Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K
Federal RegisterApr 22, 2016
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 and 249
[Release No. 33-10064; 34-77599; File No. S7-06-16]
RIN 3235-AL78
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K
AGENCY:
Securities and Exchange Commission.
ACTION:
Concept release.
SUMMARY:
The Commission is publishing this concept release to seek public comment on modernizing certain business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K. These disclosure requirements serve as the foundation for the business and financial disclosure in registrants' periodic reports. This concept release is part of an initiative by the Division of Corporation Finance to review the disclosure requirements applicable to registrants to consider ways to improve the requirements for the benefit of investors and registrants.
DATES:
Comments should be received on or before July 21, 2016.
ADDRESSES:
Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission's Internet comment form (
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept.shtml
);
• Send an email to
rule-comments@sec.gov
. Please include File Number S7-06-16 on the subject line; or
• Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (
http://www.regulations.gov
). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-06-16. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Web site (
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept.shtml
). Comments also are available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted without change; we do not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make publicly available.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Angie Kim, Special Counsel in the Office of Rulemaking, at (202) 551-3430, in the Division of Corporation Finance; 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Relevant History and Background
A. History of Regulation S-K
B. Broad Economic Considerations
C. Prior Regulation S-K Modernization Initiatives and Studies
III. Disclosure Framework
A. Basis for Our Disclosure Requirements
1. Statutory Mandates
2. Commission Responses to Market Developments
B. Nature of Our Disclosure Requirements
1. Principles-Based and Prescriptive Disclosure Requirements
2. Audience for Disclosure
3. Compliance and Competitive Costs
IV. Information for Investment and Voting Decisions
A. Core Company Business Information
1. General Development of Business (Item 101(a)(1))
2. Narrative Description of Business (Item 101(c))
3. Technology and Intellectual Property Rights (Item 101(c)(1)(iv))
4. Government Contracts and Regulation, Including Environmental Laws (Items 101(c)(1)(ix) and (c)(1)(xii))
5. Number of Employees (Item 101(c)(1)(xiii))
6. Description of Property (Item 102)
B. Company Performance, Financial Information and Future Prospects
1. Selected Financial Data (Item 301)
2. Supplementary Financial Information (Item 302)
3. Content and Focus of MD&A (Item 303—Generally)
4. Results of Operations (Item 303(a)(3))
5. Liquidity and Capital Resources (Item 303(a)(1) and (a)(2))
6. Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements (Item 303(a)(4))
7. Contractual Obligations (Item 303(a)(5))
8. Critical Accounting Estimates
C. Risk and Risk Management
1. Risk Factors (Item 503(c))
2. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk (Item 305)
3. Disclosure of Approach to Risk Management and Risk Management Process
4. Consolidating Risk-Related Disclosure
D. Securities of the Registrant
1. Related Stockholder Matters—Number of Equity Holders (Item 201(b))
2. Description of Capital Stock (Item 202)
3. Recent Sales of Unregistered Securities (Items 701(a)-(e))
4. Use of Proceeds From Registered Securities (Item 701(f))
5. Purchases of Equity Securities by the Issuer and Affiliated Purchasers (Item 703)
E. Industry Guides
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
F. Disclosure of Information Relating to Public Policy and Sustainability Matters
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
G. Exhibits
1. Request for Comment
2. Schedules and Attachments to Exhibits
3. Amendments to Exhibits
4. Changes to Exhibits (Instruction 1 to Item 601)
5. Material Contracts (Item 601(b)(10))
6. Preferability Letter (Item 601(b)(18))
7. Subsidiaries and Legal Entity Identifiers
H. Scaled Requirements
1. Categories of Registrants Eligible for Scaled Disclosure
2. Scaled Disclosure Requirements for Eligible Registrants
3. Frequency of Interim Reporting
V. Presentation and Delivery of Important Information
A. Cross-Referencing
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
B. Incorporation by Reference
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
C. Hyperlinks
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
D. Company Web Sites
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
E. Specific Formatting Requirements
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
F. Layered Disclosure
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
G. Structured Disclosures
1. Comments Received
2. Discussion
3. Request for Comment
VI. Conclusion
I. Introduction
Regulation S-K was adopted to foster uniform and integrated disclosure for registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), registration statements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), and other Exchange Act filings, including periodic and current reports.
1
Over thirty years ago, the Commission expanded and reorganized Regulation S-K to be the
central repository for its non-financial statement disclosure requirements.
2
When adopting the integrated disclosure system, the Commission's goals were to reduce the costs to registrants and eliminate duplicative disclosures while continuing to provide material information.
3
In this concept release, we revisit the business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K. We seek to assess whether they continue to provide the information that investors need to make informed investment and voting decisions and whether any of our rules have become outdated or unnecessary.
1
See
Item 10(a) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.10].
2
See
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Release No. 33-6383 (Mar. 3, 1982) [47 FR 11380 (Mar. 16, 1982)] (“1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release”).
3
See id.
We focus this release on business and financial disclosures that registrants provide in their periodic reports, which are a subset of the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K.
4
We focus on these requirements because many of them have changed little since they were first adopted. We are not at this time revisiting other disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K, such as executive compensation and governance, or the required disclosures for foreign private issuers, business development companies, or other categories of registrants. Although the specific scope of this concept release is as indicated, we welcome and encourage comments on any other disclosure topics not specifically addressed in this concept release.
4
The scope of this release does not include certain disclosure requirements for information other than business and financial disclosures, such as Subpart 400, which requires disclosure about management and certain security holders as well as corporate governance matters. We also have not included offering-specific disclosure requirements under Subpart 500, which generally apply to registration statements and prospectuses but not periodic reports.
This release begins with a discussion of the regulatory history of the integrated disclosure system and Regulation S-K as well as an overview of prior initiatives to review and modernize our disclosure requirements. We then present the framework for our current disclosure regime and explore potential alternative approaches. We proceed to review the business and financial disclosure requirements that apply to periodic reports. We first consider what financial and business information should be required and whether any of these requirements are appropriate to scale for smaller registrants. We then explore how registrants can most effectively present this information to improve its usefulness to investors. In this release, we consider input we have received from letters submitted in response to disclosure modernization efforts
5
as well as the staff's experience with particular disclosure requirements, regulatory history and changes in the regulatory and business landscape since the rule's adoption.
5
See infra
notes 9 to 10 and accompanying text.
Through this release, we are reviewing and seeking public comment on whether our business and financial disclosure requirements continue to elicit important information for investors and how registrants can most effectively present this information. We are specifically seeking comment on:
• Whether, and if so, how specific disclosures are important or useful to making investment and voting decisions and whether more, less or different information might be needed;
• whether, and if so how, we could revise our current requirements to enhance the information provided to investors while considering whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation;
6
6
Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(f)] requires that, whenever the Commission is engaged in rulemaking under the Exchange Act and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and capital formation. Section 2(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77b(b)] sets forth this same requirement.
See also
Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2)].
• whether, and if so how, we could revise our requirements to enhance the protection of investors;
• whether our current requirements appropriately balance the costs of disclosure with the benefits;
• whether, and if so how, we could lower the cost to registrants of providing information to investors, including considerations such as advancements in technology and communications;
• whether and if so, how we could increase the benefits to investors and facilitate investor access to disclosure by modernizing the methods used to present, aggregate and disseminate disclosure; and
• any challenges of our current disclosure requirements and those that may result from possible regulatory responses explored in this release or suggested by commenters.
While we set forth a number of general and specific questions, we welcome comments from investors, registrants and other market participants on any other concerns related to our disclosure requirements. In addition to comments received on this release, we will consider any input from investor focus group studies or surveys, the Investor Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies.
This concept release is part of a comprehensive evaluation of the Commission's disclosure requirements recommended in the staff's Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K (“S-K Study”), which was mandated by Section 108 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).
7
Based on the S-K Study's recommendation and at the request of Commission Chair Mary Jo White,
8
Commission staff initiated a comprehensive evaluation of the type of information our rules require registrants to disclose, how this information is presented, where and how this information is disclosed and how we can leverage technology as part of these efforts (collectively, “Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative”). The overall objective of the Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative is to improve our disclosure regime for both investors and registrants.
7
Public Law 112-106, Sec. 108, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). Section 108 of the JOBS Act required the Commission to conduct a review of Regulation S-K to determine how such requirements can be updated to modernize and simplify the registration process for emerging growth companies (“EGCs”). For a further discussion of the S-K Study,
see
Section II.C.
8
See SEC Issues Staff Report on Public Company Disclosure
(Dec. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540530982
.
In connection with the S-K Study
9
and the subsequent launch of the Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative,
10
we received public comments on various topics discussed in this release. Below and elsewhere throughout this release, we discuss these comments as further context for the topics under consideration. Comments received in connection with the Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative that are outside the scope of this release are not discussed here. These comment letters are being considered as part of the staff's continued evaluation of Regulation S-K
from which the staff expects to make further recommendations to the Commission for consideration.
9
In connection with the S-K Study, we received public comments on regulatory initiatives to be undertaken in response to the JOBS Act.
See
Comments on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title I—Review of Regulation S-K,
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-i/reviewreg-sk/reviewreg-sk.shtml
.
Some of the comments received in connection with the S-K Study were specific to EGCs.
10
To facilitate public input on the Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, members of the public were invited to submit comments. Public comments we have received to date on the topic of Disclosure Effectiveness are available on our Web site.
See
Comments on Disclosure Effectiveness,
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/disclosure-effectiveness/disclosureeffectiveness.shtml
.
The staff is also working on recommendations for our consideration to propose specific revisions to update or simplify certain of our business and financial disclosure requirements, as required by the recently enacted Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (“FAST Act”).
11
Those recommendations relate to specific proposals to help address “duplicative, overlapping, outdated or unnecessary” disclosure and are not specifically addressed in this concept release, which seeks to explore both general considerations and specific questions that we believe would benefit from further evaluation and input before proposing any changes to the related rules.
12
11
Public Law 114-94, Sec. 72002, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
12
Id.
II. Relevant History and Background
A. History of Regulation S-K
Regulation S-K
Enactment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act resulted in the creation of two separate disclosure regimes. These disclosure regimes remained distinct for approximately thirty years and often resulted in overlapping and duplicative disclosure requirements. Regulation S-K reflects the Commission's efforts to harmonize disclosure required under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act by creating a single repository for disclosure regulation that applies to filings by registrants under both statutes.
The current integrated disclosure system resulted from a series of efforts triggered by a 1964 amendment to the Exchange Act,
13
which added Section 12(g) to the Exchange Act and extended the Exchange Act's reporting requirements to companies meeting specified thresholds, including those that were not exchange listed.
14
In light of the Exchange Act's broadened reporting requirements, Professor Milton Cohen suggested in a seminal 1966 law review article greater coordination between the Securities Act and Exchange Act.
15
He recommended that the continuous reporting obligations under the Exchange Act serve as the foundation for corporate disclosure while relaxing or eliminating overlapping Securities Act disclosure requirements.
16
13
See, e.g.,
Disclosure to Investors—A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts, Policy Study,
Mar. 27, 1969,
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/tbi/gogo_d.php
(“Wheat Report”) (stating that one of the reasons for a broad re-examination of disclosure policy was the 1964 amendment to the Exchange Act).
See also infra
note 15.
14
15 U.S.C. 781(g). Congress enacted Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act in 1964, which required an issuer to register a class of securities under Section 12(g) if the securities were “held of record” by 500 or more persons and the issuer had total assets exceeding $1 million. Prior to the enactment of Section 12(g), the Exchange Act reporting requirements were applicable only to listed companies. The Commission used its authority under Section 12(h) to raise the asset threshold for Section 12(g) registration from $1 million to $3 million in 1982, $5 million in 1986 and $10 million in 1996.
As a result of amendments made by the JOBS Act and the FAST Act, Section 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act now requires an issuer that is not a bank, bank holding company, or savings and loan holding company to register a class of equity securities if the securities are held of record by either (i) 2,000 persons, or (ii) 500 persons who are not accredited investors and the issuer has total assets exceeding $10 million. Banks, bank holding companies and savings and loan holding companies with total assets exceeding $10 million must register a class of equity securities if the securities are held of record by 2,000 or more persons. Public Law 112-106, Sec. 501, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) and Public Law 114-94, Sec. 85001, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
15
See
Milton H. Cohen,
“Truth in Securities” Revisited,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1350 (1966) (“With the 1934 Act now extended to thousands of additional companies by the 1964 Amendments, the need of a reexamination with an eye to coordination of the 1934 Act with the earlier one is all the greater”).
16
See id.
at 1341-42, stating “[i]t is my thesis that the combined disclosure requirement of these statutes would have been quite different if the 1933 and 1934 Acts (the latter as extended in 1964) had been enacted in opposite order, or had been enacted as a single, integrated statute—that is, if the starting point had been a statutory scheme of continuous disclosures covering issuers of actively traded securities and the question of special disclosures in connection with public offerings had been faced in this setting. Accordingly, it is my plea that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure system having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the 1934 Act and treating “1933 Act” disclosure needs on this foundation.”
Subsequent to the publication of this article, the Commission initiated several studies that advanced efforts to integrate the Securities Act and Exchange Act disclosure regimes. These efforts included the Disclosure Policy Study led by Commissioner Francis Wheat
17
and the report issued by the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure led by former Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. (“Sommer Report”).
18
In 1969, the Wheat Report concurred with Cohen's proposal for a coordinated disclosure system. It recommended an enhanced degree of coordination between the disclosures required by the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and formulated specific proposals for integrating disclosure between the two Acts.
19
In 1977, the Sommer Report suggested adopting a single, integrated disclosure system and recommended developing one coordinated disclosure form.
20
17
See supra
note 13.
18
See Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Cmte. Print 95-29, House Cmte. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess (Nov. 3, 1977)
available at http://opc-ad-ils/InmagicGenie/DocumentFolder/report%20of%20the%20advisory%20committee%20on%20corporate%20disclosure%20to%20the%20sec%2011011977.pdf.
19
See generally
Wheat Report.
20
See
Sommer Report at 420-432.
Following the Sommer Report, the Commission adopted the first version of Regulation S-K, which included only two disclosure requirements—a description of business and a description of properties.
21
While additional disclosure requirements were added in 1978 and 1980,
22
Regulation S-K was significantly expanded and reorganized in 1982 as the repository for the uniform non-financial statement disclosure requirements under both the Securities Act and Exchange Act.
23
With this expansion and reorganization, the Commission moved much of the guidance in the prior Industry Guides into Regulation S-K and amended the forms and schedules to reference requirements in Regulation S-K.
24
21
See
Adoption of Disclosure Regulation and Amendments of Disclosure Forms and Rules, Release No. 33-5893 (Dec. 23, 1977) [42 FR 65554 (Dec. 30, 1977)] (“1977 Regulation S-K Adopting Release”).
22
See
S-K Study at 10, footnote 27.
23
See id.
at 10, footnote 28.
24
For a discussion of the Industry Guides,
see infra
notes 639 to 644 and accompanying text.
Many of the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K originated in Schedule A of the Securities Act, which lists 27 items that must be disclosed in a registration statement and prospectus.
25
Section 7 of the Securities Act provides that the registration statement shall contain the information and be accompanied by the documents specified in Schedule A, except the Commission may exercise its rulemaking authority to prescribe additional information or may permit prescribed information to be omitted as it deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
26
Over the years, the Commission has exercised this authority to adopt various registration forms and disclosure requirements. While many of the disclosure requirements currently in Regulation S-K originated in Schedule A, the Commission has amended Regulation S-K numerous times since its adoption.
27
25
15 U.S.C. 77aa. Schedule A requires companies to provide information such as: General information about the company, its business and capital structure; information about the directors, principal officers, promoters and ten percent stockholders and remuneration of officers and directors; information about the offering; financial statements of the company and of any business to be acquired through the proceeds of the issue; and copies of agreements made with underwriters, opinions of counsel on legality of the issue, material contracts, the company's organizational documents and agreements or indentures affecting any securities offered.
26
15 U.S.C. 77g.
27
For a comprehensive discussion of prior revisions to Regulation S-K, please see Sections II and III of the S-K Study at 8-92.
B. Broad Economic Considerations
The purpose of corporate disclosure is to provide investors with information they need to make informed investment and voting decisions. Lowering information asymmetries between managers of companies and investors may enhance capital formation and the allocative efficiency of the capital markets. In particular, disclosure of information that is important for investment and voting decisions may lead to more accurate share prices, discourage fraud, heighten monitoring of the managers of companies, and increase liquidity. Effective disclosure requirements also should increase the integrity of securities markets, build investor confidence, and support the provision of capital to the market. In addition, such requirements can facilitate the coordination of registrants around consistent disclosure standards, increasing the efficiency with which investors can process the information.
There are potential drawbacks associated with disclosure requirements. Disclosure can be costly for registrants to produce and disseminate, and disclosure of certain sensitive information can result in competitive disadvantages. There is also a possibility that high levels of immaterial disclosure can obscure important information or reduce incentives for certain market participants to trade or create markets for securities. The appropriate choice of disclosure requirements therefore involves certain tradeoffs. These tradeoffs may depend on the nature of the audience for disclosure and the characteristics of registrants.
Markets are composed of a broad spectrum of investors with different information needs. Some investors may be highly sophisticated and have access to substantial resources to process and interpret data, while others may lack sophistication or have fewer resources to process and interpret data. Investors also may differ in their reliance on disclosure or on third-party analyses of disclosure. The breadth of the audience for disclosure may inform choices about what information is important to investment and voting decisions and should therefore be disclosed. The diversity of the audience for disclosure, and how different subsets of this audience access and digest information about registrants, will also affect decisions about how best to format and disseminate disclosure.
The trade-off between the benefits and costs of disclosure requirements may vary across different types of registrants. For example, to the extent that our disclosure requirements impose fixed costs, they may impose a disproportionate burden on smaller registrants. At the same time, these registrants may have relatively simple operations and thus be able to promote an understanding of their business and financial condition with less disclosure than larger, more complex registrants. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to provide disclosure accommodations for certain types of registrants, while remaining cognizant of the potential adverse impacts that reduced disclosure may have on capital formation and the allocative efficiency of the capital markets.
The benefits associated with disclosing certain items of information may be greater in some cases than in others, such as when an item of disclosure reflects an important part of one registrant's operations but an immaterial part of another's. In this context, it may be important to consider various approaches to trigger disclosure where it is more likely to be important, rather than in all cases. It may also be useful to have disclosure requirements, or guidance in fulfilling these requirements, that are specific to certain industries or other subsets of registrants. We seek to understand if disclosure requirements can be more appropriately tailored to registrants given the likely variation across registrants in the benefits and the costs of disclosing certain types of information. We discuss specific economic considerations in more detail below.
C. Prior Regulation S-K Modernization Initiatives and Studies
From time to time, the Commission has assessed its disclosure requirements. Several of these studies focused on modernizing or simplifying disclosure requirements. Other initiatives focused on different aspects of the regulatory framework, such as the securities offering process or the financial reporting system, but had the effect of raising disclosure issues for further consideration or shaping current disclosure requirements. The Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative builds upon these prior studies and initiatives.
Task Force on Disclosure Simplification
The Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (“Task Force”), comprising staff from across the Commission, was formed in 1995 to review regulations affecting capital formation with a view towards “streamlining, simplifying, and modernizing the overall regulatory scheme without compromising or diminishing important investor protections.”
28
In its report to the Commission in 1996, the Task Force recommended the Commission “eliminate or modify many rules and forms, and simplify several key aspects of securities offerings.”
29
Based on the Task Force's recommendations, the Commission rescinded forty-five rules and six forms and adopted other minor or technical rule changes to eliminate unnecessary requirements and to streamline the disclosure process.
30
28
See Report of the Task Force on Disclosure Simplification,
available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm
(Mar. 5, 1996) (“Task Force Report”). To facilitate its review, the Task Force met with issuers, investor groups, underwriters, accounting firms, law firms and other active participants in the capital markets.
29
See id.
stating “ . . . recommendations [of the task force] roughly fall into three categories: (1) Weeding out forms and regulations that are duplicative of other requirements or have outlived their usefulness; (2) Requiring more readable and informative disclosure documents; and (3) Reducing the cost of securities offerings and increasing access of smaller companies to the securities markets.”
30
See
Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, Release No. 33-7300 (May 31, 1996) [61 FR 30397 (June 14, 1996)] (“Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification Release”). For example, changes to Regulation S-K included eliminating four infrequently used (or otherwise already available) items from the list of required exhibits in Item 601(b) (opinion regarding discount on capital shares, opinion regarding liquidation preference, material foreign patents, and information from reports furnished to state insurance regulatory authorities).
See also
Phase Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, Release No. 33-7431 (July 18, 1997) [62 FR 43581 (Aug. 14, 1997)] (“Phase Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification Release”) (rescinding two forms and one rule and amending a number of rules and forms). The Commission further implemented certain of the recommendations in the Task Force Report relating to accounting disclosure rules that were identified as being largely duplicative of U.S. GAAP or other Commission rules.
The Task Force also made the following recommendations on Regulation S-K:
• Streamline Item 101's description of business disclosure by eliminating duplication of quantitative information about business segments and foreign operations provided in the financial statements;
• revise Item 102's description of property disclosure to elicit “more meaningful and material disclosure;” and
• eliminate Item 103's instruction to replace the $100,000 standard with a general materiality standard for certain environmental legal proceedings to ensure registrants will not be required to disclose non-material information.
31
31
The Task Force also generally recommended adjusting certain dollar thresholds in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X for inflation since the time of their adoption. The Task Force cited, among other items, the $50,000 threshold in Item 509 of Regulation S-K (relating to disclosure of payments to experts and counsel) [17 CFR 229.509] and the $100,000 threshold in Rule 3-11 of Regulation S-X (relating to the definition of an inactive registrant) [17 CFR 210.3-11].
See
Task Force Report.
While the Commission made a number of changes in response to the Task Force recommendations, the three items identified above were not adopted by the Commission. We revisit some of these issues in the questions presented below.
Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Process
Also in 1995, the Commission established the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes (“1995 Advisory Committee”) to advise on, among other things, the regulatory process and disclosure requirements for public offerings. The 1995 Advisory Committee's primary recommendation was implementing a system of “company registration.”
32
32
Under a “company registration” system, a company would, on a one-time basis, file a registration statement (deemed effective immediately) that includes information similar to that currently provided in an initial short-form shelf registration statement. This registration statement could then be used for all types of securities and all types of offerings. All current and future Exchange Act reports would be incorporated by reference into that registration statement, and around the time of an offering, transactional and updating disclosures would be filed with the Commission and incorporated into the registration statement. As part of this “company registration” system, companies would be required to adopt certain disclosure enhancements (and encouraged to adopt others) that seek to improve the quality and timeliness of disclosure provided to investors and the markets.
See
Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Release No. 33-7314 (July 25, 1996) [61 FR 40044 (July 31, 1996)] (“Securities Act Concept Release”).
Noting the Task Force Report, the 1995 Advisory Committee did not focus on specific line-item disclosure requirements but suggested disclosure enhancements as part of its recommendations for a system of “company registration.” These enhancements included a management certification to the Commission for all periodic and current reports, a management's report to the audit committee to be filed as an exhibit to the Form 10-K, expansion of current reporting obligations on Form 8-K and a risk factor disclosure requirement in Form 10-K.
33
33
See Report of The Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes
(July 24, 1996),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm
.
After receiving reports from both the Task Force and the 1995 Advisory Committee, the Commission issued a concept release on regulation of the securities offering process and also sought input on the 1995 Advisory Committee's proposed disclosure enhancements.
34
34
See
the Securities Act Concept Release. Many of the issues raised in the concept release were revisited in the Commission's 1998 proposal to modernize the securities offering process (known as the “Aircraft Carrier” release), and in the Commission's 2005 Securities Offering Reform rulemaking. Some of the proposals from the Aircraft Carrier release were later adopted. For example, the Aircraft Carrier release recommended inclusion of risk factor disclosure in Exchange Act registration statements and annual reports. This recommendation was adopted as part of Securities Offering Reform.
See
The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Release No. 33-7606A (Nov. 17, 1998) [63 FR 67174 (Dec. 4, 1998)] (“Aircraft Carrier Release”) and Securities Offering Reform, Release No. 33-8591 (July 19, 2005) [70 FR 44722 (Aug. 3, 2005)] (“Securities Offering Reform Release”).
Plain English
In 1998, the Commission adopted rules intended to improve the readability of prospectuses by promoting clear, concise and understandable disclosure (“Plain English Rules”).
35
These rules required registrants to write the cover page, summary and risk factors section of prospectuses in plain English
36
and were extended to Exchange Act reports in 2005.
37
35
See
Plain English Disclosure, Release No. 33-7497 (Jan. 28, 1998) [63 FR 6370 (Feb. 6, 1998)] (“Plain English Disclosure Adopting Release”).
36
Id.
37
See
Securities Offering Reform Release. As part of the Securities Offering Reform Release, Form 10-K was amended to require risk factor disclosure to be written in accordance with the same Plain English Rules that apply to risk factor disclosure in Securities Act registration statements.
See also
Part I, Item 1A of Form 10-K.
Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting
In 2007, the Commission chartered the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (“CIFiR Advisory Committee”) to examine the U.S. financial reporting system.
38
While the CIFiR Advisory Committee did not recommend specific changes to Regulation S-K, several of its suggestions sought to improve the usefulness of information in periodic reports.
39
The Commission adopted some of these suggestions, which included updating the Commission's interpretive guidance on use of electronic media for disseminating information on a registrant's financial performance
40
and adopting rules to require filing of interactive data-tagged financial statements.
41
38
The dual goals of the CIFiR Advisory Committee were “to examine the U.S. financial reporting system in order to make recommendations intended to increase the usefulness of financial information to investors, while reducing the complexity of the financial reporting system to investors, preparers, and auditors.”
See Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(Aug. 1, 2008), (“CIFiR Advisory Committee Report”),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/acifr/acifr-finalreport.pdf
.
39
See
CIFiR Advisory Committee Report (stating that “[i]ncreasing the usefulness of information in SEC reports” was one of five themes underlying the CIFiR Advisory Committee's recommendations).
40
In 2008, the Commission published interpretive guidance on the use of company Web sites as a means for companies to communicate and provide information to investors in compliance with the federal securities laws and, in particular, the Exchange Act.
See
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web sites, Release No. 34-58288 (Aug. 1, 2008) [73 FR 45862 (Aug. 7, 2008)] (“2008 Web site Guidance”). When it published the 2008 Web site Guidance, the Commission noted that the guidance was prompted, in part, by the CIFiR Advisory Committee's efforts.
41
In 2008, the Commission announced the 21st Century Disclosure Initiative, with the goal of preparing a plan for future action to modernize the Commission's disclosure system. The Initiative's report, issued in 2009, recommended a new disclosure system in which interactive data would replace plain-text disclosure documents while retaining the substantive content and filing schedule of the current system.
See 21st Century Disclosure Initiative: Staff Report, Toward Greater Transparency: Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission's Disclosure System
(Jan. 2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/disclosureinitiative/report.pdf
.
The Commission adopted rules in 2009 requiring companies to provide financial statement information in interactive data format using the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (“XBRL”) format.
See
Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, Release No. 33-9002 (Jan. 20, 2009) [74 FR 6776 (Feb. 10, 2009)] (“Interactive Data Release”). This adopting release notes the CIFiR Advisory Committee's recommendation to require filing of interactive data-tagged financial statements.
JOBS Act Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K
The JOBS Act required the Commission to review Regulation S-K to determine how its disclosure requirements can be updated to modernize and simplify the registration process for EGCs.
42
In response to this mandate, Commission staff published the S-K Study in December 2013. Although the Congressional mandate
focused on EGCs, the report was intended to facilitate the improvement of disclosure requirements applicable to companies at all stages of development.
43
42
Public Law 112-106, Sec. 108, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). For a discussion of EGCs, including the definition of “emerging growth company,” see Section IV.H.1.
43
See
S-K Study at 4.
The S-K Study recommended a comprehensive review of disclosure requirements in the Commission's rules and forms, including Regulations S-K and S-X, and identified specific areas for further review.
44
It also recommended the Commission consider the following principles when reviewing and evaluating changes to disclosure requirements:
44
See id
at 92-104. The S-K Study identified four issues for further study: (1) Generally, any recommended revisions should emphasize a principles-based approach as an overarching component of the disclosure framework while preserving the benefits of a rules-based system; (2) any review of the disclosure requirements should evaluate the appropriateness of current scaled disclosure requirements and consider whether further scaling is appropriate for EGCs or other categories of companies; (3) any review of the disclosure requirements should evaluate methods of information delivery and presentation, both through EDGAR and other means; and (4) any review of disclosure requirements should consider ways to present information to improve the readability and navigability of disclosure and explore methods for discouraging repetition and disclosure of immaterial information. As to this fourth issue, the S-K Study suggested reevaluating quantitative thresholds and other materiality standards in Regulation S-K as well as reassessing requirements for information that is readily accessible, such as historical stock price information.
Id.
at 97-98.
• Improving and maintaining the informativeness of disclosure;
• historical objectives of the rule and their continued or recurring relevance;
• whether the required information is available on a non-discriminatory basis from reliable sources and, if so, any costs or benefits from obtaining the information other than from the registrant;
• administrative and compliance costs of the requirements;
• any competitive or economic costs of disclosing proprietary information;
• maintenance of the Commission's ability to conduct an effective enforcement program and deter fraud; and
• importance of maintaining investor confidence in the reliability of registrant information, in order to, among other things, encourage capital formation.
45
45
See id.
at 94-95.
FAST Act Disclosure Modernization and Simplification
Under the FAST Act,
46
the Commission is required to carry out a study to determine how best to modernize and simplify the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K and to propose revisions to those requirements.
47
The FAST Act requires that the study of Regulation S-K:
46
Public Law 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
47
Public Law 114-94, Sec. 72003, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015).
• Emphasize a company-by-company approach that allows relevant and material information to be disseminated to investors without boilerplate language or static requirements while preserving completeness and comparability of information across registrants; and
• evaluate methods of information delivery and presentation and explore methods for discouraging repetition and the disclosure of immaterial information.
In conducting this study, the Commission is required to consult with the Investor Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies and to issue a report of findings and recommendations to Congress.
48
The FAST Act also requires the Commission to revise Regulation S-K to further scale or eliminate requirements to reduce the burden on EGCs, accelerated filers, smaller reporting companies (“SRCs”), and other smaller issuers, while still providing all material information to investors, and to eliminate duplicative, overlapping, outdated or superseded provisions.
49
48
Id.
49
Public Law 114-94, Sec. 72002, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015). The required revisions would not apply to provisions for which the Commission determines that further study is necessary to determine their efficacy.
Consistent with the S-K Study's recommendations and the FAST Act mandates, and in furtherance of the Commission's prior modernization studies and initiatives, we seek to evaluate components of our disclosure framework and revisit certain of our business and financial disclosure requirements to assess whether they continue to provide investors with information that is important to making informed investment and voting decisions. We also seek to evaluate whether current disclosure requirements should be revised to include different formats to facilitate the readability and navigability of disclosure, which we discuss in Section V of the release.
III. Disclosure Framework
A. Basis for Our Disclosure Requirements
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act authorize the Commission to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
50
The Commission has used this authority to require disclosure of information it believes is important to investors in both registration statements for public offerings and in ongoing reports.
50
See generally,
Sections 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77g(a)(10), 77j; and 77s(a)]; and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(b), 78
l,
78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a)].
1. Statutory Mandates
The Securities Act and Exchange Act
A central goal of the federal securities laws is full and fair disclosure.
51
In enacting these laws, Congress recognized that investors must have access to accurate information important to making investment and voting decisions in order for the financial markets to function effectively. Thus, our disclosure rules are intended not only to protect investors but also to facilitate capital formation and maintain fair, orderly and efficient capital markets.
51
See
Preamble of the Securities Act (stating it is an Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.). In enacting the mandatory disclosure system under the Exchange Act, Congress sought to promote complete and accurate information in the secondary trading markets.
See
S. Rep. No. 73-1455, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934 at 68 (stating “[o]ne of the prime concerns of the exchanges should be to make available to the public, honest, complete, and correct information regarding the securities listed”) and H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934 at 11 (stating “[t]here cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”).
Schedule A of the Securities Act sets forth certain items of disclosure to be included in registration statements filed in public offerings and provides the basis for many of the disclosure requirements currently in Regulation S-K. Items in Schedule A are largely financial in nature and were intended to help investors assess a security's value. According to the House Report that preceded the Securities Act:
The items required to be disclosed . . . are items indispensable to any accurate judgment upon the value of a security . . . The type of information required to be disclosed is of a character comparable to that demanded by competent bankers from their borrowers, and has been worked out in light of these and other requirements. They are . . . adequate to bring into full glare of publicity those elements of real and unreal values which may lie behind a security.
52
52
H.R Rep. No. 73-85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1933.
The Exchange Act requires similar business and financial information to be
disclosed in Exchange Act registration statements and periodic reports.
53
53
See
Section 12(b)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78l].
In addition to mandating certain disclosure requirements, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act grant the Commission authority to modify and supplement these requirements as necessary or appropriate to implement the purpose of the statutes.
54
Moreover, whenever it is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider whether the action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission must consider whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
55
54
See, e.g.,
Sections 19(a) and 28 of the Securities Act and Sections 3(b), 23(a)(1) and 36(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. [15 U.S.C. 77s(a), 15 U.S.C. 77z-3] and [15 U.S.C. 78c(b), 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1)]. Section 19(a) of the Securities Act and Section 23(a)(1) of the Exchange Act grant the Commission authority to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of each title; Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act provides that the Commission shall have power to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in the Exchange Act, consistently with the provisions and purposes of the Exchange Act; Section 28 of the Securities Act and Section 36(a)(1) of the Exchange Act provide that the Commission may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of each title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.
55
See, e.g.,
Section 2(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77b(b)] and Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(f)].
See also
Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2)].
Business and Financial Legislation
From time to time, Congress has introduced additional disclosure requirements through other statutory mandates. Recent mandates have focused on corporate responsibility, corporate governance and providing enhanced business and financial information to investors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”)
56
mandated numerous changes to strengthen the accountability of public companies for their financial disclosure and required substantial Commission rulemaking to implement its provisions, many of which resulted in additions to Regulation S-K.
57
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)
58
required the Commission to adopt an array of disclosure provisions on corporate governance, executive compensation and specialized disclosure.
59
56
Public Law 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
57
See
S-K Study at 21-23, footnotes 57-62 and corresponding text for a discussion of additions made to Regulation S-K as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
58
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
59
See
S-K Study at 28-29, footnotes 73-77 and corresponding text for a discussion of provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that impact requirements in Regulation S-K.
Other Legislation
In some instances, Congress has mandated disclosure that is not necessarily financial in nature. These mandates have ranged from broad policy considerations to prescriptive directives. For example, under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),
60
Congress required all federal agencies to include consideration of the environment in regulatory action. In response to this mandate, the Commission adopted environmental compliance and litigation disclosure requirements.
61
Similarly, Section 1503 of the Dodd-Frank Act required registrants to include information about mine safety and health in their periodic reports. Although the disclosure requirements in Section 1503 were self-executing,
62
the Act authorized the Commission to issue such rules or regulations as necessary for the protection of investors and to carry out the purposes of Section 1503.
63
To facilitate consistent compliance, the Commission adopted rules to codify the statutory disclosure requirements.
64
More recently, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRSHRA”) requires registrants to disclose certain business activities relating to Iran in their periodic reports.
65
60
42 U.S.C. 4321-4347.
61
As a result of NEPA, the Commission issued an interpretive release in 1971 alerting companies to potential disclosure obligations that could arise from material environmental litigation and the material effects of compliance with environmental laws. The Commission later adopted more specific disclosure requirements relating to these matters and, in 1976, the Commission amended its forms to require disclosure of any material estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities.
See
Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Release No. 33-5170 (July 19, 1971) [36 FR 13989 (July 29, 1971)], Disclosure with Respect to Compliance with Environmental Requirements and Other Matters, Release No. 33-5386 (April 20, 1973) [38 FR 12100 (May 9, 1973)], Disclosure of Environmental and Other Socially Significant Matters, Release No. 33-5569 (Feb. 11, 1975) [40 FR 7013 (Feb. 18, 1975)] (“Notice of Public Proceedings on Environmental Disclosure Release”), Conclusions and Final Action on Rulemaking Proposals Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Release No. 33-5704 (May 6, 1976) [41 FR 21632 (May 27, 1976)] (“1976 Environmental Release”),
Natural Resources Defense Council et al.,
v.
SEC,
389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) (“Natural Resources Defense Council”).
62
See
Section 1503(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The disclosure requirements took effect 30 days after enactment of the Act.
63
Id.
at Section 1503(d)(2).
64
See
Mine Safety Disclosure, Release No. 33-9286 (Dec. 21, 2011) [76 FR 81762 (Dec. 28, 2011)] (“Mine Safety Disclosure Release”).
65
Public Law 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012). Section 219 of ITRSHRA amended Section 13 of the Exchange Act to add subsection (r). This subsection requires a company that files annual and quarterly reports under Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act to provide disclosure if, during the reporting period, it or any of its affiliates knowingly engaged in certain specified activities involving contacts with or support for Iran or other identified persons involved in terrorism or the creation of weapons of mass destruction. ITRSHRA was self-executing and required no substantive rulemaking by the Commission.
2. Commission Responses to Market Developments
Our disclosure regime includes requirements that we have adopted in response to market developments or advancements in technology. In response to the disorderly markets and damage to investors caused by the hot issue securities markets between 1967 and 1971, the Commission initiated hearings to determine the adequacy of existing disclosure requirements
66
and adopted new disclosure requirements to elicit more meaningful information concerning all registrants and to communicate more effectively the economic realities of new registrants.
67
Similarly, in 1994 in response to significant and sometimes unexpected losses in market risk sensitive instruments due to, among other things, changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates and commodity prices, the Commission adopted Item 305 (quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risk).
68
66
Hot issues result when the price of a new issuance of securities rises to a substantial premium over the initial offering price immediately or soon after the securities are first distributed to the public. In 1967-1971, the new issues markets experienced a resurgence.
See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning the Hot Issues Markets,
August 1984,
available at http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1984_0801_SECHotIssuesT.pdf
. Between 1968 and 1970, the value of stocks traded on national securities exchanges fell a total of $78.8 billion, from $759.5 billion to $680.7 billion.
See
Securities and Exchange Commission, Thirty-Seventh Annual Report, appendix Table 5 at 221 (1971)
available at https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1971.pdf
.
67
See
New Ventures, Meaningful Disclosure, Release No. 33-5395 (June 1, 1973) [38 FR 17202 (June 29, 1973)] (“Hot Issues Adopting Release”).
68
See
Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information about Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments, Release No. 33-7386 (Jan. 31, 1997) [62 FR 6044 (Feb. 10, 1997)] (“Disclosure of Market Risk Sensitive Instruments Release”).
Significant advancements in technology have also prompted some of our disclosure requirements. The
Commission's efforts in Securities Offering Reform recognized the impact of technology on market demand for more timely corporate disclosure and the ability of issuers to capture, process, and disseminate this information.
69
Similarly, modernization of our oil and gas rules was intended to update oil and gas disclosure requirements to align them with current practices and changes in technology.
70
69
See
Aircraft Carrier Release; Securities Offering Reform Release.
70
See
Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting, Release No. 33-8995 (Dec. 31, 2008) [74 FR 2157 (Jan. 14, 2009)] (“Oil and Gas Release”).
We are considering changes to our disclosure requirements and seeking public input on how our disclosure requirements could be improved for the benefit of investors and registrants and whether the requirements could be revised to adapt to future changes in market conditions and advancements in technology. We also are seeking input on the utility of mechanisms such as sunset provisions or temporary rules.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
One commenter stated that a sunset provision would require the Commission to consider changes in the economic, business and regulatory landscape in assessing whether new disclosure requirements should be made permanent.
71
For significant new disclosure requirements, this commenter suggested a sunset provision of five or ten years and that formal Commission action should be required to indefinitely extend or modify any significant new disclosure requirement.
71
See
letter from Ernst & Young (Sept. 11, 2012) (“Ernst & Young 1”).
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
We received a few comment letters that discussed potential regulatory mechanisms to review and update our disclosure requirements.
72
To determine the continuing need for disclosures in light of the then current economic, business and regulatory landscape, one commenter suggested a formal, post-adoption review process for significant new disclosure requirements.
73
This review process, or “sunset review,” would require formal Commission action to make a new disclosure requirement permanent. Another commenter recommended that the Commission develop a mechanism to timely update disclosure requirements to address new topical issues and to delete existing disclosure when the informational value for investors is diminished.
74
One commenter generally recommended sunset rules and finding a means to evaluate user demand and disclosure effectiveness for potentially outdated requirements.
75
72
See, e.g.,
letters from the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (Sept.10, 2014) (“SCSGP”), Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Oct. 13, 2014) (“SIFMA”), and letter and articles referenced therein from Arthur J. Radin (May 29, 2015) (“A. Radin”).
73
See
SCSGP. This commenter also suggested that the staff issue “closing guidance” when topics on which the staff had previously focused are no longer areas of primary concern. The commenter cited 2003 MD&A guidance on disclosure of critical accounting policies estimates as an example of guidance that could be considered closed.
See
Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Release No. 33-8350 (Dec. 19, 2003) (“2003 MD&A Interpretive Release”) [68 FR 75056 (Dec. 29, 2003)]. This commenter stated “it is not clear that investors are unaware of the uncertainties associated with the methods, assumptions and estimates underlying a company's critical accounting measurements.”
74
See
SIFMA. This commenter did not propose a particular mechanism that the Commission should use.
75
See
A. Radin.
b. Discussion
When adopting disclosure requirements that have departed from traditional disclosure concepts, the Commission has historically taken an incremental approach to change by first adopting modest revisions and then expanding their application after observing and evaluating the rules' effectiveness. For example, the initial adoption of simplified registration and reporting requirements for smaller businesses on Form S-18 were “in the nature of an experiment”
76
and a departure from traditional disclosure concepts.
77
After observing relative, widespread acceptance of Form S-18 and the absence of significant disclosure or enforcement problems, the Commission expanded the form's availability,
78
and it eventually served as a model for our current system of scaled disclosure for SRCs.
79
76
See
Simplified Registration and Reporting Requirements for Small Issuers, Release No. 33-6049 (Apr. 3, 1979) [44 FR 21562 (Apr. 10, 1979)] (“Form S-18 Release”) at 21564.
77
Id.
at 21562 (“The Commission will monitor closely the use of Form S-18 for an appropriate period . . .”).
78
See
Availability of Simplified Registration Form to Certain Mining Companies, Release No. 33-6299 (Mar. 27, 1981) [46 FR 18947 (Mar. 27, 1981)].
See also
Revisions to the Optional Form for the Registration of Securities to Be Sold to the Public by the Issuer for an Aggregate Cash Price Not To Exceed $5,000,000, Release No. 33-6406 (June 4, 1982) [47 FR 25126 (June 10, 1982)] (expanding Form S-18's availability to non-corporate registrants and registrants engaged, or to be engaged, in oil and gas related operations).
79
See
Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, Release No. 33-8876 (Dec. 19, 2007) [73 FR 934 (Jan. 4, 2008)] (“SRC Adopting Release”). In adopting the current scaled disclosure regime, the Commission stated “[t]he amendments that we are adopting address the need to revisit and adjust the Commission's small company policies to reflect changes in our securities markets as well as changes to the regulatory landscape since 1992, when the Commission first adopted an integrated scaled disclosure system for small business in Regulation S-B. The Commission adopted Regulation S-B and its associated Forms SB-1 and SB-2 based upon the success of Form S-18 . . .”
The Commission has, on occasion, adopted temporary rules or rules with automatic sunset provisions to better assess the effect of or necessity for a particular rule before adopting the rule on a permanent basis. For example, Securities Act Rule 415, which permits delayed and continuous offerings under certain circumstances, was initially adopted on a temporary basis for a period of nine months during which the Commission monitored the operation and impact of the new rule.
80
Following public hearings and comment on Rule 415, the Commission determined additional experience with the rule was necessary to study its operation and impact
81
and extended the temporary nature of this rule.
82
The Commission permanently adopted Rule 415 following 18 months of monitoring the operation and impact of the rule.
83
80
See
1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release.
81
See
Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Release No. 33-6423 (Sept. 2, 1982) [47 FR 39799 (Sept. 10, 1982)].
82
Id.
In June 1983, the Commission published the shelf registration rule for comment again in order to provide all interested parties another opportunity to share their views and experience under the Rule before the Commission made its final determination.
See
Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Release No. 33-6470, (June 9. 1983) [48 FR 27768 (June 17, 1983)].
83
See
Shelf Registration, Release No. 33-6499 (Nov. 17, 1983) [48 FR 52889 (Nov. 23, 1983)].
While the Commission acted to permanently adopt Rule 415, it has allowed other temporary rules to expire. The Commission adopted on a temporary basis Securities Act Rules 702 and 703. Rule 702 required the filing of a Form 701 after sales under Rule 701 exceeded a particular threshold. Rule 703 disqualified registrants from relying on the Rule 701 exemption from registration where the registrant failed to make the filing required by Rule 702.
84
In adopting Rules 702 and 703, the Commission noted the importance of monitoring new exemptive provisions and stated that it would use Form 701 to “assess the utility of the exemption and, oversee
any abuses.”
85
The Commission did not extend Rules 702 and 703 based on its belief that the sunset of these rules had not compromised investor interests and that their reinstitution of the rules would serve little purpose.
86
84
See
Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, Release No. 33-6768 (Apr. 14, 1988) [53 FR 12918 (Apr. 20, 1988)] (adopting Rule 701, an exemption from registration for certain offers and sales made pursuant to the terms of compensatory benefit plans or written compensation agreements for issuers that are not subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and adopting rules 702 and 703 on a temporary basis of five years).
85
See
Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, Release No. 33-6683 (Jan. 16, 1987) [52 FR 3015 (Jan. 30, 1987)] at 3021.
86
See
Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification Release.
Even in the absence of a temporary rule or sunset provision, the Commission has undertaken efforts to study the effects of new rules or amendments. The Commission uses these studies to guide future amendments or rulemaking. For example, our staff has examined the effects on capital formation through private placements after adoption of amendments to Regulation D in accordance with the JOBS Act.
87
In adopting amendments to Rule 506 of Regulation D
88
to eliminate the prohibition against general solicitation for a subset of Rule 506 offerings, the Commission stated that the staff will monitor developments in the market for these offerings.
89
In addition, in connection with recently adopted amendments to Regulation A, an exemption from registration for smaller issues of securities, and the adoption of Regulation Crowdfunding, a new exemption for smaller securities offerings using the Internet through crowdfunding, the Commission stated, in each case, that the staff will study and submit a report to the Commission on the impact of the regulation on capital formation and investor protection.
90
87
Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov,
Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009-2014,
Oct. 2015,
available at
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf
.
88
17 CFR 230.506.
89
See
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Release No. 33-9415 (July 20. 2013) [78 FR 44771 (July 24, 2013)].
90
See
Amendments to Regulation A, Release No. 33-9741 (Mar. 25, 2015) [80 FR 21805 (Apr. 20, 2015)] (“2015 Regulation A Release”);
See
Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9974 (Oct. 30, 2015) [80 FR 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015)] (“Crowdfunding Adopting Release”). When proposing the crowdfunding rules, the Commission directed the staff to develop a work plan to review and monitor use of the crowdfunding rules, focusing on the types of issuers using the exemption, level of compliance by issuers and intermediaries, and whether the exemption is promoting new capital formation while providing key protections for investors.
See
Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9470 (Oct. 23, 2013) [78 FR 66427 (Nov. 5, 2013)].
Requiring affirmative Commission action to extend or make permanent certain requirements, the utility of which may change over time, could require us to more frequently consider the effectiveness of our requirements. Alternatively, the Commission could commit to studying the impact of certain rule changes on a specified schedule, without making the rules temporary or applying automatic sunset provisions. Any such review would be in addition to the periodic review currently required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”),
91
under which the Commission reviews its rules that have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities within ten years of their publication as final rules.
92
These approaches would, however, require significant Commission resources and could compete with other Commission priorities.
91
[5 U.S.C. 610(a)].
92
Each year, since 1981, the Commission provides the public with notice that these rules are scheduled for review and invites public comment on whether the rules should be continued without change, or should be amended or rescinded to minimize any significant economic impact of the rules upon a substantial number of such small entities. As a matter of policy, the Commission reviews all final rules that are published for notice and comment to assess not only their continued compliance with the RFA, but also to assess generally their continued utility.
See, e.g.,
List of Rules to be Reviewed Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Release No. 33-9965 (Oct. 22, 2015) [80 FR 65973 (Oct. 28, 2015)]. In the past, the Commission has received little or no comment on the rules that it publishes for review.
c. Request for Comment
1. Should the Commission consider including automatic sunset provisions in new disclosure requirements? If so, what types of disclosure requirements should include these provisions? What factors should we consider in identifying them? What would be an appropriate length of time for any sunset provisions? Would this length of time vary with the nature of the rule in question?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of automatic sunset provisions? Would automatic sunset provisions result in unnecessary regulatory uncertainty for investors or registrants?
3. How would the use of automatic sunset provisions affect registrants, investors and other users of disclosure? Would registrants, investors or other users incur increased costs associated with the use of automatic sunset provisions?
4. Should we consider requiring the staff to study and report to the Commission on the impact of new disclosure requirements when adopting them, in addition to the review the Commission performs under the RFA? For what type of disclosure requirements would such an approach be appropriate? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a study and report on a new rule?
5. Are there other ways our disclosure requirements could be revised to adapt more easily to future market changes and technological advancements?
B. Nature of Our Disclosure Requirements
The concept of materiality has been described as “the cornerstone” of the disclosure system established by the federal securities laws.
93
Schedule A to the Securities Act identifies certain categories of information that are generally viewed as material to investors.
94
Those categories are incorporated and expanded upon in the categories of information that registrants are required to disclose under Regulation S-K.
93
See
Sommer Report at 320.
94
See id.
at 324.
In creating and implementing our system of integrated disclosure, identification of material information was one of two principal objectives. In the 1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release, the Commission stated:
The Commission's program to integrate the disclosure systems has focused on two principal objectives: First, a comprehensive evaluation of the disclosure policies and procedures under both Acts to identify the information which is material to security holders and investors in both the distribution process and the trading markets . . . and, second, a determination of the circumstances under which information should be disseminated to security holders, investors and the marketplace.
95
95
See
1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release at 11382.
See also
Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities of Securities Offerings, Rel. No. 33-6235 (Sept. 2, 1980) [45 FR 63693 (Sept. 25, 1980)] (“1980 Proposed Revisions”) at 63694. This proposing release states “[t]he shape of the [Commission's integrated disclosure] program will be influenced by the answer to two fundamental questions: (1) What information is material to investment decisions in the context of public offerings of securities; and (2) Under what circumstances and in what form should such material information be disseminated and made available by companies making public offerings of securities to the various participants in the capital market system? The task of identifying what information is material to investment and voting decisions is a continuing one in the field of securities regulation.”
The Commission adopted line-item requirements in Regulation S-K and its predecessors to provide investors with specific disclosure within broad categories of material information.
96
Through its disclosure requirements, the Commission has adopted different approaches to guide registrants in
evaluating materiality for purposes of disclosure, including in some cases using quantitative thresholds to address uncertainty in the application of materiality.
96
See
Sommer Report at 324.
1. Principles-Based and Prescriptive Disclosure Requirements
Principles-based disclosure requirements.
Many of our rules require disclosure when information is material to investors.
97
These rules rely on a registrant's management to evaluate the significance of information in the context of the registrant's overall business and financial circumstances and determine whether disclosure is necessary.
98
The requirements are often referred to as “principles-based” because they articulate a disclosure objective and look to management to exercise judgment in satisfying that objective.
99
97
On several occasions, the Commission has reiterated that its requirements seek disclosure of material information.
See, e.g.,
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Release No. 33-9106 (Feb. 8, 2010) [75 FR 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010)] (“Climate Change Release”) at 6292-6293 (stating “During the 1970s and 1980s, materiality standards for disclosure under the federal securities laws also were more fully articulated. Those standards provide that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote or make an investment decision, or, put another way, if the information would alter the total mix of available information.”); Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities Issuers, Release No. 33-7558 (Jul. 29, 1998) [63 FR 41394 (Aug. 4, 1998)] (“Year 2000 Release”) at 41395 (stating “Our disclosure framework requires companies to disclose material information that enables investors to make informed investment decisions.”); Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Events, Release No. 33-5092 (Oct. 15, 1970) [35 FR 16733 (Oct. 29, 1970)] at 16733-16734 (“Notwithstanding the fact that a company complies with such [annual, semi-annual and current] reporting requirements, it still has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material facts regarding the company's financial condition . . . Corporate managements are urged to review their policies with respect to corporate disclosure and endeavor to set up procedures which will insure that prompt disclosure be made of material corporate developments . . .”).
See also infra
note 107.
98
See
Sommer Report at 322 (“Although the initial materiality determination is management's, this judgment is, of course, subject to challenge or question by the Commission or in the courts.”).
99
See Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption of a Principles-Based Accounting System,
July 2003,
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm
(“Section 108 Study”).
For example, Item 303(a)(2) requires registrants to disclose material commitments for capital expenditures, known material trends in the registrant's capital resources, and expected material changes in the mix and relative cost of such resources.
100
Similarly, Item 101(c)(1)(xi) requires registrants to disclose the estimated amount spent during each of the last three fiscal years on company-sponsored research and development activities, if material.
101
100
Item 303(a)(2) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.303(a)(2)].
101
Item 101(c)(1)(xi) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.101(c)(1)(xi)].
Prescriptive disclosure requirements.
Some of our rules employ objective, quantitative thresholds to identify when disclosure is required, or require registrants to disclose information in all cases. These requirements are sometimes referred to as “prescriptive” or “rules-based” because they rely on bright-line tests rather than management's judgment to determine when disclosure is required.
For example, disclosure requirements specific to environmental proceedings in Item 103 enumerate thresholds for disclosure based on a percentage of current assets (10%) or a specified dollar amount ($100,000).
102
Meeting or exceeding the applicable thresholds necessitates disclosure. Similarly, Item 101(c)(1)(i), requires registrants to disclose for each of the last three fiscal years the amount or percentage of total revenue contributed by any class of similar products or services which accounted for ten percent or more of consolidated revenue in any of the last three fiscal years or fifteen percent or more of consolidated revenue, if total revenue did not exceed $50 million during any of such fiscal years.
103
As another example, Item 703 establishes a requirement for registrants to disclose all repurchases of equity securities by issuers and affiliated purchasers.
104
102
Instructions 5.B and 5.C to Item 103 of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.103].
See also infra
note 120.
103
Item 101(c)(1)(i) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.101(c)(1)].
104
Item 703 of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.703].
Materiality.
The concept of materiality is used throughout the federal securities laws. The Commission has used a definition of materiality since at least 1937. Previously, the Commission defined “material,” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information, as “those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security registered.”
105
In 1982, the Commission revised Rule 12b-2, which defines “material” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information, to adopt the Supreme Court's definition of materiality.
106
105
Proposed Revisions of Regulation C, Registration and Regulation 12B, Registration and Reporting, Release No. 33-6333 (August 6, 1981) [46 FR 41971 (Aug. 18, 1981)] (“1981 Proposed Revisions”). The proposing release notes that, prior to proposing this definition, the definition of “material” was the same as adopted in 1937. This definition provided “[t]he term `material', when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security registered.”
See, e.g.,
Adoption of Amendments to General Rules and Regulations, Release No. 34-4194 (Dec. 17, 1948) [
not published in the
Federal Register
] (“1948 Adoption of Amendments to General Rules and Regulations Release”).
106
See
1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release. Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act provides that the term “material,” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered. [17 CFR 240.12b-2].
In addition to the information required to be disclosed, Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 requires registrants to disclose such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. Rule 12b-20 of the Exchange Act [17 CFR 240.12b-20].
The Court has held that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the information important in deciding how to vote or make an investment decision.
107
The Court further explained that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information available.
108
107
See Basic Inc.
v.
Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988) (“Basic” or “Basic v. Levinson”) at 231, quoting
TSC Industries, Inc.
v.
Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976) (“TSC Industries”) at 449. In
TSC Industries,
the Supreme Court adopted a standard for materiality in connection with proxy statement disclosure under Schedule 14A and Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act. This standard was supported by the Commission.
See TSC Industries
at footnote 10 (“. . . the SEC's view of the proper balance between the need to insure adequate disclosure and the need to avoid the adverse consequences of setting too low a threshold for civil liability is entitled to consideration . . . The standard we adopt is supported by the SEC.”). In
Basic,
the Court reaffirmed this standard of materiality and applied it in the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context. Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits any person from making an untrue statement of material fact or omitting a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading in connection with the offer or sale of any security. Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act [17 CFR 240.10b-5].
108
See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v.
Siracusano,
131 U.S. 1309 (2011) (“Matrixx Initiatives”) at 1318, quoting
TSC Industries
at 449. In
Matrixx Initiatives,
the Court applied the materiality standard, as set forth in
TSC Industries
and
Basic.
In articulating these standards, the Supreme Court recognized that setting too low of a materiality standard for purposes of liability could cause management to “bury shareholders in an avalanche
of trivial information.”
Id.
at 1318, quoting
TSC Industries
at 448-449.
In proposing to revise Rule 12b-2 to adopt the Court's definition of “material,” the Commission noted the trend to apply the Court's definition in every type of federal securities law violation and concluded that the same test would be applied for any purpose under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
109
Although some commenters recommended retaining the current definition or modifying the proposed one, the Commission adopted the definition as proposed because it was based on the definition set forth by the Court.
110
109
See id.
110
See
1982 Integrated Disclosure Adopting Release.
Article 1-02(o) of Regulation S-X retains the definition of “material” prior to
TSC Industries.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the staff indicated that it views this definition in Regulation S-X to be similar to the definitions of “material” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act and Rule 405 of the Securities Act, which are consistent with
TSC Industries. See
footnote 6 of Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Release No. SAB 99 (Aug. 12, 1999) [64 FR 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999)] (“SAB 99”). As with any staff guidance referenced in this release, the views of the staff are not rules or interpretations of the Commission. The Commission has neither approved nor disapproved the views of the staff.
From time to time, the Commission has provided guidance to assist management in the types of assessments to make and issues to consider in determining whether information is material.
111
For example, based on a review of MD&A disclosure to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure practices and identify any common deficiencies, the Commission provided interpretive guidance on assessments management should make to determine whether disclosure of forward-looking information is required under Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
112
Similarly, in the context of determining whether financial statements must be restated, Commission staff has expressed the view that materiality determinations cannot be reduced to a numerical formula and evaluations of materiality require both quantitative and qualitative considerations.
113
111
See, e.g.,
Climate Change Release (providing guidance as to how registrants should evaluate climate change-related issues when considering what information to disclose to investors under existing disclosure requirements and confirming that, if material, registrants should provide climate change-related disclosure); 2003 MD&A Interpretive Release (providing guidance on MD&A and emphasizing that registrants should focus on materiality).
112
See, e.g.,
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Release No. 33-6835 (May 18, 1989) [54 FR 22427 (May 24, 1989)] (“1989 MD&A Interpretive Release”) (setting forth a two-step analysis for disclosure of material forward-looking information in MD&A). For a discussion of the Commission's forward-looking guidance under Item 303 of Regulation S-K and recent court of appeals decisions,
see
Section IV.B.3.c.
113
See
SAB 99.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
We received three comment letters that discussed principles-based requirements or made recommendations about quantitative disclosure thresholds.
114
Two commenters suggested that we move towards a more principles-based disclosure regime in which “companies [would be] expected to take the initiative to identify material information rather than simply respond to an extensive list of potentially relevant line-item disclosure requirements.”
115
Another commenter stated that it is counterintuitive to define disclosure requirements using a “one-size-fits-all quantitative thresholds.”
116
114
See
letters from Fenwick & West LLP, Cooley LLP and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, PC (June 19, 2012) (“Silicon Valley”), Mike Liles (Apr. 10, 2013) (“M. Liles”) (endorsing the comments expressed in the Silicon Valley letter) and Ernst & Young 1.
115
See
Silicon Valley and M. Liles.
116
See
Ernst & Young 1.
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
Several commenters addressed whether disclosure requirements should be principles-based or prescriptive.
117
The majority of these commenters supported a principles-based system.
118
Some of these commenters suggested revising or eliminating existing prescriptive disclosure requirements.
119
One of these commenters stated that the “touchstone for any disclosure requirement must be materiality as seen through the eyes of a reasonable investor” and suggested reviewing the quantitative disclosure thresholds in Items 103 and 404 of Regulation S-K
120
to consider whether they are appropriate.
121
Another one of these commenters suggested amending Item 10
122
of Regulation S-K to permit registrants to omit information otherwise required by Regulation S-K if the information is not material and if the inclusion of the information is not necessary to make any required statements not materially misleading.
123
However, this commenter noted that this provision should not apply in all instances.
124
This commenter also suggested revisions to some of the quantitative disclosure thresholds in Regulation S-K to “better calibrate” such requirements
125
and recommended that the Commission determine whether disclosure standards other than materiality should be harmonized to “lessen ambiguity as to how these undefined disclosure standards should be applied.”
126
117
See, e.g.,
letters from Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (July 29, 2014) (“CCMC”) (expressing support for a more principles-based approach to disclosure); SCSGP (recommending that we eliminate line-item disclosure requirements that apply without regard to materiality or that contain quantitative disclosure thresholds that do not appropriately reflect materiality); Standards & Financial Market Integrity Division, CFA Institute (Nov. 12, 2014) (“CFA Institute”) (stating that a principles-based system could lead to standards that are inconsistently applied); Shearman & Sterling LLP (Nov. 26, 2014) (“Shearman”) (stating that a principles-based approach would better withstand the pace at which the business environment changes); letter from the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Business Law Section, American Bar Association (Mar. 6, 2015) (“ABA 2”); UK Financial Reporting Council (Mar. 10, 2015) (“UK Financial Reporting Council”); Corporate Governance Committee of the Business Roundtable (Apr. 5, 2015) (“Business Roundtable”); A. Radin.
118
See, e.g.,
CCMC; SCSGP; ABA 2; Shearman; UK Financial Reporting Council; Business Roundtable.
119
See, e.g.,
CCMC; SCSGP; Shearman; ABA 2.
120
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of material pending legal proceedings. Instruction 2 specifies that no information need be given with respect to a proceeding that involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed ten percent of current assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.
Instruction 5 to Item 103 requires disclosure of proceedings related to federal, state, or local environmental protection laws when (i) the proceeding is material to the registrant's business or financial condition; (ii) the proceeding involves primarily a claim for damages, or involves potential monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred charges or charges to income and the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds ten percent of current assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; or (iii) a governmental authority is a party to a proceeding involving monetary sanctions, unless the registrant believes that the proceeding will result in no monetary sanctions, or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interests and costs, of less than $100,000. [17 CFR 229.103].
Item 404 requires disclosure of transactions with related parties where the related party had or will have a direct or indirect material interest and the amount involved exceeds $120,000 or, in the case of SRCs, where the amount involved exceeds the lesser of $120,000 or one percent of the average of the SRC's total assets at year end for the last two completed fiscal years. [17 CFR 229.404].
121
See
CCMC (noting that quantitative thresholds similar to the ones in Item 103 “may not in fact be set at levels material for all, or even most companies”).
122
Item 10 of Regulation S-K contains general requirements on the application of Regulation S-K, Commission policies on projections and security ratings, incorporation by reference and the use of non-GAAP financial measures in Commission filings. [17 CFR 229.10].
123
See
ABA 2.
124
See id.
(citing the $120,000 threshold in Item 404 as an example of an instance in which the use of a quantitative disclosure threshold is appropriate).
125
See id.
For example, this commenter suggested increasing the quantitative threshold in Instruction 5.C to Item 103 from $100,000 to $1,000,000.
126
Id.
As an example, this commenter noted that “major” is used as a standard in Items 101(h)(4)(vi), 102, and 601(b)(10)(ii)(B).
Two commenters stated that a principles-based approach would provide additional flexibility to registrants by allowing them to disclose material information based on all relevant facts and circumstances.
127
One commenter, in lieu of creating new item requirements, encouraged greater staff guidance through disclosure guidance topics or staff bulletins to provide companies with factors to consider when making materiality determinations.
128
One commenter stated that using materiality as a guiding principle “carries with it the recognition that what is important to a reasonable investor may change over time.”
129
Another commenter suggested that accounting professionals should readdress the concept of materiality and this would help reduce the volume of unnecessary disclosure.
130
127
See
SCSGP; Shearman.
128
See
SCSGP.
129
See
Business Roundtable.
130
See
A. Radin.
One commenter opposed a principles-based system, stating such a system could result in inconsistent application of the principles-based threshold and thus non-comparable information across companies.
131
This commenter also stated that the use of prescriptive disclosure requirements does not prevent companies from including additional principles-based disclosure if the company would like to do so.
132
131
See
CFA Institute (also citing MD&A disclosure during the financial crisis as evidence that principles-based reporting requirements alone are not sufficient).
132
Id.
b. Discussion
In 2003, the staff prepared a study on the adoption of a principles-based accounting system.
133
Although it did not address disclosure requirements under Regulation S-K, many of the study's conclusions may be relevant to our general consideration of principles-based disclosure standards. The study found drawbacks to establishing accounting standards on either a rules-based or a principles-based approach.
134
The study noted that principles-only standards may present enforcement difficulties because they are, by their nature, imprecise.
135
They can also result in a significant loss of comparability among reporting entities. Prescriptive standards, on the other hand, can be circumvented more easily by structuring around the bright-line requirements of the standard.
136
133
See
Section 108 Study. Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the Commission to conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting system.
134
See
Section 108 Study.
135
See id.
136
See id.
In the S-K Study, the staff stated that any recommended revisions to Regulation S-K should emphasize a principles-based approach as an overarching component of the disclosure framework while preserving the benefits of a rules-based system, which affords consistency, completeness and comparability across registrants.
137
In assessing this recommendation, we recognize the merits and drawbacks of our principles-based and prescriptive disclosure requirements.
137
See
S-K Study at 98.
Limiting prescriptive disclosure requirements and emphasizing principles-based disclosure could improve disclosure by reducing the amount of information that may be irrelevant, outdated or immaterial. Because prescriptive disclosure requirements may result in disclosure that is not necessarily material or important to investors, greater use of principles-based disclosure requirements may allow registrants to more effectively tailor their disclosure to provide only the information about their specific business and financial condition that is important to investors. A principles-based approach also may allow registrants to readily adapt their disclosure to facts and circumstances that may change over time.
On the other hand, reducing prescriptive disclosure requirements and shifting towards more principles-based disclosure requirements may limit the comparability, consistency and completeness of disclosure. Also, in the absence of clear guidelines for determining when information is material, registrants may have difficulty applying principles-based disclosure requirements,
138
and the disclosure provided may not give investors sufficient insight into how registrants apply different principles-based disclosure thresholds. Potentially important information that may be disclosed in response to a prescriptive disclosure requirement might not be included in response to a principles-based disclosure requirement. In the context of accounting standards, some have noted practical challenges associated with principles-based standards as “auditors and accountants may be less able to predict how regulators or courts will apply these principles in particular contexts.”
139
Additionally, the use of prescriptive disclosure requirements does not prevent registrants from including additional, principles-based disclosures that the registrant deems important.
138
See
Financial Reporting Council,
Cutting Clutter, available at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Cutting-Clutter-Combating-clutter-in-annual-report.pdf
. In this report, the Financial Reporting Council, the United Kingdom's independent regulator responsible for corporate governance and reporting, refers to a “threshold” problem, and lists the many words used to describe when disclosure is required. The report listed the following descriptors triggering disclosure: Critical, essential, fundamental, important, key, main, major, primary, principal, and significant.
Id.
The Financial Reporting Council's report pertains to the requirements of companies listed in the United Kingdom, but there are similarly several disclosure “thresholds” used in Regulation S-K.
139
See
C. Coglianese, E. Keating, M. Michael and T. Healey,
The Role of Government in Corporate Governance,
NYU Journal of Law & Business 1: 233-251 (2004).
The Section 108 Study proposed a third alternative for developing new accounting standards, which the staff referred to as an “objectives-oriented” approach.
140
Under this approach, standard setters would develop new rules by clearly articulating the accounting objective of the standard and providing sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be applied on a consistent basis. The staff further recommended that such standards should be based on a consistently-applied conceptual framework, minimize exceptions and avoid the use of bright-line tests.
141
We are soliciting comment below on whether such an approach might be appropriate for business and financial disclosures.
140
See
Section 108 Study.
141
See id.
c. Request for Comment
6. Should we revise our principles-based rules to use a consistent disclosure threshold? If so, should a materiality standard be used or should a different standard, such as an “objectives-oriented” approach or any other approach, be used? If materiality should be used, should the current definition be retained? Should we consider a different definition of materiality for disclosure purposes? If so, how should it be defined?
7. Should we limit prescriptive disclosure requirements and emphasize a principles-based approach? If so, how? How can we most effectively balance the benefits of a principles-based approach while preserving the benefits of prescriptive requirements?
8. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a principles-based approach? Would a principles-based approach increase the usefulness of disclosures? What would be the costs and benefits of such an approach for investors and registrants?
9. Do registrants find it difficult to apply principles-based requirements? Why? If they are uncertain about whether information is to be disclosed, do registrants err on the side of including or omitting the disclosure? If registrants include disclosure beyond what is required, does the additional information obfuscate the information that is important to investors? Does it instead provide useful information to investors?
10. Do registrants find quantitative thresholds helpful in preparing disclosure? Do such thresholds elicit information that is important to investors? Do they require registrants to provide some disclosure that investors do not need? To the extent our rules contain quantitative thresholds, how should we define them? Are specified dollar amounts more or less effective than amounts based on a registrant's financial condition, such as a percentage of revenues or assets?
11. Should we develop qualitative thresholds for disclosure? Should there be a combination of quantitative and qualitative thresholds?
12. Do registrants find principles-based disclosure requirements helpful in preparing disclosure? Do such requirements elicit information that is important to investors?
13. Would principles-based disclosure affect corporate compliance and governance structures? If so, how?
2. Audience for Disclosure
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act require registrants to provide information prescribed by the Commission as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
142
The legislative history of the federal securities laws speaks broadly to the “buying public,”
143
without addressing variation in the needs or sophistication of investors.
142
See
Section 7(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77g(a)(1)] and Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78m(a)].
143
See
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933) (broadly referring to the “public,” “buying public” or “investing public”).
Nearly fifty years ago, the Wheat Report recognized variation among the investor audience for disclosure and suggested that the Commission's disclosure requirements should strike a “pragmatic balance . . . between the needs of unsophisticated investors and those of the knowledgeable student of finance.”
144
The Sommer Report also recognized the broad spectrum of investors but recommended that the Commission should not expect corporate filings “to be readily understandable in total by uninformed investors.”
145
Instead, the Sommer Report concluded that the Commission's rules should “emphasize disclosure of information useful to reasonably knowledgeable investors willing to make the effort needed to study the disclosures, leaving to disseminators the development of simplified formats and summaries usable by less experienced and less knowledgeable investors.”
146
144
Wheat Report at 10.
145
Sommer Report at D-9.
See also
A.A. Sommer Jr,.
The U.S. SEC Disclosure Study,
1 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 145, 148 (1978) (“[T]he Committee did not believe that the Commission should design a variety of formats and degrees of summarization to serve the diverse needs of various investors. It is evident that the sophistication and knowledge of investors varies broadly, from the small, occasional [investor] through the sophisticated portfolio managers. The Committee believed that by having the Commission concentrate on the needs of sophisticated investors, the needs of other types of investors would be adequately served through the many private services which collect, synthesize, summarize and comment upon data concerning issuers.”).
146
Sommer Report at D-9. The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure identified as information disseminators the “organizations commonly thought of as the financial press,”
id.
at 163, that “condense, summarize and disseminate available information and thereby assist analysts and investors in obtaining investment decision making information in forms suitable to their respective needs and abilities to use it.”
Id.
at D-5.
When adopting format and content changes to Form 10-K and the annual report to security holders as part of integrated disclosure, the Commission characterized users of Form 10-K as different from users of the annual report to security holders.
147
Specifically, the Commission viewed annual reports to shareholders as readable documents designed to be delivered to shareholders
148
and stated that the disclosure requirements in these reports “evolved in the context of shareholders making voting decisions.”
149
Meanwhile, the Commission noted that Form 10-K was a more technical document,
150
and the Form 10-K disclosure was developed for “investors and other users making economic decisions about the company.”
151
The Commission further noted that the most frequent users of Form 10-K disclosure were institutional investors, professional security analysts and sophisticated individual investors.
147
See
Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and Guides; Integration of Securities Act Disclosure Systems, Release No. 33-6231, (Sept. 2, 1980) [45 FR 63630 (Sept. 25, 1980)] (“1980 Form 10-K Adopting Release”).
148
See
Proposed Amendments to Annual Report Form; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Release No. 33-6176 (Jan. 15, 1980) [45 FR 5972 (Jan. 24, 1980)] (“1980 Form 10-K Proposing Release”).
See also
1980 Form 10-K Adopting Release, citing Annual Reports—Information Required in Proxy Statement, Release No. 34-10591 (Jan. 10, 1974) [39 FR 3820 (Jan. 30, 1974)] for the statement that “[t]he annual report to security holders has long been recognized as the most effective means of communication between management and security holders. Such reports are readable because they generally avoid legalistic and technical terminology and present information in an understandable, and often innovative, form . . . The Commission believes it is in the public interest that all security holders be provided with meaningful information regarding the business, management, operations and financial position of the issuer and that the annual report to security holders is the most suitable vehicle presently available for providing this information.”
See also
Annual Reports, Release No. 34-11079 (Oct. 31, 1974) [39 FR 40766 (Nov. 20, 1974)] at 40766.
149
1980 Form 10-K Adopting Release at 63630.
150
See
1980 Form 10-K Proposing Release.
151
1980 Form 10-K Adopting Release at 63630.
In the adopting release for these changes, the Commission stated its belief that focusing primarily on these frequent users is appropriate in formulating Form 10-K disclosure requirements, but “such a focus would not be appropriate in formulating requirements for annual reports to security holders.”
152
While the Commission acknowledged the benefit of uniformity of certain minimum disclosures in the annual report to security holders and the Form 10-K, it stated that not all disclosure requirements would be identical between the Form 10-K and the annual report to security holders, which potentially served different purposes and user constituencies.
152
Id.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
Two commenters noted that, in some contexts, customers, vendors and competitors of registrants typically understand certain disclosures, but that the same information is likely to be less meaningful to investors who typically would lack the necessary industry-specific knowledge and interest.
153
153
See
Silicon Valley and M. Liles.
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
Two commenters discussed the profile of the investor contemplated by our disclosure requirements and the intended audience for public company disclosures.
154
Both commenters recommended that we should assume that investors using registrants' disclosures have some level of sophistication. One of these commenters suggested that a contributing factor to increased disclosure is the current assumption that the typical investor is a novice.
155
The other commenter
recommended an empirical study of the audience for financial statements and a review of who makes investment decisions and how such decisions are made.
156
This commenter stated that sophisticated investors are likely the most appropriate audience for Commission filings, as they are generally the investors performing detailed analysis and acting as price-makers. This commenter also stated that most of these investors do not express concern about the volume of disclosure.
154
See, e.g.,
CFA Institute; Shearman.
155
See
Shearman (stating “it seems that disclosure if often premised on the assumption that the reasonable investor has little or no knowledge of a company's business, its industry or the merits or risks associated with its business. We believe
that the profile of the reasonable investor has devolved to the `neophyte investor' . . .”).
156
See
CFA Institute.
One commenter suggested that current disclosure is too complicated for the everyday person to read and that it should be less duplicative and more straightforward.
157
Another commenter noted the diversity of the investor community and that the Commission's mandate is to protect all investors.
158
This commenter acknowledged that some disclosures may not be useful to retail investors but may be useful to institutional investors or vice versa and that in such circumstances, disclosure should still be required. This commenter also stated that each segment of the investor community is “entitled to have access to all necessary and relevant information.” Additionally, this commenter noted that broad based disclosure improves transparency and builds public trust, confidence and understanding of capital markets.
157
See
letter from Carrie Devorah (Sept. 25, 2015).
158
See
letter from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (Nov. 20, 2015) (“AFL-CIO”).
b. Discussion
We recognize the diverse composition and varied informational needs, sophistication and financial resources of investors and that some investors may obtain their analysis or advice from or through third parties who use registrant disclosures. Investors using registrant disclosure directly may include both individual investors and institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, exchange traded funds, pension funds, hedge funds and managed accounts. These investor types may also use registrant disclosure indirectly through professional data aggregators, financial advisors, proxy advisors, professional analysts, journalists, and other third parties who process and synthesize disclosures for end user investors.
Different investor types and third parties may focus on different filings or items of disclosure.
159
Accordingly, the audience for disclosure is an important consideration in determining the means for disclosure, and specifically, in which filings or locations certain information should be directly provided and where cross-references, hyperlinks or incorporating by reference to information elsewhere is appropriate.
160
159
See, e.g.,
1980 Form 10-K Adopting Release.
See also, e.g.,
M. Drake, D. Roulstone, and J. Thornock,
The Determinants and Consequences of Information Acquisition via EDGAR,
32 Contemp. Acct. Res. 1128, at 1128-1161 (2015) (documenting that, of the 9.8 million users who directly searched the EDGAR database from 2008 to 2011, 86% are infrequent users accessing the database less than three times a quarter and generally accessing only one filing, although there is a small percentage of users accessing EDGAR at least every other trading day).
160
For a further discussion of cross-referencing, incorporation by reference and hyperlinks,
see
Sections V.A., V.B., and V.C., respectively.
Similarly, as different investors and third parties use disclosure in different ways and seek varying degrees of information, the audience for disclosure is also an important consideration in determining what information is disclosed. Institutional investors, their financial advisors and some third parties often use, and have supported requiring complex information and interactive data.
161
These types of investors are likely to use disclosures of large numbers of registrants and therefore, may be relatively more interested in standardized disclosure formats well-suited for large-scale processing and analysis, including machine-readable formats.
161
See, e.g.,
CFA Institute,
Financial Reporting Disclosures: Investor Perspectives on Transparency, Trust, and Volume,
July 2013, (“CFA Report”),
available
at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2013.n12.1; see also
Interactive Data Release at footnote 98.
Other investors may seek disclosure that emphasizes, within the universe of information that is disclosed, the information and analysis that management believes is most important.
162
To the extent some investors rely on market prices to efficiently incorporate all public information, rather than relying on disclosures directly, it could be argued that disclosures should be tailored to those users most likely to actively follow a registrant, transact in the registrant's securities and set the market price.
163
Investors in registrants that do not have a public trading market for their securities, however, may rely more directly on disclosure to evaluate their investments.
162
For a discussion of tailoring disclosure to meet the diverse or potentially competing needs of the investor audience,
see
SectionV.F.
163
The efficient market theory suggests that under certain assumptions, most investors, when making investment decisions, could rely on market prices to incorporate all available information. According to this theory, most investors would not need to individually examine much of the information in disclosures.
See, e.g.,
Stephen J. Choi,
Company Registration: Towards a Status-Based Antifraud Regime,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567, 569-70 (1997); Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
25 J. Fin. 383, 383-417 (1970). The Sommer Report stated that the efficient market theory is silent as to the optimum amount of information required or whether the optimum should be achieved on a mandatory or voluntary basis. The Sommer Report also stated that market forces alone are insufficient to cause all material information to be disclosed.
See
Sommer Report at D-6. Other studies have noted the limitations of the efficient market theory.
See, e.g.,
Robert J. Shiller,
From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance,
J. Econ. Persp. 83, 83-104 (2003).
c. Request for Comment
14. Should registrants assume some level of investor sophistication in preparing their disclosures? If so, what level or levels of sophistication? How should investor sophistication be measured? What are the risks or other disadvantages to investors if registrants either underestimate or overestimate the level of investor sophistication and resources when preparing their disclosures? Does disclosure protect all investors if it is tailored to a subset of the investor community?
15. Should we revise our rules to require disclosure that is formatted to provide information to various types of investors in a manner that will facilitate their use of disclosure for investment and voting decisions?
16. Commenters have suggested that disclosure should be written for a more sophisticated investor than current disclosure appears to contemplate,
164
and that tailoring disclosure to less sophisticated investors contributes to excessive disclosure.
165
Should our disclosure requirements be revised to address these views? If so, how could we revise our disclosure requirements, and which requirements should we revise, to encourage more appropriately targeted disclosure? If we revised our disclosure requirements to address these views, would there be any harm or costs to investors?
164
See
CFA Institute.
165
See
Shearman.
17. How do investors and other users of disclosure currently access and use this information? How does this vary across different subsets of the audience for the disclosure?
18. Should we use investor testing, such as focus groups or electronic surveys, to provide input on investors' use of and access to disclosure?
19. To what extent should the reliance of certain investors on market prices or third-party analyses, rather than using
disclosure directly, be a factor in determining the type of investor to which disclosures should be targeted?
20. To what extent should we consider the needs of other market participants, such as professional securities analysts and other third parties, in revising our disclosure requirements? What would be their needs?
3. Compliance and Competitive Costs
When the Commission is engaged in rulemaking it is statutorily required to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether an action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
166
Disclosure requirements can help reduce information asymmetries from management to investors,
167
improving the allocative efficiency of the capital markets and enhancing capital formation by lowering the cost of capital.
168
Lack of information may affect investors' willingness to invest and may decrease the allocative efficiency of the capital markets. Thus, requiring an appropriate level of disclosure is critical to a well-functioning capital market.
166
See supra
note 6.
167
See
Robert Verrecchia,
Essays on Disclosure,
32 J. Acct. Econ. 91, 91-180 (2001) (demonstrating that a credible commitment to disclosure reduces uncertainty and information asymmetries between a firm and its investors or among investors).
168
See, e.g.,
Richard Lambert, Christian Leuz, and Robert E. Verrecchia,
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital,
45 J. Acct. Res. 385, 385-420 (May 2007) ; Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz,
Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth Expectations around U.S. Cross-Listings,
93 J. Fin. Econ. 428, 428-454 (2009). Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) demonstrate theoretically that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital. Hail and Leuz (2009) find empirical evidence that firms, especially firms from countries with weaker institutional structures that cross-list securities on U.S. exchanges, experience a decrease in their costs of capital.
Disclosure may also have costs to registrants that could negatively affect these factors, although advances in technology and communications have the potential to reduce these costs. As disclosure costs rise, registrants' costs of capital may increase, which can reduce investment, lower the value of a company and impede economic growth. Registrants may also choose to exit the Commission's reporting system, when eligible, or remain private if the disclosure requirements are sufficiently costly.
169
169
See
Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz,
Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board,
39 J. Acct. Econ. 233, 233-264 (2005). Bushee and Leuz find seventy-six percent of firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board (“OTCBB”), many of which tended to be on average significantly smaller by market capitalization, left the market after the OTCBB eligibility rule required registrants whose securities were quoted on the OTCBB to file updated financial reports with the Commission or with their banking or insurance regulators.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
One commenter stated its belief that “certain Regulation S-K disclosures impose unnecessary costs while not providing concomitant value to investors . . . because the original purposes of the disclosure requirements have been achieved or are no longer as important.”
170
Two commenters stated that potential first-time registrants evaluate Exchange Act reporting and compliance costs in weighing the costs and benefits of an initial public offering.
171
170
See
Ernst & Young 1.
171
See
Silicon Valley and M. Liles.
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
Some commenters expressed general support for changes in disclosure requirements that would reduce costs for registrants while still providing needed information to investors.
172
Other commenters, in making specific recommendations, acknowledged compliance costs of these recommendations
173
or suggested ways to minimize the cost of such recommendations.
174
One commenter noted the high cost of regulations, especially those promulgated by the Commission.
175
172
See, e.g.,
letters from Ernst & Young, dated Nov. 20, 2015 (“Ernst & Young 2”); letter from the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Business Law Section, American Bar Association (Nov. 14, 2014) (“ABA 1”); ABA 2; Business Roundtable; Arthur Mboue (Jun 24, 2015); and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (July 14, 2015) (“Biotech Industry Organization”).
173
See, e.g.,
SCSGP at 14 (acknowledging that seeking repeal of requirements only a few years after their enactment would impose “an additional layer of costs”); ABA 2 (stating that, in its review of specific Regulation S-K items, it considered whether certain requirements could be better calibrated to provide investors with relevant and useful disclosure while balancing compliance costs to companies); letter from Allianz Global Investors (Aug. 13, 2015) (“Allianz”) (stating that its goal in requesting certain additional environmental data is to improve disclosure while minimizing any additional reporting burden) and letter from Data Transparency Coalition (Oct. 29, 2015) (“Data Transparency Coalition”).
174
See
letter from Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (Nov. 12, 2014) (“SASB”).
175
See
A. Radin.
b. Discussion
We are sensitive to the costs of disclosure, including the administrative and compliance costs of preparing and disseminating disclosure as well as the potential costs of disclosing sensitive information to competitors. While the S-K Study did not specifically consider costs to investors, the staff identified economic principles that should be given consideration when reviewing and considering changes to our disclosure requirements, including: (1) The extent to which a given disclosure requirement entails high administrative and compliance costs; and (2) the extent to which disclosure of a company's proprietary information may have competitive or other economic costs.
176
176
See
S-K Study at 94.
To address the potential negative effects that would result from disclosing sensitive information, our rules permit registrants to request confidential treatment of proprietary information, if disclosure of such information would cause competitive harm to the registrant.
177
The Commission generally does not consider confidential treatment to be appropriate for information that is necessary for the protection of investors.
178
If the Commission grants a request for confidential treatment, the registrant may redact the proprietary information from its public filings.
177
Rule 80(b)(4) [17 CFR 200.80(b)(4)] (adopted under the Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552] (“FOIA”)) (identifying as “nonpublic” records those that disclose trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential); Securities Act Rule 406 [17 CFR 230.406]; Exchange Act Rule 24b-2 [17 CFR 240.24b-2]
See also National Parks and Conservation Association
v.
Morton,
547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that information is confidential for purposes of FOIA if it is of the type not usually released to the public and, if released, would cause substantial competitive harm) and
National Parks and Conservation Association
v.
Kleppe,
547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that information is confidential if its release is likely to cause substantial competitive harm and that actual competitive harm need not be shown).
178
Securities Act Rule 406(b)(2)(iii) [17 CFR 230.406(b)(2)(iii)]. The staff has provided guidance that, except in unusual circumstances, disclosure required by Regulation S-K or any other applicable disclosure requirement is not an appropriate subject for confidential treatment.
See
Staff Legal Bulletin 1A, Confidential Treatment Requests (July 11, 2001) (“Staff Legal Bulletin 1A”),
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf1r.htm
.
The Commission also has addressed the costs of disclosure through regulatory relief in the form of scaled disclosure requirements for certain smaller registrants. These accommodations are intended to promote capital formation and provide relief where the fixed costs of compliance may be particularly high relative to the size of the company while also considering investor protection.
179
179
See, e.g.,
SRC Adopting Release at 942 (stating that the SRC definition “is appropriately scaled in that it reduces costs to smaller companies caused by unnecessary information requirements, consistent with investor protection”); Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, Release No. 33-8819 (July 5, 2007) [72 FR 39670 (July 19, 2007)] at 39678 (stating the Commission's objective to “provide maximum flexibility for [SRCs] without disadvantaging investors [by] establishing a baseline of required disclosure, [while encouraging SRCs] to determine for themselves the proper balance and mix of
disclosure . . . given the costs of compliance and the market demand for information”).
Throughout this concept release, we seek comment on changes to specific disclosure requirements that could reduce costs for registrants, while still providing investors with information that is important or useful to making informed investment and voting decisions. Separately, we address the effectiveness of our scaled disclosure requirements.
180
In addition to those discussions, we are interested in public comment on other methods we could consider to reduce costs for registrants that would not compromise investors' access to important information.
180
For a discussion of our scaled disclosure requirements,
see
Section IV.H.
c. Request for Comment
21. Do current disclosure requirements appropriately consider the costs and benefits of disclosure to registrants and investors? How should the Commission evaluate benefits, such as those arising from disclosure, that cannot be easily quantified?
22. In addition to scaled disclosure and confidential treatment, are there other accommodations that we could make to reduce costs for registrants while still providing investors with the information that is important or useful to making informed investment and voting decisions?
23. Are there other benefits and costs that we should consider when evaluating disclosure effectiveness?
IV. Information for Investment and Voting Decisions
A. Core Company Business Information
Disclosure about a registrant's business lays the groundwork for understanding and assessing a company, its operations and financial condition. Information about a registrant's industry, business environment and other factors affecting the business helps inform investment and voting decisions by placing other disclosure in context. Schedule A of the Securities Act requires disclosure of the general character of the business transacted or to be transacted by the registrant. Item 101 of Regulation S-K similarly requires a description of a registrant's business. Item 102 requires disclosure about a registrant's materially important physical properties. We are reviewing the disclosure required by Item 101(a)(1) and (c)
181
and Item 102 of Regulation S-K to determine whether they continue to provide investors with the information they need to understand the nature of a registrant's business and properties. We are seeking public input on whether there are any disclosure requirements that should be eliminated or modified and whether we should add any new disclosure requirements to these Items.
181
The staff is separately considering certain aspects of Item 101 in developing recommendations for potential changes to update or simplify certain disclosure requirements. For a description of this project,
see supra
Section I.
1. General Development of Business (Item 101(a)(1))
Item 101(a) of Regulation S-K requires a description of the general development of the business of the registrant during the past five years, or such shorter period as the registrant may have been engaged in business.
182
In describing the general development of the business, Item 101(a)(1) requires disclosure such as the following: The year in which the registrant was organized and its form of organization; the nature and results of any bankruptcy, receivership or similar proceedings with respect to the registrant or any of its significant subsidiaries; the nature and results of any other material reclassification, merger or consolidation of the registrant or any of its significant subsidiaries; the acquisition or disposition of any material amount of assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of business; and any material changes in the mode of conducting the business.
182
17 CFR 229.101(a)(1). Item 101(a)(1) states information shall be disclosed for earlier periods if material to an understanding of the general development of the business.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
None.
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
One commenter, as part of a general recommendation to limit disclosure requirements asking for the same or very similar information on multiple occasions, noted redundancies between current reports on Form 8-K and annual reports on Form 10-K and recommended that redundant disclosure in reports subsequent to disclosure in a Form 8-K should not be required.
183
For example, and as noted by this commenter, Items 1.03 (Bankruptcy or Receivership) and 2.01 (Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets) of Form 8-K require disclosure similar to the disclosure required under Item 101(a)(1). This commenter also recommended making a distinction under Item 101(a)(1) for new registrants, which may be disclosing the general development of their business for the first time in a registration statement, and established reporting registrants, which would have disclosed such information in a previous filing.
183
See
CCMC (also noting redundancies between Item 4.01 of Form 8-K (Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant) and Item 304 of Regulation S-K (disclosure of changes in and disagreements with accountants) and Item 3.02 of Form 8-K (Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities) and Item 701 of Regulation S-K (disclosure of recent sales of unregistered securities)).
b. Discussion
A requirement to provide a brief outline of the general development of the business for the preceding five years was included in the earliest forms of registration statements and annual reports.
184
The first version of Regulation S-K adopted in 1977 included Item 101(a)(1) as part of the description of business disclosure requirements.
185
At that time, the Commission amended Item 101(c) to delete a requirement to discuss specific business changes during the past three fiscal years noting “[a]ny material changes would be described pursuant to paragraph (a) of the item.”
186
184
See, e.g.,
Item 6 of Form A-2 adopted in 1935, which required registrants to outline briefly “the general development of the business for the preceding five years.”
See
Release No. 33-276 (Jan. 14, 1935) [
not published in the
Federal Register
]. Additionally, Item 5 of Form A-1, adopted in 1933, required registrants to briefly describe the length of time the registrant had been engaged in its business.
See
Release No. 33-5 (July 6, 1933) [
not published in the
Federal Register
].
See also
S-K Study at 32, footnote 88.
185
See
1977 Regulation S-K Adopting Release.
186
Id.
at 65553. (“The disclosure requirement relating to descriptions of products or services has also been amended to delete the requirement that changes in the kinds of products produced or services rendered or in the markets or methods of distribution during the past three fiscal years be discussed. Any material changes would be required to be described pursuant to paragraph (a) of the item.”).
Business developments and other disclosure called for by Item 101(a)(1) are often reflected elsewhere in the filing, such as in the financial statements or MD&A. Additionally, in 2004, the Commission expanded the number of reportable events on Form 8-K to include items that may result in disclosure that overlaps with the requirements of Item 101(a)(1), such as disclosure of entry into a material definitive agreement, including business combination agreements.
187
187
See
Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Release No. 33-8400 (Mar. 16, 2004) [69 FR 15594 (Mar. 25, 2004)] (“2004 Form 8-K Adopting Release”).
c. Request for Comment
24. Does the current requirement in Item 101(a)(1) to describe the general development of a registrant's business during the past five years provide useful disclosure that is not available either elsewhere in the current filing (
e.g.,
MD&A or the notes to the financial
statements) or in any prior filing, including current reports on Form 8-K? Should we require additional or more specific information under Item 101(a)(1) and, if so, what type of information and why?
25. How could we improve Item 101(a)(1)? For example, is the five-year time frame for this disclosure appropriate? Would a shorter or longer time frame be more appropriate? If so, what time frame would be appropriate and why?
26. Does this disclosure continue to be useful for registrants with a reporting history? Once a registrant has disclosed this information in a registration statement should we allow registrants to omit this disclosure from subsequent periodic reports unless material changes occur? Alternatively, should we require registrants to describe its business as currently conducted as well as any material changes that have occurred in the last five years?
27. Should we revise Item 101(a)(1) to require disclosure of a registrant's business strategy? Would investors find such a disclosure important or useful? If so, should this requirement be included in a registrant's MD&A? Should we define “business strategy”? If so, how?
28. Should we permit a summary disclosure of the general development of a registrant's business in all filings except the initial filing? For example, should we require a more detailed discussion of a registrant's business in the initial filing, and in subsequent filings only require a summary of the registrant's business along with a discussion of material changes in the business as previously disclosed in the registrant's Form 10-K? Alternatively, should we require a more detailed discussion of a registrant's business on a periodic basis, such as every three years, and a summary disclosure in other years? Should any such requirement be conditioned on timely reporting or some other consideration?
29. What types of investors or audiences are most likely to value the information required by Item 101(a)(1)?
30. What is the cost of providing the disclosure required by Item 101(a), including the administrative and compliance costs of preparing and disseminating this disclosure? How would these costs change if we made any of the changes contemplated here? Please provide quantified estimates where possible and include only those costs associated with providing disclosure under Item 101(a).
2. Narrative Description of Business (Item 101(c))
While Item 101(a) requires disclosure of the general development of the business, Item 101(c) requires a narrative description of a registrant's business and identifies thirteen specific items that must be disclosed:
188
188
17 CFR 229.101(c). Item 101(c)(1) specifies that, to the extent material to an understanding of the registrant's business taken as a whole, the description of each segment must include the information specified in subsections (i) through (x). Information in subsections (xi) to (xiii) is required to be discussed for the registrant's business in general; where material, the segments to which these matters are significant also must be identified.
(i) principal products produced and services rendered;
(ii) new products or segments;
(iii) sources and availability of raw materials;
(iv) intellectual property;
(v) seasonality of the business;
(vi) working capital practices;
(vii) dependence on certain customers;
(viii) dollar amount of backlog orders believed to be firm;
(ix) business subject to renegotiation or termination of government contracts;
(x) competitive conditions;
(xi) company-sponsored research and development activities;
(xii) compliance with environmental laws; and
(xiii) number of employees.
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
Two commenters recommended eliminating the requirement in Item 101(c) to disclose the amount of backlog orders believed to be firm for EGCs, stating the concept of backlog is not a “meaningful metric” for most of these companies.
189
These commenters stated that eliminating this requirement for EGCs would not “compromise the delivery of meaningful disclosure to investors.” These commenters also raised the question of whether the concept of backlog (or for businesses other than industrials, some other measure of committed revenue that is not yet reflected in the financial statements) would be addressed more appropriately in MD&A. Another commenter recommended eliminating disclosure requirements that no longer apply due to market or other changes and noted backlog as an example.
190
This commenter recommended eliminating this requirement for all registrants, not only EGCs, or moving this requirement to MD&A.
189
See
Silicon Valley and M. Liles. Item 101(c)(1)(viii) requires disclosure of the dollar amount of backlog orders believed to be firm, as of a recent date and as of a comparable date in the preceding fiscal year, together with an indication of the portion thereof not reasonably expected to be filled within the current fiscal year, and seasonal or other material aspects of the backlog.
190
See
Ernst & Young 1.
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
One commenter stated that many of the subsections of Item 101(c) would be more appropriately addressed elsewhere in the filing, stating that when such information is material to a registrant, investors would be better served by having the registrant address that information in its MD&A or risk factors.
191
191
See
SCSGP (stating that the following subsections of Item 101 would be more useful if included in MD&A: backlog ((c)(1)(viii)), working capital practices ((c)(1)(vi)), sources and availability of raw materials ((c)(1)(iii)), dependence on certain customers ((c)(1)(vii)), competitive conditions ((c)(1)(x)), compliance with environmental laws ((c)(1)(xii)) and risks attendant to foreign operations ((d)(3))).
b. Discussion
Consistent with Schedule A of the Securities Act, the earliest forms of registration statements and annual reports required a brief outline of the general character of the business done and intended to be done by a registrant.
192
Many of the disclosure requirements that currently appear in Item 101(c) were adopted in 1973 following investigation of the hot issues markets.
193
The adopting release notes that, in making investment decisions, venture capitalists and underwriters typically obtain specific information from companies about their competitive position and the methods of competition in their respective industries, and accordingly, the new requirements were expected to provide similar information to the investing public.
194
At the same time, the Commission also added requirements for the disclosure of the amount of backlog orders, the sources and availability of raw materials essential to the business, the number of employees and working capital practices.
195
192
See, e.g.,
Item 5 of Form A-2 adopted in 1935, which required registrants to outline briefly “the general character of the business done and intended to be done by the registrant and its subsidiaries.”
See
Release No. 33-276 (Jan. 14, 1935) [
not published in the
Federal Register
]. Additionally, Items 3 through 5 of Form A-1, adopted in 1933, required registrants to briefly describe the “character of business done or intended to be done,” disclose a list of states where the issuer owned property and was qualified to do business, and the length of time the registrant had been engaged in its business.
See
Release No. 33-5 (July 6, 1933) [
not published in the
Federal Register
].
See also
S-K Study at 32, footnote 88.
193
See
Hot Issues Adopting Release.
See also
Hot Issues; Meaningful Disclosure, Release No. 33-5274 (July 26, 1972) [37 FR 16005 (Aug. 9, 1972)].
194
See
Hot Issues Adopting Release.
195
See id.
In the S-K Study, the staff recommended reviewing the description of business for continuing relevance in
light of changes that have occurred in the way businesses operate, which may make other disclosures relevant that are not expressly addressed under current requirements.
196
As an example, the S-K Study noted that requirements could be more specific as to additional disclosure that would be necessary where a business relies heavily on intellectual property owned by a third party or relies on a service agreement with third parties to perform necessary business functions.
197
196
See
S-K Study at 99-100.
197
Below, and in other parts of this release, we discuss other areas where our requirements could be revised to reflect changes in the way businesses operate.
c. Request for Comment
31. Do the disclosure requirements in Item 101(c) continue to provide useful information to investors? How could we improve Item 101(c)'s requirements?
32. How could we update Item 101(c) to better reflect changes in the way businesses operate? Are there particular categories or types of registrants for which these disclosure requirements are more or less relevant?
33. Are there additional line-item disclosure requirements about a registrant's business that would improve the quality and consistency of disclosure? Are there any categories of information that certain registrants voluntarily provide, and are not required to disclose under Item 101(c), that we should include in Item 101(c)?
198
What would be the benefits and challenges of requiring disclosure of additional categories of information?
198
For example, the staff has observed that many registrants provide disclosure about the regulatory environment in which their business operates although no specific line-item disclosure requirement for this exists.
34. Currently, some registrants include in their business section a general description of their industry. Should industry disclosure be a separate requirement? If so, would this requirement be more useful to investors in the business section or in MD&A?
35. Should we require additional specific disclosure relevant to particular industries, such as manufacturing or technology companies? If so, which industries and why? What are the benefits and challenges of requiring industry-specific disclosure?
199
199
For a discussion of industry-specific disclosures,
see
Section IV.E.
36. What is the impact on disclosure of listing the thirteen item requirements in Item 101(c)? In practice, do registrants view Item 101(c) as a checklist? Do the prescriptive items result in disclosure of information that is not important by some registrants?
37. Should we require Item 101(c) disclosure only in the initial filing with follow-up disclosure of any material changes for subsequent years? Should any such requirement be conditioned on timely reporting or some other consideration? Should the requirements differ for registration statements and periodic reports?
38. Is there any information currently disclosed in the description of business that should be presented in a different context such as MD&A or risk factors? Why?
39. In some circumstances, disclosure is required under Item 101(c)(1) if material. The item specifies that, to the extent material to an understanding of the registrant's business taken as a whole, the description of each segment shall include the information in (c)(1)(i) through (x) and that matters in (c)(1)(xi) through (xiii) shall be discussed for the registrant's business in general; where material, the segments to which these matters are significant shall be identified. Additionally, some sub-items of Item 101(c)(1) require disclosure if material, such as (c)(1)(ii) and (c)(1)(ix),
200
while others do not.
201
Should we require disclosure of all line items in Item 101(c) in all circumstances, regardless of materiality? Why or why not? Alternatively, would a principles-based approach to disclosure about a registrant's business and operations allow flexibility to disclose information that is important to investors? If so, how should such a disclosure requirement be structured? What factors should we consider in developing such a requirement?
200
For example, Item 101(c)(1)(ii) requires a description of the status of a product or segment (
e.g.,
whether in the planning stage, whether prototypes exist, the degree to which product design has progressed or whether further engineering is necessary), if there has been a public announcement of, or if the registrant otherwise has made public information about, a new product or segment that would require the investment of a material amount of the assets of the registrant or that otherwise is material. In addition, Item 101(c)(1)(ix) requires a description of any material portion of the business that may be subject to renegotiation of profits or termination of contracts or subcontracts at the election of the Government.
201
For example, Item 101(c)(1)(xiii) requires disclosure of the number of persons employed by the registrant.
40. What types of investors or audiences are most likely to value the information required by Item 101(c)? Would an alternative format or presentation of the information improve the value of such disclosure to a particular type of investor or audience? If so, what type of format or presentation?
41. What is the cost of providing the disclosure required by Item 101(c), including the administrative and compliance costs of preparing and disseminating this disclosure? How would these costs change if we made any of the changes contemplated here? Please provide quantified estimates where possible and include only those costs associated with providing disclosure under Item 101(c).
3. Technology and Intellectual Property Rights (Item 101(c)(1)(iv))
Item 101(c)(1)(iv) requires disclosure of the importance to the segment and the duration and effect of all patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises and concessions held.
202
202
17 CFR 229.101(c)(1)(iv).
a. Comments Received
S-K Study.
None
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative.
None.
b. Discussion
A broad range of industries benefit from intellectual property, both directly and indirectly,
203
and intellectual property has become increasingly important to business performance.
204
Certain industries produce or use significant amounts of intellectual property or rely more heavily on these rights.
205
Accordingly, certain registrants provide detailed disclosure in response to Item 101(c)(1)(iv), and disclosure varies among registrants and across industries.
203
See
Economics and Statistics Administration and United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus
(March 2012) at iv,
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf
(“Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy”).
204
See, e.g.,
Kelvin W. Willoughby,
What impact does intellectual property have on the business performance of technology firms?,
Int. J. Intellectual Property Management, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2013).
205
See
Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy. This report identifies seventy-five industries as “IP-intensive.” In this report, patents, trademarks and copyrights were the categories of intellectual property assessed. The methodology for designating each of these subcategories as “IP-intensive” is outlined further in this report. For patent intensive industries, the report utilized the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and identified, as the four most patent-intensive industries, those industries classified in computer and electronic product manufacturing (NAICS 334). This three-digit NAICS industry includes computer and peripheral equipment; communications equipment; other computer and electronic products; semiconductor and other electronic components; and navigational, measuring, electro-medical, and control instruments.
In the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, registrants that provide detailed patent disclosure often disclose the jurisdiction in which the patent was filed, year of expiration, type of patent (
e.g.,
composition of
matter, method of use, method of delivery or method of manufacturing), products or technologies to which the patent relates and how the patent was acquired (
e.g.,
licensed from another entity or owned and filed by the registrant). Some registrants in these industries aggregate patent disclosure by groups of patents, potentially making disclosure about individual material patents difficult to discern. As registrants in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries regularly sell one or a few patented products that generate substantial revenue, disclosure of “patent cliffs,”
206
which often result in material adverse financial effects, may be required in the risk factors section or MD&A.
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The term “patent cliff” as used in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry refers to a future loss of patent protection and consequential loss of revenue. These potential future losses are known to registrants far in advance of their onset. When they occur, they often precipitate material adverse financial effects.
See, e.g.,
Andrew Jack,
Pharma tries to avoid falling off `patent cliff,'
Financial Times, May 6, 2012 and
Cliffhanger,
Economist, Dec. 3, 2011.
See also
Ed Silverman,
Big Pharma Faces Some Big Patent Losses, but Pipelines are Improving,
Wall St. J.: L. Blog,
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/02/09/big-pharma-faces-some-big-patent-losses-but-pipelines-are-improving/
.
In the information technologies and services industry, registrants protect their intellectual property through the use of patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, licenses and confidentiality agreements.
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Registrants with large portfolios of intellectual property often disclose that their products, services and technologies are not dependent on any specific patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or license. As a result, these registrants often provide only high-level discussions of their intellectual property portfolios, which include general statements of a registrant's development, use and protection of its intellectual property. Registrants with smaller intellectual property portfolios tend to provide slightly more detailed discussions, including, for example, disclosure of their total number of issued patents, a range of years during which those patents expire and their total number of pending patent applications.
207
See
Bruce Abramson,
Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles Approach to Intellectual Property Reform,
8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 75 (2002) (discussing the software industry's use of intellectual property law).
In general, registrants in the information technologies and services industry use copyrights to protect against the unauthorized copying of software programs
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and trade secrets to protect proprietary and confidential information that derives its value from continued secrecy.
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Since Item 101(c)(1)(iv) does not require disclosure about copyrights or trade secrets, registrants currently make disclosure about such matters voluntarily.
208
See
Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust,
9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 161, 172 (1999) (discussing the dependence of software technology companies on copyright).
209
See
Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus,
Software Copyright: Sliding Scales and Abstracted Expression,
32 Hous. L. Rev. 317, 325 (1995) (distinguishing between the software industry's use of trade secret law, patent law and copyright law).
c. Request for Comment
42. Should we retain the current scope of Item 101(c)(1)(iv), which requires disclosure of a registrant's patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises and concessions? Should we expand the rule to include other types of intellectual property, such as copyrights? Should we remove the individual categories and instead require disclosure of “intellectual property”? If so, should we define that term and what should it encompass?
43. What, if any, additional information about a registrant's reliance on or use of technology and related intellectual property rights should we require and why? Should we revise Item 101(c)(1)(iv) to require more detailed intellectual property disclosure, similar to the disclosure currently provided by some biotechnology and pharmaceutical registrants? If so, should we require such detailed disclosures for all or only some of a registrant's intellectual property, such as those that are material to the business?
44. For registrants with large intellectual property portfolios, does aggregate disclosure of the total number of patents, trademarks and copyrights and a range of expiration dates provide investors with sufficient information? If not, what additional information do investors need about a company's portfolio of intellectual property? Would tabular disclosure or an alternate format or presentation of a registrant's intellectual property portfolio make the information more useful to investors? What would be the benefits and challenges of requiring disclosure of this information in this format?
45. Should we limit these disclosure requirements to registrants in particular industries? If so, which industries should we specify and why? Is disclosure about a registrant's intellectual property most useful in the context of the description of business, disclosure about trends and developments affecting results of operations, or in a discussion of risk and risk management?
46. What are the competitive costs of disclosure under Item 101(c)(1)(iv)?
4. Government Contracts and Regulation, Including Environmental Laws (Items 101(c)(1)(ix) and (c)(1)(xii))
Item 101(c)(1)(ix) requires disclosure of any material portion of a business that may be subject to renegotiation of profits or termination of contracts or subcontracts at the election of the government.
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Item 101(c)(1)(xii) requires disclosure of the material effects of compliance with environmental laws on the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries, as well as any material estimated capital expenditures for the remainder of the fiscal year, the succeeding fiscal year, and such future periods that the registrant deems material.
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