Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

Federal RegisterOct 19, 2000

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Amendment No. 401-2, 417-1 and 420-1]

RIN 2120-AG15

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:

Final rule; request for comments on handling of solid propellants and cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board.

SUMMARY:

The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends its commercial space transportation licensing regulations to add licensing and safety requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, commercial launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges under safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether that site is located on or off of a federal launch range. These rules will provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety requirements to protect the public from the risks associated with activities at a launch site.

DATES:

Effective Date:

December 18, 2000. An application pending at the time of the effective date must conform to any new requirements of this rulemaking as of the effective date. All license terms and conditions, and all safety requirements of this rulemaking also apply as of the effective date.

Comment Date:

Comments on handling of solid propellants and cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board must be submitted on or before December 18, 2000.

ADDRESSES:

Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-1999-5833 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.

You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to these regulations in person in the Dockets Office between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed explosive siting requirements for facilities on a launch site that would handle solid and liquid propellants and other explosives. The FAA did not propose rules for solid explosives other than “division 1.3,” as described below.

As noted in the NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system for the transport of dangerous goods. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for dangerous goods, of which explosives are included as UNO “Class 1, Explosives.” Class 1 explosives are further subdivided into six “divisions” based on the character and predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or property damage. Two explosive divisions that are likely to be present on a launch site are division 1 and division 3, referred to as division 1.1 and 1.3, respectively. Division 1.1 consists of explosives that have a mass explosion hazard, and division 1.3 consists of explosives that have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed criteria only for division 1.3 because the FAA believed that the only solid explosives for commercial launches that would likely affect separation distances on a launch site were division 1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1 explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems, the quantity is small. The FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are from old military missiles, which are not likely to be used at a commercial launch site.

One government commenter, the 45th Space Wing Range Safety Engineering Support (45SW/SESE), pointed out that this was not a correct assumption, and the FAA agrees. As noted by the 45SW/SESE, experience with explosive siting at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station shows that division 1.1 explosives are often significant enough to influence explosive site plans.

Accordingly, section 420.65, Handling of Solid Propellants, now includes requirements for division 1.1 explosives. Because this change is being adopted without prior notice and public comment, interested persons are also invited to submit written comments on section 420.65.

The FAA also includes a new requirement in this rulemaking explicitly requiring a launch site operator licensee to cooperate with the National Transportation Safety Board in section 420.59 for launch accidents as well as for launch site accidents. The FAA will implement this change without prior notice and comment and therefore invites interested persons to submit written comments on section 420.59. Pending the evaluation of the public comments, the FAA has decided to proceed with due diligence to implement its requirements.

The FAA will consider and respond to comments on the new provisions. The FAA will consider all comments received, and will publish in the

Federal Register

a summary of the disposition of those comments and, if appropriate, changes to the rule that may result from consideration of those comments.

Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment number and must be submitted in triplicate to the address above. The FAA will review all comments received and will file all comments in the public docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after the comment closing date.

Commenters who want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this final rule must include a preaddressed, stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.” The postcard will be date-

stamped by the FAA and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Final Rules

You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the following steps:

(1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).

(2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket number shown at the beginning of this rulemaking document. Click on “search.”

(3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.

You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the

Federal Register's

web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final rule.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

You can find out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us

9-AWA-SBREFA@faa.gov.

Outline of Final Rule

I . Background

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

C. Current Practices

II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments

A. Overview

B. Environment

C. Policy

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

F. Launch Site Location Review

G. License Conditions

H. Operational Responsibilities

III. Part Analysis

IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX—Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701—Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a launch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated commercial space licensing authority to the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the operation of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing regulations at 14 CFR Ch. III. The first commercial launch licensing regulations were issued in April 1988, 53 FR 11004, when no commercial launches had yet taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing process intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while ensuring public safety. The Department noted that it would “continue to evaluate and, when necessary, reshape its program in response to growth, innovation, and diversity in this critically important industry.” 53 FR 11006.

Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development of commercial launch sites. The federal launch ranges provided commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support, including flight safety services.

Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

The United States government has, since the 1950s, built, operated, and maintained a space launch infrastructure for launching satellites into space. Much of the demand for and use of these launch sites has traditionally come from U.S. military and civil government agencies. Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of the government-operated launch sites began providing support for commercial launch activities as well, with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) acting as the primary intermediary for providing launch services to satellite operators. Following the Challenger accident, a White House decision in August 1986 allowed launch customers to solicit bids directly from the launch vehicle builders who would, in turn, lease launch facilities from NASA or the United States Air Force (USAF). This decision, coupled with the 1984 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act and its 1988 amendments, did much to foster commercial launch business, which continues to grow to this day.

The number of commercial space launches has steadily grown over the years since the first licensed commercial launch in 1989. From March 29, 1989 to July 28, 2000, 130 licensed launches have taken place. Launch vehicles have included traditional orbital launch vehicles such as the Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles such as the Starfire. New vehicles using traditional launch techniques include Lockheed Martin Corporation's (Lockheed Martin) Atlas III and Athena, EER's Conestoga, Orbital Sciences Corporation's (Orbital) Taurus, and The Boeing Company's (Boeing) Delta III. Unique vehicles such as Orbital's Pegasus and the Zenit 3-SL of Sea Launch Limited Partnership (Sea Launch), launched from a modified oil rig located in the Pacific Ocean, are included in this count. New launch vehicles are proposed every year. On the horizon are Lockheed Martin's Atlas V

and Boeing's Delta IV. A number of companies are proposing partially and fully reusable launch vehicles. In addition, some companies are participating in partnership with NASA to develop X-33 and X-34 launch vehicles incorporating reusable and single-stage-to-orbit technology, a partnership which could result in vehicles for commercial use.

The launch site industry, the focus of this final rule, has also made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on line with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral Air Force Base in Florida (CCAFB), and the Western Range located at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA; White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S. Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy. Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch services.

Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB. Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) received an FAA license to operate Launch Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently, Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island, Alaska. It is evident from this list that federal launch ranges still play a role in the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. California Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal launch range property. Two launches each have taken place from California Spaceport, KLC, and SFA.

Other commercial launch sites are being considered in other states. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization proposes to operate Southwest Regional Spaceport adjacent to the White Sands Missile Range as a site for reusable launch vehicles. The State of Montana is proposing to fly reusable launch vehicles from a site near Great Falls, Montana and Malmstrom Air Force Base. The state of Nevada is supporting the development of a launch site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada. The State of New Mexico proposes to construct and operate the Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) located in south central New Mexico for use by private companies conducting commercial space activities and operations. The State of Texas has enabled the development of a commercial Spaceport for reusable launch vehicles. Lastly, in Utah, the Wah Wah Valley Interlocal Cooperation Entity, proposes to construct and operate a commercial launch site utilizing approximately 70,000 acres of Utah State Trust lands located 30 miles southwest of Milford, Utah.

Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance. In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance concerning the information that might be requested as part of an application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to these requests, DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation (Office) published “Site Operators License, Guidelines for Applicants,” on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site operators. The guidelines described the information that DOT, and then the FAA, expected from an applicant for a license to operate a commercial launch site. This information included launch site location information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations document that governed how the facility would be operated to ensure public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application that are critical to assessing the suitability of the launch site location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing safe operations.

The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for potential developers of launch sites pending this rulemaking, and the guidelines describe the information that the FAA requests of an applicant as part of its application for a license to operate a launch site. The pace of development of the launch site industry has resulted in the FAA describing the process and requirements for applications for launch site operator licenses under the guidelines. As noted above, the FAA issued its first license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International for the operation of California Spaceport. The FAA issued this license under its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. III to license the operation of a launch site. Because the operation of California Spaceport as a launch site occurs at a federal launch range, the U.S. Air Force plays a significant role in California Spaceport's safety process. In fact, the FAA was able to review the Spaceport Systems International application expeditiously because the applicant certified its intention to observe the safety requirements currently applied by the Western Range and contained in “Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety Requirements (EWR 127-1),” (Mar. 1995).

The FAA determined that applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, together with Air Force approval of other important elements of the operation of a launch site protected public health and safety and the safety of property. In general, the FAA deems the compliance by a licensed launch site

operator with these requirements in combination with other safety practices imposed by a federal launch range as acceptable for purposes of protecting the public and property from hazards associated with launch site activities at a licensed launch site operator's facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration regarding safety oversight of licensed launch site operators located on federal launch ranges.

EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/450SW/.

On June 25, 1999, the FAA released a notice of proposed rulemaking,

Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site,

64 FR 34316 (Jun. 25, 1999). This will be referred to throughout this document as the Launch Site NPRM.

Comparison of the Guidelines and the Final Rule

The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect as of the effective date of this final rule. A comparison of some of the similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The one aspect of the licensing process that will not change is that the FAA will issue a license to operate a launch site only if the operation of the launch site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. The guidelines were flexible and were intended to identify the major elements of an application and lead the applicant through the application process with the FAA. The final rule codifies the requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.

The guidelines and the final rule share some common elements, namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in detail below, in the description of the final regulations. Under the final regulations, the information requirements for these reviews remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.

A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch site is an important component of both the guidelines and the final regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review, the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request an applicant to provide information regarding geographic characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment, the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch site operations. Under the guidelines, an application includes the frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in wind or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.

In contrast to the guidelines, the final rules require an applicant to use specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch site location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, including orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed launch point on the launch site must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle that the applicant wishes to have launched from the launch point. An applicant is provided with a choice of methods to develop a flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of impact dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, no additional analysis is required. Otherwise, an applicant is required to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the public from a representative launch does not exceed a casualty expectation (E

) of 30 × 10

−6

. The FAA will review the applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was correct, and will approve the launch site location if the E

risk criteria were met.

Under either the guidelines or the final regulations, little or no launch site location review is needed if the applicant proposes to locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The fundamental purpose of the FAA's proposed launch site location review—to determine whether a launch may potentially take place safely from the proposed launch site— has been amply demonstrated at each of the ranges. Exceptions may occur if a prospective launch site operator plans to use a launch site at a federal launch range for launches markedly different from past federal launch range launches, or if an applicant proposes a new launch point from which no launch has taken place.

The guidelines and final regulations differ markedly in their approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive safety is part of the analysis and safety plan. In contrast, the final regulations require the submission of an explosive site plan, but impose fewer operational ground safety responsibilities on a launch site operator. For flight safety, under the guidelines and final rules, a launch site operator license contains minimal flight safety responsibilities. The FAA assigns almost all responsibility for flight safety and significant ground safety responsibility to a licensed launch operator. Extensive ground and flight safety requirements will accompany a launch license. This does not mean a launch site operator cannot offer flight safety services or equipment to its customers. However, the adequacy of such services and equipment typically will be assessed in the FAA's review of a launch license application.

II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments

With this rulemaking, the FAA creates in 14 CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to contain the requirements for obtaining and possessing a license to operate a launch site. If a prospective launch site operator proposes to offer its launch site to others, that person must obtain a license to operate a launch site.

Part 420 does not apply in two notable situations. A launch operator operating a private site for its own launches does not need a license to operate a launch site because its launch license would cover the safety issues associated with the launch site. A person wishing to operate a site to support amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14 CFR 401.5, also does not need a license to operate a launch site because the launches taking place from

the site are exempt from AST's regulations.

By means of operational, explosive safety, and site location requirements, the FAA's regulations will address public safety issues associated with launches that take place from a launch site whose operation the FAA has licensed. Additionally, the FAA will address environmental issues, and will have international obligations and national security interests reviewed by the appropriate agencies, in the course of a license review. Environmental review may precede or take place concurrently with the licensing process.

The grant of a license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA review and licensing.

AST received comments from 11 members of the public and one government organization. The one government commenter was the 45th Space Wing Range Safety Engineering Support (45SW/SESE). The public commenters were:

—ACTA, Inc.

—New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization

—Kistler Aerospace Corporation

—Lockheed Martin Corporation

—National Fire Protection Association

—Don A. Nelson

—Nelson Engineering Co.

—Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission

—Christopher Shove, Ph.D.

—Space Access, LLC

—Texas Aerospace Commission

ACTA, Inc. divided its comments into those from ACTA itself and those from ACTA staff.

A. Overview

The FAA's approach to licensing the operation of a launch site focuses on five areas of concern critical to ensuring that operation of a launch site will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or international obligations of U.S. interests. These reviews encompass the environment, policy considerations, the siting of explosives and other explosive safety measures, the safety of a launch site location, and operational responsibilities.

Part 420 is divided into four subparts. Subpart A includes the scope and applicability of the part, and definitions applicable to the part. Subpart B includes the criteria and information requirements for obtaining a license. Subpart C lists the terms and conditions of a license to operate a launch site. Subpart D lists the other responsibilities of a licensee.

Part 420 separates the requirements to obtain a license from the responsibilities of a licensee. Much of the information required by subpart B pertains to how the applicant will meet its responsibilities in accordance with subpart D.

Under the regulations, an applicant is required to provide the FAA with information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews and determinations. An applicant is also required to submit an explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public areas.

The regulations provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that is accomplished by the FAA's launch site location review: namely, a showing that launch may occur safely from the site.

The FAA is imposing specific operational ground safety responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and requires that a license applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A launch site operator licensee's responsibilities include: preventing unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing the public and customers to visit the site; informing customers of limitations on use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous activities conducted by customers; maintaining agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard and with the FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches will take place and among other measures, the issuance of a Notice to Mariners and Notice to Airmen, respectively, prior to a launch from the launch site; and notifying adjacent property owners and local jurisdictions of the pending flight of a launch vehicle. Part 420 also contains launch site operator responsibilities with regard to record keeping, license transfer, compliance monitoring, accident investigation and explosives. Other federal government agencies have jurisdiction over a number of ground safety issues, and the FAA does not intend to duplicate their efforts.

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product, help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part 68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-case release would reach the public, the source must develop and implement a prevention program and an emergency response program. Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which existing systems could fail and result in accidental releases.

Discussion of Comments Regarding Overview

A few commentors provided comments that focussed on the FAA's regulatory approach.

Space Access believed that instead of focussing on the launch site location, the rule should put primary interest on the activity occurring on a site, including preparation for a launch, launch, and any activity or process conducted on or near the site that might endanger the public health and safety.

Space Access

at 1. The FAA agrees, but believes that a launch site location analysis is necessary in order to determine whether a launch could safely take place from the location selected. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not plan to license the operation of a launch site from which even a hypothetical launch could not take place and has devised the location review to avoid such an eventuality. The other requirements in part 420, in conjunction with the ground and flight safety requirements of a launch license, should address the activity occurring on a site.

Space Access also notes that the rule must achieve minimum safety standards but not require excessive agency

oversight or business duplication of effort.

Space Access

at 2. The desire to avoid duplication of effort was also expressed by Kistler Aerospace Corporation and Christopher Shove, Ph.D., a Senior Consultant for Space Data Systems, Inc. Although Kistler commends the FAA for striving to keep the regulatory environment free from redundant requirements levied by multiple agencies,

Kistler Aerospace Corporation

at 2;

Christopher Shove

at 1. Kistler also states that this goal should be expanded to include launch site operators operating out of localities that already address similar concerns through local rules or ordinances.

The FAA agrees that it should not impose requirements that duplicate other federal regulations. That is why there are relatively few operational responsibilities of a launch site licensee in part 420. For example, OSHA and the EPA have many regulations that apply to launch site operators, which the FAA does not duplicate. If an applicant is required to fulfill other safety requirements because of state or local regulations, or rules of property owners, the FAA will work with the applicant to avoid duplication of paper work. However, applicants must meet FAA and other federal standards.

The New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization (NMOSC) thought that the proposed regulations should not relate only to launch operations. NMOSC suggested that the proposed regulations be expanded to include recovery operations.

New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization

at 1. The FAA agrees that recovery operations are important. However, recovery operations are covered in another rulemaking.

Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing,

65 FR 56617 (Sept. 19, 2000).

Because the FAA stated in the NPRM that when launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance, NMOSC suggested that the FAA is willing to accept a double standard on safety. NMOSC believes that New Mexico will be treated differently from Florida and California because their launch sites are federal, and New Mexico's is not.

NMOSC

at 2. This is not true. The FAA did not mean to imply that a launch operator has more responsibility for flight safety from a commercial launch site than from a federal launch site. In both cases, the launch operator is responsible for the safety of its flight. The FAA was only pointing out that a launch operator at a non-federal launch site will not be able to depend on an established flight safety infrastructure that currently exists at federal launch ranges.

Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) recommended, in the interest of standardization and interoperability, that a launch site operator be required to establish and maintain at its facility a range safety/tracking system that functions at an industry-wide standard and demonstrate that it meets the standard.

LMC

at 4. A launch operator should be required to demonstrate to the FAA that its launch vehicle interfaces with this standardized range safety/tracking system. The FAA agrees on the importance of range safety and tracking for most launch operations. Because launch safety is the responsibility of the launch operator, because interoperability and standardization are business issues about which a launch site operator may wish to make its own decisions, the FAA notes with interest but declines to pursue this suggestion. Although the federal launch ranges offer a standardized form of range safety and tracking, the FAA is reluctant to enshrine particular standards through regulation, especially when the ranges themselves are re-visiting how to provide tracking, transmission and other launch safety services. Nothing precludes a launch site operator from providing such services as well; a launch operator will continue, of course, to remain responsible under its launch license for the safety of the flight of its vehicle, regardless of with whom it contracts for supporting services.

B. Environmental

Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to determine whether these activities will significantly affect the quality of the environment. Because the FAA is responsible under NEPA regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement (EIS), part 420 requires a license applicant to provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an analysis in accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant will typically engage a contractor with specialized experience in the NEPA process to conduct the study underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis.

The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review, including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will not issue a license if the FAA has not concluded an environmental review in accordance with all applicable regulations and guidelines.

Discussion of Comments Regarding the Environmental Review

Nelson Engineering Co. stated that the X-33 EIS process included overflight and safety issues. Nelson Engineering felt that including overflight and safety issues for licensed activities was a duplication of effort since these safety issues are covered in the license process as well. It noted that the public has the right to know and comment on overflight and safety issues, but it would be best to handle it separate from the EIS process.

Nelson Engineering

at 2. The FAA agrees. Safety issues are better addressed in the licensing process where safety standards exist. When the question of safety comes up during the FAA's environmental review process, the FAA notes in the environmental documentation that safety issues are addressed in the licensing process.

NMOSC commented on the FAA's statement that an applicant may acquire property for future use as a launch site. NMOSC states that according to the CEQ regulations as interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable alternatives.

NMOSC

at 2. The FAA partially agrees with NMOSC in that purchasing a site with the intent to

build a launch facility, without looking at other possible locations, limits the launch site selection and evaluation of alternatives and is contrary to the requirements of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). NEPA requires an applicant to show that it looked at several feasible sites based on certain criteria and that it chose one of those sites as the preferred or selected alternative. However, an applicant can in fact purchase property for future use as a launch site if the applicant can show that it looked at several sites and picked a particular site based on certain parameters. It must also document the evaluation of those alternative sites.

C. Policy

The FAA conducts a policy review of an application for a license to operate a launch site to determine whether operation of the proposed launch site would jeopardize national security, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA conducts the policy review in coordination with other federal agencies that have responsibility for national and international interests. The Department of Defense is consulted to determine whether a license application presents any issues affecting national security. The Department of State reviews an application for issues affecting foreign policy or international obligations. Other agencies, such as NASA, are consulted as appropriate. By this rulemaking, the regulations require an applicant to supply information relevant to the FAA's policy approval, including, for example, identification of foreign ownership of the applicant. The FAA will obtain other information required for a policy review from information submitted by an applicant in other parts of the application. During a policy review, the FAA will consult with an applicant regarding any questions or issues before making a final determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any questions before completion of the review.

No comments regarding policy review were received and no changes have been made to part 420 from the Launch Site NPRM.

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

The final rules establish criteria and procedures for the siting of facilities at a launch site where solid propellants, liquid propellants, and other explosives are located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads for flight. These criteria and procedures are commonly referred to as quantity-distance (Q-D) requirements because they provide minimum separation distances between explosive hazard facilities, surrounding facilities and locations where the public may be present on the basis of the type and quantity of explosive material located within the area. Minimum prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an explosion do not reach the public.

An applicant must provide the FAA with an explosive site plan that demonstrates compliance with the Q-D requirements. Because the FAA must approve this plan, applicants are cautioned not to begin construction of facilities requiring an explosive site plan until obtaining FAA approval. Note also that the Q-D requirements do not address any toxic hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through procedural means, and the FAA addresses toxic hazards in a separate rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for launch. If a toxic hazard is a controlling factor in siting, a prudent launch site operator will address the issue when preparing its site plan.

The quantity-distance criteria are a critical mitigation measure required in a launch site operator application to provide the public protection from ground operations at a launch site. The final rules have other mitigation measures, including launch site operator responsibilities that address accident prevention measures, and procedural requirements to protect other launch site customers and visitors on the launch site. Any other procedural requirements necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards will be the responsibility of a launch operator under a launch license.

A launch license encompasses ground activities involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in the United States. This may include the storage and handling of explosives involved with the handling and assembly of launch vehicles at a launch site.

The FAA has made certain changes in response to comments to part 420, from what was proposed in the Launch Site NPRM regarding the explosive site plan requirements. A brief summary of these changes is discussed below and is discussed in further detail in the Part analysis.

• The NPRM did not require an applicant proposing to locate a launch site at a federal launch range to submit an explosive site plan. In the final rule, the applicant must submit an explosive site plan to the federal launch range operator.

• Q-D requirements for hazard class 1.1 were added, including a provision for public traffic route distance.

• The assumption that solid and liquid stages on a launch vehicle would not explode simultaneously has been removed from the Q-D requirements for locating solid and liquid propellants together.

• The explosive site plan requirements were moved from subpart B, Application Requirements, to subpart D, Licensee Responsibility. Although an applicant must complete an explosive site plan to obtain a license, this section was moved because the explosive site plan is a document with which a licensee must comply and keep up to date at all times.

• A provision was added to clarify that explosive siting issues outside the scope of the part 420 requirements will be evaluated by the FAA on an individual basis consistent with industry safety standards.

A discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the reason the FAA is adopting explosive siting criteria, current Q-D standards, the FAA's use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other approaches to explosive safety, and the application of ATF, DOD or NASA standards are covered in the Launch Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34320—34322. Solid explosive divisions, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads are discussed below.

Solid Explosive Divisions

The Launch Site NPRM proposed requirements for division 1.3 solid explosives. As noted in the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system, a system that governs transport of dangerous goods. The Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration assigns dangerous goods to the appropriate class in accordance with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for dangerous goods, of which ammunition and explosives are included as the UNO “Class 1, Explosives.” Class 1 explosives are further subdivided into “divisions” based on the character and predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:

•

Division 1.1

—consists of explosives that have a mass explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the entire load instantaneously.

•

Division 1.2

—consists of explosives that have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.

•

Division 1.3

—consists of explosives that have a fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.

•

Division 1.4

—consists of explosives that present a minor explosion hazard.

•

Division 1.5

—consists of very insensitive explosives.

•

Division 1.6

—consists of extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard.

The FAA originally proposed criteria only for division 1.3 because it believed that the only solid explosives for commercial launches that would likely affect separation distances on a launch site were division 1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1 explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems, the quantity is small. The FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives will not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are from old military missiles, which are not likely to be used at a commercial launch site.

In response to comments from the 45th Space Wing pointing out the errors underlying this assumption, part 420 now includes quantity-distance requirements for explosive division 1.1 explosives. Compared with explosive division 1.3 explosives, the distances are greater due to their more hazardous nature.

Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements

The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) initiated a DOD Explosive Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and established an interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants Working Group (LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of possible inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the current approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D criteria for most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in hazard group and compatibility group definitions, and possible inaccurate characterization of blast overpressure hazards of liquid propellant explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of explosive equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance criteria, and to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9, which addresses liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials.

The DDESB work is almost completed, and the recommendations of the LPWG should be incorporated in the DOD standard in the near future. Because the DDESB is possibly the best-equipped group in the country to address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the final rule should not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard and compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and the public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible adoption by the FAA.

Solid and Liquid Bi-Propellants at Launch Pads

In the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at launch pads for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant components. The required separation distance would be the greater of the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant would not have to add the separation distances of both. This proposal rested on the conclusion that, generally, no credible scenario existed that could produce a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant motors. This requirement has changed because the assumption may not always be correct.

Under the final rule, an applicant must conduct an analysis of the maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is expected to occur. If analysis shows that an explosion caused by the liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the solid propellants, and an explosion due to the solid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid propellants, the distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and public areas should be based on the MCE.

Discussion of Comments

The 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division (45SW/SESE), provided a number of comments on the FAA's proposed explosive safety requirements. First, the 45SW/SESE suggests including alternative approaches to Q-D standards such as risk-based thresholds and limits.

45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division

at 1. The FAA agrees that alternative approaches to Q-D may be appropriate. However, the FAA will not formally adopt such an approach at this time for the following reasons.

On December 9, 1999, the DDESB approved, for limited use at DOD facilities, the use of risk-based explosives safety siting of explosives facilities for calendar years 2000 through 2002. Specifically, on a case-by-case basis, a risk-based explosives safety analysis that supports an explosives facility siting may be submitted to the DDESB Secretariat for review and approval.

A risk based analysis is used when a waiver or exemption would be required to approve a facility. The FAA will monitor the experience of the DDESB during those three years, and may take regulatory action at that time.

Memorandum from USAF Colonel Daniel T. Tompkins to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps board members (Dec. 9, 1999).

In the meantime, an applicant unable to meet the Q-D requirements might attempt a risk-based approach if able to provide a clear and convincing demonstration that the proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. Such a demonstration would have to include an explosives safety analysis that analyzes hazards associated with handling explosive materials on the launch site. The applicant should examine the relationship between an explosive hazard facility and an exposed facility to determine what effect one has on the other in the event of an accidental explosion. As discussed in the NPRM, net explosives weight is used to calculate Q-D separations by means of the formula: D=KW

1/3

, where D is the required distance (in feet), K is the protection factor depending on the degree of risk assumed or permitted, and W

1/3

is the cube root of the net explosives weight (NEW) in pounds. This formula is also used for assessing risk. Dividing the distance by the cube root of the NEW will give the actual K factor of protection. A K factor equates to an overpressure, as shown in table 1. Knowing the expected overpressure can help in understanding the facility or equipment damage and the personnel injuries expected to be sustained by a particular blast overpressure. Hazardous fragments must also be considered when preparing a risk assessment.

For more information on blast pressure, blast effects, and fragment hazards, see Air Force Manual

(AFMAN) 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, sections 4.48 and 4.49 (Mar. 7, 2000).

Table 1.—K-Factor to PSI Relationship

K-factor

PSI

K-factor

PSI

1.0

1000

3.0

1.2

763

2.8

1.4

597

2.6

1.6

475

2.4

1.8

384

2.3

2.0

315

2.2

2.5

200

2.1

3.0

135

2.0

3.5

1.9

4.0

1.8

4.5

1.7

5.0

1.63

6.0

1.56

7.0

1.5

8.0

1.4

9.0

1.4

9.6

1.3

8.0

1.3

6.8

1.25

5.9

1.2

5.2

1.2

4.7

1.0

4.2

0.9

3.8

0.7

3.5

0.6

3.2

0.5

45SW/SESE asks

whether there is an assumption that all DOD explosive site plan approval is current for launch sites on a federal range? What if formal DDESB approval is not on record?

45SW/SESE

at 1. The FAA does assume that all DOD explosive site plan approval is current for launch sites on a federal range and that formal DDESB approval is on record. The FAA's launch site safety assessments of the national launch ranges show that the DOD ranges enforce their standards. However, if the FAA discovers through its safety inspection program that a licensee is operating out of compliance with the DDESB approved explosive site plan, it will consider this a violation of the license and may take appropriate enforcement action.

Table 4.2 in AFMAN 91-201 (Mar. 7, 2000).

With respect to the FAA's statement that a launch site operator is responsible for preventing unauthorized public access to the site, the 45SW/SESE commented that this should include surrounding areas designated as posing an environmental or explosives hazard.

45SW/SESE

at 2. The FAA agrees in principle. With respect to environmental hazards, surrounding areas posing an environmental hazard will be addressed in the environmental review process.

With respect to explosives, to comply with these rules adopted today, areas posing an explosive hazard during ground activities must, by regulatory requirement, be contained within the launch site. A launch site operator is responsible for preventing unauthorized access to the site. It is also responsible for ensuring that hazardous areas within the site are clear and that other users of the site are not placed at risk during hazardous operations. In the NPRM, the FAA stated that minimum prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an explosion do not reach the public. 45SW/SESE notes that some other reasons for separation distances include to prevent unnecessary injuries or casualty to workers related to the explosive operation; to protect property; to avoid propagation from one explosive location to another; and remote explosives testing.

45SW/SESE

at 2. The FAA agrees, but wishes to stress that these requirements are intended to protect public safety because public safety is the FAA's mandate. Property belonging to members of the public also achieves some measure of protection in accordance with these requirements. Also, propagation from one explosive location to another is covered through part 420's intraline distance requirements.

In the NPRM, the FAA states that it must approve the explosive site plan that an applicant provides to the FAA. The 45SW/SESE asks whether explosive site plans already approved by the DDESB will be granted FAA approval.

45SW/SESE

at 3. The answer is yes. A new requirement from the NPRM is that the FAA now requires applicants for launch sites located on a federal launch range to provide the FAA with a copy of an explosive site plan. However, the FAA will not approve it. The FAA will use the explosive site plan for compliance monitoring purposes only.

The 45SW/SESE notes that “launch site” in some contexts implies “launch complex,” which excludes other launch processing facilities or areas at the launch range.

45SW/SESE

at 3. The FAA does not wish to imply that a launch site is merely a launch complex on a launch site. To clarify, a launch site includes the entire land area operated by a launch site operator, including all launch complexes and facilities within.

The Act and the regulations define launch site as the location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues or transfers under this chapter) and necessary facilities. 49 USC 70102(6); 14 CFR 401.5.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the proposed requirements do not account for the use of barricades and other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an explosion on exposed areas.

An applicant proposing to use such measures in order to deviate from the proposed siting rules may, during the application process, provide a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. 45SW/SESE states that this use of a waiver is inconsistent with the way the Air Force uses them. A waiver is used to document a condition or requirement that is not achieved, not one where the condition or requirement is being met.

45SW/SESE

at 4. The FAA did not mean “waiver” in the way the Air Force uses it. If a launch site operator plans to use barricades or other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an explosion on exposed area, the applicant would have to submit a clear and convincing demonstration of an equivalent level of safety.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that proposed subpart B would establish criteria and procedures for the siting of facilities at a launch site where solid and liquid propellants are located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads for flight. 45SW/SESE notes that propellants are not enough. The requirements should include other explosives as well including linear shaped charges, safe and arm devices, initiators, and igniters.

45SW/SESE

at 2, 4. The FAA agrees, and has modified the explosive siting requirements to include those explosives, which are division 1.1 explosives.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. 45SW/SESE points out that this is incorrect, and the FAA agrees. The linear shaped charge, which is an explosive division 1.1 explosive, is the driver of distance requirements because in most cases a solid rocket booster is zero percent trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalency.

45SW/SESE

at 5. ACTA adds that DOD 6055.9 states that the inhabited building distance for division 1.1 solid propellants ranging from 1-35,000 lb is 1250 ft. Proposed table E-1 only requires 800 ft. for quantities up to 1,000,000 lb. This is true even when quantities of 1.1 explosives are present.

ACTA

at 5. The FAA agrees that its assumption that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria was incorrect. The FAA has added division 1.1 explosives to this final rule.

In the NPRM, the FAA also stated that because division 1.3 solid propellants are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not incorporate compatibility groups for solid propellants. 45SW/SESE asks how compatibility would be determined if there was a need to store other explosives with the solids?

45SW/SESE

at 5. Ensuring that explosives in an explosives hazard facility are compatible is a procedural requirement of a launch operator. Ground safety will be covered in a separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for launch.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at launch pads for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant components. The required separation distance would be the greater of the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant did not have to add the separation distances of both. The NPRM assumed that generally, no credible scenario existed that could produce a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant motors. 45SW/SESE states that the general assumption that a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant motors is unlikely is not a prudent approach. 45SW/SESE recommends analyses be performed on a case-by-case basis to determine a credible scenario. A number of current Q-D site plans considered TNT equivalencies from both the solids and liquids.

45SW/SESE

at 5, 6;

but see Lockheed Martin

at 3 (agreeing with the NPRM proposal as permitting greater flexibility in operations and launch vehicle design).

The FAA agrees with 45SW/SESE, and adopts the suggestion to require that an applicant address an explosion of both solid and liquid propellants at the same time. Air Force standard AFMAN 91-201, section 3.8 states that the combined bulk explosive weight of explosive items is not necessarily the weight used for Q-D calculations. Q-D is based on the maximum credible event (MCE), namely, the worst case explosion, that is expected to occur. Section 3.8.3 further states the basic rule when combining mass-detonating (e.g., the explosive equivalent of liquid propellants) and nonmass-detonating explosives (e.g., an explosive division 1.3 solid rocket motor). Consider the distance for the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 first as 1.1. Then consider the distance for the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 as 1.3. The required distance is the greater of the two. However, section 3.8 further states that exceptions are granted when analyses or test results demonstrate that the explosive division 1.1 (for liquid propellants) will not cause detonation of the explosive division 1.3 explosives.

This approach has now been incorporated into the final rule, in section 420.69. Note that the FAA still considers a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant motors to be unlikely. The FAA requires that this improbability be demonstrated. Otherwise, a launch site operator will have to use the combined explosive weight of the solids and liquids to determine required distances.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9 that exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a local lightning warning system is used to terminate operations before the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and will be provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route distance. The 45SW/SESE notes that this exception is not prudent in Florida where lightning strikes can occur without warning, except possibly an unmanned small licensed location where the value of the facility and its content are assumable risks.

45SW/SESE

at 6.

The FAA agrees that if lightning strikes can occur without warning, then it would be prudent to have a lightning protection system. The final rule would require a lightning protection system in that situation. A licensee must ensure the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an electrical storm. If this is not possible, then a lightning protection system is required. Note also that the objective is not to protect the licensee's property or that of its contractors, subcontractors, or customers, but members of the public and their property.

In the NPRM, the FAA defined intraline distance as the minimum distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control of one launch site customer. The FAA notes that unlike distances to protect the public, intraline distance will not protect workers with the same level or protection as the public. If intraline distances are not maintained between two explosive hazard facilities, then the larger area encompassing both quantities must be used for Q-D purposes when determining prescribed distances to the public. The 45SW/SESE questions how that could be acceptable when worker safety is diminished, and personnel protection must be established to be consistent with OSHA.

45SW/SESE

at 7. Worker safety comes under the jurisdiction of OSHA, and, as noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not

plan to duplicate the requirements of other regulatory agencies.

45SW/SESE also notes that inhabited building distance, which the FAA proposed as public area distance, has an assumed 20% facility damage and some injury. 45SW/SESE states that this may be a reasonable risk on a DOD installation, and asks whether 20% facility damage and injury is acceptable to the general public?

45SW/SESE

at 8;

see also Lockheed Martin

at 3. The FAA agrees with the commentors regarding the importance of NFPA 780. However, the FAA will not incorporate NFPA 780 by reference because it does not always include mandatory language. Due to its importance and utility, the FAA will undoubtedly refer to it for appropriate guidance.

Although LMC believes NFPA 780 is an appropriate and useful standard for a lightning protection system, it states that a launch site operator should not be required to install and maintain an independent lightning protection system. A launch operator will likely have one as a way to attract customers.

Lockheed Martin

at 3. The FAA disagrees. The FAA has learned from experience that while most launch site operators might be expected to adhere to commonly held standards; this is not always the case. Without such requirements, an adequate level of safety or risk mitigation cannot be achieved. If most would do this anyway, then the impact is minimal. In any event, because it involves the construction of facilities, the FAA has made the installation of a lightning protection system a requirement for a launch site operator license to ensure its availability.

In addition to NFPA 780, the 45SW/SESE suggested that the FAA review DOD 6055.9, and applicable Air Force instructions to provide full regulatory requirements. The FAA has reviewed DOD 6055.9, Air Force Manual 91-201, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) “Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics,” NSS 1740.12 (Aug.1993). The FAA believes that the requirements in the final rule cover the basic safety issues that need to be addressed for lightning protection systems. The FAA expects applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and NASA standard.

Another explosive mishap prevention measure is the control of static electricity. The FAA did not propose any requirements in the NPRM regarding the control of static electricity because the FAA believed that the control of static electricity in launch operations is primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by the FAA in another proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements for launch. The FAA asked for the public's view.

LMC agreed with the FAA and noted that new rules on control of static electricity should reflect current procedures used by the launch operators.

Lockheed Martin

at 4. The NFPA recommended NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (1993), as a reference document. NFPA 77 provides a basic understanding of the phenomena of static electric discharges and how they can serve as ignition sources, and includes useful information on bonding and grounding.

F. Launch Site Location Review

The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether the location of a proposed launch site could support launches that would not jeopardize public health and safety, and the safety of property. To that end, the FAA will determine whether at least one hypothetical launch could take place safely from a launch point at the proposed site. The FAA will not license

the operation of a launch site from which a launch could never safely take place. An applicant should, however, bear in mind that an FAA license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch license would be issued for any particular launch proposed from that site. Accordingly, much of the decision making with respect to whether a particular site will be economically successful will rest, as it should, with a launch site operator, who will have to determine whether the site possesses sufficient flight corridors for economic viability.

Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is hypothetically possible to launch at least one type of launch vehicle on at least one trajectory from each launch point at the proposed site while meeting the FAA's collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that there exists at least one flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas from a proposed launch site that would contain debris away from population. Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will allow to occur only when the risk to people is below an expected casualty (E

) of 30 × 10

−6

. In other words, if there are too many people around a launch site or in a flight corridor the FAA will not license the site.

All this is not to say that the FAA is requiring an applicant for a license to operate a launch site to perform a complete flight safety analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that an applicant may or may not have customers or a particular launch vehicle in mind. Accordingly, the FAA's launch site location review methods only approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions and recognizing that not all factors need to be taken into account, a full flight safety analysis that would normally be performed for an actual launch. Of course, if an applicant does have a customer who satisfies the FAA's flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a license for launch from the site, that showing would also demonstrate to the FAA that a launch may occur safely from the proposed site, and the FAA could issue a license to operate the launch site on the basis of the actual launch proposed.

The launch site location review applies to both expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). Detailed methodologies for the launch site location review are only provided for expendable launch vehicles with a flight history. The reusable launch vehicles currently proposed by industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, the FAA considered it unwise to define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for RLVs. An applicant proposing a launch site limited to the launch of reusable launch vehicles would still need to define a flight corridor and conduct a risk analysis if population were present within the flight corridor, but the FAA will review such an analysis on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the principles discussed in this rulemaking.

Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.

A launch site location review provides an applicant with alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to an E

risk of greater than 30 × 10

−6

. Each proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched from each point.

Each of the three methods for evaluating the acceptability of a launch site's location require an applicant to identify an area, whether a flight corridor or a set of impact dispersion areas, emanating from a proposed launch site. That area identifies the public that the applicant must analyze for risk of impact and harm. An applicant who anticipates customers who use guided orbital launch vehicles must define a flight corridor for a class of vehicles launched from a specific point along a specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch point or until the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point leaves the Earth's surface, whichever is shorter. For guided sub-orbital launch vehicles, the flight corridor ends at an impact dispersion area of a final stage. An applicant must demonstrate either that there are no populated areas within the flight corridor or that the risk to any population in the corridor does not exceed the FAA's risk criteria. Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided vehicle, an applicant must analyze the risks associated with a series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. If there are people in the dispersion areas, the applicant must demonstrate that the expected casualties from stage impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.

, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This E

value defines the acceptable collective risk associated with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and, as prescribed by the regulations, shall not exceed an expected average number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 × 10

−6

) for each launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This E

value defines acceptable collective risk.

The FAA's methods for identifying a flight corridor or impact dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital expendable launch vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles without an FTS.

For purposes of part 420, references to a guided expendable launch vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital may be understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS.

Part 420 does not include a means for analyzing risks posed by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles, the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.

Part 420 divides guided orbital expendable launch vehicles into four classes, with each class defined by its payload weight capability, as shown in table 2. Sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are not divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as either guided or unguided. Table 3 shows the payload weight and corresponding classes of existing orbital expendable launch vehicles. For a launch site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant

defines a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated” which the FAA anticipates will be based on expected customers.

Table 2.—Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)

100 nm orbit

Weight class

Small

Medium

Medium large

Large

28 degrees inclination *

≤4400

>4400 to ≤11100

>11100 to ≤18500

>18500

90 degrees inclination

≤3300

>3300 to ≤8400

>8400 to ≤15000

>15000

* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.

Table 3.—Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles

Vehicle

Payload weight (lbs)

100 nm Orbit 28° inc.

Payload weight (lbs)

100 nm Orbit 90° inc.

Class

Conestoga 1229

600

450

Small.

Conestoga 1620

2,250

1,750

Small.

Athena-1

1,755

1,140

Small.

Athena-2

4,390

3,290

Small.

Pegasus

700

N/A

Small.

Pegasus XL

1,015

769

Small.

Scout

560

460

Small.

Taurus

3,100

2,340

Small.

Atlas II

14,500

12,150

Medium/Large.

Atlas IIA

16,050

13,600

Medium/Large.

Atlas IIAS

19,050

16,100

Large.

Atlas IIIA

19,050

15,700

Large.

Atlas IIIB

23,630

20,240

Large.

Atlas V 404

27,550

23,700

Large.

Atlas V 552

44,200

37,400

Large.

Delta 6920

8,780

6,490

Medium.

Delta 7920

11,330

8,590

Medium/Large.

Delta 3

18,280

14,920

Medium/Large.

Delta 4 M

18,600

15,150

Large.

Delta 4 M (5,4)

30,000

23,000

Large.

Delta 4 Heavy

56,900

46,000

Large.

Titan II

N/A

4,200

Medium.

Titan III

31,200

N/A

Large.

Titan IV

47,400

41,000

Large.

Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch site for guided orbital and sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are presented in appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions for creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method to appendix A. Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a flight corridor for guided expendable launch vehicles, but provides more detailed calculations to employ so that, although an appendix B flight corridor is typically less conservative than that of appendix A, it should prove more representative of actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C contains the FAA's method for applicants to analyze the risk posed by guided expendable launch vehicles within a flight corridor created in accordance with appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are presented in appendix D, which describes how an applicant should estimate impact dispersion areas and analyze the risk in those areas.

Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under appendix A. Because appendix A provides a more simple methodology, an applicant may want to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can define a flight corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, that does not overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the launch site location review requirements with the least effort. If, however, the corridor includes populated areas, the applicant may create an appendix B flight corridor that may be more narrow, or may conduct a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required to try appendix A before employing appendix B.

The FAA's location review reflects a number of assumptions designed to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or addressing a particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more fully below, but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for appendices A and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that launch failure debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful containment must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination system. A perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure that any debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a flight corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but launch success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes

a location review based on an assumption of containment.

The approaches provided in the four location review appendices are based on some common assumptions that reflect limitations of the launch site location review analysis. The FAA is not requiring an applicant to analyze the risks posed to the public by toxic materials that might be handled at the proposed site, nor the risk to ships or aircraft from launch debris or planned jettisoning of stages. The FAA recognizes that these assumptions represent a limitation in the launch site location review. The FAA intends that these three risks will be dealt with through pre-flight operational controls and flight commit criteria which are partially addressed through part 420 coordination requirements and which also will be identified as part of a launch license review. All launches that take place from a U.S. launch site whose operation is licensed will either be regulated by the FAA through a launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the government carries out for the government.

The two methods for creating guided expendable launch vehicle flight corridors are intended to account for expendable launch vehicle failure rate, malfunction turn capability, and the expendable launch vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by the impact dispersions of these vehicles. The premise undergirding each of these methods is that debris would be contained within the defined flight corridor or impact dispersion areas. Accordingly, for purposes of a launch site location review, only the populations within the defined areas need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that were a flight termination system to fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, a launch vehicle could stray outside its planned flight corridor. That concern will be better accommodated through another forum, namely, the licensing of a launch operator and the review of that launch operator's flight safety system. Because a containment analysis only looks at how far debris would travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, the containment analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight termination system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the acceptability of a launch site's location for launching guided expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning vehicle will be destroyed and debris will always impact within acceptable boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to explore, for purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch site's location, the possibility that a vehicle's flight termination system may fail and that the vehicle could continue to travel toward populated areas. Any proposed site may present such risks—indeed, any proposed launch presents such risks—but they are best addressed in the context of individual launch systems. This working assumption of a perfectly reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply to the licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider the reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of a launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that for the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.

Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for the final stage of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The FAA does not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to assess the general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable launch vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently launch vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided expendable launch vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks from nominally jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A launch license review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not going to impact in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed for launches from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.

Each of the FAA's approaches to defining flight corridors or impact dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk launch event associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is not meant to imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily acceptable; only that they will not be considered in the course of this review. For a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, that event is vehicle failure. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the launch event of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted impact of stages. For a guided expendable launch vehicle the overflight risk, which results from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction (assuming no FTS failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally jettisoned debris are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the FAA proposes that risk due to stage impact be analyzed instead of the overflight risk. This distinction is necessitated by the fact that the failure rate during thrust is historically significantly lower for unguided vehicles than for guided vehicles. Current unguided expendable launch vehicles with many years of use are highly reliable. They do not employ an FTS; therefore, debris pieces usually consist of vehicle components that are not broken up. Another reason for the difference between analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact dispersions are significantly larger than guided vehicle impact dispersions. These differences add up to greater risk within an unguided expendable launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas outside the dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only performed on those populations within an unguided expendable launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area.

An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate that the OEZ can be clear of members of the public during a flight. An OEZ defines the area where the public risk criteria of 30 ×10

−6

would be exceeded if one person were present in the open. The overflight exclusion zone was estimated from risk computations for each expendable launch vehicle type and class. An applicant must define an OEZ because expendable launch vehicle range rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle effective casualty areas, the area within which all casualties are assumed to occur through exposure to debris, are large, and impact dispersion areas are dense with debris so that the presence of one person inside this hazardous area is expected to produce E

values exceeding the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant must either own the property, demonstrate to the FAA that there are times when people are not present, or that it could clear the public from the overflight exclusion zone prior to flight. Evacuating an overflight exclusion zone for an inland site, might, for example, require an applicant to demonstrate that agreements have been reached with local communities to close any public roads during a launch.

The FAA has made a few changes to the Launch Site NPRM for this final rule. First, the launch site location

review regulatory text has been expanded to better map out the launch site location review for both ELVs and RLVs. The appendices remain essentially the same.

Second, the size of the flight corridors that are generated in either appendix A or B are now assumed in appendix C to reflect a three-sigma event. The NPRM had used five-sigma. To review, for purposes of the launch site location review, a flight corridor is an area on the Earth's surface estimated to contain debris of a ballistic coefficient of ≥3 pounds per square foot from nominal and non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle, assuming a perfectly functioning flight termination system. The land encompassed by the flight corridor includes the population most at risk due to a launch. The data used to develop a flight corridor does not directly provide statistical significance. However, the relative risk to any specific populated area can be assumed to vary proportionally with the populated area's distance from the nominal trajectory ground trace. The NPRM assumed the boundaries were five-sigma distances, which proved unwise because the statistical probability of an event occurring between three-sigma and five-sigma is extremely small. The launch site location review procedures are not precise enough for the FAA to claim that a flight corridor contains all of the population at risk at such a low probability level. Assuming that the distance to the flight corridor boundary is three-sigma is a more reasonable assumption.

Third, the multipliers in the launch site location review have been taken out. In the Launch Site NPRM, to add conservatism to the launch site location review, applicants would multiply the final E

value obtained through either appendix C or appendix D by a multiplier of two and five, respectively. This final rule does not make use of multipliers because the FAA, upon reconsideration, now believes that the procedures for estimating risk in appendices A-D are conservative enough to not require a multiplier at the end of the process.

Lastly, the FAA clarified in the regulatory text that orbital expendable launch vehicles are classified by weight class, based on the weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 100-nm orbit, as defined in table 2.

Discussion of Comments

The FAA received comments on the launch site location review from ACTA, Inc; the New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization; Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission; Space Access, LLC; Christopher Shove; and the Texas Aerospace Commission.

ACTA stated that medium to large vehicles launched from Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) do not meet the risk criteria.

ACTA

at 1. The FAA disagrees. Using Appendix B, medium to large vehicles do pass the launch site location review.

ACTA stated that unlike under EWR 127-1, the FAA has decided not to permit any risk above 30×10

−6

. This coupled with a very conservative approach to risk analysis could prove detrimental to the U.S. industry.

ACTA

at 1. The FAA disagrees. The expected casualty acceptable risk level, 30×10

−6

, is not new. It is a current requirement for launches. Second, the very conservative approach proposed is conservative because simplifying assumptions were made. In many instances the FAA believes that such approaches adequately demonstrate the acceptability of the site location without the added burden of more complex analysis. It should not prove detrimental because applicants may do a more refined, less conservative analysis. To make this option explicit, sections 420.23 and 420.25, covering the flight corridor and risk analysis, respectively, explicitly state that the FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required in the appendices.

ACTA also states that the risk analysis methodology presented in the document is very simplistic. There are better methods available, albeit more complex, but the NPRM does not allow for any other methodology. ACTA recommended that an applicant be allowed to use equivalent approved analysis methods and processes that have been validated by use at federal ranges involved in ELV and RLV activities.

ACTA

at 2, 6 and 7. The FAA agrees and has modified the launch site location review to allow such methods without a waiver. The analysis methodology is intended to be simplistic and conservative. The actual risks will be less than that estimated by the methodologies provided. In many cases, the site applicant may not have available the inputs necessary to provide a detailed risk analysis. In addition, many launch sites are so remote that they do not need detailed analyses to show that the risk levels are acceptable. New under these final rules is that an applicant has the option of using higher fidelity methodologies.

ACTA states that the NPRM offers no insight into the source of numbers, such as casualty areas, that the FAA directs the license applicant to use. The references should be identified.

ACTA

at 1. Review of the Launch Site NPRM shows that the FAA provided its sources. The NPRM stated, for example, to address the issues raised, that the FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in table 1, section 420.21. 64 FR at 34353.

ACTA and ACTA staff raised concerns regarding issues not addressed in this rulemaking. ACTA stated that the NPRM did not address launch-related risk from potential toxic releases, from far-field window breakage, or debris risk to ships and aircraft.

ACTA

at 1, 2. ACTA staff added that ignoring the existence of established major air corridors or shipping lanes seems shortsighted.

ACTA

at 9. The FAA disagrees. Air corridors and shipping lanes are not ignored. A launch site operator must have an agreement in place with FAA Air Traffic and the Coast Guard covering those issues before it will get a license.

The FAA agrees that the issues of toxicity and windows breaking should not be ignored for launch safety, and launch -related risk from potential toxic releases, from far-field window breakage, or debris risk to ships and aircraft are covered in launch license application reviews. Toxic and blast risks were not covered in this rulemaking because launching only when circumstances such as wind are favorable can minimize such risks. The FAA considers these issues better addressed through the launch license. Second, debris risk to ships and aircraft are addressed in these regulations. An applicant must conclude agreements with the Coast Guard and the FAA Air Traffic in order to address ship and aircraft risk, and a separate rulemaking addresses these issues with additional specificity.

ACTA states that the level of analysis in the NPRM seems to assume that the applicant will be very naïve, and not have access to good tools or consultant support.

ACTA

at 2. The FAA disagrees. Not all applicants are flight safety specialists. The FAA believes that providing tools and data to conduct risk and other analyses is beneficial to the industry. The proposed appendices take an applicant step by step through the process.

ACTA states that the FAA's lack of methodology for risk analysis in the back azimuth direction other than the

exclusion zone implies that there is no back azimuth risk.

ACTA

at 2. The FAA does not wish to imply that there is no back azimuth risk. There is. However, as noted in the NPRM, the launch site location review assumes a perfectly functioning flight safety system. Therefore, population behind the launch site is only addressed if it is within the overflight exclusion zone or within the flight corridor due to wind effects. Otherwise back azimuth population is not reviewed. A launch license applicant will need to adequately address all flight risks in order to receive a license.

ACTA states that the instantaneous impact point (IIP) rates are unrealistically low, particularly late in flight. If only powered flight is considered, the average IIP rate will increase. Using a lower IIP rate inflates the computed risk.

ACTA

at 2. The FAA notes that the IIP range rate data was intended to be conservative but, as discussed in the NPRM, they are not unrealistically low. 64 FR at 34342.

ACTA states that the effective casualty areas seem very high. The casualty area numbers are a prime contributor to the unrealistically high risks computed by these methods.

ACTA

at 2. The FAA disagrees that the casualty area are unrealistically high if one considers, for each piece of debris, its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. They are also intended to be conservative. Higher fidelity analyses will be necessary for the launch license application. Also, now that the FAA will permit higher fidelity analyses that produce an equivalent level of safety, the FAA finds that the concern is addressed.

ACTA states that the overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) is designed to protect an individual in the public at a risk level of 30×10

−6

casualties. ACTA further states that this seems rather loose, and that the Range Commanders Council Standard suggests 1×10

−7

fatalities and the Eastern Range (ER) and Western Range (WR) have used 1×10

−6

casualties as an individual risk limit for the general public.

ACTA

at 3. The FAA disagrees. ACTA misunderstood what was stated in the NPRM. The NPRM actually states that an overflight exclusion zone is the area where the collective risk to the public would be greater than 30×10

−6

if one person were present in the open. 64 FR 34329. The overflight exclusion zone does not incorporate an individual risk standard per se, but is merely an area that must be clear of population for the collective risk standard to be met.

ACTA states that if 30×10

−6

was used as the basis for developing the distance D

max

, then D

max

appears quite conservative for that risk level.

ACTA

at 3. The FAA did not use the criteria of 30×10

−6

as the basis for developing the distance D

max

. The basis for D

max

is the estimated maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into flight.

ACTA also opposed the FAA's use of a ballistic coefficient of three. The NPRM stated that although the FAA proposes to assume a ballistic coefficient of three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive debris hazardous to the public, ballistic coefficient is not directly related to fatality criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The ballistic coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs, which represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing person. ACTA states that historically, the national ranges have used impact kinetic energy as a criterion for determining whether an inert fragment may or may not produce a casualty. ACTA has been performing biomechanical simulations, which are still in progress, to investigate these criteria in support of the Air Force federal launch ranges. However, one conclusion is that impact kinetic energy by itself is an inadequate predictor of whether or not an inert impacting fragment will produce a casualty.

ACTA

at 4, 5. The FAA notes that the method suggested is far too complex for the scope of this final rule. This final rule very simply assumes that a hit is a casualty. Note that the risk criterion is based on the generation of a casualty not a fatality.

NMOSC also disagreed with the FAA's statement that a ballistic coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs, which represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing person. NMOSC states that 58 ft-lbs is a better number to use than 11, but asks what is the basis for the 50% lethality claim for 58 ft-lbs and ballistic coefficient of three. Furthermore, sheltering should also be considered.

NMOSC

at 3.

The basis for the 50% lethality claim is for a standing person and is found in the Range Commanders Council (RCC) Supplement to Standard 321-97, “Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, Inert Debris”, Figure 4-3, on page 4-5. However, the FAA would like to modify its statement made in the NPRM with respect to how ballistic coefficient relates to kinetic energy and the 50% lethality claim. Ballistic coefficient (β) is very difficult to relate to kinetic energy. (β) is equal to an object's weight divided by the product of the object's drag coefficient and it's projected area and expressed in units of lbs/ft

. Kinetic energy units are joules or ft-lbs/sec. Various combinations of weight, drag coefficient, and projected area can equate to the same β, but each combination would produce a different kinetic energy.

ACTA makes a number of points about launch corridors. First, ACTA states that impulsive velocities imparted to fragments from explosives are ignored throughout.

ACTA

at 6. The FAA did consider whether it was appropriate to address explicitly impulsive velocities but decided that the conservatism incorporated into appendix B obviates the need for including them in the appendix B analysis. Additionally, these analyses are not intended to be high fidelity analyses or require inputs that a launch site applicant may not have. These analyses are believed to be adequate for most coastal site applicants. More detailed analysis will be required from launch operators.

Second, ACTA states that no justification is given for the use of five-sigma for the launch corridor boundaries.

ACTA

at 6. The FAA does agree that the use of five-sigma to define the flight corridor boundary was not appropriate. As noted above, the final rule assumes the boundaries are three-sigma.

Third, ACTA states that there does not appear to be any real probabilistic basis for any of the dispersion analyses.

ACTA

at 6. ACTA is correct. No attempt is made to determine the variations of risk within the corridor. In the downrange direction, the chance of a failure is considered equal at any given point on the flight trajectory. In the crossrange direction, the chance that debris will impact any given point within the flight corridor is based on its distance from the trajectory ground trace. Impacting the boundary of the flight corridor is considered a three-sigma event, and all points in between the trajectory ground trace and the flight corridor boundary vary linearly from zero to three-sigma.

Lastly, ACTA notes that in the risk analysis, the crossrange standard deviations are used to compute E

. Using downrange risk models such as those found in appendix B, one can choose to vary the crossrange sigma up and down and compute the E

as a function of sigma. Then a maximum E

can be obtained within reasonable limits of the possible range of the crossrange sigma. This helps to eliminate the controversy about the determination of the width of the corridor.

ACTA

at 6.

The FAA agrees with ACTA in that the approach would provide a more accurate assessment of risk. If an applicant conducted such an analysis, it might consider offering the analysis as demonstrating an equivalent level of safety. However, the method appears to require an applicant to make several launch corridor computations adjusting the sigma value until an optimum value is found that produces exactly 30×10

−6

for the enclosed population. The FAA does not believe this is necessary for assessing most launch site locations, and has not adopted the suggested change. The analyses provided by the FAA are presented in a fashion that produces a binary decision. The risk computations for the populations enclosed by the corridor will either pass or fail the E

criteria. If the resultant E

is above the threshold the applicant can quickly decide if an azimuth or launch point adjustment will resolve the problem.

ACTA next states that the equation for casualty expectancy in appendix C contains the ratio of the casualty area to the populated area. This ratio should be limited to one, to avoid the possibility of predicting more casualties, given impact, than the number of people in the population center.

ACTA

at 6. The FAA agrees and the change is reflected in the appendix.

In the NPRM's discussion of the launch site location review, the FAA notes that for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided expendable launch vehicle, an applicant would analyze the risks associated with a series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. ACTA staff suggests that the FAA should also be concerned about any population centers within the three-sigma dispersions along the entire trajectory, as is done for orbital launch vehicles.

ACTA

at 8. As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA selected the event of greatest risk for guided and unguided launch vehicles. 64 FR 34353. For proven unguided launch vehicles, that risk stems from success. For purposes of assessing a launch point, the FAA does not believe it is necessary to address failures scenarios for launch points that are going to support proven unguided suborbital launch vehicles. Malfunction scenarios are discounted due to the very low probability of failure in proven unguided suborbital launch vehicles. An unguided suborbital launch vehicle will fly a wind-weighted trajectory in most cases. The impact dispersion areas for the rocket's stages account for the impact points within three-sigma probability of occurrence given the rocket does not experience a malfunction. If a launch point is to be used solely for unproven unguided suborbital launch vehicles, then an applicant must look at failure scenarios.

ACTA staff also believes the FAA should establish criteria for individual risk because it is a significant consideration needed to adequately provide protection for the public.

ACTA

at 9. The FAA does not disagree, and may revise its launch site regulations in the future. At this time, however, the FAA has decided to cover individual risk issues through a launch license, and has determined that the OEZ and other requirements are suitable for making a decision on the suitability of a launch site.

In the NPRM, in justifying the fact that stage impact is not assessed during the launch site location review for orbital launch vehicles, the FAA stated that risk calculations performed for launches from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure. ACTA suggests that this statement be tempered because risks posed by normally jettisoned Delta 2 GEMS are a significant element of concern from VAFB.

ACTA

at 9.

The FAA does not wish to imply that stage disposition is of no concern. Stage disposition is a critical safety issue and will be covered in launch license applications. However, because the location of drop zones is different for every launch vehicle, and because the launch site location review is not meant to assess specific launch vehicles, the FAA has designed the launch site location so that a launch site that does not have safe areas to dispose of stages will not likely pass the launch site location review. Significant population within the flight corridor, particularly near the flight trajectory ground trace, would raise the estimated E

above the acceptable limit.

ACTA staff had a few comments on definitions. First, the NPRM defined “flight corridor” as an area on the Earth's surface estimated to contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.” ACTA staff asked what about the other potential 49% of the debris?

ACTA

at 9. The FAA agrees that the definition should not have used the term “majority” and the word “majority” has been removed from the definition.

Second, the NPRM defined “instantaneous impact point (IIP)” as an impact point, following thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag effects.” The definition should acknowledge that several forms of IIP calculations are possible. IIPs can be calculated based on vacuum, drag or oblateness corrections depending on the application.

ACTA

at 9, 10. The FAA agrees. The definition no longer states that it must be calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag effects. However, for purposes of part 420, IIP is calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag.

ACTA staff next commented on proposed section 420.15(b), in which the proposed rule stated “For launch sites analyzed for expendable launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide each month and any percent wind data used in the analysis.” ACTA at 10. For percent wind data, ACTA suggests use of mean winds. ACTA also suggests the use of a wind covariance matrix. Mean winds are called out in the launch site location review. An applicant should be able to use worse winds, e.g. three-sigma winds, if it desires.

ACTA

at 10. The FAA does not believe a statistical analysis of winds such as using a wind covariance matrix is necessary to assess a launch point. Wind covariance matrices are also not readily available from the suggested wind data source, so therefore the FAA will not incorporate the suggested changes.

Proposed section 420.23 stated that the FAA will evaluate the adequacy of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles including all new launch vehicles, whether expendable or reusable, on a case-by-case basis. ACTA requested additional criteria.

ACTA

at 10. The FAA will rely on the goal of the launch site location review—to show that a launch vehicle can be launched safety from a given launch point. Unproven launch vehicles must be looked at carefully due to their inherently high probability of failure.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) that an applicant must demonstrate is either unpopulated, is uninhabited at certain times, or from which the public can be excluded during launch. ACTA staff notes that using this overly conservative approach to risk analysis would likely prevent X-33 launches from the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC).

ACTA

at 11. Similarly, NMOSC states that the requirement for, and specifications of, an OEZ should depend on the vehicle's reliability and whether it has multiple stages. NMOSC suggests that it not be required for a highly reliable, non-staging RLV.

NMOSC

at 3. The FAA agrees in part with ACTA and NMOSC. The size or existence of an OEZ for a reliable non-staging RLV,

depends on whether any area exists around the launch point where the E

risk is equal to or greater than 30 × 10

−6

, if one member of the public is inside. An overflight exclusion zone may or may not apply to an RLV, depending on the circumstances of a particular case analyzed. The approval of a flight corridor for an RLV, such as the X-33, would be handled on a case-by-case basis.

ACTA staff noted that the appendix A launch area is based on a Delta II. ACTA states that this has several shortcomings because the families of launch vehicles based on Castor-120 SRMs, such as Athena and Taurus, are more representative of those likely to be launched from a non-federal launch site.

ACTA

at 11. The FAA notes that an appendix A launch area is large enough to encompass launch vehicles based on Castor-120 SRMs. Although turning rates for the Athena and Taurus may be higher than Delta II, this is not critical for the appendix A flight corridor lines because appendix A can accommodate the Athena and Taurus turns.

ACTA states that in the launch area, ignoring the IIP displacement caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rates until 50,000 ft. seems unwise based on the turning potential of most ELVs, especially the Athena and Taurus.

ACTA

at 11. The debris dispersion radius accounts for a number of failure scenarios, including the IIP displacement caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rate. The debris dispersion radius is the estimated maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into flight.

Other than the debris dispersion radius, ACTA is correct in that malfunction turns and trajectory dispersions are not explicitly accounted for in the launch area computations. The FAA does not believe this is necessary to assess the viability of a launch point. In the launch area, winds are the dominant dispersion effect for low-β debris pieces, accounting for up to 70% of the total launch area dispersion effect. Conservative assumptions in the appendix B method adequately cover the remaining percentage contributions to the overall impact dispersion.

ACTA staff suggests that in the launch area, the FAA should better communicate that the 10 and 100 mile limits are based on IIP and not on present position.

ACTA

at 11. The FAA agrees and has modified appendices A and B accordingly.

ACTA staff notes that for the launch and downrange areas, an applicant is to compute P

for each populated area using the following equation:

ER19oc00.000

ACTA suggests that this be replaced by the normal integral with a single footnote saying that it can be approximated using Simpson's rule.

ACTA

at 11. The FAA agrees that there are other ways to approximate the normal integral that are just as accurate as Simpson's rule. An applicant is not precluded from using other ways of computing the normal integral.

Space Access LLC also had a number of comments on the launch site location review. First, Space Access found the proposed rule difficult to accept in two areas. First, flight E

issues should be outside the scope of site licensing and all flight-related and mission-based calculations are the responsibility of the launch operator. Providing several methods to simplify E

is confusing, conflicting with other published guidance, and could be considered precedent setting.

Space Access

at 2. Much of what Space Access suggests is already reflected in the final rule. For individual launches, all flight-related and mission-based calculations are part of a launch operator license. The launch site location review is intended, however, to ensure that the FAA does not issue a license that cannot support the launch vehicles intended for launch from the launch site. Providing several methods to simplify E

is meant to provide flexibility to applicants. Lastly, review of the appendices unearthed no conflicts with other published guidance.

Second, Space Access believes the proposed rule effectively precludes approval of any new commercial launch sites, because under appendix A and C, Cape Canaveral would be disapproved as a launch site for Delta, Atlas, and Titan vehicles if it were not on federal property.

Space Access

at 4. The FAA disagrees. Cape Canaveral would fail the proposed appendix A analysis but would not fail the proposed analysis under appendix B and C. The simplicity of appendix A is designed for launch sites that are in remote locations. Cape Canaveral is not a remote site.

Space Access adds that appendix B and C would not help the shortcomings of appendix A because this method uses the same casualty area numbers, which are the significant driver in the calculations. Space Access also comments that the casualty area provided in Table C-3 is too large and appendix C provided data would appear to be excessively conservative and overwhelms all other calculations.

Space Access

at 4. In response, the casualty area numbers are indeed conservative, but not excessively so. An applicant is also permitted to utilize a more refined analysis and provide a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that provided in the appendices.

Similarly, Space Access states that appendix C may only allow the approval of small launch vehicles. This will encourage more launches of small payloads and therefore increase overall risk to the public by exposing the public to a large number of launches. A normalized risk evaluation, such as risk per pound of payload, minimizes total risk and should be considered in any risk methodology.

Space Access

at 5. The FAA disagrees that the proposed appendix C allows only for the approval of small launch vehicles. Space Access offers no support for this argument.

Space Access further states that the impact of appendix C is that potential launch site operators will fail to get sufficient local and state support, financial and legislative inputs, to work through issues with the FAA and potential launch operators. The enforcement of these proposed rules at this time would negatively affect the development of new safe launch sites for all classes of launch vehicles.

Space Access

at 5. The Texas Aerospace

Commission stated that the proposed rules preclude approval of any new launch sites, which are not already on federal launch ranges. These proposed rules would stop the progress being made in Texas and other states to secure investments and commitments for the development of safe, efficient and modern commercial spaceports.

Texas Aerospace Commission

at 1. Because Space Access and Texas Aerospace Commission do not offer evidence in support of their concerns, the FAA will continue to rely on the reasons it gave in the NPRM. The launch site location review is designed to avoid licensing the operation of a launch site that cannot safely support a launch. The launch site location review should not preclude the licensing of any launch site that can safely support launches.

Space Access suggests that the FAA delete all E

calculations from the proposed rule for site operators. It comments that the appendix A and C methodology appears to be extremely inaccurate, the appendix B and C methodology lacks the fidelity required for use by launch operators for licensing, and actual vehicle E

data is the only valid method.

Space Access

at 5. The Texas Aerospace Commission recommends the FAA consult with the RLV developers and proposed launch site operators/developers to establish a safe, less conservative, and simple method of calculating E

Texas Aerospace

at 1. The FAA disagrees, noting that the appendices are designed to offer flexibility in ascertaining whether a site is acceptable. The FAA has determined that a review of a launch site location is a necessary component of any license application process. Moreover, an applicant is not tied to the appendices. For expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will accept other analyses that provides a clear and convincing demonstration that an applicant's proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the appendices. For reusable launch vehicles, an applicant defines a flight corridor that contains the hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch vehicle. The applicant must provide a clear and convincing demonstration of the validity of its flight corridor.

Space Access states that the launch point, debris dispersion area, and overflight exclusion zone definition and descriptions are of specific concern to a site operator and should be formalized. This guidance will directly benefit potential site operators by providing clear planning and procedures to use for proper land acquisition and site development work.

Space Access

at 5. In response, the FAA agrees that providing clear planning and procedures to use for proper land acquisition and site development work is important. The primary purpose of the launch site location review is to avoid the development of launch sites that can never support launches due to the proximity of population. Note that the debris dispersion area and overflight exclusion zones are only used to assess the adequacy of a launch point to support launches. The actual hazards areas for specific launch vehicles will be determined in the launch license process.

Space Access states that the FAA should delete the discussion of launch area and downrange area from the proposed rule. According to Space Access, these areas should not be of concern to a site operator because a site operator has little or no legal control, liability or responsibility in these areas—the launch operator does. Possible demarcation of responsible areas for a site operator is when a launch vehicle enters into international airspace (100 km or 300,000 feet or the crossing of a vehicle into airspace above international waters). Another possible definition is when takeoff or liftoff occurs.

Space Access

at 6.

The FAA agrees that a launch operator is responsible for the safety of a launch. However, the purpose of the launch site location review is to assess the safety of the launch point, not the policies and procedures of a specific launch operator, and these regulations place certain responsibilities upon a launch site operator. To adequately assess the safety of a launch point, one must look at more than just the local population. Downrange activities must be considered in evaluating the acceptability of the launch location, therefore launch area and downrange area requirements remain in the final rule.

Space Access believes that current reliability data for probability of failure (P

) should be used for the specific vehicle or class of launch vehicles under consideration.

Space Access

at 6. The FAA would like to point out that an applicant may use probability values that reflect the type of launch vehicle it intends on launching from the launch point. The value must be reasonable. A good value should have a 95% confidence that the actual P

is equal to or less than the value used.

Space Access believes that all commercial launches should be treated equally from any location. The FAA should not exempt commercial site operators from these rules at federal ranges. No benefits are provided by a federal launch range exemption to these rules. The perception by new commercial launch operators and new commercial site operators is they are being held to a higher standard.

Space Access

at 7;