Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z)
Federal RegisterDec 23, 2014
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BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
12 CFR Parts 1005 and 1026
[Docket No. CFPB-2014-0031]
RIN 3170-AA22
Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z)
AGENCY:
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
ACTION:
Proposed rule; request for public comment.
SUMMARY:
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) is proposing to amend Regulation E, which implements the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA); Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act (TILA); and the official interpretations to the regulations. The proposal would create comprehensive consumer protections for prepaid financial products. The proposal would expressly bring such products within the ambit of Regulation E as prepaid accounts and create new provisions specific to such accounts. The proposal would generally cover those prepaid accounts that are cards, codes, or other devices capable of being loaded with funds and usable at unaffiliated merchants or for person-to-person transfers, and are not gift cards (or certain other related types of cards). The proposal would modify Regulation E to establish disclosure requirements specific to prepaid accounts that would require financial institutions to provide certain disclosures to consumers prior to and after the acquisition of a prepaid account. The proposal would also include an option for an alternative to Regulation E's periodic statement requirement that would permit prepaid product providers to make available to consumers certain methods for access to account information in lieu of sending periodic statements. Additionally, the proposal would apply Regulation E's limited liability and error resolution provisions to prepaid accounts, with certain modifications, including applying these provisions after account registration. Moreover, the proposal would require prepaid account issuers to provide the Bureau with terms and conditions for prepaid accounts, which it would post on a Web site maintained by the Bureau. Relatedly, issuers would also be required to post the terms and conditions on their own Web sites or make them available upon request. Finally, the proposal would also contain amendments to Regulations Z and E to regulate prepaid accounts with overdraft services or credit features. Among other things, prepaid cards that access overdraft services or credit features for a fee would generally be credit cards subject to Regulation Z and its credit card rules. Moreover, the proposal would require that consumers consent to overdraft services or credit features and give them at least 21 days to repay the debt incurred in connection with using such services or features. Further, Regulation E would be amended to include disclosures about overdraft services or credit features that could be linked to prepaid accounts. The compulsory use provision under Regulation E would also be amended so that prepaid account issuers would be prohibited from requiring consumers to set up preauthorized electronic fund transfers to repay credit extended through an overdraft service or credit feature.
DATES:
Comments must be received on or before March 23, 2015.
ADDRESSES:
You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CFPB-2014-0031 or RIN 3170-AA22, by any of the following methods:
•
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov
. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
•
Email: FederalRegisterComments@cfpb.gov.
Include Docket No. CFPB-2014-0031 and/or RIN 3170-AA22 in the subject line of the email.
•
Mail:
Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 1700 G Street NW., Washington, DC 20552.
•
Hand Delivery/Courier:
Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 1275 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20002.
Instructions:
All submissions should include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the Bureau is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments electronically. In general, all comments received will be posted without change to
http://www.regulations.gov.
In addition, comments will be available for public inspection and copying at 1275 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20002, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern Time. You can make an appointment to inspect the documents by telephoning (202) 435-7275.
All comments, including attachments and other supporting materials, will become part of the public record and subject to public disclosure. Sensitive personal information, such as account numbers or social security numbers, should not be included. Comments generally will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kristine Andreassen, Morgan Harper, and Jane Raso, Counsels; Krista Ayoub, Joseph Baressi, and Eric Goldberg, Senior Counsels, Office of Regulations, at (202) 435-7700.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Summary of the Proposed Rule
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) is issuing this notice to propose comprehensive consumer protections for prepaid financial products (or prepaid products). Such products are among the fastest growing types of payment instruments in the United States. However, with certain limited exceptions, prepaid products have not been subject to the existing Federal consumer regulatory regimes that provide consumer disclosures, error resolution and protection from unauthorized transfers.
See generally
12 CFR part 1005.
The Bureau is proposing to establish a new definition of “prepaid account” within Regulation E and adopt comprehensive consumer protection rules for such accounts. The proposal would extend Regulation E protections to prepaid products that are cards, codes, or other devices capable of being loaded with funds, not otherwise accounts under Regulation E and redeemable upon presentation at multiple, unaffiliated merchants for goods or services, or usable at either automated teller machines or for person-to-person (P2P) transfers; and are not gift cards (or certain other types of limited purpose cards), by bringing these products under the proposed definition of “prepaid account.”
The Bureau is also proposing to modify Regulation E, as it would pertain to prepaid accounts, in several key respects. First, the Bureau proposes to require financial institutions to make certain disclosures available to consumers before a consumer agrees to acquire a prepaid account. These disclosures would take two forms, whether provided in oral, written, or electronic form. The first would be a short form highlighting key fees that the Bureau believes are most important for consumers to know about prior to acquisition. The second would be a long form that would set forth all of the prepaid account's fees and the conditions under which those fees could be imposed. When certain
conditions are met, the proposed rule would provide an exception for financial institutions that offer prepaid cards for sale over the phone or in retail stores that would allow such institutions to provide consumers with access to the long form disclosure by telephone or internet, but otherwise not make the long form available until a consumer has acquired the prepaid account. To facilitate compliance, the Bureau is additionally proposing model forms and sample forms. The use of the model forms would establish a safe harbor for compliance with the short form disclosure requirement. The Bureau is also proposing revisions to existing Regulation E model forms and model clauses to provide model language.
In addition, with certain modifications, the Bureau is proposing to extend to all prepaid accounts the existing Regulation E requirements regarding the provision of transaction information to accountholders that currently apply to payroll card accounts, Federal government benefit accounts, and non-needs tested State and local government benefit accounts. These provisions would allow financial institutions to either provide periodic statements or, alternatively, make available to the consumer: (1) The account balance, through a readily-available telephone line; (2) an electronic history of account transactions that covers at least 18 months; and (3) a written history of account transactions that covers at least 18 months upon request. For all prepaid accounts, the Bureau proposes to require financial institutions to disclose monthly and annual summary totals of all fees imposed on a prepaid account, as well as the total amount of all deposits to and debits from a prepaid account when providing a periodic statement or electronic or written account history.
Further, the Bureau is proposing to modify Regulation E to adopt error resolution and limited liability provisions specific to prepaid accounts. Currently, Regulation E limits consumers' liability for unauthorized transfers, provided that the consumer gives timely notice to the financial institution, and requires financial institutions to resolve certain errors in covered accounts. The Bureau proposes to extend this regime to prepaid accounts, with modification to the timing requirements for reporting unauthorized transfers and errors when a financial institution follows the periodic statement alternative described above. The Bureau is also proposing not to apply the limited liability and error resolution requirements of Regulation E to unregistered prepaid accounts. Moreover, the proposed rule would include provisions that would require prepaid account issuers to post prepaid account agreements on the issuers' Web sites (or make them available upon request in limited circumstances) and to submit those agreements to the Bureau for posting on a Web site maintained by the Bureau.
The Bureau is also proposing to revise various other provisions in subparts A and B of Regulation E. With respect to subpart A, the proposed amendments include a revision that would provide that, similar to payroll card accounts, a consumer cannot be required to establish an account for receipt of government benefit. Additionally, the Bureau proposes to revise official interpretations to Regulation E to incorporate a preemption determination the Bureau made regarding certain State laws related to unclaimed gift cards. With respect to subpart B, which applies to remittance transfers, the Bureau proposes a conforming change to the official interpretations.
Overdraft Services and Credit Features
The Bureau is also proposing to modify Regulations Z and E to address the treatment of overdraft services and other credit features offered in connection with prepaid accounts.
Regulation Z.
The Bureau is proposing changes to Regulation Z so that prepaid account issuers that offer overdraft services or other credit features in connection with such accounts and charge a fee for the service (such as interest, transaction fees, annual fees, or other participation fees) generally would be subject to Regulation Z's credit card rules and disclosure requirements for open-end (not home-secured) consumer credit plans. In addition, the Bureau proposes to revise Regulation Z so that its credit card rules would apply to separate lines of credit linked to prepaid accounts. The proposal would also require an issuer to obtain a consumer's consent before adding overdraft services and credit features to a prepaid account and would prohibit the issuer from adding such features until at least 30 calendar days after a consumer registers the prepaid account. Moreover, the proposal would amend Regulation Z as it pertains to credit on prepaid accounts to provide that a consumer would receive a periodic statement not more often than once per month and then have at least 21 days to repay the debt the consumer incurred in connection with using the overdraft service or credit feature. The proposal would also prevent an issuer from requiring, as terms of the credit feature, that it could immediately take incoming payments to a prepaid account, such as cash loads or direct deposits, to repay and replenish the credit line.
Regulation E.
The Bureau is proposing to revise Regulation E to include disclosures about overdraft services or credit features that could be linked to prepaid accounts in the short and long form disclosures. The Bureau is also proposing to provide that the compulsory use provision would apply to overdraft services or other credit features linked to prepaid accounts. As proposed, prepaid account issuers would be prohibited from requiring consumers to set up preauthorized electronic fund transfers to repay credit extended through an overdraft service or credit feature. Lastly, the Bureau proposes to amend Regulation E to restrict issuers from applying to a consumer's prepaid account different terms and conditions such as charging different fees for accessing funds in a prepaid account, depending on whether the consumer elects to link the prepaid account to an overdraft service or credit feature.
Effective Date
The Bureau proposes that with certain exceptions, the effective date for the requirements set forth in a final rule would be nine months after the final rule is published in the
Federal Register
. The exception proposed herein is that for a period of 12 months after the final rule is published in the
Federal Register
, financial institutions would be permitted to continue selling prepaid accounts that do not comply with the final rule's pre-acquisition disclosure requirements, if the account and its packaging material were printed prior to the proposed effective date.
II. Background
A. Prepaid Financial Products
As noted above, prepaid products—in various forms—are among the fastest growing types of payment instruments in the United States. A 2013 study by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) reported that compared with noncash payments such as credit, debit, automated clearing house (ACH), and check, prepaid card payments increased at the fastest rate from 2009 to 2012.
1
Among other
things, the report found that the number of prepaid card payments reached 9.2 billion transactions in 2012 (up from 5.9 billion in 2009).
2
1
Fed. Reserve Sys.,
The 2013 Federal Reserve Payments Study, Recent and Long-Term Payment Trends in the United States: 2003-2012, Detailed Report and Updated Data Release
(2014),
available at https://.frbservices.org/files/communications/
pdf/general/2013_fed_res_paymt_study_detailed_rpt.pdf
.
2
Id.
at 37.
There is significant variation among prepaid products. For example, some prepaid products are “reloadable,” meaning that a consumer or other authorized party can add funds to the account after the account is issued, while others are not. Additionally, some prepaid products, such as certain gift cards, are “closed-loop,” meaning that a consumer can only use the product at a specific merchant or group of merchants. Regulation E currently regulates closed-loop gift cards and similar products.
See
§ 1005.20. Other prepaid products are “open-loop.” Like gift cards, these products are used to store funds. However, unlike closed-loop prepaid products, they can be used on payment and automated teller machine (ATM) networks.
3
3
Payment networks include Visa, MasterCard, American Express, and Discover; ATM networks include NYCE, PULSE, STAR and Cirrus.
Consumers may acquire prepaid products in a variety of ways. Prepaid products may be sold directly to consumers in retail locations, over the telephone, or online. They may also be provided at no charge through an entity that uses the prepaid product to distribute funds to a recipient, such as an employer that distributes wages to an employee on a payroll card. Further, as discussed in greater detail below, prepaid products may not be tied to a physical card or device, and instead may be accessible and usable online or at a physical location through a mobile device such as a smartphone.
Typically, consumers may not spend more than the total amount of funds loaded onto a prepaid product, although some products permit consumers to access additional funds for a fee in a manner similar to overdraft services or credit features offered with checking accounts. As discussed below, a “general purpose reloadable” (GPR) card is one type of reloadable, open-loop prepaid product. Others include prepaid products onto which third parties distribute funds, also as discussed in greater detail below. These include payroll cards and cards for the disbursement of student loan proceeds or insurance proceeds, and cards used to disburse Federal and non-needs based State and local government benefits.
4
4
As described in more detail below, payroll card accounts and cards used to distribute certain government benefit payments are currently regulated by Regulation E.
GPR Cards
A GPR card is one of the most common and widely-available forms of open-loop, reloadable prepaid products. A financial institution generally issues a GPR card for an amount paid to load the card by a consumer less the purchase price of the card, if any. A GPR card can be reloaded by the consumer, meaning that once the card is registered, the consumer can add funds to the card. Based on the Bureau's research, it understands that currently, the top five GPR card programs (as measured by load volume) identified by the Aite Group have maximum load amounts generally ranging from approximately $2,500 to $15,000, with some exceptions made for large tax refunds. The prevalence of GPR cards has grown rapidly. According to projections by the Mercator Advisory Group, the amount loaded onto GPR cards grew from less than $1 billion in 2003 to nearly $65 billion in 2012. This makes GPR cards among the fastest-growing forms of prepaid products over that decade, growing from less than 8 percent of prepaid load to over 36 percent during that same period. The growth rate has continued. According to Mercator's projections, the total dollar value loaded onto GPR cards is expected to continue to grow to over $98 billion in 2014.
5
5
Mercator Advisory Grp.,
Eleventh Annual U.S. Prepaid Cards Market Forecasts, 2014-2017
at 13 (Nov. 2014).
Virtual GPR cards.
As noted above, prepaid products may not be tied to a physical card or device, and instead may be accessible and usable online or at a physical location through a mobile device such as a smartphone. The Bureau understands that the use of GPR prepaid products not linked to a physical card or device to store and transfer funds via the internet, text, or mobile phone application is growing. To use these “virtual GPR cards” (“virtual” because these accounts are not linked to a physical card or device), consumers may receive account information such as the account number that they can then use to make purchases.
GPR Card Functionality
As noted above, consumers generally purchase GPR cards at retail locations, over the telephone, or online. When buying a GPR card at a retail location, consumers typically pay an upfront purchase fee. Program managers may waive this fee for GPR cards that consumers purchase online. A newly-purchased GPR card is usually loaded by the retailer at the time of purchase with funds provided by the consumer. However, in order to take advantage of all of the GPR card's features, consumers are often required to contact the GPR card's program manager and register the card, or at least to activate it. Indeed, the Bureau understands that it is common that unless a consumer registers the consumer's newly-purchased GPR card, the consumer only has a “temporary card,” because program managers do not send a “permanent card” embossed with the consumer's name until the consumer registers the card. Further, the Bureau understands that unless a GPR card is registered, there is typically a cap on the amount of funds a consumer can load onto the card and restrictions on the consumer's use of the card (
e.g.,
the consumer might not be able to use the card at ATMs or reload funds onto the card).
Registration typically requires the consumer to provide specific identifying information (
i.e.,
full name, domestic residential address, date of birth, and a Social Security Number or Taxpayer Identification Number, or, in some instances, another government-issued identification number). The information is used by the program manager or issuing bank to verify the consumer's identity. If the consumer's identity cannot be verified, the card is not considered registered. As noted above, customers with unregistered GPR cards are generally able to spend their initial load but will not be able to reload the card or use it at an ATM. Activation may require a consumer to provide less identifying information than registration.
GPR cards can generally be reloaded through direct deposit of wages, pensions, or government benefits; a cash purchase of a reload product; direct cash reload; transfer from another prepaid product or a deposit account; or deposit of a check at a participating check-cashing outlet or via remote deposit capture.
6
Consumers can typically obtain cash from their prepaid products via ATM withdrawals, bank teller transactions, or by electing to obtain cash back on a personal identification number (PIN) transaction at a merchant. Additionally, consumers can typically make purchases with their GPR cards wherever the payment network brand appearing on the card is accepted. A number of programs also offer an online bill pay function, which sometimes has a fee associated with it. Consumers can typically obtain updates
regarding their GPR card's account balance (and, for some programs, recent transaction activity) via toll-free telephone calls, text messages, email alerts, the card program's Web site, or written account histories. Some GPR card providers charge consumers to speak to a customer service agent or to receive a written copy of their account history. Consumers may incur fees to obtain balance information at an ATM.
6
The Bureau understands that in limited circumstances, a consumer can reload a GPR card via paper check.
In fact, the Bureau understands that GPR cards can vary substantially with respect to the fees and charges assessed to consumers, both in terms of their total volume as well as in the number and type of fees assessed. Based on its review of the 2012 FRB Philadelphia Study, the Bureau believes average cardholder costs for GPR and payroll cards range from approximately $7.00 to $11.00 per month, depending on the type and distribution channel of the account.
7
In a 2014 paper, the Pew Charitable Trusts estimated that the median consumer using one of the 66 major GPR cards it examined would be charged approximately $10.00 to $30.00 every month for use of the cards, on average, depending on the consumer's understanding of the card's fee structure and ability to alter behavior to avoid fees.
8
The 2012 FRB Philadelphia Study also found that in terms of total value, maintenance and ATM withdrawal fees are among the most significant fees incurred by users of open-loop prepaid products.
9
7
Stephanie Wilshusen et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.,
Consumers' Use of Prepaid Cards: A Transaction-Based Analysis,
at 39 (2012) (2012 FRB Philadelphia Study),
available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2012/D-2012-August-Prepaid.pdf
. The authors of the report noted that the report's primary focus is on GPR cards and payroll cards, which will be discussed in greater detail below.
8
The Pew Charitable Trusts,
Consumers Continue to Load Up on Prepaid Cards,
at 39 (Feb. 2014) (2014 Pew Study),
available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2014/02/06/consumers-continue-to-load-up-on-prepaid-cards
.
9
2012 FRB Philadelphia Study, at 6.
Consumers' Use of GPR Cards
The 2012 FRB Philadelphia Study found that most of the prepaid products in its study are used for both cash withdrawals and purchases of goods and services. In particular, it found that depending on the product, cash withdrawals account for about one-third to one-half of the value taken off the product. The study also reported that it believed that prepaid cards are used primarily to purchase nondurable goods and noted that many of the products studied are also used to pay bills.
10
10
Id.
Further, as discussed in greater detail below, both the type of consumers who use GPR cards and the reasons for which they use them vary. Although it has been reported that the majority of users of open-loop prepaid products have had checking accounts at some point and that most users also have experience using credit cards,
11
it also has been observed that for some consumers, the lack of access to checking accounts and other types of more established financial products and services such as credit cards appear to be the key driver of their use of GPR cards.
12
The 2014 Pew Survey found that 58 percent of consumers that use prepaid products are currently without checking accounts, but indicated they want to have a checking account in the future.
13
The survey also found that 26 percent of prepaid product users without checking accounts indicated that they use prepaid products because, among other reasons, they would not be approved for a checking account.
14
11
The Pew Charitable Trusts,
Why Americans Use Prepaid Cards: A Survey of Cardholders' Motivations and Views,
at 7 (Feb. 2014) (2014 Pew Survey). It appears that the prepaid products discussed in the report included GPR cards, payroll cards, and government benefit cards. The study excluded closed-loop prepaid products.
12
2014 Pew Survey, at 7-8, 11.
13
Id.
at 10-11.
14
Id.
at 14.
When consumers open a checking or savings account, they must satisfy the depository institution or credit union's customer identification program (CIP) obligations, which is part of the institution's Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money laundering compliance program.
15
In addition, banks and credit unions generally review information about prospective customers obtained from specialized reporting agencies that can reveal prior history of involuntary account closure, unsatisfied balances, and other issues with prior checking account use.
15
See e.g.,
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering InfoBase,
http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/olm_011.htm
.
Customer identification and verification procedures (other than those related to credit or similar inquiries) are largely identical between checking and GPR accounts. First, the customer identification and verification requirements for providers and sellers of prepaid access issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury), are largely similar to the CIP requirements for depository institutions and credit unions. Second, the Bureau understands that for most prepaid products, the issuer (
i.e.,
the depository institution or credit union providing access to the networks and holding the funds) sets the minimum standards for the CIP.
16
However, there are differences. The primary difference is usually with respect to the method of customer verification. Checking and savings accounts are more frequently opened in person at a financial institution's branch location (and thus use “documentary” forms of identification, such as a driver's license or passport, to verify identity). Prepaid products, however, even those purchased at retail locations, are usually registered via telephone or online (and thus use “non-documentary” forms of verification such as using information obtained from consumer reporting agencies).
16
Mercator Advisory Grp.,
Customer Identification Programs in Prepaid: Best Practices,
at 2 (July 2013).
When consumers apply for credit cards, a card issuer will generally rely on a rigorous process to determine whether an applicant is an appropriate credit risk. In contrast, most GPR cards do not contain similar requirements. The 2014 Pew Survey found that 33 percent of monthly users of open-loop prepaid products have never had a credit card.
17
GPR cards may also be more accessible to consumers than debit cards that require the cardholder to have opened a traditional transactional account such as a checking account as a prerequisite. The 2014 Pew Survey found that 41 percent of monthly users of open-loop prepaid products currently do not have a checking account.
18
Similarly, a 2013 survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) found that of those people whom it surveyed, approximately 33 percent of those who reported using a prepaid card in the 30 days prior to being surveyed were unbanked.
19
Additionally, debit card issuers may evaluate potential customers for credit risk more closely than prepaid card issuers. The Bureau understands that debit card issuers often provide faster fund availability than prepaid card issuers and thus may bear
greater depositor credit risk such as the risk that a deposited check never clears.
17
See
2014 Pew Survey, at 7. The Bureau recognizes that this figure may include consumers that have never tried opening a credit card account, as well as those that tried to open a credit card account, but had their application denied.
18
Id.
19
See also
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
Appendix to 2013 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households
(Oct. 2014) (2013 FDIC Survey), at 46,
available at
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/report.pdf
.
The 2013 FDIC Survey also suggests that unbanked and underbanked consumers are more likely than the general population to use open-loop prepaid products such as GPR cards. It found that there are approximately 30 million unbanked and underbanked households in the United States.
20
It also found that these households tend to be disproportionate users of GPR cards and payroll cards. It observed that 19.7 percent of underbanked and 27.1 percent of unbanked households, as well as 33 percent of previously banked households, reported having used such cards (compared with 12 percent reported use in the entire population).
21
The FDIC also found that while usage among all households remained relatively stable since 2009, the proportion of unbanked households that had used a prepaid card increased from 12.2 percent in 2009 to 17.8 percent in 2011 and 27.1% in 2013.
22
In addition to the lack of access to traditional financial products and services as a shared characteristic of some of the consumers that use GPR cards, the FDIC study shows that prepaid card users were more likely than the general population to be young, single mothers, disabled, or have sub-$50,000 incomes, and less likely to be homeowners, white, have college degrees, or be employed.
23
20
2013 FDIC Survey, at 4.
21
2013 FDIC Survey, at 35-36.
22
2013 FDIC Survey, at 29.
23
2013 FDIC Survey appendix, at 46-47.
Further, the 2014 Pew Survey noted that the desire to avoid fee-based overdraft services associated with checking accounts appear to motivate some consumers to choose open-loop prepaid products over checking accounts. Indeed, the survey concluded that 41 percent of users have closed or lost a checking account due to overdraft fees.
24
Checking accounts can become costly. For instance, Bureau staff has determined that the median checking account overdraft fee charged as of July 2014 among the largest fifty U.S. depository institutions ranked by consumer checking balances is $35 per item.
25
By contrast, except for a few exceptions discussed below, GPR cards are generally not offered with an overdraft service nor other credit features.
26
Moreover, GPR card providers that offer such services or features charge lower fees than the fees depository institutions or credit unions charge for checking account overdraft.
27
Thus, for consumers who do not want to, or cannot open a checking account, the Bureau believes that a GPR card could be a viable substitute. Indeed, the Bureau observes that many GPR cards are advertised as a “safe” or “secure” alternative to a checking account.
28
24
2014 Pew Survey, at 8;
see also id.
at 13-14 (explaining that 46 percent of respondents indicated that one of the major reasons they use prepaid cards is to “Avoid overdraft fees;” 51 percent of respondents said one of their major reasons is “Helping you not spend more money than you actually have”).
25
Nearly all depository institutions the Bureau considered assess overdraft fees on a per-item basis. Among those that do, both the median and modal lowest-tier overdraft fee is $35. Some depository institutions have higher overdraft fees that apply after a certain number of overdraft occurrences. However, the Bureau's analysis considers only the lowest-tier fees a consumer would encounter if de minimis or other policies do not preclude a fee. For depository institutions that charge different amounts in different regions, Bureau staff considered pricing for the region where the depository institution is headquartered.
26
See, e.g.,
2014 Pew Study, at 4, 9-10.
27
Id.
28
See, e.g.,
NBCPA Web site,
What are Prepaid Cards,
http://www.nbpca.com/en/What-Are-Prepaid-Cards/Prepaid-Card-Benefits.aspx
(“[With prepaid cards] . . . [avoid] the risk of over-spending or overdraft, thus avoiding the interest, fees and potential negative credit score implications of traditional credit cards. [For parents], prepaid cards [help] maintain control over [children's spending].”)
Consumers with access to traditional financial products and services use GPR cards as well.
29
The Bureau understands that one of the ways in which many consumers use such cards is for a limited purpose such as while traveling or making online purchases, because they may believe that using prepaid cards is safer than using cash, a credit card, or a debit card in those situations.
30
These consumers may not ever register and reload the card. Instead, they may let the card become dormant or discard it after spending down the initial balance, and then purchase another GPR card at a later date if new needs arise. The Bureau understands that another popular way in which consumers use GPR cards is as a budgeting tool. For example, a family might budget a fixed amount each month for dining out and put that money on a GPR card, or parents may provide a GPR card to a child at college to control the child's spending.
29
2014 Pew Survey, at 7 (59 percent of prepaid card users also have a checking account.)
30
See, e.g.,
2014 Pew Survey, at 1, 13.
Further, based on the Bureau's market research and analysis, the Bureau believes that additional consumers will continue to adopt GPR cards. It also believes that consumers that currently use GPR cards may increasingly find that they no longer want to have traditional financial products and services such as a checking account or a credit card in addition to their GPR card. The Bureau notes that GPR card functionality has been expanding. For example, some GPR card programs have started to offer checking account-like features such as check-writing using pre-authorized checks, the ability to send direct deposits via an ACH to the GPR card, and, in some limited cases, the ability of third parties to debit and credit the GPR card account via ACH (
e.g.,
crediting the card account through direct deposit). Additionally, many GPR card programs have offered consumers ways to access their account online, including through mobile devices such as smartphones. For example, oftentimes consumers can use mobile phone applications to closely monitor their GPR card transactions, balances, and fees; to load funds to their GPR cards; and to transfer funds between accounts. Lastly, like credit and debit cards, GPR cards provide access to payment networks. Consumers may find this to be an important feature of GPR cards in that some merchants may only accept payment through a card that provides access to one of these networks.
Marketing and Sale of GPR Cards
In recent years, the GPR card segment has grown increasingly competitive, which has resulted in a decrease in prices, coupled with an increase in transparency for many products.
31
Nevertheless, GPR card providers market the cards in ways that may negatively affect consumers' ability to make meaningful comparisons.
32
Card packaging is often limited in size. Because many of them are designed to be sold in retail stores, the card package, also known as a J-hook package, is no larger than 4 inches by 5.25 inches.
33
Thus, card packages have limited space in which to explain their product and disclose key features. It has also been reported that fee information for prepaid products is sometimes hard to find and difficult to understand, thus making comparison shopping challenging.
34
However, the Bureau believes that consumers benefit from comparison shopping. For example, the 2012 FRB Philadelphia Study found that total cardholder costs vary by the type of open-loop prepaid product.
35
31
See, e.g.,
Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Cards, Cards and More Cards: The Evolution to Prepaid Cards,
Inside the Vault, Fall 2011, at 1, 2,
available at
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/itv/articles/?id=2168
(“Competition among prepaid card issuers and increased volume have helped lower card fees and simplify card terms”); 2014 Pew Study, at 2 (“[O]ur research finds that the providers are competing for business by lowering some fees and are facing pressure from new entrants in the market”).
32
2014 Pew Survey, at 5, 6.
33
A j-hook is a looped hook used by retailers to hang prepaid cards (and other products). Retailers often sell prepaid cards on j-hooks in a standalone display rack at the end of an aisle in a store.
34
See, e.g.,
Consumer Reports,
Prepaid Cards: How They Rate on Value, Convenience, Safety and
Fee Accessibility and Clarity,
(July 2013), at 24,
available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/prepaid-cards-help-design-a-new-disclosure/
.
35
2012 FRB Study, at 6, 39, 72; Fumiko Hayashi & Emily Cuddy,
General Purpose Reloadable Prepaid Cards: Penetration, Use, Fees and Fraud Risks,
at 33-35 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Working Paper No. RWP 14-01, 2014) (Kansas City Fed Study),
available at https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp14-01.pdf
.
In addition to the size limitations to GPR card packaging related to the fact that many GPR cards are sold through the retail channel on J-hooks, certain aspects of purchasing GPR cards in retail settings may pose additional issues. For instance, some retail locations may only offer one or a handful of products. Retailers may not always have a broad selection of GPR cards that consumers can compare while in a particular store, because prepaid card providers can establish exclusive marketing arrangements that may prevent competitors' cards from being sold in the same store.
36
The Bureau acknowledges that the lack of choice is not necessarily unique to GPR cards sold in certain retail locations. For example, any one bank or credit union may only offer a limited range of transactional accounts. Further, in some stores, prepaid products including GPR cards may be displayed behind a register, requiring a consumer to ask to see each product packaging individually. The Bureau believes that this process likely makes comparison-shopping more time-consuming, even when choice among products exists. Lastly, in a retail setting, GPR cards may be displayed near closed-loop prepaid products such as gift cards. This could contribute to consumer confusion. For the above reasons, the Bureau believes that a consumer looking to comparison shop among different GPR cards in a retail setting may incur high search costs.
36
For example, earlier this year Blackhawk Network Holdings, Inc. extended its exclusive distribution arrangement with Safeway Inc. through 2019.
See
Press Release, Blackhawk Network,
Safeway and Blackhawk extend exclusive prepaid card distribution agreement through 2019
(Mar. 7, 2014),
available at http://.com/blackhawk-comments-on-parent-company-safeways-spin-off-announcement/
.
Additionally, in a retail setting, consumers desiring to purchase GPR cards may only allot limited time to consider their purchases. The Bureau believes that consumers often purchase a GPR card while purchasing groceries and convenience items, and may not take the time to fully review and comprehend the terms of the card that they are acquiring. Moreover, the selling of GPR cards in convenience and other retail stores that do not otherwise sell financial products (as opposed to, for example, at a bank) may not be conducive to helping a consumer understand the terms and conditions of the GPR card or that the consumer may be starting a long-term financial relationship that could entail significant expense for the consumers. For example, the Bureau believes that a salesperson at a convenience store where a GPR card is sold may not be able to provide adequate information to a consumer about the product. In contrast, the Bureau expects that an employee at a bank or credit union would be better informed.
Further, once a consumer can review the full terms and conditions of a GPR card, the consumer has typically already purchased the card and loaded funds onto it, making returns difficult or impossible due to the inability of the retail store to refund the cash loaded onto a prepaid product including a GPR card. During outreach, several prepaid product providers have informed the Bureau that they provide refunds related to the purchase of a prepaid card, but the Bureau believes that few consumers realize that this is an option. The Bureau acknowledges that consumers who determine they do not want to establish a long term relationship with the GPR prepaid card they purchased may also end the relationship more easily (as compared to closing a checking or credit card account). Such consumers could spend down the funds initially loaded onto the card and then discard it. However, the Bureau believes that the consumer could still incur fees such as monthly maintenance fees for using the GPR card.
Structure of Typical GPR Card Programs
GPR card products are generally provided by combinations of entities working together rather than by a single, vertically-integrated entity operating all aspects of the program. In fact, the Bureau understands that the typical GPR card supply chain involves more parties than the supply chains for traditional checking or savings accounts or for credit cards. Although a consumer may only interact with a single entity or limited number of entities involved in the supply chain such as those entities whose logos are displayed on the GPR card or its packaging, the Bureau believes that the fact that many different entities can be involved in the supply chain could expose consumers as well as the entities themselves to greater risks such as potential losses resulting from the insolvency or malfeasance of other entities involved in the supply chain, when compared to the risks associated with a traditional checking or savings account. The Bureau discussed the various entities that may be involved in a typical GPR card program below.
Entities involved in a typical GPR card program.
First, entities known in the industry as program managers may design, manage, market, and generally operate GPR card programs. Program managers may include depository institutions and credit unions, but are typically non-depository entities. Program managers typically establish or negotiate a GPR card program's terms and conditions, market the card, assume most of the financial risks associated with the program, and reap the bulk of the revenue from the program.
37
The program manager is also, in most cases, the primary consumer-facing party in connection with a GPR card, because it is typically the program manager's brand on the card as well as its packaging.
38
While a handful of program managers appear to have had a large majority of the market share as recently as 2012, the Bureau notes that the GPR card industry is fast-changing. Indeed, it appears that new entrants—both start-ups and established financial institutions—have led to both increased competition and growth in the market over just the last few years.
39
37
See
Kansas City Fed Study, at 6.
38
See
Aite Grp. LLC,
Prepaid Debit Card Realities: Cardholder Demographics and Revenue Models,
at 17 (Nov. 2013).
39
Id.
Program managers typically contract with various third-party service providers for various tasks. One of the most important entities involved in GPR card program is the prepaid card issuer, which is typically either a depository institution or credit union. Virtually all GPR cards must be issued by depository institutions or credit unions that are authorized by the retail electronic payment card networks. Issuers may manage the accounts that hold funds loaded onto the cards. Some depository institutions and credit unions are actively involved in the GPR cards they issue by serving as both issuer and program manager for their own programs. Other depository institutions may only act as an issuer and provide sponsorship into specific payment networks, but may work closely with the entity that is the program manager for a specific GPR card program to design, market and administer the
program. In sum, the particular services that issuers provide and their degree of involvement in any GPR card program may vary.
40
The Bureau understands that variations can be due to the extent to which the program manager performs particular services by itself, as well as due to the particular features of a specific GPR card program.
40
In some cases, a white label model is used whereby banks and credit unions rely upon another institution to issue prepaid accounts, which may be branded with the bank or credit union's name. There are a handful of such programs through which banks and credit unions, including some that are small, offer prepaid accounts (typically as a convenience to their customers or members).
To produce, market and sell GPR cards, program managers work with, as applicable, manufacturers and distributors. The Bureau understands that distributors arrange for GPR cards to be sold through various channels including through retailers, money transfer agents, tax preparers, check cashers, and payday lenders. Further, in many cases, the Bureau understands that third-party processors may provide many of the back-office processing functions associated with initial account opening (including those related to transitioning from temporary to permanent cards), transaction processing, and account reporting. Lastly, the payment networks themselves also establish and enforce their own rules and security standards related to payment cards generally and prepaid products such as GPR cards specifically. The networks also facilitate card acceptance, routing, processing, and settling of transactions between merchants and card issuers.
How funds are held.
In contrast to a traditional checking or savings account, prepaid products including GPR cards are unique in that the underlying funds are typically held in a pooled account at a depository institution or credit union. This means that rather than establish individual accounts for each cardholder, a program manager may establish a single account at a depository institution or credit union in its own name, but typically title the account to indicate that it is held for the benefit of each individual underlying cardholder. The Bureau understands that the program manager, sometimes in conjunction with the issuing depository institution or credit union or the depository institution or credit union holding the funds, will typically establish policies and procedures and put in place systems to demarcate each cardholder's funds within the pooled account. As discussed in detail below, these pooled accounts may qualify for, as applicable, FDIC pass-through deposit insurance or National Credit Union Administration's (NCUA) Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) pass-through share insurance. Whether the accounts in fact qualify depends on how the account is structured and whether certain other conditions are met. Also discussed in greater detail below, both the FDIC and NCUA have special rules, regarding how pool accounts may qualify for, as applicable, FDIC or NCUSIF pass-through insurance.
Revenue generation.
The Bureau understands that GPR cards typically generate revenue through an up-front purchase price paid by the consumer, the assessment of various monthly maintenance and transactional fees, and interchange fees collected from merchants by the payment networks. The 2012 FRB Philadelphia Study found that “while not as important as cardholder fees, interchange revenues (fees paid by a merchant or acquiring bank for the purpose of compensating an issuer for its involvement in an electronic prepaid, debit, or credit card transaction) account for more than one-fifth of the issuer revenues in the general-purpose programs and almost half of revenues in the payroll programs.”
41
Revenue is shared among some or all of the entities involved in the GPR card supply chain, although as also discussed above, program managers generally reap the bulk of the revenue from GPR card programs. Further, the Bureau notes that publicly-available details of how revenue is distributed and expenses are accounted for are sparse. Additionally, the Bureau believes that the distribution of revenue and the sharing of expenses among the entities involved the GPR card supply chain likely vary across programs.
41
2012 FRB Philadelphia Study, at 6.
Prepaid Products Loaded by Third Parties
The Bureau understands that consumers also receive network-branded open-loop prepaid products from third parties that disburse funds to consumers by loading the funds onto such accounts. Previously, funds may have been distributed to the consumer via paper check, direct deposit into a traditional checking or saving account, or cash. Payroll cards are the most common example of prepaid products used by third parties to distribute funds to consumers. In 2013, over five million payroll cards were issued, and $30.6 billion was loaded onto them.
42
The Bureau understands that an employer may establish payroll cards for its employees, directly or indirectly, for the express purpose of delivering on an ongoing basis, recurring payments of an employee's wages, salary, or other compensation, and an employee may choose having his compensation distributed via a payroll card over other options for receiving compensation.
42
Mercator Advisory Grp.,
Eleventh Annual U.S. Prepaid Cards Market Forecasts, 2014-2017,
at 32 (Nov. 2014).
If an employee chooses a payroll card, the Bureau understands that the employer will provide the employee with a network-branded prepaid card that accesses a subaccount assigned to the individual employee. Moreover, on each payday, the employer will transfer the employee's compensation to the payroll card account, instead of providing the employee with a paper check or making a direct deposit of funds to the employee's checking or savings account. The employee can use the payroll card to withdraw funds at an ATM or over-the-counter via a bank teller. The employee can also use the payroll card to make purchases online and at physical retail locations. An employee may even be able to obtain cash back at the point-of-sale (POS). Some payroll cards may offer features such as convenience checks and electronic bill payment. The Bureau understands that employers market payroll cards as an effective means for employees who may lack a traditional banking relationship to receive wages. Indeed, the Bureau believe that payroll cards may provide some consumers a more suitable, cheaper, and safer method of receiving their wages, as compared to other methods, such as receiving a check and going to a check-cashing store, if the consumer does not have a checking account.
Within the last ten years, however, there have been increasing concerns raised about payroll cards, with specific focus on potentially harmful fees and practices associated with payroll cards. As explained in greater detail below, the Board extended a modified form of Regulation E coverage to payroll cards in 2006, but did not extend these rules to GPR cards and other prepaid products. Among the relevant provisions of Regulation E that apply to payroll cards is the provision on compulsory use. Pursuant to this provision, no financial institution or other person can mandate that a consumer receive an electronic fund transfer into an account at a particular institution as a condition of employment. 12 CFR 1005.10(e)(2).
The Bureau issued a guidance bulletin in September 2013 to clarify the application of § 1005.10(e)(2) to payroll
card accounts.
43
The bulletin reminded employers that they cannot require their employees to receive wages on a payroll card. It also explained some of the Regulation E protections that apply to payroll card accounts, such as those pertaining to fee disclosure, access to account history, limited liability for unauthorized use, and error resolution rights. Since the Bureau issued the bulletin, it understands that certain industry stakeholders have worked to develop industry standards incorporating and building upon the guidance given in it.
44
Nevertheless, the Bureau believes that concerns persist as to whether and how employers and financial institutions are complying with the compulsory use provision and other provisions of Regulation E, as well as related State laws applicable to the distribution of wages.
45
For example, employees may not always be aware of the ways in which they may receive their wages, because States may have differing and evolving requirements.
46
43
CFPB Bulletin 2013-10,
Payroll Card Accounts (Regulation E)
(Sept. 12, 2013),
available at http://.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_payroll-card-bulletin.pdf
.
44
See, e.g.,
Press Release, MasterCard
MasterCard Introduces Payroll Card Standards
(Dec. 13, 2013),
available at http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-releases/mastercard-introduces-payroll-card-standards/
.
45
See, e.g.,
N.Y. State Attorney Gen., Labor Bureau,
The Impact of Payroll Cards on Low-Wage Workers, available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Pinched%20by%20Plastic.pdf
.
46
See, e.g., http://paycard.americanpayroll.org/compliance-regulations
(listing the various State regulations that apply to payroll cards).
The Bureau additionally believes that payroll card accounts raise disclosure issues beyond those addressed by its payroll card accounts guidance bulletin, discussed above. Employers may offer a payroll card account when an employee starts employment, and the issue of how the employee is to be paid is likely to be one among the many and varied human resource issues confronting the employee during orientation. An employee may be provided with a stack of forms to complete and may not have the time or opportunity to review them. It is also possible that the employee may be unaware that receiving wages via a payroll card account is optional, particularly if the employer does not present the options clearly. These forms the employee may receive from the employer may not always include all of the relevant information regarding the terms and conditions of the payroll card account, such as fees associated with the card and how cardholders can withdraw funds on the card. Separately, some have raised concerns about the extent to which payroll card providers share program revenue with employers and, if so, whether that revenue sharing has negative consequences for cardholders.
Payroll cards are just one type of network-branded open-loop prepaid products consumers may receive from third parties that disburse funds to consumers by loading the funds onto such accounts. For example, institutions of higher education may partner with certain entities to disburse student financial aid proceeds into network-branded open-loop prepaid products endorsed by those institutions.
See
34 CFR 668.164(c)(2) (setting forth that certain Federal student aid payments disbursed via “an account that underlies a stored-value card” is considered a direct payment to a student or parent). Like with payroll card accounts, some have raised concerns about revenue sharing in connection with prepaid cards provided to students.
A 2014 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that of the U.S. colleges and universities participating in Federal student aid programs for the 2011-2012 school year that had agreements with financial firms to provide debit and prepaid card services for students, approximately 80 percent of such agreements were for debit cards, with the remainder for prepaid cards.
47
The report also stated that more than 80 percent of the schools identified in the report with card agreements indicated that students could use their cards to receive financial aid and other funds from the school.
48
Further, the report found instances where certain third-party providers involved in college card programs work with a bank partner.
49
47
U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-14-91,
College Debit Cards Actions Needed to Address ATM Access, Student Choice and Transparency,
at 8 (Feb. 2014) (GAO 2014 College Card Report),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660919.pdf.
48
GAO 2014 College Card Report, at 9.
49
Id.
at 15.
Among other things, the GAO noted concerns about the fees on student debit and prepaid cards, as well as the lack of ATM access and the lack of the schools' neutrality toward the card programs.
50
It found instances in which schools appeared to encourage students to enroll in the school's specific prepaid card program, rather than present neutral information about disbursement options for financial aid.
51
Relatedly, the Department of Education is in the process of a negotiated rulemaking regarding the use of third-party entities to disburse Federal student aid, including those that may distribute funds via prepaid products.
52
50
U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-14-91, a Report to the Chairman, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pension, U.S. Senate
(Feb. 2014),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660920.pdf.
51
Id.
52
78 FR 69612 (Nov. 20, 2013).
Further, the Bureau understands that prepaid cards are also used by some insurance providers to pay certain insurance claims such as claims related to a property or casualty loss.
53
During outreach, some insurance providers informed the Bureau that, where permitted by State law, it is faster and more economical to provide workers compensation payments on prepaid cards relative to mailing paper checks. Additionally, after a natural disaster, the disbursement of funds from insurance claims onto prepaid cards may allow funds to be delivered to consumers that may be unable to use or access traditional checking or savings accounts.
53
Mercator Advisory Grp.,
Tenth Annual U.S. Prepaid Cards Market Forecasts, 2013-2016,
at 42-43 (Oct. 2013).
Similarly, taxpayers may direct tax refunds onto prepaid cards provided by tax preparers or government entities. These prepaid cards are typically open-loop cards. Other disbursements onto prepaid cards include disbursement of mass transit or other commuting-related funds, which are typically onto restricted closed loop cards. However, the Bureau understands that new transit payment models are emerging, and these models tend to involve open-loop prepaid cards.
54
Aid distributed by relief organizations or government agencies in response to natural disasters is usually loaded onto open-loop cards. In some of these cases, the cards may be reloaded by the entity that initially disbursed funds onto the card.
54
See e.g.,
https://www.ventrachicago.com/
(The city of Chicago's mass transit card has reloadable open-loop features).
See also
http://www.septa.org/key/
(The city of Philadelphia announced that its mass transit card will also have reloadable open-loop features).
Finally, government entities also distribute various funds onto prepaid products. In addition to distributing tax refunds onto such products, the Federal government and various State governments may use prepaid products to distribute government benefits such as Social Security Payments,
55
unemployment insurance benefits,
56
child support payments, and other types of disbursements including needs-tested benefits. Needs-tested benefits include funds related to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). State and local government programs for distributing needs-tested benefits are typically referred to as electronic benefit (EBT) programs. Most States offer a choice between at least direct deposit to a traditional checking or savings account or a prepaid product for the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. However, the Bureau understands that several States require the distribution of such benefits onto prepaid products.
57
With respect to other government benefits, as noted below in the discussion of relevant law, Regulation E does not apply to EBT programs.
58
In addition, Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service, on behalf of the United States military, provides both closed-loop and open-loop prepaid cards for use by servicemembers and contractors in the various branches of the armed forces.
59
The features of and fees charged in connection with these cards may vary.
55
Treasury has established the Direct Express program for the distribution of government benefits such as Social Security payments.
56
See e.g.,
Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.,
2013 Survey of Unemployment Compensation Prepaid Cards,
at 7 (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.nclc.org/issues/unemployment-compensation-prepaid-cards.html
(noting that 42 States offer some form of
prepaid card for distribution of employment compensation payments).
57
Id.
at 1.
58
See
EFTA section 904(d)(2)(B); Regulation E § 1005.15(a)(2).
59
See, e.g.,
Navy Cash/Marine Cash,
http://fms.treas.gov/navycash/index.html
and Eagle Cash,
http://fms.treas.gov/eaglecash/index.html.
As discussed further below, the Navy Cash and Marine Cash products may have multiple “purses” such that one “purse” can only be used at a limited number of linked merchants (such as various places on a Naval vessel) while the other “purse” can be linked to a payment card network that provides global acceptance to unaffiliated merchants.
The Bureau believes that as a general matter, prepaid products loaded by third parties present some of the same consumer protection issues as GPR cards such as the lack of clear disclosures about fees and other important terms and conditions, and the lack of opportunity for consumers to compare and evaluate different products before acceptance. Consumers may use these products as their primary transaction account, particularly when the product is loaded with all of the consumer's incoming funds (
e.g.,
wages, unemployment benefits, student loan proceeds, etc.). In accepting the product, a consumer may not fully grasp all of its fees and terms and how those fees and terms might impact the consumer over time. In addition and as previously noted, consumers may be offered these products in situations that make comparison shopping difficult. However, the Bureau believes that many prepaid accounts with funds loaded by third parties may present distinct set of issues as well. The Bureau understands many types of these accounts are distributed to very specific segments of consumers such as college-age students or very low-income consumers, and accordingly, there may be distinct consumer protection issues associated with these prepaid products.
Digital Wallets
In recent years, there has been increasing industry interest in developing “digital wallets” and “mobile wallets.” A consumer may keep cash, debit and credit cards, GPR cards, and gift cards in a physical wallet or purse. Digital wallets have been marketed as a viable alternative to a physical wallet, because a number of digital wallets currently available can store one or more of the consumer's payment credentials electronically.
60
For example, a digital wallet may allow a consumer to store the consumer's bank account, debit card, credit card, and/or prepaid card credentials in the wallet, which may be accessed by the consumer through a Web site. Digital wallets that a consumer could access using a mobile device such as a smartphone have been described as mobile wallets.
61
Further, some, but not all, digital wallets currently available to consumers allow a consumer to store funds in it directly or by funding a prepaid product, and draw down the stored funds.
62
60
Aite Grp. LLC,
Money Goes Mobile,
(May 2014),
available at
http://www.aitegroup.com/report/money-goes-mobile
.
61
Id.
62
See e.g.,
http://www.google.com/wallet/index.html
(last accessed on Oct. 28, 2014) (“The Wallet Balance is the money in your Google Wallet . . . [money will be stored in the wallet]. [Use] your Wallet Balance to send money to friends [and shop], or transfer money to your bank account. You can also add money to your Wallet Balance . . . from a credit card, debit card or linked bank account.”);
see also,
https://www.serve.com/
(last accessed on Oct. 28, 2014) (“Use the American Express Serve Mobile App to check your balance and recent transactions, pay bills on the go, add checks, and send money to family or friends who have a Serve Account. Download the American Express Serve Mobile App for iOS or Android.”).
Digital wallets have been marketed as allowing consumers to electronically transmit funds in multiple settings. Currently, digital wallets can be used by a consumer for online purchases,
63
payments at brick-and-mortar retailers through, for example, contactless communication at the point of sale,
64
as well as person-to-business (
i.e.
bill pay) and P2P transfers.
65
The Bureau understands that there may be significant variations in how funds are held in digital wallets and how payments are processed by digital wallets and that payment processing by digital wallets is evolving quickly. For instance, some digital wallets provide methods for accessing the ACH system to make a payment. In this case, a consumer might use a digital wallet to pay for an online purchase, and the digital wallet facilitates the transfer of funds from the consumer's checking account to fund the transaction. In other cases, the consumer's funds are first transferred to the digital wallet either by the consumer or by the digital wallet provider, and then transferred to ultimate payee. For example, it may be possible for a consumer to maintain a positive balance in the wallet through transfers from sources such as a bank account, a credit, debit, or prepaid card, or a P2P transfer. The consumer's digital wallet balance may be held in the name of the digital wallet provider in a pooled account that is not further divided into subaccounts that are held in the name of any individual consumer.
63
See e.g.,
Visa Checkout Terms of Service,
https://secure.checkout.visa.com/pages/terms?country=US&locale=en
(last accessed on Oct. 28, 2014).
64
See e.g.,
Google Wallet Terms of Service,
https://wallet.google.com/termsOfService?type=BUYER&gl=US
(last accessed on Oct. 28, 2014).
65
See e.g.,
Boost Mobile Wallet Terms of Service, (
https://boostmobile.wipit.me/legal/terms.aspx
(last accessed on Oct. 28, 2014).
A mobile wallet may act as a pass-through that enables consumers to pay for goods at a store using payment credentials for other accounts, such as credentials for a consumer's credit card, debit, or prepaid card that the consumer has stored on the mobile wallet. For example, a consumer could use a mobile wallet on a smartphone to select the consumer's debit card to fund a payment for a good or service, and then use near field communication to tap the phone at a point-of-sale terminal to pay. The Bureau expects that variations of digital wallets will continue to grow and observes that the methods described herein are a few of the funding options available in the current market.
Credit Features, Overdraft Programs & Prepaid Products
As currently offered and marketed, most prepaid products do not allow consumers to spend more money than is loaded onto the product. Although there are a few exceptions, most providers of prepaid products do not currently offer overdraft services,
66
a linked line of
credit,
67
access to a deposit advance product
68
or other method of accessing credit in connection with a prepaid product.
69
Instead, prepaid products, including many GPR cards, are actively marketed as “safe” alternatives to checking accounts with opt-in overdraft services, credit cards, or other credit options.
70
66
As discussed further below, overdraft services evolved from ad hoc, discretionary programs in which financial institutions would sometimes cover particular transactions that would otherwise overdraw an account as a courtesy to the consumer
rather than return the transaction and subject the consumer to a non-sufficient-funds (NSF) fee, merchant fees, and other negative consequences from bounced checks. Overdraft services fees are imposed on a per transaction basis, and the financial institution takes the balance owed as soon as additional funds are deposited into the account. Further, as explained below, the Board exempted overdraft services from regulation under TILA and Regulation Z, as long as they are provided pursuant to an agreement that does not obligate the financial institution to cover any particular transaction. In addition, these programs are not typically subject to traditional underwriting processes used for other credit products. Under Regulation E, financial institutions must obtain an opt-in by the consumer before imposing overdraft fees on ATM and one-time point of sale transactions by debit card.
See
Regulation E, § 1005.17(b).
67
A linked line of credit is a separate line of credit that a financial institution “links” to a deposit account or prepaid product to draw funds automatically where transaction made using funds from the account or product would otherwise take the balance on the account or product negative. Such a credit feature is generally subject to interest rates, traditional credit underwriting, and the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Similarly, some financial institutions offer consumers an option to link their credit card to a deposit account to provide automatic “pulls” to cover transactions that would otherwise exceed the balance in the account.
68
A deposit advance product (DAP) is a small-dollar, short-term loan or line of credit that a financial institution makes available to a customer whose deposit account reflects recurring direct deposits. The customer obtains a loan, which is to be repaid from the proceeds of the next direct deposit. DAPs typically do not assess interest and are fee-based products. Repayments are typically collected from ensuing deposits, often in advance of the customer's other bills. (See CFPB Whitepaper on Payday and Deposit Advance Products: Initial Data Findings, Apr. 30, 2013,
see also
OCC and FDIC Final Guidance on Supervisory Concerns and Expectations Regarding Deposit Advance Products, 78 FR 70552, 70624 (Nov. 26, 2013). Publication of the Bureau's White Paper and the guidance issued by the FDIC and OCC has caused many financial institutions to reevaluate their DAP programs.
69
For example, a financial institution could offer a product whereby consumers with a credit account access that account and “push” the credit into their prepaid accounts where it can be spent.
70
See, e.g.,
NBCPA,
What are Prepaid Cards?,
http://www.nbpca.com/en/What-Are-Prepaid-Cards/Prepaid-Card-Benefits.aspx
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (“For many Americans, prepaid cards serve as a tool with which to more effectively budget their spending. With a prepaid card, consumers avoid the risk of over-spending or overdraft, thus avoiding the interest, fees and potential negative credit score implications of traditional credit cards. And for parents, prepaid cards provide tools to maintain control over their teens' or college students' spending.”);
see also
Examining Issues in the Prepaid Card Market: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Prot., S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) (Remarks of Dan Henry, Chief Executive Officer, NetSpend Holdings, Inc.) (“Our customers are typically working Americans who want control. . . .”).
As the Bureau observed above, it appears that a desire to avoid fee-based overdraft services motivates a sizeable portion of consumers to choose prepaid products, such as GPR cards, over checking accounts.
71
Further, a slight majority of consumers that participated in the 2014 Pew Survey stated that one of the major reasons that they use prepaid products is that they help those consumers control their spending.
72
Similarly, the Bureau's own focus groups also found that many consumers choose prepaid products because they help them control their spending.
73
Unlike deposit accounts with an overdraft feature or linked lines of credit, credit cards, and other credit products, consumers that use prepaid products without credit features (
i.e.,
most prepaid consumers) cannot spend funds that have not been loaded into the account.
71
2014 Pew Survey, at 14 ex.12 (noting that the top two reasons consumers claim to use prepaid cards related to avoiding credit card debt (67 percent) and helping them not spend more money than they actually have (66 percent).
72
2014 Pew Survey, at 13-14.
73
ICF Report, at 5.
It also appears that many consumers specifically seek to acquire prepaid products that do not offer overdraft services or credit features because they have had negative experiences with credit products, including checking accounts with overdraft features or want to avoid fees related to such products. For example, the 2014 Pew Survey found that many prepaid consumers previously had a checking account and either lost that account (due to failure to repay overdrafts or related issues) or gave up the checking account due to overdraft or bounced check fees.
74
Relatedly, prepaid products are often used by consumers who cannot obtain a checking account due to bad credit or other issues.
75
GPR cards—which are sometimes marketed as involving “no credit check”—provide consumers with access to electronic payment networks, the ability to make online purchases, and increased security and convenience over alternatives such as cash.
76
Prepaid consumers often are unable to open credit card accounts and cannot get a traditional checking account with a debit card due to negative reports with credit reporting agencies focusing on checking-account related credit issues.
74
2014 Pew Survey, at 7-8 (noting both that “Most prepaid card users who have had a checking account in the past have paid associated overdraft fees for debit card usage” and that “Among those prepaid card users who have ever had a bank account, 41 percent of them say they have closed or lost a checking account because of overdraft or bounced check fees”).
75
Id.
at 8 (noting that one-third of prepaid consumers who have ever had a checking account say they have closed a bank checking account themselves because of overdraft or bounced check fees and 21 percent who say they have had a financial institution close their account because of overdraft or bounced check fees).
76
See
ICF Report, at 5; 2014 Pew Survey, at 14 ex.12 (noting that 72 percent of prepaid consumers say that a reason they have a prepaid card is to make purchases online and other places that do not accept cash).
Apart from consumers' reasons for favoring prepaid products, regulatory factors may also have discouraged prepaid product providers from offering overdraft services or credit features in connection with their products. The Bureau understands that some prepaid product issuers have received guidance from their prudential regulators that has deterred those financial institutions from allowing prepaid products they issue to offer overdraft services or credit features. Relatedly, the Bureau believes that a 2011 Office of Thrift Supervision enforcement action regarding a linked deposit advance feature may also have had a chilling effect on the growth of DAPs.
77
Finally, while a number of industry commenters to the Bureau's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Prepaid ANPR) expressed interest in offering overdraft services or credit features in connection with prepaid products, some industry commenters also expressed their reluctance to proceed until there is greater certainty as to whether this rulemaking would alter the permissible bounds of such a program.
77
See In the Matter of MetaBank,
Office of Thrift Supervision, Order No. CN 11-25 (July 15, 2011), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/ots/enforcement/97744.pdf
.
The Bureau understands that the only credit features being offered on prepaid accounts currently are structured as overdraft services.
78
To date, overdraft services on prepaid accounts have been generally structured similar to overdraft services offered by financial institutions on checking accounts, but in some ways, are more consumer-friendly. For example, the programs charge a per-transaction fee each time the consumer incurs an overdraft (
e.g.,
one program
charges $15) although the fee tends to be lower than fees typically charged for checking accounts (median fee as of July 2014 is $35).
79
In addition, issuers of certain prepaid products with overdraft services will waive the overdraft fee if the consumer repays the overdraft quickly (
e.g.,
within 24 hours) or if the overdraft is only for a nominal amount (
e.g.,
$5 or $10). Further, these terms and conditions also limit the number of overdrafts that will be permitted in a given month and the amount by which the account balance can go negative, and contain “cooling off” periods after a consumer has incurred more than a certain number of overdrafts. During the cooling off period, the consumer is typically prohibited from using the overdraft service.
78
See
CFSI Prepaid Industry Scorecard (noting that only two in a survey of 18 GPR programs representing 25% of the market currently offers an opt-in overdraft service); CFPB Overdraft Whitepaper, at 14 (summarizing data showing that most banks and credit unions offer opt-in overdraft programs). Apart from actual overdraft programs, some prepaid programs, according to their terms and conditions, reserve the right to impose a fee for a negative balance on a prepaid account. (These programs' agreements typically state that the cardholder is not permitted to spend beyond the balance in the prepaid account, but if circumstances were to occur that cause the balance to go negative, a fee will or may be imposed. Some agreements state that repeated attempts to spend beyond the card balance will or may result in the prepaid account being closed). Roughly 10 percent of reviewed agreements noted such a charge.
79
Bureau staff determined the median figure for checking account overdraft fees through an analysis of the overdraft fees charged by the largest 50 U.S. banks ranked by consumer checking balances.
With respect to the issue of fees, revenue from overdraft services does not appear to have significantly influenced the pricing structure of prepaid products in the same way that overdraft services have influenced traditional checking accounts. Indeed, as discussed above, overdraft services offered in connection with prepaid products are relatively rare, and fees are relatively modest compared to similar fees associated with checking account overdraft programs. As discussed in greater detail in the section-by-section analysis below, as a result of several regulatory exemptions discussed below, the Bureau believes that checking account overdraft programs have evolved from courtesy programs under which financial institutions would decide on a manual, ad hoc basis to cover particular transactions and help consumers avoid negative consequences to automated programs that are the source of as much as two-thirds of financial institutions' deposit account revenue.
80
As a result, depository institutions and credit unions have developed checking accounts to have low (or sometimes no) up-front costs, to add services such as online bill pay (including not only electronic payments through the ACH network but also manual generation of checks authorized through the bank or credit union's on-line bill pay portal) at no additional cost, and to rely on “back end” fees such as per-transaction overdraft fees and NSF fees to maintain profitability. While some prepaid products may also have low or no upfront fees associated with them, the Bureau believes that this is largely due to the fact that as a general matter, fixed costs for prepaid products are substantially lower than similar costs for many checking accounts.
81
Moreover, financial institutions that issue prepaid accounts typically do not earn their revenue from “back-end” overdraft fees or NSF fees. Instead, they earn revenue from other types of fees, such as ATM fees, and interchange fees collected from use of a prepaid account on a payment network.
82
80
According to information supplied to the Bureau as part of its large bank overdraft study and reported in its Overdraft White Paper, overdraft and NSF-related fees from consumer checking accounts constituted 61 percent of consumer and 37 percent of total deposit account service charges earned by study banks in 2011. If aggregate study bank fee revenue ratios could be extrapolated to all FDIC-insured institutions, this would imply the banking industry earned roughly $12.6 billion in consumer NSF and overdraft fees in 2011.
See
CFPB Overdraft White Paper, at 14-15.
81
See
Cathy Corby Parker,
Is “What's Old New Again” for Financial Institutions in Prepaid?
(Aug. 2012),
available at https://www.aba.com/Tools/Offers/Documents/What's%20Old%20Is%20New%20Again%20White%20Paper.pdf
.
82
For example, in 2013 one major program manager derived approximately 32 percent of its operating revenue from cash-reload fees and 30 percent from interchange fees.
See
Green Dot Corp., 2013 Annual Report, at 30 (2014) available at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=235286&p=irol-reportsAnnual
.
As discussed in greater detail below, certain prepaid products, such as payroll card accounts and prepaid accounts that receive Federal payments, must comply with Regulation E's overdraft provisions. However, because many prepaid products are not now currently subject to Regulation E, they may not be required to comply with its provisions specific to overdraft services. Nonetheless, the Bureau understands that program managers of prepaid products with overdraft services or credit features have structured their products to comply with Regulation E's rules regarding overdraft services. Specifically, the Bureau understands that overdraft programs on GPR cards and payroll card accounts typically provide a disclosure similar to Model Form A-9 in appendix A to Regulation E.
83
This model form contains disclosures that require a consumer to opt-in to the overdraft service before a financial institution may charge the consumer a fee for a point-of-sale debit or ATM transaction that results in an overdraft of a consumer's account.
84
83
The Bureau understands that prepaid product providers that offer overdraft services typically do so with respect to both their GPR cards and payroll card accounts, to the extent they offer both products.
84
The Bureau found in its Study of Prepaid Account Agreements that some programs' agreements state that while they do not offer formal overdraft services, they will impose negative balance or other similar fees for transactions that may take an account negative despite generally not permitting such activity.
See
Study of Prepaid Account Agreements, at 24-25. The Bureau does not believe such fees are typically charged.
The Bureau understands that prepaid products that are associated with overdraft services or credit features generally offer such services only to those consumers that meet specified criteria, such as evidence of recurring deposits over a certain dollar amount. These recurring deposits presumably allow the financial institution to have some confidence that there will be incoming funds of adequate amounts to repay the debt. Further, the Bureau understands that the terms and conditions of prepaid product overdraft programs typically require that the next deposit of funds into the prepaid product—through either recurring deposits or cash reloads—be used to repay the overdraft, or they will claim such funds for the purpose of repaying the overdraft.
B. Existing Regulation of Prepaid Products
There are several Federal regulatory regimes, including those regarding consumer protection; receipt of Federal payments; interchange; and international money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes that apply to some or all types of prepaid products. In addition to EFTA, its implementing regulation, Regulation E, and related guidance, other relevant regulations include Treasury's Financial Management Service's rule on the receipt of Federal payments on prepaid cards;
85
the Board's Regulation II on debit card interchange and routing (12 CFR part 235); and FinCEN's prepaid access rule.
86
85
75 FR 80335 (Dec. 22, 2010).
86
76 FR 45403 (July 29, 2011).
Prudential regulators have also issued guidance about the application of their regulations to prepaid products, program managers, and financial institutions that issue prepaid products. For example, the FDIC has issued guidance regarding pass-through deposit insurance for prepaid accounts.
87
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has published a guidance bulletin to provide guidance to national banks for assessing and managing the risks associated with prepaid access programs.
88
However, as
discussed below, the Bureau believes that there are gaps in the existing Federal regulatory regimes that cause certain prepaid products not to receive full consumer protections, in particular under Regulation E. In addition to Federal regulations that apply to prepaid products, the Bureau also discusses below some State consumer protection laws and other regulations specific to prepaid products.
87
FDIC General Counsel Opinion No. 8, Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, 73 FR 67155, 67157 (Nov. 13, 2008) (FDIC 2008 General Counsel Opinion).
88
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, OCC Bulletin 2011-27,
Prepaid Access Programs, Risk Management Guidance and Sound Practices
(June 28, 2011),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2011/bulletin-2011-27.html
.
1. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Related Provisions in Regulation E Core Provisions of EFTA and Regulation E
Congress enacted EFTA in 1978 with the purpose of “provid[ing] a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems.” However, EFTA's primary objective is “the provision of individual consumer rights.”
89
Congress also empowered the Board to promulgate regulations implementing EFTA. EFTA section 904(a). With the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), authority to implement most of EFTA transferred to the Bureau.
90
See
Dodd-Frank Act sections 1061(b) and 1084; 12 U.S.C. 5581(b); 15 U.S.C. 1693a
et seq.
89
See
Public Law 95-630; 92 Stat. 3728 (1978).
90
Public Law 111-203, section 1084, 124 Stat. 2081 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1693).
The regulations first promulgated by the Board to implement EFTA now reside in subpart A of Regulation E, 12 CFR part 1005.
91
These rules provide a broad suite of protections to consumers who make electronic fund transfers (EFTs). An EFT is any transfer of funds initiated through an electronic terminal, telephone, computer, or magnetic tape for the purpose of ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to debit or credit a consumer's account. § 1005.3(b)(1). Regulation E also provides protections for accounts from which consumers can make EFTs. In its initial rulemaking to implement EFTA, the Board developed a broad definition of “account,” which closely mirrored the definition of “account” in EFTA.
92
The definition provides that, subject to certain specific exceptions, an account is a demand deposit (checking), savings, or other consumer asset account (other than an occasional or incidental credit balance in a credit plan) held directly or indirectly by a financial institution and established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. § 1005.2(b)(1).
91
These provisions were originally adopted as 12 CFR part 205 but, upon transfer of authority in the Dodd-Frank Act to implement Regulation E to the Bureau were renumbered as 12 CFR part 1005. 76 FR 81020 (Dec. 27, 2011). Unless otherwise noted, historical provisions noted described as residing in 12 CFR part 1005 originally were contained in 12 CFR part 205.
92
44 FR 18468, 18480 (Mar. 28, 1979).
For covered accounts, Regulation E mandates that consumers receive certain initial disclosures, in writing and in a form that the consumer can keep. § 1005.4(a)(1). As applicable, the initial disclosures must include, among other things, disclosures regarding a consumer's liability for unauthorized EFTs, an error resolution notice, contact information for the financial institution providing the account, the types of transfers a consumer may make and any limitations on the frequency and dollar amount of transfers, and the fees associated with making EFTs.
See generally
§ 1005.7(b). Regulation E also sets forth substantive provisions on error resolution and impose limits on a consumer's liability for unauthorized EFTs.
See
§§ 1005.6 and 1005.11. Moreover, Regulation E contains, among other things, provisions specific to periodic statements that generally must be provided in writing (§ 1005.9(b)), the issuance of access devices (§ 1005.5),
93
preauthorized EFTs and compulsory use (§ 1005.10), requirements for overdraft services (§ 1005.17), and ATM disclosures (§ 1005.16).
93
An access device is a card, code, or other means of access to a consumer's account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the consumer to initiate EFTs. § 1005.2(a)(1).
As discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Act transferred authority to implement most of EFTA from the Board to the Bureau. Since assuming the transferred authority, the Bureau has amended Regulation E in two substantive respects. First, as discussed in more detail in the section-by-section analysis below, the Bureau added consumer protections to Regulation E for certain international fund transfers. 12 CFR 1005.30
et seq.
Additionally, the Bureau amended Regulation E with respect to certain rules pertaining to ATM fee notices.
94
However, before authority transferred from the Board to the Bureau, the Board had revised Regulation E on multiple occasions to add, among other things, protections for products used for the electronic distribution of government benefits, payroll card accounts, gift cards, and gift certificates. The Board's amendments to Regulation E to expand coverage to these additional account types are discussed below.
94
78 FR 18221 (Mar. 26, 2013).
Amendments to Regulation E Regarding Additional Account Types
In 1994, the Board amended Regulation E to extend Regulation E's protections to accounts used for the electronic distribution of government benefits in what was then 12 CFR 205.15 (1994 EBT Rule).
95
After the Board finalized the 1994 EBT Rule, Congress limited the application of EFTA and Regulation E with respect to State and local electronic benefit transfer programs to only those programs that are “non-needs tested,” when it enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, a comprehensive welfare reform law.
96
95
59 FR 10678 (Mar. 7, 1994).
96
Public Law 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
The enactment of the statute necessitated a change to the 1994 EBT Rule to exempt needs-tested government benefit programs established or administered under State or local law (
e.g.,
benefits such as those provided under SNAP and the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program). As the Board explained at the time, the revision to EFTA was “enacted by the Congress at the urging of State officials, who expressed concern about the costs of compliance with EFTA and Regulation E. In particular, the States believed that EFTA provisions limiting a recipient's liability for unauthorized transfers could raise serious budgetary problems at the [S]tate level.”
97
As a result, the Board ultimately adopted a rule exempting EBT programs established or administered by State or local government agencies from Regulation E. However, all accounts used to distribute benefits for Federally-administered programs (including Federal needs-tested programs) and non-needs tested State and local government benefit programs, such as employment-related ones, remained covered by Regulation E.
98
97
62 FR 3242, 3243 (Jan. 22, 1997).
98
62 FR 43467 (Aug. 14, 1997).
When the Board resumed rulemaking after enactment of the welfare reform legislation, it also took notice that prepaid cards (at the time referred to as stored-value cards) were beginning to be used by more consumers. The Board sought comment on whether to adopt rules specific to prepaid financial products (other than government benefit accounts) pursuant to its authority under EFTA (1996 Stored-Value Proposal).
99
The Board explained that the facts, as it understood them, supported a determination to include stored-value accounts as accounts under Regulation E. Among the provisions considered in the 1996 Stored-Value Proposal, the Board proposed to extend Regulation E's error resolution
provisions to stored-value accounts and provide a periodic statement alternative for such accounts similar to what was adopted for government benefit cards in the 1994 EBT Rule. In the proposal, the Board noted pending legislation in Congress that would address stored-value cards. H.R. 2520, 104th Cong., § 443; S. 650, 104th Cong., § 601 (1995).
99
61 FR 19696 (May 2, 1996).
Ultimately, Congress directed the Board to conduct a study to evaluate whether provisions of EFTA could be applied to stored-value products without adversely affecting the cost, development, and operation of such products.
100
The Board concluded in a March 1997 report that:
100
Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
[G]iven the limited experience [at that time] with electronic stored-value products to date, it is difficult to predict whether the benefits to consumers from any particular Regulation E provision would outweigh the corresponding costs of compliance. . . . [F]ull application of Regulation E would likely impose substantial operating and opportunity costs of compliance. Partial application of Regulation E would be less burdensome than full application but, depending on the details, could still impose significant operating and opportunity costs for some electronic stored-value products.
101
101
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Report to Congress on the Application of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to Electronic Stored-Value Products,
at 75 (Mar. 1997),
available at http://www.Federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/efta_rpt.pdf
. Notably, the products examined by the Board in this report differ from most prepaid products in use today.
The Board ultimately did not finalize the 1996 Stored-Value Proposal. In the report, it concluded that the market was evolving rapidly and was not yet ripe for regulation.
102
102
Id.
The Board next considered changes to Regulation E with respect to prepaid products in 2004, when it proposed amendments to Regulation E to extend it to payroll card accounts established by an employer for providing an employee's compensation on a regular basis.
103
The Board concluded that extending a modified form of Regulation E protections was warranted for payroll card accounts because they are often used as account substitutes. However, as discussed in greater detail below, yet again, the Board decided not to extend such protections to other prepaid products such as general-use prepaid cards, because it concluded that consumers used such cards in many different ways.
103
69 FR 55996 (Sept. 17, 2004).
In its final rule, the Board included payroll card accounts within the definition of account in § 1005.2(b) (Payroll Card Rule).
104
The Board also established provisions in Regulation E specific to payroll card accounts that modified certain Regulation E provisions as the Board deemed appropriate. As noted above, Regulation E generally requires financial institutions to provide periodic statements in writing.
See
§ 1005.9(b). The Board allowed providers of payroll card accounts to avoid this requirement, if the institution makes available to the consumer: (1) The account balance, through a readily available telephone line; (2) an electronic history of account transactions that covers at least 60 days (including all the information required in periodic statements by § 1005.9(b)); and (3) a written history of account transactions that is provided promptly in response to an oral or written request and that covers at least 60 days (including all the information required in periodic statements by § 1005.9(b)).
See
§ 1005.18(b). Related provisions in § 1005.18(c) modify other requirements of Regulation E with respect to payroll card accounts. They include modification related to the requirements for initial disclosures, annual error resolution notices (otherwise required by § 1005.8(b)), and error resolution and limitations on liability, in recognition of the modified periodic statement requirement.
104
71 FR 51437, 51438 (Aug. 30, 2006).
As noted above, in adopting the Payroll Card Rule, the Board considered whether also to include GPR cards within Regulation E. The Board ultimately concluded that, as of 2006, it was premature to do so. In its view of the marketplace at that time, the Board noted that consumers did not often use other prepaid products such as general-use prepaid cards in the same way that they used payroll card accounts. The Board stated that “[F]or payroll card accounts that are established through an employer, there is a greater likelihood [than for general-use prepaid cards] that the account will serve as a consumer's principal transaction account and hold significant funds for an extended period of time.”
105
105
71 FR 51437, 51441 (Aug 30, 2006).
Similarly, in an earlier interim final rule that established that payroll card accounts are covered accounts under Regulation E, the Board expressed its belief that to the extent that consumers use general-use prepaid cards like gift cards, “consumers would derive little benefit from receiving full Regulation E protections for a card that may only be used on a limited, short-term basis and which may hold minimal funds, while the costs of providing Regulation E initial disclosures, periodic statements, and error resolution rights would be quite significant for the issuer.”
106
It also noted that GPR cards are “generally designed to make one-time or a limited number of payments to consumers and are not intended to be used on a long-term basis.”
107
106
71 FR 1473, 1475 (Jan. 10, 2006).
107
Id.
In 2009, Congress enacted the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act).
108
Among other provisions, the Credit CARD Act instructed the Board to promulgate new rules regarding expiration dates and dormancy or inactivity fees for gift cards, gift certificates, and certain types of general-use prepaid cards that are marketed or labeled as gift cards. The statute generally excluded general-use prepaid cards that are reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate. Credit CARD Act section 401; EFTA section 915. In 2010, the Board issued the resulting implementing regulations, set forth in § 1005.20 of current Regulation E (Gift Card Rule).
109
108
Public Law 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
109
75 FR 16580 (Apr. 1, 2010).
Following the Credit CARD Act, the Gift Card Rule only covers certain general-use prepaid cards. Under the rule, covered general-use prepaid cards are those that are non-reloadable cards or that are reloadable and marketed or sold as a gift card.
See
§ 1005.20(a)(3) (definition of a “general-use prepaid card”). Moreover, like the statute, the Gift Card Rule excludes those general-use prepaid cards that are reloadable and not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate. § 1005.20(b)(2). For covered prepaid products, the Gift Card Rule requires the disclosure of certain fees and restricts a person's ability to impose dormancy, inactivity, or service fees for certain prepaid products, primarily gift cards. § 1005.20(d) and (f). Additionally, among other things, the Gift Card Rule generally prohibits the sale or issuance of covered prepaid products that have an expiration date of less than five years. § 1005.20(e). In adopting the Gift Card Rule, the Board did not apply the majority of Regulation E's protections, including provisions regarding periodic statements, liability for unauthorized transactions, and error resolution to covered prepaid products. However, Congress explicitly gave the Board the authority to do so. Credit CARD Act section 401; EFTA section 915(d)(1).
2. FMS Regulations of the Treasury Department
The Treasury Financial Management Service (FMS), now part of Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service, manages all Federal payments. In 2010, it promulgated an interim final rule that permitted delivery of Federal payment to prepaid cards (the FMS Rule).
110
Among other things, the FMS Rule provides that for a prepaid card to be eligible to receive Federal payments, the card account must be held at an insured financial institution. Additionally, the card account must be set up to meet the requirements for FDIC or NCUSIF pass-through deposit or share insurance, as discussed in greater detail below. Additionally, the card account must not have an attached line of credit or loan feature that triggers automatic repayment from the card account. Moreover, the card account issuer must comply with all of the requirements, and provide the cardholder with all of the consumer protections, that apply to payroll card accounts under Regulation E. 31 CFR 210(b)(5)(i).
110
75 FR 80335 (Dec. 22, 2010). Prior to the effective date of the FMS Rule, prepaid cards (other than those issued under FMS-established programs) were not eligible to receive Federal payments.
Based on Bureau outreach including discussions with industry participants, comment letters received in response to the Prepaid ANPR,
111
as well as a review of numerous prepaid products' terms and conditions, discussed in more detail below, the Bureau believes that many providers currently comply with the FMS Rule for all of their prepaid products, including those not receiving Federal payments. The Bureau further believes that to comply with the FMS Rule, many prepaid product providers had to adjust their systems and programs.
112
For example, to the extent that a provider did not maintain procedures for resolving errors with respect to the prepaid products it offered (or maintained procedures different from what Regulation E requires), the provider had to either adjust its processes to provide these protections or ensure that their prepaid products do not receive Federal payments.
111
77 FR 30923 (May 24, 2012).
112
In issuing the FMS Rule, Treasury noted that it:
[B]elieves that a number of prepaid cards already provide most, though not necessarily all, of the payroll card protections to cardholders. It is our expectation that some issuers of existing prepaid cards will choose to modify the terms and conditions of the card accounts to include all of the payroll card protections to cardholders, so that their cards will be eligible to receive Federal payments. We also anticipate that as new prepaid card programs are developed, issuers seeking to make the cards available to Federal payment recipients will structure their cards to incorporate Regulation E's payroll card protections.
75 FR 80335, 80338 (Dec. 22, 2010).
3. Pass-Through Deposit Insurance
The FDIC, among other things, protects funds placed by depositors in insured depository institutions. FDIC insurance protects deposit accounts, including checking and savings accounts, money market deposit accounts and certificates of deposit against loss up to $250,000 per depositor, per insured depository institution, within each account ownership category (
e.g.,
for individual owners, co-owners, trust beneficiaries, and the like).
113
The NCUSIF plays a similar role for insured credit unions.
114
113
See, e.g., http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis/
.
114
See, e.g., http://www.ncua.gov/DataApps/Pages/SI-NCUA.aspx
.
As noted above, the Bureau understands that funds loaded onto prepaid products are typically held in pooled accounts at depository institutions or credit unions. Both the FDIC and NCUA have special rules, discussed below, regarding how such accounts may qualify for, as applicable, FDIC or NCUSIF pass-through insurance. The Bureau believes that provided these requirements are met, most prepaid products are eligible for FDIC (or NCUSIF) pass-through deposit (or share) insurance.
With respect to the FDIC's rules for determining the ownership of deposits placed at insured depository institutions by agents or custodians of the true holder of the funds, its 2008 General Counsel Opinion No. 8 provides that FDIC's deposit insurance coverage will “pass through” the custodian to the underlying individual owners of the deposits in the event of failure of an insured depository institution, provided that three specific criteria are met. Those criteria are as follows. First, the account records of the insured depository institution must disclose the existence of the agency or custodial relationship. This requirement can be satisfied by opening the account under a title such as the following: “ABC Company as Custodian for Cardholders.” Second, the records of the insured depository institution or records maintained by the custodian or other party must disclose the identities of the actual owners and the amount owned by each such owner. Third, the funds in the account actually must be owned (under the agreements among the parties or applicable law) by the purported owners and not by the custodian (or other party).
115
115
FDIC General Counsel Opinion No. 8,
Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other Nontraditional Access Mechanisms,
73 FR 67155, 67157 (Nov. 13, 2008), internal citations omitted.
The NCUA's regulations similarly state that:
[I]f the account records of an insured credit union disclose the existence of a relationship which may provide a basis for additional insurance, the details of the relationship and the interest of other parties in the account must be ascertainable either from the records of the credit union or the records of the member maintained in good faith and in the regular course of business.
12 CFR 745.2(c)(2). NCUA regulations governing share insurance for specific types of accounts provide additional details. For example, provisions governing retirement and other employee benefit plan accounts specifically address pass-through insurance, stating that “[a]ny shares of an employee benefit plan in an insured credit union shall be insured on a `pass-through' basis, in the amount of up to the [Standard Maximum Share Insurance Amount] for the non-contingent interest of each plan participant, in accordance with § 745.2 of this part.” 12 CFR 745.9-2(a)
; see also, e.g.,
12 CFR 745.3, 745.4, 745.5, 745.8, 745.9-1.
4. Interchange and the Board's Regulation II
Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act added new section 920 to EFTA regarding debit card interchange and amended EFTA section 904(a) to give the Board sole authority to prescribe rules to carry out the purposes of section 920.
116
It contains several provisions related to debit cards and electronic debit transactions. EFTA section 920(a)(2) requires that the amount of any interchange fee that an issuer of debit cards receives or charges with respect to an electronic debit transaction be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction. It directs the Board to establish standards for assessing whether the amount of any interchange fee is reasonable and
proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer. However, as discussed below, there are a few exemptions from the limitation on interchange fees that an issuer may receive from or charge to a merchant.
116
The amendment is known as “The Durbin Amendment,” after U.S. Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois, who was the amendment's chief sponsor.
See, e.g.,
David Morrison,
Durbin Amendment Lawsuit Unresolved as 2013 Winds Down,
Credit Union Times Magazine, Dec. 18, 2013,
available at
http://www.cutimes.com/2013/12/18/durbin-amendment-lawsuit-unresolved-as-2013-winds
;
see also
Zhu Wang,
Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation: Some Assessments and Considerations,
98 Econ. Q. 159 (2012)
available at
https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2012/q3/pdf/wang.pdf
.
EFTA section 920(c) sets forth definitions that apply solely for the purposes of EFTA section 920. Section 920(c)(5) defines an electronic debit transaction as “a transaction in which a person uses a debit card.” Additionally, section 920(c)(2) defines debit card to include “a general-use prepaid card, as that term is defined in section 915(a)(2)(A),” which is the Credit CARD Act's definition of general-use prepaid card. Accordingly, interchange transaction fees for transactions made with general-use prepaid cards (as defined under the Credit CARD Act) would be subject to the debit card interchange fee restrictions set forth in EFTA section 920(a).
As noted above, EFTA section 920(a) provides certain exemptions from the interchange fee limitations for certain cards. Section 920(a)(7)(A) provides exemptions from the fee restrictions for general-use prepaid (and debit) cards provided to a consumer pursuant to government-administered payment programs and for certain general purpose reloadable prepaid cards. In addition, there is a blanket exemption from the interchange fee limitations for cards of issuers with total assets of less than $10 billion. EFTA section 920(a)(6). Thus, interchange fees for transactions made with these prepaid cards meeting the criteria for the statutory exemptions are generally not subject to the fee restrictions of EFTA section 920(a). However, EFTA section 920(a)(7)(B) provides that after July 21, 2012, interchange fees for transactions made with prepaid cards that receive the exemption set forth in EFTA section 920(a)(7)(A) are nonetheless limited by the Act's interchange fee restrictions if certain fees such as an overdraft fee may be charged with respect to the card. The exemption for interchange fees of cards of issuers with total assets below $10 billion is not subject to section 920(a)(7)(B). In July 2011, the Board promulgated Regulation II (12 CFR part 235) to implement EFTA section 920. The provisions regarding debit card interchange fee restrictions became effective as of October 1 of that year.
117
117
76 FR 43394 (July 20, 2011); 76 FR 43478 (July 20, 2011);
amended by
77 FR 46258 (Aug. 3, 2012).
5. FinCEN Rules
FinCEN also regulates prepaid products pursuant to its mission, which it describes as to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities. As noted above, it has issued regulations to regulate certain prepaid products. In 2011, pursuant to a mandate under the Credit CARD Act, FinCEN published a final rule to amend BSA regulations applicable to money services businesses with respect to stored value or “prepaid access” (FinCEN's Prepaid Access Rule).
118
Subject to certain specific exemptions, a “prepaid program” is defined as an “arrangement under which one or more persons acting together provide(s) prepaid access.” 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(4)(iii). The term “prepaid access” is defined as “access to funds or the value of funds that have been paid in advance and can be retrieved or transferred at some point in the future through an electronic device or vehicle, such as a card, code, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, or personal identification.” 31 CFR 1010.100(ww).
118
76 FR 45403 (July 29, 2011).
FinCEN's Prepaid Access Rule established a comprehensive approach toward regulating prepaid access. Among other things, the Rule requires each provider or seller of prepaid access to: (1) File suspicious activity reports; (2) collect and retain certain customer and transactional information; and (3) maintain an anti-money laundering program. These BSA requirements are similar to those that apply to other categories of money services businesses.
119
119
76 FR 45403, 45419 (July 29, 2011).
6. State Laws
Many States have passed consumer protection laws or other rules to regulate prepaid products in general, and in particular, certain types of prepaid products such as government benefits cards. Illinois is an example of a State that has issued regulations applicable to prepaid products in general. In 2013, Illinois imposed pre-acquisition, on-card and at-the-time-of-purchase disclosure requirements on “general-use reloadable prepaid cards.”
120
IL SB 1829 (2013), Public Act 098-0545,
codified at
205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 616/10 and 616/46. California is an example of a State that has enacted laws on specific types of prepaid products. In 2013, California enacted a law that extended protections similar to the FMS Rule to prepaid products receiving unemployment benefits and basic-needs benefits from the State of California. CA A 1820 (2013), ch. 557,
codified at
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1339.1 and Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11006.2. In 2014, California enacted another law extending similar protections to cards used for distribution of child support payments. CA A 2252 (2014), ch. 180,
codified at
Cal. Fam. Code § 17325.
120
The Illinois law defines “general use reloadable card” as:
[A] card, code, or other access device that is: (1) Issued on a prepaid basis primarily for personal, family, or household purposes to a consumer in a specified amount in exchange for payment; (2) issued under an agreement containing terms and conditions that permit funds to be added to the card, code, or other device after the initial purchase or issuance, including a temporary non-reloadable card issued solely in connection with a general use reloadable card, code, or other device; and (3) not marketed or labeled as a gift card or gift certificate; and (4) redeemable upon presentation at multiple, unaffiliated merchants for goods or services or usable at automated teller machines.
205 ILCS 616/10.
Further, the Bureau understands that many States have money transmitter laws that may apply to prepaid product providers. The laws vary by State but generally require companies to be licensed and to post a surety bond to cover accountholder losses, if the providers become insolvent. Most States further require that the companies hold high-grade investments to back the money in customer accounts. However, the Bureau also understands that States vary in the amount of their oversight of companies licensed under the money transmitter laws, and many may not have streamlined processes to pay out funds in the event a prepaid product provider were to file for bankruptcy protection.
121
121
See, e.g.,
Pew Charitable Trusts,
Imperfect Protection—Using Money Transmitter Laws to Insure Prepaid Cards
(Mar. 2013).
C. Existing Regulation of Credit Products and Overdraft Services Offered in Connection With Transaction Accounts
In this rulemaking, the Bureau has considered whether and to what extent it should regulate credit features offered in connection with prepaid accounts. In approaching this question, the Bureau is conscious of the regulatory framework that has developed, including for credit products subject to Regulation Z and overdraft services on traditional deposit accounts that are exempt from Regulation Z but subject to certain parts of Regulation E. On several occasions, Federal regulators have addressed deposit account overdraft services in various rulemakings including those conducted pursuant to Regulations E and Z as well as in public guidance documents. The relevant actions are discussed below.
1. Open-End (Not Home-Secured) Credit Products Under the Truth in Lending Act and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
Credit products are generally subject to the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, although the application of specific provisions of the statute and regulation depends on the attributes of the particular credit product. In 1968, Congress enacted TILA to promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and cost and to provide standardized disclosures. Congress has revised TILA several times and its purpose now is to “assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. 1601(a). TILA thus defined credit broadly to mean the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or incur debt and defer its payment. 15 U.S.C. 1602(f).
122
122
The term creditor in Regulation Z generally means a person who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in more than four installments (not including a down payment), and to whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there is no note or contract.
See
§ 1026.2(a)(17)(i).
Congress has amended TILA on several occasions to provide consumers of certain types of credit products with additional protections. The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA),
123
enacted in 1974, added a number of substantive protections for consumers who use open-end credit
124
or use credit cards subject to TILA. Public Law 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974). For example, the FCBA increased rights and remedies for consumers who assert billing errors and required a minimum 14-day grace period for payments for creditors that offer a grace period, prompt re-crediting of refunds, and refunds of credit balances. Credit cards are also subject to these requirements,
125
but also to a broad range of additional protections. Regulation Z defines the term “credit card” to mean any card, plate, or other single credit device that may be used from time to time to obtain credit.
See
§ 1026.2(a)(15)(i). A charge card is a credit card on an account for which no periodic rate is used to compute a finance charge.
See
§ 1026.2(a)(15)(iii). Cognizant that many financial institutions issue credit cards to cardholders with whom they also have a deposit account relationship, Congress in the FCBA also restricted the right of such institutions from taking funds out of a deposit account to satisfy their credit card claims.
126
In 1988, Congress amended TILA through the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act. These revisions required issuers of credit cards and charge cards to provide certain disclosures at the time of application and solicitation.
123
Public Law 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974).
124
As discussed in greater detail in the section-by-section analysis of § 1026.2(a)(20), open-end credit exists where there is a plan in which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; the creditor may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and the amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the term of the plan (up to any limit set by the creditor) is generally made available (even if not disclosed) to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid. § 1026.2(a)(20). Closed-end credit is credit that does not meet the definition of open-end credit. § 1026.2(a)(10).
125
Indeed, credit cards are subject to specialized and heightened disclosure requirements in advertisements, at the time of account opening, periodically for each billing cycle (
i.e.,
periodic statements), and when certain terms of the account change. In addition, for credit card accounts disclosures generally are required on or with applications or solicitations. Among the required disclosures for credit cards on or with an application or solicitation is a tabular disclosure setting forth seven different disclosures. § 1026.60. This “Schumer box” must be similar to model forms in Regulation Z appendix G-10 and must set forth certain fees, interest rates, transaction charges, and other required charges.
126
See Gardner
v.
Montgomery County Teachers Fed. Credit Union,
864 F.Supp.2d (D. Md. 2012) (providing an overview of the FCBA's no offset provision).
In 2009, Congress enhanced protections for credit cards in the Credit CARD Act, which it enacted to “establish fair and transparent practices related to the extension of credit” in the credit card market.
127
The Credit CARD Act regulates both the underwriting and pricing of credit card accounts. Specifically, it prohibits credit card issuers from extending credit without assessing the consumer's ability to pay and imposes special rules regarding the extension of credit to persons under the age of 21 and to college students. The Credit CARD Act also restricts the fees that an issuer can charge during the first year after an account is opened, and limits the instances and the amount of such fees in which issuers can charge “back-end” penalty fees when a consumer makes a late payment or exceeds his or her credit limit. The CARD Act also restricts the circumstances under which issuers can increase interest rates on credit cards and establishes procedures for doing so. The Board generally implemented these provisions in subpart G of Regulation Z. Thus, while all open-end (not home-secured) credit plans receive some of TILA's protections, generally only open-end (not home-secured) credit plans that are accessed by credit cards receive the additional protections of the Credit CARD Act.
127
Public Law 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
Although EFTA does not generally focus on credit issues, Congress provided one important protection in that statute as well. Known as the compulsory use provision, it provides that no person may “condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer's repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers.” EFTA section 913(1).
128
(A preauthorized electronic fund transfer is an electronic fund transfer authorized in advance to recur at substantially regular intervals, such as a recurring direct deposit or ACH debit.) Where applicable, the compulsory use provision thus prevents a creditor from requiring a particular form of payment, such as a recurring ACH debit to another account, as a form of repayment of the credit. This provides consumers with the ability to control how and when they repay credit and does not allow a creditor to insist on a particular form of repayment. Thus, as implemented in Regulations Z and E, some of these protections are broadly applicable to credit generally while others are specific to particular credit products. For example, open-end lines of credit that consumers can link to a deposit account to pull funds when the account has insufficient funds are subject to certain disclosure requirements under Regulation Z, certain provisions of the FCBA, and the compulsory use provision under Regulation E (although compulsory use exempts overdraft lines of credit).
128
As implemented in Regulation E, § 1005.10(e)(1), this provision contains an exception for overdraft credit plans: “No financial institution or other person may condition an extension of credit to a consumer on the consumer's repayment by preauthorized electronic fund transfers, except for credit extended under an overdraft credit plan or extended to maintain a specified minimum balance in the consumer's account.”
2. Federal Regulatory Treatment of Deposit Account Overdraft Services
A separate regulatory regime has evolved over the years with regard to treatment of overdraft services, which started as courtesy programs under which financial institutions would decide on a manual, ad hoc basis to cover particular transactions for which a consumer lacked funds in their deposit account rather than to return the transactions and subject consumers to a
not-sufficient-funds (NSF) fee, merchant fees, and other negative consequences from bounced checks. Although Congress did not exempt overdraft services or similar programs offered in connection with deposit accounts from TILA, the Board in issuing Regulation Z in 1969 carved financial institutions' “bounce-protection” programs out of the new regulation.
129
See, e.g.,
§ 1026.4(c)(3) (excluding charges imposed by a financial institution for paying items that overdraw an account from the definition of “finance charge,” unless the payment of such items and the imposition of the charge were previously agreed upon in writing); § 1026.4(b)(2).
130
The Board distinguished between “bounce protection programs” where there is no written agreement to pay items that overdraw the account, and more formal, line-of-credit overdraft programs where there is a written agreement to pay overdrafts. Because financial institutions reserved discretion to pay particular overdrafts and exercised that discretion on an ad hoc basis, the Board exempted informal bounce protection programs but subjected overdraft lines of credit to Regulation Z when the creditor imposes a finance charge or the line of credit is accessed by a debit card.
131
129
34 FR 2002 (Feb. 11, 1969).
130
Section 1026.4(b)(2) provides that any charge imposed on a checking or other transaction account is an example of a finance charge only to the extent that the charge exceeds the charge for a similar account without a credit feature.
131
Later in the 1970s, the Board added provisions in Regulation Z specifically addressing credit cards. 40 FR 43200 (Sept. 19, 1975). The Board subsequently carved debit cards, where there is no agreement to extend credit, out of the definition of credit card. 46 FR 50288, 50293 (Oct. 9, 1981).
The Board revisited the exception of bounce protection programs from Regulation Z in 1981, in a rulemaking in which the Board implemented the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act.
132
In the related proposal, the Board considered adjusting its overdraft exemption to apply only to “inadvertent” overdrafts because, the Board stated, a charge imposed for honoring an instrument under any agreement between the institution and the consumer is a charge imposed for a credit extension and thus fits the general definition of a finance charge, regardless of whether the charge and the honoring of the check are reflected in a written agreement.
133
Ultimately, however, the Board made only a “few minor editorial changes” to the exception in § 1026.4(c)(3) from the definition of finance charge that applied to fees for paying items that overdraw an account where there is no written agreement to pay, concluding that it would exclude from Regulation Z “overdraft charges from the [definition of] finance charge unless there is an agreement in writing to pay items and impose a charge.”
134
132
Public Law 96-221, sec. 601, 94 Stat. 132; 45 FR 80648 (Dec. 5, 1980).
133
Id.
at 80657.
134
46 FR 20848, 20855 (Apr. 7, 1981).
The Board also took up the status of bounce protection programs in the early 1980s in connection with the enactment of EFTA. As noted above, EFTA's compulsory use provision generally prohibits financial institutions or other persons from conditioning the extension of credit on a consumer's repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers. The Board, however, exercised its EFTA section 904(c) exception authority to create an exception to the compulsory use provision for credit extended under an overdraft credit plan or extended to maintain a specified minimum balance in the consumer's account.
See
§ 1005.10(e)(1). In adopting this exception, the Board aligned Regulation E with its approach to overdraft in Regulation Z—it exempted overdraft services from rules otherwise applicable to credit products. The Board stated that “overdraft protection is a service that financial institutions have been providing to consumers at little or no extra cost beyond the cost of the protected account.”
135
135
46 FR 2972, 2973 (Jan. 13, 1981).
Overdraft services in the 1990s began to evolve away from the historical model of bounce protection programs in a number of ways. One major industry change was a shift away from manual ad hoc decision-making by financial institution employees to a system involving heavy reliance on automated programs to process transactions and to make overdraft decisions. A second was to impose higher overdraft fees. In addition, broader changes in payment transaction types also increased the impacts of these other changes on overdraft services. In particular, debit card use expanded dramatically, and financial institutions began extending overdraft services to debit card transactions. In the 1990s, many institutions expanded transactional capabilities by replacing consumers' ATM-only cards with debit cards that consumers could use to make electronic payments to merchants and service providers directly from their checking accounts using the major payment networks (and thus most merchants could accept them).
136
As a result, debit card transaction volumes grew quickly as payment networks that enable these transactions broadened. Acceptance by grocery stores, gas stations, fast food restaurants, and other retailers helped to drive the popularity of debit card payments across regional and global ATM networks (accessed by using a PIN). By the late 1990s, “signature debit” transaction volumes became the most common type of debit card transaction.
137
These debit cards offered acceptance at all merchants that honored payments from the major payment networks, such as internet retailers.
138
136
See
R. Borzekowski et al.,
Consumers' Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, and Price Response, at 2
(Apr. 2006)
available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200616/200616pap.pdf
(noting that, as of 2006, “Annual debit card transactions at the point of sale have been growing at over twenty percent per year since 1996 and now exceed credit card transactions.”). By 2006, debit card payment transaction volumes in the United States had exceeded both check and credit card payments, and from 2006 to 2011, the total volume of U.S. consumer debit card transactions nearly doubled.
137
Fumiko Hayashi, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
The New Debit Card Regulations: Initial Effects on Networks and Banks,
Econ. Rev., 4th quarter 2012, at 83 chart 2. With respect to “signature debit” transactions, a consumer does not use a PIN but instead typically signs a copy of a transaction receipt provided by the merchant in order to affirm the consumer's identity. For further information on the difference between signature-based and PIN-based card transactions,
see,
for example, the preamble of the Board's proposed rule to implement the Durbin amendment, 75 FR 81722, 81723 (Dec. 28, 2010).
138
See generally
CFPB Overdraft White Paper, at 11-17 (explaining growth of debit card transactions from consumers' deposit accounts)
available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf
.
As a result of these operational changes, overdraft services became a significant source of revenue for banks and credit unions as the volume of transactions involving checking accounts increased due primarily to the growth of debit cards.
139
Before debit card use grew, overdraft fees on check and ATM transactions formed a greater portion of deposit account overdrafts. Debit card transactions presented consumers with markedly more opportunities to incur an overdraft fee when making a purchase because of increased acceptance and use of debit cards for relatively small transactions (
e.g.,
fast food and grocery stores).
140
Over time, revenue from overdraft increased and began to influence significantly the overall cost structure for many deposit accounts, as providers began relying heavily on back-end pricing while eliminating or reducing front-end pricing (
i.e.,
free checking accounts) as discussed above.
141
139
CFPB Overdraft White Paper, at 16.
140
See
CFPB Overdraft White Paper, at 11-12.
141
See id.,
at 16-17.
As a result of the growth of debit card transactions and the changing landscape of deposit account overdraft services, Federal banking regulators expressed increasing concern about consumer protection issues and began a series of issuances and rulemakings. First, in September 2001, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released an interpretive letter expressing concern about overdraft protection services.
142
The letter noted that overdraft services are extensions of credit but that related fees may not be finance charges under Regulation Z. In declining to issue a “comfort letter” regarding an unnamed overdraft service, the OCC called attention to a number of troubling practices, including inadequate disclosure to consumers of the risk of harm from overdraft services and failure to properly help consumers who were using overdraft services as “a means of meeting regular obligations” to find more economical forms of credit.
143
142
Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 914,
3rd Party Program,
(Aug. 3, 2001)
available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/sep01/int914.pdf
.
143
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 914.
The Board also signaled concern with overdraft services in a number of rulemaking actions. In a 2002 proposal to amend Regulation Z with regard to the status of certain credit card-related fees and other issues, the Board noted that some overdraft services may not be all that different from overdraft lines of credit and requested comment on whether and how Regulation Z should be applied to banks' bounce-protection services, in light of the Regulation's exclusion of such services but inclusion of lines-of-credit where a finance charge is imposed or is accessed by a debit card.
144
The Board did not modify the Regulation Z exemptions when it issued final rules in 2003,
145
but proposed revisions to Regulation DD (which implements the Truth in Savings Act) and its commentary in 2004 to address concerns about the uniformity and adequacy of institutions' disclosure of overdraft fees generally and to address concerns about advertised automated overdraft services in particular.
146
The Board specifically noted that it was not proposing to cover overdraft services under TILA and Regulation Z, but that further consideration of the need for such coverage would be appropriate if consumer protection concerns about these overdraft services were to persist in the future.
147
When the Board finalized the Regulation DD proposal in 2005, it noted that it declined at that time to extend Regulation Z to overdraft services. In doing so, it noted that industry commenters were concerned about the cost of imposing Regulation Z requirements on deposit accounts and about the compliance burden of providing an APR calculated based on overdraft fees without corresponding benefits to consumers in better understanding the costs of credit. The Board also noted that some members of its Consumer Advisory Council believed that overdraft services are the functional equivalent of a traditional overdraft line of credit and thus should be subject to Regulation Z, but that financial institutions' historical practice of paying occasional overdrafts on an ad hoc basis should not be covered by Regulation Z. While not specifically addressing these concerns, the Board emphasized that its decision not to apply Regulation Z did not preclude future consideration regarding whether it was appropriate to extend Regulation Z to overdraft services.
148
144
67 FR 72618, 72620 (Dec. 6, 2002).
145
The March 2003 final rule preamble stated that “[t]he Board's staff is continuing to gather information on these services, which are not addressed in the final rule.” 68 FR 16185 (Apr. 3, 2003).
146
69 FR 31760 (June 7, 2004).
147
Id.
at 31761.
148
70 FR 29582, 29584-85 (May 24, 2005). In this 2005 rulemaking, the Board revised Regulation DD to address concerns about the uniformity and adequacy of information provided to consumers when they overdraw their deposit accounts. Among other things, the final rule required institutions that promote the payment of overdrafts in an advertisement to disclose on periodic statements, total fees imposed for paying overdrafts and total fees imposed for returning items unpaid on periodic statements, both for the statement period and the calendar year to date, and to include certain other disclosures in advertisements of overdraft services. Ultimately, in 2009, the Board expanded this provision to all institutions not just those that promote the payments of overdrafts.
See
74 FR 5584 (Jan. 29, 2009).
In February 2005 (prior to the Board having finalized the Regulation DD changes discussed above), the Federal banking agencies also issued joint guidance on overdraft programs in response to the increased availability and customer use of overdraft services (Joint Guidance).
149
The purpose of the Joint Guidance was to assist insured depository institutions in the responsible disclosure and administration of overdraft protection services. It grew out of concern that
149
70 FR 9127 (Feb. 24, 2005) (Joint Guidance)
available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-02-24/pdf/05-3499.pdf
.
See also
Office of Thrift Supervision Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs, 70 FR 8428 (Feb. 18, 2005).
[D]isclosure, and implementation of some overdraft protection programs, intended essentially as short-term credit facilities, are of concern [to the Federal banking agencies]. For example, some institutions have promoted this credit service in a manner that leads consumers to believe that it is a line of credit by informing consumers that their account includes an overdraft protection limit of a specified dollar amount without clearly disclosing the terms and conditions of the service, including how fees reduce overdraft protection dollar limits, and how the service differs from a line of credit.
150
150
70 FR 9127, 9129 (Feb. 24, 2005).
The Joint Guidance stated that “the existing regulatory exceptions [
i.e.,
exceptions in Regulation Z such that the Regulation does not apply] were created for the occasional payment of overdrafts, and as such could be reevaluated by the Board in the future, if necessary. Were the Board to address these issues more specifically, it would do so separately under its clear [TILA] authority.”
151
The Joint Guidance went on to state that “[w]hen overdrafts are paid, credit is extended. Overdraft protection programs may expose an institution to more credit risk (
e.g.,
higher delinquencies and losses) than overdraft lines of credit and other traditional overdraft protection options to the extent these programs lack individual account underwriting.”
152
This guidance remains in effect.
151
Id.
at 9128.
152
Id.
In the late 2000s as controversy regarding overdraft services continued to mount despite the increase in regulatory activity, Federal agencies began exploring various additional measures with regard to overdraft, including whether to require that consumers affirmatively opt in before being charged for overdraft services. First, in May 2008, the Board along with the National Credit Union Administration and the former Office of Thrift Supervision proposed to exercise their authority under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
153
to prohibit institutions from assessing any fees on a consumer's account in connection with an overdraft service, unless the consumer was given notice and the right to opt out of the service, and the consumer did not opt out.
154
At the same time, the Board issued a proposal under Regulation DD to expand disclosure requirements and revise periodic statement requirements to provide aggregate totals for overdraft fees and for returned item fees for the periodic statement period and year-to-date.
155
The Board finalized portions of
the Regulation DD proposal in January 2009.
156
In addition, although the three agencies did not finalize their FTC Act proposal, the Board ultimately adopted a similar opt-in requirement for ATM and point of sale transactions under Regulation E in late 2009.
153
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. 45.
See also
Federal Deposit Ins. Act section 8 (extending to the Board authority to take appropriate action when unfair or deceptive acts or practices are discovered). 12 U.S.C. 1818.
154
73 FR 28904 (May 19, 2008).
155
73 FR 28730 (May 19, 2008).
156
74 FR 5584 (Jan. 29, 2009). Specifically, this rule required, among other things, all depository institutions to disclose aggregate overdraft fees on periodic statements, and not solely institutions that promote the payment of overdrafts.
The overdraft opt-in rule in Regulation E applies to all accounts covered by Regulation E, including payroll card accounts. In addressing overdraft services for the first time as a feature of deposit accounts in Regulation E,
157
the Board concluded that the opt-in rule carried out “the express purposes of EFTA by: (a) Establishing notice requirements to help consumers better understand the cost of overdraft services for certain EFTs; and (b) providing consumers with a choice as to whether they want overdraft services for ATM and one-time debit card transactions in light of the costs associated with those services.”
158
Not surprisingly, the rule did not expressly discuss GPR cards, which as noted above, the Board had not subjected to Regulation E coverage.
159
157
74 FR 59033 (Nov. 17, 2009).
158
Id.
at 59037.
159
Id.
at 59040.
Following the adoption of the Board's overdraft opt-in-rule, the FDIC expanded on the previously-issued Joint Guidance when it issued a Financial Institution Letter that reaffirmed its existing supervisory expectations with respect to overdraft payment programs generally and provided specific guidance with respect to automated overdraft payment programs.
160
In 2011, the OCC proposed similar guidance regarding automatic overdraft programs and deposit advance products. This guidance, if finalized, would have clarified the OCC's application of principles of safe and sound banking practices in connection with deposit-related consumer credit products such as automated overdraft services and direct deposit advance programs.
161
The OCC withdrew this proposed guidance in 2013.
162
160
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Fin. Inst. Letter FIL-81-2010,
Overdraft Payment Programs and Consumer Protection Final Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance,
(Nov. 24, 2010) (FDIC Overdraft Payment Supervisory Guidance),
available at
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10081.html
.
161
76 FR 33409 (June 8, 2011).
162
78 FR 25353 (Apr. 30, 2013).
Since the Bureau assumed authority from the Board for implementing most of EFTA in 2011, it has taken a number of steps—including research, analysis, and solicitation of comment—to assess the impact and efficacy of the Board's 2009 overdraft opt-in rule as it pertains to deposit accounts. In early 2012, the Bureau issued a Request For Information (RFI) that sought input from the public on a number of overdraft topics, including: Lower cost alternatives to overdraft protection programs, consumer alerts and information provided regarding balances and overdraft triggers, the impact of changes to Regulations DD and E and overdraft opt-in rates, the impact of changes in financial institutions' operating policies, the economics of overdraft programs, and the long-term impact on consumers.
163
In response, the Bureau received over 1000 comments. This RFI did not request information specific to prepaid products, and few commenters specifically addressed prepaid products. The Bureau has also undertaken significant research into overdraft services that has resulted, to date, in the release of a white paper of initial data findings in June 2013 and a data point in July 2014.
164
163
77 FR 12031 (Feb. 28, 2012).
164
CFPB Overdraft White Paper,
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_whitepaper_overdraft-practices.pdf.;
CFPB Overdraft Data Point, available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/data-point-checking-account-overdraft/.
The Bureau has previously indicated that it is considering whether rules governing overdraft and related services in connection with deposit accounts are warranted, and, if so, what types of rules would be appropriate. A possible rulemaking might include new or revised disclosures or address specific acts or practices.
165
165
See http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201404&RIN=3170-AA42
.
3. Other Relevant Federal Regulatory Activity
In addition to the two general regulatory regimes governing credit products generally and overdraft services as outlined above, two Federal initiatives have specifically addressed the possibility of credit features being offered in connection with prepaid products. First, the Treasury FMS Rule (described above), adopted in late December 2011, only permits Federal payments to be deposited onto a prepaid product if the product is not attached to a line of credit or loan agreement under which repayment from the account is triggered upon delivery of the Federal payments, among other conditions.
See
31 CFR 210.5(b)(5)(i)(C). The Supplementary Information to that Interim Final Rule indicates that the goal of this requirement is to prevent payday lending and other arrangements in which a financial institution or creditor “advances” funds to a cardholder's account, and then repays itself for the advance and any related fees by taking some or all of the cardholder's next deposit.
166
The Treasury FMS Rule does not, however, directly address the permissibility of overdraft services.
166
75 FR 80335 (Dec. 22, 2010).
Second, as is discussed above in the broader regulatory overview, the Board's Regulation II implementing provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act generally caps interchange fees that may be imposed on debit cards. However, Regulation II provides exemptions from the fee restrictions for certain GPR cards; as a result, interchange fees for transactions made with these prepaid cards are generally not subject to the fee restrictions of EFTA section 920(a). 12 CFR 235.5(d)(1). However, EFTA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, carves out of this exemption interchange fees for transactions made with these prepaid cards if, with respect to the card, an overdraft fee may be charged. EFTA and Regulation E provide a separate, blanket exemption for cards or issuers with assets of less than $10 billion, so these cards are not subject to the fee restrictions even if overdraft fees may be charged on the account.
Separately, the Department of Defense (the Department) recently proposed amendments to its regulation (32 CFR part 232) that implements the Military Lending Act (MLA), 10 U.S.C. 987,
et se.
167
Under the MLA, a creditor generally may not apply a military annual percentage rate (MAPR) greater than 36 percent in connection with an extension of consumer credit to a military service member or dependent. 10 U.S.C. 987(b). The Department's proposal would modify its regulation to expand the scope of coverage to which the regulation applies to a broad range of open-end and closed end credit products, but would exclude overdraft services that are exempted from Regulation Z as discussed above.
168
For open-end (not home secured) credit card accounts, any credit-related charge that is a finance charge under Regulation Z (as well as certain other charges) would be included in calculating the MAPR
169
for a particular billing cycle and the MAPR for that billing cycle could not
exceed 36 percent.
170
For such credit card accounts, the Department's proposal, however, provides that a card issuer does not have to include in the calculation of the MAPR any charge that is a bona fide fee and that is reasonable and customary for that type of fee.
171
167
79 FR 58602 (Sept. 29, 2014).
168
79 FR 58602 at 58616.
169
79 FR 58602 at 58610.
170
79 FR 58602 at 58619.
171
79 FR 58602 at 58638.
See
proposed § 232.4(d) of the Department's proposal. The exclusion from the MAPR calculation for bona fide fees does not apply to periodic rates. It also does not apply to any credit insurance premium, including charges for single premium credit insurance, fees for debt cancellation or debt suspension agreements, or to any fees for credit related ancillary products sold in connection with and either at or before consummation of the credit transaction or upon account opening, because those charges are expressly included in the definition of “interest” in the applicable statute (10 U.S.C. 987(i)(3)) and therefore must be included in the MAPR calculation.
D. The Bureau's May 2012 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
As noted above, the Bureau issued the Prepaid ANPR, which posed a series of questions for public comment about how the Bureau might consider regulating GPR cards. The Bureau sought input on the following topics: (1) The disclosure of fees and terms; (2) if consumers should be informed whether their funds are protected by FDIC pass-through deposit insurance; (3) unauthorized transactions and the costs and benefits of requiring card issuers to provide limited liability protection from unauthorized transactions similar to those protections available for other accounts under Regulation E; and (4) other product features including credit features in general and overdraft services in particular, linked savings accounts, and credit repair or credit building features such as features that claim to offer consumers the opportunity to improve or build credit).
The Bureau received over 220 comments from a variety of commenters.
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Industry commenters, including depository institutions and credit unions, prepaid program managers, payment networks and industry trade associations, submitted the majority of comments. The Bureau also received comment letters from consumer and other interest groups, as well as several individual consumers. In preparing this notice, the Bureau has evaluated the comments received in response to the Prepaid ANPR and has engaged in additional analysis of prepaid products and consumer behavior. As discussed in greater detail in the section-by-section analysis below, the proposal covers a variety of prepaid products including GPR cards. The Bureau notes that covered account types have different characteristics.
172
The comments can be reviewed at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0019-0001
.
E. Other Payments-Related Bureau Actions
In June 2014, the Bureau issued a Request for Information regarding the opportunities and challenges associated with the use of mobile financial products and services (Mobile RFI).
173
As part of the Mobile RFI, the Bureau is exploring how mobile technologies are impacting economically vulnerable consumers with limited access to traditional banking systems. The Mobile RFI asked questions on a number of topics, including access for economically vulnerable consumers and the ways that mobile technologies could expand access to financial services, the use of mobile technologies for real-time money management, the types of customer service or technical assistance that are available to consumers when they use mobile products, and privacy and data security issues. The comment period on the Mobile RFI ended on September 10, 2014. The Bureau received approximately 48 comments, which it is in the process of reviewing.
173
79 FR 33731 (June 12, 2014).
In July 2014, the Bureau began accepting consumer complaints about prepaid products.
174
In addition to prepaid cards, consumers may also submit complaints about payroll cards, government benefit cards, gift cards, and mobile wallets.
175
In August 2014, the Bureau issued a consumer advisory on virtual currencies that discussed the risks to consumers posed by such currencies.
176
At the same time, the Bureau also began accepting consumer complaints regarding virtual currencies.
177
174
Press Release,
CFPB Begins Accepting Consumer Complaints on Prepaid Cards and Additional Nonbank Products, available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-begins-accepting-consumer-complaints-on-prepaid-cards-and-additional-nonbank-products./
.
175
See http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/#credit-card
.
176
CFPB Consumer Advisory,
Risks to Consumers Posed by Virtual Currencies
(Aug. 2014),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consumer-advisory_virtual-currencies.pdf
.
177
See http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/#money-transfer
.
The section-by-section analysis below discusses in greater detail the potential application of this proposed rule to certain mobile financial products and services. The Bureau also recognizes that the proposed rule may have potential application to virtual currency and related products and services. As a general matter, however, the Bureau's analysis of mobile financial products and services, as well as and virtual currencies and related products and services, including the applicability of existing regulations and this proposed regulation to such products and services, is ongoing.
III. Overview of Outreach and Related Industry and Consumer Research
The Bureau conducted extensive and significant additional outreach and research since it issued the Prepaid ANPR as part of its efforts to study and evaluate prepaid products. In addition to reviewing the comments received, the Bureau has engaged in a variety of outreach and other research efforts to understand better how consumers use prepaid products and where problems might exist or potentially develop. These efforts include meetings with industry, consumer groups, and non-partisan research and advocacy organizations, market research and monitoring, and related efforts. Relatedly, the Bureau has colle
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