collisions. Although we analyze the impacts of these potential serious injuries or mortalities that are authorized, the required mitigation and monitoring measures are expected to minimize the likelihood that ship strike or these high-level explosive exposures (and the associated serious injury or mortality) actually occur.

Generally speaking, for acoustic impacts we estimate the amount and type of harassment by considering: (1) Acoustic thresholds above which NMFS believes the best available science indicates marine mammals will be taken by Level B harassment (in this case, as defined in the military readiness definition of Level B harassment included above) or incur some degree of temporary or permanent hearing impairment; (2) the area or volume of water that will be ensonified above these levels in a day or event; (3) the density or occurrence of marine mammals within these ensonified areas; and (4) and the number of days of activities or events.

Acoustic Thresholds

Using the best available science, NMFS, in coordination with the Navy, has established acoustic thresholds that identify the most appropriate received level of underwater sound above which marine mammals exposed to these sound sources could be reasonably expected to experience a disruption in behavior patterns to a point where they are abandoned or significantly altered, or to incur TTS (equated to Level B harassment) or permanent threshold shift (PTS) of some degree (equated to Level A harassment). Thresholds have also been developed to identify the pressure levels above which animals may incur non-auditory injury from exposure to pressure waves from explosive detonation.

Despite the quickly evolving science, there are still challenges in quantifying expected behavioral responses that qualify as Level B harassment, especially where the goal is to use one or two predictable indicators

(e.g.,

received level and distance) to predict responses that are also driven by additional factors that cannot be easily incorporated into the thresholds (

e.g.,

context). So, while the new behavioral Level B harassment thresholds have been refined here to better consider the best available science (

e.g.,

incorporating both received level and distance), they also still, accordingly, have some built-in conservative factors to address the challenge noted. For example, while duration of observed responses in the data are now considered in the thresholds, some of the responses that are informing take thresholds are of a very short duration, such that it is possible some of these responses might not always rise to the level of disrupting behavior patterns to a point where they are abandoned or significantly altered. We describe the application of this Level B harassment threshold as identifying the maximum number of instances in which marine mammals could be reasonably expected to experience a disruption in behavior patterns to a point where they are abandoned or significantly altered. In summary, we believe these behavioral Level B harassment thresholds are the most appropriate method for predicting behavioral Level B harassment given the best available science and the associated uncertainty.

We described these acoustic thresholds, none of which have changed, in detail in the

Acoustic Thresholds

section and Tables 13 through 22 of the 2018 AFTT final rule; please see the 2018 AFTT final rule for detailed information.

Navy's Acoustic Effects Model

The Navy proposed no changes to the Acoustic Effects Model as described in the 2018 AFTT final rule and there is no new information that would affect the applicability or validity of the Model. Please see the 2018 AFTT final rule and Appendix E of the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS for detailed information.

Range to Effects

The Navy proposed no changes from the 2018 AFTT final rule to the type and nature of the specified activities to be conducted during the seven-year period analyzed in this final rule, including equipment and sources used and exercises conducted. There is also no new information that would affect the applicability or validity of the ranges to effects previously analyzed for these activities. Therefore, the ranges to effects in this final rule are identical to those described and analyzed in the 2018 AFTT final rule, including received sound levels that may cause onset of significant behavioral response and TTS and PTS in hearing for each source type or explosives that may cause non-auditory injury. Please see the

Range to Effects

section and Tables 23 through 38 of the 2018 AFTT final rule for detailed information.

Marine Mammal Density

The Navy proposed no changes to the methods used to estimate marine mammal density described in the 2018 AFTT final rule and there is no new information that would affect the applicability or validity of these methods. Please see the 2018 AFTT final rule for detailed information.

Take Requests

As in the 2018 AFTT final rule, in its 2019 application, the Navy determined that the three stressors below could result in the incidental taking of marine mammals. NMFS has reviewed the Navy's data and analysis and determined that it is complete and accurate, and NMFS agrees that the following stressors have the potential to result in takes of marine mammals from the Navy's planned activities:

• Acoustics (sonar and other transducers; air guns; pile driving/extraction);

• Explosives (explosive shock wave and sound, assumed to encompass the risk due to fragmentation); and

• Vessel strike.

NMFS reviewed and agrees with the Navy's conclusion that acoustic and explosive sources have the potential to result in incidental takes of marine mammals by harassment, serious injury, or mortality. NMFS carefully reviewed the Navy's analysis and conducted its own analysis of vessel strikes, determining that the likelihood of any particular species of large whale being struck is quite low. Nonetheless, NMFS agrees that vessel strikes have the potential to result in incidental take from serious injury or mortality for certain species of large whales and the Navy specifically requested coverage for these species. Therefore, the likelihood of vessel strikes, and later the effects of the incidental take that is being authorized, has been fully analyzed and is described below.

Regarding the quantification of expected takes from acoustic and explosive sources (by Level A and Level B harassment, as well as mortality resulting from exposure to explosives), the number of takes are based directly on the level of activities (days, hours, counts,

etc.,

of different activities and events) in a given year. In the 2018 AFTT final rule, take estimates across the five-years were based on the Navy conducting three years of a representative level of activity and two years of maximum level of activity. Consistent with the pattern set forth in the 2017 application, the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS, and the 2018 AFTT final rule, the Navy included one additional

representative year and one additional maximum year to determine the predicted take numbers in this rule. Specifically, as in the 2018 AFTT final rule, here the Navy uses the maximum annual level to calculate annual takes (which would remain identical to what was determined in the 2018 AFTT final rule), and the sum of all years (four representative and three maximum) to calculate the seven-year totals for this rule. The Navy will not conduct any additional ship shock activities, and therefore both the total number and annual number of ship shock takes estimated and authorized for the seven-year period is the same as the number requested in the five-year period under the 2018 AFTT final rule.

The quantitative analysis process used for the 2018 AFTT FEIS/OEIS and the 2017 and 2019 Navy applications to estimate potential exposures to marine mammals resulting from acoustic and explosive stressors is detailed in the technical report titled “Quantifying Acoustic Impacts on Marine Mammals and Sea Turtles: Methods and Analytical Approach for Phase III Training and Testing” (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2018). The Navy Acoustic Effects Model estimates acoustic and explosive effects without taking mitigation into account; therefore, the mode

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