Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction Scheduled for September 15, 2004; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. AUC-04-57-A (Auction No. 57); DA 04-954]

Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction

Scheduled for September 15, 2004; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or

Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of twenty Automated

Maritime Telecommunications System licenses in Auction No. 57,

scheduled to begin on September 15, 2004. This document also seeks

comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other auction

procedures.

DATES: Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply comments

are due on or before April 30, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail

to the following address: [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Christopher

Shields, (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Lyle Ishida

(202) 418-0660, Lisa Stover (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions:

Roberto Mussenden or Ghassan Khalek, (202) 418-0680.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 57

Comment Public Notice released on April 5, 2004. The complete text of

the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, including the attachments, is

available for public inspection and copying during regular business

hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th

Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 57

Comment Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's

duplicating contractor, Qualex International, Portals II, 445 12th

Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (202) 863-

2893, facsimile (202) 863-2898, or via e-mail [email protected].

1. By the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 20

Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) licenses. This

auction is scheduled to commence on September 15, 2004 (Auction No.

57). AMTS is a specialized system of coast stations which provide

integrated and interconnected marine voice and data communications,

somewhat like a cellular phone system, for tugs, barges, and other

vessels on waterways. Service to units on land is permitted, so long as

marine-originating communications receive priority. In Auction No. 57,

two 500-kilohertz blocks of paired spectrum in the 217/219 MHz band

will be offered in each of 10 AMTS Areas (AMTSAs).

2. A complete list of licenses available for Auction No. 57 is

included as Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice.

The following table describes the licenses that will be auctioned

in each of the AMTSAs:

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Geographic area No. of

Block Frequency bands (MHz) Total bandwidth Pairing type licenses

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A.......... 217.5-218.0/219.5-220.0. 1 MHz.............. 2 x 500 kHz........ AMTSA............. 10

B.......... 217.0-217.7/219.0-219.5. 1 MHz.............. 2 x 500 kHz........ AMTSA............. 10

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Note: The table displays the band edges of spectrum blocks A and

B using the twenty 25 kHz channels that comprise each block as

listed in 47 CFR 80.385(a)(2). It should be noted that pursuant to

47 CFR 80.481, licensees are not required to use 25 kHz

channelization and may choose any channelization scheme; however,

regardless of the channelization scheme used, emissions at these

band edges must be attenuated within the limitation that would be

required under 47 CFR 80.211 if the licensee were using 25 kHz

channels.

3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to

``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this

subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of

bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction

procedures. * * *'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced

Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to

familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the

day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,

under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of

auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The

Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to

Auction No. 57.

I. Auction Structure

A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design

4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction

No. 57 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This methodology

offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding

rounds in which bidders may place bids. The Bureau seeks comment on

this proposal.

B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

5. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine

an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking

into account such factors as the population in each geographic license

area and the value of similar spectrum. The upfront payment is a

refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid

on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject

to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide

the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments

owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in mind for

Auction No. 57, The Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a

license-by-license basis using the following formula:

$0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000

per license. Accordingly, in Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment

Public Notice the Bureau lists all licenses included in Auction No. 57

and the proposed upfront payment for each license. The Bureau seeks

comment on this proposal.

6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront

payment submitted by a bidder will determine the maximum number of

bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a

bidder's initial eligibility. Each license is assigned a specific

number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in

Attachment A of the

[[Page 21111]]

Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding unit per dollar

basis. This number does not change as prices rise during the auction. A

bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses.

Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination of licenses as long

as the total number of bidding units associated with those licenses

does not exceed its current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be

increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment

amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units

it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and

submit an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. The

Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

C. Activity Rules

7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable

period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively

throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction

before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific

percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of

the auction. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule will

either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or must use an

activity rule waiver (if any remain).

8. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each

characterized by an increased activity requirement. The auction will

start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will

advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the

auction activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units

receiving new high bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for

three consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further

proposes that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages

unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this

discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder

activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity level,

the percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which

there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase

in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

9. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following activity

requirements: Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the

auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is

required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of

its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite

activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility

in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used).

During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be

calculated by multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths

(5/4).

Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to

maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent

of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced

eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the

current round activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).

10. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that

believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their

reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.

Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and

suggested alternative activity rules.

D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

11. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current

bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round

being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies

to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity

waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a

mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction

eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from

placing a bid in a particular round.

12. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with

insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if

available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system

will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at

the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below

the minimum required unless: (i) the bidder has no activity rule

waivers available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic

application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the

minimum requirement. Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and

does not satisfy the required activity level, its current eligibility

will be permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the

auction.

13. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its

bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the

bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism

during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function

in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is

permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the

activity rules. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be

permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

14. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means

to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a

proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding

system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are

submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility

will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which

there are no new bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open.

Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted during a round, that waiver

cannot be unsubmitted.

15. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 57 be

provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the

bidder's discretion during the course of the auction. The Bureau seeks

comment on this proposal.

E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

16. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice

or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend,

or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical

obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding

activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason

that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In

such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the

auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the

auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its

entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend

the auction. Exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion

of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for

situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule

waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

II. Bidding Procedures

A. Round Structure

17. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 57 over the Internet.

Telephonic bidding will also be available. As a contingency plan, the

FCC Wide Area Network will be available as well. The telephone number

through which the backup FCC Wide Area Network may be accessed will be

[[Page 21112]]

announced in a later public notice. Full information regarding how to

establish such a connection will be provided in the public notice

announcing details of auction procedures.

18. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public

notice to be released at least one week before the start of the

auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The

simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of sequential bidding

rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details

regarding the location and format of round results will be included in

the same public notice.

19. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in

order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the

bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding

strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for

the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day,

depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau

seeks comment on this proposal.

B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

20. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe

methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum

opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the

Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is

not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the

Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a

minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each

auction.

21. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below

which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can

be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other

hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction

below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate

the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the

discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the

auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the

reserve price to be the same amount.

22. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau

proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 57. The

Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been used in other

auctions, is an effective bidding tool.

23. Specifically, for Auction No. 57, the Commission proposes the

following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening

bids:

$0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000

per license. The specific minimum opening bid for each license

available in Auction No. 57 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction

No. 57 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this

proposal.

24. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will

result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable

amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should

explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an

alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims

with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening

bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the

Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of

spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of

technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service

areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other

relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of

the AMTS spectrum. The Bureau also seeks comment on whether, consistent

with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by

having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments

25. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a

given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated

Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for

each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening

bid. In the rounds after a bid is placed on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing high bid

plus the defined increment.

26. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC

Automated Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for

that license for the following round. The difference between the

minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will

define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each

license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid

plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using

multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the

standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid

amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment,

etc.).

27. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening

bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received

a bid will be calculated differently.

28. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum

acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as we have done in

several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum

acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, not to be

confused with the bid increment. The percentage increment for each

license is based on bidding activity on that license in all prior

rounds; therefore, a license that has received many bids throughout the

auction will have a higher percentage increment than a license that has

received few bids.

29. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine

the minimum acceptable bids for each license for the next round is made

at the end of each round. The computation is based on an activity

index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round

and the activity index from the prior round. The current activity index

is equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on

the license in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the

weighting factor times the activity index from the prior round. The

activity index is then used to calculate a percentage increment by

multiplying a minimum percentage increment by one plus the activity

index with that result being subject to a maximum percentage increment.

The Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the

minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage

increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the

percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20% depending upon

the number of bids for the license.

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)

Ii+1 = smaller of ((1 + Ai) * N) and M

X i+1 = Ii+1 * Yi

where,

Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)

[[Page 21113]]

Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1),

A0 is 0

Ii+1 = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling

Xi+1 = dollar amount associated with the percentage

increment

Yi = high bid from the current round

30. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received

on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the

following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the

dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result

rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the

nearest hundred if it is under ten thousand.

Examples

License 1

C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

Round 1 (2 New Bids, High Bid = $1,000,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the

smoothing formula:

A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1

I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the

maximum percentage increment)

ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage

increment for round 2 (using I2):

X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000

Round 2 (3 New Bids, High Bid = $2,000,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the

smoothing formula:

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2

I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the

maximum percentage increment)

ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage

increment for round 3 (using I3):

X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)

i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the

smoothing formula:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5

I4 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the

maximum percentage increment)

ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage

increment for round 4 (using I4):

X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000

iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000

31. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening

bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference

between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage

increment, and the minimum opening bid. That is, I = (minimum opening

bid)(1 + N){rounded{time} -(minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N

equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be approximately ten

percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the second, twenty

percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.

32. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has

been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second

highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are

calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times

one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second

highest bid.

33. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum

acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances

so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Automated

Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.

D. High Bids

34. At the end of a bidding round, a high bid for each license will

be determined based on the highest gross bid amount received for the

license. In the event of identical high bids on a license in a given

round (i.e., tied bids), we propose to use a random number generator to

select a single high bid from among the tied bids. If the auction were

to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the winning

bidder would be the one that placed the selected high bid. However, the

remaining bidders, as well as the high bidder, can submit higher bids

in subsequent rounds. If any bids are received on the license in a

subsequent round, the high bid again will be determined by the highest

gross bid amount received for the license.

35. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid

on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from

a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.''

Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity.

E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

36. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following bid

removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding

period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that

round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may

effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder

removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal

payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.

37. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous

rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder

that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject

to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The

Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal

procedures.

38. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 65 FR 52401, August 29,

2000, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals

facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of

efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the

course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some

instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The

Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit

the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission

stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion,

consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw

bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the

Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal

procedures.

39. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each

bidder in Auction No. 57 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more

than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to

withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere

bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The

two rounds in which withdrawals may be utilized will be at the bidder's

discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the

Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high

bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals

are utilized. Withdrawals will remain

[[Page 21114]]

subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the

Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.

F. Stopping Rule

40. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before

or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction

within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to

employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping

rule means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding

closes simultaneously on all licenses.

41. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the

first round in which no new bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are

received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will

remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

42. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to

exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 57:

i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule.

The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses

after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,

withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing

high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing

a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would

not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau

further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be

used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.

ii. Keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers

are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event,

the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive

waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder

with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use

a remaining activity rule waiver.

iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of

additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes

this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final

round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least

one of a specified preceding number of rounds.

43. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain

circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very

slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely

that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.

Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to

increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number

of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum

bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still

a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

III. Conclusion

44. Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply

comments are due on or before April 30, 2004. Because of the disruption

of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the Bureau

requires that all comments and reply comments be filed electronically.

Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail to the

following address: [email protected]. The electronic mail containing

the comments or reply comments must include a subject or caption

referring to Auction No. 57 Comments and the name of the commenting

party. The Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to

electronic mail as Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word

documents. Copies of comments and reply comments will be available for

public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public

Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC

20554. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy

copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn

Garland at (717) 338-2850.

45. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-

disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte

rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that

memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the

substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects

discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and

arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to

oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose

proceedings are set forth in Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.

Federal Communications Commission.

Gary Michaels,

Deputy Chief, Auction and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.

[FR Doc. 04-9019 Filed 4-19-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712-01-P