Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations
Federal RegisterJan 7, 2004
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary
14 CFR Part 255
[Dockets Nos. OST-97-2881, OST-97-3014, OST-98-4775, and OST-99-5888]
RIN 2105-AC65
Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations
AGENCY:
Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY:
The Department is amending its rules governing airline computer reservations systems (“CRSs” or “systems”) to eliminate most of the rules now and to terminate additional rules as of July 31, 2004. The Department is readopting the rules prohibiting display bias and adopting rules that prohibit systems from imposing certain types of contract clauses on participating airlines that would unreasonably restrict their ability to choose how to distribute their services. These rules will be effective during a six-month transition period.
DATES:
This rule is effective on January 31, 2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas Ray, Office of the General Counsel, 400 Seventh St. SW., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-4731.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Electronic Access
You can view and download this document by going to the website of the Department's Docket Management System (
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). On that page, click on “simple search.” On the next page, type in the last four digits of the docket number shown on the first page of this document, 2881. Then click on “search.” An electronic copy of this document also may be downloaded from
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and from the Government Printing Office's Electronic Bulletin Board Service at (202) 512-1661. Internet users may reach the Office of the Federal Register's home page at:
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Table of Contents
A. Summary of Final Rule
B. Background
1. The CRS Business
2. The Travel Agency Distribution System and the Business Relationships between Travel Agencies and the Systems
3. Regulatory Background
C. Development of the Record in this Rulemaking
D. Procedural Issues
E. The Need for Limited CRS Regulation
1. Introduction
2. Final Rule
3. Market Definition
4. The Systems' Market Power over Airlines
5. The Potential for System Conduct Undermining Airline Competition
6. System Practices that Preserve Market Power
7. The Systems' Ability to Engage in Display Bias
F. The Department's Statutory Authority To Regulate CRS Practices
1. Whether Non-Airline Systems Are Ticket Agents Subject to Section 411
2. Antitrust Principles Relevant to System Practices
3. First Amendment and International Law Issues
G. The Specific Rule Proposals
1. The Scope of the Rules
2. Exclusion of Internet-Based Systems
3. Definitions
4. Rules Barring Display Bias
5. Contract Clauses Restricting Airline Choices on System Usage
6. Equal Functionality
7. The Mandatory Participation Rule
8. Booking Fees
9. Booking Fee Bills
10. Other Participating Carrier Contract Rules
11. Marketing and Booking Data
12. Third-Party Hardware and Software
13. Travel Agency Contracts
14. The Tying of Commissions and Marketing Benefits with a Subscriber's Choice of a System
15. Regulation of the Internet's Use in Airline Distribution
16. Tying of Internet Participation
17. International Issues
18. Retaliation against Discrimination by Foreign Airlines and Systems
19. Sunset Date for the Rules
20. Effective Date of the Rules
21. Divestiture
Regulatory Process Matters
Regulatory Assessment and Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Paperwork Reduction Act
Federalism Implications
Taking of Private Property
Civil Justice Reform
Protection of Children
Consultation and Coordination with Tribal Governments
Energy Effects
Environment
Glossary
ASTA—American Society of Travel Agents.
Board—The Civil Aeronautics Board.
Booking fees—Fees paid by airlines and other travel suppliers when a travel agent makes or changes a booking in a system.
CRS—Computer reservations system.
Mandatory participation rule—The rule requiring each airline that has a significant ownership interest in a system to participate in competing systems at as high a level of functionality as it does in its own system, if the terms are commercially reasonable.
Network airlines—The airlines that operate hub-and-spoke route systems, especially the five largest airlines (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United).
Non-airline system—A system that is neither owned nor controlled by any airline or airline affiliate.
OMB—Office of Management and Budget.
Participate—To make the services of an airline or other travel supplier available for sale through a system under a contract with that system.
Parity clauses—Clauses in participating airline contracts that require a participating airline to buy at least as high a level of service from the system as it does from any other system.
Productivity pricing—Pricing formula used in subscriber contracts that enables the travel agency to obtain lower CRS fees from a system if the travel agency meets minimum booking quotas established by the contract.
Section 411—49 U.S.C. 41712, recodifying section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act.
Subscriber—A travel agency that obtains CRS services under a contract with the system.
System—Computer reservations system.
Webfares—Discount fares offered by an airline through its own website and often through selected distribution channels.
A. Summary of Final Rule
In this proceeding we have reexamined whether our existing rules on computer reservations systems (“CRSs” or “systems”), 14 CFR Part 255, remain necessary and, if so, whether we should readopt them, with or without modifications. If we do not readopt the rules, they will expire on their sunset date, currently January 31, 2004. Our notice of proposed rulemaking asked for comment on these issues and proposed that most of the rules should be readopted. 67 FR 69366 (November 15, 2002). After reviewing the comments and the on-going changes in the airline distribution and CRS businesses reflected in those comments, we have concluded that most of the rules should be allowed to sunset on January 31, 2004. We believe, however, that we should adopt the rules prohibiting display bias and certain rules barring unreasonably restrictive requirements in the contracts between systems and their airline customers for a six-month transition period to provide an opportunity for the affected parties to prepare for complete deregulation of computer reservation systems. We intend to monitor developments in the industry during this period and beyond. We, of course, retain our authority to pursue future regulatory or enforcement actions against airlines or systems that engage in anti-competitive practices.
The systems' operations have been subject to rules for twenty years. Although the systems now are commonly called global distribution systems, or GDSs, we will continue to refer to them here as CRSs. The Civil Aeronautics Board (“the Board”), the agency that had been responsible for the economic regulation of the airline industry, originally adopted those rules in 1984. 49 FR 32540 (August 15, 1984),
aff'd, United Air Lines
v.
CAB,
766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985). After reexamining whether those rules were necessary and effective, we readopted them with some changes in 1992. 14 CFR Part 255, adopted at 57 FR 43780 (September 22, 1992).
When these rulemakings were held, one or more airlines or airline affiliates owned or controlled each system, airlines depended heavily on travel agencies for distribution, travel agents used a system to research airline service options and to make bookings, and each travel agency predominantly relied on one system to perform these tasks. Systems therefore did not need to compete for airline participants (a “participant” is an airline that agrees to make its services saleable through a system). The airlines that controlled the systems had the incentive and ability to use them to prejudice the competitive position of non-owner airlines and to provide information on airline services through the systems to travel agents that gave an undue preference to the services operated by the owner airlines. Competitive market forces did not discipline the prices and terms for services offered by systems to participating airlines.
Our goal in CRS rulemakings has been to prevent practices that were likely to harm consumers by substantially reducing airline competition or by giving travel agents and their customers inaccurate or misleading information on airline services. The rules block system practices that would cause consumers and their travel agents to receive misleading information and would distort airline competition. We adopted most of the rules under our authority to prevent unfair methods of competition in the sale of airline transportation, an authority that empowers us to prohibit practices that violate the antitrust laws or antitrust principles, but, in adopting the rules prohibiting display bias, we additionally relied on our authority to prevent unfair and deceptive practices in the marketing of air transportation.
We should adopt rules regulating industry practices only if they are reasonably necessary to prevent anti-competitive or deceptive practices that are likely to occur, and would cause significant consumer harm if they did occur, and that market forces are unlikely to remedy. Any rule must be effective and enforceable. Rules intended to address a serious competitive concern may have unintended consequences that may reduce efficiency and consumer choice. As we explained in our notice of proposed rulemaking, we will not adopt rules that address all potential problems, for such detailed regulations would necessarily impose significant burdens on the systems and interfere with legitimate business practices. 67 FR 69389. Our approach for determining whether rules are necessary is essentially the same as that recommended by the Justice Department. The Department of Justice states that regulation is appropriate “only when (1) market participants have substantial and durable market power that will likely harm consumers directly, or will be exercised in ways that exclude or limit competition in contiguous markets, and (2) the regulation will likely be effective and enforceable without imposing significant costs of its own.” Justice Department Reply Comments at 18.
Our rules included a sunset date, currently January 31, 2004, to ensure that we would review whether the rules remained necessary in light of on-going developments in the CRS and airline distribution businesses. 57 FR 43829-43830; 68 FR 15350 (March 31, 2003). This proceeding carries out that reassessment. The major changes that have occurred since our last major rulemaking underscore the need for such a reassessment.
All of the U.S. airlines that had controlled a system have divested their CRS ownership interests. As a result, none of the four systems now operating in the United States is owned or controlled by any U.S. airline or airline affiliate. Furthermore, airlines are selling an increasingly large share of their tickets through their Internet websites and a diminishing share through travel agencies using a system. The airlines' control over access to their webfares, the discounted fares originally offered only through individual airline websites, has enabled them to obtain lower fees from two of the systems. And travel agencies are increasingly demanding—and winning—contracts from the systems that give them more freedom to use alternative booking channels and to switch systems periodically.
Our examination of these developments has persuaded us that we should allow most of the existing rules to sunset upon their expiration. The major predicate for the rules has always been the systems' control by airlines. The U.S. airlines' divestiture of their ownership interests has eliminated that basis for the rules. While each system still has market power over most airlines, that power is diminishing. Moreover, the record does not show a likelihood that the systems would use that power to distort airline competition except potentially through the sale of bias.
On the other hand, we have determined that we should readopt, for a six-month transition period, the rules prohibiting display bias and rules prohibiting certain types of contract clauses in the systems' contracts with airlines. We are readopting the rules against display bias because we believe that, were the rules terminated immediately, systems might well be expected to bias their displays in ways that could mislead travel agents and their customers and prejudice airline competition. For that reason, we believe it is important to provide a measure of notice to the industry prior to the rules' termination and a concomitant opportunity to prepare for the absence of regulation.
Similarly, we are adopting for the same short transition period two rules governing the contracts between the systems and airlines: rules prohibiting parity clauses (a parity clause would require an airline to participate in that system at at least as high a level as it participates in any other system) and clauses requiring airlines to provide access to all webfares as a condition to any participation in a system. However, an airline is free to agree to such clauses. We believe that, were these prohibitions terminated immediately, the systems would have sufficient market power to impose contract terms on airlines that would unreasonably restrict the airlines' ability to bargain for better terms for participation. The transition period during which these prohibitions will be maintained will furnish the industry with reasonable notice of the forthcoming change with an opportunity to prepare for it. Our final decision is consistent with the recommendations made by the Justice Department.
The two rules on contract clauses and the rule prohibiting display bias therefore will sunset on July 31, 2004. We will actively monitor developments during the transition period and beyond and take appropriate investigative, enforcement, or regulatory action if we see evidence that systems or airlines are engaging in anti-competitive conduct in connection with airline distribution through the systems and other channels.
We will not readopt the other rules now in force, and we reaffirm our tentative decision not to adopt rules governing the use of the Internet in airline distribution. The rules that we are not readopting will automatically expire on January 31, 2004, their sunset date.
The elimination of most of the rules will ensure that government regulation does not interfere with market forces and innovation in the CRS and airline distribution businesses. The record indicates that market forces are beginning to discipline business practices in the CRS industry. Ending the broad regulation of CRS practices will enable each system and each airline to bargain over the terms on which CRS services should be provided, just as airlines obtain products and services from other suppliers under agreements negotiated by the parties. The systems will have the same ability to bargain with their other customers, the travel agencies. The resulting terms under which airlines and travel agencies obtain system services will likely reflect the interests of both sides better than if we maintained broad regulations restricting the parties' behavior. While we cannot predict exactly what will happen, we believe that ending most of the rules will produce the best results for consumers over time. We base this judgment on our experience with airline deregulation. Airline deregulation has provided lower fares and better service for consumers, in part by enabling new firms to enter the airline business. Several of the new airlines have followed new business plans that have provided great benefits for airline travelers. Airline deregulation has produced these benefits even though the deregulated airline industry has not operated in the manner expected by industry experts on the eve of deregulation. The deregulation of the CRS business should also benefit consumers, even though we cannot forecast how it will play out.
Our final rule also conforms to the limits imposed by Congress on our authority to regulate the airline and airline distribution businesses. Congress has given us the authority to prevent practices that violate the antitrust laws or antitrust principles and practices that are deceptive, but no comprehensive oversight authority over airline distribution. We are adopting only those rules that are necessary to prevent practices in the CRS business that would constitute unfair or deceptive practices, or unfair methods of competition.
We are aware that some participants in the airline distribution and CRS businesses may seek to engage in anti-competitive conduct that would reduce competition in the airline and airline distribution businesses and thereby harm consumers. A system, for example, might develop vertical ties with an airline that would cause the system to operate in a way that could prejudice airline competition. Some systems may seek to pursue practices that would reduce competition in the CRS business and preserve their market power over airlines. Even without specific regulations, any such practices could be unfair methods of competition and thus unlawful. We retain the authority to bring enforcement cases against firms that violate the statutory prohibition against unfair methods of competition, and we will take appropriate action if we have evidence of unlawful conduct. As Congress stated when it deregulated the airline industry, S. Rep. No. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) at 52:
Vigorous enforcement of antitrust policy is the discipline by which competition can remain free and markets can operate in a healthy fashion. Predatory behavior, market concentration, and other economic evils should be avoided and remedied by the Board when they exist.
See also
H. R. Rep. No. 98-793, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) at 5: “Although the airline industry has been deregulated, this does not mean that there are no limits to competitive practices. As is the case with all industry, carriers must not engage in practices which would destroy the framework under which fair competition operates.”
We will also actively monitor the systems' reactions to the substantial deregulation of their business, and we, of course, retain the power to reexamine our decision that all rules should terminate by July 31, 2004, if the systems' conduct or other developments makes such a reexamination necessary.
Our final rule departs from the proposals made by our notice of proposed rulemaking. Our notice proposed to eliminate two of the major rules, the rule barring discriminatory booking fees and the rule requiring airlines with a significant ownership interest in one system to participate in competing systems at an equivalent level if the terms for doing so were commercially reasonable, but to readopt most of the remaining rules. Our review of the rulemaking record up to that point suggested that rules were still necessary, notwithstanding the changes in the systems' ownership and the growing role of the Internet. 67 FR 69375-69384. The notice, however, did request comment on whether we should sunset more of the rules now, and we predicted that the rules would become unnecessary in a few years. 67 FR 69368, 69376, 69388-69389.
The comments and the continuing developments in airline distribution and the CRS business have convinced us that most of the rules are no longer appropriate. In particular, one of the systems, Worldspan, was owned by three U.S. airlines when we issued our notice of proposed rulemaking but was sold several months ago to two private venture capital firms. The airline distribution business has continued to evolve since we issued the notice. Airlines are selling more tickets through the Internet. Moreover, as we predicted, the airlines' control over access to their webfares has led some of the systems to offer airlines discounted booking fees in return for the ability to sell those fares. 67 FR 69381; Galileo Supp. Comments at 5-8. And the comments have shown that the systems' contracts with travel agencies are significantly less restrictive than they were even a few years ago.
See, e.g.
, ASTA Comments at 14-16.
That our final rule does not duplicate our proposal is consistent with the purpose of rulemaking procedures. The notice of proposed rulemaking was designed to obtain comments from interested persons on our tentative findings and our economic and policy analysis and to enable them to submit current information. We held a public hearing to give interested persons an additional opportunity to present their views and respond to our questions. The comments submitted in this proceeding, together with the on-going developments in the airline distribution and CRS businesses, have persuaded us that our proposals should not be made final. Those proposals, while reasonable in light of industry conditions two or three years ago, to a large extent no longer reflect current conditions.
We will begin our explanation of our final rule by updating our description of the CRS and travel agency businesses, and we address several procedural issues. We then discuss our conclusions on the need for adopting some CRS rules, including our findings that the systems continue to have market power over airlines, and discuss the question of our legal authority to readopt the rules and to apply them to systems that are not owned by airlines. We thereafter present the rationale for our decisions on each of the rule proposals.
Our notice of proposed rulemaking included a request for comments on whether we should clarify our policy on fare disclosures as regards the disclosure of travel agency service fees. We have decided to address that question in a separate rule.
We will refer to commenters by their common names (for example, “Alaska,” not “Alaska Airlines”). References to comments and reply comments are to the pleadings filed in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking, not the pleadings filed in response to the advance notices of proposed rulemaking, which were discussed in the notice of proposed rulemaking. We will refer to the statutory provision that is the principal basis for our adoption of CRS rules, 49 U.S.C. 41712, by its traditional name, section 411, as we did in the notice of proposed rulemaking. The glossary at the beginning of this document gives the meaning of the abbreviations and technical terms used in this rule.
B. Background
Our notice of proposed rulemaking described in some detail the nature of the airline distribution and CRS businesses, including the travel agency business. 67 FR 69369-69375. Here we will update our factual description on the basis of the information provided by the comments and set forth the factual findings underlying our final decision.
1. The CRS Business
Airlines use several distribution methods: direct sales through their reservations agents, sales through “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies, sales through individual airline websites, and sales through on-line travel agencies. In the past, the “brick-and-mortar” travel agency channel produced the great majority of airline revenues for almost all airlines. In 1999 travel agencies sold almost three-quarters of airline tickets, almost all through off-line travel agencies. 67 FR 69369, citing Bear, Stearns & Co., “Point, Click, Trip: An Introduction to the On-Line Travel Agency” (April 2000) at 17. Since then the Internet has become an increasingly important distribution channel. Galileo states that the different channels' shares of total airline tickets in 2002 were as follows, Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 24:
Percent
off-line sales by airlines
17
on-line sales by airlines
10
off-line sales by travel agencies
58
on-line sales by travel agencies
15
Until recently the great majority of all travel agency airline ticket sales, whether off-line or on-line, have been made through one of the systems.
Four systems operate in the United States: Sabre, Galileo, Worldspan, and Amadeus. Each of them was originally developed by one or more U.S. airlines (Amadeus entered the U.S. market by acquiring a U.S. system). Two of the systems—Sabre and Galileo—were no longer owned or controlled by any U.S. airlines when we issued the notice of proposed rulemaking. At that time, three U.S. airlines—American, Delta, and Northwest—owned Worldspan. Amadeus was then owned by three European airlines—Air France, Iberia, and Lufthansa—as well as by public shareholders (and has the same ownership today). Worldspan's airline owners sold that system to two private venture capital firms on June 30, 2003, after the issuance of our notice of proposed rulemaking. As part of that sale, the airline owners agreed to certain parity clauses and marketing commitments. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 20; Amadeus Comments at 32-33; August 1, 2003, Letter from Charles Simpson, Jr.; Sabre Supp. Reply at 4. Amadeus is now the only system with any airline ownership.
The systems that have no airline owners have marketing ties with their former owners. United markets Galileo, American markets Sabre, and Delta and Northwest have agreed to market Worldspan for several years following the closing of the system's sale. Amadeus Comments at 25, n. 24; Galileo Supp. Comments at 1-4. Southwest also markets Sabre, although Southwest never had an ownership interest in the system.
Each system's share of CRS airline bookings in the United States in 2002 was as follows, Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 18:
Percent
Sabre
44.7
Worldspan
26.5
Galileo
19.7
Amadeus
9.2
Since 1999 the shares of Galileo and Amadeus have been declining, while Worldspan's share has risen sharply, from 19.3 percent to 26.5 percent. The growth in Worldspan's share in large part reflects its status as the booking engine for two of the three largest on-line travel agencies, Expedia and Orbitz.
Each system provides information and booking capabilities on the airlines that “participate” in it, that is, agree to make their services saleable through the system. The system obtains its availability information from the airlines' internal reservations systems, and it makes bookings in those systems, which are used by the airlines' own reservations agents and other staff members. The systems also provide information and booking capabilities for rental cars, hotels, and other travel services. Airline transportation is the most important travel service sold through the systems, and airlines obtain a larger share of their revenues from CRS bookings (sales made through the systems) than do other travel suppliers. 67 FR 69370.
An airline (or other travel supplier) participating in a system must pay fees for each booking transaction (the fees paid by participating airlines are usually called “booking fees”). Airlines can participate at different levels. At higher levels the information provided travel agencies will be more timely and so more reliable, and travel agents can carry out tasks like reserving specific seats for their customers. An airline that chooses a higher level of participation must pay a higher booking fee. 67 FR 69370. Booking fees paid by airlines provide well over half of the systems' total revenues. 67 FR 69380.
The average airline booking fee per segment is $4.25. Because the average ticket includes more than one segment, the average booking fee per ticket is $11. United Reply Comments at 28; “Upheaval in Travel Distribution: Impact on Consumers and Travel Agents,” National Commission to Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry” (November 13, 2002), at 16. United alleges that its average booking fee per segment equals 3.3 percent of its average revenue per segment. United Reply Comments at 29. Sabre has stated that the effective booking fee per segment for its highest level of participation was $4.38 in 2002, about 2.4 percent of the average airline ticket price for tickets sold through Sabre. Sabre charges $2.12 per segment for airlines participating at its low level, Basic Booking Service. Sabre Comments at 14; Sabre Comments, Wilson Declaration at 6.
Sabre and Galileo have created programs that give participating airlines lower booking fees in return for a commitment to provide the system with all of their webfares. Under Sabre's Direct Connect Availability program (“DCA program”), an airline can obtain a 10 percent reduction in its booking fees, guaranteed for three years, in exchange for a commitment to provide the system with all of the airline's published fares, including its webfares. American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, U.S. Airways, and a number of smaller airlines now participate in this program. Sabre Supplemental Reply at 1.
Galileo first established its Momentum program, which gave airlines a 20 percent reduction in booking fees for tickets sold through participating travel agencies, if the airlines agreed to give Galileo access to all of their publicly-available fares. Travel agencies could participate in the program if they agreed to a reduction in their incentive payments from Galileo. United and U.S. Airways were the first airlines that joined this program. One of the travel agencies that joined the program was Rosenbluth International, the fourth largest U.S. corporate travel agency. Due to complaints from America West and other airlines, Galileo dropped the initial requirement that any airline participating in the Momentum program must upgrade its participation level to the highest level. More recently Galileo introduced Preferred Fares Select, which will enable airlines to obtain lower booking fees on all of their bookings if they agree to make all of their publicly-available fares saleable through Galileo. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 52-56; Galileo Reply Comments at 33-34; Galileo Supplemental Comments at 5-8; Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 10-11.
The record does not indicate that Amadeus or Worldspan has introduced comparable programs.
Travel agencies often obtain CRS services at no cost or receive bonus payments in exchange for agreeing to use a system. ASTA states that in 2002 fewer than half of all travel agencies paid monthly fees for system services and that 60 percent of them received a signing bonus of some kind from the system that they were using. ASTA Comments at 17. The systems pay on average $1 to $1.50 per booking to travel agencies for using a system. Sabre Comments at 7.
As we stated in the notice of proposed rulemaking, travel agents have depended heavily on the systems to determine what airline services are available and to make bookings. There we cited statistics showing that travel agencies in 1999 sold almost three-quarters of all airline tickets and made 93 percent of their domestic airline bookings and 81 percent of their international airline bookings through a system. 67 FR 69369-69370. The record shows that since then the share of airline revenues produced by travel agents using a system has been declining. The Justice Department states that the share of revenues produced by “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies for the five airlines that own Orbitz has fallen from 76 percent in May 2000 to 67 percent in March 2002, primarily due to the growth in Internet sales. Justice Department Reply Comments at 14-15.
In the past, almost all U.S. airlines participated in every system. Southwest, which has participated only in Sabre and at a low level, was the major exception. JetBlue, which began operations in 2000, also participates only in Sabre and at the same level as Southwest. Sabre Comments at 38. Airlines that can avoid participation in every system focus their marketing efforts instead on direct sales to consumers, made through either the airline's website or its reservations agents. Airlines that have been participating in all of the systems, such as Alaska, have been shifting many of their bookings away from the travel agency channel, which required them to pay the systems' booking fees.
See, e.g.
, Alaska Comments at 5. The large network airlines nonetheless still obtain at least 60 percent of their revenues from bookings made by travel agents using a system, as discussed below. American, for example, states that over 70 percent of its bookings are made through the systems. American Reply Comments at 19. The share of total industry bookings made through the systems has been declining in part due to the growth of airlines like Southwest that do not depend on travel agencies for the major share of their revenues. American Reply Comments at 19.
The systems have played a major role in airline distribution because travel agents—the airlines' primary distribution channel—have relied so much on the systems for investigating airline service options and booking tickets, because the systems are so efficient. They electronically provide comprehensive information and booking capabilities on airlines and other travel suppliers. Each system presents displays that integrate almost all services offered in a market. Each system shows the schedules and fares offered by airlines in each market that are available for sale through travel agents using that system and whether seats are available on specific flights at specific fares (some fares are often not available through the systems, notably corporate discount fares and webfares). The system thus allows the travel agent to compare the schedules and fares offered by different airlines and determine which would best meet a customer's needs. The agent using a system can reserve a seat and issue a paper ticket or print an E-ticket.
On-line agencies also use systems—Travelocity uses Sabre, while Expedia and Orbitz use Worldspan, for example. 67 FR 69370. Orbitz and Expedia have been developing direct connection technologies which enable bookings to be made directly with an airline's internal reservations system, bypassing Worldspan. Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 8-9.
Since the Board first adopted CRS rules, no firm has entered the CRS business. Until recently, entry into the CRS business would have been prohibitively costly and time-consuming. 67 FR 69381. This may no longer be true. Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 8. New direct-connection technologies can enable firms to provide airline information and booking services that replicate at least some of the services provided by the systems. Galileo Comments at 42, n. 38. Orbitz, which now operates as an on-line travel agency, plans to make its services available to travel agencies through software being developed by Aqua. Orbitz continues to rely on Worldspan for some functions involved in the search and booking process. 67 FR 69373, 69374. Another commenter in this proceeding, AgentWare, is also offering travel agencies fare and schedule information and links to booking sites. Galileo Comments at 66-67.
The development of sources of airline information and booking capabilities on the Internet has created additional resources that travel agents can use. Travel agents are increasingly checking the fares and services offered on websites because some airline discount fares have not been sold through the systems. Travel agents, however, continue to make most of their airline bookings through a system. Using alternative booking channels is less efficient for travel agents, as discussed below. Nevertheless, the development of alternative sources of information and booking capabilities on the Internet, and the airlines' control over access to their webfares, have begun to make the systems responsive to market force discipline.
Corporate travel departments as well as travel agencies use the systems. A corporate travel department can book travel for its company's employees by accessing a system through the Internet or by Intranet (an internal corporate communications network based on Internet technology). 67 FR 69370.
Systems operate throughout the world. U.S. systems like Sabre and Worldspan market their services to travel agencies in foreign countries, and Amadeus is a major system in the Eastern Hemisphere. The systems had the following shares of worldwide CRS airline bookings in 2002, Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 18:
Percent
Sabre
30.8
Worldspan
15.1
Galileo
26.4
Amadeus
27.7
The European Union, Canada, and other governments have regulations governing CRS operations. The United States has entered into a number of international air services agreements that require each party to ensure that the systems operating in its country and their owners do not subject airlines and systems from the other country to discriminatory treatment. 67 FR 69371-69372.
2. The Travel Agency Distribution System and the Business Relationships Between Travel Agencies and the Systems
The systems' practices have affected airline competition because of the importance of travel agents in airline distribution. The travel agency system has provided airlines with an efficient means of distribution. Travel agencies have acted as agents for virtually all airlines and generally hold themselves out to the public as sources of impartial advice on airline services and other travel services. 67 FR 69371.
In 2001, there were 18,425 travel agencies. The travel agency business is dominated by the largest travel agencies. In 2001, the 117 travel agencies with revenues of more than $50 million (as measured by sales of air transportation) accounted for 57.2 percent of all travel agency sales. The 1,015 travel agencies with revenues of $5 million to $50 million accounted for another 20.1 percent of all travel agency sales. “Upheaval in Travel Distribution: Impact on Consumers and Travel Agents,” National Commission to Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry” (November 13, 2002), at 113.
See also
Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at Table 3 (Sabre's top five subscribers produced 25.7 percent of its total bookings, excluding Travelocity, and the top 100 produced 49.6 percent of its total bookings, excluding Travelocity).
As noted above, in 2002 the airlines obtained 58 percent of their bookings from “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies and 15 percent from on-line travel agencies. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 24. The three largest on-line travel agencies had the following shares of all on-line travel agency bookings in 2002: Travelocity, 28.5 percent; Expedia, 28.7 percent; and Orbitz, 21.3 percent. Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at Table 2. Travelocity is a Sabre subsidiary, while Orbitz is owned by the five largest U.S. airlines—American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United. Travelocity has been using Sabre as its source of airline information and booking capabilities, while Expedia and Orbitz have been using Worldspan for these functions. Orbitz and Expedia have been developing direct connections with airlines that bypass Worldspan. Airlines that agree to be “charter associates” in Orbitz, which includes a commitment to make all publicly available fares available for sale through Orbitz, receive a rebate on their booking fees. 67 FR 69374.
The larger airlines still obtain most of their revenues from bookings made by travel agents. However, despite the continuing importance of travel agencies in airline distribution, the travel agency business has faced severe business problems in recent years, due to developments such as the airlines' elimination of base commissions (but not incentive commissions), the growing use of the Internet by many travelers, particularly leisure travelers, and the overall decline in airline traffic.
See
“Upheaval in Travel Distribution: Impact on Consumers and Travel Agents,” National Commission To Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry” (November 13, 2002). From 1994 to 2002, the number of travel agencies fell by 31 percent and the number of travel agency locations by 21 percent. “Upheaval in Travel Distribution” at 21. The number of travel agencies declined by 12 percent in the year ended September 2002 and by another 7 percent through April 2003. ASTA Reply Comments at 15-16.
The nature of the travel agencies' operations is important to this proceeding, because we must consider the impact of our decisions on the travel agencies' business and because the rules have covered some features of the relationships between the systems and travel agencies. However, providing support for travel agencies that would offset other economic developments is not within our statutory authority and therefore not a proper goal of this proceeding. This proceeding must be, and is, limited to preventing system practices and related airline practices that would harm consumers by significantly reducing airline competition.
A critical factor in our decision-making is that travel agencies, unlike most airlines, can choose which system to use. Most travel agencies need to use only one system, and for most travel agencies no system has features and information that are indispensable, as discussed below. Because most travel agencies are free to decide to use one system rather than its competitors, the systems compete vigorously for travel agency customers. As noted above, systems usually pay travel agencies for choosing one system rather than another.
See, e.g.
, 67 FR 69371; Sabre Comments at 7.
In past rulemaking proceedings, and in our notice of proposed rulemaking in this proceeding, we cited evidence that the systems' contracts with travel agencies often contained provisions that unreasonably restricted the travel agencies' ability to use more than one system or to use alternative electronic sources of airline information and booking channels. 67 FR 69405; 57 FR 43822. For example, each system formerly kept travel agencies from buying their own equipment and made them use equipment provided by the system for accessing its services. 57 FR 43796. The record further suggested that the systems' contracts with travel agencies typically included “productivity pricing” programs that imposed financial penalties on an agency that began using another system or other booking channel for making a substantial number of bookings, or that gave the agency incentive payments if it made most of its bookings through that system. 67 FR 69408. These types of restrictive contract provisions concerned us because they tended to preserve the systems' market power and denied airlines an opportunity to encourage travel agencies to use alternative electronic means for obtaining information on airline services and making bookings, such as direct links between a travel agency and an airline's own internal reservations system. Our notice observed, however, that the systems were giving at least some travel agencies more flexible terms. 67 FR 69405.
The proposals made by our notice fairly reflected industry conditions when the comments on our advance notices of proposed rulemaking were filed. Large Agency Coalition Comments at 7. However, the comments submitted in response to our notice of proposed rulemaking show that travel agencies since then have been successfully demanding more flexible contracts and winning the ability to use alternative booking channels. ASTA's October 2002 travel agency survey made the following finding (quoted in Sabre Comments at 151):
[CRS] vendors are introducing a new crop of more flexible contracts with less rigid productivity requirements and more pricing options. [C]ontract terms have gotten more favorable towards agencies with shorter overall length, lower required segments and a higher percentage of agencies receiving booking incentives.
See also
Large Agency Coalition Comments at 7-14.
For example, subscriber contracts typically have a term that is substantially shorter than the maximum permitted by our rules. Our rules prohibit contracts with a term of more than five years and require a system to offer a three-year contract to any travel agency offered a five-year contract. 57 FR 43825. For some time after we adopted that rule, few travel agencies had contracts with a term of less than five years. 67 FR 69405. Now, however, many travel agencies have contracts that are no more than three years in length. The percentage of travel agencies with five-year contracts has declined from 85 percent in 1998 to 47 percent in 2002, while the percentage with three-year contracts has risen from 9 percent in 1998 to 39 percent in 2002. Almost 60 percent of Worldspan subscribers had five-year contracts in 2002, while only 35 percent of Sabre's subscribers had such contracts. Sabre Comments at 17-18; Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 14-15.
Travel agencies, moreover, have a substantial ability to switch systems when their existing contract expires. Half of the responding agencies in the ASTA survey stated they intended to obtain competitive bids at the end of their current contract, while another third stated that they might seek competitive bids and only one sixth stated they definitely intended to continue using the same system. Sabre Comments at 153. Nonetheless, switching systems can impose significant costs on travel agencies, at least for smaller travel agencies. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 81.
When we last readopted the rules, we added a provision giving travel agencies the right to use their own equipment to access a system and to use third-party software. Before then, each system typically demanded that its subscribers use equipment provided by the system and barred subscribers from accessing other systems and databases from that equipment. 57 FR 43796-43797. Travel agencies are increasingly using their own equipment. Only 70 percent of travel agencies leased equipment from a system in 2002, while 85 percent did so in 2000. ASTA Comments at 14. Sabre alleges that it seeks to exit the equipment-leasing business, that 73 percent of the equipment used by Sabre subscribers will be provided by third parties by the end of 2003, and that 62.5 percent of their equipment was being provided by third parties as of November 2002. Sabre Comments at 131. Amadeus states that only one fourth of its subscribers rely entirely on equipment provided by Amadeus. Amadeus Comments at 45. Subscribers to other systems are more likely to use equipment provided by the system. ASTA represents that systems do not resist subscriber efforts to use their own equipment instead of equipment provided by the system. ASTA Comments at 15. Sabre represents that it does not enforce the provisions in its older subscriber contracts that barred the travel agencies from using Sabre equipment to access other systems. Its subscribers are free to use multiple systems. Sabre Comments at 17, n. 17, and 71. Amadeus has made a similar representation. Amadeus Comments at 45.
Sabre further represents that the larger travel agencies often have complete flexibility in using the systems. Sixteen of Sabre's 20 largest “brick-and-mortar” travel agency customers use multiple systems, and many use their own software to direct bookings to a specific system, often in order to maximize their incentive payments. Those 16 agencies produce 35 percent of Sabre's total volume from “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies. Sabre Comments at 71. However, as discussed below in our market definition analysis, each location of a travel agency that subscribes to more than one system tends to predominantly rely on one system rather than make substantial use of every system whose services are being purchased by the parent firm.
Using alternate booking channels and sources of information has become easier for travel agents in recent years. New software, for example, allows travel agents to conduct fare searches simultaneously through a system and airline websites. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 29. The systems allegedly do not seek to block their subscribers from using alternative booking channels and sources of information, and they help develop tools enabling travel agents to use alternative sources of information. Galileo Comments at 64, 66-67. In 2002, 98 percent of all travel agencies had Internet access, according to an ASTA survey. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 81.
However, despite the widespread use of the Internet by travel agents, they make relatively few bookings through the Internet. According to the ASTA survey, travel agents made only 10 percent of their bookings through websites, and most of those bookings were for tours booked through tour operator sites. ASTA Comments at 12. The inefficiency of using the Internet for airline bookings is probably the most important deterrent to a greater use of the Internet.
See
“Upheaval in Travel Distribution: Impact on Consumers and Travel Agents,” National Commission To Ensure Consumer Information and Choice in the Airline Industry” (November 13, 2002), at 47-50.
Our notice further identified the systems' pricing practices as a factor that seemingly kept travel agencies from using alternative systems and booking channels. Each system's productivity pricing program generally gave travel agencies incentive payments if a subscriber used the system for a large majority of its bookings (or imposed financial penalties if it did not). We believed that such productivity pricing programs effectively deterred travel agencies from making significant use of alternative booking channels, such as airline websites. While we noted that the percentage of subscriber contracts with productivity pricing had been declining, most subscriber contracts still included productivity pricing. 67 FR 69408-69409.
The comments show that the systems' productivity pricing provisions have become significantly less widespread and less restrictive in the last few years. In 1998 91 percent of subscriber contracts had productivity pricing, but only 56 percent did in 2002. The average number of bookings required before a travel agency can obtain incentive payments has fallen from 252 in 1998 to 194 in 2002. ASTA Comments at 15; Sabre Comments at 69, 162. The Large Agency Coalition represents that the systems' incentive payment programs typically allow the travel agency to make up to thirty percent of its bookings outside the system before it suffers a financial penalty. Transcript at 231. Despite these changes, however, Sabre states that it has contracts with some small travel agencies that require the subscriber to use no system other than Sabre. Sabre argues that this requirement is reasonable under the circumstances because Sabre is providing support for the agency's operations that would otherwise not be economical. Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 20. Nonetheless, despite the greater flexibility allowed travel
agencies by recent productivity pricing arrangements, the record suggests that the systems' current contractual arrangements may still deter travel agencies from making many bookings through the Internet. Orbitz Comments at 23, n. 10; ASTA Comments at 26, n. 44, and 34-35; Travel Management Alliance Comments.
The increasing flexibility of the contracts obtained by travel agencies is the result of changes in the travel agency business. ASTA states that travel agencies must have a greater ability to respond to changing technology, especially the growth of the Internet. The increasing uncertainties of the travel agency business itself, moreover, are likely to encourage many travel agencies to avoid long-term commitments if possible. ASTA Comments at 14. The large travel agencies created in recent years have more bargaining leverage with the systems.
In the past, we have endeavored to prevent system practices that would deter travel agencies from using multiple systems. We reasoned that the systems' market power over airlines would be reduced if travel agencies had the ability to use alternative sources of airline information and booking capabilities. 57 FR 43797. Travel agency parties had encouraged those efforts. 67 FR 69391; 57 FR 43796.
The travel agency commenters in this proceeding assert, however, that rules designed to encourage travel agencies to use multiple systems will be futile. They contend that almost all travel agencies predominantly or entirely use one system. ASTA thus alleges, ASTA Comments at 3-4:
Use of a single CRS is a function of the market reality that multiple CRS's are highly inefficient for travel agencies, who therefore do not employ them. No amount of realistically foreseeable inducement from competing CRS's or regulatory pressure from DOT is going to overcome the inefficiencies for most agencies of operating multiple CRS's in today's environment.
See also
Transcript at 213.
Using more than one system is generally inefficient for travel agencies, because, among other things, it requires training staff members to work with different systems and will cause the booking records of different customers to be in different places. Cardinal Travel Service Comments; Galileo Comments at 64-65; Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 79; ASTA Comments at 23-24; Large Agency Coalition Comments at 20. At travel agencies that have multiple offices, each office tends to use one system even though the firm subscribes to several systems. Carlson Wagonlit Comments at 11.
Travel agencies, moreover, assertedly have no need to use multiple systems. Large Agency Coalition Comments at 20; Transcript at 236-237. While some travel agencies use multiple systems, they appear to make relatively little use of the secondary system. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 79-80. The Large Agency Coalition is a group of 22 large, corporate-oriented travel agencies, all but one of which was included in a recent listing of 84 top corporate travel agencies. Although many of the 22 use two or three systems, they typically do so because (i) the dominant airline in a city other than the agency's headquarters city insisted that the agency use the system affiliated with the airline, (ii) a newly-won corporate client wished to keep its existing system at an on-site location rather than switch to the agency's primary system, or (iii) the agency acquired another agency which had a contract obligating it to continue using another system. Large Agency Coalition Comments at 1-3.
See also
Transcript at 212.
3. Regulatory Background
The Board's rules, adopted in 1984, included an expiration date to ensure that we would reexamine the rules after they had been in force for several years. We therefore reexamined those rules through our rulemaking completed in 1992. 57 FR 43780 (September 22, 1992). We readopted the rules, because we found that CRS rules remained necessary then to protect airline competition and to help ensure that consumers did not receive inaccurate or misleading information on airline services. We based our decision on the systems' control by airlines and airline affiliates, which could still use their control of the systems to prejudice airline competition if there were no rules. Airlines then relied on travel agencies for distribution and had no practical ability to induce travel agencies to use systems charging lower fees, and travel agencies did not choose systems on the basis of their treatment of airlines.
See
67 FR 69367, 69372.
The rules adopted by us regulate the operations of systems owned or marketed by an airline or airline affiliate insofar as the system was providing services to travel agencies.
The current rules (i) bar each system from using carrier identity as a factor for editing and ranking services, (ii) prohibit systems from charging airlines discriminatory booking fees, (iii) require each system to make available to any participating airline the booking and marketing data generated by the system from bookings for domestic travel made through the system, and (iv) prohibit certain types of restrictive contract provisions that unreasonably limit the travel agencies' ability to switch systems or use more than one system. The rules also require each system to provide non-owner airlines with information and booking capabilities as accurate and reliable as those provided the owner airline, and they give each travel agency the right to use its own equipment in conjunction with a system and to access other systems and databases from the same terminals used to access its primary system, unless the agency uses equipment provided by that system. The rules additionally require each airline with a significant CRS ownership interest to participate in other systems at as high a level of functionality as it does in its own system, if the terms for participation are commercially reasonable (this is the mandatory participation rule).
Five years after our last overall reexamination of the rules, we revised the rules in two respects. First, we prohibited systems from enforcing “parity clauses” against airlines that did not own or market a competing system. 62 FR 59784 (November 5, 1997). The parity clauses required each airline to buy at least as high a level of service from the system as it did from any other system. The parity clauses made it unnecessary for systems to compete for airline participation at higher levels of service. Secondly, we strengthened the prohibition against display bias by requiring each system (i) to offer at least one display that does not give on-line connections a preference over interline connections and (ii) to either list one-stop and other direct flights before connecting services or use elapsed time as a significant factor in selecting flight options from the database. 62 FR 63837 (December 3, 1997). We strengthened the rule in large part because of evidence that United had caused Galileo to create displays that prejudiced United's competitors. 62 FR 63840-63841.
C. Development of the Record in This Rulemaking
To ensure that the record in this proceeding would be as complete as possible and that all interested persons would have the opportunity to present their views and to respond to points made by other commenters, we have used procedures in addition to those required by the Administrative Procedure Act for informal rulemakings. We began this proceeding by issuing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking,
62 FR 47606 (September 10, 1997). We issued a supplemental advance notice of proposed rulemaking that asked interested persons to update the record and to comment on the implications of two developments, the Internet's growing role in airline distribution and the systems' shrinking airline ownership. 65 FR 45551 (July 24, 2000).
After reviewing the comments submitted in response to those notices, we issued our notice of proposed rulemaking on November 15, 2002. That notice, as stated above, proposed to readopt most of the existing rules but also asked for comments on whether the rules had become unnecessary. We additionally proposed to eliminate the mandatory participation rule and the prohibition against discriminatory booking fees. We tentatively concluded that we should not extend the rules to cover the distribution of airline tickets through the Internet. We asked for comment on whether we should change our policy statement requiring travel agents to disclose the full amount of airline fares to consumers so that travel agents would be obligated to state separately the amount of any travel agency service fee, as long as the fee did not exceed certain levels. We took into account the changes in the systems' airline ownership, although only Galileo and Sabre then had no airline owners. We tentatively believed that the systems might engage in practices that would undermine airline competition due to the marketing relationships and other ties that continued to exist between the systems and their former airline owners.
To make certain that interested persons had ample opportunity to present their evidence and positions on the issues, we established a lengthy comment period and asked for reply comments. 67 FR 69366. We later extended the comment period and reply comment period by two months and one month, respectively. 67 FR 72869 (December 9, 2002). To provide an additional opportunity for public participation, we also held a public hearing on May 22, where interested persons could present their views to a Department official, Michael W. Reynolds, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, and answer his questions. 68 FR 25844 (May 14, 2003); 68 FR 27948 (May 22, 2003).
We received about 95 comments and 35 reply comments. The commenters included members of Congress, other Federal agencies, the systems, many U.S. and foreign airlines, many travel agencies and travel agents, firms that process the marketing and booking data sold by the systems, and several public interest groups. Because of the complexity of the issues and the varying effects of the rule proposals, the commenters do not share common views.
The Justice Department argues that we should readopt the rules prohibiting display bias and should not adopt any other rules except possibly transitional rules barring the systems from demanding most-favored-nation clauses in their contracts with participating airlines. Sabre, Worldspan, United, Expedia, and Travelocity contend that we should terminate all of the CRS rules. Amadeus, Galileo, Alaska, America West, Midwest, and U.S. Airways generally assert that most of the rules should be readopted. Orbitz, American, Continental, Delta, and Northwest argue that we should maintain some rules only for a transition period to ensure that the CRS industry's deregulation will succeed. The travel agency commenters largely support the continuation of rules governing the systems' contracts with their travel agency customers but object to any significant restrictions on the systems' incentive pricing programs. The public interest groups generally oppose continued regulation, but some argue that we should take action to prevent Orbitz' operations from reducing competition.
As stated above, we have determined not to make final our tentative proposals to readopt most of the rules. The comments on our notice of proposed rulemaking have shown that market forces in the CRS business are more effective than was shown by the comments submitted before we issued that notice: the airlines' control over access to their webfares has enabled them to obtain better terms for participation in some systems, the systems' subscriber contracts are giving travel agencies increasing flexibility to use alternative booking channels, and the airlines' share of revenues from travel agents has continued to decline. Furthermore, as a result of the Worldspan sale, no system is now controlled by U.S. airlines.
Before turning to the detailed discussion of the substantive issues, we will address the procedural questions raised by commenters.
D. Procedural Issues
For this proceeding we have followed the notice-and-comment procedures established by the Administrative Procedure Act for informal rulemakings, as we have done in all past CRS rulemakings. 67 FR 69369. We also held a public hearing and invited interested persons to submit reply comments as well as comments. These informal rulemaking procedures have given commenters a fair opportunity to present their evidence and policy and legal arguments and have enabled us to resolve the issues rationally and efficiently.
Some parties filed comments or reply comments after the due date for those documents. We have accepted all such documents, and we have considered them to the extent practicable.
Sabre's comments included several exhibits for which Sabre requested confidential treatment. Sabre thereafter concluded that some of these exhibits did not require confidential treatment, because their information was equivalent to that provided by other commenters without any request for confidential treatment. We were unable to work out an arrangement with Sabre on the remaining documents that would meet Sabre's interests in protecting the confidentiality of the information while satisfying our need to give all interested persons an adequate opportunity to review the information while preparing their comments. We are therefore returning those documents to Sabre, and we have not considered them at all in this rulemaking.
Some commenters requested a more formal hearing where they could cross-examine members of our staff and representatives for other commenters. We found such additional procedures would be unnecessary for the development of an adequate record in this proceeding. 68 FR 12883 (March 18, 2003).
Several commenters assert that the record is stale or incomplete.
See, e.g.
, Galileo Reply Comments at 9-13; ASTA Reply Comments at 4-8. We disagree. While our notice of proposed rulemaking cited some factual material that may not have reflected current conditions, the notice set forth our tentative factual findings, our reasoning on the economic and policy issues, and, most importantly, gave all interested persons ample opportunity to submit their own factual information. Any commenter who considered the factual record outdated or incomplete could have corrected any inadequacies by submitting current information. We believe that the record is more than adequate for our decision.
We also disagree with those commenters who contend that we cannot reach a rational decision on the issues without learning the details of the marketing and other on-going relationships between Worldspan and its former airline owners.
See, e.g.
, Galileo Reply at 10. In this proceeding we are considering what general rules,
if any, should be adopted that will regulate each system's operations, not whether specific features of the arrangements between Worldspan and its former owners may be unlawful as unfair methods of competition. The record is entirely adequate for us to determine what general rules should be adopted. If it becomes apparent that specific features of the relationships between Worldspan and its former owners present questions about possible violations of section 411, we can address those issues through our investigatory and enforcement powers. In addition, the record does not include information on the details of the relationships between Galileo and United, or between Sabre and American or Southwest. Some commenters, however, have submitted evidence on their experience with those relationships, and other commenters could have done so as well. That evidence indicates neither that we must obtain additional information nor that the existing relationships create a likelihood of anti-competitive behavior that would injure airline competition and that requires regulations.
Our notice of proposed rulemaking included an initial regulatory flexibility analysis as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601
et seq.
That analysis discussed the potential impact of our rule proposals on small entities and invited comments on that analysis. 67 FR 69423-69424. Travel agencies, several members of Congress, the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy, and some other commenters contend that we failed to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, because our initial regulatory flexibility analysis allegedly failed to provide adequate analysis and an opportunity for comment on several rule proposals affecting travel agencies, particularly our proposal to restrict the systems' incentive payment programs.
See
,
e.g.
, June 9, 2003, Letter from Senators Snowe and Kerry; March 19, 2003, Letter from the Democratic Members of the House Committee on Small Business; Comments of the Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy; ASTA Comments at 51-54. We recognize the importance of the goal of ensuring that our rules do not unreasonably or unnecessarily affect small businesses and the importance of compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We believe that we have fulfilled our obligations under that statute. However, the issue is moot for the most part because we are not adopting the rule proposals that generated most of the complaints. In addition, certain other proposals sought by travel agency groups, such as a requirement that every airline make all publicly-available fares saleable through every distribution channel, are not alternatives that we have the statutory authority to adopt on the basis of the record in this proceeding. Our final regulatory flexibility analysis is set forth later in this rule.
We also conducted a review under 5 U.S.C. 610 of the CRS rules, Part 255, in this proceeding. As discussed below, we concluded that changes were necessary to relieve regulatory burdens and respond to changed circumstances.
E. The Need for Limited CRS Regulation
1. Introduction
We adopted the current rules because we found that regulations were necessary to prevent the systems from engaging in anti-competitive conduct that was likely to prejudice competition in the airline industry (for example, display bias and unjustly discriminatory booking fees). We additionally concluded that some practices followed by the systems represented efforts to preserve their market power over airlines (for example, subscriber contract provisions that kept travel agents from using alternative booking channels). We further determined that, if there were no rules, the systems would probably bias their displays, thereby denying travel agents and their customers impartial and information on airline services. 57 FR 43781-43787. In addition, as the Justice Department observes, the system owned by an airline that dominated a region had a substantially greater ability to obtain subscribers than did other systems. If that system operated in ways designed to prejudice the competitive position of rival airlines, it would reinforce its owner's dominant position in the airline market. Justice Department Reply Comments at 9.
We based these conclusions on our findings that airlines relied heavily on travel agencies for distribution, that travel agents generally used a system to determine what airline services were available and to make bookings, that each travel agency predominantly or entirely used one system for these tasks, and that the resulting need of almost all airlines to participate in each system meant that market forces did not discipline the prices and terms offered by the systems for airline participation. We further relied on the fact that each system was then owned and controlled by one or more airlines or airline affiliates. 57 FR 43781, 43790, 43794.
Recent developments, such as the systems' ownership changes and the growth of on-line bookings, have seriously eroded the basis for the findings on which the current rules were based. We must thus examine whether the regulation of system operations remains necessary. When we issued our notice, one system was still controlled by three U.S. airlines, and we tentatively found that the rules remained necessary because the systems still had market power over airlines and because the continuing ties between the systems and their former owners created a likelihood that systems would engage in conduct that would prejudice airline competition. 67 FR 69377-69384. We nonetheless invited comments on whether we should allow all of the rules to sunset, 67 FR 69368, and we stated that we anticipated that the on-going changes in the marketing of airline tickets could in time make the rules unnecessary. 67 FR 69376.
The commenters disagree on whether rules are still necessary. The Justice Department recommends that we maintain only the rules prohibiting display bias and possibly short-term rules barring certain types of most-favored-nation clauses in the systems' contracts with participating airlines. Some commenters, such as Expedia and United, contend that the rules should be terminated now. Sabre argues that no rules are necessary unless a system is still controlled by U.S. airlines. Other commenters, like Orbitz, American, Continental, and Northwest, contend that we should adopt regulations for a transition period to ensure that the ultimate deregulation of the CRS business will be effective. And still others, like Midwest, argue that the regulations are likely to remain essential for a number of years. Some commenters, like United, argue that we may not regulate non-airline systems at all and that we should not regulate systems owned or controlled by airlines.
2. Final Rule
We have concluded that market forces are beginning to discipline the systems' prices and terms for airline participation, and the systems' competition for subscribers is in large part eliminating contract provisions that substantially restrict travel agents from using alternative electronic sources of airline information and booking capabilities. Furthermore, the record does not contain evidence showing a likelihood that a system will engage in conduct designed to distort competition in the airline industry, except for display bias. Readopting most of the existing regulations would not be
justified without such evidence. For these reasons, we have determined to permit most of the rules to sunset upon their expiration on January 31, 2004.
The only exceptions are the rules that prohibit display bias and foreclose certain contract clauses with airlines that would maintain the systems' market power. We find that the systems continue to have market power over airlines, as argued by the Justice Department; that there is some potential for conduct by the systems that could prejudice airline competition (most notably the sale of display bias); and that systems could engage in practices that could unreasonably preserve their market power. For these reasons, we will adopt these rules for a six-month period in order to facilitate an orderly transition to a completely deregulated distribution marketplace. We retain the power to reexamine this decision if unexpected developments show that continuing regulation may be necessary. We are also prepared to take enforcement action if a system engages in conduct that appears to violate section 411.
We explain in this section why we have concluded that most of the current rules are no longer needed, and that the remaining rules will be maintained only for a short transition period. The several types of system conduct that create concern require separate discussion, because they involve different groups of system users—airlines, travel agencies, and travel agents and their customers—and the degree and effectiveness of market forces for each group is different. For airlines, the question is whether competition disciplines the prices and terms for CRS services offered airlines. For travel agencies, the question is whether the systems can engage in conduct that tends to preserve any market power they may have over airlines by unreasonably restricting a travel agency's use of alternative information sources and booking channels. For travel agents and their customers, the question is whether the systems could engage in display bias and similar practices that would lead to consumer deception and undermine airline competition. As a separate matter, we must determine whether, assuming that the systems do have market power over airlines, they are likely to pursue practices that would distort airline competition, even though no U.S. airlines now control any system.
Most commenters supporting continuing regulation assume that any rules should apply equally to all systems, whether or not owned and controlled by airlines. None of the commenters argues that Amadeus' ownership by three European airlines provides a basis for regulating that system if the others are unregulated. We agree. We doubt that the alliance relationships between each Amadeus owner and one or more U.S. airlines will substantially increase the potential for anti-competitive behavior affecting the U.S. airline market, especially since the Amadeus owners belong to different alliances. In addition, Amadeus has substantial public ownership, and its obligations to its public shareholders should lessen any potential for action by Amadeus designed only to distort airline competition in the United States. Amadeus also has the smallest market share in the United States. Amadeus Comments at 32-33; Sabre Comments at 4, n.6.
The primary basis for our rule proposals was our belief that the proposals appeared necessary to prevent system practices that would constitute unfair methods of competition and that market forces would not prevent those practices. We will begin our explanation of the need for maintaining some short-term, residual regulation with our analysis of the systems' market power over most airlines, an analysis that begins with our conclusions on market definition. We then discuss whether systems are likely to engage in conduct that would prejudice airline competition, preserve their existing market power, or give consumers and their travel agents misleading information on airline services. Despite our conclusion that the systems have market power over airlines, we are allowing most of the existing rules to expire because we find that the systems are not likely to engage in practices that would prejudice airline competition or tend to maintain their existing market power, except for display bias and the potential imposition of some contract clauses on participating airlines that would reduce the airlines' bargaining power. Because we conclude that the systems would probably sell display bias if our prohibition against doing so were immediately terminated, thereby misleading travelers, we have decided to retain that prohibition for a six-month transitional period to furnish the industry notice of the change.
Where we find short-term, transitional regulation necessary, our analysis is substantially the same for both airline and non-airline systems. Elsewhere, as discussed below, our conclusions that rules are not necessary stems in large part from the lack of any U.S. airline control of the systems now operating in the United States. If Orbitz enters the CRS business, there would again be a system controlled by U.S. airlines. However, we are unwilling at this time to adopt general regulations based upon Orbitz' potential entry.
3. Market Definition
In judging whether any regulation is necessary, the fundamental question is whether market forces would discipline system practices. If competition would do so, no rules should be necessary.
Cf.
Justice Department Reply Comments at 18.
When we adopted the current rules, we found that they were necessary because each system had market power over almost all airlines and market forces would not discipline the systems' anti-competitive practices. We also adopted rules governing subscriber contracts, even though we did not find that systems generally had market power over travel agencies, because the systems' contracts with travel agencies contained clauses that would maintain the systems' market power over airlines. 67 FR 69405. In the current rulemaking, we again made a tentative determination that the systems had market power over airlines.
Determining whether the systems have market power over airlines requires us to define the relevant market. The relevant market must contain all products or services that consumers—here the airlines—are likely to consider using for the same purpose. The relevant market includes all reasonably interchangeable products and services, because “the ability of consumers to turn to other suppliers restrains a firm from raising prices above the competitive level.”
United States
v.
Microsoft Corp.
, 253 F.3d 34, 51-52 (DC Cir. 2001), quoting
Rothery Storage & Van Co.
v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc.
, 792 F.2d 210, 218 (DC Cir. 1986).
In our notice of proposed rulemaking, we tentatively found that, for airlines, each system is a relevant market. Most airlines still obtain the great majority of their revenues from travel agents, each travel agency office normally uses only one system, and travel agents rarely make airline bookings outside a system. If travel agents routinely used several electronic sources of airline information and booking capabilities when making reservations for their customers, an airline could then afford to withdraw from one or more systems, because the travel agents' use of alternative systems would still enable the airline to obtain bookings. Travel agencies, however, typically rely entirely or predominantly on one system for investigating airline service options and making bookings. 67 FR 69375-69376, 69377-69381.
As a result, an airline that wants its services to be readily saleable by travel
agencies must participate in each system, because otherwise it will lose a significant amount of revenue. As the Justice Department had stated in an earlier rulemaking, quoted at 67 FR 69376:
Each CRS provides access to a large, discrete group of travel agents, and unless a carrier is willing to forego access to those travel agents, it must participate in every CRS. Thus, from an airline's perspective, each CRS constitutes a separate market and each system possesses market power over any carrier that wants travel agents subscribing to that CRS to sell its airline tickets.
We further noted that, due to the economics of the airline industry, the addition or loss of a few passengers on an airline flight will determine whether the flight is profitable. The importance of marginal revenues in the airline business meant that airlines cannot afford to lose access to any significant distribution channel. In that regard, we quoted the statement of one industry economist, Daniel Kasper, 67 FR 69375:
Airlines utilize many different distribution channels for the simple reason that they must do so in order to ensure that their products are easily accessible to the broadest possible array of prospective travelers. . . . Because attracting incremental passengers is critically important to an airline's profitability, each airline strives to match or surpass the visibility to purchasers enjoyed by its rivals. That is, airlines must compete for “shelf space” in any channel where consumers prefer to shop.
The comments support our tentative factual findings on market definition. First, most airlines still obtain the majority of their revenues from bookings made by travel agencies through a system. The Justice Department states that the five airlines that own Orbitz derived 65 percent of their total revenues in March 2002 from “brick-and-mortar” travel agency bookings. Justice Department Reply Comments at 14. America West states that 67 percent of its revenues in 2002 came from bookings made through the systems. America West Comments at 7. Alaska similarly states that it obtains 56 percent of its revenues from travel agencies. Alaska Comments at 5. Delta states that 55 percent of its revenues are produced by “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies and that another 10 percent are produced by on-line travel agencies through a system. Delta Reply Comments at 39. Sabre by itself produces about one-third of a typical airline's revenues. Orbitz Comments at 10. While the Justice Department suggests that the systems' use by on-line travel agencies (as opposed to “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies) adds little to their market power over airlines, because most consumers check two or more websites before making a booking on-line, the Justice Department agrees that the systems have market power due to their usage by “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies. Justice Department Reply Comments at 15. About 80 percent of CRS bookings made by travel agencies are made by “brick-and-mortar” agencies. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 24.
In arguing that the systems do not have market power, Sabre cites figures showing that less than half of all tickets will be sold this year by travel agencies using a system.
See
,
e.g.
, Sabre Comments, McAfee and Hendricks Declaration at 2; Transcript at 8. We believe that market shares based on revenues, not individual tickets, should be determinative. A firm's profitability directly depends on its total revenues, not on the number of units sold. The travelers who make bookings on-line tend to buy tickets that are sold at greater discounts. The travelers using “brick-and-mortar” travel agencies are more important to the airlines because they tend to buy the more expensive tickets. Justice Department Reply Comments at 16.
We agree with Sabre that the travel agencies' share of total bookings has been declining and will likely continue to decline.
See
,
e.g.
, Justice Department Reply Comments at 14. However, as noted, the large network airlines still obtain the large majority of their revenues from travel agencies using a system, a situation likely to persist for some time to come.
Business travelers—the travelers that produce a disproportionate share of the network airlines' revenues—have been reluctant to make bookings on-line or otherwise outside the travel agency channel. Justice Department Reply Comments at 16; NBTA Comments at 11-14. Consumers make about five times as many on-line bookings as do corporate travelers. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 26, n. 40. We recognize that a growing number of business travelers are booking on-line, but they appear to be doing so through websites offered by travel agencies using a system, or through one of the corporate booking firms acquired by systems like Sabre. Sabre Reply Comments at 34-35; American Reply Comments at 25.
It may well be that within several years even a large proportion of business travelers will book their air travel outside of travel agencies using a system, but they do not do so now. Most airlines, including the major network airlines, derive the large majority of their revenues from bookings made through a system.
See also
Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 29.
Secondly, travel agents continue to rely on systems for booking airline tickets. ASTA states that, on average, 87 percent of travel agency airline bookings are made through a system. ASTA Comments at 23. Galileo estimates that an even higher percentage of travel agency bookings are made through a system. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 25, n. 37. Travel agents generally have access to the Internet and use it, primarily for research on travel options, but they have not made much use of the Internet for airline bookings, as noted above, because using the Internet is significantly less efficient than using a system. ASTA Comments at 12-13.
Thirdly, to operate more efficiently, most travel agencies use only one system, as discussed above. While the largest travel agencies tend to have two or more systems, they do not seem to make substantial use of all of them. Those agencies typically rely predominantly on one system. The Large Agency Coalition states that its members—all large corporate travel agencies—do not subscribe to multiple systems in order to improve their ability to book airline travel, but because of continuing business relationships between the agency and the dominant airline in local markets, between some of their corporate customers and airlines, or between an acquired agency and its system. Large Agency Coalition Comments at 1-3. Carlson Wagonlit alleges that each of its branch offices relies predominantly on one system even though the travel agency firm subscribes to all of the systems: “Using multiple CRSs at one location creates numerous operational difficulties related to training agents on multiple CRSs and because client information is maintained within the CRS.” Carlson Wagonlit Comments at 11.
Fourthly, the airlines' dependence on marginal revenues requires them to participate in every significant distribution channel. No commenter denies that marginal revenues are critical in the airline industry. Sabre's experts agreed with our finding: “Air transportation involves high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Thus a few incremental bookings can spell the difference between profit and loss.” Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 29.
We are unconvinced by the claims of several commenters that airlines can nonetheless find substitutes for the
travel agency channel and that travel agents can use substitutes for the systems. We recognize that Southwest, JetBlue, and some other low-fare airlines operate successfully without obtaining many bookings from travel agents. Southwest and JetBlue reportedly obtain only 20 percent and 10 percent of their revenues, respectively, from travel agencies. Justice Department Reply Comments at 15, n.14. Other airlines, particularly the large network airlines, cannot now practicably end their reliance on the travel agency channel. The low-fare airlines have traditionally focused on attracting leisure travelers. As shown, leisure travelers are much more likely to book flights through the Internet without using a “brick-and-mortar” travel agency (or an on-line agency). Insofar as other airlines follow a business strategy that involves attracting business customers—the travelers most likely to use travel agencies—those airlines continue to be dependent on travel agencies for the largest share of their revenues and may have limited bargaining leverage against the systems, at least in the near future. The network airlines, moreover, tend to operate more complex hub-and-spoke route systems than the low-fare airlines, and that complexity limits their ability to obtain direct sales, unlike airlines such as Southwest that primarily operate point-to-point services. It may be that the network airlines would be more successful if they adopted the same business strategy as the low-fare airlines. They have not done so, however, and presumably could not do so without significant expense. American Comments at 17-21; 67 FR 69379. As a result, these airlines rely on travel agencies for the majority of their revenues. Our determination of the relevant market must rely on the choices actually made by airlines and consumers, not on the choices that some think they should make.
Cf. U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case
, Order 2002-1-12 (January 25, 2002) at 42-43.
We recognize that airlines have been shifting some bookings away from the travel agency channel to their own websites. This shift has been much stronger for low-fare airlines than for the large network airlines. Despite these efforts, some believe that the Internet is unlikely to produce more than 40 percent of airline revenues by 2005. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 23-24. Airlines have also taken steps to encourage travel agencies to bypass the systems. For example, American has an arrangement with American Express that enables that travel agency to make bookings directly with American. Amadeus Comments at 12-13. The record does not indicate that direct booking arrangements will substantially reduce the agencies' use of the systems for airline bookings any time in the near future. As shown, the larger airlines still obtain the large majority of their revenues from bookings made through the systems.
Several commenters contend that travelers can use alternative distribution channels and are not locked into the travel agency channel, or, alternatively, can switch between travel agencies if one agency uses a system that provides inferior service.
See
,
e.g.
, Sabre Comments at 59-65. We agree that consumers can choose where to book and need not book through a travel agency if they do not wish to, and that many consumers can easily switch between travel agencies. At least for corporate customers, however, changing agencies will impose some switching costs. Justice Department Reply Comments at 16, n.19. Airlines do not enjoy such choices. If a substantial number of travelers choose to use travel agencies, as they do, and if those travel agencies, with few exceptions, use only one system and do not readily make bookings outside the system, as is true, then each airline must participate in each system used by a significant number of travel agencies in order to avoid losing bookings from those agencies. As we stated in the notice, 67 FR 69378:
The existence of one distribution channel that is attractive to a significant and growing number of travelers does not make that channel competitive with another channel that a larger if shrinking share of travelers finds preferable. With a very few exceptions, any airline that uses only one channel will not obtain the business of those travelers that prefer the other channel.
See also
American Comments at 16-17 and Dorman Declaration at 5. While the airlines' customers have alternatives, that does not make irrelevant the question of whether systems have market power over airlines.
Cf. United States
v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc.
, 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir., 2003);
In Re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation,
E.D.N.Y. No. 96-CV-5238, April 1, 2003, Memorandum and Order at 5.
Some arguments made by the commenters opposing our preliminary analysis mischaracterize our reasoning. Sabre wrongly alleges that we concluded that systems have market power over travel agencies. Sabre Comments at 59, 71, 84. Nothing could be further from the truth. We expressly found that systems compete vigorously for travel agency subscribers, 67 FR 69371, 69405, and nowhere did we state that systems have market power over travel agencies. Sabre additionally misstates our analysis by asserting that we found that travel agencies control their customers. Sabre Comments at 59, 63.
Sabre has failed to show that the relevant market is not each system, but the broader market of providing travel information to consumers, or airline ticket distribution, a market in which each system's share would be relatively small. Sabre Comments at 57-59, 79. As a practical matter, airlines wishing to electronically provide information and booking capabilities to travel agencies currently have no effective substitute for participation in each system. Similarly, because travel agencies do not use multiple systems, Sabre's observation that no system has even a 50 percent share of the CRS business, Sabre Comments at 81, is irrelevant. Each system is a separate market insofar as airlines are concerned. Furthermore, each system has a dominant share of the CRS business at cities where its former airline owners were the dominant airlines. Justice Department Reply Comments at 22.
4. The Systems' Market Power Over Airlines
Because readopting CRS rules to block anti-competitive behavior will require a finding that the systems have market power over most airlines, we must determine whether they do have such power. If systems have market power over airlines, they will be able to charge them prices that exceed competitive levels, and the resulting costs will be passed on to consumers, even if many or most consumers can choose between different distribution channels when buying airline tickets.
We are following the definition of market power applied by the Supreme Court in antitrust cases. In
Eastman Kodak Co.
v.
Image Technical Services
, 504 U.S. 451 (1992), the Court stated that market power is the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market,” 504 U.S. at 464, quoting
Jefferson Parish Hospital
v.
Hyde
, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984), and “the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output,” 504 U.S. at 464, quoting
Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v.
United States Steel Corp.
, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). The courts have similarly stated that a firm is a monopolist “if it can profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level.”
United States
v.
Microsoft Corp.
, 253 F.3d at 51.
Our notice of proposed rulemaking stated our belief that each system still
has market power over most airlines. We noted in that regard that some airlines that had otherwise supported the elimination of most or all of the rules still conceded that the systems have market power. Northwest had thus stated, as quoted by us at 67 FR 69378:
Sales to consumers made over the Internet, via both airline websites and online agents, have provided significant new competition to CRSs, but each CRS typically remains the only means by which to reach the travel agents who use that system. Each CRS therefore continues to have significant market power based on the travel agents to which it has exclusive access.
First, until now an airline or other firm could not practicably create competitive alternatives for the systems. Among other things, building a new system would be costly and time-consuming, and the great majority of travel agencies already had contracts to use an existing system. 67 FR 69381. Entry into the business has become easier, as argued by Sabre. Sabre Comments at 52-85. However, because travel agencies generally rely entirely or predominantly on one system for information and bookings on airline services, new entry is unlikely in the near term to eliminate the systems' existing market power.
Secondly, airlines have generally been unable to persuade travel agencies to use one system rather than another. If they could, they would have some bargaining leverage against the systems. Airlines could then shift business to systems offering better terms for airline participants and away from systems offering poorer terms. Because travel agencies do not pay booking fees, they have no direct incentive to use the system charging the lowest fees. The record suggests, in fact, that the incentive payment programs used by the systems encourage travel agencies to choose the system that is the most expensive for participating airlines. The systems then obtain subscribers typically by offering to give them bonus payments. The revenues used for those incentive payments come from the fees paid by participating airlines (and to a smaller extent by other travel suppliers).
See, e.g.
, American Reply Comments, Dorman Declaration at 2-4.
Airlines have had no effective incentives that they can offer travel agencies to encourage the use of one system rather than another, except in local markets where a dominant airline can influence travel agency choices by denying access to its corporate discount fares and marketing benefits to travel agencies that do not use its preferred system. As discussed in our notice of proposed rulemaking, airlines that dominate an area's airline markets, like Delta at Atlanta and American in southern Florida, can influence local travel agencies to use the airline's preferred system, because those travel agencies cannot easily succeed without the ability to sell the corporate discount fares offered by the area's major airline. 67 FR 69381.
Airlines have developed programs to encourage travel agents to agree to terms that offset some CRS costs, or to bypass the systems, but those programs do not yet seem to have had great success. American's “Everyfare” program gave travel agencies access to American's webfares if they agreed to assume the airline's booking fee liability. Amadeus Comments at 10-13. Northwest and other airlines have created websites designed for travel agent bookings. Sabre Supp. Reply at 2.
We recognize that airlines have been gaining bargaining leverage against the systems, a factor that caused us to propose the elimination of the mandatory participation rule and the rule barring discriminatory booking fees. Nonetheless, the systems currently have significantly greater leverage. An airline's greatest leverage for obtaining lower fees or better terms for participation will be a threat to withdraw from the system. If an airline withdraws, however, it will immediately begin losing bookings from that system, and those losses will not be entirely offset by increased bookings through the Internet. Any saving in CRS participation expenses will arrive later, and will not quickly offset the revenues lost from the reduction in bookings. Booking fees, after all, equal about two percent of the revenues obtained by an airline from sales made through a system. Orbitz Comments at 10, n.4.
Cf.
Amadeus Comments at 18-19.
It is true that an airline's withdrawal from a system will make that system less attractive to travel agencies, and over time the system will lose subscribers. Because the average travel agency contract has a term of three years, however, only a relatively small portion of the system's subscribers will have the ability to switch to another system in the short term.
Thus the airline's revenue losses from withdrawal will be substantial and begin occurring immediately, while the system's losses in subscribers will be gradual and occur only over a period of some months. In these circumstances, the system should have the upper hand in bargaining.
See, e.g.
, Orbitz Comments at 10.
An airline could also put pressure on the system by attempting to reduce the number of tickets sold through the system without withdrawing completely. One possibility would be to increase their efforts to encourage travelers to book directly with the airline. These lost sales would lower the systems' revenues, but may also increase the airline's distribution costs.
An airline could put pressure on the system by lowering its participation level, because doing so would make the system less attractive to travel agencies that frequently book the airline without drastically reducing the airline's bookings from that system's subscribers. The lower level of participation would make it somewhat harder for travel agents to obtain information and reliably make bookings, and could block travel agents from conducting functions that are important to their customers. These functionality differences would not lead to a loss of as many bookings as would withdrawal but presumably would still result in lower revenues from the travel agents using that system. On the other hand, the lower level of participation would have less impact on the system's ability to market itself to travel agencies in the future. We expect that airline changes in participation levels will give airlines bargaining leverage.
Our notice of proposed rulemaking predicted that the airlines' control over access to their webfares could enable them to obtain better terms for system participation. 67 FR 69381. As discussed above, Sabre and Galileo have begun programs that give airlines a discount from the standard booking fee levels in exchange for a commitment to provide all publicly-available fares, including webfares. The commenters disagree over the implications of these programs. Some commenters assert that airlines have gotten little in exchange for the commitments required of them.
See, e.g.
, American Reply Comments at 21-23. America West states that Orbitz has offered substantially larger fee reductions for airlines that agree to its most-favored-nation clause. America West Reply to Supp. Comments at 2-3. Other commenters contend that the programs demonstrate that airlines have bargaining power and that the systems do not have market power.
See, e.g.
, Sabre Reply Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 15-16.
We believe that the airlines' ability to change their participation levels and their control over access to webfares is reducing the systems' market power. Overall, however, we find that the systems currently still have market power over most airlines, although the continuing changes in airline distribution, particularly the growing importance of the Internet for airlines,
travel agents, and travelers, should continue to erode the systems' market power. Our finding that the systems have market power is consistent with the Justice Department's conclusions. Justice Department Reply Comments at 2, 16-17.
We disagree with Sabre's contention, first made in its reply comments, that the airlines' contracts with corporate customers keep systems from having market power. Sabre asserts that system practices cannot significantly affect airlines, because “much business travel” involves fares directly negotiated with specific airlines, often booked through direct links. Sabre Reply Comments at 36; Sabre Reply Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 7-9. Airlines obtain substantial amount of business from corporate customers that do not have such contracts, and the contracts do not normally bar employees from traveling on alternative airlines.
We have based our finding of market power on the industry's structural characteristics, not on an analysis of whether the systems' fees are at supracompetitive levels. The best evidence of a firm's monopoly power would be a showing that it has been able to profitably charge prices that significantly exceed competitive levels. Because direct evidence of this ability is usually not available in Sherman Act monopolization cases, the courts usually rely on market structure evidence to determine whether a firm has monopoly power.
United States
v.
Microsoft Corp.
, 253 F.3d at 51. We have taken the same approach here.
When we last compared the systems' prices with their costs, we concluded that the larger systems at least were charging supracompetitive prices.
See
56 FR 12586, 12595 (March 26, 1991). We have not done such an analysis since then, as we noted in our notice, but stated our belief that the systems' booking fees were probably above competitive levels, because they were not disciplined by market forces. 67 FR 69382. t with our findings that the systems must compete for travel agency subscribers but do not compete for airline participants.
The airline commenters generally support our finding that booking fees are not disciplined by competition and contend that the fees substantially exceed competitive levels. They point out, for example, that the network airlines' financial crisis since 2001 has enabled them to drive down costs from other suppliers while the systems have been raising their fees and reporting large profits.
See, e.g.
, America West Comments at 7-9.
In response, the systems have denied that their fees are not disciplined by competition, and they argue that the fees are reasonable. They contend that their costs have been rising due to increased functionality provided airlines and the growing number of messages carried by their communications links.
See, e.g.
, Galileo Comments at 38-39. While the systems thus contend that several important cost factors have increased significantly in recent years, they have not submitted a detailed cost analysis that would show that their booking fees do not significantly exceed their costs, nor have they attempted to demonstrate that the booking fees charged before the beginning of the cited cost increases did not significantly exceed their costs.
We continue to believe that the systems' fees exceed competitive levels for the reasons set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking. We have not seen evidence that the systems' fees generally respond to market forces, although two of the four systems have made modest concessions in exchange for access to airline webfares. However, we have not done an analysis of the systems' costs and revenues that would demonstrate that their fees exceed competitive levels. As explained above, a finding that the fees are at supracompetitive levels is not necessary for our determination that the systems have market power over airlines.
We also cannot accept Sabre's claim that bookings made through a system are relatively inexpensive for airlines while bookings made through airline websites are not (and that bookings made through airline websites are more expensive than those made by an airline's reservations agents). Sabre Comments, Wilson Declaration at 22. Sabre's analysis is belied by the efforts of virtually every airline to shift bookings to its own website. Several low-fare airlines have claimed that their ability to obtain most of their revenues from direct sales gives them a great cost advantage over other airlines.
See
American Reply Comments at 32.
See also
67 FR 69373, 69374. Sabre in any event has failed to demonstrate that its calculation is valid. American Reply Comments, Dorman Declaration at 8-9; United Reply Comments at 35, n.96; America West Reply Comments at 27.
See also
Northwest Reply Comments at 19-20.
5. The Potential for System Conduct Undermining Airline Competition
Our finding that each system has market power over airlines is not sufficient by itself to justify the adoption of rules. To adopt rules regulating the systems in order to prevent potential unfair methods of competition, we should have evidence that, if there were no regulations, systems would likely engage either in anti-competitive conduct designed to preserve their market power, a subject discussed below, or in conduct intended to distort airline competition. Any such conduct would harm consumers, either by causing airlines to pay supracompetitive prices for CRS services or by denying consumers the benefits of lower fares and better service created by competition between airlines.
When each system was owned and controlled by one or more airlines or airline affiliates, experience demonstrated that systems were likely to engage in conduct designed to prejudice the competitive position of rival airlines, for example, by biasing displays against the owner airlines' competitors and charging competing airlines discriminatorily high booking fees.
See
56 FR 12589. None of the systems now operating in the United States, however, is owned by a U.S. airline. Obviously a system that is not owned or controlled by a U.S. airline will not have the same incentives to prejudice the competitive position of rival airlines. Justice Department Reply Comments at 13-14; Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 26-30 and McAfee & Hendricks Declaration at 53-59. We must therefore determine whether a non-airline system (a system not owned or controlled by an airline or airline affiliate) is likely to engage in unfair methods of competition.
We have found, as shown, that the systems have market power over airlines. To the extent that they do, their booking fees may exceed the fee levels that would exist in a competitive market, and the service offered airlines by the systems may be below the level of service that would exist in a competitive environment. The systems' possession of market power, however, by itself would not justify rules regulating their practices. The antitrust laws permit firms with monopoly power to use that power as long as they do not engage in conduct that is designed to maintain or extend that power. “[M]erely possessing monopoly power is not itself an antitrust violation.”
United States
v.
Microsoft Corp.
, 253 F.3d at 51. As explained below in our analysis of our authority under section 411, we may prohibit unfair methods of competition, which are practices that violate the antitrust laws or antitrust principles.
Our notice of proposed rulemaking stated our belief that there was a risk that non-airline systems would engage
in anti-competitive conduct in order to prejudice airline competition. Each of the non-airline systems still had ties with its former U.S. airline owners, and each of the non-airline systems was being marketed by one or more of its former owners. The record suggested, moreover, that marketing airlines took actions favoring a system even when doing so appeared to be contrary to their interests in selling their own tickets. We therefore proposed to apply the rules, to the extent they were readopted, to non-airline systems. 67 FR 69383.
The systems continue to have marketing relationships and other relationships with their former owner airlines.
See, e.g.
, Amadeus Comments at 25, n.24; Galileo Supp. Comments at 3. The lack of control by any U.S. airline will not eliminate the possibility that a system would agree with an airline to engage in conduct that would undermine the competitive position of the airline's rivals. Each system, after all, continues to have market power over most airlines, and each of the larger airlines dominates some local markets, primarily at its hubs. A system and such an airline might agree that the system would change its operations so as to benefit the airline while the airline would use its local dominance to strengthen the system's marketing efforts. Justice Department Reply Comments at 19.
The record suggests that the systems are willing to sell preferential treatment to airlines at least insofar as display bias is concerned. Their willingness to do so is apparent from their own comments, which argue that we should allow systems to sell bias. Amadeus Comments at 53-54; Sabre Comments at 141-142. The Justice Department believes that the systems are likely to engage in display bias. Justice Department Reply Comments at 19-21.
See also
American Antitrust Institute Comments at 8. Our notice cited evidence that display bias is sold to suppliers in other travel industries. 67 FR 69383. Although Amadeus has denied that it biases its displays for hotels and rental cars, Amadeus Reply Comments at 12, n.16, the other systems' comments do not address this issue.
Apart from bias, however, the record does not indicate that systems are likely to seek to operate in ways designed to prejudice airline competition. Our notice of proposed rulemaking expressly invited commenters to submit evidence on whether systems had sought to distort competition in other travel industries. 67 FR 69383. One speaker at our public hearing stated that he did not know of any system practices that distorted competition in other industries, Transcript at 85, and one commenter asserted that there is no evidence of competitive harm resulting from the systems' treatment of firms in other travel industries. Worldspan Reply at 17.
See also
Transcript at 116-117, 151-154. The record further suggests that the marketing relationships between systems and airlines currently give the marketing airline little incentive to help the system and that marketing airlines, in fact, do little to help the system being marketed. American Comments at 30; Large Agency Coalition Comments at 14-15; Large Agency Coalition Reply Comments at 16-17. This suggests that the ties between airlines and systems may have weakened enough so that systems would have little interest in taking action that undermined airline competition in order to favor one airline. The Justice Department additionally believes that contractual arrangements between airlines and systems do not pose a sufficient threat to competition to justify the adoption of general rules at this time. Justice Department Reply Comments at 1-2.
See also
Expedia Reply Comments at 3, n.1. We note, nonetheless, Amadeus' complaint that American, Delta, and Northwest have recently tied a travel agency's ability to sell corporate discount fares with the use of the system affiliated with the airline. Amadeus Comments at 91-92. However, this tying affects competition between the systems and does not necessarily show that systems will engage in conduct designed to distort airline competition.
Furthermore, we cannot predict at this point what kinds of relationships may arise as a result of the CRS industry's deregulation. We do not wish to adopt rules now when we do not know what types of potential anti-competitive practices, if any, may occur. We therefore do not agree with the arguments of some commenters that rules should be maintained on the ground that systems have continuing marketing and other special arrangements with selected airlines.
See, e.g.
, Galileo Comments at 7-11.
We fully agree with the Justice Department, however, that there is a potential for contractual relationships between systems and airlines that would be designed to reduce competition in either or both the CRS and airline industries. The Justice Department has stated its intent to take action against any such agreements that violate the antitrust laws, and we also have statutory authority to take appropriate action if such contractual relationships appear to be unfair methods of competition that violate section 411. Under 49 U.S.C. 41708, formerly section 407 of the Federal Aviation Act, we can obtain copies of any agreements between airlines and systems if we see a need to investigate contractual relationships between systems and participating airlines.
6. System Practices that Preserve Market Power
While we have determined that most of the rules should not be readopted, even though each system continues to have substantial market power over airlines, we are readopting for a short transition period the rule prohibiting parity clauses and adopting an analogous rule prohibiting most-favored-nation clauses demanded as a condition for any participation in a system. These types of contract clauses would tend to maintain the systems' market power and reduce the bargaining leverage of participating airlines. Because we are essentially deregulating the CRS business notwithstanding the systems' market power, we decided to adopt the parity and most-favored-nation clause prohibitions for a period long enough allow affected parties to respond to the transition to complete deregulation.
We originally adopted the rule prohibiting systems from enforcing parity clauses (except as to airlines that owned or marketed a competing system) because three of the systems had imposed parity clauses on airline participants. These clauses required each airline to participate in the system at at least as high a level as it participated in any other system. Thus, for example, Sabre's parity clause required Alaska to participate in Sabre at the full availability level as long as Alaska participated in any other system at that level, even if Alaska considered Sabre's service at that level too costly or not as attractive as the comparable service offered by other systems. 62 FR 59786-59787, 59791-59792. Because these parity clauses eliminated some possibility of system competition for airline participants, and required each airline to buy a level of service that an airline might not wish to buy, we adopted a rule prohibiting the systems from enforcing airline parity clauses except as to airline participants that owned or marketed a competing system. 62 FR 59784.
We have concluded that this rule should be readopted for another six months. We are also adopting for the same period an analogous rule that will prohibit each system from requiring airlines as a condition to any
participation in the system to make all publicly-available fares saleable through the system. If we did not provide for an orderly transition, a contract clause requiring a participating airline to provide all webfares as a condition to participation, sometimes referred to as a most-favored-nation clause, would deny the airline the ability to use its control over access to its webfares as bargaining leverage to obtain better terms and prices for system participation. Such a clause would additionally tend to prevent the development of alternative sources of information and booking channels, for a travel agency would have less incentive to use alternatives if the system used by the agency already provided complete information on webfares. It is our expectation that the six-month period during which our prohibition on such clauses will remain in place will enable airlines to prepare more effectively for the termination of these rules.
On the other hand, we have decided not to readopt rules designed to prohibit system contract practices that would unreasonably restrict travel agency subscribers from switching systems or using alternative systems or booking channels. In the past, the systems engaged in subscriber contract practices that appeared to be designed to preserve their market power. Travel agencies accepted such contract clauses even though most travel agencies could choose between systems. 67 FR 69405. We therefore adopted rules barring subscriber contracts from having a term that exceeded five years and giving travel agencies the right to use their own third-party equipment and software in conjunction with a system.
As discussed above, the record shows that travel agencies in recent years have been obtaining more flexible contracts from the systems. The term of the average subscriber contract, for example, is well under five years. While most subscriber contracts still have productivity pricing clauses, the productivity pricing clauses in the contracts currently offered travel agencies do not seem to effectively block travel agents from using alternative booking channels. And travel agencies appear to have a substantial ability to switch systems at the end of their contract term. While systems may have some contracts that may be unreasonably restrictive, their contracts in general do not seem to block travel agents from obtaining information and making bookings outside the system. Moreover, the market is moving in a more competitive direction—travel agencies are obtaining more flexibility, not less, in their newest contracts.
As a result, the current record shows that rules regulating travel agency contracts are no longer necessary. Several airline commenters and Orbitz have argued that we should continue to regulate the systems' subscriber contract practices, because the existing contracts are alleged to unreasonably lock travel agencies into using their existing system.
See, e.g.
, Orbitz Comments at 46-49; America West Comments at 26-29; American Comments at 33-35; Continental Comments at 17-20; Delta Comments at 41-42. For the reasons discussed below in connection with the specific subscriber contract issues, the systems' current contracts do not appear to unreasonably keep travel agencies from using alternative booking channels.
7. The Systems' Ability To Engage in Display Bias
Display bias has been a concern since the systems were first developed. Experience has demonstrated that travel agents are likely to book one of the first services displayed by a system in response to a travel agent's request for information, even if services shown later in the display would better satisfy the customer's needs. If systems give preferential display positions to one airline's services, that display bias will harm airline competition and cause consumers to be misled. 57 FR 43801-43802, 43807-43808.
Our rules have prohibited systems from biasing their displays in order to prevent unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Display bias both prejudices airline competition, by reducing the airlines' ability to compete on the basis of the relative attractiveness of their schedules and fares, and causes travel agents to give misleading or incomplete advice to their customers.
Display bias is possible because of the way in which the systems present information on airline service options. The systems display information on computer screens. Each screen can display only a limited number of flights, so a system must use criteria for ranking the available flights. Display position is important, because travel agents are more likely to book the flights that are displayed first. The number of airline services available in most markets also requires the systems to edit their displays, because many services will be unattractive to travelers (Los Angeles-San Francisco travelers, for example, will not choose connecting services over Denver or Salt Lake City). Systems display airline services in several different ways. The display traditionally used by travel agencies ranks flights in a market on the basis of the criteria developed by the system and shows whether seats are available on the listed flights. Some systems rank flights in this type of display by listing all nonstop flights first, then one-stop flights and other direct flights, and finally connecting services. Others have ranked flights on the basis of relative quality, such as each flight's elapsed time or its displacement time (the time difference between the departure time requested by the traveler and the time of each flight). 67 FR 69370.
Every system also has a display that ranks flights on the basis of price, with the lowest being listed first. Travel agents use that display for customers whose major concern is finding the lowest fare. 67 FR 69370.
We have concluded that we should continue to prohibit display bias, both to prevent anti-competitive conduct, as recommended by the Justice Department, and to prevent consumer deception, but only for an additional six months. Were the rule terminated immediately, systems would likely be in a position to bias displays, as discussed above. Display bias could cause consumer harm by reducing airline competition and by causing travel agents to book customers at times on flights that do not best meet the traveler's needs.
Display bias can mislead travel agents (and thus their customers), because by definition it means ranking and editing airline services on some basis other than neutral criteria based on general consumer preferences. Before the Board adopted the rules on display bias, when each system was owned by one airline, systems constructed displays that put their competitors at a disadvantage by omitting services and fares offered by competing airlines that would be attractive to many consumers. Each system often listed flights operated by its owner airline above flights operated by competitors that better met the customer's travel requirements. 56 FR 12589. We later found it necessary to revise our rules on display bias because Apollo, Galileo's predecessor, created displays that essentially gave the connecting services operated by network airlines a preference over one-stop flights operated by point-to-point airlines. For example, Apollo could display an Alaska one-stop flight in the Seattle-Burbank market well after connecting services that left Seattle as much as an hour before the Alaska flight and that arrived in Burbank after the Alaska flight had landed. Apollo similarly displayed an Alaska one-stop Orange County-Seattle flight after connecting services that took substantially longer and that involved
connections at Salt Lake City or Phoenix. 61 FR 42208, 42212-42213 (August 14, 1996). Apollo at that time was owned by several airlines, not just by United, yet the owner airlines agreed to adopt a display that would benefit United while prejudicing the travel agents' ability to find the best service for their customers. 61 FR 42209.
Display bias also can reduce competition. Bias can shift enough passengers from disfavored airlines to a favored airline to make the former's flights unprofitable in the targeted markets. That can cause a disfavored airline to reduce or eliminate its service in those markets. As we stated above in our discussion of the systems' market power over airlines, the profitability of an airline flight often depends on marginal revenues, so the shift of traffic that may result from display bias can have large competitive consequences. Justice Department Reply Comments at 20, n.26. The resulting reduction in capacity and potentially in the number of competitors will enable the favored airline to raise fares and reduce service. Justice Department Reply Comments at 7. For example, two of the airlines that complained about the Apollo display discussed above—Alaska and Midwest Express—were point-to-point airlines whose services fared worst in the Apollo display. Alaska estimated that the display would reduce its annual revenues by $15 million, and Midwest Express estimated that its annual revenue losses would equal several million dollars. 62 FR 63837, 63841 (December 3, 1997).
Experience thus shows that bias can be effective, notwithstanding the travel agents' interest in finding and booking the services that best meet their customers' needs. As noted, travel agents tend to book one of the first flights displayed by the system. Travel agency customers depend on their travel agent to extract information from the system display, which only the travel agent sees. Travel agents generally work under time pressure that often keeps them from searching through several display screens to overcome the bias. ASTA Comments at 41; AAA Comments at 2; Carlson Wagonlit Comments at 16; British Airways Coments at 2-3. The systems can also hide the extent of their bias. 49 FR 32540, 32547 (August 15, 1984). A system arguably could choose to omit some services altogether. For example, Priceline, an on-line seller of airline tickets, agreed with Delta that Priceline would not sell seats offered by Delta's competitors on flights to or from Atlanta, Delta's hub. Justice Department Reply Comments at 20, n.27, and 30, n.37. As a result, bias could keep consumers in many cases from obtaining accurate and complete information on schedules and fares from travel agents relying on a system for their information.
Display bias, moreover, provides no apparent consumer benefits. It does not function like advertising, because it provides no information. In fact display bias “would divert passengers without regard to airlines’ prices or quality.” Justice Department Reply Comments at 19. Display bias is also unnecessary to help travel agents who, due to a customer's demands, are interested in seeing only services offered by one airline. The rules do not bar systems from enabling travel agents to create displays listing the services of a single airline.
See also
Galileo Comments at 61 (Galileo subscribers can create displays tailored to the preferences of their customers, including customer airline preferences).
When we readopted the rules against display bias at the conclusion of our last overall reexamination of the CRS rules, we addressed several theoretical arguments that assertedly showed that display bias was “beneficent.” Some commenters argued that a flight's display position would not affect travel agency bookings, that display bias reflected the preferences of a system's subscribers, and that other airlines could buy display bias. We found that these arguments were disproven by experience. 57 FR 43786-43787.
Several commenters have presented somewhat similar arguments here that bias would not work and that there is no reason to prohibit it. While these commenters may be correct in predicting that bias today would not be as effective as it was in the past, we are not convinced that systems could engage in display bias without causing consumer harm.
Systems clearly wish to be able to sell bias. That indicates that they believe airlines will be willing to buy bias, and obviously airlines will be willing to buy bias only if they expect it to be effective. Past experience with system efforts to bias displays suggests that their expectation is correct.
We question whether airlines injured by display bias can practicably take steps to offset it. In response to our example of the Galileo display that harmed Alaska's display position, Mercatus argues that Alaska could have either outbid United for the bias or cut its fares to attract additional passengers. Mercatus Comments at 10. While Alaska may have had the ability to take some steps to offset the effect of the bias, Mercatus has failed to show that those steps would have been practicable. Our concern, moreover, is not limited to the Galileo display's impact on competition. The display also caused travel agents and their customers to receive incomplete or misleading information on the available service options. The display was designed to cause travel agents to book customers on airlines like United even when Alaska provided significantly better service.
Travel agents use the Internet at times to search for alternatives to the services displayed by a system. In theory, as argued by some commenters, the Internet's availability as a check on the quality of displays offered by a system would deter a system from biasing its displays.
See, e.g.
, Transcript at 123-124. We have doubts, however, whether travel agents regularly use the Internet as a test of a system's displays. As shown, travel agents are commonly pressed for time, which is why bias works—travel agents often do not wish to take the time required to search several screens to find the best service for a customer. The many complaints from travel agents about the unavailability of webfares on the systems, and their assertions that almost no travel agency is interested in using more than one system due to the inefficiencies involved, is a further indication that travel agents making a booking for a customer are unlikely to search several sources of information before selecting a flight to recommend. Sabre's evidence is consistent with this conclusion. A 2001 survey indicated that only 11 percent of the travel agents with Internet access had booked airline tickets on the Internet, that 13 percent often used the Internet to check for lower fares, and that 23 percent occasionally used the Internet for that purpose. Sabre Comments, Salop & Woodbury Declaration at 12. We assume that the number of travel agents using the Internet to check for other services will grow significantly, but not by such an extent as to make display bias ineffective.
Travel agencies, moreover, cannot quickly shift to a different system if the system they are using biases its displays. While travel agencies have some ability to switch systems, many agencies would likely incur significant costs by switching from one system to another. Galileo Comments, Guerin-Calvert, Jernigan, & Hurdle Declaration at 81.
Any display bias by the systems would not be comparable to the practice of grocery stores selling preferential shelf positions to their suppliers. Unlike the grocery store shelf, which the shopper sees and can easily scan, the traveller never sees the system display
used by a travel agent, and systems can create display bias that obscures the service alternatives to a much greater extent than the shelf position used by grocery store suppliers. Airlines would be willing to buy bias because it would be effective, and its effectiveness means it is likely that a significant number of consumers will be booked on inferior services when other services would better meet their needs.
Delta contends that bias should not prevail if travel agencies really desire unbiased displays. Delta Reply Comments at 25. As noted, however, the systems assume they can sell display bias, and experience indicates that systems have some ability to hide the extent of the bias. Furthermore, the travel agents' interests are not our only concern—we wish to ensure that travel agency customers can obtain accurate information, and to prevent the harm to airline competition that could result if CRS display bias reappeared.
A travel agency customer's ability to go to another travel agency if one travel agency provides bad advice due to its use of a system that biases its displays would not prevent display bias from causing harm. The consumers' ability to switch travel agencies would deter bias if customers find out that better service was available and know that the travel agent booked the inferior service because the travel agent was using a system that provided inferior displays. That seems improbable. Customers instead are unlikely to know why the travel agent did not book the better service. Customers might assume that the better service was sold out, or that the better fare was not available when a customer's booking was made, as we concluded in our last major CRS rulemaking. 57 FR 43787.
See also
American Antitrust Institute Comments at 11. Furthermore, travelers with confidence in their ability to obtain accurate fare information on the Internet would be less likely to use a travel agent to book their tickets.
While we conclude that systems are likely to bias displays in the absence of rules prohibiting such bias, we believe that on-going developments are likely to reduce the systems' market power over airlines over time. We further expect that these developments will enable travel agents and their customers to easily use alternative sources of information to an extent that should deter the kind of display bias that would significantly mislead travel agents and consumers. Accordingly, we have decided to retain the prohibition against display bias only for a transitional period of six months, with a termination date of July 31, 2004. Our expectation is that the notice provided by this transition period will help to accelerate developments in the market that reduce the harm display bias might otherwise engender.
F. The Department's Statutory Authority To Regulate CRS Practices
Having concluded on economic policy grounds that some rules will remain necessary for the next six months, and that the remaining rules should cover all systems, not just those owned by airlines, we must address our statutory authority to adopt the rules and make them applicable to both airline and non-airline systems.
The basis for our adoption of CRS rules has been our authority under section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, recodified as 49 U.S.C. 41712, to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition by airlines and ticket agents in air transportation and the sale of air transportation. Section 411 states, “[T]he Secretary may investigate and decide whether an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition in air transportation or the sale of air transportation.” If the Secretary “finds that an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or unfair method of competition, the Secretary shall order the air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to stop the practice or method.” Congress modelled our authority under section 411 on the Federal Trade Commission's authority under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition in other industries.
United Air Lines
, 766 F.2d 1107, 1111-1112 (7th Cir. 1985). In enforcing section 411, we must consider the public interest factors set forth in 49 U.S.C. 40101. 68 FR 3293, 3294 (January 23, 2003). Because section 411 limits our authority to practices affecting airline distribution, we may not regulate the systems' treatment of other travel suppliers, such as hotels, rental cars, and Amtrak. 67 FR 69389.
As noted, section 411 covers airlines (both U.S. and foreign) and “ticket agents.” The statute defines a ticket agent as “a person (except an air carrier, a foreign air carrier, or an employee of an air carrier or foreign air carrier) that as principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling, providing, or arranging for, air transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(40).
The courts have construed the meaning of deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition. A deceptive practice is one that will tend to deceive a significant number of consumers.
United Air Lines
, 766 F.2d at 1113. An unfair method of competition is a practice that violates antitrust laws or antitrust principles. We may therefore prohibit some airline conduct permitted by the antitrust laws.
See, e.g., Pan American World Airways
v.
United States
, 371 U.S. 296, 306-308 (1963);
United Air Lines
, 766 F.2d at 1114.
When several airlines sought judicial review of the original CRS rules, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Board's adoption of the rules on the ground that section 411 authorized the Board to prohibit anti-competitive conduct even though the systems' conduct might not violate the antitrust laws.
United Air Lines
v.
CAB
, 766 F.2d 1107. The Board's underlying findings were very similar to those used in our past rulemakings. The Court stated that the Board's finding that some of the systems had substantial market power was sufficient to authorize the Board's regulation of CRS practices: that finding “would bring their competitive practices within the broad reach of section 411,” for the Board “can forbid anticompetitive practices before they become serious enough to violate the Sherman Act.” The Court reasoned that the types of conduct prohibited by the Board on antitrust grounds—price discrimination and denying a competitor access to an essential facility on equal terms—were “traditional methods of illegal monopolization” that the Board could prohibit, even though no system had a monopoly under Sherman Act standards.
United Air Lines
, 766 F.2d at 1114. In determining whether the Board properly held that display bias was a deceptive practice, the Court viewed the test as whether the practice would tend to deceive a significant number of consumers. 766 F.2d at 1113.
While Section 411 allows us to prohibit some conduct that is not prohibited by the antitrust laws, it does not give us broad authority to regulate practices in the airline and airline distribution businesses. Airlines are generally free to determine how to distribute and sell their services, including sales through travel agencies, as long as they do not violate antitrust principles. The antitrust laws allow individual firms to choose how to distribute their products and services as long as they do not violate one of the provisions of those laws. 67 FR 69384, citing
Paschall
v.
Kansas City Star Co.
,
727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc); and
Auburn News Co.
v.
Providence Journal Co.
, 659 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1981).
Similarly, the courts have held that the FTC's comparable authority to prohibit unfair methods of competition in other industries does not empower that agency to regulate business conduct in order to make an industry more competitive. In
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v.
FTC
, 729 F.2d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit stated, “[I]n the absence of proof of a violation of the antitrust laws or evidence of collusive, coercive, predatory, or exclusionary conduct, business practices are not ‘unfair’ in violation of section 5 unless those practices either have an anticompetitive purpose or cannot be supported by an independent legitimate reason.” In
DuPont
the court therefore vacated an FTC order prohibiting certain types of pricing conduct in an oligopolistic industry, which the FTC had prohibited in the belief that the industry's pricing would then become more competitive. The FTC had not found that the pricing conduct at issue violated the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws or was otherwise “collusive, coercive, predatory, or exclusionary.”
See also Official Airline Guides, Inc.
v.
FTC
, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980);
Boise Cascade Corp
. v.
FTC
, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
Our decision that most of the existing rules should be allowed to sunset follows from our conclusions that those rules are no longer necessary. That decision also reflects the limits placed by Congress on our authority to regulate airline distribution practices. As a result of Congress' decision to deregulate the airline industry, we may not require firms in the airline distribution business to change their practices without finding that those practices will violate section 411.
We based our proposal to readopt rules proscribing display bias on both our authority to prohibit deceptive practices and our authority to prohibit unfair methods of competition. No one has contested our authority to regulate the systems' display practices under our authority to prohibit deceptive practices, if the systems are ticket agents and our regulations are consistent with the First Amendment (several commenters dispute these assumptions). The argument over our authority to readopt the proposed rules involves both of our tentative conclusions that the statutory definition of ticket agents includes the systems and that system practices at issue could be unfair methods of competition. We address these issues in detail below.
In our notice of proposed rulemaking, we observed that section 411 also authorizes us to prohibit unfair practices by airlines and ticket agents, not just deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition, but that we had not relied on that authority as a basis for readopting CRS rules. 67 FR 69384. The FTC has advised us that the FTC has adopted a strict definition of “unfair practices” under the FTC Act and that Congress has since codified the Commission's definition. FTC Comments at 1-3. In its reply comments, America West briefly suggests that we should bar systems from charging supracompetitive booking fees on the ground that such fees violate public policy. America West Reply Comments at 16, n.30. We are unwilling to adopt America West's suggestion. We have not previously based the CRS rules on our authority to prohibit unfair practices, and we do not now intend to rely on that authority, when our notice did not propose to do so and other commenters have not had the opportunity to comment on America West's suggestion.
1. Whether Non-Airline Systems Are Ticket Agents Subject to Section 411
The U.S. airlines' divestiture of their CRS ownership interests requires us to resolve whether we may directly regulate the systems under section 411, because we based our authority to regulate system practices in the past on the systems' airline ownership. Neither we nor the Board ever decided that issue in the earlier rulemakings. 67 FR 69385. We tentatively concluded in our notice of proposed rulemaking that the systems were ticket agents subject to section 411. After considering the comments on this issue, we conclude that we may directly regulate the systems under section 411, even though most of them no longer are controlled by airlines. However, we are also adopting a rule barring airlines from attempting to induce systems to create displays that would not comply with the standards established by our rule prohibiting systems from engaging in display bias.
A few commenters have suggested that we need not decide whether section 411 authorizes us to directly regulate the systems, because each of the existing systems has ties with its former airline owners. We decline this invitation to avoid the issue. Achieving all of our goals without directly regulating the systems would be difficult. Neither relying on the existence of marketing relationships between the systems and airlines nor barring airlines and travel agencies from doing business with systems that engage in unacceptable practices would provide a sound basis for regulating all of the systems' operations.
Section 411 authorizes us to regulate the systems directly if they are “ticket agents” within the meaning of our statute. As noted above, the statute defines a ticket agent as “a person (except an air carrier, a foreign air carrier, or an employee of an air carrier or foreign air carrier) that as principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling, providing, or arranging for, air transportation.” 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(40). Our notice of proposed rulemaking tentatively concluded that systems are “ticket agents.” 67 FR 69384-69385.
Sabre, Galileo, United, Expedia, Travelocity, and ASTA contend that systems are not ticket agents. Amadeus and America West, on the other hand, support our tentative conclusion that the systems are ticket agents subject to section 411.
After considering the comments, we conclude that the systems are ticket agents and that we may therefore prohibit them from engaging in unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition in the sale of air transportation.
As we explained in the notice, the systems are active participants in the sale of air transportation, not just communications links. 67 FR 69384-69385. The systems enable travel agents to conduct booking transactions, require airlines to accept any bookings made by a travel agent through the system, make credit card authorizations, and issue tickets. They charge airlines fees based on booking transactions. A system operates a central computer that collects information on airline schedules and fares and the availability of seats, arranges that information under its own editing and ranking criteria in displays that are provided to travel agents, and provides a booking capability enabling travel agents to make airline reservations for their customers. The systems also require airlines to allow any system user to make bookings on the airline through the system.
See, e.g.
, Amadeus Reply at 34-35; America West Reply Comments at 7-8. When the booking is made through the system, either through its own central computer or by a direct connection feature in a participating airline's internal reservations system, the travel agent's purchase is complete.
The systems' contracts with participating airlines reflect their function as an integral part of the distribution of airline tickets, not just as a communications link. America West's contracts with Sabre and Worldspan
thus state respectively that the parties “desire to enter an agreement concerning the booking of reservations [and] the sale of the Participating Carrier's air services through SABRE” and “[t]he parties desire to enter into an agreement and provide for the distribution of the services of Participating Carrier through the WORLDSPAN system.” America West Comments at 13, 14.
In our view, the systems thus sell, offer for sale, and arrange for air transportation, activities which bring them within the statutory definition of ticket agent, because they are also carrying out these functions as a principal or agent.
The statutory definition of “ticket agent” states that anyone carrying out the listed functions as “principal or agent” is a ticket agent. This definition should cover everyone involved in selling, offering for sale, or arranging for air transportation no matter what status they may have under agency law principles. A person involved in the sale or offering for sale of airline tickets must be either a principal or agent. We do not see any third category of actor that would be applicable here, and the commenters arguing that the systems are not ticket agents do not contend that they are acting in some capacity other than principal or agent. We think Congress included the phrase “as principal or agent” to ensure that all persons conducting the listed functions were covered, whether or not they were acting as an airline's agent, acting under their own authority, or acting under someone else's authority. By using the terms “principal or agent,” Congress did not mean to make a person's status as ticket agent depend on whether that person was a party to an agency relationship. Congress surely meant to make section 411 applicable to persons who committed unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive practices while engaged in the sale or offering for sale of transportation, even if that person acted entirely independently.
We believe that the systems operate as principals in the offering for sale and arranging for air transportation. The systems act as independent firms that are involved in the distribution of airline services. The commenters arguing that systems cannot be ticket agents largely ignore the statute's inclusion of persons who act as principal and assume that a showing that a system is not an agent necessarily means it cannot be a ticket agent.
See, e.g.
, United Reply at 10-12. This implicitly assumes that the principal in the transaction must be the carrier. The statute, however, states that a ticket agent is “a person (except an air carrier, a foreign air carrier, or an employee of an air carrier or foreign air carrier) that as principal or agent” performs one of the listed functions, such as the sale of air transportation. Congress thus determined that other persons participating in the distribution process, not just the airline, could be principals and would be ticket agents. The commenters' arguments that the systems cannot be agents suggests that they must be acting as principals.
The commenters opposing the systems' inclusion within the definition of “ticket agent” argue that the systems are not the airlines' agents. They contend that the systems' contracts with participating airlines specifically disclaim any agency relationship.
See, e.g.
, United Comments at 6-7. This argument misses the point—as shown, if the systems are not the airlines' agents, they must be acting as principals. To some extent, however, the systems may be operating as the airlines' agents, for example, in obtaining credit card authorizations for sales made through the systems. Amadeus Comments at 27. While the commenters arguing that systems are not ticket agents cite the systems' participating airline contracts, which state that no agency relationship is being created, the contracts' statements on the parties' relationships are not binding on us.
See, e.g., Board of Trade
v.
Hammond Elevator Co.
, 198 U.S. 424, 437-438 (1905);
State Police Ass'n of Massachusetts
v.
C.I.R.
, 125 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, we disagree with the argument made by some commenters that travel agents are the airlines' agents and that the systems, therefore, cannot be agents of the airlines.
See, e.g.
, Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 21-22. This argument assumes that only one party in any each transaction can act as the airline's agent. We see no logical reason why only one party can act as an airline's agent in the course of a traveller's purchase of airline tickets.
The statute states that a person is a ticket agent if the person “sells” or “offers for sale” air transportation. The systems sell and offer for sale air transportation because they present the travel agent with air service options that the agent can purchase through the system. A system tells the travel agent what flights are being operated, what the fares are, and whether seats are available at each fare, and enables the travel agent to book the seat and pay for it on the customer's behalf by entering specified keystrokes. If the travel agent follows the proper procedures for making the booking, the airline is obligated by its contract to accept the booking as valid, whether or not any record of the transaction appears in the airline's internal reservations system. The system thus offers air transportation for sale and sells it.
We further find that each system “holds itself out as selling, providing, or arranging for air transportation.” As discussed, each system offers for sale and sells air transportation. A system also arranges for air transportation, because it enables the travel agent to choose the services best suited for the travel agent's customer and enables the agent to book whatever combination of services may be required by the customer. The system holds itself out as performing these functions, because it has informed its subscribers (and potential subscribers) that it offers these functions.
We do not agree with the contention made by some commenters that the systems may not be deemed as holding out the sale, provision, or arranging for air transportation, because no system deals directly with the public or holds itself out to the public as offering airline tickets for sale.
See, e.g.
, Sabre Reply Comments at 15. Travel agents, after all, act as the travelers' agent, not just as the airlines' agent, and any representations made to a travel agent are necessarily representations made to the travel agent's principal, the customer. The statute, moreover, does not state that the ticket agent must offer to sell air transportation directly to the public, and we see no reason why such a limitation should be read into the language of the statute.
We therefore conclude that each system is a ticket agent. Interpreting “ticket agent” as including the systems would enable us to apply section 411 to firms whose critical role in airline distribution enables them to substantially affect airline competition and the accuracy of information provided consumers.
At the same time, our reading of the term “ticket agent” will not make firms providing only information on airline services or communications links subject to section 411. As shown, the systems do much more than just provide information or a communications facility because they are active participants in the sale of air transportation. As we explained in the notice, when a consumer uses the telephone to buy goods and services, the telephone line links the consumer with the firm selling the product or service, and the consumer conducts the transaction directly with the retailer. In contrast, a travel agent using a system to make a booking communicates
exclusively with the system, not the airline, unless the travel agent uses a direct access feature that enables travel agents to obtain information and make bookings directly with an airline's internal reservations system. Furthermore, telephone companies do not choose which data will be sent to the listener, but the systems edit their displays of airline services. More importantly, a telephone company has no apparent interest in whether transactions conducted by telephone are honored by the parties. Each system, in contrast, requires airlines to accept bookings made through the system and imposes fees based on the number of transactions made by subscribers, not on the number of messages transmitted by them. Similarly, as described above, the systems' productivity pricing arrangements with subscribers award incentive payments (or impose penalties) based on the number of transactions made by the subscriber, not the number of messages, as discussed above.
The contentions made by the commenters arguing that systems are not ticket agents are not persuasive. On the ground that the large majority of CRS bookings are now made directly with an airline's internal reservations system, Sabre characterizes the systems as communications links. Sabre Comments, Fahy Declaration at 23. However, Sabre concedes that a significant fraction of its bookings are not made directly in an airline's internal system. Furthermore, the widespread use of direct access (referred to as seamless connectivity by Sabre) does not negate the syst
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