Derivatives Clearing Organizations and International Standards

Federal RegisterAug 16, 2013

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 39, 140, and 190

RIN Number 3038-AE06

Derivatives Clearing Organizations and International Standards

AGENCY:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY:

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) is proposing amendments to its regulations to establish additional standards for compliance with the derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) core principles set forth in Section 5b(c)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) for systemically important DCOs (“SIDCOs”) and DCOs that elect to opt-in to the SIDCO regulatory requirements (“Subpart C DCOs”). SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs would be required to comply with the requirements applicable to all DCOs, which are set forth in the Commission's DCO regulations on compliance with core principles, to the extent those requirements are not inconsistent with the requirements of the regulations in this proposed rule. The proposed amendments include: Procedural requirements for opting in to the regulatory regime as well as substantive requirements relating to governance, financial resources, system safeguards, special default rules and procedures for uncovered losses or shortfalls, risk management, additional disclosure requirements, efficiency, and recovery and wind-down procedures. These additional requirements would also be consistent with the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (“PFMIs”) published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“CPSS-IOSCO”). In addition, the Commission is proposing certain delegation provisions and certain technical clarifications.

DATES:

Submit comments on or before September 16, 2013.

ADDRESSES:

You may submit comments, identified by RIN number 3038-AE06, by any of the following methods:

• Agency Web site:

http://comments.cftc.gov.

• Mail: Secretary of the Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

• Hand Delivery/Courier: Same as Mail, above.

• Federal eRulemaking Portal:

http://www.Regulations.gov.

Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

All comments must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied by an English translation. Comments will be posted as received to

http://www.cftc.gov.

You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. If you wish the Commission to consider information that may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, a petition for confidential treatment of the exempt information may be submitted according to the procedures established in Commission regulation 145.

The Commission reserves the right but shall have no obligation, to review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse or remove any or all of your submission from

http://www.cftc.gov

that it may deem to be inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language.

All submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the public comment file and will be considered as required under the Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under the Freedom of Information Act.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ananda Radhakrishnan, Director, Division of Clearing and Risk (“DCR”), at 202-418-5188 or

aradhakrishnan@cftc.gov;

Robert B. Wasserman, Chief Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-5092 or

rwasserman@cftc.gov;

M. Laura Astrada, Associate Chief Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-7622 or

lastrada@cftc.gov;

Peter A. Kals, Special Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-5466 or

pkals@cftc.gov;

Jocelyn Partridge, Special Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-5926 or

jpartridge@cftc.gov;

Tracey Wingate, Special Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-5319 or

twingate@cftc.gov;

or Kathryn L. Ballintine, Attorney-Advisor, DCR, at 202-418-5575 or

kballintine@cftc.gov,

in each case, at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background

A. Regulatory Framework for Registered DCOs

B. Designation of DCOs as Systemically Important Under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act

C. Existing Standards for SIDCOs

D. DCO Core Principles and Existing Regulations for Registered DCOs

E. PFMIs

F. The Role of the PFMIs in International Banking Standards

G. Proposed Rulemaking Applicable to SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs

II. Discussion of Revised and Proposed Rules

A. Regulation 39.2 (Definitions)

B. Regulation 39.30 (Scope)

C. Regulation 39.31 (Election To Become Subject to the Provisions of Subpart C)

D. Regulation 39.32 (Governance for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

E. Regulation 39.33 (Financial Resources for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

F. Regulation 39.34 (System Safeguards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

G. Regulation 39.35 (Default Rules and Procedures for Uncovered Losses or Shortfalls (Recovery) for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

H. Regulation 39.36 (Risk Management for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

I. Regulation 39.37 (Additional Disclosure for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

J. Regulation 39.38 (Efficiency for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

K. Regulation 39.39 (Recovery and Wind-Down for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

L. Regulation 39.40 (Consistency With the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures)

M. Regulation 39.41 (Special Enforcement Authority For Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

N. Regulation 39.42 (Advance Notice of Material Risk-Related Rule Changes by Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

O. Regulation 140.94 (Delegation of Authority to the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk)

P. Regulation 190.09 (Member Property)

III. Effective Date

IV. Related Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

C. Consideration of Costs and Benefits

I. Background

A. Regulatory Framework for Registered DCOs

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).

1

Title VII of the

Dodd-Frank Act, entitled the “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010,”

2

amended the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA” or the “Act”)

3

to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives, including swaps. The legislation was enacted to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system by, among other things: (1) Providing for the registration and comprehensive regulation of swap dealers and major swap participants; (2) imposing mandatory clearing and trade execution requirements on clearable swap contracts; (3) creating rigorous recordkeeping and real-time reporting regimes; and (4) enhancing the Commission's rulemaking and enforcement authorities with respect to, among others, all registered entities and intermediaries subject to the Commission's oversight.

1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The text of the Dodd-Frank Act may be

accessed at

http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/hr4173_enrolledbill.pdf.

2

Section 701 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

3

7 U.S.C. 1

et seq.

Section 725(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 5b(c)(2) of the CEA, which sets forth core principles that a DCO must comply with in order to register and maintain registration with the Commission. The core principles were originally added to the CEA by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,

4

and, in 2001, the Commission issued guidance on DCO compliance with these core principles.

5

However, in furtherance of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity, the Commission, pursuant to the Commission's enhanced rulemaking authority,

6

withdrew the 2001 guidance and adopted regulations establishing standards for compliance with the DCO core principles.

7

As noted in the preamble to the final rule for Subpart A and Subpart B of part 39 of the Commission's regulations (“Subpart A” and “Subpart B,” respectively), the implementing regulations of the DCO core principles, the Commission sought to provide legal certainty for market participants, strengthen the risk management practices of DCOs, and increase overall confidence in the financial system by assuring “market participants and the public that DCOs are meeting minimum risk management standards.”

8

4

See

Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Public Law 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

5

See

A New Regulatory Framework for Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 45604 (Aug. 29, 2001) (adopting 17 CFR Part 39, Appendix A).

6

See

Section 725(c)(2)(i) of the Dodd Frank Act (giving the Commission explicit authority to promulgate rules regarding the core principles pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Section 8a(5) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 12a(5)).

7

See

Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 76 FR 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011).

8

Id.

at 69335.

B. Designation of DCOs as Systemically Important Under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act

Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled “Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010,”

9

was enacted to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability.

10

Section 804 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“Council”) to designate those financial market utilities (“FMUs”)

11

that the Council determines are, or are likely to become, systemically important.

12

9

Section 801 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

10

Section 802(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

11

An FMU includes “any person that manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of transferring, clearing, or settling payments, securities, or other financial transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions and the person.” Section 803(6)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

12

Section 804(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The term “systemically important” means “a situation where the failure of or a disruption to the functioning of a financial market utility . . . could create, or increase, the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the financial system of the United States.” Section 803(9) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

See also

Authority to Designate Financial Market Utilities as Systemically Important, 76 FR 44763, 44774 (July 27, 2011) (final rule).

In determining whether an FMU is systemically important, the Council uses a detailed two-stage designations process, using certain statutory considerations

13

and other metrics to assesses, among other things, “whether possible disruptions [to the functioning of an FMU] are potentially severe, not necessarily in the sense that they themselves might trigger damage to the U.S. economy, but because such disruptions might reduce the ability of financial institutions or markets to perform their normal intermediation functions.”

14

On July 18, 2012, the Council designated eight FMUs as systemically important under Title VIII.

15

Two of these designated FMUs are CFTC-registered DCOs

16

for which the Commission is the Supervisory Agency.

17

13

Under Section 804(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act, in determining whether an FMU is or is likely to become systemically important, the Council must take into consideration the following: (A) The aggregate monetary value of transactions processed by the FMU; (B) the aggregate exposure of an FMU to its counterparties; (C) the relationship, interdependencies, or other interactions of the FMU with other FMUs or payment, clearing or settlement activities; (D) the effect that the failure of or a disruption to the FMU would have on critical markets, financial institutions or the broader financial system; and (E) any other factors the Council deems appropriate.

14

76 FR at 44766.

15

See

Press Release, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Oversight Council Makes First Designations in Effort to Protect Against Future Financial Crises (July 18, 2012),

available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1645.aspx.

16

While Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. (“CME”), ICE Clear Credit LLC (“ICE Clear Credit”), and The Options Clearing Corporation (“OCC”) are the CFTC-registered DCOs that were designated as systemically important by the Council, the CFTC is the Supervisory Agency only for CME and ICE Clear Credit, the SEC serves as OCC's Supervisory Agency.

17

See

Section 803(8)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act (defining “Supervisory Agency” as the federal agency that has primary jurisdiction over a designated financial market utility under federal banking, securities or commodity futures laws).

C. Existing Standards for SIDCOs

Section 805 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Commission to consider relevant international standards and existing prudential requirements when prescribing risk management standards governing the operations related to payment, clearing, and settlement activities for FMUs that are (1) designated as systemically important by the Council and (2) engaged in activities for which the Commission is the Supervisory Agency.

18

More generally, Section 752 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Commission to consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent international standards with respect to the regulation of, among other things, swaps, futures, and options on futures.

19

18

See

Section 805(a)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Commission notes that under section 805 of the Dodd-Frank Act it also has the authority to prescribe risk management standards governing the operations related to payment, clearing, and settlement activities for FMUs that are designated as systemically important by the Council and are engaged in activities for which the Commission is the appropriate financial regulator.

19

Section 752 of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. 8325, provides:

(a) In order to promote effective and consistent global regulation of swaps and security based swaps, the [CFTC], the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the prudential regulators (as that term is defined in section 1a(30) of the [CEA], as appropriate, shall consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of international standards with respect to the regulation * * * of swaps * * * [and] swap entities * * *.

(b) In order to promote effective and consistent global regulation of contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery and options on such contracts, the [CFTC] shall consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the establishment of international standards with respect to the regulation of contracts of a sale of a commodity for future delivery and on options on such contracts.

The Commission has previously reviewed the risk management

standards set forth in part 39 of the Commission's regulations in light of relevant international standards and existing prudential requirements to identify those areas in which additional risk management standards for SIDCOs would be appropriate. In 2010, the Commission proposed enhanced financial resource requirements for SIDCOs that would have required a SIDCO to (1) maintain sufficient financial resources to meet the SIDCO's financial obligations to its clearing members notwithstanding a default by the two clearing members creating the largest combined financial exposure for the SIDCO in extreme but plausible market conditions,

20

and (2) only count the value of assessments, after a 30% haircut, to meet up to 20% of the resources required to meet obligations arising from a default by the clearing member creating the second largest financial exposure.

21

In addition, in 2011 the Commission proposed to improve system safeguards for SIDCOs by enhancing certain business continuity and disaster recovery procedures.

22

20

Financial Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 75 FR 63113, at 63119 (Oct. 14, 2010) (notice of proposed rulemaking).

21

Id.

22

See

Risk Management Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 FR 3697, 3726-3727 (Jan. 20, 2011) (notice of proposed rulemaking). The proposal also implemented special enforcement authority over SIDCOs that, pursuant to section 807(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act, would have granted the Commission authority under the provisions of subsections (b) through (n) of section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in the same manner and to the same extent as if the SIDCO were an insured depository institution and the Commission were the appropriate federal banking agency for such insured depository institution.

See

76 FR at 3727.

Because efforts to finalize the PFMIs were ongoing at the time the Commission adopted certain amendments to part 39 applicable to DCOs, rules specific to SIDCOs could have put SIDCOs at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign central counterparties (“CCPs”) not yet subject to comparable rules. Moreover, at the time, because no DCO had been designated as systemically important by the Council, the Commission concluded it would be premature to finalize the SIDCO regulations in the Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles adopting release.

23

Instead, the Commission decided, consistent with Section 805(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act,

24

to monitor domestic and international developments concerning CCPs and reconsider the proposed SIDCO regulations in light of such developments. In 2013, after careful consideration of the comments on the 2010 proposed SIDCO rules and in light of domestic and international market and regulatory developments, the Commission finalized these proposed regulations in a manner consistent with the PFMIs.

25

Specifically, in the final rules the Commission amended part 39 by creating a Subpart C and adding regulations that (1) increased the minimum financial resource requirements for SIDCOs, (2) restricted the use of assessments by SIDCOs in meeting such financial resource obligations, (3) enhanced the system safeguards requirements for SIDCOs, and (4) granted the Commission special enforcement authority over SIDCOs pursuant to Section 807 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

26

23

See

76 FR at 69352.

24

The Commission notes again that Section 805(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to consider international standards in promulgating risk management rules.

25

Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations, (final rule published in the

Federal Register

August 15, 2013) (“SIDCO Final Rule”).

26

Id.

D. DCO Core Principles and Regulations for Registered DCOs

As noted above, in order to register and maintain registration status with the Commission, DCOs must comply with all of the DCO core principles set forth in Section 5b(c)(2) of the CEA, as amended by Section 725 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as all applicable Commission regulations. However, for purposes of this proposal, the Commission would like to highlight the following requirements set forth in the core principles and related Commission regulations: Core Principle B (Financial Resources) and regulations 39.11 and 39.29; Core Principle D (Risk Management) and regulation 39.13; Core Principle G (Default Rules and Procedures) and regulation 39.16; Core Principle I (System Safeguards) and regulations 39.18 and 39.30; Core Principle L (Public Information) and regulation 39.21; Core Principle O (Governance Fitness Standards); Core Principle P (Conflicts of Interest); and Core Principle Q (Composition of Governing Boards).

1. Core Principle B: Financial Resources

Core Principle B requires DCOs to have “adequate financial, operational, and managerial resources, as determined by the Commission, to discharge each responsibility of the [DCO].”

27

Specifically, Core Principle B requires a DCO to possess financial resources that, at a minimum, exceed the total amount that would enable the DCO to meet its financial obligations to its clearing members, notwithstanding a default by the clearing member creating the largest financial exposure for the DCO in extreme but plausible market conditions and to cover its operating costs for a period of one year, as calculated on a rolling basis. Regulation 39.11 codifies these minimum requirements for all DCOs.

28

Pursuant to regulation 39.29, however, a SIDCO that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile must maintain financial resources sufficient to enable it to meet its financial obligations to its clearing members notwithstanding a default by the two clearing members creating the largest combined financial exposure for the SIDCO in extreme but plausible market conditions.

29

27

Section 5b(c)(2)(B) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7a-1(c)(2)(B).

28

Specifically, regulation 39.11 requires registered DCOs to maintain financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios, which include, but are not limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions, otherwise known as “Cover One.”

29

Financial resources sufficient to cover the default of the two participants creating the largest credit exposure in extreme but plausible circumstances is known as “over two.”

See also

infra

note 70.

2. Core Principle D: Risk Management

Core Principle D requires a DCO to ensure that it possesses the ability to manage the risks associated with discharging the responsibilities of the DCO through the use of appropriate tools and procedures. It further requires a DCO to measure its credit exposures to each clearing member not less than once each business day and to monitor each such exposure periodically during the business day. Core Principle D also requires a DCO to limit its exposure to potential losses from defaults by clearing members through margin requirements and other risk control mechanisms, to ensure that the DCO's operations would not be disrupted and non-defaulting clearing members would not be exposed to losses that non-defaulting clearing members cannot anticipate or control. Finally, Core Principle D provides that a DCO must require margin from each clearing member sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal market conditions and that each model and parameter used in setting such margin requirements must be risk-based and reviewed on a regular basis. Regulation 39.13

establishes the requirements that a DCO must meet in order to comply with Core Principle D, including documentation requirements, the methodology for the calculation and coverage of margin requirements, and the criteria and timing of stress tests that a DCO must conduct.

30

30

The Commission also requires that a DCO's actual coverage of its initial margin requirements meet an established confidence level of at least 99%, based on data from an appropriate historic time period.

See generally

17 CFR 39.13(g)(2)(iii).

3. Core Principle G: Default Rules and Procedures

Core Principle G requires a DCO to have rules and procedures designed to allow for the efficient, fair, and safe management of events during which clearing members become insolvent or otherwise default on their obligations to the DCO. In addition, Core Principle G requires a DCO to clearly state its default procedures, make its default rules publicly available, and ensure that it may take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue meeting its obligations. Regulation 39.16 establishes the minimum requirements that a DCO must meet in order to comply with Core Principle G, including the requirements for the DCO's default management plan and the procedures for dealing with the default and insolvency of a clearing member.

4. Core Principle I: System Safeguards

Core Principle I requires a DCO to establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight that identifies and minimizes sources of operational risk through the development of appropriate controls and procedures, and automated systems that are reliable, secure, and have adequate scalable capacity. Core Principle I also requires that the emergency procedures, back-up facilities, and disaster recovery plans that a DCO is obligated to establish and maintain specifically allow for the timely recovery and resumption of the DCO's operations and the fulfillment of each obligation and responsibility of the DCO. Finally, Core Principle I requires that a DCO periodically conduct tests to verify that the DCO's back-up resources are sufficient to ensure daily processing, clearing, and settlement. Regulation 39.18 delineates the minimum requirements that a DCO must satisfy in order to comply with Core Principle I, including a recovery time objective of the next business day. In addition, regulation 39.30 requires a SIDCO to have a business continuity and disaster recovery plan with a recovery time objective of not later than two hours following the disruption. Regulation 39.30 also requires a SIDCO to have geographic diversity in the resources used to enable the SIDCO to meet its recovery time objective.

5. Core Principle L: Public Information

Core Principle L requires a DCO to provide market participants sufficient information to enable the market participants to identify and evaluate accurately the risks and costs associated with using the DCO's services. More specifically, a DCO is required to make available to market participants information concerning the rules and operating and default procedures governing its clearing and settlement systems and also to disclose publicly and to the Commission the terms and conditions of each contract, agreement, and transaction cleared and settled by the DCO; each clearing and other fee charged to members; the DCO's margin-setting methodology; daily settlement prices; and other matters relevant to participation in the DCO's clearing and settlement activities. Regulation 39.21 sets forth the requirements a DCO must meet in order to comply with Core Principle L and details the information to be disclosed to the public and requirements regarding the method and timing of such disclosure.

6. Core Principle O: Governance Fitness Standards

Core Principle O requires a DCO to establish transparent governing arrangements to both fulfill public interest requirements and to permit the consideration of the views of owners and participants. In addition, Core Principle O requires a DCO to establish and enforce appropriate fitness standards for directors, members of any disciplinary committee, members of the DCO, any other individual or entity with direct access to the settlement or clearing activities of the DCO, and affiliated parties.

7. Core Principle P: Conflicts of Interest

Core Principle P requires a DCO to establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision making process of the DCO. Core Principle P further requires a DCO to establish a process for resolving conflicts of interest.

8. Core Principle Q: Composition of Governing Boards

Core Principle Q requires a DCO to ensure that the composition of the governing board or committee of the DCO includes market participants.

E. PFMIs

1. Overview

In the SIDCO Final Rule, the Commission determined that, for purposes of meeting its obligation pursuant to Section 805(a)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the PFMIs, which were developed by CPSS-IOSCO over a period of several years,

31

were the international standards most relevant to the risk management of SIDCOs.

32

31

See

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,

Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures,

(April 2012)

available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD377.pdf.

See also the Financial Stability Board June 2012 Third Progress Report on Implementation, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120615.pdf

(Noting publication of the PFMIs as achieving “an important milestone in the global development of a sound basis for central clearing of all standardised OTC derivatives”).

32

In making this determination, the Commission noted that “the adoption and implementation of the PFMIs by numerous foreign jurisdictions highlights the role these principles play in creating a global, unified set of international risk management standards for CCPs.”

See

SIDCO Final Rule.

In February 2010, CPSS-IOSCO launched a review of the existing sets of international standards for financial market infrastructures (“FMIs”) in support of a broader effort by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)

33

to strengthen core financial infrastructures and markets by ensuring that gaps in international standards were identified and addressed.

34

CPSS-IOSCO endeavored to incorporate in the review process lessons from the 2008 financial crisis and the experience of using the existing international standards, as well as policy and analytical work by other international committees including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”).

35

The PFMIs replace CPSS-IOSCO's previous international standards applicable to CCPs,

36

and establish international risk management standards for FMIs, including CCPs, that facilitate clearing

and settlement.

37

In issuing the PFMIs, CPSS-IOSCO sought to strengthen and harmonize existing international standards and incorporate new specifications for CCPs clearing OTC derivatives.

38

The objectives of the PFMIs are to enhance the safety and efficiency of FMIs and, more broadly, reduce systemic risk andfoster transparency and financial stability.

39

33

The FSB is an international organization that coordinates with national financial authorities and international policy organizations to develop and promote effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies.

See generally http://www.financialstabilityboard.org.

34

PFMIs, ¶ 1.6.

35

Id.

36

The international standards for FMIs, prior to the publication of the PFMIs, included, the

Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems

published by CPSS in 2001, the

Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems

published by CPSS-IOSCO in 2001, and the

Recommendations for Central Counterparties

published by CPSS-IOSCO in 2004 (collectively all three are referred to as the “CPSS-IOSCO Principles and Recommendations”).

See

PFMIs, ¶¶ 1.4-1.5.

37

The PFMIs define a “financial market infrastructure” as a “multilateral system among participating institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the purposes of clearing, settling, or recording payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial transactions.”

See

PFMIs, ¶ 1.8.

38

See id.,

¶ 1.2.

39

Id.,

¶ 1.15.

The PFMIs set out 24 principles which address the risk and efficiency of an FMI's operations.

40

Assessments of observance with the PFMIs focus also on the “key considerations” set forth for each of the principles.

41

While Subpart A and Subpart B incorporate the vast majority of the standards set forth in the PFMIs,

42

the Commission, which is a member of the Board of IOSCO, intends to implement rules and regulations that are fully consistent with the standards set forth in the PFMIs by the end of 2013. To that end, the Commission has recognized that in certain instances, the standards set forth in the PFMIs may not be fully covered by the requirements set forth in Subpart A and Subpart B. Thus, this rulemaking would revise Subpart C to address those gaps, specifically with respect to the following PFMI principles: Principle 2 (Governance); Principle 3 (Framework for the comprehensive management of risks); Principle 4 (Credit risk); Principle 6 (Margin); Principle 7 (Liquidity risk); Principle 9 (Money settlements); Principle 14 (Segregation and portability); Principle 15 (General business risk); Principle 16 (Custody and investment risks); Principle 17 (Operational risk); Principle 21 (Efficiency and effectiveness); Principle 22 (Communication procedures and standards); and Principle 23 (Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data).

40

See id.,

¶ 1.19.

41

See

Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Disclosure Framework and Assessment Methodology (Dec. 2012) (hereinafter “Disclosure Framework and Assessment Methodology”),

available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD396.pdf.

42

Indeed, Subpart A and Subpart B were informed by the consultative report for the PFMIs.

See generally

76 FR at 69334.

2. Principle 2: Governance

Principle 2 addresses the governance arrangements of an FMI.

43

Specifically, it states that the governance arrangements of an FMI should be “clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system.”

44

An FMI's governance arrangements must be documented and set forth “direct lines of responsibility and accountability,” which are disclosed to owners, regulators, clearing members and their customers, and the public.

45

In addition, an FMI must clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and management, ensure that the board of directors and management have appropriate experience, design procedures to identify and resolve conflicts of interest for members of the board of directors, and regularly review the performance of the board of directors as a whole and individual directors.

46

In order to ensure that the board of directors has the appropriate incentive to fulfill its multiple roles, the board must typically include non-executive board members.

47

Further, the FMI's risk management framework must be clear, documented and reflect the risk-tolerance policy, assign responsibility and accountability for risk decisions, and specify how decisions will be made in crises and emergencies.

48

Finally, Principle 2 requires the FMI's “design, rules, overall strategy, and decisions to reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders,” and requires that “major decisions” be “clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders” and to the public when there is “a broad market impact.”

49

43

The PFMIs define “governance” as “the set of relationships between an FMI's owners, board of directors (or equivalent), management, and other relevant parties, including participants, authorities, and other stakeholders (such as participants' customers, other interdependent FMIs, and the broader market).” PFMIs at Annex H: Glossary.

44

See

PFMIs at Principle 2.

45

Id.

at Principle 2, Key Consideration (hereinafter, “K.C.”) 2.

46

Id.

at Principle 2, K.C. 3, 5.

47

Id.

at Principle 2, K.C. 4.

48

See id.

at Principle 2, K.C. 6.

49

Id.

at Principle 2, K.C. 7.

3. Principle 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks

Principle 3 addresses an FMI's risk management framework, requiring it to “comprehensively manag[e] legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.”

50

In addition, as part of its risk management framework, an FMI “must regularly review” and develop tools to address “the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities . . . as a result of interdependencies,”

51

and “identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern.

52

Principle 3 further requires an FMI to “assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down” and to “prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down as a result of that assessment.”

53

An FMI is required to “provide incentives” so that its participants and their customers “manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.”

54

Finally, Principle 3 requires an FMI's risk management framework to be periodically reviewed.

55

50

PFMIs at Principle 3.

51

PFMIs at Principle 3, K.C. 3.

52

PFMIs at Principle 3, K.C. 4.

53

Id.

54

PFMIs at Principle 3, K.C. 2.

55

PFMIs at Principle 3, K.C. 1.

4. Principle 4: Credit Risk

Principle 4 addresses an FMI's credit risk, that is, the risk that a counterparty to the CCP will be unable to fully meet its financial obligations when due.

56

Generally, Principle 4 requires all FMIs to establish explicit rules and procedures to address any credit losses they may face as a result of an individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI.

57

These rules and procedures should also address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, how the funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers will be repaid, and how an FMI will replenish its financial resources that it may use during a stress event, such as a default, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.

58

More specifically, Principle 4 states that “a CCP should cover its current and potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using margin and other prefunded financial resources.”

59

Additionally, Principle 4 provides that a CCP involved in activities with a more complex risk profile

60

or that is

systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios, including, but not limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

56

The PFMIs define “credit risk” as the risk that a counterparty, whether a participant or other entity, will be unable to meet fully its financial obligations when due, or at any time in the future. PFMIs at Annex H: Glossary.

57

See

PFMIs at Principle 4, K.C. 7.

58

See id.

59

Id.

at Principle 4, K.C. 4.

60

Activities “with a more complex risk profile” include clearing financial instruments that are characterized by discrete jump-to-default price changes or that are highly correlated with potential participant defaults.

Id.

at Explanatory Note (hereinafter, “E.N.”) 3.4.19.

5. Principle 6: Margin

Principle 6 addresses an FMI's margin requirements and requires a CCP to use “an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed” to “cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products.”

61

Specifically, Principle 6 requires a CCP's margin system to take into account the “risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio and market that it serves” and be calibrated accordingly.

62

Further, a CCP's margin system must have reliably sourced and timely price data.

63

A CCP's regular reviews of its margin models and coverage must include, at minimum, (i) rigorous daily backtesting, (ii) monthly sensitivity analyses, and (iii) regular “assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties” of the margin models, which consider a wide range of possible market conditions “including the most-volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in the correlation between prices.”

64

Principle 6 also states that “[a] CCP should have the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls and payments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.”

65

61

PFMIs at Principle 6.

62

Id.

at Principle 6, K.C. 1.

63

See id.

at Principle 6, K.C. 2.

64

Id.

at Principle 6, K.C. 6.

65

Id.

at Principle 6, K.C. 4.

6. Principle 7: Liquidity risk

Principle 7 addresses the risk that an FMI may not have sufficient funds to meet its financial obligations as and when due.

66

Specifically, Principle 7 provides that an FMI manage its liquidity risks from a variety of sources, including participants, settlement banks, custodian banks, and liquidity providers

67

on an ongoing and timely basis

68

and regularly test the sufficiency of liquidity resources through rigorous stress testing.

69

Additionally, Principle 7 provides that the minimum liquid resource requirement for CCPs should be resources that would permit Cover One, but a CCP that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should “maintain additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover a wider range of potential stress scenarios,” including resources that would permit Cover Two.

70

Principle 7 also sets forth specifications for qualifying liquidity resources which may be used to meet the minimum liquid resource requirement.

71

66

The PFMIs define “liquidity risk” as “the risk that a counterparty, whether a participant or other entity, will have insufficient funds to meet its financial obligations as and when expected, although it may be able to do so in the future.”

Id.

at Annex H: Glossary.

67

See

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 1.

68

See

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 2.

69

See

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 9.

70

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 4. The term “Cover Two” refers to the requirement that a CCP maintain financial resources sufficient to enable it to meet its financial obligations to its clearing members notwithstanding a default by the two clearing members creating the largest combined financial exposure for the SIDCO in extreme but plausible market conditions.

71

See

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 5-8.

7. Principle 9: Money Settlements

Principle 9 addresses money settlements, stating that an FMI should minimize and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.

72

In other words, an FMI should “monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from commercial settlement banks,” by (i) establishing and monitoring “adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take into account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalization, access to liquidity, and operational reliability;”

73

and (ii) monitoring and managing “the concentration credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.”

74

72

Id.

73

See

PFMIs at Principle 7, K.C. 3.

74

See id.

8. Principle 14: Segregation and Portability

Principle 14 addresses segregation and portability, stating that “a CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.”

75

A CCP's segregation and portability rules should, at a minimum, “effectively protect a participant's customers' positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant.”

76

Further, Principle 14 states that a CCP's segregation and portability arrangements should be disclosed, including whether the protection provided for customer collateral is on an individual or omnibus basis and whether there are any “constraints, such as legal or operational constraints” that may impair its ability to segregate or port a participant's customers' positions and related collateral.”

77

75

PFMIs at Principle 14.

76

Id.

at K.C. 1.

77

PFMIs at Principle 14, K.C. 4.

9. Principle 15: General Business Risk

Principle 15 addresses general business risk, the inability of an FMI to continue as a going concern, requiring an FMI to “hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses.”

78

The liquid net assets should be sufficient, at all times, “to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.”

79

Specifically, “an FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan” that is supported by “liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses.”

80

10. Principle 16: Custody and Investment Risk

78

The PFMIs define “general business risk” as “any potential impairment of the FMI's financial position (as a business concern) as a consequence of a decline in its revenues or an increase in its expenses, such that expenses exceed revenues and result in a loss that must be charged against capital.” PFMIs at Annex H: Glossary.

79

PFMIs at Principle 15.

80

Id.

at K.C. 3. Such liquid net assets used to support the recovery and orderly wind-down plan should be held in addition to the assets required to cover participant defaults and other risks.

Id.

Principle 16 addresses custody and investment risks, stating that an FMI should safeguard its own assets as well as the assets of its participants.

81

Specifically, the FMI should minimize the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets.

82

In addition, the FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks.

83

81

PFMIs at Principle 16.

82

Id.

83

Id.

11. Principle 17: Operational Risk

Principle 17 addresses the risk of deficiencies in information systems or internal processes, human errors, management failures, or disruptions from external events that will result in the reduction or deterioration of services provided by the FMI.

84

Principle 17 states that “[b]usiness continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfillment [sic] of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or

major disruption.”

85

Additionally, an FMI's business continuity plan “should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (“IT”) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events.”

86

84

PFMIs, ¶ 2.9.

85

PFMIs at Principle 17.

86

Id.

at Principle 17, K.C. 6.

12. Principle 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness

Principle 21 addresses the efficiency and effectiveness of an FMI. An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of clearing and settlement arrangement, operating structure, scope of products cleared or settled and integration of technology and procedures.

87

An effective CCP reliably meets its obligations in a timely manner and achieves the public policy goals of safety and efficiency for participants and the markets it serves.

88

87

PFMIs at Principle 21, K.C. 1.

88

Id.

at Principle 21, K.C. 2-3.

13. Principle 22: Communication Procedures and Standards

Principle 22 addresses communication procedures and standards. An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.

89

These include common sets of rules across systems for exchange messages, standardized messaging formats, and reference data standards for identifying financial instruments and counterparties.

89

PFMIs at Principle 22, K.C. 1.

14. Principle 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data

Principle 23 addresses the disclosure of an FMI's rules and procedures to participants and the public. An FMI should disclose its rules and procedures to participants, so that participants can have an “accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI.”

90

Further, the FMI should make disclosures to the public regarding fees, basic operational information, and other relevant information, such as the responses to the Disclosure Framework published by CPSS-IOSCO,

91

so that prospective participants can also assess the risks, fees, and other material costs incurred by participating in the FMI.

92

90

PFMIs at Principle 23.

91

See

Disclosure Framework and Assessment Methodology,

supra

note 41.

92

See

PFMIs at E.N. 3.23.1.

F. The Role of the PFMIs in International Banking Standards

The Commission notes that where a CCP is not prudentially supervised in a jurisdiction that has domestic rules and regulations that are consistent with the standards set forth in the PFMIs, the implementation of certain international banking regulations will have significant cost implications for that CCP and its market participants.

In July of 2012, the BCBS,

93

the international body that sets standards for the regulation of banks, published the “Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties” (“Basel CCP Capital Requirements”), which sets forth interim rules governing the capital charges arising from bank exposures to CCPs related to OTC derivatives, exchange traded derivatives and securities financing transactions.

94

The Basel CCP Capital Requirements create financial incentives for banks

95

to clear financial derivatives with CCPs that are licensed in a jurisdiction where the relevant regulator has adopted rules or regulations that are consistent with the standards set forth in the PFMIs. Specifically, the Basel CCP Capital Requirements introduce new capital charges based on counterparty risk for banks conducting financial derivatives transactions through a CCP.

96

These new capital charges relate to a bank's trade exposure and default fund exposure to a CCP.

97

93

The BCBS is comprised of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from around the world including, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

See

Bank for International Settlements, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, December 2010 (revised June 2011),

available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.

94

See Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties

(July 2012),

available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.pdf

. The Basel CCP Capital Requirements are one component of Basel III, a framework that “is part of a comprehensive set of reform measures developed by the BCBS to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the international banking sector.”

See

Bank for International Settlement's Web site for compilation of documents that form the regulatory framework of Basel III,

available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm

.

95

“Bank” is defined in accordance with the Basel framework to mean a bank, banking group or other entity (

i.e.

bank holding company) whose capital is being measured.

See Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework,

Definition of Capital, paragraph 51. The term “bank,” as used herein, also includes subsidiaries and affiliates of the banking group or other entity. The Commission notes that a bank may be a client and/or a clearing member of a DCO.

96

See

Basel CCP Capital Requirements, Annex 4, Section II, 6(i).

97

Trade exposure is a measure of the amount of loss a bank is exposed to, based on the size of its position, given a CCP's failure. Under the Basel CCP Capital Requirements, trade exposure is defined to include the current and potential future exposure of a bank acting as either a clearing member or a client to a CCP arising from OTC derivatives, exchange traded derivatives transactions or securities financing transactions, as well as initial margin.

See

Basel CCP Capital Requirements, Annex 4, Section I, A: General Terms. Current exposure, includes variation margin that is owed by the CCP, but not yet been received by the clearing member or client.

Id.

Default fund exposure is a measure of the loss a bank acting as a clearing member is exposed to arising from the use of its contributions to the CCP's mutualized default fund resources.

See

Basel CCP Capital Requirements, Annex 4, Section I, A: General Terms.

The capital charges for trade exposure are based upon a function multiplying exposure by risk weight. Risk weight is a measure that represents the likelihood that the loss to which the bank is exposed will be incurred, and the extent of that loss. The risk weight assigned under the Basel CCP Capital Requirements varies significantly depending on whether or not the counterparty is a qualified CCP (“QCCP”).

98

A QCCP is defined as an entity that (i) is licensed to operate as a CCP, and is permitted by the appropriate regulator to operate as such, and (ii) is prudentially supervised in a jurisdiction where the relevant regulator has established and publicly indicated that it applies to the CCP on an ongoing basis, domestic rules and regulations that are consistent with the PFMIs.

99

If a bank transacts through a QCCP acting either as (1) a clearing member of a CCP for its own account or for clients

100

or (2) a client of a clearing member that enters into an OTC derivatives transaction with the clearing member acting as a financial intermediary, then the risk weight is a flat 2% for purposes of calculating the counterparty risk.

101

If

the CCP is non-qualifying, then risk weight is the same as a bilateral OTC derivative trade and the bank applies the corresponding bilateral risk-weight treatment, which is at least 20% if the CCP is a bank or as high as 100% if the CCP is a corporate institution.

102

98

See id.

at Annex 4, Section IX, Exposures to Qualifying CCPs, paragraphs 110-119 (describing the methodology for calculating a bank's trade exposure to a qualified CCP);

see also id.

at paragraph 126 (describing methodology for calculating a bank's trade exposure to a non-qualifying CCP). “A QCCP is defined as an entity that (i) is licensed to operate as a CCP, and is permitted by the appropriate regulator to operate as such, and (ii) is prudentially supervised in a jurisdiction where the relevant regulator has established and publicly indicated that it applies to the CCP on an ongoing basis, domestic rules and regulations that are consistent with the PFMIs.”

See

Section I, A: General Terms of the Basel CCP Capital Requirements).

99

Id.

at Section I, A: General Terms.

100

The term “client” as used herein refers to a customer of a DCO.

101

Id.

at Section IX: Central Counterparties, paragraphs 110 and 114. Client trade exposures are risk-weighted at 2% if the following two conditions are met: (1) The offsetting transactions are identified by the CCP as client transactions and

collateral to support them is held by the CCP and/or clearing member, as applicable, under arrangements that prevent losses to the client due to the default or insolvency of the clearing member, or the clearing member's other clients, or the joint default or insolvency of the clearing member and any of its other clients and (2) relevant laws, regulations, contractual or administrative arrangements provide that the offsetting transactions with the defaulted or insolvent clearing member are highly likely to continue to be indirectly transacted through the CCP, or by the CCP, should the clearing member default or become insolvent.

However, in certain circumstances risk weight may increase. Specifically, if condition 1 is not met (

i.e.

where a client is not protected from losses in the case that the clearing member and another client of the clearing member jointly default or become jointly insolvent) but condition 2 is met, the banks trade exposure is risk-weighted at 4%. If neither condition 1 nor 2 is met, then the bank must capitalize its exposure to the CCP as a bilateral trade.

Id.

at paragraphs 115 and 116.

102

See

BCBS,

Consultative Document: Capitalisation of Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties,

paragraph 28 (Nov. 2011),

available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs.206.htm

.

With respect to default fund exposure, whenever a clearing member bank is required to maintain capital for exposures arising from default fund contributions to a QCCP, the clearing member bank may apply one of two methodologies for determining the capital requirement: The risk-sensitive approach, or the 1250% risk weight approach.

103

The risk-sensitive approach considers various factors in determining the risk weight for a bank's default exposure to a QCCP such as (i) the size and quality of a QCCP's financial resources, (ii) the counterparty credit risk exposures of such a CCP, and (iii) the application of such financial resources via the CCP's loss bearing waterfall in the case one or more clearing members default.

104

The 1250% risk weight approach allows a clearing member bank to apply a 1250% risk weight to its default fund exposures to the QCCP, subject to an overall cap of 20% on the risk-weighted assets from all trade exposures to the QCCP.

105

In other words, banks with exposures to QCCPs have a cap on the capital charges related to their default fund exposure. In contrast, a clearing member bank with exposures to a non-qualified CCP must apply a risk weight of 1250% with no cap for default fund exposures.

106

103

See

Basel CCP Capital Requirements, Annex 4, Section IX, paragraphs 121-125.

104

Id.

at paragraph 122. The Commission notes that the 1250% risk weight represents the reciprocal of the 8% capital ratio (which is the percentage of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets).

105

Id.

at paragraph 125.

106

Id.

at paragraph 127.

Thus, the Basel CCP Capital Requirements provide incentives for banks, including their subsidiaries and affiliates, to clear derivatives through CCPs that are QCCPs by setting (1) lower capital charges for OTC derivatives transacted through a QCCP and (2) significantly higher capital charges for OTC derivatives transacted through non-qualifying CCPs. The increased capital charges for transactions through non-qualifying CCPs may have significant business and operational implications for U.S. DCOs that operate internationally and are not QCCPs. Specifically, banks faced with such higher capital charges may transfer their OTC derivatives business away from such DCOs to a QCCP in order to benefit from the preferential capital charges provided by Basel CCP Capital Requirements. Alternatively, banks may reduce or discontinue their OTC business altogether. Banks may also pass through the higher costs of transacting on a non-qualifying DCO that result from the higher capital charges to their customers. Accordingly, customers using such banks as intermediaries may transfer their business to an intermediary at a QCCP. In short, a DCO's failure to be a QCCP may cause it to face a competitive disadvantage retaining members and customers.

G. Proposed Rulemaking Applicable to SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs

As described in detail in section II below, this proposed rulemaking would create a new category of DCO, a Subpart C DCO. A Subpart C DCO would include any registered DCO that elects to become subject to the provisions in Subpart C of part 39 of the Commission's regulations (“Subpart C”). Further, this rulemaking would revise Subpart C so that Subpart C would apply to SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs, and would include new or revised standards for governance, financial resources, system safeguards, default rules and procedures for uncovered losses or shortfalls, risk management, disclosure, efficiency, and recovery and wind-down procedures. These requirements would address any remaining gaps between the Commission's regulations and the PFMI standards. Thus, Subpart C, together with the provisions in Subpart A and Subpart B, would establish domestic rules and regulations that are consistent with the PFMIs. As such, because SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs would have the requirements of Subpart A, Subpart B, and Subpart C applied to them on a continuing basis, SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs would be QCCPs for purposes of the Basel CCP Capital Requirements.

107

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the rules proposed herein, as well as comment on the specific provisions and issues highlighted in section II, below.

107

See

discussion of QCCP status

supra

Section I.F.

II. Discussion of Revised and Proposed Rules

A. Regulation 39.2 (Definitions)

The Commission proposes to amend regulation 39.2 by amending one definition and adding six definitions. First, the Commission proposes a technical amendment to the definition of “systemically important derivatives clearing organization.” The definition now describes a SIDCO as a registered DCO “which has been designated by the [Council] to be systemically important . . . .” The proposed definition would describe a SIDCO as a registered DCO “which is currently designated . . . ” This revision is necessary to allow for the possibility that a systemic importance designation may be rescinded.

108

108

See

76 FR at 44775 (finalizing 12 CFR 1320.13(b), which states that “[t]he Council shall rescind a designation of systemic importance for a designated financial market utility if the Council determines that the financial market utility no longer meets the standards for systemic importance.”).

Second, the Commission proposes to add a definition for the phrase “activity with a more complex risk profile,” to provide greater clarity as to the types of activities that would trigger a Cover Two financial resources requirement. The Commission proposes to define “activity with a more complex risk profile” to include clearing credit default swaps, credit default futures, and derivatives that reference either credit default swaps or credit default futures, as well as any other activity designated as such by the Commission. By permitting activities to be added by Commission action, the proposed definition provides the Commission with flexibility to address new and innovative market activities. The phrase “activity with a more complex risk profile” appears in regulation 39.29 (Financial resources requirements), which this rulemaking proposes to revise and renumber as regulation 39.33. The phrase also appears in PFMI Principles 4 (Credit risk) and 7 (Liquidity risk).

The Commission also proposes to add a definition for the term “subpart C

derivatives clearing organization.” As proposed, a “subpart C derivatives clearing organization” would include any registered DCO that is not a SIDCO and that has elected to become subject to Subpart C.

In addition, the Commission proposes to add definitions for “depository institution,” “U.S. branch and agency of a foreign banking organization,” and “trust company.” A “depository institution” would have the meaning set forth in Section 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 461(b)(1)(A)). A “U.S. branch and agency of a foreign banking organization” would mean the U.S. branch and agency of a foreign banking organization as defined in Section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101). A “trust company” would mean a trust company that is a member of the Federal Reserve System, under Section 1 of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 221), but that does not meet the definition of “depository institution.”

The Commission requests comment on these definitions. In particular, the Commission requests comment on the potential costs and benefits resulting from or arising out of the proposed definition of “activity with a more complex risk profile.” The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide both quantitative data and detailed analysis in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits. In addition, the Commission requests comment on whether there are alternative definitions that would provide a more effective or efficient means for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs. The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any such alternatives, and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives.

B. Regulation 39.30 (Scope)

The Commission proposes to expand regulation 39.28 (and renumber it as regulation 39.30) so that Subpart C would apply to SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs. As described above, the rules proposed in Subpart C address the gaps between Commission regulations and the standards set forth in the PFMIs.

109

As such, a DCO that is subject to the requirements of Subpart A, Subpart B, and Subpart C should meet the requirements for QCCP status and benefit from the lower capital charges on clearing member banks and bank customers of clearing members for exposures resulting from derivatives cleared through QCCPs.

110

Such a DCO may also be viewed more favorably by potential members or customers of members in that it would be seen to be held to international standards. Because of these potential benefits, the Commission proposes that a DCO that has not been designated to be systemically important should have the option to elect to become subject to Subpart C.

111

109

See also supra

Section I.G.

110

See supra

Section I.F.

111

As a technical matter, the Commission proposes to move existing paragraph (c) of renumbered regulation 39.30 (requiring a SIDCO to provide notice to the Commission in advance of any proposed change to its rules, procedures, or operations that could materially affect the nature or level of risks presented by the SIDCO, in accordance with the requirements of regulation 40.10) to proposed new regulation 39.42. Because the other provisions of proposed regulation 39.30 would pertain exclusively to the scope of Subpart C, it would be appropriate for existing paragraph (c) to be codified in a separate regulation.

See infra

Section II.N for further detail.

With respect to SIDCOs, the Commission is committed to maintaining risk management standards that enhance the safety and efficiency of a SIDCO, reduce systemic risks, foster transparency and support the stability of the broader financial system.

112

To support financial stability, a SIDCO must operate in a safe and sound manner. If it fails to measure, monitor, and manage its risks effectively, a SIDCO could pose significant risk to its participants and the financial system more broadly.

113

The Commission shares the stated objectives of the PFMIs, namely to enhance the safety and efficiency of FMIs and, more broadly, reduce systemic risk and foster transparency and financial stability.

114

The PFMIs have been adopted and implemented by numerous foreign jurisdictions.

115

A global, unified set of international risk management standards for systemically important CCPs can help support the stability of the broader financial system and, for the reasons set forth in the discussion below, the Commission proposes that SIDCOs be required to comply with all of the requirements set forth in part 39 of the Commission's regulations, including the proposed standards set forth in Subpart C.

112

See

SIDCO Final Rule (Discussion of risk management standards).

See also

Section 805(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

113

See supra

Section I.E.

114

PFMIs ¶ 1.15.

115

In Europe, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and implementing technical standards entered into force on March 15, 2013, and establish standards for CCPs that are consistent with the PFMIs. See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013,

available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:052:0041:0074:EN:PDF;

and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, preamble paragraph 90, 2012 O.J. (L 201),

available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:FULL:EN:PDF.

In Asia, Singapore has adopted the PFMIs into its financial regulations pertaining to FMIs.

See

Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures in Singapore,” (January 2013),

available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/About%20MAS/Monographs%20and%20information%20papers/MASMonograph_Supervision_of_Financial_Market_Infrastructures_in_Singapore%202.pdf.

In addition, Australia and Canada have publicly indicated their intent to adopt the PFMIs.

See

Reserve Bank of Australia, “Consultation on New Financial Stability Standards,” (August 2012),

available at http://www.rba.gov.au/payments-system/clearing-settlement/consultations/201208-new-fin-stability-standards/index.html;

Canadian Securities Administrators Consultation Paper 91-406 “Derivatives: OTC Central Counterparty Clearing,” (June 20, 2012),

available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category9/csa_20120620_91-406_counterparty-clearing.pdf.

In the United States, the SEC adopted a final rule that incorporates heightened risk management standards for CCPs that clear security-based swaps, based on, in part, the PFMIs' “Cover Two” standard for CCPs engaged in a more complex risk profile or that are systemically important in multiple jurisdictions.

See

17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(b)(3) (2013) (requiring, in relevant part, SEC-registered clearing agencies (

i.e.,

CCPs) to maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the participant family to which they have the largest exposure in extreme but plausible conditions, provided that a security-based swap clearing agency, (

i.e.,

a CCP that clears security-based swaps) shall maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the two participant families to which it has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market conditions).

The Commission requests comment on the proposed rules. Specifically, and in light of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial system, the Commission requests comment on the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring SIDCOs to comply with Subpart C. The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide quantitative data and detailed analysis in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits. In addition, the Commission requests comment on whether there are more effective or efficient means for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs. The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any such alternatives, and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives.

C. Regulation 39.31 (Election To Become Subject to the Provisions of Subpart C)

As discussed above,

116

the Basel CCP Capital Requirements impose significantly higher capital charges on banks (including their subsidiaries and

affiliates) that clear derivatives through CCPs that do not qualify as QCCPs. Because such charges could create incentives for banks to migrate their business to CCPs that are QCCPs or to avoid clearing, U.S. DCOs that operate internationally, but that are not QCCPs, may face a substantial competitive disadvantage. It would appear that DCOs that have not been designated by the Council as systemically important should have the ability to be held to international standards and to attain QCCP status.

117

Accordingly, the Commission is proposing regulation 39.31, which would provide a mechanism whereby a DCO that has not been designated by the Council as systemically important may elect to become subject to the provisions of Subpart C (

i.e.,

may “opt” to become subject to the regulations otherwise applicable only to SIDCOs) and, thereby, attain QCCP status. The Commission is also proposing procedures for withdrawing or rescinding that election.

116

See

discussion

supra

Section I.F.

117

A DCO that is subject to the obligations contained in Subpart A, Subpart B, and Subpart C would be a QCCP.

The proposed amendments to Subpart C are intended to enhance the financial integrity and operational security of a SIDCO, which is critically important to safeguarding the stability of the U.S. financial system. Accordingly, the Commission proposes that a SIDCO should be subject to all of the requirements set forth in Subpart C. The Commission recognizes, however, that the overall balance of the costs and benefits of this enhanced regulatory regime, including the benefits accruing from QCCP status, and the costs associated with the implementation of Subpart C, may vary among DCOs that are not SIDCOs. The proposed “opt-in” regime allows DCOs that are not designated by the Council as systemically important to weigh for themselves the costs and benefits of attaining QCCP status.

The authority provided by Sections 5b(c)(2)(A) and 8a(5) of the CEA permits the Commission to establish and enforce regulations applicable to specified categories of DCOs that affirmatively elect to become subject to such regulations. Indeed, the Commission notes that it applies, and maintains the authority to enforce, regulations to persons and entities that voluntarily register in certain capacities.

118

118

See, e.g.,

Section 5b(b) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7a-1(b) (voluntary registration as a DCO). The Commission recognizes that for such entities, the benefits of voluntary registration outweigh the costs of complying with the CEA and Commission regulations. Thus, the Commission permits such entities to register with it, which registration necessarily entails continuing supervision by the Commission, compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, and Commission authority to enforce the CEA and its regulations against such entities.

Authority for proposed regulation 39.31 is also supported by Section 752 of the Dodd- Frank Act,

119

which, as described above, directs the Commission to consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on effective and consistent global regulation of swaps and futures. Expanding the application of Subpart C to include DCOs that have not been designated by the Council as systemically important, but that nonetheless wish to become subject to regulations that are fully consistent with the standards set forth in the PFMIs, helps promote the international consistency called for in Section 752.

119

See supra

note 19.

The mandate of Section 15 of the CEA further supports the adoption of a flexible approach, permitting some non-SIDCOs, but not all DCOs, to be subject to the additional regulations of Subpart C. As discussed below in more detail, the Commission is required by Section 15(a)(1) to consider the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation prior to promulgating it.

120

The benefits of enhanced financial integrity and operational security, the benefits accruing from being held to international standards and from QCCP status, and the costs associated with the implementation of Subpart C, may vary among DCOs that have not been designated as systemically important. DCOs that wish to compete internationally may find compliance with Subpart C a necessary cost to operate on a global stage. Similarly, DCOs that have banks or bank affiliates as members may find such compliance important to their membership and, in turn, to their own business. Accordingly, the Commission proposes that, at this time, DCOs that are not designated as systemically important should be provided with the opportunity to become subject to Subpart C based upon their assessments of the benefits and burdens associated with meeting the regulations set out in this Subpart C.

120

See infra

Section IV.C (Consideration of Costs and Benefits);

see also

Section 15(a)(1) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 19(a)(1), stating that, “Before promulgating a regulation under this Act or issuing an order . . . the Commission shall consider the costs and benefits of the action of the Commission.”

The Commission emphasizes however, that, under the present proposal, once a non-SIDCO elects to become subject to Subpart C, that non-SIDCO would, as of the effective date of the election, be subject to examination for compliance with Subpart C and to enforcement action for non-compliance. This status would continue until such time, if any, as the election is properly vacated as set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(e).

1. Regulation 39.31(a): Eligibility Requirements

Proposed regulation 39.31(a) sets forth the two categories of entities that would be eligible to elect to become subject to the provisions in Subpart C. A DCO that is not a SIDCO could request such election using the procedures set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(b). An entity applying for registration as a DCO pursuant to regulation 39.3 (“DCO Applicant”) could request the election in conjunction with its application for registration (“Registration Application”) using the procedures set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(c).

2. Regulation 39.31(b): Subpart C Election and Withdrawal Procedures for Registered DCOs

Proposed regulation 39.31(b) would establish the procedures by which a DCO that is already registered could elect to become subject to the provisions of Subpart C and the procedure by which it could withdraw that election. These procedures are intended to provide the Commission, clearing members, and customers (and regulators of such clearing members and customers) with assurance that the electing DCO will be held to and will be required to meet the standards set forth in Subpart C and in the PFMIs.

A DCO seeking to become subject to Subpart C would be required to file with the Commission a completed Subpart C Election Form, which is proposed to be included in part 39 of the Commission's regulations as Appendix B thereto. The proposed Subpart C Election Form would include three parts: (1) General Instructions, (2) Elections and Certifications, and (3) Disclosures and Exhibits. As discussed below, a DCO Applicant requesting an election to become subject to Subpart C also would be required to file a Subpart C Election Form with the Commission.

121

121

See

discussion

infra

Section II.C.3.

In the Elections and Certifications portion of the Subpart C Election Form, a DCO would be required to affirmatively elect to become subject to Subpart C and to specify the date upon which it seeks to make its election effective. The effective date selected by the DCO could be no earlier than ten business days after the date the Subpart C Election Form is filed with the

Commission. The DCO, through its duly authorized representative,

122

would be required to certify that, as of the effective date of its election, the DCO will be in compliance with Subpart C and will remain in compliance unless and until the DCO rescinds its election pursuant to proposed regulation 39.31(e), discussed below.

123

The DCO also would be required to certify, through its duly authorized representative, that all information contained in the Subpart C Election Form is “true, current and complete in all material respects.”

122

The signatures required by the “Elections and Certifications” portion of the proposed Subpart C Election Form would be required to be the manual signatures of the duly authorized representatives of the DCO described in the instructions. If the Subpart C Election Form is filed by a corporation, the Elections and Certifications would be required to be signed in the name of the corporation by a principal officer duly authorized; if filed by a limited liability company, they would be required to be signed in the name of the limited liability company by a manager or member duly authorized to sign on the limited liability company's behalf; if filed by a partnership, they would be required to be signed in the name of the partnership by a general partner duly authorized; and if filed by an unincorporated organization or association which is not a partnership, they would be required to be signed in the name of such organization or association by the managing agent (

i.e.,

a duly authorized person who directs or manages or who participates in the directing or managing of its affairs).

123

See

discussion

infra

Section II.C.5.

In the Disclosures and Exhibits portion of the Subpart C Election Form, a DCO would be required to provide a regulatory compliance chart that separately sets forth for proposed Subpart C regulations 39.32 through 39.39, citations to the relevant rules, policies and procedures of the DCO that address each such regulation and a summary of the manner in which the DCO will comply with each regulation. In addition, the DCO would be required to provide, in separate exhibits, any documents that demonstrate its compliance with proposed Subpart C regulations 39.32 through 39.36 and 39.39.

124

The Commission also proposes requiring the DCO to complete and to publish on the DCO's Web site the DCO's responses to the Disclosure Framework and to provide the Commission with the URL to the specific page where such responses can found.

125

The Disclosure Framework would be required to be completed in accordance with section 2.0 and Annex A thereof

126

and would be expected to fully explain how the DCO complies with the standards set forth in the PFMIs. As noted in section 2.5 of the Disclosure Framework, CPSS-IOSCO are in the process of developing a set of criteria for the disclosure by an FMI of quantitative information to enable stakeholders to evaluate FMIs and to make cross-comparisons (“Quantitative Information Disclosure”). The Commission proposes requiring the DCO, in the event that such criteria are published, to publish its Quantitative Information Disclosure on the DCO's Web site and to provide the Commission, on its Subpart C Election Form, the URL to the specific page where the Quantitative Information Disclosure may be found.

124

This approach is consistent with the Form DCO that must be filed by DCO Applicants. The Form DCO requires DCO Applicants to submit to the Commission, as individual exhibits to the Form DCO, documents that demonstrate compliance with the requirements contained in Subpart B. 17 CFR Part. 39, Appendix A.

125

This proposed obligation is consistent with the obligation under proposed regulation 39.37 of SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to complete and publically disclose their Disclosure Framework responses.

See

discussion

infra

Section II.I.

126

Compliance with Section 2 and Annex A of the Disclosure Framework, collectively, would require the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to provide “a comprehensive narrative disclosure for each applicable [PFMI] principle with sufficient detail and context to enable the reader to understand the [SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's] approach to observing the principle. In addition, the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to provide: (1) An executive summary of the key points from the disclosure [responses]; (2) a summary of the major changes since the last update of the disclosure[responses]; (3) a description of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO and the markets it serves, including basic data and performance statistics on its services and operations; (4) a description of the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's general organization and governance structure; (5) an overview of the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's legal and regulatory framework; (6) an explanation of the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's system design and operation; (6) a list of publicly available resources, including those referenced in the disclosure [responses], that may help a reader understand the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO and its approach to observing each applicable PFMI principle. The narrative disclosure for each principle would be required to provide sufficient detail and context “to enable a variety of readers with different backgrounds to understand the [SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's] approach to observing the principle.”

Id.

Pursuant to proposed regulation 39.31(b)(2), the filing of a Subpart C Election Form would not create a presumption that the Subpart C Election Form is materially complete or that supplemental information would not be required. The Commission could, prior to the effective date, request that the DCO provide supplemental information in order to process the DCO's Subpart C Election Form and the DCO would be required to file such supplemental information with the Commission. Proposed regulation 39.31(b)(3) also would require the DCO to promptly amend its Subpart C Election Form if it discovers a material omission or error in, or if there is a material change in, the information provided to the Commission in the Subpart C Election Form or other information provided in connection with the Subpart C Election Form.

Once a Subpart C Election Form is filed by a DCO, the Commission may permit the DCO's election to become subject to Subpart C to take effect as set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(b)(4) or may stay or deny the election under proposed regulation 39.31(b)(5). If the Commission stays or denies the election, it would issue written notification thereof to the DCO. Proposed regulation 39.31(b)(4) would provide that, unless the Commission stays or denies the DCO's election to become subject to Subpart C, such election would become effective upon the later of: (1)(i) The effective date specified by the DCO in its Subpart C Election Form or (ii) ten business days after the DCO files its Subpart C Election Form with the Commission or (2) or upon the effective date set forth in written notification from the Commission that it shall permit the election to take effect after a stay issued pursuant to proposed regulation 39.31(b)(5). The Commission may provide written acknowledgement of receipt of the DCO's Subpart C Election Form, as well as written acknowledgement that it has permitted the DCO's election to become subject to Subpart C to take effect and the effective date of that election.

127

The Commission emphasizes that, consistent with the certification required to be provided by a DCO as part of its Subpart C Election Form, a DCO, as of the date its election to become subject to Subpart C becomes effective, would be held to the requirements of Subpart C and the DCO would become subject to potential enforcement action by the Commission for failure to comply with any such requirements. To the extent that compliance with Subpart C would require the DCO to implement new rules or rule amendments, all such rules or rule amendments must be approved or permitted to take effect prior to the effective date.

127

The decision to approve, to deny or to stay an election to become subject to Subpart C may be made by, and the related written notices may be provided by, the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk pursuant to the authority delegated to him or her under the proposed amendment to regulation 140.94.

See infra

Section II.O.

Proposed regulation 39.31(b)(7) would allow a DCO that has submitted a Subpart C Election Form to withdraw the form at any time prior to the effective date specified therein by filing a notice thereof with the Commission. Withdrawal, however, would not be permitted on or after the specified effective date. A DCO that wishes to rescind its election to become subject to

Subpart C after the effective date would be permitted to do so using the procedures set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(e).

128

128

See

discussion

infra

Section II.C.5.

3. Regulation 39.31(c): Election and Withdrawal Procedures for DCO Applicants

Proposed regulation 39.31(c) sets forth procedures through which a DCO Applicant may request to become subject to the provisions of Subpart C at the time that the DCO Applicant files its Registration Application. These procedures are intended to provide the Commission with a basis to evaluate the DCO Applicant's ability to comply with the provisions of Subpart C, and ultimately to provide the Commission, potential members and customers (and regulators of such members and customers) with assurance that the DCO Applicant will, once DCO registration has been granted, be held to and will, in fact, meet the standards set forth in Subpart C and in the PFMIs.

The Commission encourages DCO Applicants to make their election to become subject to Subpart C at the time that their Registration Application is filed. The Commission anticipates considerable overlap between the information and documentation contained in a Registration Application filed by a DCO Applicant and the information and documentation that would be required to be submitted to the Commission as part of a Subpart C Election Form. It would appear that simultaneous filings would allow Commission resources to be used more efficiently and effectively.

As proposed, a DCO Applicant requesting an election to become subject to Subpart C would make such request by attaching a Subpart C Election Form to the Form DCO that the DCO Applicant files pursuant to regulation 39.31. The certifications, disclosures, and exhibits that would be required to be provided by a DCO Applicant in the Subpart C Election Form would be the same as those required of registered DCOs,

129

except that the DCO Applicant would not specify an effective date for its election. Rather, the DCO Applicant would certify that, if the Commission permits its election to become subject to Subpart C to become effective, the DCO Applicant will be in compliance with the Subpart C regulations as of the date set forth in the Commission's notice thereof.

129

The DCO Applicant would be required to: (1) Certify that all information contained in its Subpart C Election Form is “true, correct and complete in all material respects;” (2) provide a regulatory compliance chart that separately sets forth, for proposed Subpart C regulations 39.32 through 39.39, citations to the relevant rules, policies and procedures of the DCO Applicant that address each such regulation and a summary of the manner in which the DCO Applicant will comply with each regulation; (c) provide, as separate exhibits to the Subpart C Election Form, any documents that demonstrate the DCO Applicant's compliance with proposed Subpart C regulations 39.32 through 39.36 and 39.39; (d) complete and publish on the DCO Applicant's Web site, the DCO's responses to the Disclosure Framework and provide the Commission with the URL to specific Web site page where such responses can found; and (e) if applicable, publish on the DCO Applicant's Web site the DCO Applicant's Quantitative Information Disclosure and provide the Commission the URL to the specific page where such disclosure may be found.

As with Subpart C Election Forms filed by registered DCOs, the filing of a Subpart C Election Form by a DCO Applicant would not create a presumption that the Subpart C Election Form is materially complete or that supplemental information would not be required. Under proposed regulation 39.31(c)(3), the Commission could, at any time during the Commission's review of the Subpart C Election Form, request that the DCO Applicant submit supplemental information in order for the Commission to process the DCO Applicant's Subpart C Election Form or its Registration Application and the DCO Applicant would be required to file such supplemental information. In addition, the DCO Applicant would be required by proposed regulation 39.31(c)(4) to promptly amend its Subpart C Election Form if it discovers a material omission or error in, or if there is a material change in, the information provided to the Commission in the Subpart C Election Form or other information provided in connection with the Subpart C Election Form.

130

130

Proposed regulations 39.31(c)(3) and 39.31(c)(4) are consistent with regulations 39.3(a)(2) and 39.3(a)(3) governing DCO application amendments and the submission of supplemental information in connection with a DCO application, respectively. 17 CFR 39.31(a)(2)-(3).

Under proposed regulation 39.31(c)(2), the Commission would review the Subpart C Election Form as part of the Commission's review of the DCO Applicant's Registration Application and the Commission, based upon its review and analysis of the information submitted in the Subpart C Election Form, could permit the DCO Applicant's election to take effect at the time it approves the Registration Application. The Commission would provide the DCO Applicant written notice of its determination to permit the election to become subject to Subpart C to become effective.

131

The Commission notes that any Registration Application for which there is a Subpart C Election Form pending would be evaluated against the standards set forth in Subpart C as well as the standards set forth in Subpart A and Subpart B in order for the Commission to approve the Registration Application. That is, the Commission would not approve any such Registration Application if the Commission determines that the DCO Applicant's election to become subject to Subpart C should not become effective because the DCO Applicant has not demonstrated its ability to comply with the requirements of Subpart C. The DCO Applicant would be permitted to withdraw the Subpart C Election Form as set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(c)(5), however, prior to the Commission's taking action on the Registration Application.

131

The decision to permit a DCO to become subject to Subpart C may be made by, and notice thereof may be provided by, the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk, as set forth in Commission regulation 140.94, as proposed to be amended herein.

See

discussion

infra

Section II.O.

Proposed regulation 39.31(c)(5) would permit a DCO Applicant to withdraw a request to become subject to Subpart C by filing with the Commission a notice of the withdrawal. The DCO Applicant could withdraw its Subpart C Election Form without withdrawing its Form DCO.

4. Regulation 39.31(d)—Public Information

Proposed regulation 39.31(d) would provide that certain portions of the Subpart C Election Form will be considered public documents that may routinely be made available for public inspection. Such portions include: The Elections and Certifications and Disclosures in the Subpart C Election Form, the rules of the DCO, the regulatory compliance chart, and any other part of the Subpart C Election Form that is not covered by a request for confidential treatment subject to regulation 145.9. This proposal is consistent with the transparent treatment typically afforded materials submitted in connection with applications to become registered with the Commission.

132

132

See, e.g.,

17 CFR 39.3(a)(5) (setting forth those portions of DCO Registration Applications that are considered public information).

5. Regulation 39.31(e)—Rescission

Proposed 39.31(e) would permit a Subpart C DCO to rescind its election to comply with Subpart C by filing a notice of its intent to rescind the election with the Commission. The Commission proposes that DCOs that “opt-in” to Subpart C should be permitted to rescind, subject to certain conditions. These conditions are intended to provide the DCO's members and

customers, and the regulators of such members and customers, notice of, and time to take such actions as these entities may deem appropriate in light of, the DCO's decision to rescind its election. As discussed above, the Commission proposes that a SIDCO should be required to comply with the Subpart C provisions unless and until the SIDCO's designation as systemically important is rescinded by the Council.

133

133

See

12 CFR 1320.13(b) (procedure for the Council to rescind a designation of systemic importance for a systemically important financial market utility).

As proposed, the rescission of a DCO's election to become subject to Subpart C would become effective on the date specified by the Subpart C DCO in its notice of intent to rescind the Subpart C election, except that the rescission could not become effective any earlier than 90 days after the date the notice of intent to rescind is filed with the Commission. This proposed 90-day period is necessary to provide banks and other entities that wish to limit their cleared transactions to clearing solely through a QCCP (

e.g.,

because of the preferential Basel CCP Capital Requirements applicable to exposures to derivatives cleared through a QCCP) sufficient time to transfer their business to another Subpart C DCO or SIDCO. The Subpart C DCO would be required to comply with all of the provisions of Subpart C until such rescission is effective. The Commission also proposes requiring that the notice of intent to rescind include a certification that the Subpart C DCO has complied with and will comply with the notice requirements set forth in proposed regulation 39.31(e)(3).

Proposed regulation 39.31(e)(3)(i) would require a Subpart C DCO that files a notice of intent to rescind to provide periodic notices to each of its clearing members, and to have rules in place requiring each of its clearing members to provide such notices to each of the clearing member's customers. Specifically, a Subpart C DCO would be required to issue the following notices to its clearing members: (1) No later than the filing with the Commission of the notice of its intent to rescind its election to be subject to Subpart C, written notice that the Subpart C DCO intends to file such notice and the date that the rescission is intended to take effect, and (2) on the effective date of the rescission of its election to be subject to Subpart C, written notice that the rescission has become effective. These notices appear necessary to ensure that the Subpart C DCO's clearing members and customers are afforded sufficient time to consider and react to the implications of the Subpart C DCO's rescission of its election to be subject to Subpart C.

Proposed regulation 39.31(e)(3)(ii) would also require a Subpart C DCO to: (1) No later than the date it files a notice of its intent to rescind its election to be subject to Subpart C, provide notice to the general public of its intent to rescind such election; (2) on the effective date of the rescission of its election to be subject to Subpart C, provide written notice to the general public that the rescission has become effective; and (3) remove all references to its Subpart C DCO (and QCCP) status on its Web site and in all other materials that it provides to its clearing members and customers, other market participants, or members of the public. As discussed herein, because of the potential capital impact of transacting through a clearinghouse that is not a QCCP, these public notices would appear necessary to ensure that market participants are afforded sufficient time to consider and react to a Subpart C DCO's rescission of its election to be subject to Subpart C. However, the Commission proposes that the notices to the general public required by this subsection may be accomplished through publication on the Subpart C DCO's Web site.

In addition, the employees and representatives of the Subpart C DCO would be prohibited by proposed regulation 39.31(e)(3)(iii) from making any reference to the organization as a Subpart C DCO (or QCCP) on and after the date that the notice of its intent to rescind its election to become subject to Subpart C is filed. Because the QCCP recognition that accompanies Subpart C DCO status provides significant benefits to those transacting through a Subpart C DCO, it would be inappropriate and misleading to permit a DCO to hold itself out as a Subpart C DCO (or QCCP) once it has filed a notice of intention to rescind that status, even though the rescission is not immediately effective.

Proposed regulation 39.31(e)(4) provides that the rescission of a DCO's election to be subject to Subpart C would not affect the authority of the Commission concerning any activities or events occurring during the time that the DCO maintained its status as a Subpart C DCO. That is, the Subpart C DCO is continually obligated to, and would be subject to enforcement action for failure to, comply with the Subpart C provisions during the time that it was subject to Subpart C and maintained its Subpart C DCO status.

Proposed regulation 39.31(f) would provide that a SIDCO that is registered with the Commission, but whose designation of systemic importance is rescinded by the Council, shall immediately be deemed to be a Subpart C DCO. Such Subpart C DCO would be subject to the Subpart C provisions unless and until it elects to rescind its status as a Subpart C DCO.

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed regulation 39.31 including, without limitation, the following:

(1) All aspects of the proposed Subpart C election eligibility requirements including, without limitation, the appropriateness of permitting DCO Applicants to request to become subject to Subpart C at the time of filing their Registration Applications. If DCO Applicants should not be permitted to request to become subject to Subpart C at the time of filing their Registration Applications, what would be the basis for such prohibition and what would be a suitable waiting period after registration with the Commission for making a Subpart C Election Form filing?

(2) All aspects of the proposed Subpart C Election Form including, without limitation, the following:

(a) The elections and certifications contained therein and the disclosures and exhibits required;

(b) whether DCOs and DCO Applicants should be permitted to amend or supplement their Subpart C Election Form; and

(c) possible incentives to encourage DCOs and DCO Applicants to file Subpart C Election Forms that are accurate and complete at the time of filing, in order to avoid amendments, supplements and withdrawals.

(3) Whether the Commission should require the Subpart C Election Form certifications to be made under penalty of perjury.

(4) All aspects of the proposed election and withdrawal procedures applicable to DCOs including, without limitation, the following:

(a) The appropriateness of permitting a DCO to designate the effective date of its status as a Subpart C DCO that is subject to the provisions of Subpart C;

(b) The appropriateness of the ten-business-day waiting period prior to a DCO's status as a Subpart C DCO becoming effective, any suggested alternative time frame, and the reasons why such alternatives would be preferable; and

(c) The circumstances under which it would be appropriate for the Commission to provide written acknowledgement of receipt of the Subpart C Election Form and/or the effective date of the DCO's Subpart C

DCO status, and the form of such acknowledgment.

(5) All aspects of the proposed election and withdrawal procedures applicable to DCO Applicants including, without limitation, the following:

(a) The prohibition against approving a Registration Application if a related Subpart C Election Form is pending and the Commission has determined that the DCO Applicant's request to become subject to Subpart C should not take effect;

(b) The circumstances under which it may be appropriate for the Commission to approve a Registration Application, but to stay or deny an election to become subject to Subpart C;

(c) If the Commission were to approve a Registration Application, but deny an election to become subject to Subpart C, whether the DCO Applicant should be required to wait a particular amount of time (and if so, what amount of time would be appropriate) before being permitted to elect to become subject to Subpart C pursuant to proposed 39.31(b);

(d) If an election to become subject to Subpart C could be stayed when a Registration Application is approved, whether the stay should be limited to a particular time period (and if so, what time period) after which the election must be permitted to take effect or be denied; and

(e) Any incentives, including but not limited to any waiting period after registration for eligibility to elect to become a Subpart C DCO, to encourage DCO Applicants to submit their Subpart C Election Form with their Registration Applications.

(6) The circumstances under which a DCO or DCO Applicant should be permitted to withdraw its Subpart C Election Form.

(7) All aspects of the proposed procedures for rescinding an election to become subject to Subpart C including, without limitation, the following:

(a) The information that must be contained with the notice of intent to rescind;

(b) The benefits and burden of the mandatory 90-day waiting period between the filing of the notice of intent to rescind and the date the rescission is effective;

(c) The timing, content and methods, and the costs and benefits, of providing the required notices to clearing members, the customers of clearing members, and the general public;

(d) The requirement to remove and refrain from references to the DCO as a Subpart C DCO (and QCCP) and the timing thereof;

(e) The burden of a Subpart C DCO's rescission on bank clearing members and the bank customers of such Subpart C DCO's clearing members, including the costs associated with unwinding and/or transferring positions; and

(f) Whether any alternative or additional conditions should be required of a Subpart C DCO beyond the proposed 90-day waiting period (and if so what alternative or additional conditions would be appropriate). For example, is 90 days sufficient time for clearing members and their customers to take such action as they may deem appropriate in light of such rescission?

(8) Any alternative approach to permitting a DCO or DCO Applicant to elect to become subject to Subpart C.

(9) The provision that a SIDCO whose status as a designated financial market utility is rescinded by the Financial Stability Oversight Council, be immediately deemed to be a Subpart C DCO, pending an election by the former SIDCO to rescind Subpart C DCO status.

(10) What additional disclosures should the Commission require or what other measures should the Commission take to help ensure that Subpart C DCOs obtain QCCP status?

(11) The costs and potential benefits resulting from or arising out of, permitting a DCO to elect to become subject to the provisions of Subpart C, any aspect of the procedures for allowing such election under proposed regulation 39.31, and any aspect of any suggested alternative procedures.

For each comment submitted, the Commission requests that each commenter please provide detailed rationale supporting the response, as well as quantitative data where practicable, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits.

D. Regulation 39.32 (Governance for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

The Commission proposes to add regulation 39.32 in order to implement DCO Core Principles O (Governance Fitness Standards), P (Conflicts of Interest), and Q (Composition of Governing Boards) for SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs in a manner that is consistent with PFMI Principle 2 (Governance).

134

134

In 2010 and 2011, the Commission proposed regulations concerning the governance of DCOs (the “2010/2011 Proposals”).

See

Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 FR 63732 (Oct. 18, 2010);

see also

Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR 722 (Jan. 8, 2011). The Commission notes that the regulations contained in the 2010/2011 Proposals are the subject of a separate rulemaking and, as such, the Commission does not intend to address or include those regulations in this rulemaking.

As discussed above, DCO Core Principle O states that each DCO must establish governance arrangements that are transparent to fulfill public interest requirements and to permit the consideration of the views of owners and participants.

135

DCO Core Principle O also requires each DCO to establish and enforce appropriate fitness standards for (i) directors, (ii) members of any disciplinary committee, (iii) members of the DCO, (iv) any other individual or entity with direct access to the settlement or clearing activities of the DCO, and (v) any party affiliated with any entity mentioned in (i)-(v) above. In addition, DCO Core Principle P requires each DCO to establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision making process of the DCO, and DCO Core Principle Q states that each DCO must ensure that the composition of the governing board or committee of the DCO includes market participants. These core principles are substantively similar to PFMI Principle 2, which states that a CCP “should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of [the CCP], and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.” Additionally, under PFMI Principle 2, a CCP should have procedures for managing conflicts of interest among board members and board members and managers should be required have “appropriate skills,” “incentives,” and “experience.”

136

135

See supra

Section I.D.6.

136

PFMIs at Principle 2, K.C. 4-5.

The governance requirements set forth in proposed regulation 39.32 are designed to enhance risk management and controls by promoting fitness standards for directors and managers, promoting transparency of governance arrangements, and making sure that the interests of a SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's clearing members and, where relevant, customers are taken into account. Because of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial markets, the Commission is proposing these requirements for SIDCOs. Moreover, it would be beneficial to Subpart C DCOs, their members and customers, and the financial system generally to apply these standards to Subpart C DCOs.

Specifically, subsection (a) (General rules) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to establish governance arrangements that: (1) Are written, clear and transparent, place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO, and explicitly support the stability of the broader financial system and other relevant public interest considerations; (2) ensure that the design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO appropriately reflect the legitimate interests of clearing members, customers of clearing members, and other relevant stakeholders; and (3) disclose, to an extent consistent with other statutory and regulatory requirements on confidentiality and disclosure: (i) Major decisions of the board of directors to clearing members, other relevant stakeholders, and to the Commission, and (ii) major decisions of the board of directors having a broad market impact to the public.

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The provisions concerning transparency describe which information, including the identities of board members, should be disclosed to the public and/or the Commission.

Subsection (b) (Governance arrangements) would require the rules and procedures of a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to: (1) Describe the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's management structure; (2) clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and its committees, including the establishment of a clear and documented risk management framework; (3) clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of management; (4) establish procedures for managing conflicts of interest among board members; and (5) assign responsibility and accountability for risk decisions and for implementing rules concerning default, recovery, and wind-down.

Subsection (c) (Fitness standards for the board of directors and management) would require that board members and managers have the appropriate experience, skills, incentives and integrity; risk management and internal control personnel have sufficient independence, authority, resources and access to the board of directors; and that the board of directors include members who are not executives, officers or employees of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO or of their affiliates.

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of these proposals. The Commission is particularly interested in the following: In light of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial system, would compliance with proposed regulation 39.32 reduce systemic risks? Would applying proposed regulation 39.32 to SIDCOs and to Subpart C DCOs contribute to the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly the goals of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? What alternatives, if any, to proposed regulation 39.32 would be more effective in reducing systemic risk or accomplishing the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act? Is proposed regulation 39.32 consistent with the PFMIs? If not, what changes need to be made to achieve such consistency? What alternatives to proposed regulation 39.32, if any, would be more effective or efficient for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs? Can proposed regulation 39.32 be effectively implemented and complied with? If not, what changes can be made to permit effective implementation and compliance? What are the potential benefits and costs resulting from, or arising out of, requiring SIDCOs to comply with regulation 39.32? The Commission also requests comment on the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring Subpart C DCOs to comply with regulation 39.32. In considering costs and benefits, commenters are requested to address the effect of the proposed regulation not only on a DCO, but also on the DCO's clearing members, the customers of clearing members, and the financial system more broadly. The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide quantitative data in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits. The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any alternatives to proposed regulation 39.32 and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives.

E. Regulation 39.33 (Financial Resources Requirements for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

In 2013, the Commission finalized financial resource requirements for SIDCOs in a manner that parallels the financial resources standard in Principle 4 of the PFMIs.

138

Regulation 39.29 requires a SIDCO that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions, or that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile, to meet a Cover Two requirement,

i.e.

financial resources sufficient to enable it to meet its financial obligations to its clearing members notwithstanding a default by the two clearing members creating the largest combined financial exposure in extreme but plausible market conditions. Moreover, where a clearing member controls another clearing member or is under common control with another clearing member, regulation 39.29 also requires SIDCOs to treat affiliated clearing members as a single clearing member for the purposes of the Cover Two requirement. In addition, regulation 39.29 prohibits a SIDCO from using assessments as a financial resource to meet this Cover Two standard.

138

See

SIDCO Final Rule.

The Commission proposes to further amend regulation 39.29 to enhance financial resources requirements for SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs and to achieve consistency with the relevant provisions of the PFMIs, in particular Principle 4 and Principle 7.

The Commission first proposes to renumber existing regulation 39.29 to 39.33 and to apply the requirements set forth therein to Subpart C DCOs. The Commission further proposes, for purposes of organization, deleting from paragraph (a)(1) the requirement that, where a clearing member controls another clearing member or is under common control with another clearing member, a SIDCO treat affiliated clearing members as a single clearing member (the “Clearing Member Aggregation Requirement”). The Commission proposes to include such language in new paragraph (a)(4) to clarify that the Clearing Member Aggregation Requirement applies when a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO calculates its financial resources requirements under regulation 39.33(a) as well as its liquidity resources requirements under regulation 39.33(c).

The Commission also proposes amending paragraph (a) to state that the Commission shall, if it deems appropriate, determine whether a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions. In making this determination, the Commission would, in order to limit such determinations to appropriate cases, review whether another jurisdiction had determined the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to be systemically important according to a designations process that considers whether the foreseeable effects of a failure or disruption of the derivatives clearing organization could threaten the stability of each relevant jurisdiction's financial system. In addition, the Commission proposes amending paragraph (a) to state that the Commission shall also determine, if it deems appropriate, whether any of the activities of a SIDCO

or Subpart C DCO, in addition to clearing credit default swaps, credit default futures, and any derivatives that reference either, has a more complex risk profile and may take into consideration characteristics such as non-linear and discrete jump-to-default price changes.

139

In addition and in light of the proposed liquidity provisions discussed below, the Commission proposes a technical clarification to paragraph (a)(1) to make clear that such a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO must meet its “credit exposure” (rather than “financial obligations”) to its clearing members notwithstanding a default by the two clearing members creating the largest “aggregate credit” (rather than “combined financial”) exposure in extreme but plausible market conditions. The Commission also proposes amending paragraph (b) to clarify that the prohibition on including assessments as a financial resource applies to calculating financial resources needed to cover the default of the largest and, where applicable, second largest clearing member, in extreme but plausible circumstances.

140

139

The Commission's proposed amendment to regulation 140.94(a) would delegate the authority to make these determinations to the Director of the Division of Clearing and Risk.

140

The preamble to the SIDCO Final Rule adopting release made clear that paragraph (b) applied to both Cover One and Cover Two, but the Commission has decided to add clarifying language to the regulation text.

See generally

SIDCO Final Rule.

The Commission proposes adding paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to address the liquidity of SIDCOs' and Subpart C DCOs' financial resources. These new paragraphs are intended to address the gaps between current part 39 requirements and standards set forth in Principle 7.

141

141

As discussed above in Section I.E.6, Principle 7, K.C. 2 requires a CCP to measure, monitor, and manage liquidity risk effectively. This includes the CCP maintaining sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies in order to effect same-day and, where applicable, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations in a wide range of potential stress scenarios, including the default of the participant that would create the largest aggregate payment obligations in extreme but plausible market conditions. In addition, Principle 7, K. C. 5 limits a CCP to counting only certain qualifying liquid resources for the purpose of meeting its financial resources requirement. These resources include: Cash in the currency of the requisite obligations, held either at the central bank of issue or at a creditworthy commercial bank; committed lines of credit; or high quality, liquid, general obligations of a sovereign nation. In addition, Principle 7, K. C. 4 states that a CCP that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile should consider maintaining sufficient qualifying liquid resources to meet the default of the two participants that would create the largest aggregate payment obligations in such circumstances. Principle 7, K. C. 7 also requires a CCP to monitor its liquidity providers, including clearing members, by undertaking due diligence to confirm that they have sufficient information to understand and manage their liquidity risks and have the capacity to perform as required under their commitments to the CCP.

Proposed paragraph (c)(1) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to maintain eligible liquidity resources that will enable the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to meet its intraday, same-day, and multiday settlement obligations, as defined in regulation 39.14(a), with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of stress scenarios, including the default of the member creating the largest liquidity requirements under extreme but plausible circumstances. Maintaining resources that enable the DCO to meet these obligations will help prevent a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO from defaulting on its obligations to non-defaulting clearing members, which is particularly important for a SIDCO because of the potential impact that the failure of a SIDCO could have on the U.S. financial markets.

Proposed paragraph (c)(2) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to maintain liquidity resources that are sufficient to satisfy the obligations required by new paragraph (c)(1) in all relevant currencies for which the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO has settlement obligations to its clearing members. A SIDCO should be able promptly to meet its obligations in each relevant currency. If a SIDCO has sufficient funds to meet an obligation, but the funds are not in the correct currency, then the SIDCO cannot meet that obligation in a timely manner, which could lead to a disruption of the SIDCO's services. Such disruption could, in turn, have a significant impact on the financial stability of the U.S. economy.

Proposed paragraph (c)(3) would limit a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to using only certain types of liquidity resources to satisfy the minimum liquidity requirement set forth in proposed paragraph (c)(1).

142

Among these “qualifying liquidity resources” are “committed lines of credit,” “committed foreign exchange swaps,” and “committed repurchase agreements.” “Committed” is intended to connote a legally binding contract under which a liquidity provider agrees to provide the relevant liquidity resource without delay or further evaluation of the DCO's creditworthiness,

e.g.,

a line of credit that cannot be withdrawn at the election of the liquidity provider during times of financial stress, or in the event of the default of a member of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO.

143

The proposed list of these resources is consistent with those set forth in Principle 7. Also consistent with Principle 7, proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions, or that is involved in activities with a more complex risk profile, to consider maintaining eligible liquidity resources that, at a minimum, will enable it to meet its intraday, same-day, and multiday settlement obligations, stress scenarios that include a default of the two clearing members creating the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the DCO in extreme but plausible market conditions. The financial integrity of a SIDCOs and or Subpart C DCOs might be enhanced if it considers meeting this enhanced standard.

142

In determining whether the liquidity resources that are eligible under paragraph (c)(3) are sufficient to meet the obligation specified under paragraph (c)(1) (resources that “enable” the DCO to meet its settlement obligations), it is important to avoid double counting. For example, one may not count both a committed repurchase arrangement and U.S. Treasury Bills that would be used to collateralize that arrangement.

143

Times of financial stress, and the event of the default of a member of the DCO are, of course, the times when reliable liquidity arrangements are most needed.

Under proposed paragraph (c)(3)(ii), a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to take appropriate steps to verify that its qualifying liquidity arrangements do not include material adverse change provisions and are enforceable, and will be highly reliable, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. This requirement is consistent with Principle 7.

Also consistent with Principle 7, under proposed paragraph (c)(4), if a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO maintains liquid financial resources in addition to those required to satisfy the Cover One requirement, then those resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable with proceeds available promptly or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repurchase agreements on an

ad hoc

basis. In addition, Principle 7 provides and proposed paragraph 39.33(c)(4) requires that a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO should consider maintaining collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks that is typically accepted by a central bank of issue for any currency in which it may have settlement obligations, but shall not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.

144

These provisions are designed to enhance the financial condition of SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs and help reinforce stability.

145

144

It should be noted that the requirement of proposed paragraph (c)(4) that a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO consider maintaining certain types of collateral, like the requirement of proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii), does not include a requirement as to the decision to be made following such consideration.

145

See generally

Financial Stability Oversight Council 2012 Annual Report, Appendix A at 163 (finding that “the contagion effect of a CME failure could impose material financial losses on CME's clearing members and other market participants (such as customers) and could lead to increased liquidity demands and credit problems across financial institutions, especially those that are active in the futures and options markets.”).

Pursuant to proposed paragraphs (d)(1)-(2), a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to monitor its liquidity providers in a manner consistent with Principle 7. Proposed paragraph (d)(1) would define “liquidity provider” to mean any of the following: (i) A depository institution, a U.S. branch and agency of a foreign banking organization, a trust company, or a syndicate of depository institutions, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banking organizations, or a trust companies providing a line of credit, foreign exchange swap facility or repurchase facility to the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO; and (ii) Any other counterparty relied upon by a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to meet its minimum liquidity resources requirement under paragraph (c) of this section. Moreover, under proposed paragraph (d)(5), a SIDCO with access to accounts and services at a Federal Reserve Bank is encouraged to use those services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.

146

In addition, proposed paragraph (d)(4) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquidity resources. Finally, pursuant to new subsection (e) and consistent with Principle 4, a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to document its supporting rationale for, and have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount of total financial resources it maintains pursuant to regulation 39.33(a) and the amount of total liquidity resources it maintains pursuant to regulation 39.33(c).

147

146

Under Section 806(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 5465(a), the Board may authorize a Federal Reserve Bank to establish and maintain an account for an FMU, which, as described above in Section I.B., includes a SIDCO. A SIDCO with access to accounts and services at a Federal Reserve Bank would be required to comply with related rules published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

See generally

Financial Market Utilities, 78 FR 14024 (Mar. 4, 2013) (proposal by the Board of rules to govern accounts held by designated FMUs).

147

This provision is consistent with PFMI Principle 4, K.C. 4.

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed regulation 39.33. The Commission is particularly interested in the following:

Are the proposed considerations in paragraph (a)(2) for determining whether a DCO is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions and in paragraph (a)(3) for determining whether it is engaged in activities with a more complex risk profile workable? Should alternative considerations be used?

In proposed paragraph (d)(4), should the Commission specify the frequency with which a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO must test its procedures for accessing its liquidity resources? In proposed paragraph (c)(3)(i)(E)(

1

) and (c)(3)(ii), the Commission permits highly marketable collateral to be used as a liquidity resource provided that such collateral is held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. As such, the Commission proposes to permit as a liquidity resource obligations of the United States Treasury or high quality, liquid, general obligations of a sovereign nation provided that such obligations are readily available and convertible into cash pursuant to prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements. This is consistent with the language of the PFMIs.

148

Should the requirement be for funding arrangements that are committed? The Commission requests comment on whether there are any highly reliable funding arrangements that meet the requirements of the proposed regulations that are not committed funding arrangements.

148

See PFMI Principle 7, K.C. 5.

In addition, in light of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial system, would compliance with proposed regulation 39.33 reduce systemic risks? Would proposed regulation 39.33 contribute to the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly the goals of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? What alternatives, if any, to proposed regulation 39.33 would be more effective in reducing systemic risk or accomplishing the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act? Is proposed regulation 39.33 consistent with the PFMIs? Are there more effective or efficient means for achieving consistency with the liquidity standards set forth in Principle 7? If not, what changes need to be made to achieve such consistency? What alternatives to proposed regulation 39.33, if any, would be more effective or efficient for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs? The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any such alternatives and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives. Should regulation 39.33 provide that only a SIDCO can be deemed systemically important in multiple jurisdictions? Can proposed regulation 39.33 be effectively implemented and complied with? If not, what changes can be made to permit effective implementation and compliance? What are the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring a SIDCO to comply with proposed regulation 39.33? What are the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring Subpart C DCOs to comply with proposed regulation 39.33? In considering costs and benefits, commenters are requested to address the effect of the proposed regulation not only on a DCO, but also on the DCO's clearing members, the customers of clearing members, and the financial system more broadly. The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide quantitative data in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits.

F. Regulation 39.34 (System Safeguards for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

In 2013, the Commission finalized regulation 39.30, which enhanced system safeguards requirements for SIDCOs for business continuity and disaster recovery, and included a two-hour recovery time objective (“RTO”) for SIDCOs.

149

As discussed in the adopting release, the two-hour RTO is consistent with Principle 17 of the PFMIs and increases the soundness and operating resiliency of the SIDCO, which in turn, increases the overall stability of the U.S. financial markets.

150

The Commission proposes renumbering regulation 39.30 as regulation 39.34 and amending the regulation to cover SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs as well as a technical correction to paragraph (b) to make clear that subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) concern each activity necessary for the daily processing, clearing, and settlement of existing and new contracts. Finally, to provide flexibility to address the practical burdens of obtaining the necessary physical and technological resources, and of organizing human resources, as appropriate to implement a two-hour RTO, the Commission proposes amending the regulation to allow the

Commission to, upon application, grant newly designated SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs up to one year to comply with the provisions of regulation 39.34.

149

See

SIDCO Final Rule.

150

Id.

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed regulation 39.34. The Commission is particularly interested in the following: Would applying proposed regulation 39.34 to Subpart C DCOs contribute to the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly the goals of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? What alternatives, if any, to proposed regulation 39.34 would be more effective in reducing systemic risk or accomplishing the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act? Is proposed regulation 39.34 consistent with the PFMIs? If not, what changes need to be made to achieve such consistency? What alternatives to proposed regulation 39.34, if any, would be more effective or efficient for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs? The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any such alternatives and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives. Can proposed regulation 39.34 be effectively implemented and complied with? If not, what changes can be made to permit effective implementation and compliance? What are the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring a SIDCO to comply with proposed regulation 39.34? What are the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring Subpart C DCOs to comply with proposed regulation 39.34? In considering costs and benefits, commenters are requested to address the effect of the proposed regulation not only on a DCO, but also on the DCO's clearing members, the customers of clearing members, and the financial system more broadly. The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide quantitative data in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits.

G. Regulation 39.35 (Default Rules and Procedures for Uncovered Credit Losses or Liquidity Shortfalls (Recovery) for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

The Commission is proposing regulation 39.35, which adds requirements pursuant to DCO Core Principle G, to address certain potential gaps between Commission regulations and Principles 4 and 7.

151

In particular, proposed regulation 39.35 is designed to protect SIDCOs, Subpart C DCOs, their members and customers, and the financial system more broadly by requiring SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to have plans and procedures to address credit losses and liquidity shortfalls beyond their prefunded resources, thus promoting their ability to promptly fulfill their obligations and continue to perform their critical functions.

151

DCO Core Principle G requires a DCO to have rules and procedures “designed to allow for the efficient, fair, and safe management of events during which [clearing] members or participants—(I) become insolvent; or (II) otherwise default on the obligations of the members or participants to the [DCO].” Each DCO “is required to (I) clearly state the default procedures on the [DCO]; (II) make publicly available the default rules of the [DCO]; and (III) ensure that the [DCO] may take timely action—(aa) to contain losses and liquidity pressures; and (bb) to continue meeting each obligation of the DCO.”

See supra

Section I.D.3.

Regulation 39.16 currently requires a DCO to adopt procedures permitting it to take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue meeting its obligations in the event of a default on the obligations of a clearing member to the DCO.

152

Proposed regulation 39.35 would require SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to adopt additional procedures to address certain issues arising from extraordinary stress events, including the default of one or more clearing members. Specifically, consistent with Principle 4 of the PFMIs, proposed paragraph (a) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to adopt rules and procedures addressing the following:

152

17 CFR 39.16(c).

1. How the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would allocate losses exceeding the financial resources available to the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO;

2. How the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would arrange for the repayment of any funds the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO may borrow; and

3. How the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would replenish any financial resources it may employ during such a stress event, so that the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be able to continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.

Consistent with Principle 7 of the PFMIs, proposed paragraph (b) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to establish rules and procedures enabling it to promptly meet all of its settlement obligations, on a same day and, where appropriate, on an intraday and multiday basis, in the context of the occurrence of either or both of the following scenarios: (i) Following an individual or combined default involving one or more clearing members' obligations to the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO or (ii) if there is an unforeseen liquidity shortfall exceeding the financial resources of the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO. Such rules and procedures should be established

ex ante

and may provide for the means of: increasing available assets (

e.g.

by using assessments) and/or reducing the size of liabilities (

e.g.

by engaging in variation margin haircuts or tear-ups); as well as obtaining liquidity from participants (

e.g.

through rules-based repurchase arrangements); employing a sequenced application of such tools; and replenishing any credit and liquidity resources that may be employed during a stress event.

Proposed regulation 39.35 addresses significant consequences that could result from a clearing member's default. Specifically, a DCO might not have sufficient financial resources following a clearing member's default either to cover the default or to fulfill its settlement obligations. Similarly, a DCO may be unable to fulfill its settlement obligations due to a liquidity shortfall exceeding its financial resources. In order to avoid the negative effect on its clearing members, their customers, and on the financial system more broadly of a DCO's failure promptly to meet its settlement obligations, it would be prudent for a DCO to have a recovery plan that addresses these scenarios and, given their importance to the U.S. financial system, it is critical for SIDCOs to have such plans. In addition, because this plan would be specified in the DCO's rules and/or procedures, it would be disclosed to clearing members, their customers, and the broader public. Such transparency would likely help clearing members, their customers, and other market participants properly allocate capital and other resources as well as facilitate the development of their own recovery plans.

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of these proposals. The Commission is particularly interested in the following: In light of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial system, would compliance with proposed regulation 39.35 reduce systemic risks? Would proposed regulation 39.35 contribute to the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly the goals of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? What alternatives, if any, to proposed regulation 39.35 would be more effective in reducing systemic risk or accomplishing the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act? Is proposed regulation 39.35 consistent with the PFMIs? If not, what changes need to be made to achieve such consistency?

What alternatives to proposed regulation 39.35, if any, would be more effective or efficient for achieving consistency with the standards set forth by the PFMIs? Can proposed regulation 39.35 be effectively implemented and complied with? If not, what changes can be made to permit effective implementation and compliance? What are the potential benefits and costs resulting from, or arising out of, requiring SIDCOs to comply with regulation 39.35? The Commission also requests comment on the potential costs and benefits resulting from, or arising out of, requiring Subpart C DCOs to comply with regulation 39.35. In considering costs and benefits, commenters are requested to address the effect of the proposed regulation not only on a DCO, but also on the DCO's clearing members, the customers of clearing members, and the financial system more broadly. The Commission requests that, where possible, commenters provide quantitative data in their comments, particularly with respect to estimates of costs and benefits. The Commission requests that commenters include a detailed description of any alternatives to proposed regulation 39.35 and estimates of the costs and benefits of such alternatives.

H. Regulation 39.36 (Risk Management for Systemically Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations and Subpart C Derivatives Clearing Organizations)

Proposed regulation 39.36 would include additional risk management requirements for SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs. As noted above, regulation 39.13 establishes the risk management requirements that a DCO would have to meet in order to comply with Core Principle D

153

including, among other things, specific criteria for stress tests that a DCO must conduct.

154

For example, regulation 39.13(h)(3)(ii) requires a registered DCO to, “on a weekly basis, conduct stress tests with respect to each clearing member account, by house origin and by each customer origin, and each swap portfolio…under extreme but plausible market conditions.” However, pursuant to this provision, a DCO has reasonable discretion in determining the methodology used to conduct such stress tests.

153

DCO Core Principle D requires each DCO to possess the ability to manage the risks associated with discharging the responsibilities of the DCO through the use of appropriate tools and procedures. It further requires each DCO to measure its credit exposures to each clearing member not less than once during each business day and to monitor each such exposure periodically during the business day. Core Principle D also requires each DCO to limit its exposure to potential losses from defaults by clearing members, through margin requirements and other risk control mechanisms, to reduce the risk that its operations would not be disrupted and that non-defaulting clearing members would not be exposed to losses that non-defaulting clearing members cannot anticipate or control. Finally, Core Principle D requires that the margin that the DCO requires from each clearing member be sufficient to cover potential exposures in normal market conditions, and that each model and parameter used in setting such margin requirements be risk-based and reviewed on a regular basis.

154

See supra

Section I.D.2.

The Commission is proposing regulation 39.36 to address certain differences between Commission regulations and Principles 4, 6, 7, and 9.

155

In particular, proposed regulation 39.36 would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to enhance its stress testing procedures in ways that will make it more likely that the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO will be able to understand the risks posed by its members, so that it can ensure that the relationship between its resources and obligations enables it to meet its obligations promptly.

155

See

discussion of Principles 4 and 6

supra

Sections I.E.4, I.E.5.

Specifically, and consistent with Principle 4, proposed regulation 39.36(a)(1) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to perform stress testing, on a daily basis, of its financial resources using predetermined parameters and assumptions. In addition, proposed regulation 39.36(a)(2) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to perform comprehensive analyses of stress testing scenarios and underlying parameters to ascertain that they are appropriate for determining the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's required level of financial resources in current and evolving market conditions. Proposed regulation 39.36(a)(3) would also require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to perform the analyses in proposed regulation 39.36(a)(2) “at least monthly when products cleared or markets served display high volatility, become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by clearing members increases significantly.” A SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would also be required to “evaluate [its] stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters more frequently than once a month,” where appropriate. For purposes of the analyses in proposed regulation 39.36(a)(1) and proposed regulation 39.36(a)(2), proposed regulation 39.36(a)(4) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to include the following stress scenarios for both defaulting clearing members' positions and possible price changes in liquidation periods: (i) Relevant peak historic price volatilities; (ii) shifts in other market factors including, as appropriate, price determinants and yield curves; (iii) multiple defaults over various time horizons; (iv) simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets; and (v) a range of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Moreover, proposed regulation 39.36(a)(5) would require each SIDCO and Subpart C DCO to establish procedures for reporting stress test results to its risk management committee or board of directors, as appropriate, and for using the results to assess the adequacy of, and to adjust the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's total financial resources. Finally, proposed regulation 39.36(a)(6) would require each SIDCO and Subpart C DCO to use the results of its financial resources stress testing to help make sure it meets the minimum financial resources requirement set forth in proposed regulation 39.33(a).

In addition, and consistent with Principle 7, the Commission is proposing stress testing requirements for liquidity resources that are analogous to the stress testing requirements for financial resources in proposed regulation 39.36(a), with the exception that the stress testing scenarios required by proposed regulation 39.36(c)(5) should consider the following: (i) All entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the DCO, including settlement banks, permitted depositories, liquidity providers, and other entities; (ii) intraday and multiday scenarios, where appropriate; (iii) inter-linkages between its clearing members and the multiple roles that they may play in in the SIDCO's or Subpart C DCO's risk management (

e.g.,

scenarios where a clearing member or its affiliate is also a liquidity provider); and (iv) the probability of multiple failures and contagion effect among clearing members.

Proposed regulation 39.36(c)(7) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to use the results of such stress tests to make certain that it meets the financial resources requirement set forth in regulation 39.33(a), and the liquidity resources requirements set forth in regulation 39.33(c). In addition, each SIDCO and Subpart C DCO would be required to perform, on an annual basis, a full validation of its financial risk management model and its liquid risk management model.

Proposed paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (e) are important because stress testing scenarios, underlying risk factors that constitute such scenarios, and the relationship between different risk

factors are dynamic, and need to be updated due to changing market conditions. For example, use of relative, instead of absolute, changes in interest rates may be sufficient in a normal interest rate environment, but can lead to nonsensical estimates during low rate periods. In other words, changes in a particular risk factor during unusually volatile periods may be more extreme than any in the existing scenarios. In addition, it is important for SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to stress test both their financial resources and liquidity resources. While stress testing financial resources helps SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs make sure they have the right amount, SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs need access to liquid assets subject to arrangements in which they can promptly be convertible to cash to fulfill their obligations in a timely manner. As such, stress testing liquidity resources is a critical exercise for SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs as such testing will help ensure that SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs have enough resources to cover their obligations at the time and on the day that such obligations are due. Moreover, given the significant role SIDCOs play in the U.S. financial markets, it would appear that obtaining an in-depth understanding of potential liquidity needs through comprehensive stress testing under a broad range of scenarios is critical for a SIDCO's effective risk management.

As noted above, Principle 6 requires a CCP's margin system to take into account the “risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio and market that it serves” and be calibrated accordingly.

156

In particular, Principle 6 requires a CCP to conduct a “sensitivity analysis” of its margin system at least monthly, and, more frequently, when appropriate. Accordingly, consistent with the standards set forth in Principle 6, paragraph (c) of proposed regulation 39.36 would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to conduct a sensitivity analysis of its margin model at least monthly to analyze and monitor model performance and overall margin coverage. Moreover, paragraph (c) would require the sensitivity analysis to involve reviewing a wide range of parameter settings and assumptions that reflect possible market conditions in order to understand how the level of margin coverage might be affected by highly stressed market conditions. The parameters and assumptions used by a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be expected to capture a variety of historical and hypothetical conditions, including the most volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets served by the SIDCO or Subpart C DCO and extreme changes in the correlations between prices. In addition, the sensitivity analysis would be conducted on both actual and hypothetical positions, and would include testing of the abilities of the models or model components to produce accurate results using actual or hypothetical datasets and assessing the impact of different model parameter settings. The SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would also be required to evaluate potential losses in clearing members' proprietary positions and, where appropriate, customer positions. With respect to SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs that are involved in activities with a more complex risk profile, the Commission proposes requiring such SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to take into consideration parameter settings that reflect the potential impact of the simultaneous default of two clearing members and consider the underlying credit instruments.

157

Proposed regulation 39.36(d) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO regularly to conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears, and proposed regulation 39.36(e) would require a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO to perform, on an annual basis, a full validation of its financial risk management model and its liquid risk management model. Moreover, under proposed paragraph (f), and consistent with Principle 16, custody and investment arrangements for a systemically important derivatives clearing organization's and subpart C derivatives clearing organization's own funds and assets would be subject to the same requirements as those specified in § 39.15 of this chapter for funds and assets of clearing members. This includes establishing standards and procedures that are designed to protect and ensure safety as specified in § 39.15(a), custody arrangements that minimize the risk of loss or of delay in access by the DCO as specified in § 39.15(c), and limitation of investments to instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks as specified in § 39.15(e).

156

See supra

Section I.E.5.

157

See supra

Section II.E (discussing “Cover Two” in connection with revised regulation 39.33 (financial resources)).

See generally

PFMIs at E.N. 3.6.17.

It is vitally important that all DCOs obtain an in-depth understanding of their exposure to credit risk. As financial derivatives markets expand globally and counterparty credit risk increases in size and complexity, a DCO's ability to assess its exposure to credit risk becomes even more critical. These proposed regulations are intended to enhance the ability of SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to manage their risk exposure. Because a SIDCO plays a significant role in the financial markets, accurate and dynamic risk management is critical not only to the SIDCO, but also to the stability of the broader U.S. financial system.

Under proposed paragraph (g), and consistent with Principle 9, a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from its settlement banks.

158

Specifically, a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to establish, and monitor adherence to, strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalization, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. In addition, a SIDCO or Subpart C DCO would be required to monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its settlement banks. In order to mitigate both the probability of being exposed to a settlement bank's failure and the potential losses and liquidity pressures to which it would be exposed in the event of such a failure, each SIDCO and Subpart C DCO should, where reasonable and practicable, use multiple settlement banks instead of one and consider using different settlement banks for different functions, such as depositing funds, investing funds or holding liquidity resources.

159

158

See

discussion of Principle 9

supra

Section I.E.7.

159

See

PFMIs at E.N. 3.9.5, 3.9.6. These issues could be avoided by a SIDCO to the extent it uses Federal Reserve Bank accounts and services pursuant to proposed regulation 39.33(d)(5).

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of proposed regulation 39.36. The Commission is particularly interested in the following: In light of the potential impact that a SIDCO's failure could have on the U.S. financial system, would compliance with proposed regulation 39.36 reduce systemic risks? Would proposed regulation 39.36 contribute to the goals articulated in the Dodd-Frank Act, particularly the goals of Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? What alternatives, if any, to propo

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