FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-346]

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power

Station, Unit 1, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant

Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-

3, issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (the licensee), for

operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 (DBNPS),

located in Ottawa County, Ohio.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action will expand the present spent fuel storage

capability by 289 storage locations by allowing the use of spent fuel

racks in the cask pit area adjacent to the spent fuel pool (SFP). The

cask pit is accessible from the SFP through a gated opening in the wall

dividing the two pool areas. The modification will be achieved by two

separate activities. In support of the twelfth refueling outage

(12RFO), currently scheduled for April 2000, the licensee has installed

two rack modules in the cask pit, containing a total of 153 storage

locations. Later, during Cycle 13, the licensee plans to install two

additional rack modules in the cask pit containing 136 additional

storage locations. The licensee's long-term plans include submitting a

request for a complete re-racking of the SFP. The four rack modules in

the cask pit, which will be used to support shuffling of spent fuel

during the re-racking, will be relocated into the SFP. The design of

the new high density spent fuel storage racks incorporates Boral as a

neutron absorber in the cell walls to allow for more dense storage of

spent fuel.

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's

application for amendment dated May 21, 1999, as supplemented by

submittal dated December 1, 1999.

The Need for the Proposed Action

An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to reestablish

full core off-load capability. The licensee currently has insufficient

storage capacity in the SFP to fully off-load the reactor core (177

fuel assemblies). The current spent fuel storage capacity in the SFP is

735 fuel assemblies and there are only 114 empty storage locations

available. The licensee needs to conduct a full core off-load in order

to perform reactor vessel Inservice Inspection activities during the

twelfth refueling outage (12RFO) which is currently scheduled to begin

in April 2000. The licensee's long-term plans include submitting a

license amendment request to permit a complete re-racking of the SFP

with higher density fuel storage racks.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

Radioactive Waste Treatment

DBNPS uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process

gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive

material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in

the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated October 1975. The

proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change in the waste

treatment systems described in the FES.

Gaseous Radioactive Wastes

The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the SFP is not

expected to affect the release of radioactive gases from the pool.

Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced

by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small percentage of

these fission gases is released to the reactor coolant from the small

number of fuel assemblies that are expected to develop leaks during

reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission

products enter the pool and are subsequently released into the air.

Since the frequency of refueling (and therefore the number of freshly

off-loaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the SFP at any one time)

will not increase, there will be no increase in the amounts of these

types of fission products released to the atmosphere as a result of the

increased SFP storage capacity.

The increased heat load on the pool from the storage of additional

spent fuel assemblies will potentially result in an increase in the

pool's evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is

not expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium

released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from

DBNPS will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR 20.1301.

Solid Radioactive Wastes

Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through

the pool's purification system. The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup

system at DBNPS currently generates

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approximately 50 cubic feet of solid radioactive waste annually. The

necessity for pool filtration resin replacement is determined primarily

by the need for water clarity, and the resin is normally changed about

once every 18 months. The additional number of fuel assemblies in

storage is not expected to significantly affect the resin replacement

frequency. Therefore, the staff does not expect that the additional

fuel storage provided by the new rack modules will result in a

significant change in the generation of solid radwaste at DBNPS.

Liquid Radioactive Waste

The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as

a result of the modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove

soluble radioactive materials from the SFP water. When the resins are

changed out, the small amount of resin sluice water which is released

is processed by the radwaste system. As stated above, the staff does

not expect that the additional fuel storage provided by the new rack

modules will result in a significant change in the generation of solid

radwaste at DBNPS. The volume of SFP water processed for discharge is

also not expected to be significantly changed. Therefore, the staff

expects that the amount of radioactive liquid released to the

environment as a result of the proposed SFP expansion will be

negligible.

Occupational Dose Consideration

Radiation Protection personnel at DBNPS will constantly monitor the

doses to the workers during the SFP expansion operation. Operating

experience has shown that area radiation dose rates originate primarily

from radionuclides in the pool water. During refueling and other fuel

movement operations, pool water concentrations might be expected to

increase slightly due to crud deposits spalling from fuel assemblies

and due to activities carried into the pool from the primary system.

Should dose rates above and around the cask pit perimeter increase,

this change would be identified by routine surveillances. Where there

is a potential for significant airborne activity, continuous air

monitors will be in operation. Personnel will wear protective clothing

as required and, if necessary, respiratory protective equipment. If it

becomes necessary to utilize divers for the operation, the licensee

will equip each diver with appropriate personal dosimetry. The total

occupational dose to plant workers as a result of this SFP expansion is

estimated to be between 1.85 and 4.0 person-rems. This dose estimate is

comparable to doses for SFP re-racking modifications at other nuclear

plants. The planned activities will follow detailed procedures prepared

with full consideration of ALARA (as low as is reasonably achievable)

principles.

On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the staff

concludes that the SFP expansion operation can be performed in a manner

that will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained ALARA. The

estimated dose of 1.85 to 4.0 person-rem to perform the modification is

a small fraction of the annual collective dose accrued at DBNPS.

Accident Considerations

In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible

consequences of a fuel handling accident to determine the thyroid and

whole-body doses at the site's Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population

Zone, and in the DBNPS Control Room. The proposed cask pit storage

racks will not affect any of the assumptions or inputs used in

evaluating the dose consequences of a fuel handling accident and,

therefore, will not result in an increase in the doses from a

postulated fuel handling accident.

The licensee proposes to place restrictions on the spent fuel that

will be stored in the cask pit racks. The restrictions stipulate that

the spent fuel must have been removed from the reactor vessel for at

least three years. The length of the decay period was determined by the

licensee to address onsite ALARA and thermal-hydraulics considerations.

The licensee will establish administrative controls to ensure the three

year age limitation will not be violated.

The staff reviewed the licensee's analysis of a fuel handling

accident and performed confirmatory calculations to check the

acceptability of the licensee's doses. The staff's calculations

confirmed that the offsite doses from a fuel handling accident meet the

acceptance criteria and that the licensee's calculations are

acceptable. The results of the staff's calculations are presented in

the Safety Evaluation to be issued with the license amendment.

An accidental cask drop into the pool continues to be unlikely as

none of the features preventing such a drop (e.g., design and

maintenance of the main hoist, the controlled cask movement path, and

the hydraulic guide cylinder cask drop protection system) are affected

by the proposed action. The licensee also found that the consequences

of a loss of SFP cooling were acceptable in that ample time would be

available for the operators to reestablish cooling before the onset of

pool boiling. Evaluation of a design basis seismic event indicated the

new racks would remain safe and impact-free, the structural capability

of the pool would not be exceeded, and the reactor building and crane

structure would continue to retain necessary safety margins. Thus,

these potential accidents have no environmental consequences.

The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability

or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of

any effluents that may be released offsite, and there is no significant

increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Therefore, there

are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with

the proposed action.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect

nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.

Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed action.

Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant

environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility

Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility

is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.

However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive

waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until

approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the

Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized

location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified

and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in

advance of a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping

spent fuel to the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to

increased onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.

Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility

Reprocessing of spent fuel from DBNPS is not a viable alternative

since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the

United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an

overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach

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has never been used and it would require approval by the Department of

State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel

reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual

uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.

Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to Another FirstEnergy

Facility

The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring DBNPS fuel

to another FirstEnergy facility (i.e., Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

1, or Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2) for storage would

provide short-term relief from the storage problem at DBNPS. The

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and 10 CFR Part 53, however, clearly

place the responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with

each owner or operator of a nuclear plant. The other FirstEnergy spent

fuel pools have been designed with capacity to accommodate their own

needs and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from DBNPS to another

FirstEnergy pool would create fuel storage capacity problems for these

other facilities. The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring

it to another FirstEnergy facility is not an acceptable alternative

because of increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational

radiation exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage

capacity would be created.

Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity

Alternative technologies that would create additional storage

capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, and constructing

a new pool. Rod consolidation involves disassembling the spent fuel

assemblies and storing the fuel rods from two or more assemblies into a

stainless steel canister that can be stored in the spent fuel racks.

Industry experience with rod consolidation is currently limited,

primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity release due to rod

breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding corrosion due to

some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off, and because the

prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with ongoing plant

operations.

Dry cask storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after

storage in the pool for several years, to high capacity casks with

passive heat dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored

outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. In the early 1990s,

the licensee made the decision to reclaim some of the DBNPS SFP storage

using a dry fuel storage system. In January 1996, 72 spent fuel

assemblies were loaded into three Dry Shielded Canisters and were

placed in dry fuel storage utilizing the certified Nutech Horizontal

Modular Storage (NUHOMS) system, in accordance with 10 CFR 72.214,

Certificate Number 1004. However, changes within the dry spent fuel

storage industry have caused cost increases. In addition, the

contracted supplier of the NUHOMS system voluntarily stopped

fabrication activities and was unable to provide additional storage

systems within an acceptable schedule. Further use of this technology

was re-evaluated and determined not to be the best choice for future

storage expansion at DBNPS. Based upon economics, schedule, and risk

management, the licensee concluded that dry cask storage was not a

viable alternative at DBNPS.

The alternative of constructing and licensing a new fuel pool is

not practical because such an effort would require about 10 years to

complete and would be the most expensive alternative.

The alternative technologies that could create additional storage

capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity

for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers

effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are

significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant

improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed re-

racking modifications.

Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation

Generally, improved usage of the fuel or operation at a reduced

power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of

fuel being stored in the pool and thus, increase the amount of time

before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of

fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer off-loads

would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss

of full core off-load capability that will occur as a result of the

DBNPS refueling outage scheduled to begin in April 2000, because the

spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has now almost

completed its operating history in the core. DBNPS has been operating

on the basis of 24-month refueling cycles, with core designs and fuel

management schemes optimized accordingly. Operating the plant at a

reduced power level would not make effective use of available

resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the

licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent

fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not

considered a practical alternative.

The No-Action Alternative

As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered

denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative).

Denial of the application would result in no change in current

environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action

and the alternative action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not

previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for DBNPS.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on December 14, 1999, the

staff consulted with the Ohio State official, Carol O'Claire, of the

Ohio Emergency Management Agency, regarding the environmental impact of

the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes

that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the

quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined

not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed

action.

For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the

licensee's letter dated May 21, 1999, as supplemented by letter dated

December 1, 1999, which are available for public inspection at the

Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC. Publicly available records will be accessible

electronically from the ADAMS Public Library component on the NRC Web

site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic Reading Room).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of January 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Anthony J. Mendiola,

Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate III, Division of Licensing

Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 00-804 Filed 1-12-00; 8:45 am]

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