Members of Federal Home Loan Banks

Federal RegisterJan 20, 2016

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FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

12 CFR Part 1263

RIN 2590-AA39

Members of Federal Home Loan Banks

AGENCY:

Federal Housing Finance Agency.

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has adopted a final rule revising its regulations governing Federal Home Loan Bank (Bank) membership. The final rule adopts several key revisions included in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. These revisions will prevent the circumvention of the statute's membership restrictions by ineligible entities using captive insurers as conduits for Bank membership by defining the term “insurance company” to exclude captive insurers, thereby making them ineligible for Bank membership; permit any Bank that has admitted captives to membership a transition period within which to wind down its affairs with those entities; require a Bank to obtain and review an insurance company's audited financial statements when considering its application for membership; clarify the standards by which a Bank is to determine the “principal place of business” for its members, including specific standards for insurance companies and community development financial institutions; and remove obsolete provisions and make numerous non-substantive textual revisions so as to provide greater clarity. The final rule does not implement the proposed rule's provisions with respect to continuing eligibility requirements, in order, as explained below, to avoid compliance burdens that may outweigh the benefits. The specific revisions made, and the rationale for making them, are set forth in the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

below.

DATES:

Effective Date:

February 19, 2016.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Eric M. Raudenbush, Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel,

Eric.Raudenbush@fhfa.gov,

(202) 649-3084; or Julie Paller, Senior Financial Analyst, Supervisory and Regulatory Policy, Division of Bank Regulation,

Julie.Paller@fhfa.gov,

(202) 649-3201 (not toll-free numbers), Federal Housing Finance Agency, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20219. The telephone number for the Telecommunications Device for the Hearing Impaired is (800) 877-8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Overview of the Existing Bank Membership Requirements

1. Statutory Requirements

The Federal Home Loan Bank System (Bank System) consists of eleven district Banks and the Office of Finance. The Banks are wholesale financial institutions, organized under authority of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (Bank Act) to serve the public interest by enhancing the availability of residential housing finance and community lending credit through their member institutions and, to a very limited extent, through certain eligible nonmembers.

1

Each Bank is structured as a regional cooperative in that it is owned and controlled by member institutions located within its district, which are its primary customers.

2

1

See

12 U.S.C. 1423, 1431(e), 1432(a).

See also Fahey

v.

O'Melveny & Myers,

200 F.2d 420, 446 (9th Cir. 1952) (stating that a Bank is “a federal instrumentality organized to carry out public policy”);

ADAPSO

v.

FHLBB,

568 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that the Banks remain federal instrumentalities although their stock is now held entirely by private entities). In addition to advances to members, the Bank Act also authorizes the Banks to make advances to nonmember mortgagees, including state housing finance agencies, that have been approved under title II of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1707,

et seq.,

and that meet certain additional requirements.

See

12 U.S.C. 1430b. These entities are referred to as “housing associates” in FHFA's regulations.

See

12 CFR 1201.1, 1264.1-.6, 1266.16-.17.

2

Specifically, only members may own the capital stock of a Bank, 12 U.S.C. 1426(a)(4)(B), all members are required to maintain a minimum investment in Bank stock, 12 U.S.C. 1426(c)(1), each Bank is managed by a board of directors that is elected by its members,

see

12 U.S.C. 1427(a), (b), (c), and (with limited exceptions noted in footnote 1 above) only members may obtain advances and access other products and services provided by a Bank,

see

12 U.S.C. 1429, 1430(a)(1), 1430b.

The Banks carry out their public policy function primarily by providing low cost loans, known as advances, to their members. These must be fully secured by one or more specific types of collateral, including residential mortgage loans and residential mortgage-backed securities, but also government securities, cash, other real estate related collateral, and, in some cases, secured small business, agriculture, or community development loans, or securities backed by such loans.

3

In most cases, Bank members must use the proceeds of long-term advances (that is, advances with an original term to maturity of more than five years) to fund residential housing finance, although, since 1999, smaller bank and thrift members have also been permitted to obtain long-term advances to fund small business and community development activities.

4

Bank members may use the proceeds of shorter-term advances for any business purpose. The Banks also may provide members with a limited range of other products and services, such as they provide through the “acquired member asset” (AMA) programs, under which they may purchase qualifying residential mortgage loans from their members or facilitate the sale of such loans to third-party investors.

5

3

12 U.S.C. 1430(a)(3).

4

See

12 U.S.C. 1430(a)(2).

5

See

12 CFR part 955.

The Banks fund their operations principally through the issuance of consolidated obligations (COs), which are debt instruments issued on their behalf by the Office of Finance (a joint office of the Banks) and on which all of the Banks are jointly and severally liable.

6

Congress has vested in the Banks market advantages designed to enable them to raise funds in the capital markets at interest rates only slightly higher than those on comparable Treasury instruments. These government-sponsored entities have various advantages, which include, among other things: The exemption of the Banks' corporate earnings and the earnings on their COs from state and federal income taxes;

7

the classification of the Banks' COs as “exempted securities” under the Securities Act of 1933 and as “government securities” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;

8

and the authority of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) to purchase up to $4 billion in COs under certain circumstances and the fact that Congress has occasionally granted it authority to purchase higher amounts during periods of financial crisis.

9

These market advantages were designed to enable the Banks to provide low-cost wholesale funding to their member institutions so that, in turn, those members could provide long-term home mortgage loans to consumers at a reasonable cost. These advantages accrue not only to consumers, but also to the members themselves, which benefit from a lower cost of funds that makes those institutions more competitive in their markets as compared with non-members who do not have access to such low-cost wholesale funding.

6

See

12 U.S.C. 1431; 12 CFR part 1270.

7

See

12 U.S.C. 1433.

8

See

12 U.S.C. 1426a(c)(2).

9

See

12 U.S.C. 1431(i), (

l

).

In line with the public policy goals underlying the creation of the Banks

and in conjunction with its decision to provide the Banks, and consequently their members, with the market advantages described above, Congress made a decision to limit eligibility for Bank membership to the types of financial institutions listed in section 4(a) of the Bank Act. When the statute was originally enacted in 1932, these included thrift institutions of various types that existed at the time (

i.e.,

building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations, and savings banks), as well as insurance companies. Since 1932, Congress has amended section 4(a) to expand the list of institutions that may be eligible for Bank membership only three times, adding federally insured depository institutions in 1989,

10

non-depository Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in 2008,

11

and non-federally insured credit unions in 2015.

12

Today, because most depository institutions (including the types of thrifts listed in section 4(a)) are now federally insured, essentially four types of institutions may be eligible for membership: (1) Federally insured depository institutions (including banks and thrifts whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and credit unions whose deposits are insured by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)); (2) insurance companies; (3) CDFIs that are certified by the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund of the Treasury Department; and (4) non-federally insured credit unions meeting certain statutory criteria. Entities that do not fall within one of those categories are ineligible for Bank membership.

10

See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),

Public Law 101-73, § 704, 103 Stat. 183, 415 (1989).

11

See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,

Public Law 110-289, § 1206, 122 Stat. 2654, 2787 (2008). CDFI credit unions were eligible for Bank membership prior to 2008 due to their status as insured depository institutions.

12

On December 4, 2015, the President signed into law an amendment to section 4(a) of the Bank Act that allows any non-federally insured credit union meeting certain specified criteria to be treated as an “insured depository institution” for purposes of determining its eligibility for Bank membership.

See Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act,

Public Law 114-94, § 82001 (2015). This final rule does not implement or otherwise address that recent statutory amendment. To the extent that regulatory revisions are necessary or appropriate to implement the amendment, they must be the subject of a separate rulemaking.

While qualifying as one of those enumerated types of institutions is one prerequisite for membership eligibility, an institution must meet several other requirements set forth in section 4 of the Bank Act in order to obtain membership. Section 4(a)(1) of the Bank Act requires that an institution, regardless of type: (A) Be duly organized under the laws of any state or the United States; (B) be subject to inspection and regulation under banking, or similar, laws of a state or the United States; and (C) “makes such home mortgage loans as, in the judgment of the Director [of FHFA], are long-term loans.”

13

An institution that fails to satisfy any of those requirements is not eligible for Bank membership. (Hereinafter, those requirements are referred to as the “duly organized,” “subject to inspection and regulation,” and “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirements, respectively).

13

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(1). In lieu of being subject to inspection and regulation by a state or federal regulator, a CDFI applicant must be certified as a CDFI by the Treasury Department.

See

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(1)(B).

Section 4(a)(2) of the Bank Act imposes additional eligibility requirements on insured depository institutions that were not members of a Bank as of January 1, 1989. These require that any such institution: (A) Have at least 10 percent of its total assets in “residential mortgage loans”; (B) be in a financial condition such that advances may be safely made to it; and (C) show that the character of its management and its home-financing policy are consistent with sound and economical home financing.

14

(Hereinafter, those requirements are referred to as the “10 percent,” “financial condition,” “character of management,” and “home financing policy” requirements, respectively). However, section 4(a)(4) exempts from the “10 percent” requirement any “community financial institution” (CFI),

15

which the statute defines as an FDIC-insured depository institution with less than $1 billion in average total assets (adjusted annually for inflation) over the preceding three years.

16

14

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(2).

15

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(4).

16

12 U.S.C. 1422(10)(A). By statute, FHFA must annually adjust the $1 billion CFI asset limit for inflation. 12 U.S.C. 1422(10)(B). The inflation-adjusted CFI limit for 2015 was $1.123 billion.

See

80 FR 6712 (Feb. 6, 2015).

2. FHFA's Existing Bank Membership Regulation

FHFA's regulation on Bank membership, located at 12 CFR part 1263, specifies how and when an institution must demonstrate compliance with each of the statutory membership eligibility requirements and otherwise implements those requirements. The regulation also establishes requirements relating to the membership application process, determination of the appropriate Bank district for membership, members' purchase and redemption of Bank capital stock, and voluntary or involuntary termination and reacquisition of membership.

The regulation requires all insured depository institutions, insurance companies, and CDFIs to meet six requirements in order to be considered eligible for membership: The “duly organized,” “subject to inspection and regulation,”

17

and “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirements, which by statute apply to all types of institutions; and the “financial condition,” “character of management,” and “home financing policy” requirements, which FHFA and its predecessor agency, the Federal Housing Finance Board (Finance Board), have applied by regulation to all institutions as a matter of safety and soundness.

18

Paralleling the statute, the membership regulation requires that non-CFI depository institutions also meet the “10 percent” requirement in order to be eligible for membership, but does not extend that requirement to CFIs, CDFIs or insurance companies.

19

However, the regulation does require institutions that are not insured depository institutions (

i.e.,

insurance companies and CDFIs) to have “mortgage-related assets” that “reflect a commitment to housing finance” in order to be considered eligible.

20

17

As provided in the statute, an institution certified as a CDFI by the Treasury Department's CDFI Fund is deemed to have met the “subject to inspection and regulation” requirement by virtue of that certification.

See

12 CFR 1263.6(a)(2), 1263.8.

18

12 CFR 1263.6(a).

19

12 CFR 1263.6(b).

20

12 CFR 1263.6(c). The regulation does not define the term “mortgage-related assets.”

For each of the six general eligibility requirements and for the “10 percent” requirement, part 1263 includes at least one separate section specifying in more detail how a Bank that is considering an institution's application for membership is to determine whether the applicant satisfies the requirement.

21

An applicant that meets the criteria of any of those more detailed provisions is deemed to be in compliance with the corresponding statutory eligibility requirement, although that presumption

may be rebutted if the Bank obtains substantial evidence to the contrary.

22

Conversely, an applicant that does not meet the criteria of the more detailed provisions is presumed to be out of compliance with the corresponding statutory eligibility requirements. With respect to several of the requirements, the presumption of non-compliance can be rebutted if certain additional criteria are met.

23

However, the presumption of non-compliance arising from failure to meet the criteria for the “makes long-term home mortgage loans,” and “10 percent” requirements (as well as the “duly organized” requirement) is conclusive and may not be rebutted.

21

See

12 CFR 1263.7-1263.18. In the case of the “financial condition” requirement, there are two such sections—one (§ 1263.11) setting forth the specific criteria for insured depository institutions and another (§ 1263.16) setting forth the specific criteria for insurance companies and CDFIs. There are also separate sections setting forth specific criteria for determining all of the eligibility requirements for recently chartered insured depository institutions (§ 1263.14) and for determining some of the eligibility requirements for recently consolidated institutions of any type (§ 1263.15).

22

12 CFR 1263.17(a).

23

See

12 CFR 1263.17(b) through (f).

In the case of the “10 percent” requirement, the regulation deems any insured depository institution to which that statutory requirement applies to have satisfied that requirement if, at the time of its application for Bank membership, its most recently filed regulatory financial report indicates that it has at least 10 percent of its total assets in “residential mortgage loans.”

24

In contrast to the “10 percent” requirement, neither the Bank Act nor the regulation establishes a quantitative standard for determining compliance with the “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement. The regulation deems an institution to have satisfied that statutory requirement if, at the time of its application for Bank membership, its most recently filed regulatory financial report demonstrates that it originates or purchases long-term home mortgage loans.

25

The regulation does not specify the level of activity that is needed to meet the requirement. The membership regulation does not require a Bank to determine an institution's compliance with either the “10 percent” or “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement once that institution has become a Bank member.

24

The regulation defines the term “residential mortgage loan,” which the statute does not define, to include generally all assets that qualify as home mortgage loans (

see

definition in footnote 25 below), regardless of whether the underlying loans are “long-term” or not, plus loans secured by junior liens on one-to-four family property or multifamily property, loans secured by manufactured housing, funded residential construction loans, and mortgage pass-through securities representing an ownership interest in, or mortgage debt securities secured by, any of those types of assets. 12 CFR 1263.1.

25

12 CFR 1263.9. The Bank Act defines the term “home mortgage loan” to mean “a loan made by a member upon the security of a home mortgage.” 12 U.S.C. 1422(4). In turn, the statute defines the term “home mortgage” to mean a first mortgage, or its equivalent, upon real estate on which one or more homes or dwelling units are located. 12 U.S.C. 1422(5). The existing regulation supplements the statutory definition of “home mortgage loan” by defining the term generally to include any loan or interest in a loan that is secured by a first lien mortgage or any mortgage pass-through security that represents an undivided ownership interest in such loans or in another security that represents an undivided ownership interest in such loans. 12 CFR 1263.1. The regulation also defines the term “long-term,” which the statute does not define, to mean “a term to maturity of five years or greater.”

See id.

B. FHFA's Review of the Membership Regulation

This final rule is one of the results of a continuing review of FHFA's Bank membership regulation that the Agency began in 2010. Most of the fundamental aspects of the existing membership regulation were adopted as part of two rulemakings undertaken by the Finance Board in the mid-1990s.

26

Although the membership regulation was subsequently amended several times (in some cases to make important substantive changes

27

), until 2010 there had been no comprehensive review of the regulation as a whole since it was amended to grant the Banks the authority to approve or deny membership applications in 1996. FHFA's decision to undertake such a review was prompted in part by the evolution of the financial services industry in the intervening years, which had given rise to a number of issues that the existing regulation either did not address or addressed inadequately. The goal of this review, which is ongoing, has been to determine whether the existing regulatory provisions continue to effectively implement the requirements of the Bank Act and the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) and to fulfill the purposes underlying those requirements. FHFA has also sought to determine whether certain provisions that do not need substantive revision should nonetheless be revised to address questions that have arisen about their application, or simply to read more clearly or conform more closely to the style, structure and nomenclature FHFA now uses in its other regulations.

26

In 1993, the Finance Board adopted a new membership regulation in order to implement the revisions to the statutory membership requirements made by FIRREA in 1989.

See

58 FR 43522 (Aug. 17, 1993). Most of the existing material addressing the general eligibility requirements (now located in § 1263.6), the stock requirements (§§ 1263.19-1263.23), and membership withdrawal, termination, and readmission requirements (§§ 1263.24-1263.30) was adopted at that time. A 1996 rulemaking made significant revisions and additions to the regulation in order to authorize the Banks to approve or deny all membership applications.

See

61 FR 42531 (Aug. 16, 1996). Prior to that time, the Finance Board had the ultimate authority to approve or deny membership applications, although it had delegated some of that decision-making authority to the Banks in the case of institutions meeting certain “safe harbor” criteria. Most of the existing material regarding the application process (§§ 1263.2-1263.5) and the rebuttable presumptions that apply to the various eligibility requirements (§§ 1263.7-1263.18) were adopted as part of the 1996 rulemaking.

27

For example, the regulation was amended in 2000 to implement the new statutory exemption of CFIs from the “10 percent” requirement,

see

65 FR 13866 (Mar. 15, 2000), and in 2010 to implement the statutory amendments making non-depository CDFIs eligible for membership,

see

75 FR 678 (Jan. 5, 2010).

In December 2010, after FHFA had completed an initial review of the membership regulation, the Agency published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in which it requested comments on a number of issues.

28

Primary among those issues was whether the existing regulation was effectively implementing the statutory “10 percent,” “makes long-term home mortgage loans,” and “home financing policy” eligibility requirements. The ANPR asked whether it would be appropriate to establish more objective and quantifiable standards for either of the latter two requirements and whether any or all of those requirements should be revised to explicitly apply on a continuing basis, rather than only at the time of admission to membership. The ANPR also requested comment on other issues, including whether, in light of FHFA's supervisory concerns about the acceptance of so-called “captive” insurers as members by several Banks, the Agency should amend the regulation to exclude such entities from Bank membership. FHFA received 137 comment letters in response to the ANPR, almost all of which opposed revising the membership regulation in any of the ways discussed in the notice. However, because very few of those letters provided detailed responses to the questions FHFA asked, the Agency continued to study the issues and ultimately decided to proceed with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (proposed rule).

28

See

75 FR 81145 (Dec. 27, 2010).

C. The Proposed Rule

FHFA published a proposed rule in the

Federal Register

on September 12, 2014.

29

It proposed to make two fundamental changes to the Bank membership regulation, as well as several other substantive, but less fundamental, changes, and numerous non-substantive revisions to clarify various existing regulatory provisions.

29

See

79 FR 54848 (Sept. 12, 2014).

First, the proposed rule would have revised the regulation to require that an institution hold at least one percent of its assets in home mortgage loans in order to be deemed to satisfy the statutory “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement and to require that each Bank member comply

with that “one percent” requirement and, where applicable, with the “10 percent” requirement on an ongoing basis as a condition of remaining a member. The proposed rule would have required each Bank to determine member compliance with those ongoing requirements annually, using data from members' regulatory financial reports where possible, to calculate the relevant ratios based on a three-year rolling average. Members found to be out of compliance with either requirement would have been given one year to return to compliance. As proposed, the rule would have required a Bank to terminate the membership of any institution that remained out of compliance for two consecutive years.

Second, the proposed rule sought to address the growing use of captive insurers as vehicles through which parent companies not meeting the membership eligibility requirements of the Bank Act could circumvent those requirements and gain access to low-cost Bank advances to fund their own operations and investments.

30

Several real estate investment trusts (REITs), which are not eligible for Bank membership, had established captive subsidiaries that became Bank members and then obtained advances that were disproportionately large in comparison with the investments and operations of the captives themselves, and additional REITs and other ineligible entities were seeking to do the same. This, combined with the facts that many of the parents were guaranteeing repayment of the advances made to their captive subsidiaries and providing the collateral for those advances, led FHFA to the conclusion that the real purpose of those arrangements was to provide the non-member REITs with access to Bank funding to which they were not legally entitled.

30

A captive is a special-purpose insurer formed primarily to underwrite the risks of its parent company or affiliated companies. A typical captive resembles a traditional commercial insurance company in that it is licensed under state law, sets premiums and writes policies for the risks it underwrites, collects premiums, and pays out claims. The biggest difference between a captive insurer and a commercial insurance company is that a captive does not sell insurance to the general public. In 1972, Colorado became the first state in the U.S. to enact legislation recognizing and governing captives as a class of entity distinct from commercial insurance companies. To date, over 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted such captives-specific statutes. Primarily because captives do not sell insurance to the general public, these state statutes establish standards for the formation, licensing, operation, and supervision of captives that are generally less onerous than either the state statutory regimes that apply to commercial insurance companies or the state and federal laws under which depository institutions are chartered, operated, and supervised.

See

Frank Seneco, Wesley Sierk & Evan Jehle,

Do-It-Yourself Insurance,

Private Wealth Magazine, July/Aug. 2014, at 21-22,

http://www.fa-mag.com/news/do-it-yourself-insurance-18548.html?issue=230

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015);

see also

National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Captive and Special Purpose Vehicle Use Subgroup of the Financial Condition Committee,

Captives and Special Purpose Vehicles—An NAIC White Paper

(June 6, 2013),

http://www.naic.org/store/free/SPV-OP-13-ELS.pdf

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015).

The proposed rule would have addressed this supervisory concern by defining the term “insurance company”—which is not defined in either the Bank Act or the existing regulation—to exclude captives, thereby rendering those types of entities ineligible for Bank membership. Specifically, the proposed rule would have defined “insurance company” to mean “a company whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for nonaffiliated persons or entities.” A typical captive, whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for its parent company or for other affiliates, would not be included within the scope of the proposed definition of “insurance company.” Because, as discussed above, the Bank Act and the membership regulation limit eligibility for Bank membership to institutions that qualify as an insured depository institution, a CDFI, or an insurance company, defining “insurance company” to exclude captives effectively removes such entities from among the types of institutions that may be eligible for membership.

Although the proposed rule would have made all captives ineligible for membership, it would have permitted any captive that had been admitted to membership prior to the publication date of the proposed rule to remain a member of its current Bank for five years following the effective date of the final rule. However, the rule would have capped the amount of advances that a Bank could have outstanding to such a member at 40 percent of the member's total assets and prohibited a Bank from making a new advance, or renewing an existing advance, with a maturity date beyond the five-year grace period. As proposed, the regulatory text would not have explicitly addressed the treatment of any captives that a Bank may have admitted to membership on or after the date on which the proposed rule was published. FHFA stated in the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

to the proposed rule, however, that it would interpret the regulation to require the immediate termination of such captives' membership and the prompt liquidation of any outstanding advances.

The proposed rule also would have made several other substantive, but less fundamental, changes: (1) To expand the list of assets that qualify as “home mortgage loans” to include all types of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) (as opposed to only mortgage pass-through securities) that are fully backed by qualifying whole loans; (2) to require that a Bank examine an insurance company applicant's most recent audited financial statements in determining whether it meets the “financial condition” eligibility requirement; and (3) to revise the existing regulation and add a new provision addressing how a Bank should determine the “principal place of business” (and, therefore, the appropriate Bank district for membership) for insurance companies or CDFIs. In addition to those primary revisions, FHFA also proposed to make a number of conforming changes necessary to integrate the new requirements into the regulation and to make numerous non-substantive revisions to clarify various regulatory provisions.

D. Overview of Comments on the Proposed Rule

The proposed rule initially provided for a comment period of 60 days, but, in response to numerous requests, FHFA extended the comment period to 120 days.

31

The extended comment period closed on January 12, 2015, and FHFA received over 1,300 comment letters in response to the proposed rule. Nearly 60 percent of the comment letters came from bank and thrift institutions and related trade associations; about 12 percent came from credit unions and related trade associations. The remainder of the letters were from the Banks (all of which sent more than one letter), insurance companies, CDFIs, affordable housing agencies and organizations, various types of community support organizations, home builders, REITs, public officials, and others. About two-thirds of all letters were versions of one form letter template or another.

31

See

79 FR 60384 (Oct. 7, 2014).

Few of the comment letters expressed support for any aspect of the proposed rule, and the vast majority expressed opposition to, or requested that FHFA withdraw, the entire rule. The most commonly expressed concerns arose from a belief that the rule, if implemented, would result in the Banks having fewer members on average and that this, in turn, would result in a reduction in their income. This, commenters contended, would compromise the Banks' ability to act as reliable sources of liquidity, inhibit their ability to carry out their housing

finance and community development mission, and reduce the amount of funds available for their Affordable Housing Programs and Community Investment Cash Advance programs. However, few of the commenters expressing these views provided factual support for their opinions or attempted to quantify the effects they believed the rule would have on the Banks' operations.

FHFA reviewed every comment letter and considered all of the comments in developing the final rule. The primary comments regarding each of the substantive aspects of the proposed rule, as well as FHFA's responses to some of those comments, are discussed immediately below. Comments addressing specific rule provisions are discussed in part III of this

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

, which describes the final rule in detail and the ways in which it differs from the proposed rule.

1. Comments on the Proposed Ongoing Asset Ratio Requirements

Over 800 of the comment letters addressed FHFA's proposal to measure compliance with the “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement based on a quantitative standard and to apply that quantitative requirement to members on an ongoing basis. Over 600 of the letters addressed the proposal to apply the “10 percent” requirement to members on an ongoing basis. Almost all of the commenters addressing those proposals were opposed to the proposed revisions. Approximately 66 percent of those opposed to the ongoing quantitative “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement and approximately 51 percent of those opposed to the ongoing “10 percent” requirement stated that managing their balance sheets for compliance would hinder members' business by putting them in the position of choosing between optimal balance sheet management and continued access to their Banks as a source of liquidity. About half of the commenters opposed to the proposed revisions stated that members would be harmed by losing membership in the Bank System and about half also cited concerns regarding the additional regulatory burden on members.

As further objections to the proposal, commenters also stated, among other things, that the proposal would create a significant operational burden on the Banks because the member financial information required to determine compliance with the ongoing requirements is not perfectly aligned with specific call report line items; the proposal would provide little or no benefit to the Bank System; members could never be certain that FHFA would not increase the quantitative requirements in the future; the proposed ongoing requirements would reduce membership levels at the Banks; the current regulations and collateral requirements already ensure that members maintain a nexus to the Banks' housing finance mission; the proposed ongoing requirements have no foundation in the Bank Act or its legislative history; and the requirements do not take into account that financial services organizations are often structured such that they hold mortgages and mortgage securities in various entities within their corporate organization for a range of business reasons.

Commenters also expressed concerns specific to the proposal to make the “10 percent” requirement ongoing, including that CFIs with total assets approaching the CFI threshold amount might forego acquiring another institution or reduce other activities that could grow their business solely because doing so would push their asset size above the CFI threshold and thus make them immediately subject to the “10 percent” requirement. In addition, some commenters expressed concern that, because the Bank Act does not exempt smaller credit unions from the “10 percent” requirement as it does for small banks and thrifts, the proposed changes would impose a disproportionately greater compliance burden on small credit unions than they would on small banks and thrifts.

Having reviewed all of the comment letters addressing the proposed ongoing asset ratio requirements, FHFA has decided not to include those revised requirements in the final rule. The Agency's research indicates that over 98 percent of current members likely would be in compliance with both proposed requirements (as applicable). This suggests that, for the time being, FHFA can address its supervisory concerns about members abandoning their commitment to housing finance by continuing to monitor the levels of residential mortgage assets held by members.

FHFA also recognizes that establishing a system to monitor members' compliance with the proposed ongoing asset ratio requirements could pose an additional incremental burden on the Banks and their members, particularly on members whose asset ratios are close to the required minimums. FHFA also carefully considered the comments received from the credit union industry, which contended that the proposed ongoing “10 percent” requirement would impose a disproportionate burden on small credit unions because they cannot qualify as CFIs. That view is consistent with the Agency's recent research, which indicates that, of the current members that would not meet an ongoing “10 percent” requirement, about 68 percent of them would be small credit unions.

Although FHFA has determined not to adopt the ongoing asset ratio requirements as part of the final rule, the Agency believes that members' ongoing commitment to housing finance is important to ensuring fidelity to the Bank Act and the purposes for which the Bank System was established and that the issue warrants continued monitoring going forward. FHFA therefore will continue to monitor this issue carefully and may revisit the issue in the future should its monitoring reveal a need for further action. Any such action would be undertaken through a separate rulemaking, with prior notice to, and an opportunity for comments from, all interested parties.

2. Comments on the Proposed Exclusion of Captives From Membership

About 400 of the comment letters addressed FHFA's proposal to exclude captives from Bank membership to some degree, with about 60 of those letters treating the issue in some depth. Almost all of the letters expressed opposition to all aspects of the captives proposal and none expressed support for the overall proposal. Almost all of the commenters' specific arguments in opposition to the captives proposal fell into two general categories: (1) That FHFA does not have the legal authority to implement the proposal; and (2) that the proposal is flawed from a policy perspective. Many commenters included arguments falling into both categories in their letters.

A few of the comment letters expressed no opposition to the proposal, but suggested some clarifying textual revisions. One commenter explicitly supported the idea of excluding REIT-controlled captives from membership, stating that, because REITs are uninsured, they pose “unnecessary risks” to the Bank system and, because REITs already benefit from tax preferences, it is questionable public policy to allow them access to the lower cost funding the Banks provide. However, that commenter was opposed to the exclusion of captives controlled by other types of entities.

a. Comments on FHFA's Legal Authority To Implement the Captives Proposal

Commenters who expressed legally based objections to the captives proposal made three types of arguments in support of those objections: (1) FHFA lacks the legal authority to define the term “insurance company” to exclude captives; (2) irrespective of its general authority, FHFA cannot legally exclude all captives from membership as proposed because the proposal lacks a factual basis, arbitrarily singles out captives, or is overly broad; and (3) in any event, FHFA lacks the legal authority to terminate or require termination of a captive member. These three general categories, including most of the specific legal arguments offered within those categories, are addressed in turn below.

The general legal argument expressed most frequently in the comment letters was that FHFA lacks the legal authority to define the term “insurance company” to exclude captives. Many commenters stated that, because “insurance company” is not defined in the statute, the term must be given what they believe to be its plain meaning—

i.e.,

that a captive must be considered to be an “insurance company” under the Bank Act, apparently because it is chartered or licensed under state insurance laws. Because a captive is considered to be an “insurance company” under the laws of the states that have captive insurance statutes, these commenters argued, FHFA has no authority to interpret the term any differently for purposes of the Bank Act, and thus cannot exclude captives from the category of “insurance company” as used in the Bank Act. In support of this argument, several commenters specifically cited the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act,

32

which reserves to the states the authority to regulate and tax the business of insurance, except in cases where Congress has adopted a statutory provision that explicitly provides otherwise.

32

15 U.S.C. 1011-1015.

Numerous commenters argued that FHFA's proposal to define “insurance company” to exclude captives from membership is outside the Agency's authority because it runs contrary to Congress's clear intent regarding the meaning of the term and the scope of Bank membership. In this vein, many cited the fact that the Bank Act provides that “any” insurance company may be eligible for membership as evidence of Congress's unambiguous intent to prohibit the Bank System regulator from narrowing the scope of the term to exclude any entity chartered as any type of insurance company. Others disputed FHFA's assertion in the proposed rule that in 1932 Congress could not have contemplated that the term “insurance company” would include captives because they did not exist at that time. These commenters contended that the concept of “self-insurance” has existed for hundreds of years and that other types of self-insurance vehicles did exist in 1932, although they were not at that time referred to as “captives.” Several commenters also noted that Congress has never acted to exclude captives from membership, despite the fact that an increasing number of states have adopted captive insurance statutes since the first such statutes were enacted domestically in the 1970s. Finally, many commenters cited Congress's decision to extend eligibility for Bank membership to commercial banks and credit unions in 1989 and to CDFIs in 2008 as evidence of its intent to effect “an inclusive and expansive approach” to membership and characterized FHFA's attempt to exclude captives from membership as running counter to that intent.

In addition to the broader assertions that FHFA lacks any authority to interpret the scope of the term “insurance company” as not including captives, numerous commenters argued, more narrowly, that the Agency cannot legally implement the specific approach set forth in the proposed rule because it lacks any factual basis to justify that approach. Many of the commenters advancing such arguments mischaracterized the Agency's proposal to exclude captives as being based primarily on either safety and soundness concerns or a view that captives (or their parents) do not support housing finance. Those making such mischaracterizations asserted, and in some cases cited specific evidence, that the assumptions underlying those purported bases are erroneous. Others, who correctly characterized FHFA's primary goal as being to prevent the circumvention of the statute by ineligible entities, such as REITs, that have formed captives for the express purpose of gaining access to Bank funding to which they are not legally entitled, argued that the proposed rule provided no evidence to show a factual basis for those concerns.

Some commenters argued that, even if FHFA has a legitimate factual basis for its concerns regarding the ability of ineligible entities to obtain indirect access to Bank funding through eligible subsidiaries, the Agency's decision to focus only on the exclusion of captives in the proposed rule is arbitrary because it disregards the possibility that other types of members could be utilized for a similar purpose.

While commenters advancing the foregoing argument asserted that the proposed prohibition would be too narrow, others asserted that it would be overly broad. Commenters taking the latter view contended that, if FHFA wishes to prevent entities that are not eligible for Bank membership from using captives to access Bank funding, then it should exclude from membership only captives that are owned by ineligible entities or, even more narrowly, only captives that FHFA has determined are actually being used as a funding conduit for an ineligible parent.

Finally, a number of commenters, while not conceding that FHFA has the authority to prevent the Banks from accepting captives as new members going forward, argued specifically that the Agency may not terminate, or require the Banks to terminate, captives that have already been approved for membership under the existing regulations. In support of this contention, several commenters noted that, while the Bank Act at one time explicitly authorized the Bank System regulator to require a Bank to terminate a member in certain circumstances, Congress removed this explicit authorization in 1999.

Another commenter who focused on FHFA's comments in the proposed rule

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

regarding the possibility that captive membership may pose unique safety and soundness issues asserted that those concerns could not serve as a basis for requiring the termination of captive members until the Agency had taken the steps required by section 8 of the Bank Act.

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Specifically, the commenter asserted that section 8 of the Bank Act requires FHFA, if it believes that any of the state laws under which captives are regulated give rise to safety and soundness concerns, to undertake a study of those laws and that only after concluding that a state's laws fail to provide adequate protection to the Banks may FHFA restrict the membership of otherwise eligible members in that state.

33

12 U.S.C. 1428.

One commenter asserted that termination of existing captive members would give rise to a “takings” claim against the United States in that it would deprive former captive members of their right to a pro rata share of the retained earnings of their former Banks and of access to Bank advances and other products and services without adequate compensation. The commenter

argued that, therefore, such termination is prohibited under a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that no federal agency may adopt a rule that would give rise to a “takings” claim against the United States unless it is expressly authorized it to do so by statute.

34

34

See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos.

v.

FCC,

24 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

b. Comments Asserting That the Proposal Is Flawed From a Policy Perspective

While many of the commenters did not address FHFA's legal authority to implement the proposed exclusion of captives from membership, almost all of the commenters asserted that doing so would represent a poor policy choice. The arguments made in support of commenters' policy-based objections focused primarily on issues of (1) safety and soundness, (2) mission achievement, and (3) the financial health of the Banks, their members, and the overall residential mortgage market.

Again focusing on FHFA's comments regarding the possibility that captive membership may pose unique safety and soundness issues, numerous commenters argued that captives do not pose safety and soundness risks that are materially greater than or different from those posed by other types of members. These commenters offered a number of contentions in support of this argument, including that captives are subject to regulatory regimes that are generally the same as those that apply to traditional insurers and are supervised in a similar fashion; captives have a lower rate of insolvency and default than traditional insurers because they tend to be over-capitalized and operated conservatively so as to ensure that they will be able to pay the claims of their owners; and Banks have been admitting captives as members for over 20 years and have experienced no losses on advances to captive members. Other commenters asserted that to the extent that captives may present unique safety and soundness concerns, those concerns can be addressed with more targeted requirements, such as requiring captive members to meet special seasoning requirements, minimum capital levels, or maximum leverage ratios. Still others contended that the Banks already have sufficient processes and procedures to manage any additional risk that captives may pose.

Many commenters urged FHFA to continue to allow captives—particularly those controlled by REIT parents—to be admitted to Bank membership, stressing that mortgage REITs' substantial commitment to the residential mortgage market in the U.S. is consistent with the mission of the Banks. Going further, many argued that, contrary to the approach taken in the proposed rule, FHFA should actually encourage membership approval for REIT-controlled captives as a means of increasing the level of private capital in the residential mortgage market. Several of these commenters asserted that the collateral requirements applying to Bank advances would tend to dissuade entities whose business practices are not consistent with the housing finance mission of the Banks from forming captives in order to gain access to Bank advances.

A number of commenters argued that FHFA offered no analysis of the financial impact the proposed exclusion of captives would have on the Banks and their members. Many commenters noted that the Bank System benefits from a diverse and robust membership and asserted that eliminating one class of existing and potential members would result in lost income for the Banks now and in the future. At least one commenter asserted that, for certain Banks, the financial impact of the proposal could be so significant as to jeopardize their independent status, thereby forcing them to consolidate with other Banks. Many commenters pointed out that any action that might reduce the income of any Bank to any extent would necessarily reduce the amount of funds available for those Banks' Affordable Housing Programs (AHP) because the statute requires 10 percent of a Bank's earnings to be dedicated to its AHP.

In addition to the predictions of negative consequences for the Banks and their members, a number of commenters asserted that preventing mortgage REITs and similar companies from accessing Bank funding through captive subsidiaries would have negative consequences for the overall residential mortgage market. Noting that the long-term and reliable nature of Bank funding assists in reducing the likelihood that mortgage market crises will occur and in mitigating such crises when they do occur, several of these commenters argued that preventing captive parents from accessing that funding could increase instability in the residential mortgage market by reducing liquidity and curtailing the availability of long-term funding.

c. Comment Letters Suggesting Alternative Approaches

A number of commenters suggested alternative approaches to address what they perceived to be FHFA's concerns regarding captives that would be less severe than the outright exclusion of all captives from Bank membership.

Several commenters that believed FHFA's concerns to be primarily related to safety-and-soundness or mission achievement issues suggested that the Agency could address these concerns by adopting borrowing, financial condition, or mission standards to apply specifically to captives (or, in some cases, to insurance companies generally). For example, one commenter suggested that FHFA could require ongoing periodic reporting to the Bank of information that would allow it to adequately assess the financial health and investment strategies of, and other risk metrics pertaining to, both the captive and its parent; apply a more stringent mission test to potential captive members and their parents using asset or income tests; or require that all collateral pledged by captives or their parents to secure advances be real estate related.

Commenters that more appropriately focused on FHFA's primary concern—the misuse of the captive vehicle by non-eligible entities—stated that FHFA should prevent those practices specifically, without excluding all captives from membership. For example, some suggested that the final rule allow captives with a parent or affiliate that is itself eligible for Bank membership to remain eligible. One such commenter favored the use of captives to allow parent companies that are themselves eligible for membership (“particularly . . . institutions that now have substantially higher liquidity requirements than in the past”) essentially to become members of more than one Bank, which the commenter asserted “would not only help to serve the industry's liquidity needs, but would reduce the concentration risk posed by large institutions belonging to only one or two [Banks].”

Other commenters suggested that the final rule exclude from membership only captives that FHFA or the Banks have determined are owned by non-eligible entities that are using or have used those captives as conduits to receive Bank funding for their own use. Those commenters did not provide much detail as to how that would be accomplished, although one suggested that FHFA itself should review captives' applications for Bank membership in order to determine the purpose behind each application. Finally, one commenter, who asserted that FHFA “is not well informed about captives,” suggested that the Agency should “increase its knowledge in this area and find ways to address issues raised in the

[proposed rule] by participating in a task force with insurance regulators and others in the captive insurance industry.”

d. Results of FHFA's Review of Comments on the Captives Proposal

FHFA has reviewed all of the comments regarding its proposal to exclude captives from Bank membership and has studied especially closely the considered opinions of those commenters that addressed the issue in depth. After giving careful consideration to all of the viewpoints expressed, the Agency has decided to finalize the captives provisions essentially as proposed, albeit with some minor modifications to the transition provisions. The final provisions, the reasons FHFA has decided to adopt them, the bases for FHFA's conclusion that it possesses the authority to adopt those provisions, and the Agency's responses to the points raised in the comment letters are all discussed in detail in parts II and III of this

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

.

3. Comments on the Other Substantive Proposed Revisions

About 80 commenters addressed the proposal to require a Bank to obtain and review an insurance company applicant's most recent audited financial statements in determining whether it meets the “financial condition” eligibility requirement. Nearly all of the commenters opposed the inclusion of that requirement in the final rule. Most of those commenters based their objections on the assertion that the requirement would be burdensome for insurance companies—especially those that are not required by law to have their financial statements reviewed by an outside auditor. FHFA has considered these concerns, but has decided to include the requirement, as proposed, in the final rule.

The Agency recognizes that there are costs associated with obtaining audited financial statements. It also believes, however, that there are significant benefits to the Banks from being able to rely on financial statements that have been audited by a third party, particularly when assessing an insurance company's financial condition prior to admitting it to membership, which is the only time at which this requirement will apply. Even with this additional requirement, the financial information that insurance company applicants will be required to provide to the Banks will be far less than the financial information that insured depository institution applicants must provide.

About 80 of the comment letters addressed the parts of the proposed rule that would have amended the regulations governing how an institution's principal place of business is to be determined which, in turn, dictates the Bank it may join. The proposal included one provision specific to insurance companies and CDFIs, which would have required a Bank to use objective factors to identify the geographic location from which an insurance company or CDFI conducts the predominant portion of its business operations. The proposal also would have revised the general provision, which presumes the location of an institution's “home office” to be its principal place of business, by adding a requirement that the institution actually conduct business from its home office in order to benefit from that presumption. The effect of that revision would have been to prevent a Bank from relying solely on an institution's state of domicile or incorporation as the principal place of business for Bank membership purposes.

Most of the comments focused specifically on the effect the proposed revisions would have on insurance companies.

35

Almost all of those commenters (with the exception of a few of the Banks, as discussed below) opposed the proposed revisions and stated their preference that the final rule should instead provide that an insurance company's principal place of business shall in all cases be its state of domicile (

i.e.,

the state in which it is chartered). The commenters preferred the latter approach to the standard set forth in the proposed rule because they believed that it would be simpler to apply and would ultimately impose less burden on both the Banks and state insurance regulators. In other words, under a state of domicile standard each Bank would then need to deal only with the insurance regulators and insurance laws of the states within its district, and each insurance regulator would then need to establish a working relationship only with its local Bank.

36

35

One comment letter addressed the issue specifically as it relates to CDFIs and expressed support for the approach taken in the proposed rule.

36

FHFA expects each Bank to communicate regularly with the regulator for each of its insurance company members and to be thoroughly familiar with the state insurance laws that apply to each of those members.

See

FHFA Advisory Bulletin AB 2013-09,

Collateralization of Advances and Other Credit Products to Insurance Company Members

(Dec. 23, 2013). Regardless of where an insurance company may be licensed to do business or where it carries out its back office operations, it is regulated and supervised by the insurance regulator of its state of domicile under the laws of that state.

Although there may be some practical benefits to using the state of domicile as a proxy for an institution's principal place of business, the core question is whether such an approach would be consistent with the requirements of the Bank Act. FHFA has previously determined that the term “principal place of business” contemplates a physical location at which a company conducts the predominant portion of its business activities, and that a “presence” that is legal only, without any actual business activity, falls short of what the Bank Act requires. While the state laws under which insurance companies and CDFIs are chartered typically require companies to provide an in-state address for service of legal notices or for other purposes, those laws do not necessarily require a company to maintain any kind of business presence in the state. It is possible, then, that an insurance company or a CDFI may not conduct

any

of its business in its state of domicile. To amend the regulation, as the commenters suggest, to provide that the principal place of business of an insurance company or CDFI is in all cases to be its state of domicile would allow for the possibility that a Bank member's principal place of business could be a location at which it actually has

no

place of business. Such a result would not comport with FHFA's view of the term “principal place of business” and thus would not be consistent with the requirements of the Bank Act.

II. Treatment of Captive Insurers Under the Final Rule

FHFA has carefully considered the thoughts and opinions expressed in the comment letters and thoroughly analyzed possible alternative means of addressing its concerns about the use of captive insurers by entities not eligible for Bank membership to gain access to Bank advances. Having done so, the Agency has decided to include in the final rule, with some modifications, the provisions excluding captives from Bank membership and requiring the Banks, after a transition period, to terminate the membership of all captives that were admitted under the existing regulations. As proposed, the final rule defines “insurance company” to exclude captives, thereby making them ineligible for Bank membership.

These provisions of the final rule address FHFA's supervisory concerns about the ability of entities ineligible for Bank membership (including mortgage REITs and other entities) to circumvent the Bank Act and obtain

de facto

Bank membership through captive subsidiaries that become members and then act as conduits to low-cost Bank

funding for the ineligible entity. The use of captives for this purpose under the existing regulation has grown dramatically in recent years, and has continued since the publication of the proposed rule. FHFA has well-founded concerns that this use of captive subsidiaries is open to multiple types of ineligible entities such as equity REITs, hedge funds, investment banks, and finance companies and that the practice may spread to those and other types of ineligible entities once they become aware of the advantages of gaining

de facto

Bank membership through such arrangements. As regulator of the Bank System, FHFA is responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the provisions and purposes of the Bank Act. That responsibility includes ensuring that only entities eligible for Bank membership obtain the benefits of membership. FHFA is fulfilling that responsibility by including in this final rule provisions intended to prevent further use of captives to circumvent the membership eligibility requirements of the Bank Act.

Like the proposed rule, the final rule also sets forth a transition provision permitting captives that became members prior to the publication date of the proposed rule to remain members for five years after the effective date of the final rule, but limiting their outstanding advances to 40 percent of their assets and, while permitting new advances below the 40 percent threshold, prohibiting new advances or renewals that mature beyond the five-year transition period. The final rule also contains an additional transition provision, not included in the proposed rule, to address the treatment of captives admitted to membership on or after the date of publication of the proposed rule. This provision permits any Bank that has admitted such captives one year following the effective date of the final rule within which to terminate the membership of those captives. The rule allows such captives until the end of that one-year period (or until the date of termination, if earlier) to repay their existing advances, but prohibits them from taking new advances or renewing existing advances that expire during that grace period.

In reaching its decision to include these provisions in the final rule, FHFA gave due consideration to the fact that the vast majority of commenters addressing the proposed exclusion of captives from membership objected to that aspect of the proposed rule. Ultimately, however, the volume of adverse comments does not drive FHFA's policy determinations, particularly in this case, where FHFA has found significant evidence that REITs and other entities have been forming captives solely for the purpose of providing ineligible institutions access to Bank advances.

FHFA carefully considered the merits of the opinions expressed and assertions made by commenters, including from those commenters that provided verifiable information that the Agency could assess as part of the rulemaking process. The arguments taken as a whole did not persuade the Agency that the existing statute should be applied to allow admission of captives to membership. The policy reasons behind FHFA's decision to include the captives provisions in the final rule, the legal bases for including those provisions, and the Agency's responses to a number of specific comments are set forth in detail below.

A. Policy Reasons for Excluding Captives From Bank Membership

1. Until Recently, Only a Few Captives Had Become Bank Members, and Most of Those Had Parents or Other Affiliated Entities That Were Eligible To Be Bank Members Themselves

As mentioned above, the Bank Act provides that, in addition to insured depository institutions and CDFIs, “any . . . insurance company” shall be eligible to become a member of a Bank if it meets the applicable requirements. The Bank Act does not define “insurance company,” and neither FHFA nor its predecessor agencies had previously adopted a regulatory definition of that term. Consequently, as a practical matter, any entity chartered or licensed as an “insurance company” under state law and that has met the other applicable requirements historically has been permitted to become a Bank member. Because captive insurers are chartered or licensed as insurance companies under the laws of states that have enacted captive insurance statutes, a number of those types of entities have been permitted to become Bank members under the existing membership regulation.

Although a Bank first admitted a captive to membership over twenty years ago, until recently Banks had accepted very few captives. The first captive to be admitted became a member in 1994. In the ensuing years, up until mid-2012, no more than eleven additional captives joined the Bank System. Most of the captive members that were admitted during that time period have parent companies that either are themselves eligible to be Bank members or are holding companies that own another eligible entity.

2. Recently, There Has Been a Dramatic Increase in Captive Members and Applicants, Almost All of Which Are Controlled by Ineligible Entities Seeking Access to Bank Funding

Over the last several years, however, new captive members and membership applications by captives have shown a significant and accelerating increase. Since mid-2012, the Banks have admitted 27 new captive members, 25 of which are owned by mortgage REITs, finance companies, and other types of entities that are not themselves eligible for membership. Twenty of those 25 have become members since the publication of the proposed rule in September of 2014. This trend has become a matter of growing concern to FHFA, as it has become increasingly clear that captives are being promoted and used as vehicles to provide access to Bank funding and to other benefits of membership for institutions that are legally ineligible for membership. The Banks that have accepted these captive members have based their approvals on the financial strength of the parent and not the captive itself and have projected a level of advances activity that is disproportionately large in relation to the captives own business operations and related investment needs. In many cases (although, to date, not all), captive members have fulfilled the projections reflected in the membership digests by maintaining disproportionately large levels of outstanding advances, almost all of which have been secured by collateral provided by the parent. As a result of these developments, FHFA sees a current need to define “insurance company” in a manner that will prevent the creation of such

de facto

membership arrangements.

The information contained in the membership application digests prepared by the Banks in connection with the admission of most of those captive subsidiaries supports a conclusion that they applied for membership—and, in fact, were established—for the primary purpose of accessing Bank funding for their parents' business needs; they did not seek membership to obtain support for their own operations or investments.

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As an initial matter, those digests indicate that all but one of the 25 captive members owned by a REIT or similar ineligible entity were

de novo

entities at the time they applied for membership; at least 20 of the 25 had been chartered within the preceding six months and all but one of the remaining five had been chartered within the preceding 12 months. The digests also show that the dollar amounts of anticipated advances to be made to most of those captives are grossly disproportionate to the amount of insurance business underwritten by the captive, contemplate that the parents will provide both the collateral and a guaranty for the captives' debt, and, in some cases, acknowledge that the captives will use the advance proceeds to make loans to their parents. The Banks themselves recognized the conduit nature of these captives by basing their assessment of the financial condition of their new captive members, and the amount of advances they may obtain, on the financial resources of their parents, rather than on the captives themselves.

37

The regulations require that a Bank “prepare a written digest for each applicant stating whether or not the applicant meets each of the [applicable membership eligibility requirements], the Bank's findings, and the reasons therefor.”

See

12 CFR 1263.2(b). Since September 2012, FHFA has had a special data request in place pursuant to which it has received from the Banks the membership digests for each new insurance company and CDFI

member approved during that time period.

See

FHFA Special Data Request SDR 2012-02, “Membership Decision Documentation for New Insurance Company and CDFI Members” (Sept. 17, 2012).

The chart below illustrates the recent dramatic increases in the number of captive members and in the amount of advances outstanding to captive members.

ER20JA16.000

3. There Are Currently Ongoing Efforts To Encourage Ineligible Entities To Use Captive Subsidiaries as a Means of Accessing Low-Cost Bank Funding

Numerous public statements made by captive management companies and consultants, insurance regulators, and the parent companies themselves tend to confirm that almost all of the captives in the recent wave of new members and applicants were established and applied for membership for the purpose of providing their ineligible parents with access to Bank funding and other benefits of membership. For example, Marsh & McLennan (Marsh), a firm that characterizes itself as “the world's leading captive manager,” published an article in its quarterly newsletter in early 2014 stating that it had been working with REIT clients since the summer of 2013 “to create captives for the purpose of accessing funding with the Federal Home Loan Bank system” and advertising that “low-cost funding” obtained from a Bank through a captive subsidiary can allow a REIT parent to “increase leverage and improve liquidity at attractive rates.”

38

After noting that captives were being formed in two particular states to permit access to the two Banks in whose respective districts those states lie, Marsh concluded by stating that its captive advisory team “is likely to begin forming captives in other domiciles to access additional branches of the [Bank System].” It is clear from that article, as well as from a contemporaneous Marsh report containing similar statements,

39

that the firm is not encouraging existing captives to become Bank members to obtain funding for their own investments and operations, but is instead encouraging REITs and possibly other ineligible entities to create new captives to use as conduits to low-cost Bank funding for their own operations.

38

See

Marsh & McLennan Companies,

Using Captives to Access Federal Home Loan Banking System Funding,

Marsh Insights: Captives (Mar. 2014) at 5,

http://usa.marsh.com/Portals/9/Documents/6454MA14-12785CAPNewsletter03-2014.pdf

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015).

39

See

Marsh & McLennan Companies,

The Evolution of Captives: 50 Years Later (Annual Captive Benchmarking Report)

(May 2014) at 2, 5.

At around the same time that Marsh published those materials, another firm, Willis Group Holdings PLC (which describes itself as “a leading global risk advisor, insurance and reinsurance broker”) published a brochure on its Web site entitled “Joining the Federal Home Loan Bank Offers Significant Advantages for Captive Owners, Including Low Interest Loans and Letters of Credits [sic].”

40

After describing how the firm had “experienced a significant increase in existing and prospective captive owners looking to join [a Bank] via a captive subsidiary” and summarizing the benefits of Bank membership, the brochure concludes by encouraging “[p]rospective members [to] contact Willis or the regional [Bank] to discuss the prospect of their captive joining the [Bank].”

40

Willis Group Holdings,

Joining the Federal Home Loan Bank Offers Significant Advantages for Captive Owners, Including Low Interest Loans and Letters of Credits,

Willis Global Captive Management Alert (Apr. 2014),

http://www.willis.com/documents/publications/services/captives/20140426_50294_PUBLICATION_Global_Captive_Management_Alert_FINAL.pdf

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015).

Even state insurance regulators have been publicly extolling the advantages a company can enjoy by having a captive subsidiary become a Bank member. For example, a recent article that focused on the formation of so-called “831(b) captives” quoted one state's regulator as remarking that such captive entities can be “a portal for membership” in the Bank System.

41

In the same vein, several of the mortgage REITs that commented on the proposed rule revealed their intentions regarding their captive subsidiaries by advocating “access by mortgage REITs” to the Bank System, describing the proposed rule as “[d]enying access to [Bank] funding for a mortgage REIT,” or making similar statements.

41

See

Caroline McDonald,

Steady As She Goes: 2014 Domicile Captive Review,

Risk Management (Aug. 1, 2014),

http://www.rmmagazine.com/2014/08/01/steady-as-she-goes-2014-captive-domicile-review/

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015). An “831(b) captive,” sometimes referred to as a “microcaptive,” is a captive that does not underwrite life insurance and that generates annual premiums of $1.2 million or less. Under section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, such an entity can elect to pay federal income tax based only on its investment income instead of on its taxable income as a corporation. 26 U.S.C. 831(b). The use of 831(b) captives by individuals and businesses has drawn close scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service in recent years.

4. Captives Are Uniquely Suited To Act as Conduits for Accessing the Bank System

Among the types of institutions that, to date, have been considered eligible for Bank membership, captive insurers are uniquely suited to act as conduit vehicles for business entities that wish to gain access to the Bank System, but that are ineligible to become members in their own right. Because captives are self-insurance mechanisms and typically do not sell insurance policies to the public at large, it is generally far easier and less expensive to charter, capitalize, and operate a captive than to establish and operate a traditional life or casualty company that sells policies to the public.

42

This was cogently explained by the captive regulator of one of the leading domestic captive domiciles in a response to a “Frequently Asked Question” (FAQ) appearing on its official Web site. There, the regulator noted that, while “[c]ommercial insurance companies sell insurance to the general public and are licensed in all states in which they do business,” captives by contrast “directly insure only their owners,” are “licensed in only one state, and operate[] under the captive insurance law of that domicile.” Because of those differences, the regulator explained, “the degree of regulatory oversight required for captives is less than that which is required for commercial insurers.”

42

See

Daniel Schwarcz,

A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the United States,

5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 537, 555 (Aug. 2015) (stating that captives have typically been viewed “as presenting limited regulatory concerns” due to their status as self-insurance mechanisms and that “[a]s a result, captives are subject to very limited regulatory restrictions: Their financial statements are not publicly available, they do not have to comply with statutory accounting rules and the associated reserve requirements, and they generally are not subject to standard risk-based capital requirements”). One state insurance regulator, in reporting to the state legislature on the desirability of enacting insurance legislation specific to captives, stated that a captive “is not regulated like an admitted insurance carrier, but operates under relaxed rules governing the captive's formation, capitalization, and solvency.” In noting in this Supplementary Information the differences between the regulation of captives and the other types of institutions that have, to date, been considered eligible for Bank membership, FHFA is not expressing any judgment as to the adequacy of captive regulation generally or in any particular state with a captive statute, for purposes of the limited businesses for which captives are organized.

Despite the fact that captives are already easier to establish and more lightly regulated than commercial insurance companies, the competition among states to attract businesses to organize captive subsidiaries in their respective borders is leading some states to amend, or modify the manner in which they apply, their captive laws to further reduce the regulatory burdens in relation to those imposed by other states. In a recent report prepared by a state insurance regulator that was required by statute to study the advisability of establishing a captive insurer industry in that state, that regulator recommended that the state's legislature “forgo captive legislation at this time” in part because “the industry has developed in ways that have caused considerable regulatory concern at the federal and state levels.” The report explained, “To become a thriving captive domicile today, a state must be willing to relax important regulatory

safeguards. Attractive new domiciles are those that have a high risk appetite, demand few hurdles to formation, have low premium taxes and fees, have minimal solvency and capital requirements, and require little in the way of reporting.”

43

43

In addition, a 2011 New York Times article entitled “Seeking Business, States Loosen Insurance Rules,” came to conclusions that were similar to those reached by the state insurance regulator quoted above. The article, which appeared on the newspaper's front page, cited numerous examples of states competing among themselves to relax their regulatory requirements in order to attract captives to their respective domiciles. It reported that one state, after observing the success of another in attracting captives, responded by amending its laws governing the tax rates captives must pay on premium revenues to make its rates lower than those of the other state; this prompted the other state to reconsider its own rates. The article also noted that the number of captives domiciled in a particular state had doubled in the preceding calendar year, after its insurance commissioner was given the power to exempt captives from various provisions of the state's captive insurer laws. The bulk of the article was devoted to investigating the growing trend of commercial insurance companies forming captives to reinsure blocks of outstanding policies in order to take advantage of the lower reserve requirements that apply to captives under the laws of some states.

See

Mary Williams Walsh and Louise Story,

Seeking Business, States Loosen Insurance Rules,

New York Times (New York ed.) (May 8, 2011) at A1,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/business/economy/09insure.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

(last visited on Dec. 8, 2015).

The competition between states is further evidenced by a proliferation of press releases from state insurance regulators touting their selection as, or nomination for, a “U.S. captive domicile of the year” award that is bestowed annually by a major captive industry magazine. For example, one state regulator noted in a press release regarding its selection as a finalist for the 2015 award that, after having twice amended its captive laws in recent years, the state had “positioned itself to become a preferred domicile to companies seeking a sophisticated regulatory infrastructure.” An article in the sponsoring magazine announcing the winner of the 2015 award (which, ultimately, was not the state regulator that issued the above-quoted press release) stated that its judges selected the announced winner in part because, “despite being an established jurisdiction, [the victorious domicile] continues to review its statute on an annual basis to ensure it continues delivering efficiency and value.”

44

44

See

Richard Cutcher,

2015 US Captive Services Awards: Winners Announced,

Captive Review (Aug. 11, 2015),

http://captivereview.com/news/2015-us-captive-services-awards-winners-announced/

(last visited on Dec. 8, 2015).

The same characteristics that make captives far more viable than traditional insurance companies to use as vehicles for achieving

de facto

Bank membership also set them apart from insured depository institutions in that respect. Given the many obstacles to obtaining a commercial bank, savings and loan, or credit union charter,

45

as well as the comprehensive systems of prudential regulation and supervision to which those types of institutions are subject, FHFA must regard as highly improbable the prospect of an ineligible entity chartering a depository institution for the primary purpose of providing itself with

de facto

Bank membership. FHFA is unaware of a single instance of such an occurrence in the history of the Bank System. The additional layer of supervision and examination to which a company would become subject under either the Bank Holding Company Act

46

or the Savings and Loan Holding Company Act

47

if it were to acquire control of a commercial bank or savings and loan association makes those types of institutions even more unlikely to be used as mere conduits to Bank funding. In contrast, the lack of any such requirements applying to the parent of a captive makes captives an especially attractive membership channel for REITs and other ineligible entities that are not subject to the type of inspection and regulation that applies to institutions that are eligible for Bank membership. The requirements for certification of CDFIs similarly make them unsuitable vehicles to serve as conduits for Bank funding to ineligible parents.

48

45

See, e.g.,

Patricia A. McCoy,

Banking Law Manual: Federal Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, Banks and Thrifts

§  3.02[2] (Matthew Bender, 2nd ed. 2015) (explaining that, because depository institution charters “can be (and often are) denied for a variety of reasons, including unacceptable management, poor prospects for financial success, no perceived need for the institution's services or a competitive threat to existing institutions in the same market,” they serve as “powerful if erratic controls on entry into commercial banking and the thrift industry”).

46

See

12 U.S.C. 1844;

see also

12 CFR part 225 (implementing regulations).

47

See

12 U.S.C. 1467a;

see also

12 CFR parts 238, 239 (implementing regulations).

48

To be eligible for CDFI certification, an organization must have a primary mission of promoting community development; provide both financial and educational services; serve and maintain accountability to one or more defined target markets; maintain accountability to a defined market; and be a legal, non-governmental entity at the time of application (with the exception of Tribal governmental entities). 12 CFR 1805.201. An entity must meet quantitative mission requirements in order to obtain and maintain certification as a CDFI.

5. FHFA Has a Well-Founded Concern That the Use of Captives as Conduits to Bank Funding Will Grow Beyond Mortgage REITs To Include Additional Entities That Have Little or No Connection to Housing Finance

As is evidenced by the recent surge in captive applications and membership approvals, an increasing number of mortgage REITs and similar ineligible entities have decided that the amount of effort and expense associated with forming and operating a captive is low enough to make it feasible to use this method to gain access to the Bank System. In light of the example set by those that appear to have successfully circumvented the statutory membership requirements through the use of captive subsidiaries, as well as the previously described efforts by some in the captives industry to promote this practice, FHFA expects that the prevalence of this practice will continue to grow unabated if the Agency does not take action now to end it. Having seen increasing numbers of mortgage REITs use the captive vehicle to gain access to the Bank System, the Agency is concerned that other types of entities, which may have no connection to housing finance, will begin to form captives for the same purpose.

Indeed, some connected with the insurance industry have advocated the use of captives to provide access to the Bank System regardless of whether the parent company has any connection with residential mortgage lending. For example, an article re-published on the Web site of one state's department of insurance in 2011 reported that a “budding concept is for captive owners, nonbank companies included, to use their captive insurers as portals to cheap bank credit under a federal banking law [

i.e.,

the Bank Act] enacted decades before the first captive appeared.” The article revealed that the concept is one that the state's captive regulator wants “companies like manufacturers that have nothing to do with home financing” to consider and that he is “promoting the concept with captive managers,” in part as “an engine of captive growth” in his state. The same article also quoted a number of risk management consultants as stating that the use of captives as conduits to access Bank funding “could grow” and “sounds like a wonderful arbitrage opportunity,” that “[r]esidential builders could benefit, as well as healthcare institutions” from the strategy, and that it would be a “prudent thing” for a captive owner to take advantage of the opportunity to access such low-cost capital even if the owner

is “building cars or running hotels.”

49

As noted above, Bank advances need not be collateralized with residential mortgage assets and need not be used for residential housing finance if they are of less than five years maturity.

49

See

Dave Lenckus,

Cashing In On Captives,

Risk & Insurance Newsletter (Mar. 1, 2011).

The Agency's concerns about the prospect of wider use of the captive vehicle also arise from a number of other factors. Recently, for example, the first captive member owned by an equity REIT (as opposed to a mortgage REIT) joined the Bank System and, for the first time, a captive owned by an investment bank (in this case through a number of intermediating subsidiaries) was approved for Bank membership. In addition, at least one mortgage bank recently inquired about the possibility of a Bank admitting to membership a captive subsidiary that it proposed to establish for that purpose. While the use of captive subsidiaries to access the Bank System by entities that are not involved with housing finance is nascent, recent history with traditional insurance companies and, more recently, with REITs has shown that once one portion of an industry realizes the benefits of obtaining access to Bank advances, others in that industry will follow.

50

50

Although insurance companies have been eligible for membership since 1932, until recently only a very few insurance companies actually have become members. While only 31 insurance companies and captives were Bank members in 1996, 304 were members at the end of 2014.

6. The Bank Act Specifies the Types of Institutions That May Be Eligible To Be Bank Members, and FHFA Must Act To Prevent the Continued Circumvention of Those Eligibility Requirements by Entities That Are Not Eligible

Abundant evidence exists of a prevalent and growing practice by entities that are themselves ineligible for Bank membership using captive subsidiaries to achieve a

de facto

membership status that effectively provides them with the same access to advances that is available to the types of institutions that are eligible to become members under the Bank Act. In light of the evidence, FHFA has concluded that it must take action to prohibit that practice in order to ensure the fulfillment of one of the key elements of the statutory scheme established by Congress—limiting Bank membership to the types of institutions specified in the Bank Act.

As discussed above, section 4(a) of the Bank Act specifically enumerates the types of institutions that may be eligible for membership. By necessary implication, the statute must be read as a clear statement by Congress that entities of a type not included on that list of eligible institutions are not authorized to become members or otherwise to obtain the benefits of Bank membership, regardless of the extent to which those entities may be engaged in some part of the residential mortgage market. FHFA believes that in order to give effect to this congressional intent it must look to the substance of these transactions, and cannot ignore that the economic reality behind the growing trend of captive memberships is that the captives are being used to create a

de facto

membership for entities that are not among the types of entities that may become Bank members directly.

Many commenters asserted that Congress's failure thus far to exclude captives from membership despite their increasing prevalence in the U.S. since the 1970s must necessarily lead to the conclusion that it has no concerns about the manner in which they are currently being used. Therefore, those commenters argue, FHFA must continue to consider captives to be a type of insurance company that is eligible for Bank membership. Congress's intent concerning the meaning of the term “insurance company,” as used in the Bank Act, as well as FHFA's authority to interpret that term in the current context, are discussed in detail below. However, on the specific point raised by commenters, the phenomenon of ineligible companies using captives as a conduit to obtain access the Bank System is a very recent development. FHFA does not regard the lack of congressional action on the issue of Bank membership for captive insurers to be indicative of any particular congressional intent. FHFA will not attempt to interpret the views of a current Congress that has not acted to amend a statute enacted by a prior Congress decades earlier.

Other commenters cited Congress's decision to extend eligibility for Bank membership to commercial banks and credit unions in 1989 and to CDFIs in 2008 as evidence of its intent to effect “an inclusive and expansive approach” to membership and characterized FHFA's attempt to exclude captives from membership as running counter to that intent. To the contrary, FHFA views those actions as an indication that when Congress determines that it is appropriate to permit a particular type of institution to have access to the Bank System, it will amend the Bank Act to expressly authorize that access. For example, at the time Congress enacted the Bank Act in 1932, the primary institutional holders of non-farm residential mortgage debt were savings and loan associations,

51

which held 21.4 percent, followed by savings banks at 17.1 percent, life insurance companies at 11.1 percent, and commercial banks at 10.4 percent.

52

Despite the fact that commercial banks were significant participants in originating and investing in residential mortgage loans at that time, Congress declined to include them in the list of entities eligible for Bank membership. That remained the case until 1989, when Congress made federally insured commercial banks and credit unions eligible for membership. Moreover, although representatives of the mortgage banking industry have lobbied Congress to amend the Bank Act to allow mortgage bankers to become Bank members based on their active role in supporting residential housing finance, Congress has not done so.

53

51

These were then also referred to by various other names, such as those used in section 4(a) of the Bank Act—building and loan associations, cooperative banks, and homestead associations.

See

Leo Grebler, David M. Blank & Louis Winnick,

Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects

203, n.14 (1956).

52

See

Grebler,

supra

at 473. The percentages shown are as of December 31, 1931. In 1932, as well as for decades before and up through the early 1970s, many life insurance companies were heavily involved in the origination of home mortgage loans through extensive mortgage lending networks.

See

Kenneth A. Snowden,

The Anatomy of a Residential Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s

5-8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16244, 2010). At some points during those years, life insurance companies held more than 20 percent of all domestic non-farm residential mortgage debt.

See

Grebler,

supra

at 472-74; Snowden,

supra

at 5.

See also

Raymond J. Saulnier,

Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Companies

1-9 (1950).

53

For example, at a November 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on a bill to reform the secondary mortgage markets, the Chairman-elect of the Mortgage Bankers Association testified that “Congress should give serious consideration to expanding Federal Home Loan Bank membership eligibility to include access for non-depository mortgage lenders” and to “community lenders of a variety of business models, including independent mortgage bankers.”

Housing Finance Reform: Protecting Small Lender Access to the Secondary Mortgage Market: Hearing on S. 1217 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,

113th Cong. 65-66 (Nov. 5, 2013) (statement of Bill Cosgrove, Chief Executive Officer, Union Home Mortgage Corp., and Chairman-Elect, Mortgage Bankers Association). Earlier, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 required that the Finance Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, among other agencies, each study a multitude of issues related to the Bank System, including possible measures to increase membership in the System, and report to Congress on their recommendations with respect to those issues.

See

Public Law 102-550, § 1393, 106 Stat. 3672, 4009-11 (1992). For reasons relating to mission, safety and soundness, and competitive balance, the reports produced by both agencies recommended against expanding the list of institutions that may be eligible for Bank membership to include mortgage banks.

See

Federal Housing Finance Board,

Report on the Structure and Role of the Federal Home Loan Bank System

119 (Apr. 1993);

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research,

Report to Congress on the Federal Home Loan Bank System, Vol. II

6-12 (Apr. 1994). In addition, at a 1994 hearing, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance Frank N. Newman testified that, as recommended in the reports, the Treasury Department did not believe that membership eligibility should be expanded beyond then-currently eligible group of depository institutions and insurance companies.

See The Future of the Federal Home Loan Bank System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the Need for a Comprehensive Legislative Package to Update and to Strengthen the Federal Home Loan Bank System's Mission, Structure, Capital Requirements, and Regulatory Oversight,

103rd Cong., 4, 25 (June 15, 1994).

Similarly, Congress has not authorized REITs to become members. If Congress believed that REITs' involvement in the residential mortgage markets warranted them having access to Bank advances, it could have authorized them to become members, just as it did for certain CDFIs in 2008

54

and for certain non-federally insured credit unions in 2015,

55

when it amended the Bank Act to make those types of entities eligible for membership. The fact that it has not done so for REITs, or for other types of entities that are not enumerated in section 4(a) of the Bank Act, leads FHFA to conclude that Congress has not intended to permit those entities access to Bank funding.

54

See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,

Public Law 110-289, § 1206, 122 Stat. 2654, 2787 (2008).

55

See Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act,

Public Law 114-94, § 82001 (2015).

Whether entities that are currently ineligible for membership should be permitted to have access to Bank advances is the type of public policy issue that is for Congress to address. By precluding ineligible institutions from gaining

de facto

membership through captive insurers, the final rule has the effect of preserving the decision of whether to allow REITs access to the Bank System for Congress to address, should it choose to do so. The transition periods, both the five-year transition for pre-NPR captives and the one-year transition for the post-NPR captives, will provide Congress sufficient time to consider whether Bank membership should be extended to additional categories of members before the Banks are required to begin terminating the membership of existing captive members. If Congress determines that permitting REITs, or any other entities that are not currently eligible, to have such access is the appropriate policy, then it will amend the Bank Act to make them explicitly eligible for membership as it has done in the past for commercial banks, credit unions, and CDFIs. If it decides to do so, it may also wish to consider whether special statutory provisions should be enacted with respect to REITs or other entities not subject to inspection and regulation to address their unregulated status, which would set them apart from other types of entities that are currently eligible, and whether and how to except them from the current statutory requirement that members be “subject to inspection and regulation.”

56

56

For example, when Congress added CDFIs to the list of eligible member types, Congress exempted them from the requirement that they be subject to inspection and regulation (because they are not) and instead provided that they must be certified as CDFIs by the Treasury Department.

See

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(1)(B).

B. Legal Authority of FHFA To Exclude Captives From Membership and To Require the Banks To Terminate the Membership of Captives Previously Admitted

FHFA possesses ample legal authority to adopt a regulation defining the term “insurance company” to exclude captives, thereby rendering them ineligible for membership, and to require the Banks to terminate the membership of all captives that they had admitted to membership before FHFA adopted this final rule making captives ineligible.

1. Congress Granted FHFA Broad Regulatory Authority To Ensure That the Purposes of the Bank Act Are Carried Out

Congress has given FHFA, through its Director, broad authority to administer the Bank Act. Specifically, Congress granted the Director of FHFA general regulatory authority over the Banks and specified that he is to exercise that authority to ensure that the purposes of the Bank Act and the Safety and Soundness Act (under which the Agency is established) are carried out.

57

Congress also enumerated a number of principal duties for the Director of FHFA, which include the duty to ensure that each Bank complies with the regulations issued under the Bank Act and Safety and Soundness Act, and granted the Director the authority to exercise such incidental powers as he deems necessary to fulfill his duties and responsibilities in the supervision and regulation of the Banks.

58

Congress also provided the Director of FHFA with specific authority to issue any regulations and take other regulatory actions that he deems necessary not only to implement and enforce the specific requirements of the Bank Act, but also to ensure that the Banks operate in a safe and sound manner and that the purposes of the statutes are accomplished.

59

Thus, FHFA has the authority to adopt regulations that the Director deems necessary to implement the specific membership provisions of the Bank Act, as well as those that the Director deems necessary to ensure that the purposes behind the statutory membership provisions are accomplished. By necessary implication, the grant of authority to ensure that the provisions and purposes of the Bank Act are carried out includes with it the authority to adopt regulations necessary to ensure that neither the Banks, their members, nor any other parties take any actions to circumvent, frustrate, or subvert the provisions or purposes of the Bank Act.

57

12 U.S.C. 4511.

58

12 U.S.C. 4513(a)(1), (2).

59

12 U.S.C. 4526(a).

2. Congress Clearly Delineated the Types of Institutions That May Be Eligible for Bank Membership

It is clear from the language of section 4(a)(1) of the Bank Act that Congress intended to permit only the types of institutions listed in that section to become Bank members and that it did not intend to permit any institutions not listed therein to become members. It also is reasonable to infer from the statutory language that Congress intended that entities not explicitly deemed eligible for membership should not be able to obtain indirectly any of the principal benefits of Bank membership—including the access to low-cost advances that the Banks are able to provide because of their statutory market advantages—that they are not permitted to obtain directly.

60

Although Congress did include insurance companies among the types of institutions that may be eligible to become members, it manifestly did not include REITs, hedge funds, investment banks, finance companies, or other types of general business entities.

61

60

To enable the Banks to better fulfill their public policy mission, Congress vested in them market advantages that some might view as depriving government treasuries of revenue and exposing taxpayers to risk. This supports the conclusion that Congress intended to strictly limit access to the Bank System.

61

See

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(1).

3. Captives are Being Used To Circumvent the Membership Eligibility Provisions of the Bank Act and Are Uniquely Suited To Be Used for That Purpose

As described in detail above, FHFA has determined that ineligible entities have been circumventing the statutory provisions limiting the types of entities that may become Bank members by

using captive subsidiaries as vehicles to access the benefits of membership to which they are not legally entitled. As also detailed above, captives as a class are uniquely suited to being used for that purpose due to the limited scope of their business activities, which makes them easier and less expensive to establish and operate, and because they are more lightly regulated than commercial insurance companies or insured depository institutions. There is also a relative absence of restrictions on the activities and investments of a captive's parent, as compared to those that apply to an entity that establishes a federally insured bank or savings association subsidiary. These unique characteristics, as among the types of institutions that are permitted to become Bank members under the existing membership regulation, have led captive promoters, insurance regulators, and others with vested interests in expanding the ubiquity of captives to promote them as vehicles through which REITs and other ineligible entities—including those having no connection to housing finance—may obtain access to low-cost Bank advances. This, along with the examples set by those whose attempts to use captives to obtain access to the Bank System have so far met with apparent success, makes it likely that the practice of using of captives for that purpose will continue to grow in the absence of any action by FHFA to halt the practice.

4. FHFA Has the Authority To Take Action To Prevent the Circumvention of the Provisions and Purposes of the Bank Act

The authorities conferred upon FHFA by the Bank Act and the Safety and Soundness Act, described above, empower the Agency to adopt a regulation to prevent this circumvention of the provisions and purposes of the Bank Act. Given that the vast majority of captive members are being used by ineligible entities to circumvent the statutory membership eligibility requirements and, aside from this illegitimate use, have little or no reason to be Bank members, FHFA is not required to treat those types of captives as “insurance companies” for membership purposes simply because they are chartered or licensed under state insurance statutes. The Agency has sufficient legal authority, through its mandate to ensure that the purposes of the statute are carried out, to consider the economic realities of these arrangements—

i.e.,

that the parent companies are the true parties in interest, while the captives act merely as conduits—and to take appropriate regulatory action.

FHFA has determined that the most effective and appropriate way to prevent the use of captives as vehicles to provide

de facto

membership for ineligible entities is to adopt a regulation defining the heretofore undefined term “insurance company” to exclude from membership all captives that may feasibly be used for that purpose. As discussed in part III of this

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

, FHFA has taken special care to define “insurance company” so that captives having the characteristics that give rise to the Agency's concerns will be excluded, while those institutions that do not engender such concerns and that would be regarded as carrying out the business of insurance as traditionally understood (even if they are denominated as “captives” under their states' insurance laws) will continue to be considered as insurance companies for purposes of determining eligibility for Bank membership.

5. Viewed in the Context of Today's Marketplace, in Contrast to That of 1932, the Meaning of “Insurance Company” Is Ambiguous and, Therefore, FHFA May Adopt a Reasonable Interpretation of That Term To Effect the Purposes of the Bank Act

An administrative agency has authority to interpret and define the terms of the statutes that it administers, especially terms that are undefined.

62

Among the specific types of entities that are eligible for Bank membership, Congress has defined only “insured depository institution.”

63

Congress did not define the term “insurance company” or provide any other guidance about its meaning. This leaves the term open to FHFA to define, provided that the definition is reasonable given the provisions and purposes of the Bank Act.

62

See Astrue

v.

Capato,

132 S.Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012);

Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

v.

Natural Resources Defense Council,

467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984);

Securities Industry Association

v.

Clarke,

885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989),

cert. denied,

493 U.S. 1070 (1990).

63

See

12 U.S.C. 1422(9) (defining “insured depository institution” to include banks and savings associations the deposits of which are insured by the FDIC and credit unions the share accounts of which are insured by the NCUA). In addition, although Congress did not define the term “community development financial institution,” it did provide that only those CDFIs that have been certified by the Treasury Department are eligible for membership.

See

12 U.S.C. 1424(a)(1)(B).

Many commenters expressed the opinion that defining “insurance company” to exclude captives would be in contradiction to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress as embodied in the plain language of the Bank Act, which provides that “any . . . insurance company” may be eligible for membership. By basing their assertions as to the plain meaning of section 4(a)(1) on the fact that the term “insurance company” is preceded by the word “any” in that paragraph (as are all the other terms used to describe the types of institutions that may be eligible for membership), many commenters begged the essential question of what constitutes an “insurance company” for purposes of the Bank Act in the first place. A few commenters asserted or implied that the statutory membership provisions must be read as including captives because captives are “organized, licensed and regulated” under state insurance statutes or “meet[] the definition of an insurance company under state law.”

64

FHFA does not believe that such a reading is required, particularly where, as here, it would result in an interpretation that allows circumvention of specific provisions of the Bank Act and subverts the scheme of the statute as a whole. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that a federal regulator may reasonably define an activity or a transaction as not insurance under federal law even if state law would treat it as such.

65

64

In support of this argument, several commenters specifically cited the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”

See

15 U.S.C. 1012(b). However, nothing in this final rule relates in any way to the regulation of the business of insurance or to the taxation or imposition of fees on any captive or commercial insurance company.

65

In

Nationsbank

v.

Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,

513 U.S. 251 (1995) (“VALIC”), the U.S. Supreme Court declined to apply a state law-based definition of “insurance” to a federal banking statute. There, the Court upheld the Comptroller of the Currency's classification of annuities as investments, rather than as insurance, under the National Bank Act (NBA), despite respondent's assertions that Congress intended to define “insurance” under the NBA by reference to state law, under which annuities are typically regulated as insurance. In upholding the Comptroller's classification, the Court stated, among other things, “the federal banking law does not plainly require automatic reference to state law here. The Comptroller has concluded that the federal regime is best served by classifying annuities according to their functional characteristics. Congress has not ruled out that course . . .; courts, therefore, have no cause to dictate to the Comptroller the state-law constraint VALIC espouses.” 513 U.S. at 261-262.

See also Helvering

v.

LeGierse,

312 U.S. 531 (1941) (holding that a transaction was not an insurance transaction for federal tax purposes despite its comprising a set of insurance policies under state law).

Sometimes a statutory term that appears on its face to have a commonly understood meaning may be shown to

be ambiguous when it is considered in light of the statute's overall structure, purpose, and history.

66

Construing the term “insurance company” to include any type of entity organized under a state's insurance statutes would allow companies that are not eligible for Bank membership to continue to use captives—or any entities having similar characteristics that might be developed under a different moniker—as a means of providing them with

de facto

membership. In this case, an ambiguity arises because an unconstrained reading of “insurance company” would result in a situation that is contrary to Congress's clear intent to limit the benefits of Bank membership to the several types of institutions listed in section 4(a)(1) of the Bank Act. In contrast, a reading of the term that encompasses insurance companies as they were understood when the Bank Act was enacted, not including captives, would be fully consistent with that provision and with the statutory scheme as a whole.

66

See King

v.

Burwell,

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015);

FDA

v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 132-133 (2000).

The ambiguity also arises because it is highly unlikely that Congress considered in 1932 whether captives, which did not then exist, or any class of entity having similar characteristics that would allow the entities to be readily used to circumvent the statutory requirements, should be deemed to be included within the term “insurance company.” It is most likely that the term “insurance company” would have been understood by Congress and others in 1932 to refer to a company that was in the business of insurance as it was then understood—that is, the shifting of risk by the insured to a larger class of policyholders through the intermediation of the insurance company—and not to a mechanism for the administration of self-insurance.

67

The current phenomenon of captives as a legal vehicle for managing the parent company's self-insurance did not exist in 1932 and cannot have been within the contemplation of Congress. Captives in the modern sense began to appear only in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even for many years after U.S. companies first began to form captive subsidiaries, those captives had to be domiciled off-shore, because the state insurance laws that existed at the time made it prohibitively expensive to form and operate a captive in the United States.

68

Colorado became the first U.S. jurisdiction to adopt legislation authorizing the chartering and licensing of captives in 1972,

69

and the captive trend did not begin to gain any real momentum until the mid-1980s.

67

See Helvering

v.

LeGierse,

312 U.S. 531, 539-40 (1941) (stating that “[h]istorically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing” and finding that the transaction at issue did not involve those features and therefore was not insurance under the federal income tax laws);

Spring Canyon Coal Co.

v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

43 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir. 1930) (holding that a company's contribution to a self-insurance reserve was not deductible as an insurance premium under the federal income tax laws because there was no shifting of risk). In 1932, life insurance companies originated and invested in large numbers of residential mortgage loans; these longer-term assets were well matched in duration to their life insurance liabilities. Captives do not share that business model.

68

See

Shanique Hall,

Recent Developments in the Captive Insurance Industry,

NAIC Center for Insurance Policy and Research Newsletter (Jan. 2012),

http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol2_captive.htm

(last visited Dec. 8, 2015).

69

Maureen A. Sanders,

Risk Retention Groups: Who's Sorry Now?,

17 S. Ill. U.L.J. 531, 542, n. 76 (1993).

Although some commenters asserted that early forms of captives existed in 1932 and that Congress must therefore have intended to include them as eligible for membership, those commenters did not identify any example of a captive as it is defined in FHFA's final regulation,

70

nor did they cite anything in the legislative history of the Bank Act that addresses self-insurance by any name. There is scant mention of insurance companies in the legislative history of the Bank Act, although it is logical to infer that Congress specifically included insurance companies among the types of institutions eligible for membership because life insurance companies were actively involved in originating and investing in residential mortgage loans at that time. Life insurance companies, among other classes of insurance companies, would have fit within the traditional view of an insurance company as being an institution that underwrites insurance for entities that are not its affiliates.

70

Some commenters referred to the Church Properties Fire Insurance Corporation, which was formed by lay leaders of the Episcopal Church in 1929 in order to “reduce costs by selling direct to churches and their affiliated organizations.”

See Episcopalians Form Fire Insurance Concern To Reduce the Cost of Policies on Churches,

New York Times (May 23, 1929) at 1. To the extent that this entity could be characterized as an equivalent of a modern captive, it appears to have been most similar to either an association captive or a group captive, most of which would likely qualify as an “insurance company” under the final rule definition. Although the terms used vary from state to state, an “association captive” is generally understood to be a captive that it is sponsored or owned by a group of entities within a particular trade, industry, or service organization and that insures only the risks of its owners or their affiliates.

See

Hall,

supra.

Because the types of captives that are now, and recently have been, seeking Bank membership did not come into existence until well after Congress enacted the Bank Act, FHFA does not believe that it is possible to conclude, as some commenters have asserted, that Congress would have intended to include such entities among those eligible for Bank membership. Reasonably assuming that Congress viewed the term “insurance company” in its traditional sense, it would not have had any reason to consider the possibility that another type of business entity could have organized an insurance company and then used it as a vehicle for obtaining advances from a Bank to fund its own investments or business operations.

Thus, changing factual circumstances have generated an ambiguity in the term “insurance company.” The definition of that term contained in the final rule is consistent with its historical use in the statute and with the purposes of the statute, but necessarily results in a definition that would exclude some modern entities licensed or chartered under a state's insurance statutes. Because Congress has not defined the term and because it is ambiguous for the reasons discussed, FHFA has the legal authority to define “insurance company” in a manner that is reasonable in light of the provisions and purposes of the Bank Act.

6. It Is Reasonable To Define “Insurance Company” To Exclude Captives

Defining “insurance company” to exclude captives is reasonable for three fundamental reasons, all of which have been thoroughly addressed above. First, doing so is consistent with section 4(a)(1) of the Bank Act, which is reflective of a congressionally created statutory scheme to limit the benefits of Bank membership to the types of institutions specifically listed therein. Second, captives are uniquely suited to serve as vehicles for the circumvention of that statutory provision and its underlying purposes and are being actively promoted for that use, and there is no countervailing public policy reason for them to be Bank members on the basis of their own functions, separate from their parents'. Third, defining “insurance company” in this manner is consistent with the likely intent of Congress, which would have viewed an insurance company as being a company in the business of “risk-shifting and risk-distributing,” as the Supreme Court described insurance less than a decade after the enactment of the Bank Act.

71

In addition, it is highly unlikely that Congress contemplated the existence of any class of eligible

financial institution having the characteristics of modern captives (which, as discussed, did not then exist) that make captives feasible to use as funding conduits for entities Congress did not deem eligible for Bank membership, and even less likely that Congress would have approved of such use, which effectively circumvents the very membership restrictions it imposed.

71

Helvering

v.

LeGierse,

312 U.S. at 539.

Several commenters asserted that the Agency's proposal to address that concern by focusing only on captives was “arbitrary” (and therefore not within the Agency's authority to adopt) because it disregarded the possibility that other types of members had passed advance proceeds on to non-members through intercompany transfers and could continue to do so in the future. The majority of members that are not captives are owned by holding companies that are not themselves eligible for membership and there is little question that advance proceeds may flow through to the parent companies in many cases. Given the fungibility of money and the typically complex structures of modern financial institutions, it would be extremely difficult for FHFA, or any agency, to develop a workable means of preventing all such transfers. However, even assuming that a small number of non-captive members could be acting effectively as conduits for their parent companies, no evidence suggests that any type of member institution other than captives is, as a class, being used to any material degree for such purposes. In contrast, there is abundant evidence, detailed above, that almost all members that are captives as defined in the final rule were established and sought to become Bank members for the primary purpose of acting as conduits for their ineligible parents. Given this, as well as their unique suitability for such purposes and the general absence of any other compelling rationale for them to be members, FHFA's exclusion of captives in this final rule is reasonable.

7. FHFA Has the Authority To Require the Termination of Captives That Were Previously Admitted to Bank Membership

Section 6(d)(2)(A) of the Bank Act provides that the board of directors of a Bank “may terminate” the membership of any member institution if, “subject to the regulations of the Director” of FHFA, it determines that any of the statutory grounds for termination exist. Those grounds include a failure to comply with any provision of the Bank Act or FHFA regulations.

72

A number of commenters asserted that this provision vests discretionary termination authority in each Bank and that, consequently, FHFA does not have the authority to require a Bank to terminate the membership of captives that were admitted under the regulations in force at the time of admission. In support of that assertion, several of those commenters also noted that the Bank Act had previously contained a provision explicitly authorizing the Bank System regulator to remove a member for cause (including failure to comply with statutory or regulatory provision) after a hearing, but that Congress removed that explicit authorization in 1999 when it adopted the current termination provision.

73

72

12 U.S.C. 1426(d)(2)(A).

73

See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,

Pub. L. 106-102, sec. 608, 113 Stat. 1338, 1461 (1999).

Although the 1999 amendments did transfer the mechanism of termination from the Bank System regulator to the Banks themselves, it is not plausible to suggest, as do the commenters, that Congress thereby stripped the regulator of its authority to require the removal of a member when doing so is necessary to halt a violation of the statute or regulations. The use of the words “may terminate” indicates that Congress intended to permit a Bank's board of directors some degree of discretion in deciding whether and when to terminate an institution's membership, but that discretion is limited by the statutory language subjecting the exercise of that termination authority to the regulations of the Director.

74

In this case, the Director has adopted regulatory amendments implementing a provision of the Bank Act in a way that makes captives—including those that were previously admitted—ineligible for membership. When effective, the amended regulation will be binding on the Banks, which will be obliged to comply with its provisions to the same extent that they are obliged to comply with any other statutory or regulatory requirement.

74

In addition, as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained, “ `May' ordinarily connotes discretion, but neither in lay nor legal understanding is the result inexorable. Rather, the conclusion to be reached `depends on the context of the statute, and on whether it is fairly to be presumed that it was the intention of the legislature to confer a discretionary power or to impose an imperative duty.' ”

Thompson

v.

Clifford,

408 F.2d 154, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (

citations omitted

);

see also Halverson

v.

Slater,

129 F.3d 180, 188-189 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Section 6(d)(2)(A) may permit a Bank to exercise its discretion, for example, in deciding whether and when to terminate the membership of an institution that has committed a statutory or regulatory violation for which no particular sanction is specified. The express caveat in section 6(d)(2)(A) making a Bank's termination authority subject to FHFA regulations, as well as FHFA's broad powers as supervisor and regulator of the Banks and its statutory duty to administer the Bank Act in a manner that promotes the Act's purposes and protects the public interest, provide the Agency with sufficient authority to adopt a regulation that, as the final rule does, specifies the circumstances in which a violation of the law requires a Bank to exercise its termination authority. The exercise of this regulatory authority is appropriate where, as here, the violation is not one of technical noncompliance with a minor requirement, but of the fundamental principles defining eligibility for membership and access to the Bank System, the purposes of which would be undermined if membership were allowed to continue. For these reasons, when a member is in violation of a lawfully adopted regulation for which the required sanction is termination of membership, a Bank does not have the discretion to refuse to terminate the member when and as required by the regulation.

Apart from questioning FHFA's power to regulate the Banks' termination authority under section 6(d)(2)(A), a few commenters offered other reasons that they believed the Agency cannot require a Bank to terminate the membership of its existing captive members. One asserted that requiring the termination of existing captive members would give rise to a “takings” claim against the United States in that it would deprive former captive members of their right to a pro rata share of the retained earnings of their former Banks and of access to Bank advances and other products and services, without adequate compensation. Citing a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that no federal agency may adopt a regulation that would give rise to a “takings” claim unless it is expressly authorized it to do so by statute,

75

the commenter further argued that FHFA may not adopt a regulation requiring termination because such an express statutory authorization does not exist.

75

See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos.

v.

FCC,

24 F.3d 1441, 1445-46 (D.C. Cir 1994).

Bank members—even those that are in compliance with all statutory and regulatory eligibility requirements—have no constitutionally protected property interest in continuing Bank membership. Although the Bank Act specifies that the holders of a Bank's the

Class B stock “shall own the retained earnings, surplus, undivided profits, and equity reserves, if any, of the [Bank],” it also makes clear that, “[e]xcept as specifically provided in [section 6 of the Bank Act] or through the declaration of a dividend or a capital distribution by a [Bank], or in the event of liquidation of the [Bank], a member shall have no right to withdraw or otherwise receive distribution of any portion of the retained earnings of the [Bank].”

76

But even if members did have a constitutionally protected property interest in Bank membership, FHFA's regulation effects neither a

per se

taking nor a regulatory taking as courts have developed those concepts.

76

12 U.S.C. 1426(h).

See also Fahey

v.

O'Melveny & Myers,

200 F.2d 420, 467 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding that the “purchase of [Bank] stock is a condition of [Bank] membership and does not confer proprietary interest or a property right of any kind in any [Bank] itself”).

A

per se

taking occurs when the government physically appropriates real or personal property for its own use without just compensation.

77

A captive terminated as required under the final rule will be fully compensated when the Bank redeems its Bank stock for par value (the same amount paid by the captive when it acquired the stock) in the manner provided under the Bank's capital plan. Regardless of compensation, the captive's Bank stock will not have been physically appropriated by the government for its own use. Thus, there will have been no

per se

taking.

77

See Horne

v.

Dep't of Agriculture,

135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-27 (2015).

Neither will there be a regulatory taking, which occurs when the government imposes a restriction on the use of property that results a severe and unwarranted diminution in the property's value.

78

The terminated member will not only receive the par value of its Bank stock when the stock is redeemed, but will also continue to receive any dividends declared up to the time its stock is redeemed. Thus, there can be no claim that the economic value of the stock will have been destroyed. In addition, because the Banks have independent power to terminate membership, members have a reasonable expectation that their membership may be terminated at some point. Because dividend payments are at all times subject to the approval of the Bank's board of directors, there is no reasonable investment expectation that dividends will continue to be paid. Finally, because the captives became Bank members with full knowledge that all Bank activities are heavily regulated, they cannot claim to have had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that the regulatory regime would remain forever static. This is especially true in the case of entities that became members for the purpose of circumventing the statutory membership requirements.

78

See Horne,

135 S. Ct. at 2427.

Another commenter, who focused on FHFA's comments in the proposed rule

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

regarding the possibility that captive membership may pose unique safety and soundness issues, asserted that those concerns could not serve as a basis for requiring the termination of captive members until the Agency had taken the steps required by section 8 of the Bank Act. Section 8 requires that FHFA keep abreast of the state laws under which Bank members are chartered and regulated, and states that if FHFA concludes that the laws of any state provide inadequate protection to a Bank in making or collecting advances, the Agency may “withhold or limit the operation” of any Bank in that state until satisfactory conditions are established.

79

The commenter asserted that this statutory provision prohibits FHFA from taking any action with respect to captive members until it has first undertaken a study of all of the state laws under which they operate, and only after concluding that a particular state's laws fail to provide adequate protection to a Bank.

79

See

12 U.S.C. 1428.

FHFA rejects the assertion that section 8 may be read to limit in any way the steps the Agency may take in fulfilling its statutory duty to ensure the safe and sound operation of the Banks. Even if section 8 could be so construed, it would not limit the Agency's ability to require the termination of captive members. Although the proposed rule discussed some safety and soundness concerns to which captive membership gives rise, the Agency's proposal and its ultimate decision to exclude captives from Bank membership and to require the termination of existing captives stems from its conclusion that they are being used to circumvent the statutory requirements governing the types of institutions that may become Bank members, and not primarily from safety and soundness concerns regarding captive insurers.

80

FHFA re-emphasizes that point in this final rule.

80

After describing the proposed captives provisions in the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

to the proposed rule, FHFA stated that it was proposing to take those actions “to address supervisory concerns about certain institutions that are ineligible for Bank membership, but that are using captives as vehicles through which they can obtain Bank advances to fund their business operations.”

See

79 FR 54848, 54853 (Sept. 12, 2014).

C. Discussion of Other Arguments Raised by Commenters

Most of the arguments made by commenters in opposition to the proposed captives provisions have been addressed in the discussion above regarding the legal and policy bases for FHFA's adoption of the final captives provisions. However, some commenters made other arguments that are not addressed above and that warrant discussion.

Many commenters stressed that mortgage REITs' substantial commitment to the residential mortgage market in the U.S. is consistent with the mission of the Banks, and argued that allowing them to access the low-cost funding that the Banks are able to provide will increase the level of private capital in the residential mortgage market, benefiting existing and potential homeowners and the public. Others similarly argued that preventing REITs from accessing Bank funding through their captive subsidiaries could increase instability in the residential mortgage market by reducing liquidity and curtailing the availability of long-term funding. FHFA acknowledges that mortgage REITs play a large role in the residential mortgage market and does not question the legitimacy of their activities. However, while FHFA has the duty to ensure that the operations and activities of the Banks “foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets,” it also has a duty to ensure that the Banks carry out that mission “only through activities that are authorized under and consistent with” the Bank Act and the Safety and Soundness Act.

81

Having concluded that the channeling of low-cost Bank funding to REITs and other ineligible entities through captive members is not authorized by or consistent with the Bank Act, the Agency is compelled to take action to put an end to that practice until such time, and on such terms, as Congress authorizes that access. Similarly, it is not appropriate for FHFA to expand Bank membership beyond the framework established by Congress in order to provide greater macroeconomic stability in times of financial stress, as urged by some commenters.

81

12 U.S.C. 4513(a)(1)(B).

A number of other commenters argued that FHFA offered no analysis of the financial impact the proposed exclusion of captives would have on the Banks and their members, and asserted that excluding captives from membership would result in reduced

income for the Banks in the short run and lost opportunities for income growth in the future. Any projection the Agency might attempt to make regarding the exclusion of captives would be speculative. Despite the fact that the number of captive members has increased dramatically since 2012, they still constitute a very small percentage of the Banks' membership base, and the number that would have been approved for membership in future years cannot be estimated. Similarly, while the amount of advances currently outstanding to captives is known, it is not possible to project what future levels would have been because of the difficulty of estimating not only the number of potential captive members forgone, but also what their level of demand for advances would have been.

Regardless of the financial impact, which is unknown, FHFA cannot allow the Banks to continue to engage in activities that it has concluded are not authorized under the law. Congress mandated the establishment of the Banks in order to advance public policy goals and, in order to ensure that they could fulfill those goals, provided them with initial funding from the Treasury Department and granted them tax and other advantages not generally enjoyed by ordinary for-profit corporations. Accordingly, unlike ordinary corporations, the Banks are not free to undertake any and all activities that they judge to be profitable from a business perspective without regard to the limitations imposed by their authorizing statute. Against the uncertain financial impact on the Banks of this regulation must be counterbalanced the equally uncertain financial effects of expanded government exposure and possible economic distortions from supporting expanded categories of businesses.

Many commenters pointed out that any action that might reduce the income of any Bank to any extent would necessarily reduce the amount of funds available for those Banks' Affordable Housing Programs (AHP), because the statute requires 10 percent of a Bank's earnings to be dedicated to its AHP. But increasing AHP contributions is not a legitimate reason to enhance Banks' earnings by allowing access to Bank advances by ineligible entities. In any event, expanding Banks' income through the admission of members who should be regarded as ineligible under the Bank Act is a very low-leverage way of increasing the availability of AHP funds, because the statute requires only 10 percent of Bank earnings to be dedicated to the AHP.

Finally, some commenters questioned why FHFA cannot address its concerns regarding the use of captives as funding conduits by adopting more narrowly tailored restrictions, such as by excluding from membership only captives that are owned by ineligible entities or, even more narrowly, only those that FHFA has determined are actually being used as a funding conduit for an ineligible parent. In developing the final rule, FHFA fully considered a number of narrower options, but ultimately concluded that each those options either raised legal concerns, would not adequately address the Agency's policy concerns, or were not workable from a practical perspective.

For example, the Agency considered whether it would be possible to adopt a final rule allowing captives to be members, but including provisions restricting the extent to which the captive could pass advance proceeds on to an ineligible parent such as by establishing a specified percentage of a captive's assets that may be funded by advances or by requiring that all collateral be kept on the books of the captive. FHFA concluded that, while either of these options could be justified from a legal perspective, neither would be likely to be effective, given the fungibility of advance proceeds and the legal and other expert resources available to the captive's parent companies that would enable them to develop methods of effectively circumventing any such restrictions.

82

82

Some representatives of captive members represented to FHFA that their captive subsidiaries directly support residential housing finance and do not act as conduits to ineligible parents. However, as stated above, FHFA has been unable to develop an administratively feasible way to assure that this is the case or remains so, and in the great majority of instances that FHFA has reviewed, it is not. Also, in these cases, the captive is not engaged primarily in the business of insurance, meaning the business of shifting and spreading risk to unaffiliated parties, and, therefore, would not be an insurance company as Congress would have understood that concept in 1932.

FHFA also considered adopting a final rule that would have continued to allow membership for captives owned by entities eligible to become members. This option raises a legal question whether the statutory membership framework contemplates conditioning eligibility for membership on the activities or investments of a particular institution's parent company. Apart from that, however, this option would still allow institutions that are themselves eligible for membership to use captive subsidiaries to enable inexpensive access to multiple Banks. Like the use of captives by ineligible parents, this potential use by eligible parents raises substantial questions of policy and legitimacy under the Bank Act, in light of the statute's provision that a member may join only the Bank in the district in which its principal place of business is located.

83

83

See

12 U.S.C. 1424(b). If a depository institution were to establish a captive insurer in a state in another Bank district, structured so that its books, records, and personnel were located there, the regulation, as revised by the final rule, would recognize that other state as the principal place of business of the captive for Bank membership purposes.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Final Rule

A. Definitions—§ 1263.1

The final rule adds several new definitions to § 1263.1, as well as revises or deletes the definitions of a number of terms that appear in the existing regulation. Although most of these changes are non-substantive, newly added definitions for the terms “insurance company” and “captive” are intended to implement the main policy goal of the final rule—preventing circumvention of the Bank Act's membership categories by excluding captive insurers from Bank membership. The final rule defines “insurance company” as “an entity that holds an insurance license or charter under the laws of a State and whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for persons or entities that are not its affiliates.” The rule defines “captive” as “an entity that holds an insurance license or charter under the laws of a State, but that does not meet the definition of `insurance company' set forth in this section or fall within any other category of institution that may be eligible for membership.” The purpose of defining those terms is to distinguish, as among entities that are deemed to be an insurance company under state law, between those that may be eligible for Bank membership as an “insurance company” and those that are not eligible. An entity that is chartered or licensed under a state's insurance statutes but that neither meets the definition of “insurance company” nor falls within any of the other categories of institutions that may be eligible for membership under the statute or regulations, is ineligible for membership.

Both the terms “insurance company” and “captive” were defined in the proposed rule and the final definitions are similar to those that were proposed. The proposed rule would have defined “insurance company” to mean “a company whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for nonaffiliated persons or entities.” It

would have defined “captive” to mean “a company that is authorized under state law to conduct an insurance business, but that does not meet the definition of `insurance company' . . . or fall within any other category of institution eligible for membership.” In the final rule, the latter part of the definition of “captive” remains as proposed, while the initial phrase has been revised to refer more precisely to “an entity that holds an insurance license or charter under the laws of a State.” The final rule adds that same initial phrase to the definition of “insurance company,” substituting it for the generic term “a company” that was used in the proposed definition. This was done to make clearer that these two definitions are meant to be read in conjunction with each other. In addition, in the final rule, the definition of “insurance company” now refers to an entity “whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for persons or entities that are not its affiliates,” instead of one “whose primary business is the underwriting of insurance for nonaffiliated persons or entities.” The sole reason for this change in nomenclature is because, in response to the requests of a number of commenters, FHFA has added a definition of the word “affiliate” to the final rule.

Several commenters asserted that the term “nonaffiliated persons or entities” was too vague and could be read in a way that would exclude from the definition of “insurance company” (and therefore from eligibility for Bank membership) entities that, because of diffuse ownership or other factors, cannot be easily used as financing conduits. The types of entities identified were: Mutual insurance companies, which are owned by their policyholders; “association captives,” which may be incorporated as a mutual insurer under state captive statutes to insure a group of policyholders engaged in a related trade; and risk retention groups (RRGs), which are liability insurance companies that may be chartered as either captives or as traditional insurers under state law and that are authorized as RRGs under federal law.

84

FHFA has concluded that these types of insurance companies would in almost all cases be within the definition of “insurance company” adopted in the final rule and therefore would remain eligible for membership.

84

See Federal Liability Risk Retention Act,

15 U.S.C. 3901,

et seq.

Two commenters provided specific recommendations as to how the term “nonaffiliated persons or entities” could be clarified so as to preclude the possibility that the definition of “insurance company” could be read to exclude entities that are not the intended targets of the proposal. One commenter, a Bank, suggested that FHFA define the term “nonaffiliated persons or entities” in the final rule to mean “one or more persons or entities holding less than 50% equity ownership or voting control of the insurance company.”

Another commenter suggested that FHFA take an approach similar to that reflected in the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), which defines “affiliate” to mean “any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another company.”

85

In turn, the BHCA states that one company is considered to have “control” over another thereunder if it: (A) “directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company”; (B) “controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors or trustees of the bank or company”; or (C) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) “determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.”

86

The commenter suggested that FHFA also adopt a “safe harbor” provision similar to one that applies to determinations made by the FRB under clause (C) of the foregoing which establishes a presumption that “any company which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or has power to vote less than 5 per centum of any class of voting securities of a given . . . company does not have control over that . . . company.”

87

85

12 U.S.C. 1841(k).

86

12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2).

87

12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(3).

FHFA has decided to follow that commenter's basic suggestion by adopting the concepts of “affiliate” and “control” that are reflected in the BHCA because those terms have well established meanings, as illustrated by their being used also in the Safety and Soundness Act with respect to affiliates of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

88

While the final definition of “affiliate” is taken from the BHCA, the text defining the scope of the word “control” (which in the final rule appears within the definition of “affiliate”) is based not on the language of the BHCA itself, but on the somewhat more specific definition of that word that the FRB used in its implementing regulations.

89

88

See

12 U.S.C. 4502(1).

89

See

12 CFR 225.2(e).

The final rule defines “affiliate” to mean “any entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another entity.” The new definition of “affiliate” also specifies that, for purposes of that definition, one entity “controls” another if it: (1) Owns or controls 25 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock, limited partnership shares, or similar interests of the other entity; (2) controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors, trustees, or general partners of the other entity; or (3) has the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the other entity through a management agreement, common directors or management officials, or by any other means.

The final rule definition of “control” does not include an equivalent of clause (C) in the BHCA definition of that term, which contemplates the possibility that the FRB may be required to hold hearings to determine whether one company exercises a controlling influence over another company. In other words, the rule does not contemplate that FHFA will under any circumstances hold a hearing to determine whether one entity “controls” another or to determine whether an entity falls within the definition of “insurance company.” Instead, a Bank may need to inquire into the facts of a particular case and apply its reasoned judgment in some circumstances. In applying the definition of “control,” a Bank should first make the relatively straightforward determination as to whether one entity exerts a controlling influence over another in the manner described in paragraphs (1) or (2) of the definition. If the answer to that question is “yes,” then the inquiry need go no further—one entity “controls” the other, and they are thus considered to be affiliates under the rule. If the answer to that question is “no,” then the Bank must consider, under paragraph (3), whether one entity has the power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the other entity by any other means, such as through a management agreement, common directors, or common management officials.

FHFA has also declined to include in the definition of “control” an equivalent to the BHCA provision establishing a presumption of non-control in cases where one company controls less than 5 percent of the voting stock of another.

FHFA believes that including such a provision will only further complicate the definition by appearing to require extensive inquiry into arrangements where one entity may control more than 5 percent, but less than 25 percent of the voting stock of another entity. To be clear, if a Bank determines that control does not exist in the manner described in paragraphs (1) or (2) and determines after reasonable inquiry that no alternative means of control exist as provided in paragraph (3), then it may presume that one entity does not control the other and, therefore, that they need not be considered affiliates under the rule.

Several commenters argued that the proposed rule also left unclear how a Bank would determine whether the “underwriting of insurance for nonaffiliated persons or entities” constitutes a company's “primary business,” in determining whether a particular entity fell within the definition of “insurance company.” One Bank suggested that FHFA define “primary business” to mean “a business line (such as selling policies, including reinsurance policies or contracts of reinsurance) that constitutes more than half of the insurance company's business.” However, the concept of half of a company's business invokes measurement questions more complex and protean than are easily susceptible of being addressed in regulation language of general applicability. FHFA believes that close interpretive questions are unlikely to arise with any frequency, but is prepared to provide interpretive guidance as needed in any appropriate cases.

Determinations regarding whether an institution meets the definition of “insurance company,” including determinations about what constitutes an “affiliate” and “control,” as well as the manner in which Banks should memorialize their conclusions with respect to those determinations in an applicant's membership application file, are addressed further in the discussion of final § 1263.2(b) below.

The one other substantive definitional change is to finalize the proposed expansion of the definition of “home mortgage loan” to include all types of MBS backed by qualifying loans and securities. Existing § 1263.1 generally defines “home mortgage loan” to include a loan that is secured by a first lien mortgage on one-to-four- or multi-family property, as well as a mortgage pass-through security that represents an undivided ownership interest in the underlying pool of mortgage loans. As proposed, the final rule replaces the existing reference to a pass-through security with a more general reference to a security representing either: (i) A right to receive a portion of the cash flows from a pool of qualifying loans; or (ii) an interest in other securities representing such a right. The reference to a right to receive a portion of the cash flows is intended to encompass both the rights of a holder of a mortgage pass-through security to an undivided ownership interest in the underlying loans and their principal and interest payments, as well as the rights of a holder “debt-type” instruments that grant the holder the right to a specified portion of the cash flows from the pooled mortgage loans. Thus, the revision is intended to bring within the definition of “home mortgage loan” all types of MBS—including pass-through securities, CMOs, REMICs, and principal-only and interest-only strips—that are fully backed by whole loans that meet the definition of “home mortgage loan” or by other MBS that are fully backed by such loans. The revised definition is not intended to include a bond or other debt security that is a general obligation of the issuer, even if it is collateralized by qualifying mortgage loans.

FHFA is making this revision in recognition of the fact that the capital markets do not distinguish between MBS structured as pass-through vehicles and those structured as debt instruments. In adopting the existing definition in 1993, the Finance Board codified the approach of its predecessor agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which had held that a mortgage-backed security must provide its holder with a

pro rata

ownership interest in each of the loans in the underlying pool of mortgage loans in order for the purchase of that MBS to constitute the equivalent of making or purchasing those underlying loans. Thus, while the Finance Board permitted mortgage pass-through securities, which are structured to give the holder a theoretical undivided ownership interest in each of the underlying loans, to be counted toward satisfaction of the “makes long-term home mortgage loans” requirement, it did not permit other types of MBS to be used for that purpose.

However, as explained in the

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

to the proposed rule, investors in today's financial markets recognize that the economic interest in the loans underlying such instruments is essentially the same for all types of MBS, regardless of their legal structure. Indeed, the availability of the many types of MBS with different characteristics that have evolved to meet investors' needs over the past several decades has made the secondary mortgage market much more liquid. In recognition of this, FHFA believes that it is appropriate to expand the definition of “home mortgage loan” to include all types of MBS backed by qualifying whole loans and eliminate the distinction that the regulations have historically drawn between pass-through securities and other types of MBS.

This revision was originally proposed in connection with FHFA's proposal to require an institution to hold at least one percent of its total assets in home mortgage loans in order to be deemed to comply with the “makes long-term home mortgage loans” eligibility requirement. The change was intended in part to ease the burden on members that would have been imposed by that new quantitative requirement by allowing them to satisfy the requirement with a wider range of first lien mortgage-related assets than would have been the case if the existing definition were retained. It was also intended in part to make it easier for the Banks to obtain the information necessary to confirm members' compliance with the one percent requirement from their regulatory financial reports. Notwithstanding that FHFA will not be finalizing the one percent requirement at this time, the Agency has decided to include the revised definition in the final rule for the reasons stated above.

In conjunction with the revision of the definition of “home mortgage loan,” the final rule also revises the definition of “residential mortgage loan” by replacing paragraph (5) (referring to “mortgage pass-through securities”) and paragraph (6) (referring to “mortgage debt securities”) with a new paragraph (5), which is int

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Members of Federal Home Loan Banks · 81 FR 3245 | Frix