Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 236 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 1]

RIN 2130-AC46

Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

AGENCY:

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY:

FRA is proposing to amend its regulations for passenger equipment safety standards, which currently provide for passenger rail service in a shared right-of-way under two separate tiers of safety standards: Tier I (speeds up to 125 miles per hour (mph)) and Tier II (speeds up to 150 mph). Consistent with the regulations' approach supporting interoperable passenger rail service by sharing the right-of-way, this proposed rulemaking would add a new tier of safety standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of interoperable high-speed passenger rail service at speeds up to 220 mph. However, Tier III standards would require operations at speeds above 125 mph to be in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings. The proposal also would establish crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the alternative to those currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Adopting the proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements would remove regulatory barriers, allowing a more open U.S. rail market, incorporating recent technological designs. In addition, the proposal would increase from 150 mph to 160 mph the maximum speed FRA's existing regulations allow for passenger equipment that complies with FRA's Tier II standards.

DATES:

Written comments must be received by February 6, 2017. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense or delay.

FRA anticipates it can resolve this rulemaking without a public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a public, oral hearing prior to January 5, 2017, FRA will schedule one and will publish a supplemental notice in the

Federal Register

to inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such hearing.

ADDRESSES:

Comments:

Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:

•

Web site:

The Federal eRulemaking Portal,

www.regulations.gov

. Follow the Web site's online instructions for submitting comments.

•

Fax:

202-493-2251.

•

Mail:

Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.

•

Hand Delivery:

Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Instructions:

All submissions must include the agency name, docket name, and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking (2130-AC46). Note that all comments received will be posted without change to

http://www.regulations.gov

, including any personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted comments or materials.

Docket:

For access to the docket to read background documents or comments received, go to

http://www.regulations.gov

at any time or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Devin Rouse, Mechanical Engineer, Passenger Rail Division, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, West Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-6185); or Michael Hunter, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-0368).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Common Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads

APTA American Public Transportation Association

ATD anthropomorphic test dummy

AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty

CEM crash energy management

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CG center of gravity

EN EuroNorm

ETF Engineering Task Force

FE finite element

FEA finite element analysis

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/second/second)

HSR high-speed rail

in inch(es)

kip kilopound(s)

kN kilo-Newton(s)

kph kilometer(s) per hour

lbf pound(s)-force

lbs pounds

mph mile(s) per hour

ms millisecond(s)

MU multiple unit

NEC Northeast Corridor

OVI occupied volume integrity

PTC Positive Train Control

ROW right-of-way

RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance

PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness

PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

U.S.C. United States Code

UIC International Union of Railways

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the Engineering Task Force

III. Technical Background and Overview

A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection

B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report

C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and New Standards for Tier III Passenger Equipment

1. Occupied Volume Integrity

2. Truck Attachment Strength

3. Interior Attachment Strength

D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

1. Brake Systems

2. Cab Glazing

3. Emergency Systems

4. Cab Equipment

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

V. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; Regulatory Flexibility Assessment

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

D. Federalism Implications

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

F. Environmental Impact

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

J. Energy Impact

K. Privacy Act

L. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

I. Executive Summary

This proposed rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of reviewing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending specific actions that could be useful to advance the safety of passenger service, including the development of standards for the next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working Group (“PSWG” or “Working Group”) to handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the Engineering Task Force (“ETF” or “Task Force”) for the purpose of producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate passenger rail equipment built based on alternative designs. This work led to the development of the report entitled “Technical Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use in Tier I Service” (Technical Criteria and Procedures Report or Report).

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The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have petitioned FRA for waivers from compliance with FRA's Tier I passenger equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to FRA in evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in that Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and to establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph, classified as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus on recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness criteria in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF also reached consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment, specifically trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab equipment, and cab glazing. The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of Tier III, including the proposed speed limitations on when Tier III equipment can operate on shared infrastructure and when the equipment must operate in an exclusive right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full RSAC voted to recommend the consensus items to the Administrator of FRA, as the basis for a formal rulemaking.

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U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at

http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT

.

This NPRM is based on these RSAC recommendations and, in particular, represents the first phase of rulemaking to establish Tier III passenger equipment safety standards as the work of the ETF continues.

This NPRM proposes requirements in three main subject areas: (1) Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for Tier II passenger equipment. The following is a brief overview of the proposed rule organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact.

Tier III Trainset Safety Standards

This NRPM proposes to define Tier III passenger train operations and outline minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system design criteria. FRA intends for the Tier III trainset requirements to facilitate safe implementation of interoperable high-speed rail service, enable the use of common infrastructure, and promote efficiencies. The Tier III operating environment would be unique: Tier III passenger trains would operate in a shared right-of-way at speeds up to 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds up to 220 mph. The requirements would provide for the sharing of rail infrastructure among various types of rail equipment, especially in more urban areas, while providing for dedicated passenger rail service at maximum speeds up to 220 mph. FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards would therefore continue to allow high-speed passenger rail service to be interoperable with other types of rail service, the same way that Tier I and Tier II passenger train operations are currently interoperable.

The proposed rule would establish requirements for Tier III trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and rescue access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support operational compatibility, the proposed Tier III trainset crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements are predominantly based on the proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for Tier I passenger equipment and are intended to safely apply to operations at speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated environment as approved by FRA. Specialized RSAC task groups developed the requirements for braking systems and cab glazing by focusing on the development of performance-based requirements that could be implemented in a technology-neutral manner, wherever possible.

To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and adapted their recommendations for North American standards. The intent of the proposed requirements is to ensure that safety and reliability are paramount, while incorporating elements from the most advanced, service-proven technology. The proposed requirements would be supplemented by additional requirements FRA intends to propose in a subsequent rulemaking based on recommendations the ETF is developing, which remains active addressing the topics of inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM), as well as safety planning for high-speed operations.

Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets

As noted above, FRA proposes to codify a set of technical evaluation criteria the ETF developed as guidance to those seeking to use alternatively designed Tier I passenger trainsets to demonstrate the trainsets' crashworthiness and occupant protection performance is equal to the requirements in part 238. We intend for the proposed alternative technical criteria to allow industry greater flexibility to use contemporary design techniques and more fully apply emerging technology, including crash energy management (CEM) technology, without requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the equipment. The technical criteria are based on established international standards and significant research and

testing both the industry and DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) conducted over the past 25 years. Codifying the technical criteria would dovetail with alternative crashworthiness performance requirements FRA established in part 238 for the front-end structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives, thereby broadening application of such requirements to other main structures.

Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed

On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph. That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This proposed rule would make the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II passenger equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track. Under the proposal, existing Tier II operations FRA has approved to operate at speeds up to 150 mph would be required to provide sufficient testing and vehicle/track interaction performance data required under 49 CFR 213.329 and 238.111 and obtain FRA approval before any operations occur at the new maximum authorized speed of 160 mph.

At this time, FRA is not proposing to amend the Tier II crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, or other specific Tier II requirements, to make them more performance-based. The Tier II standards are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment or proposed for Tier III passenger equipment principally because they were developed to support operations above 125 mph in a right-of-way shared with freight and other rail traffic. See 64 FR 25629. To compensate for the increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy trainset design was needed. FRA's focus in this NPRM, as informed by the RSAC process, has been principally to address the industry's need for more performance-based Tier I crashworthiness and occupant protection standards and to develop new Tier III standards to support the next generation of high-speed rail in an environment where operations above 125 mph are in a dedicated right-of-way (so as to avoid the risk of collision with other rail traffic at speeds above 125 mph). However, FRA makes clear that its approach to this NPRM does not mean FRA may not reexamine its Tier II requirements in the future.

Economic Analysis

This rule proposes to expand and make more flexible FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards. The rule would introduce a new tier of safety standards, Tier III, passenger equipment must meet to operate at speeds up to 220 mph. Currently, FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards do not specifically address safety requirements for passenger rail equipment operations at speeds above 150 mph. Furthermore, the current regulatory framework generally sets Tier I safety compliance through equipment design requirements which limit application of recent technology. Therefore, this rule would facilitate using more performance-based requirements to demonstrate Tier I compliance in alternative ways. FRA believes this rule would have a net beneficial effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a whole.

Specifically, the proposed rule would generate cost savings benefits by enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-way acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail lines in dense urban areas. Instead it would allow such trains to travel on existing, non-dedicated rail lines but at slower speeds than permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines. As there is no comprehensive set of equipment safety regulations for this type of operation in the United States, a high-speed rail operation of this nature (operating at speeds up to 220 mph) could be constructed in the absence of this rule only if the operation was governed by a rule of particular applicability, which would set forth the minimum safety standards and conditions that would apply to the operator's proposed operation. Most likely, FRA would grant this regulatory approval only if the proposed system was self-contained (

i.e.,

no high-speed passenger trains intermixing with conventional passenger or freight trains, and no highway-rail grade crossings). Such a dedicated high-speed rail system would not be as efficiently integrated with the rest of the general rail system. Not issuing the proposed regulation would also increase costs associated with the acquisition of new passenger trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail infrastructure projects. The proposed rule would ensure additional existing alternative designs can operate in the U.S. railroad environment on a widespread basis compared to existing FRA regulations. This would help avert a potential patchwork in the U.S. passenger rail fleet that would perpetuate the current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger equipment market to manufacturers. The proposed rule would allow U.S. trainsets to use technological advances for the improvement of safety and passenger rail operations which cannot be used under existing regulations. (For example it would be cost prohibitive to adapt Japanese high speed train technologies under current U.S. regulations.)

There would also be safety benefits associated with improvement of the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new high-speed rail equipment in these shared rights-of-way. Additionally, as the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and not prescriptive requirements, the proposal would result in equipment benefits generated by passenger rail operators being able to adopt service-proven safety-equivalent technology and practices and apply future technological advancements.

Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable benefits would range from $8.7 to $16.8 billion.

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Of this total, $1.2 to $2.1 billion would be for equipment benefits and $7.5 to $14.7 billion would be for infrastructure benefits. FRA estimates the present value of the total benefits to be $3.8 to $7.1 billion (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or $6.0 to $11.2 billion (when discounted at a 3-percent rate). The proposed rule would have a positive effect on society and the safety performance of the passenger railroad system. Some of the identified safety benefits are due to the ability to adopt safe equivalent technology and best practices to better the current safety environment, and to apply future technological advancements to improve rail safety.

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Tier III benefits are uncertain because they are based on assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed rail operations and how those operations will be incorporated into the U.S. rail network. It is possible that all benefits relating to Tier III equipment, including infrastructure benefits, will be zero, which would occur if no high-speed rail projects come to fruition over the forecast horizon. Similarly, the estimated infrastructure benefits hinge on the assumption of not having to build dedicated HSR track for the whole system (

i.e.,

they represent savings from being able to operate HSR using shared infrastructure). If the baseline is shared infrastructure, then these benefits will not be realized. Tier III benefits, including infrastructure benefits, are provided for expository purposes. Similarly, Tier I benefits from having performance standards are challenging to quantify, as is always the case for such benefits. However, given that they provide an option to design standards, operators would only comply with such standards voluntarily if they found it beneficial to do so.

Over the same period, FRA estimates industry would incur approximately $4.6 billion in quantifiable costs, with a present value of $2.0 billion (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or $3.2 million (when discounted at a 3-percent rate). All quantified costs

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would be for testing to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I alternative or Tier III standards. FRA assumes that the proposed rulemaking would provide an option, not a mandate, for railroads to use a different type or design of passenger equipment in Tier I service and would not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. Similarly, the proposed rulemaking would only provide a framework for railroads to operate equipment in new Tier III service—it would not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations.

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This assessment allows railroads to plan for future improvements and maintenance activities, minimizing capital investment but ensuring plant and operations are balanced for the expected service. Potential train delay was not quantified in this assessment. The relationship between train delays and the number of trains per day is determined by several factors inherent to the infrastructure, operations, and equipment used in the line segment. At this stage, it is difficult, to estimate the exact effect of the proposed rule on train delay in the United States because the characteristics of the rail lines affected by the proposed rule are still unknown.

Alternatives Considered

One of the main purposes of the proposed regulation is to provide a set of minimum Federal safety requirements to determine whether passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary standards outside of the U.S. are safe for operation in the U.S. rail environment. Traditionally, U.S. railroad safety regulations evolved as a consequence of specific accidents scenarios, which have led to the identification of specific risks in the operating environment. While FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are adequately addressed for the operating environment, the proposed rule places special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than simply mitigating them.

Importantly, the proposed rule does not intend to adopt or incorporate by reference a specific international design standard. But it is intended to open up the U.S. passenger rail market, to the greatest extent possible, to global manufacturers while ensuring passenger equipment is safe.

The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the proposed safety requirements for Tier III trainsets are the European and Japanese industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of regulatory requirements; market accessibility; benefits and costs; and operational efficiency and safety.

FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of those options based on the key attributes of the alternatives and the effect of those attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory purpose. FRA compared the technical requirements of other established high-speed rail standards to illustrate the primary differences, not a direct comparison between comparable requirements/standards.

Passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant protection design standards have been largely standardized by Euronorms.

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FRA concluded that there are no significant differences between trains built to the design standards contained in Euronorms and trains built to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the proposed rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset prices would increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the proposed Tier III requirements in this rule.

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Euronorms title derived: “Standard” means “norme” in French and “norm” in German.

https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx

.

In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.

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These technical standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the obligation to conform their operations, equipment and infrastructure to these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers and the rail line is entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional trains operating and has full grade separation. These are the significant differences underlying the design of Shinkansen trainsets operating in Japan when compared to passenger trainsets currently operating in the U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail network's ongoing safety and reliability is the principle of crash avoidance. Modifying advanced Japanese high-speed trainsets to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements and be interoperable in the U.S. rail system would likely be cost prohibitive; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset.

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http://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf

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European trains generally would not need carbody, truck, suspension, or brake modifications to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements. However, either the analysis used to demonstrate compliance of the train safety features or components would require modification or minor design modification(s) would likely be needed, or both. These differences are illustrated in the following:

Summary of Potential Changes for Equipment Designed to European Standards To Comply With Proposed Rule in the U.S.

Analysis difference

Minor modifications required

• Quasi static compression

• End structure integrity of non-cab end.

• Dynamic collision scenario

• Interior fixture attachment.

• Override protection

• Seat crashworthiness.

• Fluid entry inhibition

• Luggage racks.

• Roof and side structure integrity

• Emergency window egress & rescue access windows.

• Glazing

• Emergency lighting.

• Alerters.

The regulatory impact analysis (RIA) that accompanies this proposed rule contains a preliminary analysis of regulatory alternatives FRA considered. Specifically, the preliminary analysis compares at a general level the costs and benefits of the proposed Tier III requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed trains. The preliminary analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million European high-speed trainset

could be modified to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements with only minor structural modifications and as indicated above at little additional cost—about $310,000 per trainset. Modifications are expected to ensure such trainsets will safely operate in a U.S. setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by our proposed Tier III requirements as compared to the European standards. However, proposed requirements are supported by the recommendation of the RSAC and FRA is confident about the cost-beneficial nature of the proposal. Additionally, our analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million Japanese high-speed trainset would need significant structural modifications, including those to the carbody, trucks, and suspension, to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements, and would incur significant additional costs—about $4.7 million per trainset, as indicated above. Similarly, FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the expected incremental benefit of our proposed Tier III requirements, but we believe these additional costs are justified by the unique risks within the U.S. rail operating environment and the recommendations of the RSAC. U.S. high-speed trains may share track with other rail operations, including heavy and long freight trains, and operate on track with highway-rail grade crossings and the accompanying risks of colliding with trucks and other highway vehicles.

FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the proposed Tier I alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any regulatory action or adopting existing international design standards. As discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive modifications to meet existing Tier I requirements if FRA elected to take no regulatory action. However, under the proposed Tier I Alternative requirements, FRA believes the cost associated with compliance would be similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment.

A second alternative would be to codify EN standards as a Federal regulation, instead of the proposed Tier I alternative requirements. This option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings from fewer modifications; however, such an option would require manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EN standards in lieu of the proposed regulation may require equipment that is designed to some other standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the equipment to bring it into compliance. This means that regardless of the requirements codified, manufacturers will have to modify trainsets in order to meet these regulatory requirements. Importantly, trainsets meeting only a European standard (or Japanese or other international standard) would not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or freight equipment. Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an exclusive right-of-way, unable to take advantage of existing infrastructure.

FRA requests public comment on the alternatives presented and discussed here and invites suggestions for other alternatives that should be considered. Please also see the RIA's “Alternatives Considered” section, in which FRA similarly requests public comment on these and other alternatives.

FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems operating on an exclusive right-of-way (not physically connected to the general railroad system), utilizing passenger equipment that complies with European or other international standards but not necessarily with FRA's proposed requirements. For the reasons discussed below, FRA rejected this alternative. A major tenet of this rule is to safely facilitate the implementation of nationwide, interoperable HSR service. Standalone systems operating equipment that is not compliant with FRA's current or proposed passenger equipment safety standards would significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When developing the proposed requirements, FRA did not envision a network of standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide network.

Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory benefit—operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that 86 to 89 percent of the regulatory benefits are due to infrastructure cost avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I alternative and Tier III equipment. Interoperability will allow HSR operators to reach into major metropolitan areas where building a new, exclusive right-of-way may not be feasible due to land density, environmental, and other considerations.

An advantage of the standalone alternative is that such an individual railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels of performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such a project to attain that level of performance, the project would have to optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices, signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the individual, standalone system. Given that such an approach covers more than passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular right-of-way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not adequately addressed in FRA's current regulations, FRA continues to believe that addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-by-case basis (RPA or waiver) is prudent because of the very small number of potential operations and the potential for significant differences in their design. Moreover, this form of regulatory approval is comprehensive, covering more than equipment safety concerns, to ensure proposed standalone systems properly address all rail safety concerns. Entities considering such operations voluntarily assume the higher costs of building new infrastructure, knowing they cannot take advantage of the cost savings from sharing existing infrastructure. Nonetheless, FRA requests public comment on whether the final rule should adopt other standards—including but not limited to the Japanese and European standards—that could be used in the alternative to the proposed requirements, potentially only in appropriate Tier I or Tier III operational environments. Comment on the specific alternative standard(s) it should consider, the operational environments in which it would be appropriate to allow use of such standard(s), and information on the benefits and costs of the alternative standard(s) compared to FRA's proposed approach is requested.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would

begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a five-year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR 24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency situations and full-scale simulations.

On May 12, 1999, FRA published the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final rule (PESS). See 64 FR 25540. The PESS established comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment including requirements for carbody structure and emergency systems. FRA subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. In response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and published three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284, Jul. 3, 2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25, 2002.

FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and enhance its passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA published a final rule addressing various requirements on the inspection, testing, and operation of passenger equipment, and the attachment of safety appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008, FRA published the Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule promoting passenger occupant safety by addressing emergency communication, emergency egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73 FR 6370. FRA also established additional requirements for passenger train emergency systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised and clarified its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128, and established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger train exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR 76118.

On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energy-absorption requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or both, FRA also intended for them to apply to conventional flat-nosed equipment designs. In particular, the alternative performance requirements allow innovative designs that protect the occupied volume for its full height, even without traditional full-height collision and corner post structures, and the rule has been applied to such innovative end frame designs and traditional end frame designs.

C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

FRA established the RSAC in March 1996 and it serves as a forum for developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety program issues. The RSAC includes representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties.

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The member groups are: American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council; American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA); Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED); Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine Institute; Federal Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer Institute; Institute of Makers of Explosives; International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART), including the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation Union (UTU); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of Railway Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP); National Association of Railway Business Women;* National Conference of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);* Railway Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA); Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport Canada;* Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and Transportation Security Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.

When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and, after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the task is accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop consensus recommendations to FRA for action on the task. A working group may establish one or more task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The individual task force then provides that information to the working group for consideration.

When a working group comes to unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC members, the proposal is formally recommended to the Administrator of FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff members play an active role at the working group level discussing the issues and options and drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA often adopts the RSAC recommendation.

FRA is not bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether a recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal(s), is soundly supported, and is consistent with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. FRA explains any such variations in the rulemaking. However, to the maximum extent

practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the Engineering Task Force

On May 20, 2003, FRA presented the RSAC with the task of reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in advancing the safety of passenger rail service. In turn, the RSAC accepted the task and established the PSWG to handle the task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of this Working Group, in addition to FRA, include many of the same entities as the full RSAC.

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AAR, including BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP); AAPRCO; AASHTO; Amtrak; APTA, including Bombardier, Inc., Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc. (Interfleet), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland Transit Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), and Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation; ASLRRA; ATDA; BLET; BRS; IBEW; NARP; NRCMA; NTSB; RSI; SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; STA; TCIU/BRC; Transport Canada; TSA; and TWU.

On September 23, 2009, the Working Group established the ETF. The ETF was given the mission of developing technical criteria for the evaluation of passenger rail equipment built to alternative designs. Members of the ETF include representatives from various organizations that are part of the larger Working Group, in addition to FRA.

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AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including California Department of Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA, including Alstom, Ansaldo Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR), Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD), East Japan Railway Company, Faiveley Transport, GE Transportation, Japan International Transport Institute, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A., LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo, Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma & Associates, Siemens, Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), Stadler, STV, Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith Turbo, and Wabtec; Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency (ERA); NTSB; RSI, including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO; SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada.

The ETF developed the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. After it developed the Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to (1) develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to adopt the alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and (2) establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,

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classified as Tier III passenger equipment. While much of the ETF's initial work was used to develop the proposed crashworthiness elements of this NPRM, the ETF found it necessary to create smaller task groups to develop other and related technical criteria and recommendations for the safe operation of high-speed trainsets: The Brake Systems Task Group (BTG); Engineering, Structures, and Integrity (ESI) Task Group; Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group; and Vehicle-Track Interaction (VTI) Task Group. In addition, as explained below, the ETF established a task group to examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their applicability to Tier III trainsets. FRA intends to use the work of that part 229/Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Task Group—the “229/ITM Task Group”—in a future rulemaking so it is not specifically included in this proposal. With the exception of the Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group, the task groups consisted primarily of ETF members and participants.

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FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA's track safety standards (49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the reasoning and research behind the 220 mph maximum track speed).

The BTG was established in June 2011, in response to a request from industry representatives to develop technology-neutral requirements applicable to brake systems and technology commonly found on today's high-speed trainsets worldwide. The BTG met as a group from November 2011 to December 2012. Group members reviewed and compared current U.S. brake system requirements and international brake system requirements, including current U.S. inspection and maintenance requirements; analyzed common brake system features to determine basic brake system parameters; and identified performance-based requirements to permit operators to develop equipment-specific maintenance, inspection and service plans. The BTG divided into two sub-groups representing the Asian and European perspectives on high-speed trainset design. Each sub-group independently compared Asian and European best practices to current U.S. brake system regulations. As needed, each sub-group developed proposed amendments to current U.S. regulations to incorporate international best practices. The BTG presented its recommendations to the ETF on December 6, 2012, jointly to the PSWG and the ETF on May 30, 2013, and to the full RSAC on June 14, 2013.

The ESI Task Group was established in June 2012 to provide additional technical and engineering guidance to standardize (to the extent possible and practical) how compliance with the provisions of the proposed requirements should be demonstrated. Since many of the proposed requirements in the NPRM rely heavily on computer analysis and simulations to demonstrate compliance, the ETF sought to separate the criteria (the performance requirements) from the methodology of demonstrating compliance with those requirements. The original Report included both technical criteria and procedures for actually demonstrating that the proposed alternatives to current requirements could provide an equivalent level of safety. The Task Force agreed that the procedures were not appropriate to include in the regulatory language, and recommended that the rule text contain only the criteria and conditions for which such criteria apply. It recommended that the detailed procedures for demonstrating compliance with the criteria be in an accompanying guidance document or industry standard. The ESI Task Group met from July 2012 to March 2013, and developed a draft guidance document of suggested methods for demonstrating compliance with proposed Tier I alternative and Tier III crashworthiness requirements. This group will reconvene to finalize this document and develop a more general compliance document to accompany ETF rulemakings.

The Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group was created to resolve particular issues related to proposed cab glazing requirements for Tier III trainsets. The group consists of ETF members, and glazing experts and manufacturers from around the world. The group met four times between March and May 2013. It presented its recommendations for this NPRM to the PSWG on May 30, 2013, which FRA has adopted.

The VTI Task Group evaluated whether high-speed trainsets operate safely under conditions the Federal Track Safety Standards in 49 CFR part 213 establish. The VTI Task Group focused on the conditions presented at lower-speed classes of track, and whether certain conditions presented a challenge to the highly-specialized suspension systems of high-speed trainsets. This group provided intermediate findings to the ETF. However, the ETF decided the

information was not sufficiently conclusive to warrant continued exploration of the topic at the time.

As noted above, the ETF established an additional task group to examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their applicability to Tier III trainsets. This task group more narrowly addresses concerns and discussions originating from the BTG. This ongoing 229/ITM Task Group is developing appropriate language to apply pertinent elements from 49 CFR part 229 and ITM provisions from 49 CFR part 238 to both Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment, and recommending equivalent requirements for Tier III trainsets. The work of the 229/ITM Task Group is ongoing, and the ETF intends to incorporate the group's work into future rulemaking recommendations.

Overall, in addition to the work of the various task groups, the full ETF met 18 times over four years in support of the development of this NPRM. Minutes of each of the meetings are part of the docket in this proceeding and are available for public inspection.

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These meetings were held on the following dates and in the following locations: September 23-24, 2009, Cambridge, Massachusetts; November 3-4, 2009, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; January 7-8, 2010, Atlanta, Georgia; March 9-10, 2010, Orlando, FL; October 20-21, 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts; January 11-12, 2011, Orlando, Florida; February 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC; March 30-31, 2011, Washington, DC; June 16-17, 2011, Boston, Massachusetts; October 6-7, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana; June 27-28, 2012, Manhattan Beach, California; September 25-26, 2012, Washington, DC; December 6, 2012, Arlington, Virginia; February 13-14, 2013, Washington, DC; May 30, 2013, Washington, DC; and September 11-12, 2013, Washington, DC.

To assist the ETF, FRA often drafted proposed regulatory text for discussion at the various task groups' meetings and task group participants offered suggested changes and additions to the proposed draft text. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of the ETF's meetings and made significant contributions to the technical discussions and development of the ETF's work product, especially the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.

Through the many meetings and discussions, proposed regulatory language was developed and then presented, accepted, and approved at a joint meeting of the ETF and the Working Group on May 30, 2013. The consensus language was then presented before the full RSAC on June 14, 2013, where it was approved by consensus vote, including the recommendations from the Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group (which were in a separate document). The Working Group's recommendations were thereby adopted by the full RSAC as its recommendations to FRA. The ETF did hold an additional meeting on September 11-12, 2013, which concerned these recommendations; the ETF addressed comments from ETF members to add clarification to, but not alter, the agreed-upon recommendations.

This NPRM is a product of the RSAC's consensus recommendations and FRA believes the NPRM is consistent with RSAC's recommendations. Please note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA's proposal concerning the removal of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability to conduct operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart I of part 236 of this chapter. See the discussion of proposed changes to § 236.1007 of this chapter in the section-by-section analysis, below. FRA nonetheless believes this proposal, concerning the removal of this language from part 236, is consistent with the RSAC recommended approach to Tier III operations.

III. Technical Background and Overview

A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection

FRA, with help from the Volpe Center, conducted substantial research on rail equipment crashworthiness to establish a base of information to use to evaluate, amend, and develop regulations (with a specific focus on performance-based regulations) to respond to industry needs. Recognizing that railroads seek to deploy equipment designed to more performance-based and modern standards, FRA advanced its efforts to keep its crashworthiness regulations apace with current safety technology, particularly for passenger trains. In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space inside the train due to crushing of the train structure and, as the train decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research FRA sponsored are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which occupants can ride out the collision or derailment; and, second, to minimize the physical forces occupants are subjected to when impacting surfaces inside a passenger train as the train decelerates.

Crashworthiness regulations and specifications are intended to result in equipment features that increase survivability in accidents. The traditional approach to verify rail equipment crashworthiness in the U.S. (which is the approach used in FRA's existing regulations) is essentially car-oriented, prescribing such characteristics as the strength of the carbody and the strength of the attachment of the trucks. These features are intended to be effective for a wide range of accident conditions the equipment may be subjected to in service. The modern approach to rail equipment crashworthiness adds train-oriented specifications and typically includes minimum survivability requirements for prescribed collision scenarios. The modern approach to rail equipment crashworthiness does not replace the traditional approach. Rather, the modern approach expands the focus and manner in which rail equipment crashworthiness is evaluated, often using the traditional requirements as a performance baseline.

Modern specifications generally describe the crashworthiness performance desired of equipment that utilizes CEM features. Significant research has been conducted on CEM strategies by both FRA/Volpe and industry. CEM systems in passenger trains can improve crashworthiness by incorporating crush zones in unoccupied areas of the train cars. These zones are designed to collapse in a controlled fashion during a collision, dissipating collision energy by distributing crush through the unoccupied areas of the cars. This occupant protection strategy intends to preserve the occupied volumes in the train and limit the decelerations that occupants experience. In fact, Tier II passenger equipment must be designed with a CEM system to dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see § 238.403, and Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with a CEM system complying with this requirement. CEM-designed equipment has demonstrated that it preserves all occupied volume in a train-to-train collision scenario at more than twice the closing speed of conventional equipment in the same scenario where the CEM-designed equipment has the same level of occupied volume strength as conventional equipment.

B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report

In 2009, FRA elected to develop, in consultation with RSAC, alternative criteria and procedures to assess the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance of rail passenger equipment applicable to a wide range of equipment designs to be used in Tier I

service. The ETF was charged with producing a set of technical criteria and procedures for evaluating petitions for waivers from (or, as appropriate under § 238.201(b), approval of alternative compliance with) one or more of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; these technical criteria and procedures were published in 2011.

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The ETF developed the technical evaluation criteria and procedures so that they would provide a means of establishing whether equipment of an alternative design would result in at least equivalent performance to that of equipment designed in accordance with the structural standards in 49 CFR part 238.

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http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.

FRA intended that entities (

i.e.,

railroads, equipment manufacturers, and consultants) would apply these criteria and procedures to support requests for waiver of the applicable regulations to allow alternative evaluation of safety performance. To assist with this effort, RSAC's ETF had the following goals: Produce clear, realistic technical requirements, benefiting from the collective “best” thinking in the passenger rail industry; define the analysis and testing required to demonstrate compliance with the technical requirements; provide clear pass/fail criteria for the analyses and tests; and work expeditiously so that sponsors of potential passenger service recognize available equipment options. Through RSAC's ETF, FRA began to work with the industry to develop new criteria to evaluate passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those historically used for procurements in the U.S. (

e.g.,

AAR and APTA standards), while providing an equivalent level of crashworthiness. The initial work of the ETF culminated in development of the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. The Report contains guidelines for assessing the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance of alternatively-designed equipment used in Tier I service, including trainsets designed for operation outside the U.S. that may not be compliant with FRA's current requirements. As described in the Report, the criteria are defined by the specific conditions evaluated and the critical results of the evaluation; the procedures are defined as the analysis and test techniques applied to demonstrate compliance with the criteria. The criteria and procedures developed take advantage of the latest technology in rail equipment crashworthiness.

C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and New Standards for Tier III Passenger Equipment

After initial publication of the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, FRA concluded it would be beneficial to revise the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards to formally adopt the alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance criteria, in part due to renewed demand for passenger equipment in the U.S. By codifying the criteria into the regulations, FRA could expand the options for regulatory compliance in a clearer and more direct manner. This would reduce the industry's burden and risk of relying solely on waiver petitions to provide flexibility for additional safety-equivalent options for passenger car designs and the use of modern CEM technology. Therefore, FRA presented the ETF with a regulatory plan to formally adopt Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance standards within part 238, based on the criteria previously developed by the ETF.

At the same time, while the ETF developed the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report, the RSAC expanded the mission of the ETF to develop new safety standards for the next generation of interoperable high-speed rail passenger equipment capable of speeds up to 220 mph (Tier III). The technical criteria and procedures the ETF originally developed as alternatives for Tier I equipment also are the basis for the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for Tier III equipment in this NPRM. Therefore, FRA discusses the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements proposed in this NPRM together for both tiers of passenger train service and highlights the pertinent differences between the alternative criteria and procedures described in the Report for Tier I equipment and the crashworthiness and occupant protection proposals for Tier III equipment in the section-by-section analysis.

It is important to note that the development of the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report was heavily influenced by international experience with high-speed rail.

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In particular, FRA drew from European standards, attempting to harmonize, to the extent possible, the technical criteria and procedures FRA developed (and is consequently proposing to require in this NPRM) with the technical requirements in the European standards. This was done in part to minimize the burden on foreign car builders entering the U.S. marketplace and to take advantage of sophisticated means of validating equipment designs.

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See

U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at

http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT

.

However, FRA found that in some instances the technical requirements of the European standards did not fully address the safety concerns presented by the U.S. operating environment. FRA, in the section-by-section analysis, has highlighted those divergences. For example, in § 238.705, Dynamic collision scenario, FRA discusses the need for an additional collision scenario with a large rigid mass (a rigid or non-deformable locomotive) as opposed to a deformable mass. The additional scenario provides further insight on how tested equipment performs in preserving the occupied volume during a collision with a rigid mass, which is a known collision scenario in the U.S. rail operating environment. Additionally, in § 238.733, Interior fixture attachment, FRA proposes a greater level of interior fixture attachment strength than the European standard of ±1g laterally. This enhancement is necessary for safety, is not an onerous requirement, and represents only a minimal increase in overall trainset cost if modifications are required.

Overall, it is important to recognize that differences between the proposed requirements and international technical standards do not mean that in all cases structural modifications are necessary. Equipment designed to international standards can meet the requirements of this proposal. Therefore, the most immediate burden this proposal places on a foreign equipment manufacturer is to validate, and provide supporting documentation, that the equipment meets FRA's requirements, as proposed.

1. Occupied Volume Integrity

To meet FRA's existing passenger train crashworthiness regulations, the underframe of a train car must not experience permanent deformation when subjected to a large compressive load at the coupler locations at either end of the car. Car deformation must remain elastic (no permanent deformation) when subjected to 800,000

pounds (lbs) of force applied along the line of draft (the theoretical line running from the coupler at one end of the car to the other). Beginning in 1939, AAR formally recommended this practice for new passenger equipment operated in trains of more than 600,000 lbs empty weight in response to numerous fatal accidents involving compromised occupied volumes. In 1945, this recommendation was adopted into AAR Standard S-034—Specifications for the Construction of New Passenger Equipment Cars. Federal law applied this standard to all MU locomotives built new after April 1, 1956 and operated in trains having a total empty weight of 600,000 lbs or more. See 49 CFR 229.141(a). In 1999, when FRA issued the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA expanded this 800,000-pound static strength standard by Federal regulation to virtually all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment (see 49 CFR 238.203, 238.405).

This line-of-draft strength approach has remained the cornerstone of occupied volume integrity (OVI) evaluation for nearly a century for several reasons. The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation anywhere in the vehicle is straightforward to implement and can be readily examined visually and confirmed using strain gages or other measuring devices. If the test is conducted properly and successfully, the vehicle remains in its original condition and can therefore enter service following the test. The intended nondestructive nature of the test makes it economical to perform because the first manufactured vehicle serves both as test article and proven, deliverable product.

In addition, this proof-strength approach provides additional crashworthiness benefits and has increased in importance as additional crashworthiness features are incorporated in the structure of passenger rail vehicles. For instance, for an end frame to successfully prevent an intrusion from impacts above the floor, the structure supporting the end frame must itself be sufficiently strong. A strong end frame attached to an insufficiently robust supporting structure may prevent intrusion at the end of the vehicle but cause loss of occupied volume elsewhere in the vehicle as collision loads travel through the occupied volume. The proof-strength approach is effective in demonstrating the sufficiency of the underlying supporting structure and FRA is proposing to optimize it for application to CEM designs.

Ultimately, preserving the occupied volume is accomplished primarily by ensuring the strength of the structure protecting it. If the occupied compartment is sufficiently strong, survivable space for the occupants is maintained. Secondary impacts are limited through a combination of structural crashworthiness and occupant protection measures. Allowing portions of the car to crush in a predetermined manner can limit the forces applied to the structure surrounding the occupied volume and control the decelerations that occupants experience. Conventional practice is to make individual cars uniformly strong and principally attempt to control the behavior of individual cars during a collision. The CEM approach is train-oriented, controlling the load into the occupied volume, and apportioning the structural crushing to unoccupied areas throughout the train.

Within Europe, passenger trains are subject to two distinct standards for ensuring adequate OVI. European Standard (or Euronorm) EN 12663, “Railway Applications—Structural Requirements of Railway Vehicle Bodies—Part 1: Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock (and Alternate Method for Freight Wagons),” contains several quasi-static load cases to be evaluated at different locations on train cars, including a line-of-draft load case. The load locations and the magnitude of the load to be applied at each location tend to differ from U.S. requirements. In addition to EN 12663, a second standard, EN 15227, also applies to passenger rail equipment in Europe. EN 15227, “Railway Applications—Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway Vehicle Bodies,” contains several dynamic impact scenarios that must be evaluated. EN 12663 and EN 15227 were developed to work in concert with one another, with EN 12663 used to ensure a baseline level of OVI and EN 15227 used to ensure a baseline level of performance in an idealized collision.

FRA has employed a similar, two-step approach to OVI in this NPRM. Because a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness features, such as CEM components, a quasi-static OVI requirement is included. Whereas current domestic practice provides that the evaluation loads be applied along the line-of-draft, the proposed regulation instead places the evaluation loads at the locations on the occupied volume that constitute the ends of the collision load path. FRA intends for this change in placement of the loads to ensure that for designs featuring CEM elements, or another non-conventional longitudinal load path, the evaluation loads are applied in areas that will actually experience high compression loads during an accident. This helps ensure the rail vehicle possesses adequate OVI to restrict crushing to the intended CEM elements during a collision severe enough to activate the CEM system. The load magnitudes proposed in this NPRM were chosen to help ensure structural compatibility between existing Tier I rail equipment and any future vehicles designed to meet the proposed requirement.

The second OVI requirement FRA is proposing in this NPRM involves a dynamic collision scenario evaluated using a standardized train consist (the “initially-standing train”) being struck by the trainset undergoing evaluation (the “initially-moving train”). Whereas the quasi-static OVI requirement is applied at the individual car-level, this scenario is applied at the trainset-level. The results of the scenario evaluation are used to evaluate CEM system performance, override resistance, and truck attachment integrity. Working together, the quasi-static OVI requirement and the dynamic collision scenario requirements help ensure the energy-absorbing features of a design function at a trainset-level and that each car possesses sufficient OVI to resist loss of occupied volume during operation of the energy-absorption components.

2. Truck Attachment Strength

The current FRA regulation for Tier I passenger equipment truck attachment, 49 CFR 238.219, Truck-to-car-body attachment, specifies static load requirements. In an effort to develop standards that are more performance-based, the ETF recommended dynamic load requirements for alternatively evaluating truck attachment strength. However, comparing the safety differences between the proposed dynamic requirements and existing static requirements is not straightforward. There are many different design approaches in service for attaching the truck to the carbody and meeting the current static load requirements. The different designs have exhibited varied performance in accidents: In some relatively severe accidents, compliant designs have remained attached; while in some less severe accidents, compliant designs have become detached. The ETF strove to assure the performance the alternative, dynamic truck attachment requirements provide would be at least as effective as that the attachment strength of an average or typical truck compliant with the current static

requirements provides. The alternative, dynamic truck attachment requirements the ETF developed and recommended provide for demonstration of compliance using results from the same computer simulation of the train-to-train collision scenario used to demonstrate sufficient OVI.

3. Interior Attachment Strength

FRA's existing, acceleration-based performance requirements for interior attachments were established after years of industry practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces due to accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. As noted in the 1997 NPRM for the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rulemaking (62 FR 49728), FRA and NTSB investigations of accidents involving passenger trains designed based on this practice revealed that luggage racks, seats, and other interior fixtures breaking loose were a frequent cause of injury to passengers and crewmembers. Due to injuries caused by broken seats and other loose fixtures, FRA concluded that the practice of designing interior fittings to withstand accelerations of 6g longitudinally, and 3g laterally and vertically, was not adequate. FRA therefore proposed to enhance interior attachment fitting strength. In the 1999 final rule (64 FR 25540), FRA then set the current attachment strength requirements of 8g longitudinally, and 4g laterally and vertically. Subsequent accident investigations have revealed that interior fixtures that comply with the requirements for Tier I passenger equipment in § 238.233 perform significantly better than interior fixtures in passenger cars that do not meet the current regulations,

i.e.,

generally passenger cars already in service at the time the 1999 final rule took effect.

The ETF discussed at length requirements for interior fittings and occupant protection during accidents. As these discussions developed, there was a desire to accommodate existing equipment designs built to European standards,

i.e.,

EN 12663 and EN 15227, while maintaining a comparable level of safety to that within the U.S. rail operating environment. Many manufacturers of high-speed trainsets stressed during these discussions that this approach would allow the use of “service-proven” designs and avoid the need for significant redesign that would affect critical suspension characteristics or lead to a completely new and unproven vehicle platform. In the interest of maintaining the industry's ability to adopt service-proven designs, the ETF examined existing practices throughout the world to help establish how current and proven design practice could be evaluated for application in the U.S.

The ETF adopted an approach that incorporates specific requirements of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, “Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,” Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010 (GM/RT2100). GM/RT2100 is a safety standard that mandates requirements for the design and integrity of rail vehicle structures, including interior fixtures, for trains that operate in the United Kingdom (U.K.). GM/RT2100 (referencing EN 12663) requires interior fixtures to withstand carbody accelerations of 5g longitudinally, 1g laterally and 3g vertically. However, FRA has never found the 1g lateral acceleration requirement adequate for the U.S. rail operating environment. See FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final rule, published May 12, 1999, for a discussion on lateral attachment strength for interior fixtures (64 FR 25540).

Thus, the proposed rule increases this minimum lateral acceleration requirement to 3g, as further discussed in the section-by-section analysis below. FRA notes that the structural vehicle requirements in EN 15227 limit the mean longitudinal deceleration to 5g within certain specified collision scenarios for vehicles designed to operate on international, national, and regional networks (6.4.1). ETF industry members recommended attachment strength requirements consistent with the collision behavior of vehicle structures built to the Euronorm standards and FRA agreed with their recommendation. The specific details on how to apply this alternative international approach are discussed in the section-by-section analysis below.

D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

While the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier III passenger equipment derive from the work initially conducted by the ETF for alternatively evaluating Tier I passenger equipment, the ETF did focus specifically on a more comprehensive body of requirements for Tier III passenger equipment. These include requirements for brake systems, cab glazing, emergency systems, and cab equipment. An overview of specific proposals for Tier III passenger equipment in these areas is provided below.

1. Brake Systems

Brake systems requirements for Tier III trainsets were developed from the recommendations of the RSAC's BTG. This group examined existing brake systems and technologies from around the world, and compared brake system requirements in the U.S. with systems on high-speed trainsets operating internationally. The goal of this task group was to identify common features and determine basic regulatory parameters that considered all types of service-proven braking systems, regardless of the technology employed.

To achieve this goal, the BTG created two sub-groups to examine trainset brake system design philosophies from both Asian and European industries that currently design trainsets to operate at the speeds envisioned for Tier III. The BTG focused on developing technology-neutral, performance-based braking system requirements by selecting the best practices and designs of the international models, while still maintaining the safety intent of the original, pneumatic-based U.S. requirements. This need for a technology-neutral approach was the cornerstone for development of the Tier III brake system recommendations to the ETF, which suggested creating new requirements that would both permit the use of applicable international standards and be performance-driven to allow the development of future technologies.

To accomplish this, the BTG suggested that FRA utilize the proposed Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment (“Tier III Safe Operation Plan”), and ITM plan, discussed below, to establish and approve technology-specific performance metrics that it could not otherwise define without a prescriptive regulation. This recommendation, ultimately adopted by FRA following the RSAC process, is a fundamental concept reflected in other elements of this proposed rule: to maintain the core safety intent of existing U.S. requirements in a manner that takes into account the inherent safety of service-proven designs, as demonstrated on rail systems around the world.

2. Cab Glazing

FRA's original requirements for window and windshield safety glazing on locomotives, passenger cars, and cabooses were established in 49 CFR part 223 on December 31, 1979 (44 FR 77352) to protect railroad employees and passengers from injury due to objects striking windows or windshields. Part 223 specifies a

process for certifying window glazing material, including testing requirements for glazing in both end-facing (FRA Type I) and side-facing (FRA Type II) locations. With the introduction of Tier II requirements in 1999 (64 FR 25686) designed to provide protection at speeds up to 150 mph, FRA established additional requirements for both end-facing (FRA Type IH) and side-facing (FRA Type IIH) glazing locations in Tier II passenger equipment. FRA amended the large object impact requirements for end-facing glazing locations in 2002 (67 FR 19992) with slight modifications, creating FRA Type IHP glazing. See 49 CFR 238.421.

During the development of the Tier III requirements, the ETF decided a new, large object impact test was necessary for end-facing glazing locations (

e.g.

windshields) to address optical clarity issues stemming from current requirements (for both Tier I and II) and the need for a test procedure that could be repeated reliably. To address the optical clarity issue, the ETF wanted a methodology to use to evaluate the performance of the end-facing glazing system at its angle of installation (similar to the approach for Type IHP glazing in 49 CFR 238.421(b)(1)). Such a methodology would be more representative of the actual conditions in real-world applications. It would also help alleviate optical clarity issues resulting from thicker glazing as a function of higher operational speeds and perpendicular impact testing requirements in part 223. In addition, given the range of performance typically observed when testing most glazing materials, establishing a test procedure that could be reliably repeated on multiple test specimens was essential to ensure the quality of test results for these high-speed operations. FRA agrees with this approach.

To address these issues the ETF, through its Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group, sought to refine the glazing requirements for high-speed operations by examining current international practice. In particular, it focused on established and proven experience with the application of European standard EN 15152, and its predecessors, including International Union of Railways (UIC) standard UIC 651. It considered these standards together with high-speed rail operating experience involving the prominent modes and causes for glazing failure. These standards and operating experience, together with the existing glazing requirements for Tier I and Tier II operations, served as the basis for the development of the proposed requirements for Tier III operations.

3. Emergency Systems

This NPRM includes proposed requirements for passenger train emergency systems specific to Tier III trainsets and takes into account potential design considerations for Tier III trainset operating speeds. These proposed requirements focus particularly on emergency egress and rescue access through windows or alternative openings as part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan. Sections 238.113 (Emergency window exits) and 238.114 (Rescue access windows) were used as the baseline requirements for the total number of emergency egress and rescue access windows, as well as their acceptable means of removal and their dimensions.

To address Tier III trainsets not designed to comply with the requirements in § 238.113 or § 238.114, the proposed rule would include a means for FRA to consider alternatives based on service-proven approaches that provide an equivalent level of safety. The railroad would submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress and rescue access plan during the design review stage. This plan would allow consideration of: production challenges unique to high-speed trainsets, such as the need to pressurize compartments; proven international practice; and approaches other modes have taken (

e.g.,

emergency egress window panels/door exits similar to over-wing exit doors on aircraft). Where an appropriate safety case can be made, the proposed rule would allow a railroad to elect to employ an alternative feature or approach if the railroad can demonstrate an equivalent or superior level of safety.

This NPRM also addresses the attachment strength and performance of critical emergency systems. Specifically, it explains the requirements for minimum attachment strength of emergency lighting fixtures and any corresponding emergency power sources to be consistent with the approach we took for all other interior attachments in Tier III equipment. The NPRM would effectively provide a railroad with the option of complying with either the loading requirements currently applicable to Tier I equipment or alternative loading criteria based on an appropriate crash pulse that is justified by the intended vehicle design.

4. Cab Equipment

This NPRM contains certain equipment requirements proposed for the cabs of Tier III trainsets. These proposed requirements were developed by the RSAC's BTG and address alerters (devices installed in the controlling cab of trainsets that promote continuous, active locomotive engineer attentiveness by monitoring select trainset engineer-induced control activities) and sanders (appurtenances on trainsets that provide a means for depositing sand on each rail in front of the first power operated wheel set in the direction of movement to increase wheel-track adhesion). The BTG adopted the same approach it used to develop the braking system proposal for these two cab features, seeking performance-based requirements that could be implemented in a technology-neutral manner wherever possible. FRA intends to propose additional requirements for cab equipment in a future rulemaking based on recommendations developed by the 229/ITM Task Group.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 236—Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

Subpart I—Positive Train Control Systems

Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service

FRA is proposing to remove paragraph (d) of this section as it is no longer relevant, and to redesignate paragraph (e) as paragraph (d) of this section. Paragraph (d) provides that, in addition to the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, a host railroad that conducts a freight or passenger operation at more than 150 mph shall have an approved Positive Train Control (PTC) Safety Plan (PTCSP) accompanied by an “HSR-125” developed as part of an overall system safety plan approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer (Associate Administrator). Paragraph (d) also provides that such an operation would be governed by a rule of particular applicability. Paragraph (c) of this section contains particular requirements for freight and passenger operations at speeds more than 125 mph, and provides that a host railroad have an approved PTCSP accompanied by an HSR-125. Generally, an HSR-125 is a document establishing that the system will be operated at a level of safety comparable to that achieved over the 5-year period prior to the submission of the PTCSP by other train control systems that perform PTC functions required by subpart I to 49 CFR part 236, and which have been utilized on

high-speed rail systems with similar technical and operational characteristics in the U.S. or in foreign service, and that the system has been designed to detect incursions into the right-of-way, including incidents involving motor vehicles diverting from adjacent roads and bridges, where conditions warrant.

The particular treatment in paragraph (d) of operations at speeds over 150 mph is a legacy of FRA regulations from the 1990s concerning high-speed rail. When FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213) were amended on June 22, 1998, to include standards for higher-speed operations, the rule envisioned regulating rail operations at speeds over 150 mph through a rule a particular applicability. See 63 FR 33992. This same approach was codified in the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards when the rule was promulgated in 1999. See 64 FR 25540. Subsequently, however, FRA amended the Track Safety Standards on March 13, 2013, to remove the prescriptive reference to a rule of particular applicability and make clear that operations at speeds above 125 mph require FRA regulatory approval. See 78 FR 16052. In this NPRM, FRA is similarly proposing to remove the prescriptive reference to a rule of particular applicability in the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards and reaffirm that operations at speeds over 125 mph require FRA regulatory approval.

Accordingly, FRA is proposing to modify 49 CFR 236.1007 to remove the prescriptive reference requiring a rule of particular applicability for operations at speeds over 150 mph. Paragraph (c) of this section would continue to require that operations at speeds over 125 mph require FRA regulatory approval. However, there is no further need to prescribe in all cases distinct regulatory treatment through a rule of particular applicability for operations at speeds above 150 mph. Operations in both speed ranges constitute high-speed rail operations and are regulated by FRA as such.

FRA does not intend anything in this proposal to affect any order of particular applicability FRA has issued or may issue. In 1998, FRA issued an order of particular applicability governing certain rail operations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See 63 FR 39343, Jul. 22, 1998. The order, as amended, specifies requirements for equipping trains to respond to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) in NEC territory. See 71 FR 33034, Jun. 7, 2006. As delegated by the Secretary, FRA may issue such an order after an investigation requiring a railroad carrier to install, on any part of its line, a signal system that complies with requirements FRA has established as necessary for safety. See 49 U.S.C. chapter 205 (signal systems). Such an order of particular applicability has a far more limited scope than that envisioned at one time for a rule of particular applicability governing high-speed operations (

i.e.,

a comprehensive rule addressing all aspects of a high-speed rail operation, not just signal systems). To be clear, the order of particular applicability governing certain rail operations on the NEC will not be affected by this rulemaking.

Part 238—Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Subpart A—General

Section 238.5 Definitions

FRA is proposing to add new definitions to this part and revise certain existing definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms and minimize potential for misinterpretation of the rule. FRA requests public comment regarding the terms defined in this section and whether we should also define other terms.

FRA proposes to revise the definitions of “glazing, end-facing” and “glazing, side-facing,” and to make technical revisions to the definitions of “Tier II” and “Train, Tier II passenger” to reflect the proposed change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA also proposes to add new definitions for “Associate Administrator,” “Cab,” “Tier III,” “Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger,” “Trainset, Tier III,” and “Trainset unit.” Some of the proposed definitions we added involve new or fundamental concepts which require further discussion.

FRA proposes to define “Associate Administrator” to mean the FRA Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Associate Administrator for Safety, or the Associate Administrator's delegate. The title of Associate Administrator for purposes of this part has always referred to the same FRA official; only the full description of this official's title has changed since this part was originally promulgated. Because of the use of different titles in this part to refer to the same official, FRA proposes to add this definition to make clear that there is one official who is the Associate Administrator for purposes of this part. In the final rule, FRA may instead update and make consistent each reference to the Associate Administrator in each individual section of part 238 that refers to the Associate Administrator.

FRA proposes to add the definition “cab” to mean, for purposes of subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from which the engineer exercises control over the trainset. Cab includes a locomotive cab. FRA is adding a more general definition of “cab” to ensure the requirements apply to high-speed trainsets, which do not utilize conventional locomotives. This new definition for “cab” is not intended to impose any new requirement on other types of equipment. This definition presumes there is a typical design of a high-speed trainset where the engineer and operating console are located in the leading end of the trainset. Regardless, FRA would expect the protections of §§ 238.703 through 238.717 (Trainset structure) and § 238.721 (Glazing) to apply, as appropriate, to that leading end whether it is to be occupied by operating crewmembers or passengers, or both. In this regard, and consistent with the definition of “Occupied volume” under § 238.5, the protections mentioned above would apply, as appropriate, for the entire width of a trainset's leading end, irrespective of the occupant(s). In addition, this definition would apply to vehicles designed under appendix G to this part. FRA invites comment on this proposed definition, as well as comment on whether FRA should make more explicit in the rule text the protections that apply to the leading end of a trainset, whether intended to be occupied by crewmembers or passengers, or both.

FRA proposes to revise the definition “glazing, end-facing” to mean any exterior glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is installed, except for: The coupled ends of MU locomotives or other equipment that is semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist; and, end doors of passenger cars at locations other than the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. Any glazing location which, due to curvature of the glazing material, can meet the criteria for either end-facing glazing or side-facing glazing would be considered end-facing glazing. This definition makes clear that the glazing location means an “exterior” location and expressly identifies locations that FRA would not consider end-facing glazing locations. Additionally, the definition accounts for the aerodynamic shape of vehicle front-ends and expressly provides that any

window, based on its geometry, that could be either an end-facing glazing location or a side-facing glazing location is considered an end-facing glazing location that must comply with the end-facing glazing requirements. FRA intends for this proposed definition to be substantively the same as the revised definition for “end facing glazing location” in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards (part 223 of this chapter). See 81 FR 6775, Feb. 9, 2016. This revision is not intended to add any new requirement on glazing installed in passenger vehicles subject to the requirements of part 238. FRA intends this definition and other glazing requirements in the final rule to be consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.

FRA proposes to revise the definition “glazing, side-facing” to mean any glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is installed. Side-facing glazing also means glazing located at the coupled ends of MU locomotives or other equipment that is semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist, and glazing located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. FRA intends for this proposed revision to be substantively the same as the revised definition for “side facing glazing location” in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards, see id., and is necessary due to our proposed revision to the definition of “glazing, end-facing” in this part 238. Nonetheless, we do not intend for this revision to add any new requirement on glazing installed in passenger vehicles subject to the requirements of this part. As noted above, FRA intends this definition and other glazing requirements in the final rule to be consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.

As discussed above, FRA proposes to revise the definition of “Tier II” to increase the maximum speed allowable for this tier of passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA likewise proposes to revise the definition “train, Tier II passenger.” In addition, FRA proposes to add a definition for “Tier III” to add this equipment safety tier to this part with the definition “trainset, Tier III” to apply the proposed Tier III requirements to such equipment. Further, FRA intends for these definitions to make clear that the definitions of Tier I and Tier II do not include Tier III passenger equipment merely because the equipment operates in the Tier I and Tier II speed ranges. The operation of passenger equipment in both lower- and higher-speed ranges is integral to the definition of Tier III (please see above for a more detailed discussion of these safety tiers). This Tier III definition also makes clear that 125 mph is the maximum speed at which Tier III equipment can operate when sharing the right-of-way with non-Tier III equipment or when highway-rail grade crossings are present along the right-of-way. FRA elected this maximum speed to maintain operational compatibility with non-Tier III equipment based on the safety equivalency of the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. Further, this definition makes clear FRA is limiting Tier III operations to an absolute maximum speed of 220 mph, which is the maximum track speed permitted under FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013. FRA invites comments on the speed and operational restrictions discussed above and whether there are more appropriate alternatives to FRA's proposal.

FRA proposes to add the definition “trainset, Tier I alternative passenger” to mean a trainset consisting of Tier I passenger equipment designed under the requirements of appendix G to this part. FRA proposes to add this definition to distinguish specific Tier I trainset designs that conform to alternative standards from Tier I equipment that meets the existing Tier I requirements in subpart C but provide an equivalent level of protection by conforming with the proposed requirements of appendix G to this part.

FRA also proposes to add a new definition of “trainset unit” to mean that segment of a trainset located between connecting arrangements (articulations). This definition would clarify that the proposed requirements may apply to individual vehicles within a trainset consist, but not necessarily to the trainset as a whole.

Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure

FRA proposes to amend paragraph (c)(2) of this section to be consistent with the changes proposed to § 238.201(b) for alternative compliance. The proposed applicable elements would be in new § 238.201(b)(1) rather than in § 238.201(b) due to the proposed reorganization of that section. FRA intends to conform paragraph (c)(2) of this section accordingly.

Additionally, FRA is updating the reference to “Associate Administrator for Safety” to read simply “Associate Administrator,” consistent with the discussion provided above under § 238.5.

Subpart B—Safety Planning and General Requirements

Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan

FRA proposes to amend paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and (c) of this section to require railroads to obtain FRA approval before using Tier III passenger equipment that either has not been used in revenue service in the U.S. or has been used in revenue service in the U.S. and is scheduled for a major upgrade or introduction of new technology that affects a safety system on such equipment. The explicit inclusion of a Tier III notification and approval process is consistent with FRA's approach to the implementation of high-speed rail technology. It also provides a formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all required elements of this part are satisfactorily addressed and documented.

FRA invites comment on FRA's proposed changes to this section. Specifically, we invite comment on any additional changes we should make concerning testing and approval requirements for Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III operations.

Subpart C—Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

Section 238.201 Scope/Alternative Compliance

In this section, FRA is proposing to redesignate existing paragraph (b) as paragraph (b)(1) and to add new paragraph (b)(2) due to the proposed addition of standards for alternative compliance in appendix G to this part.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would continue to provide the existing option for railroads to petition FRA's Associate Administrator for approval to use Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. This approval remains contingent upon the railroad's successful demonstration that such standards provide a level of safety at least equivalent to those in subpart C of this part. Although FRA is proposing to add a new appendix G to this part that provides specific alternative crashworthiness standards to those in subpart C, FRA does not intend to limit the flexibility this section currently provides for using other alternative designs.

Proposed new paragraph (b)(2) would explain how Tier I passenger trainsets may comply with the alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to this part instead of the requirements

of §§ 238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219. Railroads would be required to submit test plans and supporting documentation for FRA review and give FRA at least 30 days' notice before commencing any testing, whether partially or in full, to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of proposed appendix G to this part. Railroads would also be required to submit a carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance report based on the analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to demonstrate compliance. After receipt of this report, FRA would deem the submission acceptable, unless FRA stays action within 60 days by written notice. If FRA stays action, then the railroad would be required to correct any deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected the deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service. FRA may also impose conditions in writing necessary for safely operating the equipment for cause stated.

FRA notes that the proposed approval process would differ from that for Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, which would require affirmative FRA approval. Tier I trainsets that FRA reviews under this paragraph would be deemed acceptable without further FRA action based on the appropriate submissions to FRA, unless FRA stays approval by written notice to the railroad. If FRA stays approval, FRA would then identify issues for clarification or resolution, as appropriate, which the railroad would be required to address and notify FRA it had corrected prior to placing the equipment into service.

FRA invites comment on the proposed changes to this section.

Section 238.203 Static End Strength

FRA proposes to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b)(2) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. Please note that the existing alternative compliance provision in § 238.201(b), which we propose to redesignate as § 238.201(b)(1), does not apply to the requirements of this section, unlike the other structural requirements. Hence, FRA is not proposing to reference § 238.201(b) generally in this section. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism

FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.207 Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Carbody

FRA is proposing to revise paragraph (b) of this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.209 Forward End Structure of Locomotives, Including Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.211 Collision Posts

FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.213 Corner Posts

FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Section 238.219 Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment

FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross reference to § 238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.

Subpart E—Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

Section 238.401 Scope

FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. This proposal is consistent with FRA's March 13, 2013, final rule amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which affirmed that the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph. See 78 FR 16052. Further, this proposal would make the speed range for Tier II passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track Safety Standards. As specified in § 213.307 of this chapter, Class 8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph—the same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment standards. This change would only increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph and would still require FRA approval to do so as this part and other FRA safety regulations require.

For example, Amtrak's Acela Express currently operates at a maximum speed of 150 mph and has done so for well over a decade with FRA approval. While the proposed change would neither impose any new requirement on Acela Express, nor alter any aspect of FRA's regulatory approval of Acela Express, the rule would require FRA approval to increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph.

FRA's Tier II passenger equipment safety standards are based on safety requirements developed for the operation of Amtrak passenger trainsets at speeds up to 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See 64 FR 25629. Amtrak sponsored a risk assessment of high-speed rail operations and FRA sponsored computer modeling to predict the performance of various equipment structural designs and configurations in collisions. The risk assessment found a significant risk of collisions at speeds below 20 mph and a risk of collisions at speeds exceeding 100 mph due to heavy and increasing conventional commuter rail traffic, freight rail traffic, highway-rail grade crossings, moveable bridges, and a history of low speed collisions in or near stations and rail yards. Based on the risk assessment and the results of the computer modeling, FRA determined that full reliance on collision avoidance measures rather than crashworthiness, though the hallmark of safe high-speed rail operations in several parts of the world, could not be implemented in corridors like the north end of the NEC. Traffic density patterns and right-of-way configurations would not permit implementation of the same collision avoidance measures that have proven successful in Europe and Japan. To compensate for the increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy trainset design was needed. Accordingly, the structural requirements for Tier II passenger equipment are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment or the design practice for North American passenger equipment or for high-speed rail equipment in other parts of the world.

Subpart F—Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

Section 238.501 Scope

FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. Please see the discussion of § 238.401.

Subpart H—Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

This proposed subpart would contain specific requirements Tier III passenger equipment must meet. Many of the requirements proposed herein consider Tier III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated trainset, particularly for purposes of crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements. This rule presumes that Tier III trainsets will consist of semi-permanently coupled, articulated, or otherwise “fixed” configurations, that are not intended to operate normally as individual vehicles or in mixed consists (with equipment of another design or operational tier).

The requirements proposed in this subpart are organized into subject areas based on their general applicability: trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, emergency systems, and cab equipment. These proposed requirements are intended to be applied in concert with proposed subparts I and J to establish a set of minimum safety requirements for Tier III passenger equipment that encourages a systemic approach to safety. FRA also intends that the requirements be applied in a manner that is performance-based and technology-neutral, where possible.

FRA intends to supplement these specific requirements in future rulemaking(s). As noted above, the ETF remains active and continues to address safety requirements for Tier III operations. FRA will consider regulatory changes and additions that will help FRA safely and efficiently implement Tier III operations from design, to entry into revenue service, to ongoing inspection and maintenance.

FRA notes that it intends for certain proposed sections of this subpart to be applied as an integrated set of alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part. We consider this set of proposed requirements to provide an equivalent level of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in subpart C of this part. As explained in greater detail in the discussion of appendix G below, the proposed rule clarifies which specific Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirement should be applied as an alternative set of Tier I counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA makes clear that if alternative Tier I compliance is sought under appendix G, then all the requirements in appendix G must be met so the integrity of the alternative requirements is maintained.

Section 238.701 Scope

This proposed subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA believes that in most cases new exclusive rights-of-way designed for Tier III operations will be constructed without highway grade crossings. However, some newly constructed exclusive rights-of-way may include highway grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track without a grade crossing. In these instances, imposing a 125 mph speed restriction on the entire exclusive right-of-way may have greater costs than benefits. Additional net benefits may be achievable, in certain circumstances, by applying the speed restriction only to track at or near each grade crossing instead of the entire exclusive right-of-way. In such cases, FRA would expect the railroad to address the safety considerations surrounding highway grade crossings in the exclusive right-of-way in its Tier III Safe Operation Plan, which is subject to FRA review and approval. However, FRA invites comment on alternative approaches, such as whether the rule should include provisions that explicitly apply the speed restriction only to track located at or near each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-way.

FRA is proposing to allow passenger seating in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset if safety issues associated with passengers occupying the leading unit are addressed and mitigated through a comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Demonstration of compliance with the requirements of this subpart would be subject to FRA review and approval under § 238.111.

Trainset Structure

Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements

As discussed above, FRA proposes a two-step approach to OVI in this NPRM. Accordingly, in paragraph (a) of this section, FRA proposes that for it to consider a Tier III trainset to have sufficient OVI, compliance with the requirements of both paragraph (b) of this section and § 238.705 must be demonstrated. The purpose of applying both requirements is to ensure the integrity of the occupied volume during a collision or other accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a fundamental requirement of crashworthiness—the primary goal of which is preservation of space to protect occupants during an accident. Additionally, a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness features such as CEM components.

Although the language of this section references only Tier III trainsets, the requirements of this section may also be applied to Tier I trainsets through the application of appendix G, instead of complying with the existing requirements of 49 CFR 238.203, “Static end strength.” Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate level of crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression load requirements proposed in § 238.703(b). In general, § 238.203 requires all passenger equipment to support an 800,000-pound compressive load along its line-of-draft without experiencing permanent deformation. This magnitude of load applied to the line-of-draft has been the longstanding practice in the U.S. This evaluation is readily performed on passenger equipment conventionally designed for service in the U.S. For vehicles designed less conventionally or alternatively (

e.g.,

articulated trainsets, full or partial low-floor trainsets, and trainsets utilizing CEM), the structure of the occupied volume may be designed so that collision loads are not transmitted along the line-of-draft. While a rail vehicle may be designed to carry normal, longitudinal service loads along its line-of-draft, the more severe collision loads may be introduced into the structure differently. Below is a discussion of the quasi-static compression load requirements proposed in paragraph (b) that would apply to each vehicle of a Tier III trainset, and, if elected, as an alternative for Tier I trainsets, through application of appendix G.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1) introduces three means of compliance, each consisting of a prescribed load magnitude and a corresponding pass/fail criterion (or pass/fail criteria), and states that each vehicle under evaluation must comply with one of three compression load pass/fail criteria enumerated in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii). FRA notes that this paragraph (b)(1)

applies to evaluation of individual vehicles of a trainset, not a trainset as a whole. Additionally, FRA is not proposing to require using all three alternatives to evaluate a vehicle; FRA would require only demonstration that the vehicle design complies with one compression load pass/fail criterion. By including three sets of load magnitudes and pass/fail criteria, FRA intends to accommodate quasi-static compression load evaluation for a variety of passenger trainset vehicle designs and ensure that each alternative provides an equivalent level of safety.

For each of the three quasi-static compression load requirements that may be applied, the evaluation loads are introduced not at the line-of-draft, but at the ends of the collision load path through the occupied volume. Introducing the loads along the collision load path permits evaluation of the quasi-static compression resistance of a given design in a manner more representative of the type of loading the occupied volume would experience in a collision. The details of the location(s) of the load points at the ends of the collision load path would be determined on a design-by-design basis.

The proposed quasi-static compression load requirements also permit use of a combination of elastic testing and elastic/plastic computer simulation to demonstrate a trainset's ability to comply with one of the three requirements. While an analysis of a properly-executed, finite-element (FE) computer simulation can demonstrate a design's compliance, some structural testing of the actual occupied volume undergoing evaluation is needed to validate the results the computer simulation produced. The process of validation essentially provides a computer simulation with a foundation in reality.

A detailed FE model of the carbody undergoing evaluation is necessary to properly capture the structural response of the occupied volume to the evaluation compression loads. FRA expects this model will include all the structural members and connections that comprise the occupied volume. If the carbody structure is symmetric from side to side, a symmetry boundary condition may be used to facilitate efficient model evaluation. Certain details of the carbody structure that do not directly affect the OVI, such as couplers and designated CEM components, may be omitted from the OVI model.

FRA also expects the material properties (

e.g.,

stress-strain characteristics) that are used in the model would be derived from either manufacturer-certified minimum properties or from tests conducted on the actual construction materials. Material properties may be assumed to be independent of the rate of deformation for the purposes of OVI evaluation. Failure modeling of connections (

e.g.,

welds, rivets, bolts, etc.) would not be required if the analysis does not indicate critical stresses or strains near those connections.

Appropriate boundary conditions must be chosen to provide reasonable restraint to the model. FRA expects that vertical support to the model would be provided at the locations in the actual vehicle where it would carry vertical loads. Typically, those locations include the attachments of the secondary suspension components to the underframe and, if the car is so equipped, the articulation. Longitudinal restraint in the model may be accomplished by a rigid wall that is in contact with the reaction-end of the vehicle structure. Lateral restraint may either be introduced through a symmetry boundary condition or by applying a reasonable coefficient of friction between the longitudinal restraint wall and the body structure.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) provides that the first load magnitude and corresponding pass/fail criterion is an 800,000-pound compression load applied to the collision load path without causing any permanent deformation to the occupied volume. The load magnitude (800,000 pounds) is the same as the evaluation load generally required in existing § 238.203 for Tier I passenger equipment but would be introduced into the occupied volume along the collision load path (whether or not that is the line-of-draft). The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation would be the same as the pass/fail criterion in existing § 238.203.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) provides that the second load magnitude and corresponding pass/fail test is a 1,000,000-pound compression load applied to the collision load path without exceeding either of two pass/fail criteria. Under this proposal, both pass/fail criteria must be met for a design to successfully meet this quasi-static compression load requirement, which would increase the evaluation load by 25 percent over the conventional 800,000-pound load. As a consequence of applying a more severe load, FRA would relax the pass/fail criteria to permit small areas of plastic strain to develop within the structure. Thus, the first pass/fail criterion in proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) states that local plastic strains that may develop anywhere within a model may not exceed 5 percent. This pass/fail criterion would be applied to the entire structure of the vehicle undergoing evaluation. The second pass/fail criterion in proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) states that local shortening (deformation) of the vehicle may not exceed 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the occupied volume. This criterion is intended to prevent localized loss of occupied volume that may occur when the 5-percent plastic strain criterion is not exceeded.

Paragraph (b)(1)(iii) provides that the third load magnitude and corresponding pass/fail criterion is a 1,200,000 pound compression load applied to the collision load path without exceeding the crippling strength of the vehicle. This paragraph would define crippling as the maximum point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic. The load magnitude required by this quasi-static compression load requirement would be 50 percent higher than the 800,000-pound load required by existing § 238.203, which also requires that the carbody must remain elastic to successfully meet the requirement. Because the evaluation load would be increased by 50 percent, the corresponding pass-fail criterion would require that the vehicle being evaluated have an ultimate load carrying capacity (

i.e.,

crippling resistance) equal to or greater than 1.2 million pounds. To determine the adequacy of the proposed ultimate load, in June 2011, FRA performed a series of quasi-static compression tests on passenger railcars compliant with § 238.203 and verified that these cars had an ultimate load capacity of approximately 1.2 million pounds. This testing series established that 1.2 million pounds is a reasonable minimum standard for the crippling strength of passenger equipment compliant with § 238.203. The results of that testing and corresponding FE modeling are summarized in an FRA “Research Results” report,

13

two technical papers,

14

and an FRA final report.

15

13

USDOT/FRA, “Occupant Volume Integrity Evaluation in Passenger Railcars.”

Research Results

—Office of Railroad Policy and Development, RR 12-01, February 2012.

14

Carolan, M., Muhlanger, M., Perlman, B., and Tyrell, D., “Occupied Volume Integrity Testing: Elastic Test Results and Analyses,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. RTDF2011-67010, September, 2011; Carolan, M., Perlman, B., and Tyrell, D., “Crippling Test of a Budd Pioneer Passenger Car,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2012-74087, April 2012.

15

Carolan, M., Perlman, B., and Tyrell, D., “Alternative Occupied Volume Integrity (OVI) Tests and Analyses,” U.S. Department of Transportation, DOT/FRA/ORD-13/46, October 2013.

Demonstration of compliance with any of the quasi-static requirements may be achieved through testing to the specified load or a combination of elastic testing and plastic analysis. Paragraph (b)(2) would establish that, at a minimum, an end compression load of no less than 337,000 pound-force (lbf) must be applied to the carbody structure to validate the plastic analysis. In addition, these requirements would establish the minimum level of model validation to be performed using the results of a test of the same design. Nonetheless, FRA does not intend for these proposed minimum requirements to replace sound engineering judgment that higher force values may be appropriate to obtain valid test results when designing and performing the compression testing and FE modeling.

Because paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (iii) would permit permanent deformation to occur in the occupied volume of a vehicle during its evaluation, it is likely a combination of elastic (

i.e.,

non-destructive) testing and elastic-plastic finite element analysis (FEA) would be used to demonstrate a vehicle design's ability to meet either of those two quasi-static compression load requirements. While paragraph (b)(1)(i) would not permit permanent deformation to occur in a design undergoing evaluation, FRA does not intend for the proposed rule to prevent a combination of elastic testing to a load less than 800,000 lbs and FEA up to the target load of 800,000 lbs from being used to demonstrate that a design's OVI complies with this first requirement.

As previously discussed, proposed paragraph (b)(2) states that, no matter which of the three requirements that is chosen for evaluation of a design's OVI is applied, a compression test also must be performed and the applied longitudinal compression load must be at least 337,000 lbf (1500kN). This test is required to ensure the FE computer model that is used to demonstrate alternative compliance can successfully model the response of the carbody to the same loading condition as part of a program of model validation. This value is equal to 1500 kN, which is the compression load placed on the coupler support structures required by European standard EN 12663 for Category P-II passenger equipment. The ETF recommended this minimum value for the validation test's elastic load and FRA adopted this minimum recognizing that sufficient strains must be developed within the tested structure to provide quality measurements necessary for validating a model.

Finally, proposed paragraph (b)(3) states that compliance with paragraph (b) of this section must be documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval. In particular, we propose several options for compliance with paragraph (b)(1), and FRA review and approval is necessary to evaluate the approach taken to ensure compliance.

Section 238.705 Dynamic Collision Scenario

In this section, FRA is proposing to introduce a dynamic collision scenario analysis as the second part of the OVI evaluation of a Tier III passenger trainset. PTC technology cannot protect against all possible collision scenarios, such as collisions with trespassing highway equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock (freight or passenger equipment) during manual operations at 20 mph or below. Accordingly, compliance with this requirement is necessary to preserve the occupied volume, protecting all occupants on the trainset.

As mentioned in the discussion of proposed § 238.703 above, each vehicle in the trainset would need to demonstrate it meets both the OVI requirements in proposed paragraph (b) of that section and the dynamic collision scenario requirements in proposed paragraph (b) of this section. Further, as mentioned in the discussion of proposed § 238.703, and as outlined in proposed appendix G, a Tier I passenger trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may comply with this section instead of the requirements currently applicable to Tier I passenger trainsets in § 238.203.

In combination with the quasi-static compression load requirements discussed in proposed § 238.703, the purpose of this proposed dynamic collision scenario requirement is to ensure that survivable space for the passengers and crew is preserved in up to moderately severe accident conditions (

i.e.,

conditions comparable to a head-on collision at a speed of 20 to 25 mph, depending on the type of equipment, into a stationary train). This requirement would also provide a baseline level of protection for scenarios that may be more severe, but less predictable with respect to loading conditions and historical accident data. Although the dynamic collision scenario would be conducted at the trainset level, the requirements described in this section would be evaluated at the level of the trainset's individual vehicles so no vehicle in the trainset may exceed the parameters outlined in proposed paragraph (b) as a result of the dynamic collision scenario.

Proposed paragraph (a) outlines the required conditions under which a dynamic collision scenario would be performed. Generally, the collision scenario requires a dynamic impact to be simulated between two trains: An initially-moving train and an initially-standing train. The initially-moving train is the trainset undergoing evaluation, either Tier III equipment or, as provided in appendix G, Tier I equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. The initially-standing train is a locomotive-led consist of five conventionally-designed passenger cars. The conventionally-designed passenger cars have a prescribed weight and force-versus-displacement characteristic.

16

The pass/fail criteria for the scenario determine whether there is sufficient preservation of occupied volume for passengers and crew in the trainset undergoing evaluation.

16

Appropriate weights and force-versus-displacement characteristics for the conventionally-designed passenger cars can be found in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.

FRA expects the collision scenario would be executed for an impact duration sufficient to capture the most severe portion of the collision event. The actual amount of impact time required to simulate the collision sufficiently would vary based upon the characteristics of the trainset undergoing evaluation. Typically, the collision scenario would be executed until all of the equipment, including the initially-standing and initially-moving consists, is moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity. If all of the equipment is moving together at approximately the same speed, no further car-to-car impacts would occur, and the simulation would have been executed for a sufficient duration to capture the most severe decelerations.

There are various types of analyses that may be used to evaluate the collision scenario requirements. These analyses include fully-detailed FE models, lumped-parameter analyses, or a hybrid approach where a combination of detailed FE modeling and lumped-parameter techniques are used within the same simulation. An FEA of the scenario is generally a highly-detailed simulation of the actual trainset geometry. The parts making up the trainset are meshed into a large number of elements, with each element having its own mass, stiffness, and connection properties to the adjacent elements. A lumped parameter analysis represents each car or section of a car within a trainset using a small number of masses and a small number of non-linear springs. At its extreme, each car consists

of a single mass and a single spring characteristic. A hybrid approach may utilize an FE mesh to represent some structures (

e.g.,

CEM structures that undergo large deformations) and lumped-parameter representations of other structures (

e.g.,

cars far from the impacting interface that experience little deformation). Any of the three types of analyses is capable of developing the information needed to verify a trainset's ability to meet the requirements of the collision scenario. Additionally, because the centerlines of the initially-moving and initially-standing trains are aligned with one another during this scenario, a half-symmetric model may be used to represent the colliding vehicles, as appropriate.

Proposed paragraph (a)(1) requires the initially-moving train to be made up of the equipment undergoing evaluation at its empty, ready-to-run (AW0) weight.

17

As highlighted above, this equipment can be either Tier III equipment or, under appendix G, Tier I equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards.

17

“AW0” is a loading designation that is defined by the manufacturer. Specifically, AW0 refers to the “actual weight” of an empty vehicle. The phrase “empty, ready-to-run weight” is typically how this designation is defined in a technical document.

Proposed paragraph (a)(2) states that if the length of consists to be used in service can vary, then the longest and shortest consist lengths must both be evaluated under this section. This requirement is intended to ensure the trainset's OVI is satisfactory when operated in both the shortest and longest train consists that will be utilized in service. The trainset undergoing evaluation must successfully meet the collision scenario requirements for both its shortest and longest configurations; it is not required to demonstrate other configurations meet the requirements.

Proposed paragraph (a)(3) states that if the trainset is intended for use in push-pull service, then both the locomotive-led and cab-car-led configurations shall be evaluated separately. This requirement is intended to ensure sufficient OVI for all occupied spaces in the trainset regardless of whether it is led by a cab car or a conventional locomotive.

Proposed paragraph (a)(4) describes the configuration of the initially-standing train of conventional passenger equipment. As provided in paragraph (a)(4)(i), this train is to be led by a rigid locomotive weighing 260,000 pounds and also made up of five identical coaches, each having a weight of 95,000 pounds. Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) provides that the locomotive and each passenger coach crush in response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section. Table 1 provides the non-linear, force-versus-crush relationship for the passenger cars and locomotive comprising the initially-standing train. These relationships are meant to be representative of typical crush responses for passenger equipment; likewise, the weights given for the conventional locomotive and conventional passenger cars are meant to be representative of typical weights for passenger equipment. The weights for the passenger cars and locomotives, the force-versus-crush behavior, and the geometry for the standing locomotive are all provided in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. Further detail on the geometry of the locomotive can be found in that Report. In addition, paragraph (a)(4)(iii) provides that the locomotive would be modeled using the data inputs listed in appendix H to this part, so that the locomotive's geometric design is as depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H.

Proposed paragraphs (a)(5) through (10) are meant to ensure that the collision scenario is evaluated under the same conditions by each entity performing this type of evaluation. Proposed paragraph (a)(5) explains that the scenario must be evaluated on tangent, level track.

Proposed paragraph (a)(6) describes the initial velocities to be assigned to the initially-moving consist. If the initially-moving consist is led by a cab car or an MU locomotive, then it must have an initial velocity of 20 mph. If the initially-moving consist is led by a conventional locomotive, it must have an initial velocity of 25 mph. These speeds were chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the ability of conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its occupied volume in a similar collision scenario.

FRA intends for the requirements in proposed paragraphs (a)(7) through (9) to simplify the modeling of the collision scenario and to help ensure the scenario is evaluated consistently by different entities. Paragraph (a)(7) provides that the coupler knuckles on the impacting equipment shall be closed. Paragraph (a)(8) states that the moving and standing consists are not braked. Paragraph (a)(9) states that the initially-standing train is free to move only in the longitudinal direction.

Proposed paragraph (a)(10) would require that the model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic collision requirements be validated, and that model validation be documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval. Regardless of the type of analysis employed to demonstrate a trainset's ability to meet the collision scenario requirements, the analytical model must undergo some level of validation for the results to be considered acceptable. The validation to be performed on the model used in the collision scenario would be in addition to any validation required for a model used to demonstrate the quasi-static OVI of the trainset undergoing evaluation. While full-scale destructive testing of a trainset undergoing evaluation is not expected, FRA expects that any designated energy-absorbing components will be tested at the component-level. The results of these component tests would be used to validate a model of the same type to be used to demonstrate the trainset's ability to meet the dynamic collision scenario. FRA also expects that any components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation during the modeling of the collision must be validated with some type of physical test.

Proposed paragraph (b) would contain the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in the initially-moving trainset involved in the dynamic collision scenario must meet as described in paragraph (a)—

i.e.,

the trainset undergoing evaluation. Proposed paragraph (b)(1) outlines two conditions for demonstrating that the initially-moving trainset possesses sufficient crashworthiness to resist a significant loss of occupied volume during the collision scenario. Only one of the two performance conditions would have to be shown to be met to successfully demonstrate compliance: No more than 10 inches of longitudinal, permanent deformation of the occupied volume as a result of the impact, as proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(i); or global vehicle shortening not exceeding 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the occupied volume, as proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(ii). These two performance conditions are meant to permit different analysis techniques (

e.g.,

lumped-parameter or FEA) to be applied to evaluate the collision scenario.

Proposed paragraph (b)(2) provides that if the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to demonstrate compliance with any of the requirements in §§ 238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of each vehicle during the dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g in any 100-millisecond (ms) time period. A plot of the 100-ms average longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the

curve never exceeds ±5g, would suffice to demonstrate compliance with paragraph (b)(2).

Proposed paragraph (b)(3) sets out the criteria that must be met to demonstrate the crashworthiness of the engineer's cab as a result of the dynamic collision impact. Paragraph (b)(3)(i) states that a survival space where there is no intrusion must be maintained around each seat in the cab. Survival space is defined as extending a minimum of 12 inches from each edge of the seat. Walls or other items originally within this defined space, not including the operating console, shall not further intrude more than 1.5 inches towards the seat under evaluation.

In addition, as a result of the impact, under paragraph (b)(3)(ii), there shall be a clear exit path from the cab for the occupants, and, under paragraph (b)(3)(iii), the vertical height of the compartment shall not be reduced by more than 20 percent. FRA intends for proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iii) to prevent loss of occupied volume that occurs either through lifting of the floor or downward buckling of the ceiling.

Further, proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv) provides that the operating console shall not have moved closer to the engineer's seat by more than 2 inches as a result of the impact. Because portions of the operating console in a given cab may originally be within the 12-inch survival space defined in paragraph (b)(3)(i) before the impact, it is important that the console not move more than 2 inches closer to the engineer's seat and impede the engineer from exiting the cab following the impact. The allowable encroachment for the operating console is one-third larger than the 1.5 inches allowed for walls or other items originally within the 12-inch survival space. This larger allowance assumes the initial configuration is designed so there is sufficient space for the engineer to readily get into and out of his or her seat, as well as space to comfortably situate himself or herself for normal operation of the train. Consequently, console movement of 2 inches or less can be allowed without inhibiting or preventing egress. If the engineer's seat is part of a set of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph (b)(iv) would apply to both seats. This seating arrangement is in the cabs of Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets.

Section 238.707 Override Protection

This proposed section would contain the requirements for analyzing the ability of a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical climbing or override at its collision interface locations during a dynamic collision scenario. This proposed section would examine the vertical displacement behavior of colliding equipment under an ideal impact scenario where an initially-moving Tier III trainset and an initially-standing conventional train are aligned. This section would also prescribe an impact scenario where the interface of the colliding equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by 3 inches to ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the two trains are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition helps to demonstrate that the override features are robust.

FRA clarifies that Tier III passenger trainsets would have to comply with both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. FRA also clarifies that under proposed appendix G, a Tier I passenger trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate level of override protection by complying with the requirements this section proposes instead of complying with the requirements applicable to Tier I passenger trainsets in § 238.205, Anti-climbing mechanism, and § 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car body. In general, the requirements proposed in this section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-climbing capabilities in current § 238.205 and the capability of the link between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in current § 238.207. While compliance with both §§ 238.205 and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load cases, the requirements proposed in this section were developed as a dynamic performance standard.

Proposed paragraph (a)(1) contains two sets of initial conditions for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset to resist vertical climbing or override during a dynamic collision scenario, and states these conditions must be applied using the dynamic collision scenario in proposed § 238.705(a). Criteria for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of initial conditions are provided in proposed paragraph (a)(2). Because the same model may be used both to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of § 238.705 and the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must be validated with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, if the components that experience large deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in § 238.705 also experience large deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section is not validated with test data as part of the validation of the model used in § 238.705, then additional validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2).

Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used in the collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing performance. This paragraph provides that all vehicles in both the initially-moving and the initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running heights with the centerlines of the initially-moving and initially-standing trains aligned. Because the centerlines of the colliding vehicles would be aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as appropriate. FRA intends for this initial condition to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned with one another.

Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(ii) describes the second condition to be used in the collision simulation as a 3-inch lateral and 3-inch vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment. The lateral and vertical offsets must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design, capable of preventing climbing when the colliding vehicles are not perfectly aligned. Because this simulation requires a lateral offset between the initially-standing and initially-moving consists, a symmetric boundary condition may not be employed (

i.e.,

the full width of each consist must be modeled).

Proposed paragraph (a)(2) explains the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features for its colliding interface. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii) for demonstrating appropriate resistance to override between colliding equipment. Paragraph (a)(2)(i) would provide that the relative difference in elevation of the underframes between the colliding equipment in the initially-moving and initially-standing train consists may not change by more than 4 inches at any point during the

simulation. Because the initially-standing consist is permitted only longitudinal motion under § 238.705(a)(9), no vehicle in the initially-standing consist will experience any vertical motion. Thus, the change in elevation of the initially-moving trainset's underframe would be measured relative to the underframe of the initially-standing consist. To evaluate this scenario properly, the collision simulation must be run until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-standing consists are moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity.

Proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii) contains the second pass/fail criterion to be met to demonstrate resistance to override between colliding equipment. No tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the initially-moving consist may rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 inches. This condition must be evaluated throughout the duration of the collision simulation, not only at the end of the collision. To evaluate this scenario properly, the collision simulation must be executed until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-standing train consists are moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity.

Proposed paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for demonstrating the appropriate level of override protection for connected equipment in a Tier III trainset. This paragraph would examine the vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under an ideal impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving train are aligned. It also would prescribe an impact scenario where the first coupled interface of the initially-moving train is translated both laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not perfectly aligned.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the ability of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override at the coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision scenario, using the scenario described in § 238.705(a). Like paragraph (a) of this section, each set of conditions in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) must be evaluated independently. Criteria for evaluating the dynamic collision scenario for each set of conditions are in paragraph (b)(2). As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a), because the same model may be used to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of § 238.705 and the requirements of this section, the model must be validated with test data in a way that provides confidence in the validity of the results of the collision analyses. The discussion of model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to model validation for purposes of paragraph (b).

Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be used for collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for connected equipment. This paragraph provides that all vehicles in both the initially-moving and the initially-standing train consists must be positioned at their nominal running heights, with the centerlines of the initially-moving and initially-standing trains aligned. Because the centerlines of the colliding vehicles would be aligned with one another, a longitudinally half-symmetric model may be used to simulate this collision scenario, as appropriate. This initial condition is meant to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding vehicles are initially aligned with one another.

Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) would explain that the second condition to be used in the collision simulation is a 2-inch lateral and 2-inch vertical offset of the first connected interface between vehicles in the initially-moving train. The lateral and vertical offsets must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner would demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design that would prevent climbing when the vehicles in the initially-moving trainset are not perfectly aligned. Because this simulation requires a lateral offset between the vehicles of the initially-moving consist, a symmetric boundary condition may not be used (

i.e.,

the full width of each consist must be modeled).

Proposed paragraph (b)(2) sets out the pass/fail criteria that must be successfully met to demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses adequate anti-climb features to protect the vehicles connected in the trainset from overriding each other. The criteria must be met for each set of initial conditions provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) to demonstrate appropriate resistance to override between connected equipment. Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(i) would provide that the relative difference in elevation of the underframes between the connected equipment in the initially-moving train may not change by more than 4 inches at any point during the simulation. To evaluate this scenario properly, the simulation must be run until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-standing consists are moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity.

The 4-inch vertical difference in paragraph (b)(2)(i) is a pass/fail criterion and must be measured relative to the initial heights of the connected equipment. A change in underframe height in excess of 4 inches would indicate one of the two connected vehicles has begun to climb and override the other.

Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(ii) contains the second pass/fail criterion to be met to demonstrate resistance to override between connected equipment. No tread of any wheel of the initially-moving train may rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 inches. This condition may not be exceeded at any point during the simulation. To evaluate this scenario properly, the simulation must be executed until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-standing consists are moving in the same direction at approximately the same velocity.

Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition

This section proposes requirements for fluid entry inhibition for the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset. The proposed requirements are largely the same as those in § 238.209(a) for Tier I locomotives, including MU locomotives and cab cars. Section 238.209(a) requires that the front end of a Tier I locomotive be covered by a skin equivalent to a half-inch-thick, 25-kilopound-per-square-inch (ksi) steel plate to prevent the entry of fluids into the locomotive cab in the event of a collision. While that specific requirement is easily applied to conventional designs, many of which may still make use of steel sheets for the outer skin, it is more difficult to apply to the complex, aerodynamic shapes of modern passenger trainset front ends, which often are comprised of various structures, including crash energy management elements. Because the consideration of aerodynamics and crash energy management is significant, this section proposes to account for the use of more modern designs and materials to construct a passenger trainset front end so it can be evaluated effectively.

FRA notes that, while this section focuses on the prevention of fluid entry, it also establishes a minimum level of penetration resistance that may be applied more generally. Because this section is based on § 238.209(a), which identifies two important carbody

characteristics for the protection of cab occupants in conventional equipment designs, material thickness and strength, this section offers protection for more hazards than the entry of fluid alone.

Specifically, proposed paragraph (a)(1) provides that the skin covering the front-end structure of a Tier III trainset must maintain a resistance to penetration into the cab equivalent to that of the half-inch-thick sheet of 25-ksi steel plate, as required by § 238.209(a)(1)(i) for Tier I locomotives. This may be achieved using an outer skin of an equivalent strength; a combination of materials between the engineer and the outside environment; or a composite material of a lesser thickness, if an equivalent level of penetration resistance is maintained. To demonstrate compliance, the sum of the thicknesses and material strength of all elements (

e.g.,

skin and structural elements) may be considered, when measured from the structural leading edge of the trainset up to, and including, the interior structural wall of the cab at its weakest location, when projected onto a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer's normal operating position.

By permitting additional methods to achieve equivalent penetration resistance, FRA recognizes that even though most modern designs may make use of lighter weight materials for aerodynamic skins (

e.g.,

aluminum, fiberglass), it does not imply that the protection provided is any less substantial. In fact, the combination of skin, structure, and crash energy management features in front of the engineer may actually provide more protection than the half-inch-thick, 25-ksi steel plate. It is important to note, however, that FRA intends for the performance requirement in this paragraph to be evaluated laterally across the entire width of the cab, including all carbody structures just forward of the engineer's normal operating position. This would demonstrate protection equivalent to that provided by the referenced steel plate exists across the entire width of the cab when projected in front of the engineer. Non-structural elements or features, such as the operating console and insulation materials, would not be taken into account in demonstrating compliance.

Proposed paragraph (a)(2) is derived from the existing requirement for fluid entry inhibition for Tier I locomotives in § 238.209(a)(1)(ii). It would also be applied so it is consistent with the design of modern passenger trainset front end structures. This recognizes that various techniques may be employed to provide fluid entry inhibition characteristics, particularly through the use of flexible and impermeable materials.

Proposed paragraph (a)(3) would complement the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) by prescribing that the required front-end protective skin (or its equivalent) be affixed to the main structural members (

e.g.,

collision and corner posts) to ensure the integrity of the overall front-end structure. In this regard, FRA makes clear that the requirement for front-end protective skin (or its equivalent) is independent of the requirements proposed for the other structural features at the front end of the trainset—and indeed provides an additional layer of protection. Proposed paragraph (a)(3) is also derived from the existing requirement for Tier I locomotives in § 238.209(a)(1)(iii).

Since this section expressly provides flexibility to demonstrate compliance, it inherently allows various means of compliance that could be considered acceptable. Consequently, proposed paragraph (b) would require that, at a minimum, detailed structural drawings be submitted for FRA review, with pertinent calculations to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. FRA believes it is necessary to provide such detail on how the requirements of paragraph (a) are to be met given the expected use of front-end protection in Tier III trainsets equivalent to the steel plate specified in paragraph (a), and in Tier I trainsets designed to alternative crashworthiness standards, as provided in proposed appendix G.

FRA is not aware of any international standard regarding fluid entry inhibition. These proposed requirements are necessary to protect the occupied volume because of the front end structure of Tier I and Tier III equipment as this location is vulnerable in a highway grade crossing collision if a fuel tank that is part of or being transported by the highway vehicle ruptures. See 64 FR

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