Social Security Ruling, SSR 00-1c; Disability Insurance BenefitsClaims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Social Security Ruling, SSR 00-1c; Disability Insurance

Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the

Americans With Disabilities Act

AGENCY: Social Security Administration.

ACTION: Notice of Social Security Ruling.

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SUMMARY: In accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1), the Commissioner of

Social Security gives notice of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 00-1c.

This Ruling, based on the Supreme Court's decision in

[[Page 1216]]

Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et al.,

____ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999), concerns whether a claim for

disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act would

preclude the claimant from pursuing relief under the Americans with

Disabilities Act.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 7, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joanne K. Castello, Office of Program

Support, Social Security Administration, 6401 Security Boulevard,

Baltimore, MD 21235-6401, (410) 965-1711.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although we are not required to do so

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) and (a)(2), we are publishing this

Social Security Ruling in accordance with 20 CFR 402.35(b)(1).

Social Security Rulings make available to the public precedential

decisions relating to the Federal old-age, survivors, disability,

supplemental security income, and black lung benefits programs. Social

Security Rulings may be based on case decisions made at all

administrative levels of adjudication, Federal court decisions,

Commissioner's decisions, opinions of the Office of the General

Counsel, and Agency interpretations of the law and regulations.

Although Social Security Rulings do not have the same force and

effect as the statute or regulations, they are binding on all

components of the Social Security Administration, in accordance with 20

CFR 402.35(b)(1), and are to be relied upon as precedents in

adjudicating cases.

If this Social Security Ruling is later superseded, modified, or

rescinded, we will publish a notice in the Federal Register to that

effect.

Dated: December 20, 1999.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Programs 96.001 Social

Security--Disability Insurance; 96.005 Special Benefits for Disabled

Coal Miners; 96.006 Supplemental Security Income)

Kenneth S. Apfel,

Commissioner of Social Security.

Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social

Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1))

Disability Insurance Benefits--Claims Filed Under Both the Social

Security Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act

20 CFR 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560(c), 404.1592,

and 404.1592a

Carolyn C. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation et

al., ____U.S.____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999)

This Ruling concerns whether an individual's claim for, or receipt

of, disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act

(the SSAct) would preclude the individual from pursuing relief under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The SSAct and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities but

in different ways. The SSAct provides monetary benefits to insured

individuals who are under a disability, as defined in the SSAct. The

ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against any

individual who is considered a ``qualified individual with a

disability'' as defined in the ADA.

In January 1994, the claimant filed for Social Security disability

insurance benefits. By April 1994, her condition improved and she

returned to work. She reported this to the Social Security

Administration (SSA) which denied her claim. Her employer subsequently

terminated her. She then asked SSA to reconsider its denial of her

claim. SSA again denied her claim, but following a hearing, she was

awarded benefits. However, before her Social Security award, the

claimant brought an ADA lawsuit contending that her employer terminated

her employment without reasonably accommodating her disability.

The District Court did not evaluate her ``reasonable

accommodation'' claim on the merits, but granted summary judgment to

the defendant because, in the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying

for and receiving Social Security disability insurance benefits, had

conceded that she was totally disabled. This fact, the court concluded,

estopped the plaintiff from proving an essential element of her ADA

claim, i.e., that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her

job with ``reasonable accommodation.''

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's

grant of summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's statement

on her Social Security application that she was totally disabled and

unable to work was sufficient evidence to judically estop her later ADA

claim. In her ADA claim, the plaintiff contended that, for the time in

question, with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the

essential functions of her job. The Court of Appeals thought that her

claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting

propositions; namely, ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I am not too

disabled to work.'' That court, in an effort to prevent two conflicting

claims under both Acts, used a special judicial presumption that it

believed would prevent the plaintiff from successfully pursuing her ADA

claim.

The Supreme Court (the Court) granted certiorari in light of the

disagreement among the circuits concerning the legal effect upon an ADA

claim of the application for, or receipt of, Social Security disability

insurance benefits. The Court held that, despite the appearance of

conflict between the two statutes, the two claims do not conflict to

the point where courts should apply a special negative presumption as

in the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that

there are too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an

ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore,

vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for

further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

BREYER, Supreme Court Justice:

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides

benefits to a person with a disability so severe that she is ``unable

to do (her) previous work'' and ``cannot * * * engage in any other kind

of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.''

Sec. 223(a) of the Social Security Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.

423(d)(2)(A). This case asks whether the law erects a special

presumption that would significantly inhibit an SSDI recipient from

simultaneously pursuing an action for disability discrimination under

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), claiming that ``with

* * * reasonable accommodation'' she could ``perform the essential

functions'' of her job. Section 101, 104 Stat. 331, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8).

We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent

statutory contentions are often consistent, each with the other. Thus

pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the

recipient from pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong

presumption against the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless,

an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was

too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary

judgment, she must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with

her ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her

previous job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.''

After suffering a disabling stroke and losing her job, Carolyn

Cleveland sought and obtained SSDI benefits from the Social Security

Administration (SSA). She has also brought this ADA suit in which she

claims that her former

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employer, Policy Management Systems Corporation, discriminated against

her on account of her disability. The two claims developed in the

following way:

August 1993: Cleveland began work at Policy Management Systems. Her

job required her to perform background checks on prospective employees

of Policy Management System's clients.

January 7, 1994: Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her

concentration, memory, and language skills.

January 28, 1994: Cleveland filed an SSDI application in which she

stated that she was ``disabled'' and ``unable to work.'' App. 21.

April 11, 1994: Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned

to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the

SSA two weeks later.

July 11, 1994: Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA

denied her SSDI application.

July 15, 1994: Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.

September 14, 1994: Cleveland asked the SSA to reconsider its July

11th SSDI denial. In doing so, she said, ``I was terminated [by Policy

Management Systems] due to my condition and I have not been able to

work since. I continue to be disabled.'' Id., at 46. She later added

that she had ``attempted to return to work in mid April,'' that she had

``worked for three months,'' and that Policy Management Systems

terminated her because she ``could no longer do the job'' in light of

her ``condition.'' Id., at 47.

November 1994: The SSA denied Cleveland's request for

reconsideration. Cleveland sought an SSA hearing, reiterating that ``I

am unable to work due to my disability,'' and presenting new evidence

about the extent of her injuries. Id., at 79.

September 29, 1995: The SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits

retroactive to the day of her stroke, January 7, 1994.

On September 22, 1995, the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland

brought this ADA lawsuit. She contended that Policy Management Systems

had ``terminat[ed]'' her employment without reasonably

``accommodat(ing) her disability.'' Id., at 7. She alleged that she

requested, but was denied, accommodations such as training and

additional time to complete her work. Id., at 96. And she submitted a

supporting affidavit from her treating physician. Id., at 101. The

District Court did not evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on

the merits, but granted summary judgment to the defendant because, in

that court's view, Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI

benefits, had conceded that she was totally disabled. And that fact,

the court concluded, now estopped Cleveland from proving an essential

element of her ADA claim, namely that she could ``perform the essential

functions'' of her job, at least with ``reasonable accommodation.'' 42

U.S.C. 12111(8).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary

judgment. 120 F.3d 513 (1997). The court wrote:

``[T]he application for or the receipt of social security

disability benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant

or recipient of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting

that he is a `qualified individual with a disability.' '' Id., at 518.

The Circuit Court noted that it was ``at least theoretically

conceivable that under some limited and highly unusual set of

circumstances the two claims would not necessarily be mutually

exclusive.'' Id., at 517. But it concluded that, because

``Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was

totally disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material

fact rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now

asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a

`qualified individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA

claim.'' Id., at 518-519.

We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits

about the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or

receipt of, disability benefits. Compare, e.g., Rascon v. U S West

Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998) (application

for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does not estop

plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert. pending, No. 97-

1991; Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 116

F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C. 1997) (same), with McNemar v. Disney Store,

Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-620 (C.A.3 1996) (applying judicial estoppel to

bar plaintiff who applied for disability benefits from bringing suit

under the ADA), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 958, 136 L.Ed.2d

845 (1997), and Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482

(C.A.9 1996) (declining to apply judicial estoppel but holding that

claimant who declared total disability in a benefits application failed

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a

qualified individual with a disability).

The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with

disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides

monetary benefits to every insured individual who ``is under a

disability.'' 42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1). The Act defines ``disability'' as an

``inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason

of any * * * physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.'' Section

423(d)(1)(A).

The individual's impairment, as we have said, supra, at 1599, must

be

``of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her]

previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy * * * .'' Section 423(d)(2)(A).

The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against

disabled individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal

opportunity and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their

consequently increased productivity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(8),

(9). The Act prohibits covered employers from discriminating ``against

a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of

such individual.'' Section 12112(a). The Act defines a ``qualified

individual with a disability'' as a disabled person ``who * * * can

perform the essential functions'' of her job, including those who can

do so only ``with * * * reasonable accommodation.'' Section 12111(8).

We here consider but one of the many ways in which these two

statutes might interact. This case does not involve, for example, the

interaction of either of the statutes before us with other statutes,

such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq. Nor

does it involve directly conflicting statements about purely factual

matters, such as ``The light was red/green,'' or ``I can/cannot raise

my arm above my head.'' An SSA representation of total disability

differs from a purely factual statement in that it often implies a

context-related legal conclusion, namely ``I am disabled for purposes

of the Social Security Act.'' And our consideration of this latter kind

of statement consequently leaves the law related to the former, purely

factual, kind of conflict where we found it.

The case before us concerns an ADA plaintiff who both applied for,

and received, SSDI benefits. It requires us to review a Court of

Appeals decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground

that an ADA plaintiff's ``represent(ation) to the SSA that she was

totally disabled'' created a

[[Page 1218]]

``rebuttable presumption'' sufficient to ``judicially esto[p]'' her

later representation that, ``for the time in question,'' with

reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of

her job. 120 F.3d, at 518-519. The Court of Appeals thought, in

essence, that claims under both Acts would incorporate two directly

conflicting propositions, namely ``I am too disabled to work'' and ``I

am not too disabled to work.'' And in an effort to prevent two claims

that would embody that kind of factual conflict, the court used a

special judicial presumption, which it believed would ordinarily

prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from successfully asserting an ADA

claim.

In our view, however, despite the appearance of conflict that

arises from the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not

inherently conflict to the point where courts should apply a special

negative presumption like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here.

That is because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim

and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by side.

For one thing, as we have noted, the ADA defines a ``qualified

individual'' to include a disabled person ``who * * * can perform the

essential functions'' of her job ``with reasonable accommodation.''

Reasonable accommodations may include:

``job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,

reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of

equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of

examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of

qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar

accommodations.'' 42 U.S.C. 12111(9)(B).

By way of contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual

is disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of

``reasonable accommodation'' into account, nor need an applicant refer

to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for

SSDI. See Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Comm'r for

Hearings and Appeals, SSA, to Administrative Appeals Judges, reprinted

in 2 Social Security Practice Guide, App. Section 15C[9], pp. 15-401 to

15-402 (1998). The omission reflects the facts that the SSA receives

more than 2.5 million claims for disability benefits each year; its

administrative resources are limited; the matter of ``reasonable

accommodation'' may turn on highly disputed workplace-specific matters;

and an SSA misjudgment about that detailed, and often fact-specific

matter would deprive a seriously disabled person of the critical

financial support the statute seeks to provide. See Brief for United

States et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11, and n. 2, 13. The result is that

an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform her job with

reasonable accommodation may well prove consistent with an SSDI claim

that the plaintiff could not perform her own job (or other jobs)

without it.

For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI

claims, the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure

that embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job

availability, and their interrelation. The SSA asks:

Step One: Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)

See 20 CFR 404.1520(b) (1998).

Step Two: Do you have a ``severe impairment,'' i.e., one that

``significantly limits'' your ability to do basic work activities? (If

not, you are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(c).

Step Three: Does your impairment ``mee[t] or equa[l]'' an

impairment on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are

eligible without more.) See Secs. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

Step Four: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, can you perform your ``past relevant work?'' (If so, you

are ineligible.) See Sec. 404.1520(e).

Step Five: If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment and you cannot perform your ``past relevant work,'' then can

you perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy? (If not, you are eligible.) See Secs. 404.1520(f),

404.1560(c).

The presumptions embodied in these questions--particularly those

necessary to produce Step Three's list, which, the Government tells us,

accounts for approximately 60 percent of all awards, see Tr. of Oral

Arg. 20--grow out of the need to administer a large benefits system

efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of

many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to

perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI

under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual

circumstances, remain capable of ``perform[ing] the essential

functions'' of her job.

Further, the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who

not only can work, but are working. For example, to facilitate a

disabled person's reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-

month trial-work period during which SSDI recipients may receive full

benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 CFR 404.1592 (1998). See

also Sec. 404.1592a (benefits available for an additional 15-month

1 period depending upon earnings). Improvement in a totally

disabled person's physical condition, while permitting that person to

work, will not necessarily or immediately lead the SSA to terminate

SSDI benefits. And the nature of an individual's disability may change

over time, so that a statement about that disability at the time of an

individual's application for SSDI benefits may not reflect an

individual's capacities at the time of the relevant employment

decision.

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\1\ Effective January 1, 1988, the law was amended to lengthen

the reentitlement period to SSDI benefits from 15 months to 36

months. See section 223(a)(1) of the SSAct. [Ed. note]

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Finally, if an individual has merely applied for, but has not been

awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims

is of the sort normally tolerated by our legal system. Our ordinary

rules recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which

legal theory she will succeed, and so permit parties to ``set forth two

or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or

hypothetically,'' and to ``state as many separate claims or defenses as

the party has regardless of consistency.'' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in respect to the assertion of SSDI

and ADA claims should differ. (And, as we said, we leave the law in

respect to purely factual contradictions where we found it.)

In light of these examples, we would not apply a special legal

presumption permitting someone who has applied for, or received, SSDI

benefits to bring an ADA suit only in ``some limited and highly unusual

set of circumstances.'' 120 F.3d, at 517.

Nonetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may turn out

genuinely to conflict with an ADA claim. Summary judgment for a

defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff ``fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to (her)

case, and on which (she) will bear the burden of proof at trial.''

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d

265 (1986). An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a

``qualified individual with a disability''--that is, a person ``who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions'' of her job. 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn

assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for

example, ``unable to work'' will appear to negate an essential element

of her ADA case--

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at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation. For that

reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent

contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI total disability

claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation.

The lower courts, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found

a similar need for explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity

that a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to

survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his or her own

previous sworn statement (by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly

contradicts that party's earlier sworn deposition) without explaining

the contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity. See, e.g.,

Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 5 (C.A.1 1994);

Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (C.A.2 1996); Hackman v. Valley

Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (C.A.3 1991); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736

F.2d 946, 960 (C.A.4 1984); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d

223, 228 (C.A.5 1984); Davidson & Jones Development Co. v. Elmore

Development Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (C.A.6 1991); Slowiak v. Land

O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (C.A.7 1993); Camfield Tires, Inc.

v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (C.A.8 1983); Kennedy

v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (C.A.9 1991); Franks v.

Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805

F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11 1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB

Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116 L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia

Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508

U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993). Although these cases

for the most part involve purely factual contradictions (as to which we

do not necessarily endorse these cases, but leave the law as we found

it), we believe that a similar insistence upon explanation is warranted

here, where the conflict involves a legal conclusion. When faced with a

plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting ``total disability'' or

the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent

inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat

summary judgment, that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a

reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the

plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff

could nonetheless ``perform the essential functions'' of her job, with

or without ``reasonable accommodation.''

III

In her brief in this Court, Cleveland explains the discrepancy

between her SSDI statements that she was ``totally disabled'' and her

ADA claim that she could ``perform the essential functions'' of her

job. The first statements, she says, ``were made in a forum which does

not consider the effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would

have on the ability to work.'' Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she

claims the SSDI statements were ``accurate statements'' if examined

``in the time period in which they were made.'' Ibid. The parties

should have the opportunity in the trial court to present, or to

contest, these explanations, in sworn form where appropriate.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[FR Doc. 00-411 Filed 1-6-00; 8:45 am]

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