Mortgage Assistance Relief Services

Federal RegisterDec 1, 2010

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

16 CFR Part 322

RIN 3084-AB18

Mortgage Assistance Relief Services

AGENCY:

Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission).

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

Pursuant to the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (Omnibus Appropriations Act), as clarified by the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit CARD Act), the Commission issues a Final Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose (SBP) concerning the practices of for-profit companies that, in exchange for a fee, offer to work on behalf of consumers to help them obtain modifications to the terms of mortgage loans or to avoid foreclosure on those loans. The Final Rule, among other things, would: prohibit providers of such mortgage assistance relief services from making false or misleading claims; mandate that providers disclose certain information about these services; bar the collection of advance fees for these services; prohibit anyone from providing substantial assistance or support to another they know or consciously avoid knowing is engaged in a violation of the Rule; and impose recordkeeping and compliance requirements.

DATES:

This final rule is effective on December 29, 2010, except for § 322.5, which is effective on January 31, 2011.

ADDRESSES:

Requests for copies of this Rule and this Statement of Basis and Purpose (SBP) should be sent to: Public Reference Branch, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Room 130, Washington, DC 20580. The complete record of this proceeding is also available at that address. Relevant portions of the proceeding, including the Final Rule and SBP, are available at (

http://www.ftc.gov

).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Laura Sullivan or Evan Zullow, Attorneys, Division of Financial Practices, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20580, (202) 326-3224.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A.

Statutory Authority

On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009.

1

Section 626 of the Act directed the Commission to commence, within 90 days of enactment, a rulemaking proceeding with respect to mortgage loans.

2

Section 626 also directed the FTC to use notice and comment procedures under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553, to promulgate these rules.

3

1

Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Public Law 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (Omnibus Appropriations Act).

2

Id.

§ 626(a).

3

Id.

Because Congress directed the Commission to use these APA rulemaking procedures, the FTC did not use the procedures set forth in Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a.

On May 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Credit CARD Act.

4

Section 511 of this statute clarified the Commission's rulemaking authority under the Omnibus Appropriations Act. First, Section 511 specified that the rulemaking “shall relate to unfair or deceptive acts or practices regarding mortgage loans, which may include unfair or deceptive acts or practices involving loan modification and foreclosure rescue services.”

5

The Omnibus Appropriations Act, as clarified by the Credit CARD Act, does not specify any particular types of provisions that the Commission should include, or refrain from including, in a rule addressing loan modification and foreclosure rescue services, but rather directs the Commission to issue rules that “relate to” unfairness or deception.

6

Accordingly, the Commission interprets the Omnibus Appropriations Act to allow it to issue rules that prohibit or restrict conduct that may not be unfair or deceptive itself, but that are reasonably related to the goal of preventing unfairness or deception.

7

4

Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Public Law 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (Credit CARD Act).

5

Id.

§ 511(a)(1)(B).

6

Id.

7

Unlike Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a,

see Katharine Gibbs Sch.

v.

FTC,

612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979), the Omnibus Appropriations Act, as clarified by the Credit CARD Act, does not require that the Commission identify with specificity in the rule the unfair or deceptive acts or practices that the prohibitions will prevent. Omnibus Appropriations Act § 626(a); Credit CARD Act § 511(a)(1)(B).

Second, Section 511 of the Credit CARD Act clarified that the Commission's rulemaking authority was limited to entities that are subject to enforcement by the Commission under the FTC Act.

8

The rules the Commission promulgates to implement the Omnibus Appropriations Act, therefore, cannot cover the practices of banks, thrifts, Federal credit unions,

9

or certain nonprofits.

10

8

Credit CARD Act § 511(a)(1)(C).

9

15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2).

10

15 U.S.C. 44. Bona fide nonprofit entities are exempt from the jurisdiction of the FTC Act. Sections 4 and 5 of the FTC Act confer on the Commission jurisdiction over persons, partnerships, or corporations organized to carry on business for their profit or that of their members. 15 U.S.C. 44, 45(a)(2). The FTC does, however, have jurisdiction over for-profit entities that provide mortgage-related services as a result of a contractual relationship with a nonprofit organization.

See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind

v.

FTC,

420 F.3d 331, 334-35 (4th Cir. 2005). In addition, the Commission has jurisdiction over sham non-profits that in fact operate as for-profit entities.

See infra

note 176.

The Omnibus Appropriations Act, as clarified by the Credit CARD Act, also permits both the Commission and the states to enforce the rules the FTC issues.

11

The Commission can use its powers under the FTC Act to investigate and enforce the rules, and the FTC can seek civil penalties under the FTC Act against those who violate them. In addition, states can enforce the rules by bringing civil actions in Federal district court or another court of competent jurisdiction to obtain civil penalties and other relief. Before bringing such an action, however, states must give 60 days advance notice to the Commission or other “primary federal regulator” of the proposed defendant, and the regulator has the right to intervene in the action.

11

Omnibus Appropriations Act § 626(b); Credit CARD Act § 511(a)(1)(B).

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

12

The Dodd-Frank Act made substantial changes in the federal regulatory framework for providers of financial services. Among the changes, the Dodd-Frank Act will transfer the Commission's rulemaking authority under the Omnibus Appropriations Act to a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP)

13

on July 21, 2011, which is the “designated transfer date” that the Treasury Department has set.

14

In addition, on the designated transfer date, the FTC's authority to “prescribe rules” and “issue guidelines” under the Omnibus Appropriations Act will transfer to the BCFP.

15

Both the Commission and the BCFP, however, will have authority to bring law enforcement actions to enforce the rules promulgated under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, including the Final Rule in this Proceeding.

12

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd-Frank Act).

13

Id.

§ 1061.

14

Dep't of the Treasury,

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection; Designated Transfer Date,

75 FR 57252, 57253 (Sept. 20, 2010);

see also

Dodd-Frank Act § 1062.

15

Dodd-Frank Act § 1061.

B. The Rulemaking and Public Comments Received

On June 1, 2009, the Commission published in the

Federal Register

an Advance Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (ANPR) addressing the acts and practices of for-profit companies that offer to work on behalf of consumers to help them modify the terms of their loans or to avoid foreclosure. The ANPR described these services generically as “Mortgage Assistance Relief Services,” or “MARS.”

16

On March 9, 2010, the Commission published

17

a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and proposed rule addressing Mortgage Assistance Relief Services (MARS).

18

Among other things, the proposed rule included provisions that would:

16

See Mortgage Assistance Relief Services,

74 FR 26130 (June 1, 2009)

(MARS ANPR).

In response to the ANPR, the Commission received a total of 46 comments, which are

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/mars/index.shtm.

Notably, a wide spectrum of these commenters, including a consortium of over 40 state attorneys general, consumer and community organizations, and financial service providers, strongly urged the Commission to propose a rule prohibiting or restricting the collection of fees for mortgage relief services until the promised services have been completed. Additionally, a majority of the comments expressed concern regarding pervasive deception and abuse in the marketing of MARS, including misrepresentations regarding the services MARS providers will perform and regarding their affiliation with the government, nonprofits, lenders, or loan servicers.

This SBP cites to comments submitted in response to both the ANPR and the NPRM. To distinguish the comments submitted in response to the ANPR, the notation “(ANPR)” is included in any citations to them.

17

See

Press Release, FTC,

FTC Proposes Rule That Would Bar Mortgage Relief Companies From Charging Up-Front Fees

(Feb. 4, 2010),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/mars.shtm.

18

See

Mortgage Assistance Relief Services,

75 FR 10707 (Mar. 9, 2010) (

MARS NPRM

).

• Prohibit MARS providers from making false or misleading claims;

• Mandate that providers disclose certain information about their services;

• Bar the collection of advance fees for the provision of MARS, except in certain circumstances for attorneys who collect them in connection with preparing or filing documents in bankruptcy, court, or administrative proceedings;

• Prohibit anyone from providing substantial assistance or support to another they know or consciously avoid knowing is engaged in a violation of the rule; and

• Impose recordkeeping and compliance requirements.

In response to the NPRM, the Commission received 75 comments from stakeholders, including for-profit MARS providers, state law enforcers, consumer and community groups, state bars and bar associations, and financial service providers.

19

The largest number of comments—a total of 30—were submitted either by attorneys who provide MARS

20

or entities representing attorneys, including the American Bar Association and several state bar associations.

21

These comments focused on the scope of the proposed rule's exemption for attorneys, asserting that the Commission should expand the exemption. Other commenters, including some consumer groups and a coalition of state bank examiners, also advocated that the proposed exemption for attorneys be broadened, although to a lesser extent than the attorneys and their representatives advocated.

22

By contrast, comments from NAAG

23

and others

24

urged the Commission not to change the attorney exemption in the proposed rule.

19

The comments submitted in response to the NPRM are available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/mars-nprm/index.shtm.

A list of those who submitted comments appears following Section V of this SBP.

20

See, e.g.,

Deal; Greenfield.

21

See, e.g.,

Am. Bar Ass'n (ABA); ME BA at 1-2; OR Bar at 1; WI Bar at 1; GA Bar at 1; FL Bar at 1.

22

See, e.g.,

NCLC at 10-13; CSBS at 4-5.

23

See

NAAG at 3-4.

24

See, e.g.,

CUUS at 8-9.

Apart from comments that focused on the coverage of attorneys, most comments supported the proposed rule and its specific provisions. Most significantly, these comments generally supported an advance fee ban,

25

although a few non-attorney MARS providers opposed it.

26

25

See, e.g.,

MN AG at 3; OH AG at 1; MBA at 2-3 (supporting “strict prohibition” of advance fees); NAAG at 2 (“The advance fee ban is the linchpin of effective deterrence of fraudulent practices by providers of mortgage relief services.”); NCLC at 3 (“The single most important provision is section 322.5, which prohibits the collection of any fee before providing tangible results of real value to consumers.”); AFSA at 5 (“Banning upfront fees is the best way for the FTC to ensure that MARS providers do really provide consumers with a beneficial service.”);

see also

CSBS at 3; CUUS at 6; NYC DCA at 3.

26

See, e.g.,

Metropolis; RMI; Hirsch.

II. Mortgage Assistance Relief Services

A. The Mortgage Crisis and Assistance for Consumers

As discussed in the ANPR and NPRM, historically high levels of consumer debt, increased unemployment, and a stagnant housing market have contributed to high rates of mortgage loan delinquencies, which in many cases lead to foreclosures.

27

As a result, many consumers struggling to make their mortgage payments have been searching for ways to avoid default and foreclosure. There are a number of options that may be available to them, including: (1) Short sales or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure transactions, in which the proceeds of a sale of the home or the receipt of the deed to the home, respectively, are treated by the mortgage lender as repayment of the outstanding mortgage balance; (2) forbearance or repayment plans that do not reduce the amount that consumers must pay but give them more time to bring their balance current; and (3) loan modifications that reduce consumers' indebtedness or the amount of their monthly payments. Because loan modifications allow consumers to stay in their homes and reduce their debt, this possible solution often has great appeal to them. The Commission's law enforcement experience suggests that loan modifications are the type of MARS most frequently marketed and sold.

28

27

See, e.g., MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10708-09; MBA,

Delinquencies, Foreclosure Starts Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey

(May 19, 2010) (“The delinquency rate for mortgage loans on one-to-four-unit residential properties increased to a seasonally adjusted rate of 10.06 percent of all loans outstanding as of the end of the first quarter of 2010, an increase of 59 basis points from the fourth quarter of 2009, and up 94 basis points from one year ago.”),

available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/72906.htm;

NCLC at 2; Press Release, Realtytrac,

Year-end Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties With Foreclosure Filings in 2009

(Jan. 14, 2010),

available at http://www.realtytrac.com/contentmanagement/pressrelease.aspx?itemid=8333;

Credit Suisse Fixed Income Research 2 (2008) (forecasting a total of 9 million foreclosures for the period 2009 through 2012),

available at http://www.chapa.org/pdf/ForeclosureUpdateCreditSuisse.pdf.

28

See

List of MARS Law Enforcement Actions, following Section V of the SBP, for a list of cases that the FTC has prosecuted (“FTC Case List”). Unless otherwise specified, all citations to FTC actions in this SBP refer to the complaints in these lawsuits.

In response to the mortgage crisis, government and private sector programs have been initiated to assist distressed homeowners.

29

In March 2009, the Obama Administration launched the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program and the MHA's Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), through which the government provides mortgage owners and servicers with financial incentives to modify and refinance loans.

30

Under the program,

lenders and servicers have approved roughly 500,000 permanent loan modifications.

31

The Treasury Department has also recently expanded the MHA program to assist more borrowers, for example, by introducing additional incentives for servicers to write down the outstanding principal balance for borrowers who are “under water,” that is, who owe more on their mortgages than the value of their homes.

32

29

See, e.g.,

HOPE NOW,

About Us

(“HOPE NOW is an alliance between counselors, mortgage companies, investors, and other mortgage market participants. This alliance will maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in distress to help them stay in their homes and will create a unified, coordinated plan to reach and help as many homeowners as possible.”),

available at http://www.hopenow.com/hopenow-aboutus.php.

30

For example, the program offers servicers that modify loans according to its guidelines an up-front fee of $1,000 for each modification, “pay for success” fees on still-performing loans of $1,000 per year, and one-time bonus incentive payments of $1,500 to lender/investors, and $500 to servicers, for a modification made while a borrower is still current on his or her mortgage payments. Dep't of the Treasury,

Making Home Affordable Summary of Guidelines

2 (March 4, 2010),

available at

http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/guidelines_summary.pdf.

31

See, e.g.,

Dep't of the Treasury,

Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Performance Report Through September 2010

(Oct. 25, 2010),

available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/Sept%20MHA%20Public%202010.pdf.

Further, if trial modifications are added to permanent modifications, over 1.6 million modifications have been approved.

Id.,

Testimony of Herbert M. Allison, Dep't of the Treasury, “Foreclosure Prevention: Is the Home Affordable Modification Program Preserving Homeownership?,” before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, at 5 (Mar. 25, 2010),

available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/2010/032510_HAMP/TESTIMONY-Allison.pdf.

32

See

Press Release, Making Home Affordable (“MHA”)

Housing Program Enhancements Offer Additional Options for Struggling Homeowners

(Mar. 26, 2010),

available at http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/pr_03262010.html.

On April 5, 2010, the Administration launched the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Program, which provides servicers with incentives to enter into short sales or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure transactions with consumers who do not qualify for a loan modification under the MHA program.

33

In addition, state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, housing counselors, and private sector entities

34

have offered a variety of other programs and services to help homeowners in financial distress.

35

33

See

MHA, Home

Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) Program, available at http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/hafa.html.

34

Loan holders also have exhibited a growing willingness to modify loan terms for borrowers who do not qualify for loan modifications under government programs such as HAMP. These are known as “proprietary loan modifications.”

See

Press Release, HOPE NOW,

HOPE NOW Reports More Than 476,000 Loan Modifications in the First Quarter of 2010

(May 10, 2010),

available at http://www.hopenow.com/press_release/files/1Q%20Data%20Release_05_10_10.pdf

(reporting that the industry completed 312,329 proprietary loan modifications in the first quarter of 2010).

35

See, e.g.,

Freddie Mac,

Foreclosure Prevention Workshops for Consumers, http://www.freddiemac.com/avoidforeclosure/workshops.html

(describing local credit counseling events by local governments and nonprofits); FTC,

Mortgage Payments Sending You Reeling? Here's What to Do

(2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/rea04.pdf

(describing various credit counseling alternatives).

Despite these public and private programs and services, consumers also continue to seek assistance from for-profit companies who act as intermediaries between consumers and their lenders or servicers in obtaining mortgage assistance relief services—including loan modifications. This may be happening for a number of reasons. First, MARS have been advertised and marketed widely in mass media and online, with the result that consumers may be more aware of the services offered by for-profit entities than they are of other available programs. Second, many consumers who are seeking loan modifications or other relief are not eligible for the MHA program or other government and private assistance programs. While the Treasury Department has estimated that the MHA program will help 3-4 million borrowers by February 2012,

36

industry reports estimate that roughly twice that number of mortgage loans currently are in delinquency or foreclosure.

37

Third, even among consumers who may be eligible to obtain a temporary loan modification under the MHA program, many do not qualify for a permanent loan modification.

38

Fourth, even if consumers are eligible for government programs or assistance directly from their servicers or lenders, many housing counselors and servicers have struggled to respond in a timely manner to the extraordinary number of consumers who are seeking loan modifications.

39

Finally, the Treasury Department also has observed that some servicers have not adequately met consumer demand for loan modifications under the HAMP program.

40

36

See, e.g.,

Press Release, MHA,

Making Home Affordable Program on Pace to Offer Help to Millions of Homeowners

(Aug. 4, 2009)

available at http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/pr_08042009.html;

Dep't of the Treasury,

Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Report Through June 2010

at 7 n.2 (June 2010) (“Selected Outreach Measures” table),

available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/June%20MHA%20Public%20Revised%20080610.pdf.

37

See

Alan Zibel,

Foreclosures Down 2 Percent From Last Year,

Associated Press, May 13, 2010 (noting that as of March 2010, “[n]early 7.4 million borrowers, or 12 percent of all households with a mortgage, had missed at least one month of payments or were in foreclosure”),

available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10632332; see also

Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n,

Delinquencies, Foreclosure Starts Fall in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey

(Feb. 19, 2010) (noting that roughly 15% of mortgage loans were delinquent or in foreclosure and that “[t]he percentages of loans 90 days or more past due and loans in foreclosure set new record highs”),

available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/71891.htm;

Stephanie Armour,

Home Foreclosure Rates Posts First Annual Decline in Five Years,

USA Today (May 13, 2010) (noting that nearly one-fourth of borrowers owe more on their mortgages that the value of their homes).

38

See, e.g.,

Dep't of the Treasury: MHA Servicer Report June 2010 at 1; NCRC,

NCRC Home Affordable Modification Program Survey 2010,

at 2 (noting that, as of February 2010, only 12.5% of trial modifications had been converted into permanent modifications),

available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter_reports/hamp_report_2010.pdf;

Foreclosure Prevention: Is the Home Affordable Modification Program Preserving Homeownership: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,

111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Gene Dodaro, Acting Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office) (prepared statement at 7),

available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/Committee_on_Oversight/2010/032510_HAMP/TESTIMONY-Dodaro.pdf

(noting that 32% of trial modifications lasting three months or more had been approved for conversion into permanent modifications).

39

See, e.g.,

CRL at 3 (noting that MARS have flourished as “consumers' demand for relief outpaces the capacity of mortgage servicers and government programs alike”);

The Recently Announced Revisions to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,

111th Cong. 131 (2010) (statement of Alan White, Assistant Professor, Valparaiso Univ.),

available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Printed%20Hearings/111-122.pdf.

(“Modification requests are languishing for as long as a year, servicers repeatedly ask borrowers to resubmit documentation that has been lost or become outdated, and housing counselors and mediators are unable to get timely information and responses from servicers.”); NCLC (ANPR) at 2 (noting that servicers have failed to meet borrower demand for loan modifications); NAAG (ANPR) at 7 (noting that borrowers have had difficulty reaching servicers and obtaining their assistance).

40

See, e.g., Holding Banks Accountable: Are Treasury and Banks Doing Enough to Help Families Save Their Homes?: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov't of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,

111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Timothy Geithner, Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury) (“[W]e do not believe that servicers are doing enough to help homeowners.”)

Many consumers who have been unable to obtain mortgage assistance relief services through their own efforts have turned to for-profit MARS providers for help. Providers promoting their ability to negotiate with lenders and servicers to obtain loan modifications or some other type of mortgage relief have proliferated in the past few years.

41

Responding to consumer demand, many providers have promised to obtain loan modifications,

42

but others have begun

to market short sales and other forms of relief.

43

The Commission's law enforcement experience shows that MARS providers typically are small and relatively new businesses,

44

and thus it is difficult to estimate their numbers.

45

Based on the law enforcement actions brought by the FTC and the states, however, it appears that there are over 500 such providers in the United States.

46

41

See MARS ANPR,

74 FR at 26134-35.

42

See, e.g., Safe Mortgage Licensing Act: HUD Responsibilities Under the Safe Act, Proposed Rule,

74 FR 66548, 66554 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“HUD has seen a substantial increase in the number of third-party actors (

i.e.,

individuals other than lenders and loan servicers) offering their services as intermediaries putatively to work on behalf of borrowers to negotiate modifications of existing loan terms.”); NAAG (ANPR) at 2 (“[T]he [loan modification] consulting business model is dominating the marketplace. Consultants are by far the most common source of consumer complaints received by our offices in the area of mortgage assistance services.”); OH AG (ANPR) at 2 (“For those companies that actually do put some effort into helping the consumer, the most common business model is an offer to negotiate a loan modification or repayment plan with the consumer's servicer.”); CRC (ANPR) at 1 (“In California, advertisements promising loan modification success are inescapable.”); FinCEN,

Loan Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Scams—Evolving Trends and

Patterns in Bank Secrecy Act Reporting

10 (May 2010),

available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/MLFLoanMODForeclosure.pdf

(FinCEN Report) (“Reports of foreclosure rescue scams increased substantially in the last eight months of calendar year 2009.”).

43

Although the dominant trend among MARS providers is to offer loan modifications, over the past few years some providers also have offered other purported types of loss mitigation and foreclosure avoidance.

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Foreclosure Solutions, LLC,

No. 1:08-cv-01075 (N.D. Ohio filed Apr. 28, 2008) (alleging that provider offered to stop foreclosure proceedings and secure workout plans with consumers' lenders or servicers);

FTC

v.

Mortgage Foreclosure Solutions, Inc.,

No. 8:08-cv-388-T-23EAJ (M.D. Fla. filed Feb. 26, 2008) (same). Providers may adjust their marketing to offer newly-minted forms of mortgage relief—for example, the possibility of entering a short sale under the HAFA program.

See, e.g., Illinois

v.

Home Foreclosure Solutions LLC,

No. 08CH43259 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County 2008) (alleging MARS provider offered to assist consumers to enter short sales). Another new variation of MARS is charging an advance fee to purportedly “eliminate” mortgage debts by challenging the legality of the original mortgages.

See

FinCEN,

Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Report May 2010, supra

note 42 at 9. MARS providers also have offered “sale-leaseback” or “title reconveyance” transactions. In these transactions, MARS providers instruct consumers to transfer title to their homes to the providers and then the consumers rent the homes from them. The providers promise to reconvey title at some later date, yet often do not do so, thereby taking the equity in the homes. Sale-leaseback and title reconveyance transactions appear to have become less prevalent, in part because many consumers do not have sufficient equity in their homes to make this strategy profitable.

See, e.g.,

FinCEN,

Foreclosure Rescue Fraud Report

May 2010,

supra

note 42 at 4.

44

See

FTC Case List. Some of these small and relatively new businesses are law firms. For example, NCLC surveyed members of the National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) and the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA); 298 attorneys responded that they provided some form of MARS. NCLC at 5;

see also

IRELA at 1 (stating that many of the 2,000 members of the Illinois Real Estate Lawyers Association are “engaged in the process of trying to assist their consumer clients in dealing with foreclosures, mortgage loan workouts, and related matters”).

45

See, e.g.,

U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10-787,

Federal Efforts to Combat Foreclosure Rescue Schemes are Under Way, but Improved Planning Elements Could Enhance Progress

12-16 (July 2010) (“GAO Report”) (noting that data on MARS providers is limited); NAAG (ANPR) at 3 (“It is difficult to gather exact empirical data on companies providing loan modification and foreclosure rescue services due to the predominance of Internet-based companies and their ephemeral nature.”); OH AG (ANPR) at 2 (“There is little reliable data about the foreclosure rescue industry.”); CRL at 3 (“With few barriers to entry and little to no oversight, scams are flourishing in the current environment.”).

46

See

NAAG (ANPR) at 4 (noting that state attorneys general have investigated more than 450 MARS providers); FTC Case List,

supra

note 28; Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Crack Down on Mortgage Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Scams

(Apr. 6, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/04/hud.shtm

(reporting that the Commission sent warning letters to 71 companies offering MARS).

Typically, MARS providers charge consumers hundreds or thousands of dollars

47

in advance fees,

i.e.,

fees prior to providing their services. In its law enforcement actions, the FTC has observed that some providers collect their entire fee at the beginning of the transaction,

48

while others collect two to three large installment payments from consumers.

49

NAAG and other commenters also stated that many MARS providers have begun to offer their services piecemeal, collecting fees upon reaching various stages in the process, such as assembling the documentation required by the lender or servicer, mailing paperwork to the lender or servicer, and negotiating with a lender's loss mitigation department.

50

47

See, e.g., infra

notes 48-49; GAO Report,

supra

note 45, at 7 (noting that MARS typically charge a fee of thousands of dollars); Dargon at 2 (“We charge $2,500 as a flat fee” in advance.); CRC (ANPR) at 2 (“The average fee that we are seeing borrowers charged is $3,000; we have seen fees as high as $9,500. In nearly every instance, these fees are charged up front, before any services have been rendered.”); NCRC (ANPR) at 3 (noting that “[t]ypically, loan modification companies request a significant fee upfront” and that a study performed by NCRC “documented a median fee of $2,900,” although “[f]ees ranged as high as $5,600”); NCLR (ANPR) at 1 (observing fees as high as $8,000); NCLC (ANPR) at 5-6 (estimating typical advance fees to be between $2,000 and $4,000).

48

See, e.g., supra

note 47;

FTC

v.

Infinity Group Servs.,

No. SACV09-00977 DOC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 26, 2009);

FTC

v.

Freedom Foreclosure Prevention Specialists, LLC,

No. 2:09-cv-01167-FJM (D. Ariz. June 1, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr., LLP,

No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2009).

49

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009);

FTC

v.

Washington Data Res., Inc.,

No. 8:09-cv-02309-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 12, 2009);

FTC

v.

First Universal Lending, LLC,

No. 09-CV-82322, Mem. Supp. TRO at 5 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 24, 2009);

see also, e.g.,

Dargon at 2; Rogers at 13.

50

See, e.g.,

LFSV at 2 (“[W]e have seen MARS providers who are effectively evading the advance fee prohibition in California law by charging for their `services' in `phases.' ”); NAAG at 3; LCCR at 5;

see also FTC

v.

Debt Advocacy Ctr., LLC,

No. 1:09CV2712 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 19, 2009).

As discussed in the ANPR and NPRM, MARS providers often claim to possess specialized knowledge of the mortgage lending industry,

51

sometimes touting their hiring of former mortgage brokers and real estate agents

52

to bolster their claims of purported expertise. In addition, some attorneys—including solo practitioners and small law firms that represent financially distressed individuals—increasingly have been offering MARS in connection with their legal practice.

53

51

See, e.g.,

NCLC (ANPR) at 3 (“Some modification firms claim superior expertise even though there are no recognized qualifications other than the training programs offered by HUD to certified agencies. Instead, some for-profit entities tout their experience as mortgage industry insiders.”); NAAG (ANPR) at 4;

FTC

v.

Fed Housing Modification Dep't,

No. 09-CV-01759 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 15, 2009) (alleging defendants' Web sites state that many of their “skilled negotiators” have “worked for the lenders they are dealing with”);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX), Mem. Supp. TRO. at 4-5 (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (alleging that defendants “boasted of twenty years' experience” and that they had “extensive experience in the industry”);

FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543, Mem. Supp. P.I. at 20 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (alleging that defendants' Web sites represented that they have “extensive loss mitigation experience” and that “they are led by a seasoned and proven team of professionals”);

see also

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “Inc.”,

No. 09-CV-770 (C.D. Cal filed July 7, 2009).

52

See, e.g.,

NCLC (ANPR) at 11 (“Mortgage brokers—often cited as one of the driving forces in the growth of bad subprime loans—are in demand to work for loan modification companies. One MARS advertised for consultants with mortgage and real estate experience to join its cadre of loan modification specialists.”); GAO Report,

supra

note 45, at 10 (“Federal and state officials and representatives of nonprofit organizations told us that persons who have conducted foreclosure rescue schemes include former mortgage industry professionals who had been involved in the subprime market. * * *”).

53

See generally

Greenfield; Deal; Giles.

See also

NCLC at 4.

A number of non-attorney MARS providers are employing or affiliating with lawyers, with the providers representing that they are offering traditional legal services.

54

Although these providers often tout the expertise of these attorneys in negotiating with lenders and servicers, in many instances the attorneys do little or no

bona fide

legal work.

55

In some cases, MARS

providers also offer “forensic audits,” during which attorneys purportedly conduct a legal analysis of mortgage loan documents to find law violations, thereby supposedly helping consumers acquire leverage over their lenders or servicers to obtain a better loan modification.

56

Providers offering forensic audits also assert that, because of their relationships with attorneys, state laws that prohibit non-attorneys from collecting advance fees for loan modification services do not apply to them.

57

For example, California law previously imposed a number of restrictions on “foreclosure consultants,” but allowed “licensed attorneys * * * [to] charge advance fees under certain limited circumstances.”

58

The State Bar of California subsequently observed that “foreclosure consultants may be attempting to avoid the statutory prohibition on collecting a fee before any services have been rendered by having a lawyer work with them in foreclosure consultations.”

59

California has since passed a new law that removes this attorney exemption.

60

54

See, e.g.,

NAAG at 3-4 (“We have noticed that national companies are recruiting for attorney “partners” or “local counsel” in all of the states they work in to evade states' mortgage rescue fraud statutes.”); IL AG at 1;

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. Pls. Ex Parte App. at 3 (Aug. 3, 2009) (alleging that defendants engaged in “misrepresentations prohibited by the TRO, behind a new facade: the `Walker Law Group,'” which was “nothing more than a sham legal operation designed to evade state law restrictions on the collection of up-front fees for loan modification and foreclosure relief”);

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “Inc.”,

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009);

FTC

v.

Data Med. Capital Inc.,

No. SA-CV-99-1266 AHS (Eex) (C.D. Cal., contempt application filed May 27, 2009);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr., LLP,

No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2009);

see also Cincinnati Bar Assoc.

v.

Mullaney,

119 Ohio St. 3d 412 (2008) (disciplining attorneys involved in mortgage assistance relief services).

55

See supra

note 54. The experiences detailed in one comment from an attorney illustrate the role

that attorneys play or have been asked to play in connection with MARS:

I had numerous non-attorney modification companies ask me to serve as their lawyer and accept a flat fee on each file. I would get this money and do little or no work for it. In some cases I would take in the advance fee and then disburs[e] a share to the loan officer producing the deal and a share to the company actually doing the work. Or I would be collecting the advance fee and then holding all or part of it in my trust account until the modification was completed. I declined to get involved in such arrangements.

Deal at 6.

56

See, e.g.,

MN AG at 2 (“Recently, so-called forensic loan auditors have emerged as a new type of mortgage assistance relief `service.'”); 1st ALC at 3 (MARS provider stating it engages in forensic audits); Dargon at 2 (same);

see also FTC

v.

Debt Advocacy Ctr., LLC,

No. 1:09CV2712 (N.D. Ohio Am. Compl. filed May 14, 2010) (alleging defendants purporting to offer forensic audits misrepresented that “between 80-90% of all loans [they] have audited have some form of rights violations”);

FTC

v.

Data Med. Capital Inc.,

No. SA-CV-99-1266 AHS (Eex), Mem. Supp. App. Contempt at 18 (C.D. Cal. filed May 27, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr.,

LLP, No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2009).

Since publication of the NPRM, the Commission has released an alert to warn consumers about entities purporting to provide forensic audits. FTC,

Forensic Mortgage Loan Audit Scams: A New Twist on Foreclosure Rescue Fraud

(Mar. 2010),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt177.shtm; see also, e.g.,

Cal. Dep't of Real Estate, Consumer Alert 6 (Mar. 2009) (warning consumers of “forensic loan reviews”),

available at http://www.dre.ca.gov/pdf_docs/FraudWarningsCaDRE03_2009.pdf.

57

See supra

notes 51-56;

see also

IL AG (ANPR) at 2 (“Attorneys are using the [state] exemption to market and sell the same mortgage consulting services provided by non-attorneys.”).

58

Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice,

Brown Alerts Homeowners that New Law Prohibits Up-front Fees for Foreclosure Relief Services

(Oct. 15, 2009),

available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1821.

59

See

State Bar of Cal.,

Ethics Alert:

Legal Services to Distressed Homeowners and Foreclosure Consultants on Loan Modifications

(“Cal. State Bar Ethics Alert”) 2, Ethics Hotliner (Feb. 2, 2009),

available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/ethics/Ethics-Alert-Foreclosure.pdf

; see also

Florida Bar, Ethics Alert: Providing Legal Services to Distressed Homeowners

1, available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/872C2A9D7B71F05785257569005795DE/$FILE/loanModification20092.pdf?OpenElement

(“The Florida Bar's Ethics Hotline recently has received numerous calls from lawyers who have been contacted by non-lawyers seeking to set up an arrangement in which the lawyers are involved in loan modifications, short sales, and other foreclosure-related rescue services on behalf of distressed homeowners. * * * The [Florida] Foreclosure Rescue Act * * * imposed restrictions on non-lawyer loan modifiers to protect distressed homeowners. The new statute appears to be the impetus for these inquiries.”).

60

Cal Civ. Code § 2944.7;

see also

Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen.l, Cal. Dep't of Justice,

Brown Alerts Homeowners that New Law Prohibits Up-front Fees for Foreclosure Relief Services

(Oct. 15, 2009),

available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1821.

B. Unfair or Deceptive Practices in the Marketing of MARS

The FTC, state attorneys general, and other law enforcement agencies, have extensive experience with MARS providers. In the past three years, the Commission has filed 32 law enforcement actions against providers of loan modification and foreclosure rescue services.

61

State attorneys general have investigated at least 450 MARS providers and sued hundreds of them for alleged state law violations.

62

Additionally, the Department of Justice and other agencies, working both individually and jointly, have pursued MARS providers for illegal conduct.

63

As discussed in more detail below, the evidence in the record, including extensive law enforcement experience, demonstrates that the unfair or deceptive practices of MARS providers are widespread and are causing substantial consumer harm.

64

Indeed, one recent survey of state and local consumer agencies found that the fastest growing category of consumer complaints concerned the failure of MARS providers to fulfill their promises to help save consumers' homes from foreclosure.

65

61

See

FTC Case List,

supra

note 28.

62

NAAG (ANPR) at 4; IL AG (ANPR) at 1 (noting that Illinois has over 240 open investigations of MARS providers and filed 28 lawsuits against them); Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Relief Scams

(Nov. 24, 2009) (announcing 118 actions by 26 federal and state agencies), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/11/stolenhope.shtm;

Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue and Loan Modification Scams

(July 15, 2009) (announcing operation involving 189 actions by 25 federal and state agencies),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/loanlies.shtm; Press Release,

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force,

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Results of Broadest Mortgage Fraud Sweep in History (June 17, 2010),

available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/news/news-06172010-02.html.

63

See infra

notes 92-96 and accompanying text.

64

See, e.g.,

LFSV at 1 (“During the recent mortgage crisis, we have been dealing with a flood of borrowers whose mortgages are distressed and who have been subject to abuses by companies and individuals promising assistance with obtaining modification of those loans.”)

65

See

Consumer Fed'n of Am.

et al.,

2009 Consumer Complaint Survey Report 3 (July 27, 2010),

available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/File/Consumer_Complaint_Survey_Report2009.pdf.

MARS providers commonly initiate contact with prospective customers through Internet, radio, television, or direct mail advertising.

66

Although MARS providers did not submit information for the record relating to the extent and cost of their marketing efforts, they appear to use a variety of media to target large numbers of consumers who are struggling to pay their mortgages. For example, one MARS provider that was the subject of an FTC enforcement action spent $9 million in one year to broadcast deceptive advertisements nationwide on major television and cable networks, as well as on radio stations and the Internet.

67

Typical MARS advertisements instruct consumers to call a toll-free telephone number or to e-mail the provider. One provider's advertisements allegedly yielded 1,500 inbound calls per day.

68

Another such provider disseminating direct mail advertisements reported receiving approximately 500 inbound calls per day.

69

66

The FTC procured information from a media monitoring company on the occurrence of broadcast advertising for MARS. The company located 68 radio ads and 71 television and cable ads containing the terms “save your home,” “mortgage modification,” or “loan modification.” These ads aired between the dates of September 1, 2008 and September 1, 2010. These ads were attributable to 139 different companies.

67

See FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr.,

LLP, No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx), Mem. Supp. Ex Parte TRO at 6-7 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 6, 2009).

68

Id.

at 6-8.

69

See FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV-09-800 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. TRO at 7 (C.D. Cal filed Jul. 13, 2009).

Customary representations in the ads and ensuing telemarketing and email pitches claim that the MARS provider (1) will obtain for the consumer a substantial reduction in a mortgage loan's interest rate, principal amount, or monthly payments; (2) will achieve these results within a specific period of time;

70

(3) has special relationships

with lenders and servicers;

71

and (4) is closely affiliated with the government,

72

nonprofit programs,

73

or the consumer's lender or servicer.

74

Providers also commonly represent that there is a high likelihood, and in some instances a “guarantee,” of success.

75

Many MARS providers do not disclose to consumers in their promotions the cost of their services.

76

In some cases, MARS providers entice consumers to make substantial up-front payments with false claims that they will be able to obtain a refund if consumers do not receive an acceptable result.

77

70

See, e.g., FTC

v.

First Universal Lending, LLC,

No. 09-CV-82322, Mem. Supp. TRO at 4-5 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 24, 2009);

FTC

v.

1st Guar. Mortgage Corp.

, No. 09-DV-61846 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 17, 2009);

FTC

v.

Freedom Foreclosure Prevention

Specialists, LLC,

No. 2:09-cv-01167-FJM (D. Ariz. filed June 1, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr.,

LLP, No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2009).

71

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Debt Advocacy Ctr., LLC,

No. 1:09CV2712 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 19, 2009);

FTC

v.

1st Guar. Mortgage Corp.,

No. 09-DV-61846 (S.D. Fla filed Nov. 17, 2009);

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “Inc.,”

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACVF09-768 JVS (MGX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009).

72

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Dominant Leads, LLC,

No. 1:10-cv-00997 (D.D.C. filed June 16, 2010) (alleging that defendants' Web sites featured official government seals and logos, and deceptively appeared to be affiliated with the government);

FTC

v.

Washington Data Res., Inc.,

No. 8:08-cv-02309-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 12, 2009) (alleging that defendants falsely represented that they were affiliated with the United States government);

FTC

v.

Fed. Housing Modification Dep't,

No. 09-CV-01753 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 15, 2009);

FTC

v.

Sean Cantkier,

No. 1:09-cv-00894 (D.D.C. filed July 10, 2009) (alleging defendants placed advertisements on Internet search engines that refer consumers to Web sites that deceptively appear to be affiliated with government loan modification programs);

FTC

v.

Thomas Ryan,

No. 1:09-00535 (HHK) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 25, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr.,

LLP, No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2009) (charging defendant with misrepresenting that it is part of or affiliated with the federal government);

see also

LOLLAF at 2 (“Other clients have been deceived into believing the MARS provider will assist them because it claimed to be a `non-profit,' used a government symbol or claimed to be affiliated with the HOPE hotline.”); OH AG (ANPR) at 4 (“Our office has seen many companies that have names or advertisements that make it sound like they are government sponsored.”); NCLC (ANPR) at 3 (“One website, USHUD.com, even claims to be `America's Only Free Foreclosure Resource' even though HUD-certified agencies also offer free assistance regardless of income.”).

73

See FTC

v.

New Hope Prop. LLC,

No. 1:90-cv-01203-JBS-JS (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2009); FTC v. New Hope Modifications, LLC, No.1:09-cv-01204-JBS-JS (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2009).

74

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Kirkland Young, LLC,

No. 09-23507 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 18, 2009) (alleging that defendants falsely represented an affiliation with borrowers' lenders);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV-09-800 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009) (alleging that defendants deceptively claimed affiliation with consumers' lenders);

see

also Am. Bankers Ass'n (ANPR) at 7 (“They often misuse the intellectual property of lenders and servicers by claiming in mailings, on Web sites, and in other communications that they either are affiliated with the lenders and servicers or have special relationships with them that do not exist. They use the names, trademarks and logos of these lenders and servicers in their advertising to deceive consumers into believing they can obtain modification relief for them that these consumers could not otherwise obtain for themselves at no cost.”); Chase (ANPR) at 3 (“These MARS entities also may lead the borrower to believe that they are associated with the servicer or that they have special agreements with the servicer for processing loan modifications, when, in fact, they do not.”).

75

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (alleging defendants falsely claimed success rate of 97 to 100%);

FTC

v.

Debt Advocacy Ctr., LLC,

No. 1:09CV2712 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 19, 2009) (alleging defendants falsely claimed a 90% success rate);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009) (alleging “[d]efendants have told homeowners that their success rate is above ninety percent”);

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “Inc.,”

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (alleging “[d]efendants' representatives tell consumers that Defendants have a success rate in the ninetieth percentile with their lender”);

FTC

v.

Freedom Foreclosure Prevention Specialists, LLC,

No. 2:09-cv-01167-FJM (D. Ariz. filed June 1, 2009) (alleging defendants claimed to have 97% success rate);

FTC

v.

Data Med. Capital Inc.,

No. SA-CV-99-1266 AHS (Eex), Mem. Supp. App. Contempt at 8 (C.D. Cal. filed May 27, 2009) (alleging defendants represented 100% success rate to consumers).

The Loan Modification Scam Prevention Network (LMSPN)—a coalition of Federal and state organizations led by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights—has created a nationwide complaint reporting system for loan modification fraud. The Network, formed in February 2010, has received complaints through a variety of channels, including a form posted on its Web site, the Homeowners' Hope Hotline, and referrals from non-profit housing counselors. As of August 25, 2010, the LMSPN database contained a total of 6,473 complaints of loan modification fraud, dating as far back as April 8, 2008. FTC staff reviewed a random sample of 100 of these complaints and found that 63 reported that MARS providers had guaranteed consumers loan modifications. In projecting this finding to the entire LMSPN database, the FTC estimates that between 52% and 72% of the complaints report the same information.

76

In a recent report summarizing the results of undercover calls made to MARS providers, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) found that in 54% of the calls the providers did not inform consumers about their fees.

See

NCRC,

Foreclosure Rescue Scams: A Nightmare Complicating the American Dream,

at 21 (Mar. 2010) (“NCRC Report”),

available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/research/foreclosure%20rescue%20scams%20-%20%20nightmare%20complicating%20the%20american%20dream.pdf.

77

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (alleging that defendant falsely claimed to provide “100% money back guarantee”);

Debt Advocacy Ctr., LLC,

No. 1:09CV2712 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 19, 2009) (alleging that defendants falsely represented they will refund borrower fee if unsuccessful);

FTC

v.

Infinity Group Servs.,

No. SACV09-00977 DOC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 26, 2009);

FTC

v.

Loan Modification Shop, Inc.,

No. 3:09-cv-00798 (JAP), Mem. Supp. TRO at 1 (D.N.J. amended complaint filed Aug. 4, 2009) (alleging defendants represented that advance fees were fully refundable);

FTC

v.

Freedom Foreclosure Prevention Specialists,

LLC, No. 2:09-cv-01167-FJM (D. Ariz. June 1, 2009) (alleging defendants promised “100% money-back guarantee” but then failed to provide refunds);

see also

NAAG at 2 (“[MARS providers] generally ignore their own refund policies. In the vast majority of complaints received by our offices, consumers were unable to get refunds even though the consultants performed little or no work and had promised consumers money-back guarantees. In some cases, the companies had closed or changed locations by the time the consumers discovered there was a problem, thereby preventing the consumers from even requesting a refund.”);

see also, e.g., FTC

v.

Home Assure, LLC,

No. 8:09-CV-00547-T-23T-Sm, Mot. S.J., App.1 at 6 (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 25, 2010) (Expert Report of Dr. Kivetz survey reporting that 56% of consumers requested that defendant provide a refund; 65% of those who requested a refund did so because defendant failed to perform its services; but only 12% of consumers who requested refunds received them).

Based on the FTC's law enforcement experience, the public comments, and consumer complaints, it appears that the vast majority of consumers do not receive the results MARS providers promise.

78

After collecting their up-front fees, MARS providers often fail to make initial contact with the consumer's lender or servicer for months, if at all, or to have substantive discussions or negotiations with the lender or servicer.

79

In many cases, MARS providers fail to perform even the most basic promised services or achieve any beneficial results.

78

See, e.g.,

infra

Section III.E.2.a.; LOLLAF at 1 (“We have worked with many homeowners who have paid money to a Mortgage Assistant Relief Services (MARS) provider, only to discover that they received absolutely no service in exchange for the fee.”); CMC (ANPR) at 1 (“CMC members and other mortgage servicers found that MARS providers consistently misrepresent their ability to obtain concessions from servicers * * *.”); Chase (ANPR) at 3 (“They collect their fees up-front and promise the borrower they can get a loan modification or other foreclosure relief, when, in fact, this is only a determination that the servicer can make after reviewing the borrower's financial information and investor agreements.”).

79

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (alleging that defendant often failed to return borrowers' phone calls and failed to contact and negotiate with lenders);

FTC

v.

Apply2Save, Inc.,

No. 2:09-cv-00345-EJL-CWD (D. Idaho filed July 14, 2009) (complaint alleging that “[m]any consumers learned from their lenders that Defendants had not even contacted the lender or that Defendants had only minimal, non-substantive contact with the lender”);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009) (alleging that “[d]efendants have misrepresented that negotiations were underway, although Defendants had not yet contacted the lender”);

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “

Inc.”,

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. TRO at 19 (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (alleging that consumers who contact their lenders “learn that [Defendant] never even contacted the lender, or merely verified the consumer's loan information”);

FTC

v.

Freedom Foreclosure Prevention Specialists, LLC,

No. 2:09-cv-01167-FJM (D. Ariz. June 1, 2009) (alleging that defendants failed to act on homeowners' cases for more than four to six weeks without completing—or in some cases, even starting—negotiations and “failed to return consumers' repeated telephone calls, even when homeowners were on the brink of foreclosure”).

In some cases, providers also cause harm to consumers by instructing them to stop communicating with their lenders and servicers.

80

Consumers who

sever contact with lenders and servicers unwittingly diminish their ability to learn that their MARS provider is doing little or nothing on their behalf. These consumers may never learn of concessions their lenders or servicers would be willing to make—or, worst of all, may never discover that foreclosure is imminent.

81

In some cases, MARS providers also advise consumers to discontinue making their mortgage payments even though doing so could result in the loss of their homes and damage to their credit ratings.

82

80

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov.

23, 2009);

FTC

v.

Kirkland Young,

LLC, No. 09-23507 (S.D. Fla filed Nov. 18, 2009);

FTC

v.

Washington Data Res., Inc.,

No. 8:09-cv-02309-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 12, 2009);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009);

see also

NCRC Report,

supra note

76, at 4 (noting that, on 25% of its undercover calls, MARS providers instructed the caller to cease communicating with his or her lender).

81

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (alleging that “[w]hen consumers speak with their lenders directly, they often discover that Defendants had not yet contacted the lender or only had left messages or had non-substantive contacts with the lender”);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. TRO at 18-19 (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009) (detailing “devastating effects” of consumers learning too late of lack of effort by loan modification company); CRC (ANPR) at 7 (“People who do have a chance of keeping the home are being steered away from legitimate, free homeowner counseling services or are failing to take any action before it is too late because they have been assured everything is being taken care of for them already.”).

82

See

NAAG at 4 (“We are aware of a number of rescue consultants who incorrectly claim that consumers' lenders will not work with them until they are behind on their mortgage payments. We are also aware of consultants who advise consumers not to make mortgage payments so that they will be able to afford mortgage loan modification fees.”); CUNA at 2 (consumers “are often instructed to stop making mortgage payments”); NCLC at 7 (family told “to stop paying their mortgage payments and promised a loan modification with lower payments.”); Rodriguez at 1 (“I have had clients face foreclosure because of these companies telling them to stop paying their mortgage and pay them!”);

FTC

v.

Fed. Loan Modification Law Ctr.,

LLP, No. SACV09-401 CJC (MLGx) (C.D. Cal., Am. Compl. filed June 24, 2009) (“In numerous instances, Defendants have [allegedly] encouraged consumers to stop paying their mortgages, telling consumers that delinquency will demonstrate the consumer's hardship to the lender and make it easier to obtain a loan modification.”);

FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “

Inc.”,

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 9, 2009) (alleging that “[i]n numerous instances, Defendants' representative encourages consumers to stop paying their mortgages, telling consumers that delinquency will demonstrate the consumers' hardship to the lender and make it easier to obtain a loan modification.”);

FTC

v.

Foreclosure Solutions, LLC,

No. 1:08-cv-01075 (N.D. Ohio filed Apr. 28, 2008) (“Defendants [allegedly] instruct the consumer to open a savings account and deposit, every month until further notice from Defendants, the consumer's monthly mortgage payment plus an additional [25%]. Defendants claim this money will be used to negotiate with the lender to reinstate the loan.”);

see also FTC

v.

First Universal Lending, LLC,

No. 09-CV-82322 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 24, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Housing Modification Dep't,

No. 09-CV-01753 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 15, 2009);

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC(ANx) (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MLGx) (C.D. Cal., Amd. Compl. filed Mar. 8, 2009); FTC v.

New Hope Property LLC,

No. 1:09-cv-01203-JBS-JS (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 2009); NCRC Report,

supra

note 76, at 24 (“[I]n over 50% of the tests service providers advised testers that they should not pay their mortgage.”); NAAG (ANPR) at 10 (“In some cases, the mortgage consultants will actually counsel the consumer not to make a mortgage payment, which of course frees up funds for the consultants' fee.”).

The Commission's law enforcement experience,

83

state law enforcement,

84

the comments received,

85

and state bar actions

86

indicate that a growing number of attorneys themselves market and sell MARS. Many of them engage in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, such as making the specific claim that they offer legal services,

87

when in fact, no attorneys are employed by the company, or if they are, they do little or no legal work for customers.

88

83

See infra

notes 89-90.

84

See, e.g., Florida

v.

Kirkland Young,

No. 09-90945 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty., filed Dec. 17, 2009),

available at http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-7YXQF7/$file/Complaint.121709.pdf.

Press Release, N.C. Dep't of Justice,

AG Cooper Targets California Schemes that Prey on NC Homeowners

(July 15, 2009),

available at http://www.ncdoj.com/News-and-Alerts/News-Releases-and-Advisories/Press-Releases/AG-Cooper-targets-California-schemes-that-prey-on-.aspx;

Press Release, Colo. Att'y Gen. Office,

Attorney General Announces Actions Against Seven Loan-Modification Companies As Part of Multistate Sweep

(July 15, 2009),

available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/press/news/2009/07/15/attorney_general_announces_actions_against_seven_loan_modification_companies_p;

Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen.,

Illinois Attorney General Sues 14th Company for Mortgage Rescue Fraud

(Aug. 28, 2009),

available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_08/20080828.html.

85

See, e.g.,

Deal at 5-6 (“Some non-attorney modification companies claimed to have attorneys on staff or available to review the work or to negotiate with lenders. A few lawyers `rented' their names to non-attorney MARS providers while providing little service.”); IL AG (ANPR) at 1 (noting that “33 percent of the [MARS] companies we have dealt with are owned by attorneys, while 38 percent have some link to the legal profession”); CRC (ANPR) at 2 (“An increasing number of attorneys are involving themselves in these unethical practices without providing any legal (or other) services. . . .”); MN AG (ANPR) at 5 (“This Office is aware of several loan modification and foreclosure rescue companies that have affiliated with licensed attorneys in other states in an effort to circumvent state law.”); NAAG (ANPR) at 4 (“Attorneys * * * have an increasing presence in this industry and have been found working in conjunction with or serving as referral sources for mortgage consultants.”).

86

See, e.g.,

Legislative Solutions for Preventing Loan Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,

111th Cong. 58 (2009) (statement of Scott J. Drexel, Chief Trial Counsel, State Bar of California),

available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/111-28.pdf

at 2, 4 (Drexel Testimony) (noting that attorney misconduct in connection with MARS “is a problem of extremely significant—if not crisis—proportions in California,” and that the state bar has initiated over 175 associated investigations of attorneys); Polyana Da Costa,

Record Number of Complaints Target Florida Loan Modification Lawyers,

Law.com (Oct. 1, 2009) (“The [Florida] state attorney general has received a record 756 complaints through August of this year about loan modifications involving attorneys.”), available at

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202434223147.

87

See, e.g.,

FTC

v.

Fed. Housing Modification Dep't,

No. 09-CV-01753 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 16, 2009) (alleging that defendants falsely claim to have attorneys or forensic accountants on staff);

FTC

v.

Loan Modification Shop, Inc.

, No. 3:09-cv-00798 (JAP), Mem. Supp. TRO at 14 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 4, 2009) (alleging that defendants misrepresent “that it is an attorney-based company”);

see also FTC

v.

LucasLawCenter “

Inc.”,

No. SACV-09-770 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. TRO at 19 (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (alleging that “[d]espite promises to the contrary, consumers have no contact with the purported attorneys who are supposed to be negotiating with their lenders”).

88

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009);

FTC

v.

Washington Data Res., Inc.,

No. 8:09-cv-02309-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 12, 2009);

see also FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX), Prelim. Rep. Temp. Receiver at 2-3 (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (stating that defendants' “relationship with two different lawyers was nominal at best and served primarily as a cover to dignify the business and invoke the attorney exception to advance fee prohibitions”).

C. Continued Law Enforcement and Other Responses

The Commission has taken aggressive action to protect consumers from deceptive MARS providers. As noted above, the FTC has filed 32 lawsuits

89

in the last three years against MARS providers for engaging in deceptive practices in violation of the FTC Act and, in several instances, the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR).

90

In addition, the FTC has coordinated its efforts with state law enforcement and other federal agencies, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Treasury Department, and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIG-TARP).

91

The Commission also is a member of the Financial Fraud

Enforcement Task Force (FFETF), a coalition of federal and state law enforcement agencies that has worked to combat illegal activity by MARS providers.

92

In the past 15 months, the FTC has participated in three interagency nationwide sweeps: “Operation Stolen Dreams” (June 17, 2010), in which the Commission secured consent orders against 16 marketers of MARS;

93

“Operation Stolen Hope” (November 24, 2009), in which the Commission joined with 20 states collectively to file over one hundred lawsuits against MARS providers;

94

and “Operation Loan Lies” (July 15, 2009), in which the FTC coordinated with 25 federal and state agencies to bring 189 actions against MARS defendants.

95

Prior to these nationwide sweeps, the Commission, jointly with the DOJ, the Treasury Department, HUD, and the Illinois Attorney General, had announced several law enforcement actions targeting MARS.

96

89

See

FTC Case List,

supra

note 28.

90

16 CFR 310.1,

et seq.

(2003);

see, e.g., FTC

v.

Kirkland Young, LLC,

No. 09-23507 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 18, 2009);

FTC

v.

Washington Data Res., Inc.

, No. 8:09-cv-02309-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Nov. 12, 2009);

FTC

v.

First Universal Lending, LLC,

No. 09-CV-82322 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 24, 2009);

FTC

v.

Fed. Housing Modification Dep't,

No. 09-CV-01753 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 15, 2009);

FTC

v.

Hope Now Modifications, LLC,

No. 1:09-cv-01204-JBX-JS (D.N.J. filed Sept. 14, 2009);

FTC

v.

US Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX) (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009).

91

See Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue and Loan Modification Scams

(July 15, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/loanlies.shtm;

Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Crack Down on Mortgage Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Scams

(Apr. 6, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/04/hud.shtm.

92

See

Press Release, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF),

President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force

(Nov. 17, 2009),

available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/news/news-11172009-01.html.

The FFETF was established by President Obama in late 2009 and is chaired by the Attorney General. The Commission has played an active role on the Task Force through, among other things, its membership on the Task Force's Mortgage Fraud Working Group.

93

See

Press Release, FTC,

FTC Settlement Orders Ban More Than A Dozen Marketers from Selling Mortgage Relief Services; Repeat Offender Ordered to Pay $11.4 Million for Contempt

(June 17, 2010),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/loanmods.shtm.

This sweep was organized by the FFETF, and member agencies filed hundreds of civil and criminal mortgage fraud cases, including numerous cases against MARS providers.

94

Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Relief Scams

(Nov. 24, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/11/stolenhope.shtm.

95

Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Target Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue and Loan Modification Scams

(July 15, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/loanlies.shtm.

96

Press Release, FTC,

Federal and State Agencies Crack Down on Mortgage Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Scams

(Apr. 6, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/04/hud.shtm.

In connection with these joint efforts, the Commission also sent warning letters to 71 companies marketing potentially deceptive mortgage loan modification and foreclosure assistance programs on the Internet.

Id.

Moreover, the Justice Department and other members of the FFETF have pursued many MARS providers for illegal conduct, including criminal activity.

See

Press Release, FFETF,

Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Results of Broadest Mortgage Fraud Sweep in History

(June 17, 2010),

available at http://www.stopfraud.gov/news/news-06172010-02.html.

In addition to their coordination with the Commission, the states have continued to engage in their own aggressive law enforcement. Collectively, the states have investigated at least 450 MARS providers and sued hundreds of them for alleged state law violations.

97

Individual states also have continued to enact statutes and regulations to address practices related to MARS.

98

97

See supra

note 62.

98

At least 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted such statutes or regulations.

See, e.g.,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1378 (2010 Ariz. ALS 143); Cal. Civ. Code § 2944.7;

id.

§ 2945,

et seq.;

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-1101,

et seq.;

2009 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-489; 6 Del. Code Ann. § 2400B,

et seq.;

D.C. Code § 42-2431,

et seq.;

Fla. Stat. § 501.1377; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480E-1,

et seq.;

Idaho Code Ann. § 45-1601,

et seq.;

765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 940/1,

et seq.;

24 Ind. Admin. Code § 5.5-1-1,

et seq.;

Iowa Code § 741E.1,

et seq

.;

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 6171,

et seq.

& 6191,

et seq.;

Md. Code Ann., Real Property § 7-301,

et seq.;

940 Mass. Code Regs. § 25.01,

et seq.;

Mich. Comp. Law § 445.1822,

et seq.;

Minn. Stat. § 325N.01,

et seq.;

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.935,

et seq.;

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-2701,

et seq.;

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 645F.300,

et seq.;

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 479-B:1,

et seq.;

2010 N.M. ALS 58; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 265-B; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-423,

et seq.;

2008 Or. Laws Ch. 19; R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-79-1,

et seq.;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-5501,

et seq.;

Utah Admin. Code § 61.2; Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-200.1; Wash. Rev. Code § 19.134.010,

et seq.;

Wis. Stat. § 846.45.

These laws generally include a number of requirements and restrictions, including: (1) Banning covered entities from requiring or collecting advance fees before fully performing contracted or promised services to the consumer; (2) requiring written contracts containing certain provisions and disclosures; and (3) providing consumers with the right to cancel the contract in certain circumstances.

Where, as here, Congress has not foreclosed state regulation, a state statute is preempted only if it conflicts with a federal statute.

Ray

v.

Atl. Richfield Co.,

435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978). State laws are preempted only to the extent there is a conflict—compliance with both federal and state regulations is impossible or the state law is an obstacle to effectuating the purposes and objectives of Congress.

Id.

Thus, state laws can impose additional requirements as long as they do not directly conflict with the Final Rule.

See, e.g., TSR Final Rule,

75 FR at 48481.

In addition to federal and state law enforcement, on December 15, 2009, HUD published a proposed rule in the

Federal Register

that would require states to adopt uniform licensing requirements for MARS providers.

99

The proposed HUD Rule targets the practices of “loan originators,” a term that encompasses third-party loan modification services.

100

Under the proposed HUD Rule, loan originators must undergo a background check, complete 20 hours of pre-licensing education, and pass a written test to obtain a license.

101

The proposed HUD Rule also requires the creation of a centralized database of loan originators licensed in each state, containing such information as their employment history, consumer complaints, and any enforcement and disciplinary actions brought against them. State regulators and the public will be able to access this database, thus allowing them to find and track mortgage loan originators throughout the country.

102

The goal of the proposed HUD Rule is to reduce the incidence of fraud by encouraging states to establish minimum licensing and registration standards, thereby making originators, including MARS providers, more accountable.

103

99

See Safe Mortgage Licensing Act: HUD Responsibilities under the Safe Act; Proposed rule,

74 FR 66548 (Dec. 15, 2009) (proposed HUD Rule). Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, responsibility for HUD's proposed rule will transfer to the BCFP as of the transfer date selected by the Treasury Department. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061; which has been designated as July 21, 2011.

BCFP; Designated Transfer Date,

75 FR 57252.

100

74 FR at 66554.

101

74 FR at 66552.

102

74 FR at 66548-49.

103

74 FR at 66548. The proposed rule also would authorize HUD to examine loan originators' records, conduct enforcement proceedings, and collect civil penalties for violations of HUD and state licensing requirements.

See

74 FR at 66550, 66555.

A coalition of state bank regulators argued in its comment that the FTC's proposed rule would provide important additional protections not included in the HUD proposal.

See

CSBS at 1 (“SAFE Act-compliant state licensing laws are primarily focused toward the origination of new mortgage loans and may not directly address the particular dangers associated with mortgage assistance relief services. The proposed FTC rule will establish a floor to protect consumers from abusive MARS practices nationwide. By banning up-front fees, implementing disclosure requirements, prohibiting certain misrepresentations, and instituting various record-keeping requirements for MARS providers, the FTC's proposal, if adopted, will go a long way in rooting out fraudulent practices among these individuals wherever they operate.”).

III. Discussion of the Rule

As detailed in this SBP, the Final Rule prohibits and seeks to prevent unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with mortgage assistance relief services. It includes provisions that:

1. Define several key terms, including “mortgage assistance relief service” and “mortgage assistance relief service provider”;

2. Prohibit providers from instructing consumers to cease communication with their lenders or servicers;

3. Bar providers from misrepresenting any material aspect of their services, including but not limited to several specific misrepresentations;

4. Mandate that providers disclose: (a) That they are for-profit businesses not affiliated with the consumers' lenders or the government, (b) that consumers' lenders or servicers may not agree to change their loans, (c) that consumers could lose their homes and damage their credit ratings if they stop making their mortgage payments (a disclosure triggered if providers instruct consumers to stop making payments), and (d) that consumers are not required to stay in the service or accept the results delivered, and the total cost of the service if they do accept the results.

5. Prohibit the collection of fees until providers have: (a) Secured a written and executed agreement between the consumer and the lender or servicer and, (b) before that agreement has been executed, (i) disclosed that the consumer can accept or reject the lender's or servicer's offer for mortgage relief and (ii) provided a separate written notice from the consumer's lender or servicer summarizing the material differences between the consumer's current mortgage loan and the relief offered;

6. Enjoin persons from providing substantial assistance or support to another whom they know or consciously avoid knowing is engaged in a violation of the Rule;

7. Require that providers maintain records and monitor Rule compliance; and

8. Exempt attorneys providing MARS as part of the practice of law from most provisions of the Rule if they: (a) Are licensed in the state where the consumer or the dwelling is located, and (b) comply with relevant state licensing and bar requirements. Such attorneys are exempt from the Rule's advance fee ban if they set aside MARS fees in a client trust account and withdraw funds only as the fees are earned.

A. Section 322.1: Scope

Section 322.1 states that the Final Rule implements the mandate of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, as clarified by the Credit CARD Act. These statutes state that the Commission “shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding,” and that “[s]uch rulemaking shall relate to unfair or deceptive acts or practices regarding mortgage loans, which may include unfair or deceptive acts or practices involving loan modification and foreclosure rescue services.”

104

As noted earlier, this language authorizes rules that not only prohibit or restrict practices that are themselves unfair or deceptive, but also rules that prohibit or restrict other practices if such rules are reasonably related to the goal of preventing unfairness or deception.

105

As discussed above, the Commission's rulemaking authority is limited by the Credit CARD Act to persons over whom the FTC has jurisdiction under the FTC Act.

104

See

Omnibus Appropriations Act § 626(a); Credit CARD Act § 511.

105

In articulating the scope of its rulemaking authority to remedy unfair and deceptive acts and practices under the FTC Act, the Commission has explained:

In exercising this remedial authority, the Commission has not been limited to proscribing only the precise practices found to exist, but rather has been free to close all roads to the prohibited goal. * * * The Commission's discretion to formulate an appropriate means of preventing the unfair or deceptive acts or practices found to exist also takes into account the nature of rulemaking, which involves predictions based upon pure legislative judgment and judgmental or predictive determinations such as those involved in fashioning remedies. In making such determinations, the Commission is entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience as to the appropriate remedy to impose in the rule.

FTC,

Funeral Industry Practices; Final Trade Regulation Rule,

47 FR 42269, 42272 (Sept. 24, 1982) (citing,

inter alia,

FTC

v.

Ruberoid,

343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952)) (internal citations and quotations omitted);

see also Am. Fin. Servs Ass'n

v.

FTC.,

767 F.2d 957, 988 (DC Cir. 1985) (noting that the Commission “has wide latitude for judgment” in crafting rules to curb unfair or deceptive practices).

The Commission exercises similar discretion in crafting orders to resolve law violations.

See FTC

v.

Nat'l Lead Co.,

352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957) (“[T]he Commission is clothed with wide discretion in determining the type of order that is necessary to bring an end to the unfair practices found to exist.”);

Ruberoid,

343 U.S. at 473 (“If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity.”);

Jacob Seigel Co.

v.

FTC,

327 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1946) (“The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce.”).

B. Section 322.2: Definitions

1. Section 322.2(i): Mortgage Assistance Relief Service

As discussed above, the Rule is intended to regulate for-profit providers of mortgage assistance relief services. Section 322.2(i) of the Rule adopts, without substantive modification, the proposed rule's definition of “mortgage assistance relief service” (MARS) as including “any service, plan, or program, offered or provided to the consumer in exchange for consideration, that is represented, expressly or by implication, to assist or attempt to assist the consumer” in negotiating a modification of a dwelling loan that reduces the amount of interest, principal balance, monthly payments, or fees; stopping, preventing, or postponing a foreclosure or repossession; or obtaining one of several other types of relief to avoid delinquency or foreclosure. Sections 322.2(i)(3)-(6) define these additional types of relief to include obtaining: (1) A forbearance or repayment plan; (2) an extension of time to cure default, reinstate a loan, or redeem a property;

106

(3) a waiver of an acceleration clause or balloon payment; and (4) a short sale, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, or any other disposition of the property except a sale to a third-party that is not the loan holder.

107

The Rule covers instances in which a third party itself works with lenders or servicers to obtain mortgage relief as well as instances in which a third party markets services to aid consumers who themselves work with lenders or servicers to obtain relief.

108

Accordingly, § 322.2(i) is intended to apply to every service MARS providers offer,

109

expressly or by implication, for the purpose of obtaining loan concessions, avoiding foreclosure, or saving their homes.

110

106

In many states, mortgagors have the right to “redeem,”

i.e.,

regain possession of, a property for a period of time following foreclosure.

See, e.g.,

RealtyTrac,

Foreclosure Laws and Procedures By State

(chart showing that, depending on the state and the borrower's circumstances, redemption periods can last anywhere from 10 days to over one year),

available at http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-comparison.asp.

107

Several commenters supported the adoption of this definition.

See, e.g.,

NCLC at 3 (“[T]he broad definition of MARS and MARS provider are also important aspects of the rule that will help ensure its effectiveness. By including all possible forms of mortgage relief assistance, including those represented by implication to assist or attempt to assist consumers, the FTC has reduced the possibility of scammers evading the rule with tricks or loopholes.”); CUUS at 2 (“[T]he definition of `mortgage assistance relief services' in [the proposed rule] is sufficiently broad to include the types of companies offering the services which are the subject of abuses.”); CSBS at 2 (“The state regulators believe that the proposed definition of `mortgage assistance relief service' is generally adequate in covering the scope of the NPR[M].”).

108

The Rule, however, is not intended to cover those who provide general financial advice to consumers—such as accountants or financial planners—that consumers could potentially use to avoid foreclosure or obtain loan modifications from their lenders or servicers. Nevertheless, if an entity that provides financial advice or that reviews consumers' mortgage loan paperwork (

e.g.,

performs a “forensic audit”),

see infra

note 110, promotes its services in such a manner that consumers take away the express or implied claim that the entity's service will result in a loan modification or other mortgage relief, the entity is a “mortgage assistance relief service provider” under the Final Rule. In that instance, if consumers do not obtain the represented result, the entity will have made a misrepresentation in violation of Section 322.3(b) of the Final Rule.

See infra

§ III.3.a. The Commission emphasizes that fine-print or pro forma disclaimers generally are not sufficient to qualify performance or success claims.

See, e.g.,

Deception Policy Statement,

infra

note 200, at 180;

infra

note 220.

109

See, e.g.,

MN AG at 2 (“Any rule adopted by the Commission should clearly regulate all forms of mortgage assistance relief servicers.”).

110

This provision encompasses “forensic audits” and other services in which the provider purports to review, and identify potential errors in, loan documents or documents sent by a consumer's lender or servicer in order to avert foreclosure or obtain concessions from the lender or servicer.

See supra

note 56;

MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10720 n.160. For example, if, for these purposes, a provider offers to examine and find mistakes in foreclosure documents which the lender or servicer signed by automatic means (sometimes referred to as “robo-signing”) without checking them for accuracy, this service would fall within § 322.2(i) of the Final Rule.

Mortgage assistance relief services under the Rule are limited to services

that are offered to consumers

111

who are obligated under loans secured by a “dwelling” or residence. A “dwelling” is defined in Section 322.2(e) of the Rule to be a residential structure containing four or fewer units, regardless of whether it is attached to real property. The term dwelling includes “an individual condominium unit, cooperative unit, mobile home, manufactured home, or trailer.”

112

In response to comments on the NPRM, the Rule adds the term “manufactured home” to the definition of “dwelling” to ensure that the Rule's protections extend to consumers whose homes are constructed at a site (

e.g.,

factory floor) other than the final location of the structure.

113

Finally, the definition of “dwelling” applies only to residences that are “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”

114

The definition of “dwelling” includes second homes and rental properties of consumers, because the Commission's law enforcement experience indicates that consumers who own such properties may seek help to avoid foreclosure on these properties.

115

However, “dwelling” does not cover MARS offered in connection with commercial properties.

116

111

“Consumer” is broadly defined to include “any natural person who is obligated under any loan secured by a dwelling.” Section 322.2(d). For the purposes of clarity, the Final Rule's definition of “consumer” replaces “owes on” in the proposed definition with “is obligated under.” The Commission intends to cover consumers at every stage of the process and does not limit the Rule's protections to those who are in default or foreclosure.

See

NAAG at 3 (“We support broad application of the rule to cover all homeowners, regardless of whether they are in foreclosure or have defaulted on their loans.”). Covering consumers who are not in default or foreclosure is necessary because many of them seek assistance from MARS providers before they are actually delinquent on their loans.

See

CMC (ANPR) at 8 (“Many of the abuses that servicers have encountered have occurred before the consumer has received a notice of default. MARS providers sometimes solicit customers who are not in default but who live in areas with high numbers of distressed borrowers. Any rule should apply to MARS providers at any stage of the process.”); NCLC (ANPR) at 4 (“Many homeowners have sought help from MARS [providers] before entering default, though sometimes the MARS then encourages a default. * * * The mortgage servicing industry and others have urged homeowners to seek help before they go into default.”); NCRC (ANPR) at 2 (noting that there are “[c]ompanies claiming to offer assistance with loan modifications, to consumers who may or may not be in default”); NAAG (ANPR) at 11 (“The [state] requirement that consumers be in default before statutory protections begin made sense when mortgage consultants solicited business based on foreclosure filings, as those consumers would necessarily be in default. Mortgage consultants are now able to mine public information to target consumers who are not yet in default. Consultants may rely on an Internet presence to draw in consumers who may also not be in default. As consumers have grown more concerned about the state of the economy, these solicitations are proving increasingly attractive. Based on these reasons, a rule should provide as much coverage for consumers as possible.”).

112

Section 322.2(e). The definition for “dwelling” is similar to the definition of that term in Regulation Z, 12 CFR. 226, which implements the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601

et seq.;

12 CFR 226.2(a)(19).

113

Some commenters recommended including manufactured homes, a term defined by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. 5402(6), to refer to non-site built homes.

See, e.g.,

NCLC at 3 (the term “mobile home” often refers to a home built prior to 1974, while the term “manufactured home” means a post-1974 home that complies with HUD standards);

see also

OPLC at 2; NCLC at 4.

114

This language is derived from Regulation Z.

See

12 CFR 226.2(a)(12) (definition of “consumer credit”).

115

There have been cases in which consumers were at risk of foreclosure on non-primary residences. One comment observed that those at risk of losing a property to foreclosure include senior citizens who live in nursing homes or assisted living facilities and military service members who rent their homes while deployed. NCLC at 4 (supporting covering services purported to assist consumers save second homes or rental properties from foreclosure).

116

The Final Rule also contains a definition of “dwelling loan,” unmodified from the proposal, as “any loan secured by a dwelling, and any associated deed of trust or mortgage.” Section 322.2(f).

a. Sale-Leaseback and Title Reconveyance Transactions

In the NPRM, the Commission advised that the proposed definition of MARS would cover offers of sale-leaseback and title reconveyance transactions,

117

but only if they were marketed “to save the consumer's home from foreclosure or repossession.”

118

The Commission specifically solicited comment on this aspect of the proposed rule, including whether and how a final rule should address these transactions.

119

117

As noted in § II, in a sale-leaseback or title reconveyance transaction, the MARS provider typically instructs the consumer to transfer title to his or her home to the provider and then to rent the home from the provider. The provider then promises to reconvey title to the home at some later date. In some cases, the provider also may charge upfront fees in connection with the transaction.

See supra

note 43.

118

MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10728.

119

Id.

In response to the FTC's request for comments, state law enforcers and consumer groups endorsed the proposed rule's coverage of sale-leaseback or title reconveyance transactions when they are marketed as ways to avoid foreclosure.

120

These organizations asserted that this limited coverage is sufficient in light of existing state laws governing how such sales must be structured.

121

One group of state regulators, however, advocated that the Commission address the underlying sale-leaseback transaction in a subsequent rulemaking if addressing it now would delay the issuance of the Final Rule.

122

120

See NAAG at 5 (“We believe that the proposed rule will not interfere with state laws, but instead will complement existing state laws that address sale-leaseback transactions”); CSBS at 2 (“[S]tate regulators believe that it is important for the FTC to address abuses with respect to sale-leaseback transactions.”); NCLC at 16 (“We support the FTC's plan to regulate only the marketing of these scams while leaving further regulation to the states.”).

121

Supra

note 120.

122

CSBS at 2 (“The state regulators believe that it is important for the FTC to address abuses with respect to sale-leaseback transactions. However, given the current prevalence of loan modification scams, regulations addressing those practices must receive priority. If the development of sale-leaseback regulations will delay the promulgation of final regulations to address loan modification scams, we believe that the sale-lease back regulations should be addressed in a separate effort.”).

Many states have enacted laws that comprehensively regulate sale-leaseback and title reconveyance transactions, imposing, for example, specific valuation requirements on the property transfers and obligations to determine that the consumer can reasonably afford to repurchase the property.

123

On the other hand, the record shows that sale-leaseback and title reconveyance transactions have been commonly touted as a means to avert foreclosure and its consequences.

124

Although the Final Rule does not regulate the terms of sale-leaseback and title reconveyance transactions, if such transactions are represented, expressly or impliedly, as a way for a consumer to avoid foreclosure, they present the same risks to consumers as other forms of MARS.

125

The FTC thus has determined that the Final Rule will cover offers of sale-

leaseback and title reconveyance transactions marketed as a way to save a consumer's home from foreclosure or repossession.

126

123

See supra

note 98. For example, some laws mandate that before executing a title transfer, the foreclosure rescue operator must verify that the consumer can reasonably afford to repurchase the home.

See, e.g.,

Minn. Stat. § 325N.17(a)(1). In addition, the foreclosure rescue operator may be required to obtain written consent from the homeowner, conduct a face-to-face closing, abide by federal and state laws governing sales of residential properties, allow consumers a period of time to cancel the transaction before title conveyance can be recorded, and either return title to the consumer or provide compensation that represents the property's fair market value.

See, e.g., id.

§ 325N.17(a)(2)-(4), (b).

124

See supra

note 43;

see also, e.g.,

CJI, Att. 1, 2 (private plaintiffs in Maryland challenging foreclosure rescue and equity stripping scam); NAAG (ANPR) at 5-6; CJI, Att. 1 at 2; NCLC at 16 (“Sale-leaseback and other title-transfer transactions can be the most harmful of foreclosure rescue scams because they not only deprive a homeowner of scarce money but outright steal the homeowner's deed.”).

125

Other transactions proposed to consumers similarly would be covered by the Rule if marketed as a means to stop or avoid foreclosure.

See, e.g

.,.

NV DML at 2-3 (describing two transactions being marketed to some consumers as a means to secure concessions on their mortgage loans). The definition of MARS encompasses any service that purports to help consumers stop, prevent, or postpone any foreclosure sale, or otherwise save the property, regardless of the form that relief may take. Section 322(i)(2).

126

As a general matter, the Final Rule is not intended to apply to the marketing of services to assist consumers in selling their properties to third parties. The Final Rule, however, does specifically cover the marketing of services involving the sale of properties to third parties if those services are designed or intended to assist consumers in averting foreclosure,

e.g.,

through a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. One commenter urged the Commission to exempt licensed real estate professionals from the Final Rule. NAR at 1-2. The commenter argued the Rule would restrict real estate agents in helping consumers with the process of selling their homes through short sales.

Id.

The Commission concludes that an exemption for real estate agents is not necessary. Real estate agents customarily assist consumers in selling or buying homes and perform functions such as listing homes for sale, showing homes, and finding desirable homes for consumers. The Commission is aware that real estate agents may perform these functions when properties are bought or sold through a short sale transaction, but does not consider these services to be MARS.

b. Mortgage Refinancing Services

The proposed rule covered mortgage brokers who offer loan origination or refinancing services, but only if those services are represented, expressly or impliedly, to help consumers avoid delinquency or foreclosure. The Final Rule is unchanged on this point. Thus, the Final Rule does not cover mortgage brokers who offer services that are advertised or marketed for other purposes. To obtain a new loan or refinance an existing loan, consumers can work either with the lender directly or with a mortgage broker.

127

127

Mortgage brokers can offer a wide choice of loan products from different lenders, without consumers having to deal with each lender separately. Thus, mortgage brokers commonly act as intermediaries between consumers and lenders in bona fide loan origination or refinancing transactions. Mortgage brokers typically are paid by the lender, or in some cases by the borrower, from the closing costs of the loan transaction.

See, e.g.,

Nat'l Ass'n of Mortg. Brokers FAQs,

available at http://www.namb.org/namb/FAQs1.asp?SnID=498395277; see also

NAAG at 12 (noting that brokers “are traditionally paid * * * at the closing of a consumer's loan, after all services have been provided”); NCLC (ANPR) at 29 (“[B]rokers * * * are normally paid only when a sale or mortgage transaction is completed.”).

As discussed in the NPRM, in some cases consumers at risk of foreclosure could benefit from assistance in refinancing; thus, the Commission does not wish the Rule to reduce the availability of legitimate services of this kind.

128

At the same time, the Commission is concerned that services purported to help consumers avoid foreclosure through refinancing could be marketed unfairly or deceptively. Indeed, with the deterioration of the housing market, many mortgage brokers have focused on marketing and providing MARS to consumers,

129

and the record shows that some former brokers who now provide MARS have engaged in the same types of unfair and deceptive practices as other MARS providers.

130

128

MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10713.

129

One commenter provided examples of advertisements showing MARS providers aggressively recruiting mortgage brokers to sell MARS.

See

NCLC (ANPR) at 10.

130

See, e.g. supra

note 52; Peter S. Goodman,

Subprime Brokers Back as Dubious Loan Fixers,

N.Y. Times, July 19, 2009, at A1 (accounting of how many mortgage brokers in southern California began selling MARS when loan origination work evaporated).

In the NPRM, the Commission specifically requested comment on how the Rule should treat mortgage brokers who offer refinancing services. A number of commenters, noting the incidence of unfair and deceptive practices by mortgage brokers selling MARS,

131

recommended that the Final Rule cover mortgage brokers.

132

In addition, one comment from a consumer group argued that the Rule should expressly cover refinancing as a form of MARS.

133

A consortium of state bank regulating agencies, on the other hand, recommended that the Rule exclude mortgage brokers entirely or, at a minimum, exclude their loan origination activities.

134

131

See

NYC DCA at 8; NAAG (ANPR) at 11-12.

132

CSBS at 2 (“The proposed FTC rules should apply to mortgage brokers to the extent that mortgage brokers engage in non-loan origination MARS activities,

e.g.

negotiating loan modifications, short sales, etc.”); NYC DCA at 8 (“Mortgage brokers offering for-profit mortgage assistance services are likely to be engaged in the same problematic practices as other MARS providers and must be subject to the rule.”); LLAF at 2. Comments to the ANPR made similar arguments.

See, e.g.,

NAAG (ANPR) at 11-12 (“We have already seen complaints in which mortgage brokers charge consumers for mortgage consulting services and then failed to provide services or provided fewer services than originally promised. The trend of mortgage brokers providing services is likely to continue, especially if the market for mortgage loan origination remains soft.”); NCLC (ANPR) at 13-14.

133

See

CUUS at 2-3 (recommending that Rule specify that “a refinance of the existing mortgage” is an example of an included service).

134

See

CSBS at 2 (“The proposed FTC rules do not need to address loan origination activities, even if the loan is being originated to avoid foreclosure.”).

The Commission concludes that mortgage brokers generally are not covered by the Rule. However, if a mortgage broker offers loan refinancing or originations as a means for consumers to save their homes from foreclosure—that is, the broker is providing MARS—then the Rule covers this conduct. Thus, the Final Rule protects consumers from unfair and deceptive practices by mortgage brokers operating as MARS providers without unduly restricting legitimate mortgage brokerage activities.

c. Mortgage Assistance Relief “Product”

One commenter recommended that the Commission add the word “product” to the proposed definition “mortgage assistance relief service.” The commenter recommended this addition to ensure that providers cannot evade the Rule by claiming to sell a product (

e.g.,

software, books, CDs, or other tangible materials to help consumers avoid foreclosure) rather than a service.

135

Another comment from a group of state bank regulators disagreed, stating, without elaboration, that the regulators saw no reason to include the word “product” in the definition of MARS.

136

135

See

CUUS at 2 (adding the word “product” to the definition of MARS “would prevent MARS providers from claiming they are not covered by the rule because they offer a product, not a service.”).

136

See

CSBS at 2 (“The state regulators do not believe that there is any reason to broaden the definition of MARS to include the word `product' as inquired by the Commission.”).

The Commission declines to include products in the definition of MARS in the Final Rule. The record demonstrates that providers of services to help consumers modify their mortgages and avoid foreclosure often engage in unfair and deceptive practices; in contrast, neither the Commission's law enforcement experience nor the rulemaking record show that those who sell products for mortgage assistance relief are engaged in the same types of conduct. The Commission will continue to monitor to ensure that MARS providers do not gravitate to the sale of products to evade the Rule.

137

Should MARS providers selling products engage in unfair or deceptive practices, the Commission has the authority to take law enforcement action under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Moreover, should unfair or deceptive practices in the sale of mortgage assistance relief products become widespread, the Commission may consider amending the Rule to include such practices.

138

137

Providers should be aware that merely including a product, such as a book, in conjunction with the sale of services will not remove the transaction from coverage by the Rule.

138

As discussed above,

see supra

note 15, the Commission's authority to amend the MARS Rule will transfer to the BCFP on July 21, 2011.

2. Section 322.2(a): “Clear and Prominent”

The proposed rule required that mandated disclosures be made “clearly and prominently,” specifying how this requirement applied in different mediums. The two commenters that addressed how disclosures must be made supported the proposed criteria for making clear and prominent

disclosures.

139

No commenters opposed these requirements. The Final Rule substantially adopts the proposed rule's definition of “clear and prominent” with only the few changes discussed below. The Rule sets forth general requirements to ensure that required disclosures in commercial communications

140

are sufficiently clear and prominent for consumers to notice and comprehend them.

141

In all cases, the syntax and wording of disclosures must be easy for consumers to understand and must not be accompanied by statements that contradict or obscure their meaning.

142

The disclosures must be made in each language that is “substantially used” in the advertising.

143

In addition, as described below, the Rule includes clarity and prominence requirements specific to the particular media in which disclosures appear. The extensive record of unfairness and deception in the MARS industry makes it appropriate for the Commission to articulate with specificity how MARS providers must make required disclosures to prevent consumer harm.

139

See

CSBS at 2 (endorsing requirements as “generally well-rounded and adequate”); NCLC at 16 (“The Commission has done an admirable job writing disclosure rules that will reduce the ability of MARS providers to obscure or overshadow mandatory disclosure statements.”).

140

As defined in the Final Rule, “commercial communication” is intended to include any written or oral statement, illustration, or other depiction used to induce the purchase of a service, plan, or program.

See

§ 322.2(c) (adopting the proposed definition without substantive modification). As detailed in Section III.D. of this SBP, the Final Rule also adds to the proposed provision two subprovisions defining “general commercial communication” and “consumer-specific commercial communication.”

See

§§ 322.2(c)(1) & 322.2(c)(2). Section 322.2(c)(1) defines a “general commercial communication” to be “a commercial communication that occurs prior to the consumer agreeing to permit the provider to seek offers of mortgage assistance relief on behalf of the consumer, or otherwise agreeing to use the mortgage assistance relief service, and that is not directed at a specific consumer.” Section 322.2(c)(2) defines a “consumer-specific commercial communication” as “a commercial communication that occurs prior to the consumer agreeing to permit the provider to seek offers of mortgage assistance relief on behalf of the consumer, or otherwise agreeing to use the mortgage assistance relief service, and that is directed at a specific consumer.” These definitions were added to clarify the disclosure requirements in § 322.4 of the Final Rule.

141

Where possible, in formulating the requirements of the Rule, the Commission has drawn from comparable FTC rules requiring clear and prominent disclosures.

See

Free Annual File Disclosures, 16 CFR 610.4 (2010) (

Free Credit Report Rule

); Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 CFR 436.6 (2007) (

Franchise Rule

); Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Business Opportunities, 16 CFR 437.1 (

Business Opportunity Rule

); Regulations Under Section 4 of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 16 CFR 500.4 (

Fair Packaging and Labeling Act Regulations

); Trade Regulation Pursuant to the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of 1992, 16 CFR 308.2 (

900 Number Rule

); Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Sales Made at Home or at Certain Other Locations, 16 CFR 429.1 (

Door-to-Door Sales Rule

). The disclosure requirements also are consistent with those in many FTC orders.

See, e.g.,

Sears Holding Mgmt. Co., Docket No. C-4264, File No. 082-3099 (FTC Sept. 9, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/090604searsdo.pdf.

142

See Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(3)(vi) (prohibiting any representation that contradicts, is inconsistent with, or undermines the required disclosures, and any techniques that significantly detract from the message communicated by the disclosures);

900 Number Rule,

16 CFR 308.3(a)(5);

Franchise Rule,

16 CFR 436.9(a);

Business Opportunity Rule,

16 CFR 437.1(a)(21).

143

See

Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(3)(ii) (same language as that principally used in the advertisement);

see also

NYC DCA at 7-8 (“The FTC should require MARS providers to offer all mandated disclosures * * * in the languages used in their advertising.”); LFSV at 2 (“The FTC should require that companies that negotiate a contract primarily in a language other than English provide a contract in the language in which the contract was primarily negotiated.”).

a. Written Disclosures

The proposed rule set forth various requirements for disclosures that must appear in consumer communications disseminated in print or written form, including on a computer screen. The proposed rule provided that such disclosures:

shall be in a font easily read by a reasonable consumer, of a color or shade that readily contrasts with the background of the commercial communication, in the same language as each that is substantially used in the commercial communication, parallel to the base of the commercial communication, and, except as otherwise provided in this rule, each letter of the disclosure shall be, at a minimum, the larger of 12-point type or one-half the size of the largest letter or numeral used in the name of the advertised website or telephone number to which consumers are referred to receive information relating to any mortgage assistance relief service.

Section 322.2(a)(1) of the Final Rule largely retains these requirements but modifies them slightly to improve the clarity and effectiveness of the disclosures and to conform the relevant provisions of the Final Rule to the Free Credit Report Rule the Commission recently issued.

144

The Final Rule therefore now specifies that a written disclosure must be easily readable; in a high degree of contrast from the immediate background on which it appears;

145

distinct from other text, such as inside a border; and in a distinct type style, such as bold.

146

Unchanged, however, are the requirements that the disclosure must be communicated in the same languages that are substantially used in the commercial communication;

147

and appear parallel to the base of the communication

148

and that, unless otherwise specified, each letter of the disclosure text shall be, at a minimum, the larger of 12-point type or one-half the size of the largest character used in the name of the advertised website or telephone number to which consumers are referred for information on any MARS.

149

144

See Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4 (2010). The Commission did not promulgate the Free Credit Report Rule until after it issued the

MARS NPRM.

In that proceeding, unlike this one, the Commission received numerous comments on how the rule should address the prominence of the required disclosures, including formatting and placement.

Free Annual File Disclosures; Final Rule

75 FR 9733 (2010). Several commenters, for example, offered suggestions on how to make visual disclosures prominent, including placing them within a border in a box, and in a contrasting color.

Id.

at 9734.

145

Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(a)(3)(iii);

see also,

In re Tender Corp.,

Docket No. C-4261 (FTC July 17, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823188/090717tenderdo.pdf

(stating that disclosures must appear “in print that contrasts with the background against which it appears”);

In re Budget Rent-A-Car-System, Inc.,

Docket No. C-4212 (FTC Jan. 4, 2008), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623042/080104do.pdf

(same);

see also

FTC,

Dot Com Disclosures: Information about Online Advertising

12 (2000),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus41.pdf (

Dot Com Disclosures)

(“A disclosure in a color that contrasts with the background emphasizes the text of the disclosure and makes it more noticeable. Information in a color that blends in with the background of the advertisement is likely to be missed.”).

146

Sections 322.4(a) and (b) of the Rule set forth additional requirements for the heading that must precede written disclosures. This heading must be in bold face font that is at least two-point type larger than the font size of the text of the required disclosures.

147

See also, e.g.,

Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(a)(3)(ii);

900 Number Rule,

16 CFR 308.3(a)(1). If the advertisement has substantial material in more than one language, the MARS Rule requires that the disclosure be delivered in each such language. Section 322.2(a)(1).

148

See, e.g.,

Swisher Int'l, Inc.,

Docket No. C-3964 (FTC Aug. 25, 2000),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/08/swisherdo.htm

(requiring warnings for cigars to appear “parallel * * * to the base of the * * * advertisement”); Fair Packaging and Labeling Act Regulations, 16 CFR 500.4(b) (requiring that identification for packaged goods appear “in lines generally parallel to the base on which the packaging or commodity rests as it is designed to be displayed”).

149

See Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(b)(3);

see also 900 Number Rule,

16 CFR 308.

b. Audio Disclosures

Section 322.2(a)(2) addresses the use of disclosures in audio communications such as broadcast radio or streaming radio. The proposed rule required these disclosures to be “delivered in a slow and deliberate manner and in a volume and cadence sufficient for an ordinary consumer to hear and comprehend them.” As with the requirements for written disclosures, the Commission has decided to modify these requirements slightly to improve the clarity of the

requirements for audio disclosures and to be consistent with the Free Credit Report Rule.

150

Thus, the Final Rule requires MARS providers to deliver the required disclosures “in a slow and deliberate manner and in a reasonably understandable volume and pitch.”

151

150

See supra

notes 141-49.

151

See Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(a)(1)(3)(iv);

see also In re Sears Holding,

Docket No. C-4264 (stating that audio disclosures must be made “in a volume and cadence sufficient for an ordinary consumer to hear and comprehend them”);

In re Darden Rests., Inc.,

Docket No. C-4189 (FTC May 11, 2009),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623112/070510do0623112c4189.pdf

(same);

In re Kmart Corp.,

Docket No. C-4197 (FTC Aug. 15, 2007),

available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623088/0623088do.pdf

(same);

In re Palm, Inc.,

Docket No. C-4044 (FTC Apr. 19, 2002),

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0023332/index.shtm

(same);

Dot Com Disclosures, supra

note 145, at 14 (same).

c. Video Disclosures

Section 322.2(a)(3) of the Final Rule adopts the proposed rule's video disclosure requirements without modification. Video communications include those that appear on television or are streamed over the Internet. As a threshold matter, these disclosures must be delivered in accordance with the requirements for written and audio disclosures in §§ 322.2(a)(1) and (2). In addition, the disclosures must be made simultaneously in both audio and video,

152

the latter of which must be displayed for at least the duration of the audio disclosure and comprise at least four percent of the vertical picture height of the screen.

153

152

Disclosures generally are more effective if they are made in both the visual and audio part of a consumer communication.

See generally

Maria Grubbs Hoy & J. Craig Andrews,

Adherence of Prime-Time Televised Advertising Disclosures to the “Clear and Conspicuous” Standard: 1990 Versus 2002,

23 J. Mktg. Pub. Pol. 170 (2004) (stating that “dual modality” disclosures—oral and visual together—are more effective at communicating information to consumers);

see also In re Kraft, Inc.,

114 F.T.C. 40 (1991) (finding that a visual disclosure alone was unlikely to be effective as a corrective measure in light of “the distracting visual and audio elements and the brief appearance of a complex superscript in the middle of the commercial”),

aff'd,

970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992).

153

See Federal Election Commission Rules: Contributions and Expenditure Limitations and Prohibitions,

11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(iii)(B)-(C) (statement concerning funding source for political ads “must appear in letters equal to or greater than four (4) percent of the vertical picture height” and “be visible for a period of at least (4) four seconds”).

d. Interactive Media

Section 322.2(a)(4) of the Final Rule addresses how disclosures must be made in interactive media formats, such as software, the Internet, or mobile media. As in proposed § 322.2(a)(4), the disclosures must conform with the requirements for written, audio, and video disclosures set forth in other parts of the “clear and prominent” definition. In addition, the disclosures must be provided in a way that the consumer cannot avoid the information,

i.e.

, it must be visible without the need to scroll down a Web page. The Final Rule makes two minor modifications to the proposed rule. First, it modifies the requirement that the disclosure be made on a separate landing page from the page on which the consumer takes any action to incur a financial obligation. The disclosure instead must be made on or immediately prior to the page on which the consumer takes any action to incur a financial obligation.

154

Second, the Final Rule mandates that the disclosure appear in text at least the same size as the largest character of the advertisement, replacing the proposed rule's requirement that it be twice the size of any hyperlink to the company's website or display of the URL. Both of these modifications are intended to ensure that consumers see mandated disclosures before they decide whether to purchase a mortgage assistance relief service.

155

154

The Commission declines to require in the Final Rule that information be disclosed on a separate landing page, because this requirement may not be feasible or effective in some contexts,

cf. Free Credit Report Rule; Final Rule,

75 FR 9726, 9737 (Mar. 6, 2010), and there is no evidence in the record addressing its effectiveness in this context.

155

See Dot Com Disclosures, supra

note 145, at 11 (explaining that disclosures are more likely to be effective if they are provided when the consumer is considering the purchase).

e. Program-Length Media

Section 322.2(a)(6) of the Final Rule, which adopts the proposed rule without modification, requires that disclosures in program-length television, radio, and Internet-based advertisements for MARS be presented at the beginning, near the middle, and at the end of the advertisement.

156

Requiring that disclosures be delivered at different stages of the broadcast makes it more likely that consumers who join the broadcast in progress will receive them.

156

See Free Credit Report Rule,

16 CFR 610.4(a)(3)(v). Section 308.3(a)(6) of the 900 Rule also imposes a nearly-identical requirement. 16 CFR 308.3(a)(6).

3. Section 322.2(j): “Mortgage Assistance Relief Service Provider”

a. Exemption for Loan Holders and Servicers

Under § 322.2(j) of the Final Rule, “any person that provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide, any mortgage assistance relief service” is a “mortgage assistance relief service provider,”

157

and thus subject to the Rule. The proposed rule generally exempted from its provisions loan holders and servicers, and agents of such entities unless the agents “claim, demand, charge, collect, or receive any money or other valuable consideration from the consumer for the agent's benefit.”

158

157

Section 322.2(j).

158

See

§ 322.2(i) (proposed rule). This limiting language was intended to ensure that MARS providers could not evade the Rule by styling themselves as “agents” of the lender or servicer.

In the NPRM, the Commission specifically sought comment on the proposed exemption for loan holders and servicers.

159

Lenders and servicers (who actually have the authority to change loan terms) may offer MARS that the Rule would cover in the absence of an exemption.

160

For example, a lender or servicer may notify a consumer of her eligibility for a loan modification under the MHA program and assist her in submitting the necessary paperwork.

161

In addition, lenders and servicers may outsource these functions to other parties who operate on their behalf. Such outsourcing is a common method of providing these services given the large number of consumers currently requesting assistance.

162

159

See

MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10728.

160

See, e.g.,

CMC (ANPR) at 5 (“Servicers are increasingly turning to third-party service-providers to assist them in processing loan modifications and in other loss-mitigation activities.”); Am. Bankers Ass'n (ANPR) at 4-6; AFSA (ANPR) at 3, 5; MBA (ANPR) at 4.

161

See, e.g.,

AFSA at 3 (stating that mortgage servicers engage in the same forms of communication that would be covered under the Rule “to make the consumer aware of the availability of possible loss mitigation options and to encourage the consumer to contact the mortgage servicer directly, which is a critical component of any loss mitigation policy by a mortgage servicer to assist consumers”); MBA (ANPR) at 4 (stating that mortgage servicers collect payments, conduct borrower contact and outreach, and execute loan modification or other loss mitigation agreements).

162

See, e.g.,

David Lawder,

Few US Mortgage Modifications Made Permanent,

Reuters Dec. 10, 2009,

available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1021463420091210

(referring to a company that “has been hired by some of the largest U.S. banks to assist in modification efforts”).

Several comments from the financial services industry and consumer groups expressly supported the proposed exemption for lenders and servicers,

163

but some recommended modifications to its scope.

164

Three commenters said that the Rule should cover lenders and servicers.

165

163

See

AFSA at 2-3 (The Rule is “not intended to regulate mortgage holders and servicers, but to stop for-profit MARS providers from harming consumers. The FTC is currently drafting proposed rules for mortgage acts and practices. That rule, rather than this MARS rule, is the appropriate place to consider additional regulations for mortgage holders and servicers.”); CUUS at 3 (“Consumers Union agrees that lenders and servicers should be exempted from the definition of `mortgage assistance relief services.'” Consumers Union is not aware of any lenders or servicers actively marketing MARS services for a fee to their customers.”); CUNA at 2 (“We strongly urge the FTC to retain this exemption in the Final Rule. Credit unions have not been the source of any problems for home loan

borrowers and do not need additional rules to ensure they act in their members' best interests.”); CSBS at 2-3 (“We support the Commission's inclination to generally exempt loan holders and servicers, as well as their agents, and nonprofit entities excluded from the FTC's jurisdiction from the definition of mortgage assistance relief service provider.”); MBA at 3-4 (“We are pleased that the proposed rule specifically excludes mortgage servicers.”).

164

CUUS at 3 (“The Rule should specify that the only lender or servicer qualifying for this exemption is the one currently holding the mortgage loan of the homeowner retaining the services of a MARS entity.”).

But see

MBA at 4 (the rule should exempt contractors of lenders and servicers); AFSA at 3-4 (servicers' agents and contractors that request or collect fees for their own benefit should not be excluded from the exemption). One commenter also requested that the Rule specify that “certain up-front fees are permissible by a licensed mortgage company, servicer or depository institution when necessary to execute a refinance, modification, or other loss mitigation agreement.” MBA at 4. As discussed, the rule does not apply to loan holders or servicers, and thus does not govern these activities.

165

One of the three commenters argued that lenders and servicers do not properly inform consumers of their foreclosure risks, lose paperwork associated with loan modification requests, fail to process these requests correctly, and mislead consumers about their eligibility for permanent loan modifications.

See

OPLC at 2. Another said it was aware of servicers who instructed homeowners to stop making payments and, in some cases, required homeowners to pay a fee to be considered for a loan modification. LOLLAF at 2-3. In opposing the exemption, a third commenter, a MARS provider, claimed that some lenders are “staffing up to create their own MARS entities” but did not elaborate further.

See

1st ALC, Att. at 7. However, these practices fall outside of the scope of this rulemaking, which is focused on the conduct of intermediaries who consumers retain to work with their lenders.

The Commission has determined that the record supports an exemption for lenders and servicers. These lenders and servicers might provide useful MARS to consumers, and nothing in the record shows that such entities have engaged in the core conduct addressed by the Final Rule, i.e., deceiving consumers into paying large advance fees for services and not delivering promised results.

166

166

CUUS at 3 (“Consumers Union is not aware of any lenders or servicers actively marketing MARS services for a fee to their customers.”); NAAG (ANPR) at 13 (“We are unaware of any banks, thrifts or federal credit unions engaged in for-profit loan modification or foreclosure rescue services, aside from negotiating loan modifications for consumers whose loans they are servicing.”); Am. Bankers Ass'n (ABA) (ANPR) at 6; AFSA (ANPR) at 3; HPC (ANPR) at 2; OH AG (ANPR) at 5.

Thus, the Commission adopts the exemption in the proposed rule for lenders and servicers, but with three modifications.

167

First, the Commission has modified the definitions of “servicer” and “dwelling loan holder” in §§ 322.2(l) and 322.2(g), respectively, to limit the exemption to loan holders and servicers of loans “that [are] the subject of the offer to provide mortgage assistance relief services.”

168

This modification clarifies that there is no blanket exemption for lenders and servicers based solely on their status,

169

but rather that the Final Rule exempts such entities only if they offer MARS in connection with loans they actually hold or service.

167

Section 322.2(j)(1)-(2).

168

“Dwelling loan holder” is defined in § 322.2(g) as “any individual or entity who holds the dwelling loan that is the subject of the offer to provide mortgage assistance relief services.” Section 322.2(l) defines “servicer” as “the individual or entity responsible for (1) receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a consumer pursuant to the terms of the dwelling loan that is the subject of the offer to provide mortgage assistance relief services, including amounts for escrow accounts under section 10 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. 2609), and (2) making the payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts received from the consumer as may be required pursuant to the terms of the mortgage servicing loan documents or servicing contract.” This definition draws upon the definition of servicer in the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

See

12 U.S.C. 2605(i). As noted above, the Final Rule adds the phrase “that is the subject of an offer to provide mortgage assistance relief services” to the proposed definitions of “dwelling loan holder” and “servicer.”

169

See

CUUS at 3 (“[C]onsumers Union is concerned that the lender or servicer exemptions may be used by MARS entities who otherwise provide or service loans and are technically lenders or servicers, but are not the lenders or servicers for the mortgage loan that is the subject of MARS services.”)

The second change to the exemption clarifies that it encompasses both agents and contractors of lenders and servicers. Specifically, §§ 322.2(j)(1) and (2) have been changed to include not only loan holders and servicers as well as their agents, but also “contractor[s] of such individual[s] or entit[ies].”

170

Adding the term “contractor” makes clear that the exemption would apply to third parties with whom lenders and servicers technically do not have an agency relationship as a matter of law, but who nevertheless perform MARS on their behalf.

171

170

Section 322.2(j).

171

See

MBA at 4 (contractors under the supervision and control of the servicer do not “pose the risk of a foreclosure scam or phantom help”).

Third, the Commission has determined to remove the language in the proposed rule that would exclude from the exemption third parties who “claim, demand, charge, collect, or receive any money or other valuable consideration from the consumer for the agent's benefit.” Such language would have resulted in the Rule covering agents and contractors that lenders and servicers may pay on a contingency or commission basis.

172

The Rule is not intended to restrict how lenders and servicers choose to compensate third parties that perform MARS functions on their behalf. Further, the Commission concludes that such a restriction on the exemption is not necessary to prevent third parties from improperly claiming an exemption in order to collect advance fees for MARS from consumers. The exemption applies only to those activities conducted within the scope of their agency or contractor relationship with exempted lenders and servicers. Thus, if they collect fees for MARS not performed on behalf of the lender or servicer, they would be subject to the Rule's requirements.

172

See

AFSA at 3-4 (describing use of employee incentive programs and attorneys who work on a contingency).

b. Treatment of Nonprofit Providers of Mortgage Relief Services

Section 322.2(k) of the Final Rule retains without substantive modification the exemption for nonprofit entities that was included in the proposed rule.

173

Nonprofits are excluded from the FTC's jurisdiction under the FTC Act and, therefore, they are exempt from rules issued pursuant to the Omnibus Appropriations Act.

174

This exemption includes bona fide nonprofit organizations with housing counselors offering MARS and nonprofit legal organizations representing financially stressed consumers.

175

The FTC, however, does have jurisdiction over purported nonprofits that in fact operate for the profit of their members,

176

and § 322.2(k) does not exempt these entities.

177

173

To improve the organization and clarity of the Rule text, however, the Commission has deleted proposed § 322.2(j)(3), and altered the definition of “person” in § 322.2(k) of the Final Rule—the foundational term of “mortgage assistance relief service provider”— to exclude “any person [that] is specifically excluded from the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 44 and 45(a)(2).”

174

Section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act states: “The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations * * * from using unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2). Section 4 of the Act defines “corporation” to include: “any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or association, incorporated or unincorporated,

which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members.”

15 U.S.C. 44 (emphasis added).

175

These nonprofit services are described in more detail in Section II.C. of the ANPR. MARS ANPR, 74 FR at 26135.

176

See, e.g.,

AMA

v.

FTC,

638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980);

FTC

v.

Ameridebt, Inc.,

343 F. Supp. 2d 451 (D. Md. 2004).

177

An entity that is registered as a tax exempt nonprofit under the Internal Revenue Code is not necessarily considered a nonprofit for the purposes of the exemption in the FTC Act.

See, e.g., FTC

v.

Ameridebt, Inc.,

343 F. Supp. 2d 451, 460-61 (D. Md. 2004).

C. Section 322.3: Prohibited Representations

Section 322.3 of the Final Rule prohibits MARS providers from making certain representations or misrepresentations in connection with mortgage assistance relief services.

1. Section 322.3(a): Prohibited Statement

Section 322.3(a) of the Final Rule bans MARS providers from instructing consumers not to communicate with their lender or servicer. The Commission has concluded that giving such instruction is an unfair practice. In addition, the Commission has concluded that barring such instruction is reasonably related to the prevention of deception. The provision in the Final Rule is slightly modified from the proposed rule, as detailed below.

a. Public Comments on the Proposed Provision

Several commenters supported the ban on instructing consumers not to speak with their lender or servicer, including two consumer groups, a consortium of state banking regulators, and two trade groups for the financial services industry.

178

The comments generally warned that financially-distressed consumers who receive this advice from purported MARS experts and follow it are prevented from receiving valuable information from their lender or servicer. More specifically, consumers who cease such communications prior to purchasing MARS do not learn about workout or modification offers available from their lender or servicer,

179

as well as other information that may be material in evaluating the veracity of the claims made by the MARS provider about its services.

180

Consumers who stop communicating with their lenders or servicers after purchasing MARS may not learn that the MARS provider is not taking the actions necessary to deliver the results it promised.

181

Finally, in some cases, both before and after purchasing MARS, consumers who do not communicate with their lenders or servicers may not know that foreclosure and loss of their home is imminent.

182

178

See, e.g.,

CUUS at 3 (“strongly support[ ] the Rule's prohibition on any representation that would encourage consumers not to speak with their servicer or lender”); LOLLAF at 3 (“endorse[ ] the proposed rule's ban on MARS providers advising consumers not to contact their mortgage lenders and servicers”); CSBS at 3 (supports prohibiting MARS providers from instructing consumers not to contact their lenders or servicers but agrees with limited exemption for attorneys); AFSA at 4 (“strongly support[ ] proposed § 322.3(a). MARS providers should be banned from advising consumers not to contact or communicate with their lenders or servicers * * * [T]elling a borrower not to contact a lender or servicer is the worst advice someone can give a borrower at risk or in default.”).

179

AFSA at 4 (“If lenders and servicers are unable to contact borrowers, they are unable to offer workouts or loan modifications.”); LOLLAF at 3 (“[O]ngoing communication with mortgage servicers is key to any homeowner negotiating a workout to save their home from foreclosure.”).

180

CUUS at 3 (“[T]he foreclosure clock continues to run, and rather than seeking help from a legitimate non-profit housing counseling agency, the homeowner is diverted away from legitimate sources of help by the MARS provider's assurances that they will deliver results.”);

see

also

CRC (ANPR) at 7 (“People who do not have a chance of keeping the home are being steered away from legitimate, free homeowner counseling services or are failing to take any action before it is too late because they have been assured everything is being taken care of for them already. All too often, it is not.”).

181

LOLLAF at 3 (“[C]ommunication with a servicer may allow a homeowner to determine whether or not the MARS provider is providing any service on his or her behalf, as that provider promised.”); CUUS at 3 (“Consumers report often being instructed by MARS providers to cease all communication with their lenders and/or loan servicers, even though the provider subsequently does nothing of value on the homeowner's behalf.”).

182

AFSA at 4 (“[L]enders and servicers would be unable to warn a borrower of a potential foreclosure.”); LOLLAF at 3 (“[U]rging a homeowner not to communicate with his/her servicers only increases the likelihood that a homeowner will end up in foreclosure, as well as burdened with additional late charges and other fees.”).

A few commenters objected to this prohibition as it applied to attorneys, voicing concern that it would prevent attorneys from properly advising their clients as to their mortgages.

183

As described in § III.G. of this SBP, the Final Rule exempts from § 322.3(a) attorneys who provide MARS when they meet certain conditions.

183

See, e.g.,

ABA at 5; Bronson at 5.

b. Final Section 322.3(a)

Section 322.3(a) of the Final Rule adopts the proposed rule's prohibition on the instruction,

184

with one clarification. The proposed rule prohibited MARS providers from giving consumers such instruction “in connection with the advertising, marketing, promotion, offering for sale, or sale” of mortgage assistance relief services. The Final Rule clarifies that MARS providers also are prohibited from giving consumers such instruction in connection with performing services under their contracts. This change is consistent with the discussion of the scope of the prohibition in the NPRM,

185

and with the comments indicating that consumers who follow this instruction are likely to be harmed even after purchasing MARS.

184

The Final Rule does not prohibit MARS providers from discussing with consumers the advantages and disadvantages of communicating with their lenders and servicers, so long as providers do not make any deceptive claims in doing so. Rather, the Final Rule bars MARS providers from instructing consumers not to engage in these communications.

185

MARS NPRM,

75 FR at 10715-16.

c. Legal Basis

(1) Unfairness

The Commission concludes that it is an unfair practice for MARS providers to instruct consumers not to communicate with their lenders or servicers, because that instruction:

(1) Causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers,

186

(2) that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition, and (3) is not reasonably avoidable by consumers.

187

186

To establish that an act or practice is unfair, the Commission must demonstrate actual or likely consumer injury. 15 U.S.C. 45(n).

187

15 U.S.C. 45(n) (codifying the Commission's unfairness analysis);

see also In re Int'l Harvester Co.,

104 F.T.C. 949, 1079, 1074 n.3 (1984),

reprinting

Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., United States Senate, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980) (“Unfairness Policy Statement”).

First, consumers who follow this instruction suffer or are likely to suffer substantial injury. As the commenters noted, consumers who stop communicating with their lender or servicer are deprived of critical information about (1) possible work-out options, (2) the veracity of the provider's claims, (3) whether the provider is actually performing, and (4) in some cases, that foreclosure and the loss of their homes is imminent. Consumers who lack this information may end up paying hundreds or thousands of dollars for MARS services that do not provide the promised relief, and may even lose their homes.

188

188

The FTC has observed these losses repeatedly in its law enforcement work.

See, e.g.,

FTC

v.

Loss Mitigation Servs., Inc.,

No. SACV09-800 DOC (ANX), Mem. Supp. Ex Parte TRO at 18-19 (C.D. Cal. filed July 13, 2009) (“In numerous instances, Defendants have warned consumers that any contact with their lenders will hinder Defendants' modification negotiations, and have threatened to drop consumers and deny them refunds if they independently talk to their lenders. Relying on this advice, many consumers avoid their lenders during critical periods, including after receiving notices of default or foreclosure, or other important communications. * * * At that point the cumulative effects of Defendant's misrepresentations are devastating * * * [including that] many consumers have lost their homes.”) (citations omitted);

FTC

v.

Kirkland Young, LLC,

No. 09-23507, Mem. Supp. P.I. at 19 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 24, 2009) (“[By] attempting to sever communications between consumers and their lenders, Defendants harm consumers. * * * The cost to consumers is both in time and money, which are obviously important to consumers who are behind on their mortgages and facing the threat of foreclosure on their family's home.”);

FTC

v.

US

Foreclosure Relief Corp.,

No. SACV09-768 JVS (MGX), Mem. Supp. TRO at 12 (C.D. Cal. filed July 7, 2009) (“At the company's behest, consumers also stopped answering inquiries from their lenders, and therefore did not realize that their modifications were not in process and that their homes might be at risk. * * * Defendants' inaction caused some lenders to begin foreclosure proceedings against consumers. Other consumers lost their homes.”);

FTC

v.

Truman Foreclosure Assistance, LLC,

No. 09-23543, Mem. Supp. P.I. at 20 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 23, 2009) (“When consumers speak with their lenders directly, they often discover that Defendants had not yet contacted the lender or only had left messages or had non-substantive contacts with the lender.”).

Second, the injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. There is nothing in the record suggesting that there are any circumstances in which a non-attorney MARS provider's instruction not to communicate with a consumer's lender or servicer would benefit the consumer.

189

Similarly, nothing in the record, including the comments of MARS providers, identifies any benefits to competition from such an instruction. A “benefit” this practice might bring is to increase MARS providers' revenues by increasing the number of consumers who decide to contract with them. Such “benefits” are not cognizable in an unfairness analysis.

190

Consequently, the Commission concludes that there are no benefits to consumers or competition from this act or practice, and, even if there were, they clearly are outweighed by the substantial injury to consumers discussed above.

189

Cf

Section III.G.3. (discussing the possible benefits to consumers when attorneys who represent them in legal matters give an instruction to stop communicating with adverse parties such as their lenders or servicers).

190

Increased revenues or profits to a seller engaged in an act or practice are not necessarily a benefit to competition for purposes of unfairness analysis because “[t]he benefit [from the conduct] must be to * * * competition—not simply to the actor.” J. Howard Beales, III,

The FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection,

2003 WL 21501809, at *14 n.51 (2003);

see In re Orkin Exterminating Co.,

108 F.T.C. 263, 364-65 (1986) (discussing benefits to process of competition), aff'd 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988);

FTC

v.

J.K. Publications, Inc.,

99 F.Supp.2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000);

FTC

v.

Windward Mktg,

No. 1:96-CV-615-FMH, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114, *29-30 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1997).

Finally, consumers cannot reasonably avoid the injury this act or practice causes. Many consumers are unaware of the negative consequences of failing to communicate with their lender or servicer. Moreover, the claims many MARS providers make that they have specialized expertise

191

make it less likely that consumers will disregard or discount their advice. As a result, consumers cannot reasonably avoid the harm from such instructions.

191

See supra

notes 51-53.

The Commission therefore concludes that MARS providers instructing consumers not to communicate with their lenders or servicers is an unfair act or practice. The Final Rule's prohibition on this instruction is intended to preserve and foster consumer access to information from lenders and servicers that may shed light on issues critical to consumers' decision making and their well-being.

(2) Prevention of Deception

The Final Rule's prohibition on instructing consumers not to communicate with their lenders and servicers will remove a barrier to consumers obtaining information that will enable them to evaluate the truth and accuracy of the provider's claims and to gauge the provider's performance against those claims. This provision thus will help consumers avoid being deceived. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that this prohibition is reasonably related to the goal of preventing deception.

192

192

The Commission concludes that prohibiting MARS providers from instructing consumers to stop communicating with their lender or servicer does not violate the First Amendment. The Rule restricts speech that is “commercial” in nature because it arises in the context of a commercial transaction and is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.

v.

Pub. Serv. Comm'n,

447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). The intermediate scrutiny standard applies to restrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech.

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.

v.

United States,

130 S. Ct 1324, 1339

(2010), slip op. at 19; Conn. State Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir. 2010).

To pass constitutional muster, commercial speech restrictions subject to intermediate scrutiny must satisfy the test the Court set forth in

Central Hudson.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.,

447 U.S. at 566. The Final Rule's prohibition on instructing consumers not to communicate with their lenders and servicers satisfies this test. First, the prohibition serves a substantial governmental interest in ensuring that financially distressed consumers who face foreclosure have access to information that may prevent injury and may be critical to their ability to make decisions free of deception and confusion.

See, e.g.,

Friedman

v.

Rogers,

440 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) (upholding ban on use of trade names by optometrists because “[r]ather than stifling commercial speech, [the ban] ensures that information regarding optometrical services will be communicated more fully and accurately to consumers”). Second, prohibiting the instruction directly advances this goal by removing impediments to the availability of this information to consumers. Third, there is a reasonable fit between the problem—MARS providers impeding consumers' access to critical information—and the solution, which would remove the impediment. Moreover, alternatives that are less restrictive of speech, such as a disclosure remedy, would not be effective means of achieving the goal.

See, e.g., Pearson

v.

Shalala,

164 F.3d 650, 659 (DC Cir. 1999) (noting that the banning of a claim may be permissible where a disclosure would not eliminate the harm the claim causes). For example, if MARS providers were permitted to instruct consumers not to communicate with their lender or servicer, but were required to disclose that these entities may have information that would be valuable to consumers, the inconsistent and contradictory nature of these statements would not prevent deception and would, at best, confuse consumers.

See, e.g.,

Deception Policy Statement,

infra

note 200, at 180;

Thompson Med. Co.,

104 F.T.C. at 842-43;

In re Figgie Int'l, Inc.,

107 F.T.C. 313, 401 (1986),

aff'd

sub nom,

Figgie Int'l Inc.

v.

FTC,

817 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision).

d. Recommendations by Commenters Not Adopted

Several commenters, including a consortium of state attorneys general and a consumer group, recommended that the Commission adopt an additional prohibition, not included in proposed § 322.3(a), that would ban providers from instructing consumers to stop making their mortgage payments.

193

The commenters asserted that MARS providers commonly mislead consumers concerning the consequences of not paying on their mortgages, for example, by telling them that lenders will not work with them unless they stop paying.

194

193

CUUS at 3 (“MARS providers should be prohibited from advising current or prospective clients who are not yet in default to stop making payments on their mortgage loans.”); NAAG at 4 (“[W]e would suggest making clear that consultants may not advise consumers not to pay their mortgages.”).

194

See, e.g.,

NAAG at 4 (“We are aware of a number of rescue consultants who incorrectly claim that consumers' lenders will not work with them until they are behind on their mortgage payments. We also are aware of consultants who advise consumers not to make mortgage payments so that they will be able to afford mortgage loan modification fees.”); CUUS at 3 (“Consumers often report being instructed by for-profit MARS entities to stop making mortgage payments in order to qualify for loan modification services or other forms of foreclosure relief.”).

The Commission declines to adopt this prohibition. The benefits and costs to consumers of failing to pay their mortgage depend on their individual circumstances. In most instances, it is not in the best interest of a consumer to stop paying,

195

yet there are some, albeit limited, circumstances in which it might be beneficial for some consumers to do so.

196

The Commission declines to

adopt the recommended prohibition because it could prevent MARS providers from disseminating truthful, non-misleading information that could be useful to some consumers.

195

CUUS at 3 (Consumers are “often unaware that [following MARS providers' advice to stop paying their mortgage] may ruin their credit scores and lead to fewer options to avoid foreclosure.”); CUNA at 2 (following this instruction “only serves to increase the overall mortgage debt in addition to the fees and other penalties that result when payments to the servicer or lender are not made in a timely manner”).

196

For example, the record suggests that some lenders, in the current financial crisis, may be more responsive to borrowers who are delinquent, especially if the borrower would not qualify for a loan modification under various government programs.

See, e.g.,

Suzanne Capner,

Lenders Await Call Back After Mobile Giveaway,

Fin. Times, Jun. 28, 2010 (some lenders are sending mobile phones programmed to call their loss mitigation departments to delinquent borrowers and offering them lower monthly payments when borrowers

call),

available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6df8bec-82fe-11df-8b15-00144feabdc0.html;

David Streitfeld & Louise Story, Bank of America to Reduce Mortgage Balances, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2010,

available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/business/25housing.html

(Bank of America offers mortgage balance reductions up to 30% to borrowers at least 60 days delinquent on their loans). How effective a consumer may be in leveraging delinquency is highly dependent on the particular lender, the type of loan, and the consumer's financial situation.

Nevertheless, the Commission recognizes that most consumers would be harmed if they complied with a MARS provider's instruction to stop paying on their mortgages. Therefore, as discussed more fully in § III.D. of this SBP, the Final Rule requires that if providers instruct consumers not to pay on their mortgages, they must disclose clearly and prominently that not paying may cause consumers to lose their home and damage their credit rating.

197

197

See

§ 322.4(c).

2. Section 322.3(b): Prohibited Misrepresentations

a. Proposed Provision

Section 322.3(b) of the proposed rule prohibited express or implied misrepresentations of any material aspect of any mortgage assistance relief service. To provide clarity and guidance to the industry, proposed §§ 322.3(b)(1)-(7) set forth a non-exhaustive list of specific misrepresentations that would violate the Rule, including misrepresentations about the following:

(1) The likelihood of negotiating, obtaining, or arranging a specific form of mortgage relief;

(2) The amount of time needed to obtain the promised mortgage relief;

(3) The affiliation of the provider with the government, public programs, or consumers' lenders or servicers;

(4) Consumers' payment obligations under their mortgage loans;

(5) The terms or conditions of consumers' mortgage loans;

(6) The provider's refund and cancellation policies; and

(7) That the provider has performed the promised services or has the right to demand payment.

The Commission received only a few comments specifically addressing this proposed provision. The comments were generally supportive and did not recommended substantive modification to the proposed exemplar misrepresentations

198

—although some commenters recommended adding additional examples, as detailed below.

198

CUUS at 4 (“Consumers Union supports the non-exclusive enumeration of other misrepresentations that give rise to a violation under the proposed rule.”); CSBS at 3 (“We endorse the Commission's effort to prohibit misrepresentations of any material aspect of any MARS.”); LOLLAF at 3 (“The prohibited misrepresentations enumerated in the proposed rule accurately target the deceptive conduct that it is intended to prevent and may help dispel the misconceptions that consumers hold regarding MARS providers.”); MBA at 2.

b. Final Section 322.3(b)

Section 322.3(b) of the Final Rule, like the proposed rule, prohibits misrepresenting any material aspect of any MARS, to prevent deception. The Final Rule also adopts proposed §§ 322.3(b)(1)-(7) without substantive modification, but adds five examples of prohibited misrep

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Mortgage Assistance Relief Services · 75 FR 75092 | Frix