Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F)
Federal RegisterMay 21, 2019
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BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
12 CFR Part 1006
[Docket No. CFPB-2019-0022]
RIN 3170-AA41
Debt Collection Practices (Regulation F)
AGENCY:
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
ACTION:
Proposed rule with request for public comment.
SUMMARY:
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) proposes to amend Regulation F, 12 CFR part 1006, which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and currently contains the procedures for State application for exemption from the provisions of the FDCPA. The Bureau's proposal would amend Regulation F to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA. The Bureau's proposal would, among other things, address communications in connection with debt collection; interpret and apply prohibitions on harassment or abuse, false or misleading representations, and unfair practices in debt collection; and clarify requirements for certain consumer-facing debt collection disclosures.
DATES:
Comments must be received on or before August 19, 2019.
ADDRESSES:
You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CFPB-2019-0022 or RIN 3170-AA41, by any of the following methods:
•
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov
. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
•
Email: 2019-NPRM-DebtCollection@cfpb.gov
. Include Docket No. CFPB-2019-0022 or RIN 3170-AA41 in the subject line of the email.
•
Mail:
Comment Intake—Debt Collection, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.
•
Hand Delivery/Courier:
Comment Intake—Debt Collection, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.
Instructions:
The Bureau encourages the early submission of comments. All submissions should include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the Bureau is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments electronically. In general, all comments received will be posted without change to
http://www.regulations.gov
. In addition, comments will be available for public inspection and copying at 1700 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20552, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. You can make an appointment to inspect the documents by telephoning 202-435-7275.
All comments, including attachments and other supporting materials, will become part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Proprietary or sensitive personal information, such as account numbers, Social Security numbers, or names of other individuals, should not be included. Comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Adam Mayle, Counsel; or Dania Ayoubi, Owen Bonheimer, Seth Caffrey, David Hixson, David Jacobs, Courtney Jean, or Kristin McPartland, Senior Counsels, Office of Regulations, at 202-435-7700. If you require this document in an alternative electronic format, please contact
CFPB_accessibility@cfpb.gov
.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Summary of the Proposed Rule
The Bureau proposes to amend Regulation F, which implements the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
1
to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA (FDCPA-covered debt collectors). The proposal focuses on debt collection communications and disclosures and also addresses related practices by debt collectors. The Bureau also proposes that FDCPA-covered debt collectors comply with certain additional disclosure-related and record retention requirements pursuant to the Bureau's rulemaking authority under title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
2
1
15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p.
2
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
3
The statute was a response to “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.”
4
According to Congress, these practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”
5
3
15 U.S.C. 1692(e).
4
15 U.S.C. 1692(a).
5
Id.
The FDCPA established certain consumer protections, but interpretative questions have arisen since its passage. Some questions, including those related to communication technologies that did not exist at the time the FDCPA was passed (such as mobile telephones, email, and text messaging), have been the subject of inconsistent court decisions, resulting in legal uncertainty and additional cost for industry and risk for consumers. As the first Federal agency with authority under the FDCPA to prescribe substantive rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, the Bureau proposes to clarify how debt collectors may employ such newer communication technologies in compliance with the FDCPA and to address other communications-related practices that may pose a risk of harm to consumers and create legal uncertainty for industry. The Bureau also proposes to interpret the FDCPA's consumer disclosure requirements to clarify how industry participants can comply with the law and to assist consumers in making better-informed decisions about debts they owe or allegedly owe.
6
6
Because this is a proposed rule, the Bureau's statements herein regarding proposed interpretations of the FDCPA or the Dodd-Frank Act do not represent final Bureau interpretations. The Bureau is not, through its proposed interpretations, finding that conduct either violates or is permissible under the FDCPA or the Dodd-Frank Act.
A. Coverage and Organization of the Proposed Rule
The Bureau's proposed rule is based primarily on its authority to issue rules to implement the FDCPA. Consequently, the proposal generally would impose requirements on debt collectors, as that term is defined in the FDCPA. However, the Bureau proposes certain provisions of the regulation based on the Bureau's Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking authority. With respect to debt collection, the Bureau's authority under the Dodd-Frank Act generally may address the conduct of those who collect debt related to a consumer financial product or service, as that term is defined in the Dodd-Frank Act.
7
Proposed rule
provisions that rely on the Bureau's Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking authority generally would not, therefore, require FDCPA-covered debt collectors to comply if they are not collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service.
8
Such FDCPA-covered debt collectors, however, would not violate the FDCPA by complying with any such provisions adopted in a final rule.
7
Covered persons under the Dodd-Frank Act include persons who are “engage[d] in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service”; this generally includes persons who are “collecting debt related to any consumer financial product or service” (
e.g.,
debt related to the extension of consumer credit).
See
12 U.S.C. 5481(5), (6), (15)(A)(i), (x).
8
These provisions appear in proposed §§ 1006.14(b)(1)(ii) (repeated or continuous telephone calls or telephone conversations), 1006.30(b)(1)(ii) (prohibition on the sale, transfer, or placement of certain debts), and 1006.34(c)(2)(iv) (certain information about the debt) and (3)(iv) (certain information about consumer protections). Note that proposed §§ 1006.14(b)(1)(i) and 1006.30(b)(1)(i) would prohibit the same conduct by all FDCPA-covered debt collectors that proposed §§ 1006.14(b)(1)(ii) and 1006.30(b)(1)(ii) would prohibit only for FDCPA-covered debt collectors collecting consumer financial product or service debt. Additionally, the record retention requirement in § 1006.100 is proposed only pursuant to Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking authority but would apply to all FDCPA-covered debt collectors.
The proposed rule restates the FDCPA's substantive provisions largely in the order that they appear in the statute, sometimes without further interpretation. Restating the statutory text of all of the substantive provisions may facilitate understanding and compliance by ensuring that stakeholders need to consult only the regulation to view all relevant definitions and substantive provisions. Where the Bureau proposes to restate statutory text without further interpretation, the relevant section-by-section analysis explains that the proposed rule restates the statutory language with only minor wording or organizational changes for clarity. Except where specifically stated, the Bureau does not intend to codify existing case law or judicial interpretations of the statute by restating the statutory text. The Bureau requests comment on the proposed approach of restating the substantive provisions of the FDCPA.
The proposed rule has four subparts. Subpart A contains generally applicable provisions, such as definitions that would apply throughout the regulation. Subpart B contains proposed rules for FDCPA-covered debt collectors. Subpart C is reserved for any future debt collection rulemakings. Subpart D contains certain miscellaneous provisions.
B. Scope of the Proposed Rule
Communications Proposals
Debt collection efforts often begin with attempts by a debt collector to reach a consumer. Communicating with a debt collector may benefit a consumer by helping the consumer to either resolve a debt the consumer owes, or identify and inform the debt collector if the debt is one that the consumer does not owe. However, debt collection communications also may constitute unfair practices, may contain false or misleading representations, or may be harassing or abusive either because of their content (for example, when debt collectors employ profanity) or because of the manner in which they are made (for example, when debt collectors place excessive telephone calls with the intent to harass or abuse).
Communication technology has evolved significantly since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977. Today, consumers may prefer communicating with debt collectors using newer technologies, such as emails, text messages, or web portals, because these technologies may offer greater efficiency, convenience, and privacy. These technologies also may allow consumers to exert greater control over the timing, frequency, and duration of communications with debt collectors—for example, by choosing when, where, and how much time to spend responding to a debt collector's email. Debt collectors also may find that these technologies are a more effective and efficient means of communicating with consumers.
To address concerns about debt collection communications and to clarify the application of the FDCPA to newer communication technologies, the Bureau proposes to:
• Define a new term related to debt collection communications: Limited-content message. This definition would identify what information a debt collector must and may include in a message left for consumers (with the inclusion of no other information permitted) for the message to be deemed not to be a communication under the FDCPA. This definition would permit a debt collector to leave a message for a consumer without communicating, as defined by the FDCPA, with a person other than the consumer.
• Clarify the times and places at which a debt collector may communicate with a consumer, including by clarifying that a consumer need not use specific words to assert that a time or place is inconvenient for debt collection communications.
• Clarify that a consumer may restrict the media through which a debt collector communicates by designating a particular medium, such as email, as one that cannot be used for debt collection communications.
• Clarify that, subject to certain exceptions, a debt collector is prohibited from placing a telephone call to a person more than seven times within a seven-day period or within seven days after engaging in a telephone conversation with the person.
• Clarify that newer communication technologies, such as emails and text messages, may be used in debt collection, with certain limitations to protect consumer privacy and to prevent harassment or abuse, false or misleading representations, or unfair practices. For example, the Bureau proposes to require that a debt collector's emails and text messages include instructions for a consumer to opt out of receiving further emails or text messages. The Bureau also proposes procedures that, when followed, would protect a debt collector from liability for unintentional violations of the prohibition against third-party disclosures when communicating with a consumer by email or text message.
Consumer Disclosure Proposals
The FDCPA requires that a debt collector send a written notice to a consumer, within five days of the initial communication, containing certain information about the debt and actions the consumer may take in response, unless such information was provided in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt. To clarify the information that a debt collector must provide to a consumer at the outset of debt collection, including (if applicable) in a validation notice, the Bureau proposes:
• To specify that debt collectors must provide certain information about the debt and the consumer's rights with respect to the debt. The Bureau also proposes to require a debt collector to provide prompts that a consumer could use to dispute the debt, request information about the original creditor, or take certain other actions. The Bureau also proposes to permit a debt collector to include certain optional information.
• A model validation notice that a debt collector could use to comply with the FDCPA and the proposed rule's disclosure requirements.
• To clarify the steps a debt collector must take to provide the validation notice and other required disclosures electronically.
• A safe harbor if a debt collector complies with certain steps when delivering the validation notice within the body of an email that is the debt collector's initial communication with the consumer.
The Bureau also proposes to prohibit a debt collector from suing or threatening to sue a consumer to collect a time-barred debt. The Bureau plans to test consumer disclosures related to time-barred debt and, after testing, will
assess whether a debt collector who collects a time-barred debt must disclose that the debt collector cannot sue to collect the debt because of its age. At a later date, the Bureau may release a report on such testing and issue a disclosure proposal related to the collection of time-barred debt. Stakeholders will have an opportunity to comment on such testing if the Bureau intends to use it to support disclosure requirements in a final rule.
Additional Proposals
The Bureau proposes to address certain other consumer protection concerns in the debt collection market. For example, the Bureau proposes:
• To clarify that the personal representative of a deceased consumer's estate is a consumer for purposes of proposed § 1006.6, which addresses communications in connection with debt collection. This clarification generally would allow a debt collector to discuss a debt with the personal representative of a deceased consumer's estate. The Bureau also proposes to clarify how a debt collector may locate the personal representative of a deceased consumer's estate. In addition, the proposed rule would interpret the requirement that a debt collector provide the validation notice to a “consumer” to require the notice be provided to the person acting on behalf of a deceased consumer's estate,
i.e.,
the executor, administrator, or personal representative of a deceased consumer's estate, who would have the right to dispute the debt.
• To prohibit a debt collector from furnishing information about a debt to a consumer reporting agency before communicating with the consumer about the debt.
• To prohibit, with certain exceptions, the sale, transfer, or placement for collection of a debt if a debt collector knows or should know that the debt has been paid or settled or has been discharged in bankruptcy, or that an identity theft report has been filed with respect to the debt.
The Bureau requests comment on all aspects of the proposed rule.
C. Effective Date
The Bureau proposes that the effective date of the final rule would be one year after the final rule is published in the
Federal Register
. The Bureau requests comment on this proposed effective date.
II. Background
A. Debt Collection Market Background
A consumer debt is commonly understood to be a consumer's obligation to pay money to another person or entity. Sometimes a debt arises out of a closed-end loan. At other times, a debt arises from a consumer's use of an open-end line of credit, most commonly a credit card. And in other cases, a debt arises from a consumer's purchase of goods or services with payment due thereafter. Often there is an agreed-upon payment schedule or date by which the consumer must repay the debt.
For a variety of reasons, consumers sometimes are unable (or in some instances unwilling) to make payments when they are due. Collection efforts may directly recover some or all of the overdue amounts owed to debt owners and thereby may indirectly help to keep consumer credit available and more affordable to consumers.
9
Collection activities also can lead to repayment plans or debt restructuring that may provide consumers with additional time to make payments or resolve their debts on more manageable terms.
10
9
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2013,
at 9 (Mar. 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/annual-report-on-the-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/
(hereinafter 2013 FDCPA Annual Report).
10
See id.
The debt collection industry includes creditors, third-party debt collectors (including debt collection law firms), debt buyers, and a wide variety of related service providers. Debt collection is estimated to be an $11.5 billion-dollar industry employing nearly 118,500 people across approximately 7,700 collection agencies in the United States.
11
11
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2019,
at 8 (Mar. 2019),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fdcpa_annual-report-congress_03-2019.pdf
(hereinafter 2019 FDCPA Annual Report).
Creditors
When an account becomes delinquent, initial collection efforts often are undertaken by the original creditor or its servicer. The FDCPA typically does not cover these first-party recovery efforts. If these first-party recovery efforts result in resolution of the debt, whether through payment in full or another arrangement, the consumer typically will not interact with a third-party debt collector.
Third-Party Debt Collectors
If a consumer's payment obligations remain unmet, a creditor may send the account to a third-party debt collector to recover on the debt in the third-party debt collector's name. A creditor may choose to send an account to a third-party debt collector for several reasons, including because the third-party debt collector possesses capabilities and expertise that the creditor lacks. Third-party debt collectors usually are paid on a contingency basis, typically a percentage of recoveries; debt collectors contracting with creditors on a contingency basis generated a large majority of the industry's 2018 revenue.
12
Contingency debt collectors compete with one another to secure business from creditors based on, among other factors, the debt collectors' effectiveness in obtaining recoveries.
13
12
Id.
at 10.
13
While third-party collection agencies have been increasing in size in recent years, third-party debt collection continues to include a significant number of smaller entities.
See
Robert M. Hunt,
Understanding the Model: The Life Cycle of a Debt,
at 15, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. (June 6, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/life-debt-data-integrity-debt-collection/understandingthemodel.pdf
.
Debt Buyers
If contingency collections prove unsuccessful—or if a particular creditor prefers not to use such third-party debt collectors—a creditor may sell unpaid accounts to a debt buyer. In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) called the advent and growth of debt buying “the most significant change in the debt collection business” in recent years.
14
Debt buyers purchase defaulted debt from creditors or other debt owners and thereby take title to the debt. Credit card debt comprises a large majority of the debt that debt buyers purchase.
15
Debt buyers generated about one-third of debt collection revenue, or about $3.5 billion, in 2017.
16
Creditors who sell their uncollected debt to debt buyers receive a certain up-front return, but these debts typically are sold at prices that are a fraction of their face value. Debt buyers typically price their offers for portfolios based upon their projections of the amount they will be able to collect. The debt buyer incurs the risk of recovering
less than the sum of the amount it paid to acquire the debt and its expenses to collect the debt.
14
Fed. Trade Comm'n,
The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry,
at i (2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-and-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf
(hereinafter FTC Debt Buying Report).
15
Id.
at 7 (citing
Credit Card Debt Sales in 2008,
921 Nilson Rep. 10 (Mar. 2009)).
16
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2018,
at 10 (Mar. 2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fdcpa_annual-report-congress_03-2018.pdf
(hereinafter 2018 FDCPA Annual Report) (citing Edward Rivera,
Debt Collection Agencies in the US,
IBIS World (Dec. 2017)). Although debt buyers represent about one-third of industry revenue, this overstates debt buyers' share of dollars collected, since debt buyer revenue includes all amounts recovered, whereas the revenue of contingency debt collectors includes only the share of recoveries retained by the debt collector.
Id.
Typically a debt buyer engages in debt collection, attempting to collect debts itself. However, a debt buyer also may use a third-party debt collector or a series of such debt collectors. If the debt buyer is unable to collect some of the debts it purchased, the debt buyer may sell the debt again to another debt buyer. Any single debt thus may be owned by multiple entities over its lifetime. The price paid for a debt generally will decline as the debt ages and passes from debt buyer to debt buyer, because the probability of payment decreases.
17
17
FTC Debt Buying Report,
supra
note 14, at 23-24.
Debt Collection Law Firms
If debt collection attempts are unsuccessful, a debt owner may try to recover on a debt through litigation. Most debt collection litigation is filed in State courts. Debt owners often retain law firms and attorneys that specialize in debt collection and that are familiar with State and local rules. If a debt owner obtains a judgment in its favor, post-litigation efforts may include garnishment of wages or seizure of assets.
B. Debt Collection Methods
The debt collection experience is a common one—approximately one in three consumers with a credit record reported having been contacted about a debt in collection in 2014.
18
Of those, 27 percent reported having been contacted about a single debt over the prior year, 57 percent reported having been contacted about two to four debts, and 16 percent reported having been contacted about more than four debts.
19
18
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Consumer Experience with Debt Collection: Findings from CFPB's Survey of Consumer Views on Debt,
at 5 (2017),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_Debt-Collection-Survey-Report.pdf
(hereinafter CFPB Debt Collection Consumer Survey). This figure includes consumers contacted only by creditors as well as those contacted by one or more debt collection firms.
Id.
at 13.
19
Id.
at 13.
A creditor typically stops communicating with a consumer once responsibility for an account has moved to a third-party debt collector. Active debt collection efforts typically begin with the debt collector attempting to locate the consumer, usually by identifying a valid telephone number or mailing address, so that the debt collector can establish contact with the consumer. To obtain current contact information, a debt collector may look to information that transferred with the account file, public records, data sellers, or proprietary databases of contact information. A debt collector may also attempt to obtain location information for a consumer from third parties, such as family members who share a residence with the consumer or colleagues at the consumer's workplace.
Once a debt collector has obtained contact information for a consumer, the debt collector typically will seek to communicate with the consumer to obtain payment on some or all of the debt. The debt collector may tailor the collection strategy depending on a variety of factors, including the size and age of the debt and the debt collector's assessment of the likelihood of obtaining money from the consumer. For example, rather than affirmatively locating and contacting consumers, some debt collectors collecting relatively small debts—such as many medical, utility, and telecommunications debts—will report the debts to consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) and then wait for consumers to contact them after discovering the debts on their consumer reports.
20
Other types of debt are subject to statutory or regulatory requirements that may affect how a debt collector tries to recover on them. For example, privacy protections may affect how a debt collector seeks to recover on a medical debt, and the availability of administrative wage garnishment and tax refund intercepts may affect how a debt collector seeks to recover on a Federal student loan.
20
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Consumer Credit Reports: A Study of Medical and Non-Medical Collections,
at 35-36 (2014),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201412_cfpb_reports_consumer-credit-medical-and-non-medical-collections.pdf
(hereinafter CFPB Medical Debt Report).
Changes in a consumer's situation may warrant a change in a debt collector's recovery strategy, such as when information purchased from CRAs or other third parties indicates that the consumer has started a new job. A debt owner also may “warehouse” a debt and cease collection efforts for a significant period. A new debt collector may later be tasked with resuming collection efforts because, for example, the debt owner has sold the account, detected a possible change in the consumer's financial situation, or wishes to make periodic attempts at some recovery. Each time a new debt collector obtains responsibility for collecting the debt, the consumer likely will be subject to communications or communication attempts from the new debt collector. For the consumer, this may mean contact from a series of different debt collectors over a number of years. During this time, the consumer may make payments to multiple debt collectors or may receive communication attempts from multiple debt collectors that may stop and restart at irregular intervals, until the debt is paid or settled in full or collection activity ceases for other reasons.
C. Consumer Protection Concerns
Each year, consumers submit tens of thousands of complaints about debt collection to Federal regulators;
21
many of those complaints relate to practices addressed in the proposed rule. Consumers also file thousands of private actions each year against debt collectors who allegedly have violated the FDCPA. Since the Bureau began operations in 2011, it has brought numerous debt collection cases against third-party debt collectors, alleging both FDCPA violations and unfair, deceptive, or abusive debt collection acts or practices in violation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
22
In these cases, the Bureau has ordered civil penalties, monetary compensation for consumers, and other relief. In its supervisory work, the Bureau similarly has identified many FDCPA violations during examinations of debt collectors. Over the past decade, the FTC and State regulators also have brought numerous additional actions against debt collectors for violating Federal and State
debt collection and consumer protection laws.
21
See, e.g.,
2019 FDCPA Annual Report,
supra
note 11, at 15-16; Fed. Trade Comm'n,
2018 Consumer Sentinel Network Databook,
at 4, 7 (Feb. 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2018/consumer_sentinel_network_data_book_2018_0.pdf
; 2018 FDCPA Annual Report,
supra
note 16, at 14-15; Fed. Trade Comm'n,
2017 Consumer Sentinel Network Databook,
at 3, 6 (Mar. 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2017/consumer_sentinel_data_book_2017.pdf
; Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
2017 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2017,
at 15-16 (Mar. 2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Fair-Debt-Collection-Practices-Act-Annual-Report.pdf
(hereinafter 2017 FDCPA Annual Report); Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book for January-December 2016,
at 3, 6 (Mar. 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december-2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book.pdf
.
22
See, e.g.,
Consent Order,
In re Encore Capital Grp.,
2015-CFPB-0022 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-encore-capital-group.pdf
; Consent Order,
In re Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC,
2015-CFPB-0023 (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-portfolio-recovery-associates-llc.pdf
; Complaint,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v.
Nat'l Corrective Grp., Inc.,
1:15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_complaint-national-corrective-group.pdf
.
D. FDCPA and Dodd-Frank Act Protections for Consumers
Federal and State governments historically have sought to protect consumers from harmful debt collection practices. From 1938 to 1977, the Federal government primarily protected consumers through FTC enforcement actions against debt collectors who engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act.
23
When Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977, it found that “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing . . . injuries [were] inadequate to protect consumers.”
24
Congress found that “[t]here [was] abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors,” and that these practices “contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”
25
23
15 U.S.C. 45.
24
15 U.S.C. 1692(b).
25
15 U.S.C. 1692(a).
The FDCPA was enacted, in part, “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.”
26
Among other things, the FDCPA: (1) Prohibits debt collectors from engaging in harassment or abuse, making false or misleading representations, and engaging in unfair practices in debt collection; (2) restricts debt collectors' communications with consumers and others; and (3) requires debt collectors to provide consumers with disclosures concerning the debts they owe or allegedly owe.
26
15 U.S.C. 1692(e).
Until the creation of the Bureau, no Federal agency was authorized to issue regulations to implement the substantive provisions of the FDCPA. Courts have issued opinions providing differing interpretations of various FDCPA provisions, and there is considerable uncertainty with respect to how the FDCPA applies to communication technologies that did not exist in 1977. Further, to reduce legal risk, debt collectors typically use the language of the statute in making required disclosures, even though that language can be difficult for consumers to understand.
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the FDCPA to provide the Bureau with authority to “prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors.”
27
Section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act also authorizes the Bureau, among other things, to prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.
28
Section 1031(b) provides that rules under section 1031 may include requirements for the purpose of preventing such unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
29
Covered persons under the Dodd-Frank Act include persons who are “engage[d] in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service”;
30
this generally includes persons who are “collecting debt related to any consumer financial product or service” (
e.g.,
debt related to the extension of consumer credit).
31
Covered persons under the Dodd-Frank Act thus include many FDCPA-covered debt collectors, as well as many creditors and their servicers, who are collecting debt related to a consumer financial product or service.
27
15 U.S.C. 1692
l
(d).
28
Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b), 12 U.S.C. 5531(b).
29
Id.
30
12 U.S.C. 5481(6).
31
12 U.S.C. 5481(5), (15)(A)(i), (x).
III. The Rulemaking Process
The Bureau has conducted a wide range of outreach on the scope and substance of this proposed rule, including by holding field hearings,
32
hosting two joint roundtables with the FTC,
33
and issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in November 2013.
34
The Bureau has conducted several rounds of qualitative testing of prototype debt collection disclosure forms and has conducted formal and informal surveys over the past several years to obtain a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of debt collection practices. The Bureau also convened a Small Business Review Panel in August 2016 to obtain feedback from small debt collectors. Since the Bureau began studying this market, the Bureau has met on many occasions with various stakeholders, including consumer advocacy groups, debt collection trade associations, industry participants, academics with expertise in debt collection, Federal prudential regulators, and other Federal and State consumer protection regulators. The Bureau also received a number of comments specific to the debt collection rulemaking in response to its Request for Information Regarding the Bureau's Adopted Regulations and New Rulemaking Authorities
35
and its Request for Information Regarding the Bureau's Inherited Regulations and Inherited Rulemaking Authorities,
36
and the Bureau has considered these comments in developing the proposed rule. In addition, the Bureau has engaged in general outreach, speaking at consumer advocacy group and industry events and visiting consumer organizations and industry stakeholders. The Bureau has provided other regulators with information about the proposed rule, has sought their input, and has received feedback that has helped the Bureau to prepare this proposed rule.
32
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Field Hearing on Debt Collection in Seattle, WA
(Oct. 24, 2012),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/field-hearing-on-deft-collection-from-seattle-washington/
; Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Field Hearing on Debt Collection in Portland, ME
(July 10, 2013),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/field-hearing-debt-collection-portland-me/
; Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Field Hearing on Debt Collection in Sacramento, CA
(July 28, 2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/events/archive-past-events/field-hearing-debt-collection-sacramento-calif/
.
33
Fed. Trade Comm'n & Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Debt Collection and the Latino Community: An FTC-CFPB Roundtable
(Oct. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/10/debt-collection-latino-community-roundtable
; Fed. Trade Comm'n & Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Roundtable on Data Integrity in Debt Collection: Life of a Debt
(July 6, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/71120/life-debt-roundtable-transcript.pdf
.
34
78 FR 67848 (Nov. 12, 2013).
35
83 FR 12286 (Mar. 21, 2018).
36
83 FR 12881 (Mar. 26, 2018).
A. 2013 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The Bureau issued an ANPRM regarding debt collection in November of 2013. The ANPRM sought information about both first- and third-party debt collection practices, including: Debt collectors' communication and calling practices; the use of disclosures, such as time-barred debt disclosures, in debt collection; the quantity and quality of information in the debt collection system; credit reporting by debt collectors; the prevalence and use of litigation by debt collectors, including by debt collection attorneys; and record retention, monitoring, and compliance issues.
The Bureau received more than 23,000 comments in response to the ANPRM, with approximately 379 non-form comments submitted. These non-form comments were provided by consumers, consumer advocacy groups,
industry participants and trade associations, legal groups including law school clinics, State Attorneys General, and other stakeholders. The Bureau also worked with Cornell University's Regulation Room, which interacted with consumers to obtain their input and submitted a consolidated comment representing views from a multitude of consumers. Comments on the ANPRM related to both first- and third-party collection efforts. Commenters provided significant feedback regarding debt collector communication practices and interactions with consumers, consumer disclosures, and the use of newer communication technologies. Specific comments are discussed in more detail in part V where relevant.
B. Consumer Testing
The Bureau contracted with a third-party vendor, Fors Marsh Group (FMG), to assist with developing, and to conduct qualitative consumer testing of, two potential consumer-facing debt collection model disclosure forms: The validation notice and the statement of consumer rights. The Bureau sought insight into consumers' existing understanding of debt collection protections and how consumers would interact with the forms if they were adopted in a final rule. Specific findings from the consumer testing are discussed in more detail in part V where relevant.
37
37
While the Bureau tested a statement of consumer rights disclosure, this proposal would not require debt collectors to provide such a disclosure to consumers. Instead, the Bureau proposes to require certain debt collectors to provide on the validation notice a statement referring consumers to a Bureau-provided website that would describe certain consumer protections in debt collection. See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.34(c)(3)(iv). Because the Bureau does not propose to require debt collectors to provide consumers with a statement of consumer rights disclosure, the Bureau does not summarize testing related to that disclosure in this proposal.
Validation Notice Testing
Focus groups.
FMG facilitated five focus groups in July 2014 to assess consumers' thoughts about debt collectors and debt collection, to evaluate their perceptions of disclosures provided by debt collectors, and to measure their understanding of consumers' rights in debt collection. Two focus groups, one consisting of participants who had been contacted by a debt collector within the previous two years and one consisting of participants without such experience, were held in Arlington, Virginia, on July 16, 2014. Three focus groups, two consisting of participants with debt collection experience and one consisting of participants without debt collection experience, were held in New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 29, 2014. In conjunction with the release of this proposal, the Bureau is making available a report prepared by FMG regarding the focus group testing (FMG Focus Group Report).
38
38
See generally
Fors Marsh Grp.,
Debt Collection Focus Groups
(Aug. 2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_fmg-focus-group-report.pdf
(hereinafter FMG Focus Group Report). The focus group testing was conducted in accordance with OMB control number 3170-0022, Generic Information Collection Plan for the Development and/or Testing of Model Forms, Disclosures, Tools, and Other Similar Related Materials.
Cognitive Testing.
FMG also conducted 30 one-on-one interviews of consumers to assess their perceptions, preferences, and understanding of different validation notices and to evaluate how each of the notices might affect consumer behavior. The interviews took place at three locations: Arlington, Virginia, on September 23 and 24, 2014; Minneapolis, Minnesota, on October 9 through 11, 2014; and Las Vegas, Nevada, on October 23 and 24, 2014. At each location, FMG interviewed 10 participants, seven of whom had debt collection experience and three of whom did not.
FMG tested three validation notices at each location. The first form was modeled closely on validation notices commonly used by debt collectors. The form included the disclosures specifically required by FDCPA section 809(a), and the language on the form generally mirrored the statutory language. The second form provided the same information as the first form, but in plainer language. The third form used the same language as the second form, along with additional information, including consumer protection information, chain-of-title information describing the history of the debt, and, for two of the testing locations, information about time-barred debts.
FMG asked the participants to define, locate, and explain the meaning of specific elements on each form. Participants responded to three surveys, each with three Likert-scale questions.
39
Participants were asked to compare the first and second forms side-by-side and were asked targeted questions about what they would do after reading individual elements of each notice. In conjunction with the release of this proposal, the Bureau is making available a report prepared by FMG regarding the cognitive testing (FMG Cognitive Report).
40
39
A Likert-scale is a commonly used research scale that asks respondents to specify their level of agreement or disagreement with a series of statements.
40
See generally
Fors Marsh Grp.,
Debt Collection Cognitive Interviews
(n.d.),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_fmg-cognitive-report.pdf
(hereinafter FMG Cognitive Report). The cognitive testing was conducted in accordance with OMB control number 3170-0022, Generic Information Collection Plan for the Development and/or Testing of Model Forms, Disclosures, Tools, and Other Similar Related Materials.
Usability Testing.
FMG also conducted 30 additional one-on-one interviews of consumers to assess their perceptions, preferences, and understanding of different model validation notices and to evaluate what influence, if any, these forms could have on their behavior. FMG interviewed 23 consumers who had been contacted by a debt collector within the previous two years and seven without such experience. The interviews took place at three locations: Arlington, Virginia, on March 31 and April 1, 2015; Minneapolis, Minnesota, on April 14 and 15, 2015; and Las Vegas, Nevada, on April 28 and 29, 2015. During the interviews, researchers asked participants comprehension questions to determine their understanding of the forms and debriefing questions to establish their reactions to and perceptions of the forms. Researchers also engaged consumers in testing activities to assess their interactions with the forms. In conjunction with the release of this proposal, the Bureau is making available a report prepared by FMG regarding the usability testing (FMG Usability Report).
41
The Bureau also is making available a report prepared by FMG summarizing the focus group testing, cognitive testing, and usability testing (FMG Summary Report).
42
41
See generally
Fors Marsh Grp.,
Debt Collection User Experience Study
(Feb. 2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_fmg-usability-report.pdf
(hereinafter FMG Usability Report). Like the other testing, the usability testing was conducted in accordance with OMB control number 3170-0022, Generic Information Collection Plan for the Development and/or Testing of Model Forms, Disclosures, Tools, and Other Similar Related Materials.
42
See generally
Fors Marsh Grp.,
Debt Collection Validation Notice Research: Summary of Focus Groups, Cognitive Interviews, and User Experience Testing
(Feb. 2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection_fmg-summary-report.pdf
(hereinafter FMG Summary Report).
Quantitative Testing
The Bureau plans to conduct a web survey of 8,000 individuals possessing a broad range of demographic characteristics. The survey will explore consumer comprehension and decision-making in response to sample debt collection disclosures relating to time-
barred debts. The Bureau will use the information it gathers to help assess how the Bureau may improve the clarity and effectiveness of debt collection disclosures, among other things. On February 4, 2019, in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
43
the Bureau proposed an information collection that described the web survey and was open for public comment for 30 days.
44
The comment period closed on March 6, 2019. This request is pending under OMB review and can be viewed on OMB's electronic docket at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201902-3170-001
(see ICR Reference Number 201902-3170-001). Stakeholders will have an opportunity to comment on a report describing the web survey results if the Bureau proposes to use those results to support disclosure requirements in a final rule.
43
44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.
44
See
Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request, 84 FR 1430 (Feb. 4, 2019).
C. Study of Debt Collection Market Operations
To better understand the operational costs of debt collection firms, including law firms, the Bureau surveyed debt collection firms and vendors and published a report based on that study in July 2016 (CFPB Debt Collection Operations Study or Operations Study).
45
The answers to the survey questions aided the Bureau's understanding of the compliance costs to debt collectors if the proposal were finalized. As a qualitative study, the survey's results are not necessarily representative of the debt collection industry as a whole, but they provide a broad understanding of how a range of different types of debt collectors operate.
45
See generally
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Study of Third-Party Debt Collection Operations
(July 2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/755/20160727_cfpb_Third_Party_Debt_Collection_Operations_Study.pdf
(hereinafter CFPB Debt Collection Operations Study).
The Operations Study focused on understanding how debt collection firms obtain information about delinquent consumer accounts and attempt to collect on those accounts.
46
Between July and September 2015, the Bureau sent a written survey to debt collection firms. The survey focused on current practices and included questions about employees, types of debt collected, clients, vendors, software, policies and procedures for consumer interaction, disputes, furnishing data to CRAs, litigation, and compliance. Between August and October 2015, the Bureau conducted telephone interviews with a subset of survey respondents. The interviews included several specific questions about the types of voicemails debt collectors leave and what share of lawsuits filed against consumers end with entry of default judgment, as well as some open-ended questions about the costs associated with making changes to collection management systems to address changes in State regulations. From July to October 2015, the Bureau conducted telephone interviews with debt collection vendors. A particular focus of these interviews was collection management systems, including programming and consulting services provided to system users. The Bureau also asked vendors about print mail services, predictive dialers, voice analytics, payment processing, and data services.
46
Most respondents collected debt on behalf of clients, rather than buying debt and collecting on their own behalf. Respondents that bought some debt reported that the majority of accounts they collected were for clients. As a result, the Operations Study did not provide distinct information on debt buyers and their operations as compared to third-party debt collectors.
Although the Bureau constructed the survey sample to ensure representation of debt collection firms of various sizes, the survey was not intended to be nationally representative. Nonetheless, the survey findings generally have informed the Bureau's understanding of the operations and operating costs of various types of debt collection firms. Part VI discusses the Bureau's findings from the study in greater detail.
D. Survey of Consumer Experiences With Debt Collection
The Bureau conducted a survey of consumers' experiences with debt collection, approved under OMB control number 3170-0047, Debt Collection Survey from the Consumer Credit Panel, and published a report of the findings in January 2017 (CFPB Debt Collection Consumer Survey or Consumer Survey).
47
Distributed to consumers in December 2014, the survey asked consumers about their experiences with creditors and debt collectors over the prior year, including disputes and lawsuits, and how they prefer to communicate with a creditor or debt collector. The survey also asked for information on each consumer's demographic characteristics, general financial situation, and credit-market experiences. The survey sample was selected from the Bureau's Consumer Credit Panel, which consists of a nationally representative, de-identified set of credit records maintained by one of the three nationwide CRAs, and responses were weighted to provide nationally representative results. The Consumer Survey, which included survey participants' self-reported responses, provided a more comprehensive picture of consumers' experiences and preferences related to debt collection than was previously available.
48
The Bureau considered survey responses when developing the proposal.
47
See generally
CFPB Debt Collection Consumer Survey,
supra
note 18.
48
Id.
at 4.
The Consumer Survey describes in detail several key findings relating to the prevalence of debt collection, the extent to which consumers dispute debts, and the extent to which creditors or debt collectors pursue the collection of debts through lawsuits. About one-third of consumers with a credit file at one of the three nationwide CRAs reported being contacted by a creditor or debt collector about a debt in the prior year, and most of those consumers reported being contacted about two or more debts.
49
More than one-half of the consumers who had been contacted about a debt in collection indicated that at least one of the debts about which they had been contacted was not theirs or was for the wrong amount. Roughly one-quarter of the consumers who had been contacted about a debt in collection reported having disputed a debt with their creditor or debt collector in the past year.
50
About one-in-seven consumers (about 15 percent) who had been contacted about a debt in collection reported having been sued by a creditor or debt collector in the preceding year.
51
49
Id.
at 13.
50
Id.
at 24-25.
51
Id.
at 27.
The Consumer Survey also describes in detail several key findings related to the frequency with which consumers are contacted about debts in collection, how often consumers ask debt collectors to stop contacting them, how consumers prefer to be contacted by debt collectors, and the frequency with which consumers report negative experiences with debt collectors. More than one-third of consumers (37 percent) contacted about a debt in collection indicated that the creditor or debt collector that most recently had contacted them tried to reach them at least four times per week. Seventeen percent reported that the creditor or debt collector tried to reach them at least eight times per week. Close to two-thirds of consumers (63 percent) said
they were contacted too often by the most recent creditor or debt collector.
52
52
Id.
at 30-31. As discussed further in the Consumer Survey, consumers' estimates of the frequency of contacts may be subject to uncertainty because the survey does not purport to distinguish in its questions or analysis between various factual scenarios.
Consumers contacted at the same frequency by creditors and debt collectors were more likely to characterize contact by a debt collector as occurring “too often” than when a creditor engaged in the same frequency of contact. In addition, 42 percent of consumers who reported they had been contacted about a debt in collection said they had asked at least one creditor or debt collector to stop contacting them in the prior year, but only one in four consumers who made this request reported that the contact stopped. Consumers contacted by debt collectors were more likely than those contacted by creditors to report negative experiences, such as being treated impolitely or being threatened.
53
53
Id.
at 34-35, 45-46.
Almost one-half of the consumers (including those who did not report having been contacted by a creditor or debt collector about a debt in collection in the prior year) said they would most prefer debt collectors to contact them by letter. When asked the way they would least like debt collectors to contact them, consumers most commonly indicated in-person contacts (20 percent of consumers). Nearly two-thirds of consumers said it was “very important” that others not see or hear a message from a creditor or debt collector. At the same time, most consumers also preferred that a creditor or debt collector include their name and the purpose of the call (
i.e.,
debt collection) in a voicemail or answering-machine message.
54
54
Id.
at 36-38.
E. Small Business Review Panel
In August 2016, the Bureau convened a Small Business Review Panel (Small Business Review Panel or Panel) with the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
55
As part of this process, the Bureau prepared an outline of proposals under consideration and the alternatives considered (Small Business Review Panel Outline or Outline),
56
which the Bureau posted on its website for review by the small entity representatives participating in the Panel process and by the general public.
55
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), as amended by section 1100G(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, requires the Bureau to convene a Small Business Review Panel before proposing a rule that may have a substantial economic impact on a significant number of small entities.
See
Public Law 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 847, 857 (1996) (as amended by Pub. L. 110-28, section 8302 (2007)).
56
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Small Business Review Panel for Debt Collector and Debt Buyer Rulemaking: Outline of Proposals Under Consideration and Alternatives Considered
(July 2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf
(hereinafter Small Business Review Panel Outline). The Bureau also gathered feedback on the Small Business Review Panel Outline from other stakeholders, members of the public, and the Bureau's Consumer Advisory Board and Community Bank Advisory Council.
The Panel participated in initial teleconferences with small groups of the small entity representatives to introduce the Outline and supporting materials and to obtain feedback. The Panel then conducted a full-day outreach meeting with the small entity representatives in August 2016 in Washington, DC. The Panel gathered information from the small entity representatives and made findings and recommendations regarding the potential compliance costs and other impacts of the proposals under consideration on those entities. Those findings and recommendations are set forth in the Small Business Review Panel Report, which is part of the administrative record in this rulemaking and is available to the public.
57
The Bureau has considered these findings and recommendations in preparing this proposal and addresses many of them in greater detail in part V.
58
57
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., U.S. Small Bus. Admin., & Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Final Report of the Small Business Review Panel on the CFPB's Proposals Under Consideration for the Debt Collector and Debt Buying Rulemaking
(Oct. 2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collector-debt-buyer_SBREFA-report.pdf
(hereinafter Small Business Review Panel Report).
58
Certain proposals under consideration in the Small Business Review Panel Outline and discussed in the Small Business Review Panel Report are not included in this proposed rule and therefore are not discussed in part V. For example, because this proposed rule would apply only to FDCPA-covered debt collectors, the Bureau does not include a discussion of proposals under consideration that would have imposed information transfer requirements on first-party creditors who generally are not FDCPA-covered debt collectors.
IV. Legal Authority
The Bureau issues this proposal pursuant to its authority under the FDCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act. As amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, FDCPA section 814(d) provides that the Bureau “may prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors,” as defined in the FDCPA.
59
Section 1022(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that “[t]he Bureau is authorized to exercise its authorities under Federal consumer financial law to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer financial law.”
60
Section 1022(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the Director may prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.
61
“Federal consumer financial law” includes title X of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDCPA.
62
59
15 U.S.C. 1692
l
(d). As noted, the Bureau is the first Federal agency with authority to prescribe substantive debt collection rules under the FDCPA. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act's grant of authority to the Bureau, the FTC published various materials providing guidance on the FDCPA. The FTC's materials have informed the Bureau's rulemaking and, if relevant to particular proposed provisions, are discussed in part V.
60
12 U.S.C. 5512(a).
61
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).
62
12 U.S.C. 5481(12)(H), (14).
These and other authorities are discussed in greater detail in parts IV.A through E below. Part IV.A discusses how the Bureau proposes to interpret its authority under sections 806 through 808 of the FDCPA. Parts IV.B through E discuss the Bureau's relevant authorities under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act).
A. FDCPA Sections 806 Through 808
As discussed in part V, the Bureau proposes several provisions, in whole or in part, pursuant to its authority to interpret FDCPA sections 806, 807, and 808, which set forth general prohibitions on, and requirements relating to, debt collectors' conduct and are accompanied by non-exhaustive lists of examples of unlawful conduct. This section provides an overview of how the Bureau proposes to interpret FDCPA sections 806 through 808.
FDCPA section 806 generally prohibits a debt collector from “engag[ing] in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”
63
Then, “[w]ithout limiting the general application of the foregoing,” it lists six examples of conduct that violate that section.
64
Similarly, FDCPA section 807 generally prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”
65
Then,
“[w]ithout limiting the general application of the foregoing,” section 807 lists 16 examples of conduct that violate that section.
66
Finally, FDCPA section 808 prohibits a debt collector from “us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”
67
Then, “[w]ithout limiting the general application of the foregoing,” FDCPA section 808 lists eight examples of conduct that violate that section.
68
The Bureau interprets FDCPA sections 806 through 808 in light of: (1) The FDCPA's language and purpose; (2) the general types of conduct prohibited by those sections and, where relevant, the specific examples enumerated in those sections; and (3) judicial precedent.
69
63
15 U.S.C. 1692d.
64
Id.
at 1692d(1)-(6).
65
15 U.S.C. 1692e.
66
Id.
at 1692e(1)-(16).
67
15 U.S.C. 1692f.
68
Id.
at 1692f(1)-(8).
69
Where the Bureau proposes requirements pursuant only to its authority to implement and interpret sections 806 through 808 of the FDCPA, the Bureau does not take a position on whether such practices also would constitute an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice under section 1031 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Where the Bureau proposes an intervention both pursuant to its authority to implement and interpret FDCPA sections 806 through 808 and pursuant to its authority to identify and prevent unfair acts or practices under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031, the section-by-section analysis explains why the Bureau proposes to identify the act or practice as unfair under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Interpreting General Provisions in Light of Specific Prohibitions or Requirements
By their plain terms, FDCPA sections 806 through 808 make clear that their examples of prohibited conduct do not “limit[ ] the general application” of those sections' general prohibitions. The FDCPA's legislative history is consistent with this understanding,
70
as are opinions by courts that have addressed this issue.
71
Accordingly, the Bureau may prohibit conduct that the specific examples in FDCPA sections 806 through 808 do not address if the conduct violates the general prohibitions.
70
See, e.g.,
S. Rept. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, at 4 (1977),
reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698 (hereinafter S. Rept. No. 382) (“[T]his bill prohibits in general terms any harassing, unfair, or deceptive collection practice. This will enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct which is not specifically addressed.”). Courts have also cited legislative history in noting that, “in passing the FDCPA, Congress identified abusive collection attempts as primary motivations for the Act's passage.”
Hart
v.
FCI Lender Servs, Inc.,
797 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2015).
71
See, e.g., Stratton
v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC,
770 F.3d 443, 450 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he listed examples of illegal acts are just that—examples.”).
The Bureau proposes to use the specific examples in FDCPA sections 806 through 808 to inform its interpretation of those sections' general prohibitions. Accordingly, the proposal would interpret the general provisions of FDCPA sections 806 through 808 to prohibit or require certain conduct that is similar to the types of conduct prohibited or required by the specific examples. For example, the proposal would interpret the general provisions in FDCPA sections 806 through 808 as protecting consumer privacy in debt collection in ways similar to the specific restrictions in: (1) FDCPA section 806(3), which prohibits, with certain exceptions, the publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts;
72
(2) FDCPA section 808(7), which prohibits communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by postcard; and FDCPA section 808(8), which prohibits the use of certain language and symbols on envelopes.
73
The interpretative approach of looking to specific provisions to inform general provisions is consistent with judicial precedent indicating that the general prohibitions in the FDCPA should be interpreted “in light of [their] associates.”
74
For example, courts have held that violating a consumer's privacy interest through public exposure of a debt violates the FDCPA, noting that violating a consumer's privacy is a type of conduct prohibited by several specific examples.
75
In this way, the Bureau uses the specific examples in FDCPA sections 806 through 808 to inform its understanding of the general provisions, consistent with the statute's use of the phrase “without limiting the general application of the foregoing” to introduce the specific examples.
76
72
15 U.S.C. 1692d(3).
73
15 U.S.C. 1692f(7)-(8).
74
Currier
v.
First Resolution Inv. Corp.,
762 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
Limited, Inc.
v.
C.I.R.,
286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2002)).
75
See id.
at 535.
76
15 U.S.C. 1692d-1692f.
Judicial Precedent
The Bureau interprets the general prohibitions in FDCPA sections 806 through 808 in light of the significant body of existing court decisions interpreting those provisions, which provides instructive examples of collection practices that are not addressed by the specific prohibitions in those sections but that nonetheless run afoul of the FDCPA's general prohibitions in sections 806 through 808.
77
For example, courts have held that a debt collector could violate FDCPA section 808 by using coercive tactics such as citing speculative legal consequences to pressure the consumer to engage with the debt collector.
78
Additionally, courts have held that a debt collector could violate FDCPA sections 806 through 808 by taking certain actions to collect a debt that a consumer does not actually owe or that is not actually delinquent.
79
Similarly, a debt collector could violate FDCPA section 807 by, for example, giving “a false impression of the character of the debt,”
80
such as by failing to disclose that an amount collected includes fees,
81
or by failing to disclose that the applicable statute of limitations has expired.
82
77
This interpretive approach is consistent with courts' reasoning that these general prohibitions should be interpreted in light of conduct that courts have already found violate them.
See, e.g., Todd
v.
Collecto, Inc.,
731 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2013). While judicial precedent informs the Bureau's interpretation of the general prohibitions in FDCPA sections 806 through 808, the Bureau does not propose to adopt specific judicial interpretations through its restatement of the general prohibitions except where noted in the proposal.
78
See, e.g., Hosseinzadeh
v.
M.R.S. Assocs., Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying debt collector's motion for summary judgment on section 808 claim where debt collector used false name and implied that consumer “would have legal problems” if consumer did not return debt collector's telephone call).
79
See, e.g., Fox
v.
Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc.,
15 F.3d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing grant of summary judgment to debt collector in part because “a jury could rationally find” that filing writ of garnishment was unfair or unconscionable under section 808 when debt was not delinquent);
Ferrell
v.
Midland Funding, LLC,
No. 2:15-cv-00126-JHE, 2015 WL 2450615, at *3-4 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 2015) (denying debt collector's motion to dismiss section 806 claim where debt collector allegedly initiated collection lawsuit even though it knew plaintiff did not owe debt);
Pittman
v.
J.J. Mac Intyre Co. of Nev., Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (D. Nev. 1997) (denying debt collector's motion to dismiss claims under sections 807 and 808 where debt collector allegedly attempted to collect fully satisfied debt).
80
Fields
v.
Wilber Law Firm, P.C.,
383 F.3d 562, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff's claims brought under sections 807 and 808 because dunning letter that failed to communicate that total amount due included attorneys' fees “could conceivably mislead an unsophisticated consumer”).
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., Pantoja
v.
Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
852 F.3d 679, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2017).
Several courts have applied an objective standard of an “unsophisticated” or “least sophisticated” consumer to FDCPA sections 807
83
and 808
84
and an
objective, vulnerable consumer standard to FDCPA section 806.
85
In determining whether particular acts violate FDCPA sections 806 through 808, the Bureau interprets those sections to incorporate “an objective standard” that is designed to protect consumers who are “of below-average sophistication or intelligence” or who are “especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes.”
86
83
See, e.g., Hartman
v.
Great Seneca Fin. Corp.,
569 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying least sophisticated consumer standard to section 807 claim);
Bentley
v.
Great Lakes Collection Bureau,
6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d. Cir. 1993) (same);
Swanson
v.
S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc.,
869 F.2d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
84
See, e.g., Crawford
v.
LVNV Funding, LLC,
758 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have adopted a `least-sophisticated consumer standard to evaluate whether a debt collector's conduct is ‘deceptive,' `misleading,' ‘unconscionable,' or ‘unfair' under the statute.”);
LeBlanc
v.
Unifund CCR Partners,
601 F.3d 1185, 1200-01 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying least sophisticated consumer standard to section 808 claim);
Turner
v.
J.V.D.B. & Assocs., Inc.,
330 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 2003)
(applying unsophisticated consumer standard to section 808 claim). Circuit courts have also held, for example, that the least sophisticated consumer standard applies to a consumer's understanding of a validation notice required under FDCPA section 809 and threats to take legal action under FDCPA section 807(5).
See Swanson,
869 F.2d at 1225-27;
Wilson,
225 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000).
85
For example, in
Jeter
v.
Credit Bureau, Inc.,
760 F.2d 1168, 1179 (11th Cir. 1985), the court applied a standard analogous to the “least sophisticated consumer” to an FDCPA section 806 claim, holding that claims under section 806 “should be viewed from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances makes him relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse.”
86
See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Sheriff
v.
Gillie,
136 S. Ct. 1594 (2016) (No. 15-338), 2016 WL 836755, at * 29 (quoting
Gammon
v.
GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship,
27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994) and
Clomon
v.
Jackson,
988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Courts have reasoned, and the Bureau agrees, that “[w]hether a consumer is more or less likely to be harassed, oppressed, or abused by certain debt collection practices does not relate solely to the consumer's relative sophistication” and may be affected by other circumstances, such as the consumer's financial and legal resources.
87
Courts have further reasoned that section 807's prohibition on false, deceptive, or misleading representations incorporates an objective, “unsophisticated” consumer standard.
88
This standard “protects the consumer who is uninformed, naive, or trusting, yet it admits an objective element of reasonableness.”
89
The Bureau agrees with the reasoning of courts that have applied this standard or a “least sophisticated consumer” standard.
90
The Bureau proposes to use the term “unsophisticated” consumer to describe the standard it will apply in this proposal when assessing the effect of conduct on consumers.
87
Jeter,
760 F.2d at 1179 (“[R]ather, such susceptibility might be affected by other circumstances of the consumer or by the relationship between the consumer and the debt collection agency. For example, a very intelligent and sophisticated consumer might well be susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse because he is poor (
i.e.,
has limited access to the legal system), is on probation, or is otherwise at the mercy of a power relationship.”).
88
See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra
note 86, at *10, 27-30.
89
Gammon,
27 F.3d at 1257.
90
See, e.g., Rosenau
v.
Unifund Corp.,
539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We use the `least sophisticated debtor' standard in order to effectuate the basic purpose of the FDCPA: To protect all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Clomon,
988 F.2d at 1319 (“To serve the purposes of the consumer-protection laws, courts have attempted to articulate a standard for evaluating deceptiveness that does not rely on assumptions about the `average' or `normal' consumer. This effort is grounded, quite sensibly, in the assumption that consumers of below-average sophistication or intelligence are especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes. The least-sophisticated-consumer standard protects these consumers in a variety of ways.”).
FDCPA's Purposes
FDCPA section 802 establishes that the purpose of the statute is to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to ensure that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
91
In particular, FDCPA section 802 delineates certain specific harms that the general and specific prohibitions in sections 806 through 808 were designed to alleviate. Section 802 states: “[T]he use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors . . . contribute[s] to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.”
92
91
15 U.S.C. 1692(e).
92
15 U.S.C. 1692(a).
B. Dodd-Frank Act Section 1031
Section 1031(b)
Section 1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the Bureau with authority to prescribe rules to identify and prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. Specifically, Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b) authorizes the Bureau to prescribe rules applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.
93
Section 1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act further provides that “[r]ules under this section may include requirements for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices”
94
(sometimes referred to as prevention authority). The Bureau proposes certain provisions based on its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b).
93
12 U.S.C. 5531(b).
94
Id.
Section 1031(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act is similar to the FTC Act provisions relating to unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
95
Given these similarities, where the Bureau relies on Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b) authority to support particular provisions, the Bureau is guided, in part, by case law and Federal agency rulemakings addressing unfair and deceptive acts or practices under the FTC Act. For example, case law establishes that, under the FTC Act, the FTC may impose requirements to prevent acts or practices that the FTC identifies as unfair or deceptive so long as the preventive requirements have a reasonable relation to the identified acts or practices.
96
Where the Bureau relies on Dodd Frank Act section 1031(b) prevention authority to support particular proposals, the Bureau explains how the preventive requirements have a reasonable relation to the identified unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
95
15 U.S.C. 45.
96
See Jacob Siegel Co.
v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n,
327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946) (“The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.”).
Section 1031(c)
Section 1031(c)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the Bureau shall have no authority under section 1031 to declare an act or practice in connection with a transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service, to be unlawful on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair, unless the Bureau “has a reasonable basis” to conclude that: (A) The act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (B) such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.
97
Section 1031(c)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that, in determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such a determination.
98
The Bureau proposes certain interventions based in part on its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c).
97
12 U.S.C. 5531(c)(1).
98
12 U.S.C. 5531(c)(2).
The unfairness standard under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)—requiring primary consideration of the three elements (substantial injury, not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition) and permitting secondary consideration of public policy—is similar to the unfairness standard under the FTC Act.
99
Section 5(n) of the FTC Act was amended in 1994 to incorporate the principles set forth in the FTC's “Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Unfairness Jurisdiction,”
100
issued on December 17, 1980. The FTC Act unfairness standard, the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, rulemakings by the FTC and other Federal agencies,
101
and related cases
102
inform the scope and meaning of the Bureau's authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(b) to issue rules that identify and prevent acts or practices that the Bureau determines are unfair pursuant to Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c).
99
Section 5(n) of the FTC Act, as amended in 1994, provides that, “The [FTC] shall have no authority . . . to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the [FTC] may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.” 15 U.S.C. 45(n).
100
Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, United States Senate, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980),
reprinted in Int'l Harvester Co.,
104 F.T.C. 949, 1070-76 (1984),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/commission_decision_volumes/volume-104/ftc_volume_decision_104__july_-_december_1984pages949_-_1088.pdf
(hereinafter FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness);
see also
S. Rept. 103-130, at 12-13 (1993),
reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776 (legislative history to FTC Act amendments indicating congressional intent to codify the principles of the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness).
101
In addition to the FTC's rulemakings under unfairness authority, certain Federal prudential regulators have prescribed rules prohibiting unfair practices under section 18(f)(1) of the FTC Act and, in doing so, they applied the statutory elements consistent with the standards articulated by the FTC.
See
74 FR 5498, 5502 (Jan. 29, 2009) (background discussion of legal authority for interagency Subprime Credit Card Practices rule). The Board, FDIC, and the OCC also previously issued guidance generally adopting these standards for purposes of enforcing the FTC Act's prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
See id.
102
See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v.
NDG Fin. Corp.,
No. 15-cv-52110 CM, 2016 WL 7188792 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016);
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v.
Universal Debt & Payment Sols., LLC,
No. 1:15-CV-00-859 RWS, 2015 WL 11439178 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2015);
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v.
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc.,
219 F. Supp. 3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
Substantial injury.
The first element for a determination of unfairness under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1) is that the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. As discussed above, the FTC Act unfairness standard, the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, rulemakings by the FTC and other Federal agencies, and related cases inform the meaning of the elements of the unfairness standard under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1). The FTC noted in its Policy Statement on Unfairness that substantial injury ordinarily involves monetary harm.
103
The Policy Statement stated that trivial or speculative harms are not cognizable under the test for substantial injury.
104
The FTC also noted that an injury is “sufficiently substantial” if it consists of a small amount of harm to a large number of individuals or raises a significant risk of harm.
105
The FTC has found that substantial injury also may involve a large amount of harm experienced by a small number of individuals.
106
As described in the FTC Policy Statement, emotional effects from an act or practice might be a basis for a finding of unfairness in an extreme case in which tangible injury from the act or practice could be clearly demonstrated,
107
and the D.C. Circuit has upheld an FTC conclusion that the demonstrated effects on consumers from threats to seize household possessions were sufficient to form part of the substantial injury along with financial harm.
108
The Bureau has stated that emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm “will not ordinarily amount to substantial injury” but that, in certain circumstances, “emotional impacts may amount to or contribute to substantial injury.”
109
103
See
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,
supra
note 100, at 1073.
104
Id.
105
Id.
at 1073 n.12.
106
Int'l Harvester Co.,
104 F.T.C. 949, 1064 (1984).
107
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,
supra
note 100, at 1073 n.16 (“In an extreme case, however, where tangible injury could be clearly demonstrated, emotional effects might possibly be considered as the basis for a finding of unfairness”).
108
See Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc.
v.
FTC,
767 F.2d 957, 973-74 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“the Commission found that `the threat to seize household possessions causes `great emotional suffering, humiliation, anxiety, and deep feelings of guilt, and this distress can lead to physical breakdowns or illness, disruption of the family, and undue strain on family relationships' ”) (internal citations omitted).
109
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
CFPB Supervision and Examination Process,
at UDAAP 2 (Apr. 2019),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf
.
Not reasonably avoidable.
The second element for a determination of unfairness under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1) is that the substantial injury is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. As discussed above, the FTC Act unfairness standard, the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, rulemakings by the FTC and other Federal agencies, and related case law inform the meaning of the elements of the unfairness standard under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1). The FTC stated that knowing the steps for avoiding injury is not enough for the injury to be reasonably avoidable; rather, the consumer must also understand and appreciate the necessity of taking those steps.
110
As the FTC explained in its Policy Statement on Unfairness, most unfairness matters are brought to “halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”
111
The D.C. Circuit has noted that, if such behavior exists, there is a “market failure” and the agency “may be required to take corrective action.”
112
Assessing whether an injury is reasonably avoidable also requires taking into account the costs of making a choice other than the one made and the availability of alternatives in the marketplace.
113
110
See Int'l Harvester,
104 F.T.C. at 1066.
111
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,
supra
note 100, at 1074.
112
Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc.,
767 F.2d at 976.
113
See
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness,
supra
note 100, at 1074 n.19 (“In some senses any injury can be avoided—for example, by hiring independent experts to test all products in advance, or by private legal actions for damages—but these courses may be too expensive to be practicable for individual consumers to pursue.”);
Am. Fin. Servs. Assoc.,
767 F.2d at 976-77 (reasoning that, because of factors such as substantial similarity of contracts offered by creditors, “consumers have little ability or incentive to shop for a better contract”).
Countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.
The third element for a determination of unfairness under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1) is that the act or practice's countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition do not outweigh the substantial consumer injury. As discussed above, the FTC Act unfairness standard, the FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, rulemakings by the FTC and other Federal agencies, and related cases inform the meaning of the elements of the unfairness standard under Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(1). In applying the FTC Act's unfairness standard, the FTC has stated that it generally is important to consider both the costs of imposing a remedy and any benefits that consumers receive as a result of the act or practice. Authorities addressing the FTC Act's unfairness standard indicate that the countervailing benefits test does not require a precise quantitative analysis of benefits and costs, as such an analysis may be unnecessary or, in some cases,
impossible; rather, the agency is expected to gather and consider reasonably available evidence.
114
114
Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass'n
v.
FTC,
41 F.3d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding FTC's amendments to the Funeral Industry Practices Rule and noting that “much of a cost-benefit analysis requires predictions and speculation”);
Int'l Harvester,
104 F.T.C. at 1065 n.59 (“In making these calculations we do not strive for an unrealistic degree of precision. . . . We assess the matter in a more general way, giving consumers the benefit of the doubt in close issues. . . . What is important . . . is that we retain an overall sense of the relationship between costs and benefits. We would not want to impose compliance costs of millions of dollars in order to prevent a bruised elbow.”);
see also
S. Rept. 103-130, at 13 (1994) (noting that, “[i]n determining whether a substantial consumer injury is outweighed by the countervailing benefits of a practice, the Committee does not intend that the FTC quantify the detrimental and beneficial effects of the practice in every case. In many instances, such a numerical benefit-cost analysis would be unnecessary; in other cases, it may be impossible. This section would require, however, that the FTC carefully evaluate the benefits and costs of each exercise of its unfairness authority, gathering and considering reasonably available evidence.”).
Public policy.
As noted above, Dodd-Frank Act section 1031(c)(2) provides that, in determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Bureau may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Public policy considerations, however, may not serve as a primary basis for such a determination.
115
115
12 U.S.C. 5531(c)(2).
C. Dodd-Frank Act Section 1032
The Bureau proposes certain provisions based in part on its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1032. Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(a) provides that the Bureau may prescribe rules to ensure that the features of any consumer financial product or service, “both initially and over the term of the product or service,” are “fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the product or service, in light of the facts and circumstances.”
116
Under Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(a), the Bureau is empowered to prescribe rules regarding the disclosure of the “features” of consumer financial products and services generally. Accordingly, the Bureau may prescribe rules containing disclosure requirements even if other Federal consumer financial laws do not specifically require disclosure of such features.
116
12 U.S.C. 5532(a).
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(b)(1) provides that “any final rule prescribed by the Bureau under this section requiring disclosures may include a model form that may be used at the option of the covered person for provision of the required disclosures.”
117
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(b)(2) provides that such a model form “shall contain a clear and conspicuous disclosure that at a minimum—(A) uses plain language comprehensible to consumers; (B) contains a clear format and design, such as an easily readable type font; and (C) succinctly explains the information that must be communicated to the consumer.”
118
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(b)(3) provides that any such model form “shall be validated through consumer testing.”;
119
117
12 U.S.C. 5532(b)(1).
118
12 U.S.C. 5532(b)(2).
119
12 U.S.C. 5532(b)(3).
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(c) provides that, in prescribing rules pursuant to Dodd-Frank Act section 1032, the Bureau “shall consider available evidence about consumer awareness, understanding of, and responses to disclosures or communications about the risks, costs, and benefits of consumer financial products or services.”
120
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032(d) provides that “[a]ny covered person that uses a model form included with a rule issued under this section shall be deemed to be in compliance with the disclosure requirements of this section with respect to such model form.”
121
120
12 U.S.C. 5532(c).
121
12 U.S.C. 5532(d).
D. Other Authorities Under the Dodd-Frank Act
The Bureau proposes certain interventions based in part on its authority under Dodd-Frank Act sections 1022 and 1024. Section 1022(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the Bureau's Director “may prescribe rules and issue orders and guidance, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.”
122
“Federal consumer financial laws” include the FDCPA and title X of the Dodd-Frank Act.
123
122
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).
123
12 U.S.C. 5481(14).
Section 1022(b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes certain standards for rulemaking that the Bureau must follow in exercising its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b)(1).
124
See part VI for a discussion of the Bureau's standards for rulemaking under Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b)(2).
124
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(2).
Proposed § 1006.100 concerning the retention of records would be based in part on the Bureau's authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b)(7)(A) and (B)
125
as applied to debt collectors who are nondepository covered persons that the Bureau supervises under Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(a).
126
The section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.100 contains an additional description of the authorities on which the Bureau relies for proposed § 1006.100.
125
Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b)(7)(A) authorizes the Bureau to prescribe rules to facilitate supervision of persons identified as larger participants of a market for a consumer financial product or service as defined by rule in accordance with section 1024(a)(1)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act, and Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(b)(7)(B) authorizes the Bureau to require a person described in Dodd-Frank Act section 1024(a)(1) to retain records for the purpose of facilitating supervision of such persons and assessing and detecting risks to consumers.
126
12 U.S.C. 5514(b)(7)(A)-(B).
E. The E-SIGN Act
The E-SIGN Act provides standards for determining if delivery of a disclosure by electronic record satisfies a requirement in a statute, regulation, or other rule of law that the disclosure be provided or made available to a consumer in writing. The E-SIGN Act sets forth criteria under which Federal regulatory agencies may exempt a specified category or type of record from the consent requirements for electronic disclosures in the E-SIGN Act.
127
For the reasons set forth in part V, proposed § 1006.42(c) and (d) would exempt electronic delivery of certain required notices from the consent requirements of the E-SIGN Act. Pursuant to E-SIGN Act section 104(b)(1), which permits the Bureau to interpret the E-SIGN Act through the issuance of regulations, proposed comments 6(c)(1)-1 and -2 provide an interpretation of the E-SIGN Act as applied to a debt collector responding to a consumer's notification that the consumer refuses to pay the debt or wants the debt collector to cease communication; proposed comments 38-2 and -3 provide an interpretation of the E-SIGN Act as applied to a debt collector responding to a consumer dispute or request for original-creditor information; and proposed § 1006.42(b)(1) and proposed comment 42(b)(1)-1 provide an interpretation of the E-SIGN Act as applied to certain disclosures that the regulation would require debt collectors to provide.
127
15 U.S.C. 7004(d)(1).
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
Subpart A—General
Section 1006.1 Authority, Purpose, and Coverage
1(a) Authority
FDCPA section 817 provides that the Bureau shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of the FDCPA any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Bureau determines that certain conditions have been met.
128
Before the Bureau's creation, FDCPA section 817 provided the same authority to the FTC, and the FTC issued a rule to describe procedures for a State to apply for such an exemption.
129
After the Dodd-Frank Act granted the Bureau FDCPA rulewriting authority, the Bureau restated the FTC's existing rule regarding State exemptions without substantive change as the Bureau's Regulation F, 12 CFR part 1006.
130
Existing § 1006.1(a) thus states that the purpose of Regulation F is to establish procedures and criteria for States to apply to the Bureau for an exemption as provided in FDCPA section 817.
128
15 U.S.C. 1692o.
129
See
16 CFR part 901.
130
76 FR 78121 (Dec. 16, 2011).
Consistent with the Bureau's proposal to revise part 1006 to regulate the debt collection activities of FDCPA-covered debt collectors, the Bureau proposes to revise existing § 1006.1(a) to set forth the Bureau's authority to issue such rules. Proposed § 1006.1(a) provides that part 1006 is known as Regulation F and is issued by the Bureau pursuant to sections 814(d) and 817 of the FDCPA,
131
title X of the Dodd-Frank Act,
132
and section 104(b)(1) and (d)(1) of the E-SIGN Act.
133
The Bureau proposes to move the remainder of existing § 1006.1(a), regarding State-law exemptions from the FDCPA, to paragraph I(a) of appendix A of the regulation.
134
131
15 U.S.C. 1692
l
(d), 1692o.
132
12 U.S.C. 5481
et seq.
133
15 U.S.C. 7004(b)(1), 7004(d)(1).
134
See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.108 and appendix A.
1(b) Purpose
Existing § 1006.1(b) defines terms relevant to the procedures and criteria for States to apply to the Bureau for an exemption as provided in FDCPA section 817. Consistent with the Bureau's proposal to revise part 1006 to regulate the debt collection activities of FDCPA-covered debt collectors, the Bureau proposes to revise § 1006.1(b) to identify the purposes of part 1006. The Bureau proposes to move the definitions in existing § 1006.1(b) to paragraph 1(b) of appendix A of the regulation.
135
135
See id.
Consistent with FDCPA section 802, proposed § 1006.1(b) explains that part 1006 carries out the purposes of the FDCPA, which include eliminating abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, ensuring that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and promoting consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses. Consistent with Dodd-Frank Act section 1032, proposed § 1006.1(b) further explains that part 1006 also prescribes requirements to ensure that certain features of debt collection are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with debt collection, in light of the facts and circumstances. Finally, consistent with Dodd-Frank Act sections 1022(b)(1) and 1024(b)(7), proposed § 1006.1(b) explains that part 1006 sets forth record retention requirements to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes of the FDCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act and to prevent evasions thereof, and to facilitate supervision of debt collectors and the assessment and detection of risks to consumers.
1(c) Coverage
The Bureau proposes to add § 1006.1(c) to address coverage under the proposed rule, which, with the exception of proposed § 1006.108 and appendix A, would apply to FDCPA-covered debt collectors.
136
Proposed § 1006.1(c)(1) thus provides that, except as provided in § 1006.108 and appendix A regarding applications for State exemptions from the FDCPA, proposed part 1006 applies to debt collectors as defined in proposed § 1006.2(i),
i.e.,
debt collectors covered by the FDCPA.
137
136
Proposed § 1006.108 and appendix A would apply to States.
137
Section 812 of the FDCPA addresses the furnishing of deceptive forms and applies to any person, not just to debt collectors. Proposed 1006.30(e) would prohibit FDCPA-covered debt collectors from furnishing deceptive forms. Other persons would continue to be prohibited from furnishing deceptive forms under FDCPA section 812.
Proposed § 1006.1(c)(1) also would implement FDCPA section 814(d), which provides, in part, that the Bureau may not prescribe rules under the FDCPA with respect to motor vehicle dealers as described in section 1029(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
138
Proposed § 1006.1(c)(1) would clarify that Regulation F would not apply to a person excluded from coverage by section 1029(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
139
138
12 U.S.C. 5519(a).
139
This proposed exclusion would apply only to Regulation F. Any motor vehicle dealers who are FDCPA-covered debt collectors would still need to comply with the FDCPA.
The Bureau proposes certain provisions of the proposed rule only under sections 1031 or 1032 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Act section 1031 grants the Bureau authority to write regulations applicable to covered persons and service providers to identify and prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with a transaction with a consumer for, or the offering of, a consumer financial product or service.
140
Dodd-Frank Act section 1032 grants the Bureau authority to ensure that the features of any consumer financial product or service are fully, accurately, and effectively disclosed to consumers.
141
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, collecting a debt related to any consumer financial product or service generally is, itself, a consumer financial product or service.
142
Of primary relevance here, a consumer financial product or service includes the extension of consumer credit.
143
Provisions proposed only under Dodd-Frank Act sections 1031 or 1032, if adopted, therefore would apply to FDCPA-covered debt collectors only to the extent that such debt collectors were collecting a debt related to an extension of consumer credit or another consumer financial product or service.
144
This would include, for example, FDCPA-covered debt collectors collecting debts related to consumer mortgage loans or credit cards.
140
12 U.S.C. 5531(b).
141
12 U.S.C. 5532.
142
It is a financial product or service and is a consumer financial product or service if, for example, it is delivered offered, or provided in connection with a consumer financial product or service.
See
12 U.S.C. 5481(5)(B), 5481(15)(A)(x).
143
12 U.S.C. 5481(15)(A)(i). The Dodd-Frank Act defines credit to mean the right granted by a person to a consumer to defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its payment, or purchase property or services and defer payment for such purchase. 12 U.S.C. 5481(7).
144
12 U.S.C. 5481(5).
Proposed § 1006.1(c)(2) would clarify that certain provisions in proposed Regulation F apply to FDCPA-covered debt collectors only when they are collecting consumer financial product or service debt, as defined in § 1006.2(f).
145
Proposed § 1006.1(c)(2) specifies that these provisions are §§ 1006.14(b)(1)(ii), 1006.30(b)(1)(ii),
and 1006.34(c)(2)(iv) and (3)(iv). The Bureau requests comment on all aspects of proposed § 1006.1(c), including on whether additional clarification would be helpful.
145
See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.2(f).
Section 1006.2 Definitions
FDCPA section 803 defines terms used throughout the statute.
146
Proposed § 1006.2 would repurpose existing § 1006.2 to implement and interpret FDCPA section 803 and define additional terms that would be used in the regulation.
147
The Bureau proposes to move existing § 1006.2, which describes how a State may apply for an exemption from the FDCPA, to paragraph II of appendix A of the regulation.
148
146
15 U.S.C. 1692a.
147
FDCPA section 803(7) defines the term “location information.” 15 U.S.C. 1692a(7). The Bureau proposes to define that term in § 1006.10, rather than in § 1006.2. See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.10(a).
148
See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.108 and appendix A.
Paragraphs (c), (g), and (
l
) of proposed § 1006.2 would implement the FDCPA section 803 definitions of Bureau, creditor, and State, respectively. These paragraphs generally restate the statute, with only minor wording and organizational changes for clarity, and thus are not addressed further in the section-by-section analysis below. Proposed § 1006.2(a) and (b), (d) through (f), and (h) through (k) would define other terms that would be used in the regulation, as described below. The Bureau proposes § 1006.2 to implement and interpret FDCPA section 803, pursuant to its authority under FDCPA section 814(d) to prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors. In addition to the specific comment requests noted below, the Bureau generally requests comment on whether additional clarification is needed for any of the proposed definitions and on whether additional definitions would be helpful. For example, the proposal uses the term “day” to refer to any day, including weekends and public holidays. The Bureau requests comment on whether adding a defined term such as “calendar day” and using it in the final rule would be helpful.
2(a) Act or FDCPA
Proposed § 1006.2(a) provides that the terms Act and FDCPA mean the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
2(b) Attempt To Communicate
Several of the proposed rule's requirements would apply not only to communications as defined in § 1006.2(d) but also to communication attempts. For example, proposed § 1006.6(b) and (c) would, among other things, prohibit a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer at times or places that the debt collector knows or should know are inconvenient to the consumer or after a consumer notifies the debt collector in writing that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer. In addition, proposed § 1006.22(f)(3) and (4) would generally prohibit a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer using an email address that the debt collector knows or should know is maintained by the consumer's employer or by a social media platform that is viewable by a person other than the consumer.
To facilitate compliance with the proposed provisions that apply to attempts to communicate, proposed § 1006.2(b) would define an attempt to communicate as any act to initiate a communication or other contact with any person through any medium, including by soliciting a response from such person. Proposed § 1006.2(b) further states that an attempt to communicate includes providing a limited-content message, as defined in § 1006.2(j). The Bureau proposes this definition of attempt to communicate on the basis that any outreach by a debt collector to a consumer—whether by a telephone call, text message, email, or otherwise—is designed to bring about a communication either immediately (
e.g.,
a consumer answers a debt collector's telephone call and they engage in a conversation about the debt) or at a later point in time (
e.g.,
in response to a missed telephone call or a limited-content message from a debt collector, a consumer calls or texts the debt collector and they engage in a conversation about the debt).
As proposed, an attempt to communicate covers a broader range of activity than a communication. As discussed in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.2(d), the proposed rule would define a communication, consistent with FDCPA section 803(2), as the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. The proposed definition of communication further states that a debt collector does not convey information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person if the debt collector provides only a limited-content message, as defined in proposed § 1006.2(j). The proposed definition of attempt to communicate, in contrast, does not require the conveying of information regarding a debt. As the examples in proposed comment 2(b)-1 illustrate, an attempt to communicate includes leaving a limited-content message for a consumer or placing a telephone call to a person, regardless of whether the debt collector speaks to any person or leaves any message at the dialed number. Proposed comment 2(b)-1 also would clarify that an act to initiate a communication or other contact with a person is an attempt to communicate regardless of whether the attempt, if successful, would be a communication that conveys information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person.
Although the proposed definition of attempt to communicate covers a broader range of conduct than the proposed definition of communication, in many circumstances the same conduct may give rise to both an attempt to communicate and a communication. For example, a debt collector who places a telephone call to a consumer and speaks to the consumer about the debt has both attempted to communicate with the consumer (by initiating the call and speaking to the consumer) and communicated with the consumer (by conveying information about the debt). Sometimes, however, an attempt to communicate may not give rise to a communication. For example, a debt collector who places an unanswered telephone call to a consumer and chooses not to leave a message has attempted to communicate with the consumer but has not communicated with the consumer. The Bureau requests comment on proposed § 1006.2(b) and on proposed comment 2(b)-1.
2(d) Communicate or Communication
FDCPA section 803(2) defines the term communication to mean the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.
149
Proposed § 1006.2(d) would implement and interpret this definition.
149
15 U.S.C. 1692a(2).
Proposed § 1006.2(d) first restates the statutory definition of communication, with only minor changes for clarity. Proposed § 1006.2(d) also would interpret FDCPA section 803(2) to provide that a debt collector does not convey information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person—and therefore does not communicate with any person—if the debt collector provides only a limited-content message, as defined in proposed § 1006.2(j). The section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.2(j)
regarding limited-content messages explains and requests comment both on the proposed content of limited-content messages and on the Bureau's proposal to interpret the term communication in § 1006.2(d) as excluding such messages.
Proposed comment 2(d)-1 notes that a communication can occur through “any medium” and explains that “any medium” includes any oral, written, electronic, or other medium. The proposed comment states that a communication may occur, for example, in person or by telephone, audio recording, paper document, mail, email, text message, social media, or other electronic media. The Bureau proposes comment 2(d)-1 in part to clarify that debt collectors may communicate with consumers through newer communication media, such as electronic media. The Bureau elsewhere proposes provisions to clarify how debt collectors may use those media to communicate with consumers. The Bureau requests comment on proposed § 1006.2(d) and on proposed comment 2(d)-1 and on whether additional clarification about the definition of communication would be useful.
2(e) Consumer
FDCPA section 803(3) defines a consumer as any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.
150
Proposed § 1006.2(e) would implement this definition, interpret it to include a deceased natural person who is obligated or allegedly obligated to pay a debt, and cross-reference the special definition of consumer for certain communications in connection with the collection of a debt set forth in proposed § 1006.6(a).
150
15 U.S.C. 1692a(3).
As summarized in part I.B, the Bureau proposes to address several consumer protection concerns and ambiguities in statutory language related to the collection of debts owed by deceased consumers, also known as decedent debt. One such issue is that the FDCPA does not specify whether a consumer, as defined in section 803(3), includes a deceased consumer (or whether a natural person, as that term is used in section 803(3), includes a deceased natural person). Because the definition of consumer in FDCPA section 803(3) is silent with respect to deceased consumers, debt collectors may be uncertain, when collecting a deceased consumer's debts, how to comply with FDCPA provisions that refer to a debt collector's obligations to a consumer.
For example, certain important FDCPA disclosure requirements, such as a debt collector's obligation to provide a validation notice and to respond to disputes and requests for original-creditor information, refer only to a debt collector's obligations to consumers.
151
In the absence of guidance, debt collectors may be uncertain who, if anyone, should receive the validation notice and have the right to dispute the debt if the consumer obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt is deceased. Without a validation notice and an opportunity to dispute the debt, individuals trying to resolve debts in a deceased consumer's estate may experience difficulty because they lack information needed to determine whether they are being asked to pay the right debt, in the right amount, to the right debt collector, and to assert dispute rights. To address that concern, the Bureau proposes to clarify in the commentary to §§ 1006.34(a)(1) and 1006.38 that a person who is authorized to act on behalf of the deceased consumer's estate, such as the executor, administrator, or personal representative, operates as the consumer for purposes of proposed §§ 1006.34(a)(1) and 1006.38.
152
151
See
15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)-(b).
152
See proposed comments 34(a)(1)-1, 34(d)(1)(ii)-2, and 38-1.
Consistent with those proposed clarifications, the Bureau proposes in § 1006.2(e) to interpret the definition of consumer in FDCPA section 803(3) to mean any natural person, whether living or deceased, who is obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. The proposed interpretation should clarify the meaning of the term consumer in the decedent debt context and appears to be consistent with a modern trend in the law that favors recognizing, as a default, the continued existence of a natural person after death.
153
Further, the Bureau notes that debt collectors often collect or attempt to collect debts from deceased consumers (
i.e.,
from their estates), which presents many of the same consumer-protection concerns as collecting or attempting to collect debts from living consumers.
153
See, e.g.,
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code sec. 377.20(a) (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for or against a person is not lost by reason of the person's death, but survives subject to the applicable limitations period.”). Federal law often provides an unclear answer about whether claims survive the death of a natural person. Rule 25(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows substitution “[i]f a party dies and the claim is not extinguished,” but Federal statutes often do not address whether claims extinguish upon the death of a plaintiff or defendant and, in these cases, Federal common law generally permits survival of claims where they are merely remedial in nature and not penal.
See Ex parte Schreiber,
110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884). Most authority suggests that claims brought under other portions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA), of which the FDCPA is subchapter V, likely are remedial rather than penal in nature.
See, e.g., Murphy
v.
Household Fin. Corp.,
560 F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding, in a widely adopted test, that double damages under Truth in Lending Act (TILA), subchapter I of the CCPA, are remedial rather than penal);
In re Wood,
643 F.2d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1980) (following
Murphy
to conclude that trustee of debtor's estate had standing to bring claims under TILA). On the other hand, some courts, for example, follow the tradition of the common law and treat a “natural person” as ceasing to exist at the point of death.
See, e.g., Williamson
v.
Treasurer,
814 A.2d 1153, 1164 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“We would not describe the body or remains of a deceased person as still a human being or a natural person.” (interpreting the New Jersey Right to Know law and citing
Natural person,
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999))). In light of the conflicting traditions and the FDCPA's silence, it appears appropriate to regard the statutory term “consumer” as ambiguous as to whether it includes or excludes a deceased consumer.
In addition to proposing to clarify the meaning of the term consumer in the decedent debt context, the Bureau proposes in § 1006.2(e) to cross-reference the special definition of consumer for certain communications in connection with the collection of a debt in proposed § 1006.6(a). As described in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.6, FDCPA section 805(d) identifies certain persons in addition to the section 803(3) consumer as persons with whom a debt collector may communicate in connection with the collection of any debt without violating FDCPA section 805(b)'s prohibition on third-party disclosures.
154
The Bureau proposes to implement FDCPA section 805(d) in § 1006.6(a) and to cross-reference the § 1006.6(a) definition in proposed § 1006.14(h). As discussed below, proposed § 1006.14(h) would prohibit a debt collector from communicating or attempting to communicate with a consumer through a medium of communication if the consumer has requested that the debt collector not use that medium to communicate with the consumer. Accordingly, proposed § 1006.2(e) provides that, for purposes of proposed §§ 1006.6 and 1006.14(h), the term consumer has the meaning given to it in proposed § 1006.6(a). For further discussion, see the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.6(a). The Bureau requests comment on the definition of consumer in proposed § 1006.2(e), including on whether the definition should include deceased consumers.
154
15 U.S.C. 1692c(d).
2(f) Consumer Financial Product or Service Debt
As discussed in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.1(c), certain proposed provisions would apply to debt collectors only if they are collecting a debt related to a consumer
financial product or service, as that term is defined in section 1002(5) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
155
Debt related to a consumer financial product or service would include, for example, debts related to consumer mortgage loans or credit cards. For ease of reference, proposed § 1006.2(f) would define the term consumer financial product or service debt to mean a debt related to a consumer financial product or service, as consumer financial product or service is defined in section 1002(5) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
155
12 U.S.C. 5481(5). See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.1(c).
2(h) Debt
FDCPA section 803(5) defines the term debt for purposes of the FDCPA. Proposed § 1006.2(h) would implement FDCPA section 803(5) and generally restates the statute. Proposed § 1006.2(h) also would clarify that, for purposes of § 1006.2(f), the term debt means debt as that term is used in the Dodd-Frank Act. The Bureau proposes this clarification to ensure that, when determining whether a debt is a debt related to a consumer financial product or service for purposes of § 1006.2(f), debt collectors and other stakeholders refer to the Dodd-Frank Act rather than the FDCPA's definition of debt.
2(i) Debt Collector
FDCPA section 803(6) defines the term debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA. The introductory language of FDCPA section 803(6) generally provides that a debt collector is any person: (1) Who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts (
i.e.,
the “principal purpose” prong), or (2) who regularly collects, or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another (
i.e.,
the “regularly collects” prong).
156
FDCPA section 803(6) also sets forth several exclusions from the general definition.
157
Proposed § 1006.2(i) would implement FDCPA section 803(6)'s definition of debt collector and generally restates the statute, with only minor wording and organizational changes for clarity
158
and to specify that the term excludes private entities that operate certain bad check enforcement programs that comply with FDCPA section 818.
159
156
15 U.S.C. 1692a(6).
157
Id.
158
For example, to avoid obsolete language, proposed § 1006.2(i) uses the term “mail” instead of “the mails.”
159
15 U.S.C. 1692p.
The Supreme Court recently has interpreted FDCPA section 803(6). In
Henson
v.
Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
the Court held that a company may collect defaulted debts that it has purchased from another without being an FDCPA-covered debt collector.
160
In so holding, the Court decided only whether, by using its own name to collect debts that it had purchased, Santander met the “regularly collects” prong of the introductory language in FDCPA section 803(6). The Court expressly declined to address two other ways that a debt buyer like Santander might qualify as a debt collector under FDCPA section 803(6): (1) By meeting the “regularly collects” prong by regularly collecting or attempting to collect debts owned by others, in addition to collecting debts that it purchased and owned; or (2) by meeting the “principal purpose” prong of the definition.
161
The Court held that Santander was not a debt collector within the meaning of the “regularly collects” prong because Santander was collecting debts that it purchased and owned, not collecting debts owed to another.
162
160
Henson
v.
Santander Consumer USA, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). In addition to
Henson,
the Supreme Court also recently interpreted FDCPA section 803(6) to hold that a business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings is not an FDCPA-covered debt collector, except for the limited purpose of FDCPA section 808(6).
See Obduskey
v.
McCarthy & Holthus LLP,
139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019).
161
Henson,
137 S. Ct. at 1721. The Court had not identified these questions as being presented when it granted certiorari.
Id.
162
Id.
at 1721-22.
Proposed § 1006.2(i) generally would restate FDCPA section 803(6)'s definition of debt collector. Consistent with the Court's holding in
Henson,
the proposed definition thus could include a debt buyer collecting debts that it purchased and owned, if the debt buyer either met the “principal purpose” prong of the definition or regularly collected or attempted to collect debts owned by others, in addition to collecting debts that it purchased and owned.
163
163
See, e.g., Barbato
v.
Greystone Alliance, LLC,
916 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a debt buyer whose principal purpose was debt collection was an FDCPA-covered debt collector even though the debt buyer outsourced its collection activities to third parties).
2(j) Limited-Content Message
FDCPA section 803(2) defines the term communication to mean the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.
164
As discussed, proposed § 1006.2(d) would implement and interpret that definition, including by specifying that a debt collector does not engage in an FDCPA communication if the debt collector provides only a limited-content message.
165
Proposed § 1006.2(j) would further interpret FDCPA section 803(2) by defining the content that a limited-content message would be required and permitted to include. For the reasons discussed below, under the Bureau's interpretation of the term communication, a limited-content message would not convey information about a debt directly or indirectly to any person, and, as a result, a debt collector could provide such a message for a consumer without communicating with any person for the purposes of the FDCPA or Regulation F.
164
15 U.S.C. 1692a(2).
165
See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.2(d).
The definition of communication is central to the FDCPA's protections, many of which regulate a debt collector's communications with a consumer or other person. For example, FDCPA section 805
166
restricts when and where a debt collector may communicate with a consumer, FDCPA sections 806 through 808
167
contain requirements concerning the form and content of a debt collector's communications with a consumer or other person, and FDCPA section 804
168
imposes requirements on a debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer.
166
15 U.S.C. 1692c.
167
15 U.S.C. 1692d-1692f.
168
15 U.S.C. 1692b.
Uncertainty about what constitutes a communication, however, has led to questions about how debt collectors can leave voicemails or other messages for consumers while complying with certain FDCPA provisions. Most significantly, if a voicemail or other message is a communication with a consumer, FDCPA section 807(11) requires that the debt collector identify itself as a debt collector or inform the consumer that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.
169
A debt collector who leaves a message with such disclosures, however, risks violating FDCPA section 805(b)'s prohibition against revealing debts to third parties if the disclosures are seen or heard by a third party.
170
Uncertainty about what constitutes a communication may result in debt collectors repeatedly calling consumers
and hanging up rather than risking liability by leaving messages.
169
15 U.S.C. 1692e(11). See also the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.18(e).
170
15 U.S.C. 1692c(b). See also the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.6(d).
Courts interpreting the FDCPA's definition of communication and the intersection of FDCPA sections 805(b) and 807(11) have reached conflicting results. Some courts hold that a message asking for a return call from a consumer is a communication and that a debt collector who leaves such a message violates FDCPA section 805(b)'s prohibition on communicating with third parties if the message is heard by a person other than the consumer.
171
These courts also hold that, because the message is a communication with the consumer, it must include a statement pursuant to FDCPA section 807(11) that the caller is attempting to collect a debt, which further increases the likelihood that a third party hearing the message would know that the message relates to debt collection.
172
Conversely, other courts hold that a message limited to certain content—such as the debt collector's name, a statement that the caller is a debt collector, and a call-back number—is not a communication and thus does not, itself, constitute a prohibited third-party disclosure under FDCPA section 805(b) or require an FDCPA section 807(11) disclosure.
173
171
See, e.g., Cordes
v.
Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C.,
789 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1177 (D. Minn. 2011) (holding that debt collector violated FDCPA section 805(b) by leaving voicemail messages that disclosed that the caller was a debt collector);
Marisco
v.
NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289, 291-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that consumer stated a claim for a violation of FDCPA 805(b) where debt collector's voicemail message was overheard by a third party and stated, in part, “This is an important message from NCO Financial Systems, Inc. The law requires that we notify that this is a debt collection company. This is an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose. This is an attempt to collect a debt.”);
Fed. Trade Comm'n
v.
Check Enforcement,
No. CIV.A. 03-2115 (JWB), 2005 WL 1677480, at *8 (D.N.J. July 18, 2005) (“[T]he record indicates that defendants left messages on home answering machines, which were overheard by family members and other third parties, to obtain payments from alleged indebted consumers. Thus, defendants have . . . engaged in prohibited communications with third parties in violation of Section 805 of the FDCPA.”),
aff'd sub nom. Fed. Trade Comm'n
v.
Check Investors, Inc.,
502 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2007);
see also Foti
v.
NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 2d 643, 655-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Defendant's voicemail message, while devoid of any specific information about any particular debt, clearly provided some information, even if indirectly, to the intended recipient of the message. Specifically, the message advised the debtor that the matter required immediate attention, and provided a specific number to call to discuss the matter. Given that the obvious purpose of the message was to provide the debtor with enough information to entice a return call, it is difficult to imagine how the voicemail message is not a communication under the FDCPA.”).
172
Foti,
424 F. Supp. 2d at 657-58 (“[A] narrow reading of the term `communication' to exclude instances such as the present case where no specific information about a debt is explicitly conveyed could create a significant loophole in the FDCPA, allowing debtors to circumvent the § 1692e(11) disclosure requirement, and other provisions of the FDCPA that have a threshold `communication' requirement, merely by not conveying specific information about the debt . . . . Such a reading is inconsistent with Congress's intent to protect consumers from `serious and widespread' debt collection abuses.”);
Hosseinzadeh
v.
M.R.S. Assocs., Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because it appears that defendant's messages are `communications' subjecting defendant to the provisions of § 1692e(11), it also appears that defendant has violated § 1692e(11) because the messages do not convey the information required by § 1692e(11), in particular, that the messages were from a debt collector.”).
173
See, e.g., Zortman
v.
J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc.,
870 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701, 707-08 (D. Minn. 2012) (holding that debt collector did not violate FDCPA section 805(b) by leaving a voicemail message that stated, “We have an important message from J.C. Christensen & Associates. This is a call from a debt collector. Please call 866-319-8619.”);
Zweigenhaft
v.
Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC,
No. 14 CV 01074 RJD JMA, 2014 WL 6085912, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2014) (similar);
Biggs
v.
Credit Collections, Inc.,
No. CIV-07-0053-F, 2007 WL 4034997, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2007) (“Words matter—in this instance, the words of the voice mails and the words of the statutory definition of a `communication.' The transcript of the voice mail messages demonstrates that the voice mails `convey[ed]' no `information regarding a debt.' No amount of liberal construction can broaden the statutory language to encompass the words recorded in these voice mails.”);
see also
Consent Order at ¶ IV.A.,
Fed. Trade Comm'n
v.
Expert Global Solutions, Inc.,
No. 3:13-cv-02611-M (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130709ncoorder.pdf
(enjoining defendant debt collector from leaving recorded messages in which defendant states both the debtor's name and that the caller is a debt collector, unless the recipient's voicemail greeting identifies only the debtor's first and last name or defendant has already spoken with the debtor at the called number).
Many debt collectors state that they err on the side of caution and make repeated telephone calls instead of leaving messages on a consumer's voicemail or with a third party who answers a consumer's telephone, or sending text messages.
174
Such repeated telephone calls may frustrate many consumers. Indeed, consumers often complain to the Bureau about the number of collection calls they receive and, to a lesser degree, about debt collectors' reluctance to leave voicemails.
175
In comments to the Bureau's ANPRM and in feedback during the SBREFA process, many debt collectors stated that they would place fewer telephone calls if they were confident that leaving voicemails or other messages for consumers would not expose them to risk of liability under the FDCPA.
176
The FTC and the U.S. Government Accountability Office also have previously noted the need to clarify the law regarding debt collectors' ability to leave voicemails for consumers.
177
174
See, e.g.,
Small Business Review Panel Report,
supra
note 57, at 25-26.
175
See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.14(b)(2).
176
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot., Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 FR 67848, 67867 (Nov. 12, 2013) (noting that debt collectors believe that recent case law presents a dilemma in which a debt collector's voicemail for a consumer may not be able to comply with both FDCPA sections 805(b) and 807(11)); Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change,
at 36 n.228 (Feb. 2009),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/collecting-consumer-debts-challenges-change-federal-trade-commission-workshop-report/dcwr.pdf
(hereinafter FTC Modernization Report) (summarizing industry members' comments that conflicting case law on debt collectors' ability to communicate by newer forms of technology deters debt collectors from using such technologies, including leaving voicemails);
id.
at 47-49 (noting industry commenters' concerns about their ability to leave voicemails that comply with the FDCPA and recommending that the law regarding voicemails be clarified).
177
See
FTC Modernization Report,
supra
note 176, at 49-50; U.S. Gov't Accountability. Off., GAO-09-748,
Credit Cards: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Could Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection Marketplace and Use of Technology,
at 47-48, 52 (Sept. 2009),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/295588.pdf
.
To address uncertainty about what constitutes an FDCPA communication and to reduce the need for debt collectors to rely on repeated telephone calls without leaving messages to establish contact with consumers, the Bureau proposes § 1006.2(j) to interpret FDCPA section 803(2) and define a message whose content would not “convey[ ] information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person.” Specifically, proposed § 1006.2(j) would provide that a limited-content message means a message for a consumer that includes all of the content described in § 1006.2(j)(1), and that may include any of the content described in § 1006.2(j)(2), but does not include other content. As discussed in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.2(b) and (d), a limited-content message would not be a communication, as defined in § 1006.2(d), but would be an attempt to communicate, as defined in § 1006.2(b).
Under the proposal, a debt collector who leaves a limited-content message for a consumer would not have communicated with the consumer or any other person through that message. In turn, because FDCPA sections 805(b) and 807(11) both apply only to communications as defined by the FDCPA, the requirements described in those sections would not apply to the limited-content message. Accordingly, a limited-content message would not be required to include a disclosure pursuant to FDCPA section 807(11) (as implemented by proposed § 1006.18(e)), and a debt collector would not risk violating FDCPA section 805(b) (as
implemented by proposed § 1006.6(d)) if someone other than the consumer heard or received the message.
The proposal would define a limited-content message as, in part, a message “for a consumer.” As a result, any message left for a person other than a consumer would not be a limited-content message. FDCPA section 807(11)'s requirement that a debt collector disclose that the purpose of a communication is to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose applies only when a debt collector is communicating “with the consumer.” Concerns about the intersection of FDCPA sections 805(b) and 807(11) are thus not as relevant when a debt collector contacts a person other than a consumer. In addition, because debt collectors generally are prohibited from communicating with a person other than the consumer, they generally have no need to contact third parties, and, when such communications are permitted for obtaining location information about a consumer, FDCPA section 804 already provides a comprehensive disclosure regime. Therefore, it may not be necessary to specify the content of a message that does not constitute a communication if left by a debt collector for a person other than the consumer.
The proposal would enable a debt collector to transmit a limited-content message by voicemail, by text message, or orally. Debt collectors may be most likely to use these methods to send limited-content messages, and these methods may be most likely to generate a response from a consumer. The proposal would not enable a debt collector to transmit a limited-content message by email because, as discussed below, email messages typically require additional information (
e.g.,
a sender's email address) that may in some circumstances convey information about a debt, and consumers may be unlikely to read or respond to an email containing solely the information included in a limited-content message (
e.g.,
consumers may disregard such an email as spam or a security risk). In addition, other aspects of the proposed rule (
e.g.,
the procedures described in proposed § 1006.6(d)(3) for emails and text messages) may encourage debt collectors to send debt collection communications to consumers by email. Accordingly, a rule that would enable debt collectors to send limited-content messages by email might not sufficiently protect consumers' privacy interests or be of significant benefit to debt collectors.
Proposed comment 2(j)-1 explains that any message other than a message that includes the content specified in § 1006.2(j) is not a limited-content message. The comment further explains that, if a message includes any other content and such other content directly or indirectly conveys any information about a debt, including but not limited to any information that indicates that the message relates to the collection of a debt, the message would be a communication, as defined in proposed § 1006.2(d). Proposed comment 2(j)-2 provides examples of limited-content messages.
Proposed comment 2(j)-3 provides examples of ways in which a debt collector could transmit a limited-content message to a consumer, such as by leaving a voicemail at the consumer's telephone number, sending a text message to the consumer's mobile telephone number, or leaving a message orally with a third party who answers the consumer's home or mobile telephone number. Proposed comment 2(j)-3 notes, however, that leaving a limited-content message would be subject to other FDCPA provisions, including the prohibitions on harassing or abusive conduct and unfair or unconscionable practices in FDCPA sections 806 and 808, respectively.
178
As the section-by-section analyses of proposed §§ 1006.2(b) and (d), 1006.6(b) and (c), 1006.14(h), and 1006.22(f)(3) and (4) explain in more detail, consumers may be harassed or otherwise injured not only by communications, but also by attempts to communicate, including when a debt collector conveys limited-content messages. Accordingly, those sections propose certain restrictions on when and how a debt collector may attempt to communicate with a person, including by leaving a limited-content message.
178
15 U.S.C. 1692d, 1692f.
Proposed comment 2(j)-4 would clarify that a debt collector who places a telephone call and leaves only a limited-content message for a consumer does not, with respect to that telephone call, violate FDCPA section 806(6)'s prohibition on the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity. Under the proposed interpretation, the content described in proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) would meaningfully disclose the caller's identity. The proposed interpretation would be limited to the narrow circumstance of a debt collector providing only a limited-content message to a consumer. As described below, proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) would require a limited-content message to include the name of a natural person whom the consumer could contact as well as a telephone number that the consumer could use to reply to the debt collector; a limited-content message could not contain any content that is not described in proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) or (2), and debt collectors would be prohibited from including false or misleading statements about the caller's identity or the purpose of the call. As a result, the message should not mislead a consumer about the identity of the caller and the consumer could use the contact information to call a particular employee of a debt collector. Upon receiving such a call and engaging in a communication, the debt collector would be required by FDCPA section 807(11) to disclose to the consumer that the communication is from a debt collector. This sequence of events—a limited-content message followed by a communication in which the debt collector provides the FDCPA section 807(11) disclosures—may benefit consumers more than the status quo, under which many debt collectors place repeated telephone calls without leaving any message or any contact information that the consumer can use to reply to the debt collector.
The interpretation in proposed comment 2(j)-4 would apply only when a debt collector places a telephone call and leaves only a limited-content message for a consumer. It would not extend to any other message a debt collector leaves for a consumer or other person, as such messages might not include all of the content that must be included in a limited-content message, might include content that is not described in proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) or (2) and that conveys a misleading impression about the caller's identity or purpose of the call, or might constitute a communication that is subject to FDCPA section 807(11) or that otherwise would need to include different disclosures about the caller's identity and purpose in order to satisfy FDCPA section 806(6). Similarly, the rationale in proposed comment 2(j)-4 would not extend to a telephone call that is a live conversation with the consumer because, again, the content of such a conversation would be different than the content of a limited-content message.
The Bureau requests comment on whether the proposal to define a limited-content message that a debt collector could leave for a consumer without risking a violation of FDCPA sections 805(b) or 807(11) will enable debt collectors to establish contact with consumers while reducing the number of telephone calls that consumers receive. The Bureau further requests comment on the costs and benefits of
permitting debt collectors to leave limited-content messages for consumers, including on whether those costs and benefits differ depending on whether a debt collector leaves a limited-content message: (1) In a voicemail message on a home, mobile, or work telephone; (2) in a live conversation with a third party who answers the consumer's home, mobile, or work telephone number; or (3) by text message. The Bureau requests comment on whether there are other communication media, such as email, by which debt collectors should be permitted to leave limited-content messages, including in particular on the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approach, which would not permit debt collectors to send limited-content messages by email. In addition, the Bureau requests comment on whether a debt collector should be permitted to leave limited-content messages with third parties only in certain circumstances (
e.g.,
if a third party answers the consumer's telephone number) and whether a debt collector should be able to include additional content in a limited-content message if leaving it with a third party (
e.g.,
a request that the third party take a message).
The Bureau also requests comment on the proposed commentary. In particular, the Bureau requests comment on whether proposed comment 2(j)-4 properly interprets the requirement to “meaningful[ly] disclose the caller's identity” as satisfied when a debt collector places a telephone call and leaves only a limited-content message, and on whether there are other disclosures that would satisfy the meaningful disclosure requirement of FDCPA section 806(6) without causing the message to become a communication (
i.e.,
without conveying information about a debt directly or indirectly to any person).
During the SBREFA process, small entity representatives overwhelmingly supported a rule clarifying how and when a debt collector may leave a voicemail or other message for a consumer.
179
They predicted that a rule defining a limited-content message that is not a communication under the FDCPA would reduce the number and frequency of collection calls as well as facilitate communications between debt collectors and consumers. The Small Business Review Panel Report recommended that the Bureau request comment on the costs and benefits of any limited-content message proposal, including on the costs and benefits of providing limited-content messages by media other than telephone, and of any proposal that would require debt collectors to include a toll-free callback telephone number in a limited-content message (as the proposal then under consideration would have).
180
Proposed § 1006.2(j) and the requests for comment in this section are consistent with the feedback received during the SBREFA process, which supported a definition of limited-content message, and the Panel Report's recommendations.
179
Small Business Review Panel Report,
supra
note 57, at 36.
180
Id.
2(j)(1) Required Content
Proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) would require that limited-content messages include certain content to ensure that they facilitate contact between debt collectors and consumers. In particular, proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) provides that a limited-content message must include all of the following: The consumer's name, a request that the consumer reply to the message, the name or names of one or more natural persons whom the consumer can contact to reply to the debt collector,
181
a telephone number that the consumer can use to reply to the debt collector,
182
and, if delivered electronically, a disclosure explaining how the consumer can stop receiving messages through that medium.
183
The consumer's name and a request that the consumer reply to the message may help to ensure that the correct person receives the message and is prompted to respond. Including in the message a telephone number that the consumer can use to reply to the message, as well as the name of at least one person the consumer can speak to, should enable the consumer to reply to the message and interact with a debt collector's employee who has access to information about the debt in collection. In the case of a limited-content message sent by text message, a disclosure explaining how the consumer can stop receiving such messages may help prevent harassment, as further explained in the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.6(e). In addition, the Bureau understands that the content required by § 1006.2(j)(1) often is included in a voicemail or other message for a person in a wide variety of non-debt collection circumstances, so a third party hearing or observing the message may not infer from its content that the consumer owes a debt. Under this proposed interpretation, none of the items in the limited-content message themselves individually or collectively convey that the consumer owes a debt or other information regarding a debt.
181
Proposed § 1006.18(f) would clarify that a debt collector's employee does not violate § 1006.18 by using an assumed name when communicating or attempting to communicate with a person, provided that the employee uses the assumed name consistently and that the employer can readily identify any employee who is using an assumed name. See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.18(f).
182
The proposal under consideration during the SBREFA process would have required the telephone number to be toll-free to the consumer (
e.g.,
a 1-800 number).
See
Small Business Review Panel Outline,
supra
note 56, at 24. In light of feedback from some small entity representatives regarding the potential costs of maintaining a 1-800 number for the sole purpose of being able to transmit limited-content messages, the proposed rule would not require a toll-free telephone number.
183
Proposed § 1006.6(e) would require a debt collector who communicates or attempts to communicate with a consumer electronically in connection with the collection of a debt using, among other things, a telephone number for text messages or other electronic-medium address, to include in such communication or attempt to communicate a clear and conspicuous statement describing one or more ways the consumer can opt out of further electronic communications or attempts to communicate by the debt collector to that address or telephone number. See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.6(e).
Proposed comment 2(j)(1)(iv)-1 notes that a limited-content message must include a telephone number that the consumer can use to reply to the debt collector. The proposed comment explains that a voicemail or a text message that spells out, rather than enumerates numerically, a vanity telephone number is not a limited-content message. Spelling out a vanity telephone number could, in some circumstances, convey information about a debt or otherwise disclose that the message is from a debt collector. The Bureau considered permitting such telephone numbers to be included in limited-content messages on the condition that they do not convey information about a debt, but such a condition would require a case-by-case analysis to determine if a particular vanity number conveyed information about a debt. As a result, permitting the inclusion of a vanity number in any or all circumstances could undermine the certainty that the limited-content message definition is designed to provide and could increase the risk that a third party hearing or observing the message could infer that it relates to debt collection. Similarly, the sender's email address could, in some circumstances, convey information about a debt. In part for that reason, proposed § 1002.2(j) would not permit a limited-content message to include a sender's email address and, consequently, would effectively prohibit sending a limited-content message by email. As discussed, debt collectors also may have less of a need to send a limited-content message by email because proposed § 1006.6(d)(3) would clarify the procedures that a debt
collector could maintain to avoid incurring liability for a prohibited third-party communication by email, thereby reducing the risk to debt collectors of sending debt collection communications to consumers by email.
2(j)(2) Optional Content
Proposed § 1006.2(j)(2) would permit a debt collector to include in a limited-content message certain content that may help prompt a consumer to reply but that, unlike the content described in proposed § 1006.2(j)(1), may not be necessary to enable the consumer to reply to the message or to prevent harassment. In particular, proposed § 1006.2(j)(2) provides that a limited-content message also may include one or more of the following: A salutation, the date and time of the message, a generic statement that the message relates to an account, and suggested dates and times for the consumer to reply to the message. The proposed interpretation would hold that none of these items, individually or collectively, conveys that the consumer owes a debt or other information regarding a debt.
The Bureau requests comment on all aspects of proposed § 1006.2(j), including on the proposed interpretation that none of the content described in proposed § 1006.2(j)(1) and (2) conveys information regarding a debt. The Bureau also requests comment on whether the proposal to allow a limited-content message to include a generic statement that the message relates to an “account” raises a risk that the message would convey information about a debt to a third party hearing or observing the message, and whether there is an alternative statement that would better minimize such risk. For example, the Bureau considered proposing permitting a limited-content message to state that the message relates to a “personal,” “business,” “confidential,” “private,” “important,” or “time-sensitive” matter, but each of these might, in at least certain contexts, be misleading or confusing to a consumer. The Bureau further requests comment on whether there is sufficient information required or permitted in the limited-content message to prompt consumers to make a return call or text to the included telephone number and, if not, what additional information could be included in the message that would not cause the message to constitute a communication. The Bureau also requests comment on whether including a sender or recipient email address or a vanity telephone number in a limited-content message could convey information about a debt to a third party hearing or observing the message and reduce the utility of a bright-line definition. Finally, the Bureau requests comment on the media by which debt collectors anticipate that they would send limited-content messages and on whether additional clarification is necessary regarding sending limited-content messages by media other than telephone.
2(k) Person
Proposed § 1006.2(k) would define the term person to have the meaning set forth in 1 U.S.C. 1, which provides that, “in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise,” the term person includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
184
The FDCPA does not define the term person, and the context does not appear to indicate that a meaning other than the meaning in 1 U.S.C. 1 should apply. The term person is used throughout the FDCPA and the proposed regulation. The Bureau proposes to define this term to facilitate compliance, with only minor wording changes from the statute.
184
See
1 U.S.C. 1.
Subpart B—Rules for FDCPA Debt Collectors
185
185
Consistent with its proposal to amend Regulation F to prescribe Federal rules governing the activities of debt collectors, the Bureau proposes to move existing §§ 1006.3 through 1006.8 regarding applications for State exemptions from the FDCPA to appendix A of the regulation. See the section-by-section analysis of proposed § 1006.108 and appendix A.
Section 1006.6 Communications in Connection With Debt Collection
FDCPA section 805 generally limits how debt collectors may communicate with consumers and third parties when collecting debts.
186
Proposed § 1006.6 would implement and interpret FDCPA section 805; it also would interpret FDCPA sections 806 and 808 to provide certain additional protections regarding debt collection communications.
186
15 U.S.C. 1692c.
6(a) Definition
FDCPA section 805(d) provides that, for purposes of section 805, the term consumer includes certain individuals other than the person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt. Accordingly, the protections in FDCPA section 805 apply to these individuals and the person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay the debt. Also, debt collectors may communicate with these individuals in connection with the collection of any debt without violating the FDCPA's prohibition on third-party disclosures.
187
For example, under FDCPA section 805(d), a debt collector may communicate not only with the consumer who owes or allegedly owes the debt, but also with the consumer's spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator,
188
even though debt collect
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