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FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION

FOR ADMISSION OF FRANK J.

LAWRENCE.

Case No. 1:17-mc-0098

Administrative Order No. 18-AD-013

_______________________________________/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING PETITION FOR ADMISSION

This matter is before the Court on Frank J. Lawrence, Jr.’s,1 Petition for

Admission to practice in the Western District of Michigan. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.35).2 Chief District Judge Robert J. Jonker assigned this matter to the undersigned

three-judge panel to review the petition and determine Mr. Lawrence’s suitability for

admission to the practicing bar of this Court. (Admin. Order 17-AD-115, ECF No. 1;

Admin. Order 17-AD-116, ECF No. 1-1).

On December 13, 2017, the Court conducted a hearing on the record in Grand

Rapids, Michigan, at which Mr. Lawrence appeared, along with his counsel, Dennis

Dubuc. (Minutes, ECF No. 2). For the reasons articulated below, Mr. Lawrence’s

Petition for Admission will be denied at this time.

Mr. Lawrence’s Petition for Admission does not indicate that he is a junior. This

Memorandum Opinion and Order will hereinafter simply refer to him as Frank

Lawrence and to his father as Frank Lawrence, Sr., except as needed to avoid

confusion.

Unless otherwise noted, all parenthetical record cites are to the docket in this

matter: 1:17-mc-0098.

Motion for Reconsideration

At the outset, the Court will address Mr. Lawrence’s Motion for

Reconsideration, “seeking reconsideration of this Court’s December 13, 2017, decision

to prevent him from eliciting testimony from Operations Specialist Ashley Mankin.”

(Mtn. Recon. at 1, ECF No. 3, PageID.22-30). Ms. Mankin is a Court employee who

works in the Clerk’s Office. She has had no input into the Court’s decision in this

matter. Mr. Lawrence’s interest in calling Ms. Mankin as a witness is based on his

dissatisfaction with the manner in which Chief Judge Jonker handled his Petition for

Admission.

Mr. Lawrence filed his Petition for Admission electronically on October 5, 2017.

In response to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of a felony or

misdemeanor, Mr. Lawrence stated the following:

Yes, On August 19, 2000, I was ticketed for violating a Bloomfield

Township ordinance that prohibits “interfering’ with a police officer.

This occurred after I told him that he needed to secure a warrant before

he conducted a warrantless search. He claimed that I “interfered” with

his investigation. I was found guilty and ordered to pay a monetary fine.

(Petition for Admission at ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.4).

The next day, Chief Judge Jonker sent him a letter advising that, due to the

reported conviction, he was considering “whether to handle the admission application

[himself], or refer it to a hearing panel under [the District’s] Local rules.” (Chief

Judge Jonker Letter, Oct. 6, 2017, ECF No. 1-3, PageID.10). The Chief Judge asked

Mr. Lawrence to provide copies of documents relating to his conviction, and to advise

whether “[he had] ever been denied admission to the bar of any jurisdiction.” (Id.).

The letter referenced the fact that published news reports suggested that Mr.

Lawrence had been denied admission to the Michigan Bar on “character and fitness

review.” (Id.). But, the Chief Judge noted that “published reports are not always

accurate.” (Id.).

Mr. Lawrence responded to the Chief Judge’s letter, through counsel, Dennis

Dubuc, on October 12, 2017. (Dubuc Letter, Oct. 12, 2017, ECF No. 1-4). Mr.

Lawrence provided some documents relating to his conviction, but the letter indicated

that, based on advice of counsel, he would “not to do any further research into the

matter.” (Id., PageID.12-13). Instead, his counsel asked the Chief Judge to “render

a final decision based on the information provided.” (Id.). Mr. Dubuc provided a

cursory review of his client’s efforts to be admitted to various bars – acknowledging

unsuccessful applications to the Florida Bar in 2005 and the Michigan Bar in 2006

and 2010, and noting a recent admission in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

(Id.).3 Mr. Dubuc advised that the State Bar of Michigan had certified Mr. Lawrence’s

good moral character in December 2016. (Id.).

Through Mr. Dubuc, Mr. Lawrence erroneously asserted that the Chief Judge

had received information from Mr. Lawrence’s State Bar of Michigan confidential file.

(Dubuc Letter, Oct. 12, 2017, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.12). Mr. Dubuc asked the Chief

Judge to “enter a final Order immediately so that [he] may submit this troubling

The only evidence Mr. Lawrence provides concerning his admission to the D.C. Bar

is a generic notice of admission, which does not contain his name or any information

identifying him as the intended recipient of the notice. (See Notice, Attached to

Petition for Admission, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.8). The Court is assuming, for now, that

he is a member in good standing of the D.C. Bar.

matter to the Sixth Circuit panel that will decide Lawrence v. Parker, et[] al.” (Id.,

PageID.13). Mr. Dubuc did not explain what he meant by “troubling matter,” nor did

he object to the Chief Judge’s stated consideration of assigning the matter to a threejudge panel.

On October 16, 2017, the Chief Judge responded to Mr. Dubuc’s letter, advising

him that, based on the information and materials Mr. Dubuc had provided, he had

decided to refer Mr. Lawrence’s application for admission to a panel of judges. (Chief

Judge Jonker Letter, Oct. 16, 2017, ECF No. 1-5, PageID.18). The Chief Judge noted

that, contrary to the letter’s assertion, he had not received any information from the

State Bar of Michigan. (Id.).

On December 4, 2017, Mr. Lawrence’s counsel faxed a letter to District Judge

Janet Neff, the chair of the three-judge panel. (Dubuc Letter, Dec. 4, 2017, ECF

No. 1-6). The letter included two requests: (1) that the Court require Operations

Specialist Ashley Mankin to attend the hearing in this matter and to provide sworn

testimony; and (2) that the Court provide a “bill of particulars,” containing “the

precise reasons why, in Mr. Lawrence’s case, his application was not administratively

approved by the Chief Judge.”

(Id., PageID.20-21).4

The letter also provided

additional information concerning Mr. Lawrence’s admission to practice in other

courts. (Id., PageID.21). Again, Mr. Lawrence did not raise any objection to the

assignment of this matter to the three-judge panel.

Mr. Duboc’s letter violates Local Rule 7.1(a), which explicitly prohibits letter briefs

in support of motions.

Mr. Dubuc’s spurious suggestions that the Chief Judge had engaged in

“irregularities” in the handling of Mr. Lawrence’s application, and in the initial

assignment of District Judge Paul Maloney to the three-judge panel, are unfounded.5

The Chief Judge had already advised Mr. Dubuc that he had obtained no information

from the State Bar. There is nothing in the local rules that limits what information

the Chief Judge may consider, or from what source; nor do the rules require that the

Chief Judge explain to an applicant why he elects to exercise his discretion in

appointing a three-judge panel. Moreover, any reason would be wholly irrelevant at

this juncture, as a decision of the majority of the undersigned three-judge panel is

final and binding. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(d)(iv).

At the beginning of the December 13, 2017, hearing, the Court addressed Mr.

Lawrence’s request to have Ms. Mankin testify.

The Court explained why any

testimony Ms. Mankin would have to offer would be irrelevant to Mr. Lawrence’s

application. (Hr’g Tr. at 3, ECF No. 4, PageID.57). The Court also addressed Mr.

Dubuc’s erroneous interpretation of Local Rules 83.1(c) and (d). (Hr’g Tr. at 4-6,

PageID.58-60). When he addressed the Court personally, Mr. Lawrence raised again

the issue of the interpretation of Local Rules 83.1(c) and (d).

(Hr’g Tr. at 6-7,

PageID.60-61). The Court advised Mr. Lawrence that, if he wished to pursue his

objection to the Court’s interpretation of the relevant local rules, he could file a motion

to disband the three-judge panel. (Hr’g Tr. at 7, PageID.61). Mr. Lawrence declined

On October 19, 2017, Chief Judge Jonker assigned Judge Neff to replace Judge

Maloney, as a result of Judge Maloney’s decision to recuse himself. (See Admin. Order

17-AD-116).

to make the motion, electing instead to proceed with the hearing: “I would like to

proceed by the panel asking me questions and providing testimony on my character

and fitness.” (Id. at 8, PageID.62).

Accordingly, he has waived any objection to the jurisdiction and constitution of

the undersigned three-judge panel.

Nonetheless, and giving Mr. Lawrence the

benefit of the doubt, the Court will address – again – the application of Local

Rules 83.1(c) and (d), and Mr. Lawrence’s erroneous interpretation of them.

Local Rule 83.1(c) addresses the eligibility for admission to practice in the

Western District of Michigan. It provides: “A person who is duly admitted to practice

in a court of record of a state, and who is in active status and in good standing, may

apply for admission to the bar of this Court, except as provided in (ii) below.” W.D.

MICH. LCIVR 83.1(c)(i) (emphasis supplied). Subpart (ii) provides, in relevant part,

that, if an applicant has been convicted of a crime, “the Chief Judge shall make an

independent determination as to whether the applicant is qualified to be entrusted

with professional matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney

and officer of the Court.” In other words, the Chief Judge has the authority to

determine whether an individual previously convicted of a crime is even eligible for

admission to practice in the District. If that determination is made in the negative,

the only recourse for the applicant is to “file a petition for a hearing before a three

judge panel as described in LCIVR 83.1(m)(iii).” W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(c)(ii).

Local Rule 83.1(d), on the other hand, addresses the procedure for persons to

be considered for admission.

That rule identifies the information that must be

included in an application for admission. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(d)(i)(A)-(C).

That information includes, of course, whether the applicant has ever been convicted

of a crime. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(d)(i)(C). The procedural rule gives discretion

to the Chief Judge to grant or deny an application for admission, or in the alternative,

“the Chief Judge may refer the application to a three-judge panel constituted

pursuant to subsection (m)(iii)(A).” W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(d)(iv). The reference to

subsection (m)(iii)(A) simply makes clear that the three-judge panel will consist of “at

least one active or senior district judge,” and that the other members of the panel may

include “senior judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”

LCIVR 83.1(m)(iii)(A).

W.D. MICH.

Chief Judge Jonker properly exercised his discretion in

submitting Mr. Lawrence’s application for admission to the undersigned judicial

panel, and his appointment of the undersigned judicial officers is fully consistent with

Local Rule 83.1(m)(iii)(A).

Mr. Lawrence’s argument that a three-judge panel lacks jurisdiction over his

application because the Chief Judge was first required to make a determination

regarding his eligibility is contrary to any rational interpretation of the Local Rules.6

Moreover, it is nonsensical. Under Mr. Lawrence’s view, this matter should be sent

Mr. Lawrence’s position regarding Local Rule 83.1(c) is internally inconsistent. On

the one hand, he argues that the Chief Judge was required to rule on his eligibility

for admission under Rule 83.1(c)(ii) (See Mtn. Recon. at 3-5, ECF No. 3, PageID.2426), which applies in this case only if Mr. Lawrence has been “convicted of a crime.”

But, on the other hand, he contends that his 2002 conviction for violating the

Bloomfield Township ordinance is not a “true” criminal conviction (See Dubuc Letter,

Dec. 4, 2017, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.20-21), which presumably would obviate the need

for an eligibility determination under Rule 83.1(c).

back to the Chief Judge to make a determination of whether he is eligible for

admission. That determination will either be in the affirmative, which allows Mr.

Lawrence’s application to go forward under Local Rule 83.1(d) (with a decision by

either the Chief Judge or a three-judge panel); or the determination will be in the

negative, triggering Mr. Lawrence’s right to petition for a three-judge panel review.

Mr. Lawrence has been allowed to submit an application. Pursuant to Local

Rule 83.1(d)(iv), the matter is now before a three-judge panel to make an independent

determination whether, given his prior conviction, “[he] is qualified to be entrusted

with professional matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney

and officer of the Court,” W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(c)(ii), and whether he is otherwise

suitable for admission to the practicing bar of this Court. Accordingly, unless he was

prepared to accept a potential negative decision by the Chief Judge – a highly unlikely

scenario – he is right where he would be no matter which way the Chief Judge would

have decided the issue of eligibility under Rule 83.1(c).7

Mr. Lawrence’s efforts to have this matter returned to Chief Judge Jonker are

all the more perplexing, given his stated intention, should he get his way on this

issue, to “immediately move for Judge Jonker’s disqualification,” and to “ask that a

different judge make the ‘independent determination’.” (Mtn. Recon. at 5, ECF No. 3,

PageID.26). Putting aside the fact that his contention as to the disqualification of the

Mr. Lawrence’s contention that he is entitled to “the particulars upon which the

Chief Judge denied his application” (Mtn. Recon. at 3 n.2, ECF No. 3, PageID.24) is

unsupported by any provision in the Local Rules. Moreover, it is irrelevant, as the

Chief Judge has not decided anything, but rather, referred Mr. Lawrence’s

application to the undersigned panel for an independent and final decision.

Chief Judge is wholly unfounded, Mr. Lawrence is essentially seeking to have some

judge other than the Chief Judge decide this matter. But, he has already gotten his

wish, and more – three judges other than the Chief Judge are making an independent

determination as to his application for admission.

In conclusion, Mr. Lawrence’s contention that the undersigned panel lacks

jurisdiction is frivolous, particularly given his failure to raise an objection to the

three-judge panel at or before the December 13, 2017, hearing, as well as his counsel’s

acknowledgement that the Chief Judge had the discretion to refer this matter to a

three-judge panel. (See Hr’g Tr. at 6, ECF No. 4, PageID.60 (Mr. Dubuc agreed with

Judge Neff that the Chief Judge’s “independent determination” may be based on the

decision of the panel)). Inasmuch as there is no basis to find that the Chief Judge

deviated from the District’s Local Rules, and given that Ms. Mankin has no

information relevant to his application for admission, Mr. Lawrence’s motion for

reconsideration (ECF No. 4) will be denied.

Legal Standards

Mr. Lawrence appears to be operating on the misconception that simply having

his “good moral character to practice law” certified by some other jurisdiction is

sufficient to confer upon him the right to be admitted to practice before this Court.

(See Mtn. Recon. at 8, ECF No. 3, PageID.29). It does not. See In re Desilets, 291

F.3d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 2002) (“federal courts have the right to control the membership

of the federal bar”). “ ‘Congress has provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2071 that the district

courts may prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. It is clear from 28 U.S.C.

§ 1654 that the authority provided in § 2071 includes the authority of a district court

to regulate the membership of its bar.’ ” 291 F.3d at 929 (quoting Frazier v. Heebe,

482 U.S. 641, 652 (1987) (Rehnquist, dissenting)).

“A federal district court has the ‘inherent authority’ to deny an attorney’s

application for admission to practice before that court.” Stilley v. Bell, 155 F. App’x

217, 219 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing In re Application of Mosher, 25 F.3d 397, 399-400 (6th

Cir. 1994)); accord In re Desilets, 291 F.3d at 929. This Court may “deny an attorney’s

application for admission to its bar when it is not satisfied that he possesses good

private and professional character.” In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1984).

“[T]he exercise of the authority to admit, deny, or suspend an attorney is left to the

discretion of the district court.” Stilley v. Bell, 155 F. App’x at 219 (citing In re Snyder,

472 U.S. 634, 643 n.6 (1985)).

This Court must – and will – make an independent determination of “whether

[Mr. Lawrence] possesses the professionalism and ethical competence expected of an

officer of the court.” In re Mosher, 25 F.3d at 400 (citing In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d at

859). A review of the record, including his conduct before this Court, casts serious

doubts on Mr. Lawrence’s professional and ethical competence, as well as his private

and professional character.

Background to Petition for Admission

Mr. Lawrence’s present Petition for Admission to this Court comes some

sixteen years after he graduated from law school and passed the Michigan bar exam.8

He has yet to obtain a license to practice law in Michigan. While the Michigan State

Bar recently certified his character and fitness, the Board of Law Examiners advised

Mr. Lawrence that he must retake the bar exam due to its policy of invalidating bar

examination scores after three years.

Mr. Lawrence is currently in litigation

challenging the constitutionality of that policy. Lawrence v. Pelton, Case No. 1:17-cv289 (W.D. Mich.).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has described as “contentious” Mr.

Lawrence’s relationship with the State Bar of Michigan and the Michigan Board of

Law Examiners. Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 366 (6th Cir. 2008). Sadly, that

is an understatement.

While Mr. Lawrence’s conviction was incurred a number of years ago, his

conduct following that conviction, including that before this Court, is inconsistent

with that expected of an officer of the Court. A detailed explication of the history of

his conduct regarding his conviction and efforts to discredit State Bar of Michigan

officials is warranted.

This is Mr. Lawrence’s second petition for admission to practice in the Western

District of Michigan. His first was denied on May 1, 2009, based on the fact that he

had not been admitted to practice law in any state. Mr. Lawrence unsuccessfully

appealed that decision. See In re Frank J. Lawrence, Jr., No. 09-1636, Slip Op. at 1

(6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (unpublished) (copy filed in this matter at ECF No. 5).

Mr. Lawrence’s 2002 Conviction for Interfering with Police Officers

Mr. Lawrence’s checkered history concerning his unsuccessful efforts to obtain

a Michigan law license began with his 2002 conviction for interference with police

officers during the discharge of their official duties. That conviction arose from an

August 19, 2000, incident in which Bloomfield Township police officers were called to

Frank Lawrence, Sr.’s, residence concerning a domestic assault he committed against

his son and Frank Lawrence, Jr.’s, brother: Christian Lawrence.

Christian Lawrence – at the time a young child – called 911, reporting that his

father had struck him in the eye with a board.9 Christian also reported that there

were two other people in the house: his father, and Frank Lawrence, Jr. Upon

arrival, the responding officers observed Christian through a screen door. His eye

was swollen and bleeding from a large cut. The officers asked him to come out of the

house, whereupon they questioned him about his injuries. Christian advised the

officers that his father had hit him. The officers then asked Frank Lawrence, Sr., to

come out, and they placed him under arrest.

Additional officers arrived on the scene.

The Bloomfield Township Police

Department requires officers responding to a domestic-violence call “to secure the

crime scene to ensure that no other victims are present and to seize any weapons.”

Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x 743, 745 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing testimony

Unless otherwise indicated, the factual statement contained herein is a compilation

of those set out in the Sixth Circuit’s opinions in Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Court, 560

F.3d 475, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2009), and Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x 743,

745-46 (6th Cir. 2008).

of Bloomfield Township police chief). Accordingly, the officers asked Frank Lawrence,

Jr., to step out of the house. He responded: “F[ ] you.” The officers again asked him

to step out, and he responded: “F[ ] you. Arrest me.” One of the officers then

explained to Mr. Lawrence “that they were ‘investigating a criminal act that took

place on the property,’ that they needed to come into the house and that they did not

‘have to get a search warrant.’ ” Id. Mr. Lawrence began “screaming and yelling,”

repeatedly shouting: “You’re not coming in my house. You need a search warrant.”

Id.10

Mr. Lawrence refused to comply with repeated requests to step out of the

house. Instead, he “stood with his legs spread in the doorway and us[ed] his body to

block the entrance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Eventually, “the officers

reached into the house, pulled [Mr.] Lawrence out, took him to the ground and told

him to sit down on a bench.” Id. The officers then conducted a protective sweep of

the house and recovered the board Frank Lawrence, Sr., used to hit his son, Christian.

Christian was treated by paramedics at the scene and taken to the hospital.

The officers placed Mr. Lawrence, Jr., under arrest for obstructing a police

officer, and he was taken in handcuffs to the Bloomfield Township Police Department.

He was later released on bond.

On September 8, 2000, Mr. Lawrence was charged by a Misdemeanor

Complaint with “interfering with a police officer,” an offense punishable by

Mr. Lawrence was a third-year law student at the time of this incident. (See

Dec. 13, 2017, Hr’g Tr. at 10, ECF No. 4, PageID.64; Compl. ¶ 28, Lawrence v. Chabot,

Case No. 4:03-cv-0020, ECF No. 1, PageID.11).

incarceration for up to ninety days. (See ECF No. 1-4, PageID.14). Mr. Lawrence

filed various legal actions seeking to enjoin the criminal prosecution, which included

a declaratory action in the Oakland County Circuit Court, a Section 1983 action in

the Eastern District of Michigan (EDMI), and a petition for a writ of mandamus in

the EDMI. See Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x at 745. “None of these

actions succeeded in postponing his trial.” Id.

Mr. Lawrence also filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the charge in the

48th District Court. See Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Court, 560 F.3d 475, 477 (6th Cir.

2009). He sought leave from the Oakland County Circuit Court to appeal the denial

of his motion to dismiss and to enjoin the prosecution in the district court, both of

which were denied. See id. at 477-78. Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the

Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See id. at 478.

Mr. Lawrence was convicted on April 8, 2002, following a one-day jury trial.

During the trial, Mr. Lawrence contested the legality of the officers’ actions. But he

also contested the officers’ collective testimony concerning his actions the night of

August 19, 2000. See Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x at 745-46. For

example, he claimed that the officers “never told him they wanted to enter the home

to look for evidence, insisting he refused to leave the house because he was just

wearing his underwear.” Id. at 746. Mr. Lawrence also testified “that the officers

pulled his hair, ‘dragged [him] out like an animal . . . and stomped on [his] leg.” Id.

The Oakland County Circuit Court upheld Mr. Lawrence’s conviction. The

Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.

See People v. Lawrence, 472 Mich. 942, 698 N.W.2d 400 (2005).

Mr. Lawrence’s Legal Battles with the State Bar of Michigan

Mr. Lawrence graduated from the University of Detroit Law School in 2001,

and he passed the Michigan bar exam that same year. He applied for a license to

practice law. As part of the application process, he filled out an Affidavit of Personal

History, in which he noted that he was subject to a pending misdemeanor charge for

interfering with a Bloomfield Township police officer. See Lawrence v. Chabot, 182

F. App’x 442, 445 (6th Cir. 2006). Due to the pending criminal charge, Mr. Lawrence’s

bar application was held in abeyance until resolution of the criminal case. Id.

Early in the criminal proceedings, the Bloomfield Township attorney, who was

then president of the State Bar of Michigan, offered to let Mr. Lawrence enter a “plea

under advisement.” Id. Under this plea, Mr. Lawrence would not have incurred a

conviction, and the charge would later have been dismissed if he complied with

certain terms set by the court. Id. Mr. Lawrence rejected the plea offer. Id.

More than a year later, and immediately before the jury trial began, Mr.

Lawrence’s counsel asked the township’s attorney to re-offer the “plea under

advisement.” Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x at 445. This discussion took place in

the presence of the district judge, Judge Edward Avadenka, but Mr. Lawrence was

not present. Id. The township attorney indicated a willingness to put the same plea

offer back on the table if Mr. Lawrence was willing to accept it. Id. Judge Avadenka

advised counsel “ ‘that, if the parties resolved the case with a plea under advisement,

he would communicate to the Character and Fitness Committee [of the state bar] that

a plea under advisement constitutes a conclusion of the case,’ thus permitting the

committee to act upon [Mr.] Lawrence’s bar application.” Id. at 445-46 (quoting Joint

Appendix at 1324-25). Mr. Lawrence again rejected the offer, choosing to go to trial.

Id. at 446.

A week after his conviction, Mr. Lawrence wrote a letter to the manager of the

Character and Fitness Department of the State Bar of Michigan, informing her that

the pending criminal charge holding up his application had been resolved. Lawrence

v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x at 446. In that same letter, he accused Judge Avadenka “of

improperly using [Mr.] Lawrence’s ‘law license as a bargaining chip’ by allegedly

offering to speak to the Character and Fitness Committee on [Mr.] Lawrence’s behalf

only if [Mr.] Lawrence ‘dropped the civil case11 against the Township.’ ” Id. (quoting

the Joint Appendix at 1317).12 “In light of the inflammatory allegation of judicial

misconduct, . . . an investigator of the Character and Fitness Department[]

The civil case was Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., Case No. 00-74302 (E.D. Mich).

Apparently, there is a transcript supporting Mr. Lawrence’s version of events. See

Board of Law Examiners Opinion at 20, In re Frank J. Lawrence, Jr. (William

Rheaume, concurring) (a copy of this opinion is found in Lawrence v. Berry, Case No.

5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.22 (W.D. Mich.)). The undersigned panel does not

have access to this transcript. It is troubling, however, that Mr. Lawrence chose to

raise the allegations of misconduct against the district judge with the State Bar,

rather than the Judicial Tenure Commission or some other appropriate forum.

Ironically, in the December 13, 2017, hearing before this Court, Mr. Lawrence

essentially admitted that he was using the allegations against the judge with the

State Bar as a bargaining chip to get his law license. (See Hr’g Tr. at 12-13, ECF

No. 4, PageID.66-67).

telephoned Judge Avadenka to verify the assertions in [Mr.] Lawrence’s letter.” Id.

Judge Avadenka advised the investigator of the actual content of the plea

negotiations, stating that, “while he ‘did offer to advise the Character and Fitness

Committee that the [criminal] case was concluded, Mr. Lawrence’s law license was

not used as a bargaining chip in any way.’ ” Id. (quoting the Joint Appendix at 1336).

Given a number of concerns – including “[his] litigation history and financial

difficulties” – the Character and Fitness Committee referred Mr. Lawrence’s bar

application to a district committee to conduct an interview with him. Lawrence v.

Chabot, 182 F. App’x at 446. “[Mr.] Lawrence responded by filing a motion for

adjournment of the interview, alleging for the first time that, under Michigan law,

violations of township ordinances should not be considered criminal cases.” Id. When

his request for adjournment was denied, Mr. Lawrence withdrew his bar application.

Id.

Instead of pursuing his bar application, Mr. Lawrence filed a Section 1983 suit

in the Western District of Michigan, naming, among others, the Michigan Board of

Law Examiners and its members, the State Bar of Michigan, and the justices of the

Michigan Supreme Court. See Complaint, Lawrence v. Chabot, Case No. 4:03-cv0020, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Mich). Mr. Lawrence sought “prospective relief” from the

operation of certain Michigan licensing rules and regulations, which he claimed were

“patently unconstitutional.” Id. at PageID.1. Mr. Lawrence also sought monetary

damages against certain defendants.

Id. at PageID.2.

Shortly after filing the

complaint, Mr. Lawrence filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and for a

preliminary injunction, seeking to “enjoin[] the Defendants from using protected First

Amendment activities as a basis for evaluating ‘good moral character’ and require the

Defendants to establish suitable guidelines or procedures, which comply with First

Amendment or general Due Process principles.” Lawrence v. Chabot, Case No. 4:03cv-0020, ECF No. 12, PageID.61. The district court denied the relief Mr. Lawrence

sought, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on all issues. See Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 F.

App’x at 445-59.13

Mr. Lawrence’s Extra-Judicial Actions Against Bar Officials

Mr. Lawrence withdrew his initial application for a Michigan law license in

October 2002. See Board of Law Examiners Opinion at 1, In re Frank J. Lawrence,

Jr. (a copy of this opinion is found in Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF

No. 1-2 (W.D. Mich.) (hereinafter “Board Op.”). Thereafter, and during subsequent

efforts to obtain his license, Mr. Lawrence engaged in a number activities targeting

State Bar officials with the intent of “caus[ing] financial harm or embarrassment.”

Id. at 19, PageID.21.

Soon after withdrawing his bar application, Mr. Lawrence began operating a

website he entitled “StateBarWatch,” located at http:www.statebarwatch.org, in

which he “actively criticize[d] the [State Bar of Michigan] and the [Board of Law

Examiners].” Compl. ¶ 21, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1,

Midway through the litigation, Mr. Lawrence sought, unsuccessfully to have both

the district judge and the magistrate judge disqualified for alleged bias. See Lawrence

v. Chabot, 182 F. App’x 442, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2006).

PageID.36. By his own admission, Mr. Lawrence used his website to publically make

the following accusations:

that the State Bar of Michigan’s Executive Director committed

“plagiarism”;

that the State Bar’s Assistant Regional Counsel had made false

statements in an oral argument before the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals;

that the State Bar’s Regulation Counsel made false (or at least

contradictory) statements to one or more district judges in this

District;

that one of the members of the Board of Law Examiners

improperly used a state-run website to “cast aspersions against

the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative”; and

that a member of the Board of Law Examiners had been subject

to “previous drunk-driving arrests and conviction.”

Id., PageID.36-37. Mr. Lawrence also posted to his website the fact that he had been

picketing the law office of a member of the Board of Law Examiners, using a sign that

stated: “I do not recommend attorney [ ].”14 Id., PageID.37.

In August 2004, Mr. Lawrence reapplied for a Michigan law license. Board Op.

at 1, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.3. The District

G Character and Fitness Committee held a hearing on August 15, 2005, and it later

issued a Report and Recommendation finding that Mr. Lawrence had not “shown by

clear and convincing evidence that ‘he currently possess[es] the requisite good

character and fitness to be recommended to the practice of law in this state.’ ” Id. at

1-2, PageID.3-4 (quoting District Committee’s Report and Recommendation).

The Court is omitting the attorney’s name to avoid undue embarrassment.

According to the District Committee, Mr. Lawrence made disparaging comments

about Michigan’s state courts: “ ‘[Mr. Lawrence] made it clear that, at least in part

because of the litigation, he has little respect – and indeed considerable distain [sic]

– for the state court system.’ ” Compl. ¶ 24, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134,

ECF No. 1, PageID.38 (quoting District Committee’s Report and Recommendation).

Based on these comments, the District Committee concluded: “ ‘We are concerned

about providing a law license to someone who, even before he has handled his first

case as a member of the bar, has effectively written off such a huge component of the

justice system.’ ” Id.

The

Standing

Committee

Character

and

Fitness

endorsed

the

recommendation of the District Committee, and Mr. Lawrence did not request a

hearing before that committee. Board Op. at 2, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv134, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.4. The Board of Law Examiners “voted to accept the

unfavorable recommendation.” Id. Mr. Lawrence thereafter requested a hearing

before the Board, which was conducted on April 20, 2006. Id. The Board considered

five issues, which can be summarized as follows:

whether Mr. Lawrence’s conduct in various litigation and

administrative actions, “evidences unnecessarily combative or

confrontational behavior,” including his “apparent disregard for

the rule of law when considering [his] conduct which led to his

August 19, 2000, arrest and subsequent conviction for Interfering

with a Police Officer”;

whether Mr. Lawrence’s 2001 termination from employment with

the Michigan Attorney General’s Office, including his appeal of

that termination, and his termination from a private employer for

“being unprofessional with [a] customer” had a bearing on the

Board’s 2006 fitness review;

whether Mr. Lawrence’s failure to pay certain debts “evidences

financial irresponsibility or bad faith toward creditors”;

whether Mr. Lawrence’s 2004 testimony before the Florida Board

of Bar Examiners to the effect that he did not intend to practice

law in Michigan disqualified him for admission to the Michigan

Bar; and

whether Mr. Lawrence’s conduct following the August 15, 2005,

District Character and Fitness Committee hearing was

“vexatious,

combative,

confrontational

otherwise

inappropriate.”

Id. at 2-3, PageID.4-5.

On June 14, 2006, the Board of Law Examiners issued its decision. It found

the matters relating to his employment terminations (issue 2) were too remote in time

to have been probative to its character and fitness determination; it was satisfied

with Mr. Lawrence’s stated intention to pay his past-due debts (issue 3); and it was

satisfied with Mr. Lawrence’s assurances that he intended to practice law in

Michigan. Id. at 8-9, PageID.10-11. The Board also noted that it was not bound by

the Florida Bar’s ruling denying Mr. Lawrence’s application to practice law in that

state. Id. at 9, PageID.11.

With respect to issue 1, the Board found that Mr. Lawrence showed “a lack of

judgment” in his actions that led to his August 19, 2000, arrest and later conviction

for interfering with a police officer.

Id. at 7, PageID.9.

The Board concluded,

however, that the incident, “standing alone,” would not have been dispositive –

“although the lack of judgment shown may have foreshadowed [his] actions . . .

relative to Issue 5.” Id.

The Board focused considerable attention on issue 5, which related to Mr.

Lawrence’s extra-judicial actions targeting members of the District G Character and

Fitness Committee, who recommended against his admission to practice law. One of

the committee members was, at the time, an assistant dean at the University of

Michigan School of Law.15 On September 8, 2005, Mr. Lawrence called the committee

member’s assistant at the law school, reporting that the committee member had

treated him unfairly due to his website. He also advised the assistant that he wanted

to address the law students, stating “the students deserve to know what kind of man

[the committee member was] and to see another side of [the committee member].”

Board Op. at 10, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.12

(quoting letter from committee member).

Mr. Lawrence sent a letter to the Board of Directors of Community Legal

Resources, the employer of another committee member. In that letter, Mr. Lawrence

represented himself as a “civil rights activist,” and he alleged that the committee

member had used Mr. Lawrence’s “political beliefs” against him in excluding him

from the practice of law. Id. at 10-11, PageID.12-13. In his letter, Mr. Lawrence also

accused the committee member of engaging in “a cruel and unfair manipulation of

[his hearing] testimony” regarding the disparaging comments he reportedly made

about the Michigan state court system. Id. at 11, PageID.13.16

The Court will not name the committee members who were subject to Mr.

Lawrence’s attacks, as there is no need to compound the embarrassment and distress

Mr. Lawrence’s antics assuredly caused them.

This accusation is undermined by Mr. Lawrence’s own acknowledgement to the

Board of Law Examiners that he “believe[s] that the [Michigan] courts do not

The Board of Law Examiners questioned Mr. Lawrence about these

communications. He testified that he “felt an injustice had taken place,” and that he

was “outraged.” Id. at 12, PageID.14. While he indicated “regret” for his actions, he

maintained that they were justified. Id. at 15-18, PageID.17-20. One of his own

lawyers testified that Mr. Lawrence’s actions “were ‘grievously wrong’ and that he

found them ‘personally reprehensible.’ ” Id. at 18, PageID.20.

The Board found that Mr. Lawrence’s actions “appear to have been calculated

to cause financial harm or embarrassment to [the committee members].” Id. at 19,

PageID.21. The Board further noted:

Instead of working solely within the appellate process, [Mr. Lawrence]

chose to attack the individuals involved in the process. . . . It is difficult

to conceive how [Mr. Lawrence] would consider this acceptable behavior,

especially during the time when his character was already under

scrutiny. At a bare minimum, he demonstrated gross lack of judgment.

Id. at 18-19, PageID.20-21. The Board concluded that Mr. Lawrence failed to meet

his burden of demonstrating his character and fitness to practice law: “The subject

communications show a propensity to act in other than a ‘fair’ manner. He has not

shown that he will exercise good judgment, that he will conduct himself professionally

and with respect for the law.” Id.

Soon after the Board of Law Examiners issued its decision, Mr. Lawrence again

resorted to the same vexatious tactics that caused the Board to find that he lacked

the character and fitness to practice law. One of the three Board members who

adequately protect our constitutional rights and that civil cases should generally be

brought in federal courts, if possible.” Board Op. at 11, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No.

5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.13

participated in the decision to deny him a license to practice law served, at the time,

as the Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights.17 In a letter dated five

days after the Board’s decision, Mr. Lawrence wrote to a member of the Michigan

Civil Rights Commission accusing this Board member of rendering a “disingenuous”

decision. See Frank Lawrence Letter to Albert Calille, dated June 19, 2006, filed on

the docket in Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1-3 (W.D. Mich.). He

also accused the Board member of using a state-run website to make public

defamatory statements against persons involved in a civil rights initiative. Id.,

PageID.25. Most disturbing, is Mr. Lawrence’s unsubstantiated accusation of racism:

“I have noticed that this type of hypocrisy is commonplace among many black civil

rights activists. They believe that they have a right to speak out, but for everyone

else, there exists a double standard. I truly believe that if I were black, I never would

have been treated this way.” Id.

In January 2008, Mr. Lawrence filed his third application for a Michigan law

license. See Amend. Compl. ¶ 13, Lawrence v. Raubinger, Case No. 1:10-cv-467, ECF

No. 19, PageID.200 (W.D. Mich.). Prior to submitting this application, Mr. Lawrence

used his website, statebarwatch, to claim that the Assistant Secretary to the Board

of Law Examiners was occupying his position “illegally”; to accuse the Clerk of the

Michigan Supreme Court of being “an amazingly lazy civil servant”; and to assert

that “widespread dishonesty and corruption” existed within the State Bar of

This Board member is now a United States District Judge for the Eastern District

of Michigan.

Michigan. Id., ¶¶ 10, 20, PageID.199, 202. In 2009, prior to a hearing scheduled

before the Board of Law Examiners, Mr. Lawrence mailed “hundreds of

questionnaires to the [Board] members’ former clients and acquaintances, requesting

that they [provide him] any information in their possession that would call into

question the [Board] members’ ability to serve the public.” Id., ¶ 18, PageID.201. His

bar application was denied in May 2010. (See Dubuc Letter to Chief Judge Jonker,

Oct. 12, 2017, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.12).

Discussion

Mr. Lawrence’s Conviction for Interfering with Police Officers

Mr. Lawrence continues to minimize his culpability concerning his conduct on

August 19, 2000, which led to his conviction for interfering with police officers. In his

Petition for Admission, he simply states:

I was ticketed for violating a Bloomfield Township ordinance that

prohibits “interfering” with a police officer. This occurred after I told

him that he needed to secure a warrant before he conducted a

warrantless search. He claimed I “interfered” with his investigation. I

was found guilty and ordered to pay a monetary fine.

(Petition for Admission at ¶ 6, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.4).

The Court now knows that the facts were far more serious than Mr. Lawrence

represented in his petition. Those facts include his repeated refusal to obey lawful

orders of police officers who were engaged in a criminal investigation; his repeated

use of abusive and profane language; his arrest; his being charged by a misdemeanor

complaint; and his failure to take responsibility for his actions, contesting the officers’

testimony in a jury trial.

During the December 13, 2017, hearing, Mr. Lawrence persisted in his claims

that the police officers’ accounts of the August 19, 2000, incident were inaccurate (see

Hr’g Tr. at 11, 13-14, ECF No. 4, PageID.65, 67-68), despite his conviction by an

impartial jury. He seemed more interested in casting blame on the officers involved

in his arrest than in accepting responsibility for his own actions. For example, when

asked to advise the Court of the facts leading to his arrest, Mr. Lawrence gratuitously

asserted that “[the officers’] version of the events have changed over time.” (Hr’g Tr.

at 14, PageID.68). He also claimed that the officers “dragged him” out of his house

without giving him sufficient time to respond to their order (Hr’g Tr. at 17,

PageID.71), and that they “roughed” him up (Hr’g Tr. at 15, PageID.69).

Mr. Lawrence also went out of his way to fault the trial judge. In response to

a simple question regarding the outcome of the trial, Mr. Lawrence acknowledged his

conviction, but quickly added: “The case – the judge disqualified himself because he

was, well, he was caught sending inappropriate e-mails to me. And he – and the State

Bar made mention of that in their opinion too.” (Hr’g Tr. at 11, PageID.65).

His statements to the Court concerning the facts leading to his

August 19, 2000, arrest were less than credible. For example:

And I remember the [officers’] initial concern is they wanted me

to talk with them and they wanted to interview me. Later on the facts

kind of changed and it seemed to develop into this notion that I blocked

access to the home. But I don’t remember that really being a concern of

their’s right at the get-go.

(Hr’g Tr. at 11, PageID.65). The facts, as recounted by the Sixth Circuit in its

affirmance of the denial of Mr. Lawrence’s habeas corpus petition, reveal that the

officers made clear that their order to leave the house was based on a “need to check

for additional suspects, victims, or evidence.” Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Court, 560 F.3d

475, 477 (6th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, Mr. Lawrence continued in his refusal to allow

the officers entry into the home. Id.

Mr. Lawrence’s claim that the officers “dragged” him out of his home was used

in an apparent effort to minimize his culpability. When the Court asked why he did

not comply with the officers’ order to step outside the house, Mr. Lawrence provided

a non-responsive answer: “Because they dragged me outside.” (Hr’g Tr. at 17,

PageID.71). It was only when pressed on the issue of whether he had been given an

opportunity to comply that he stated: “There was a very short window, yes.” (Id.).

Once again, Mr. Lawrence’s account is rebutted by the facts. At his trial, the

officers testified that they twice asked Mr. Lawrence to step out of the house, each

request being met with profanities and demands to be arrested. See Lawrence v.

Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x at 745; (see also Bloomfield Twp. Police Dep’t Narrative

Report, Aug. 19, 2000, Incident No. 13999, ECF No. 1-4, PageID.15-16 (recounting

officer’s repeated efforts to get Mr. Lawrence to come out of the house)). One of the

officers then explained to Mr. Lawrence why they needed to enter the residence, to

which Mr. Lawrence began “ ‘screaming and yelling’ . . . several times, ‘You’re not

coming in my house. You need a search warrant.’ ” Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp.,

313 F. App’x at 745. Rather than comply with the officers’ request to step out of the

house, Mr. Lawrence “stood with his legs spread in the doorway and ‘us[ed] his body

to block the entrance.’ After it became clear that [Mr.] Lawrence would not cooperate,

the officers reached into the house, pulled [him] out, took him to the ground and told

him to sit down on a bench.” Id.

Mr. Lawrence’s claim that he was “roughed up by the police” (Hr’g Tr. at 15,

ECF No. 4, PageID.69) is, to say the least, hyperbolic. One of the arresting officers

described Mr. Lawrence’s arrest as follows:

Officer Godlewski reached inside the house, grabbed Mr. Lawrence, Jr.’s

shirt and pulled him outside. As Mr. Lawrence, Jr. exited the house, I

held onto [his] right arm and placed my right hand on the top of his head

and ordered [him] to the ground. Mr. Lawrence, Jr. did as I requested

and I used my hands to assist [him] to the ground. Once on his knees, I

told Mr. Lawrence, Jr. to stay in that position and not move.

(Bloomfield Twp. Police Dep’t Narrative Report, Aug. 19, 2000, Incident No. 13999,

ECF No. 1-4, PageID.15-16). While Mr. Lawrence was later taken to the hospital

complaining of neck, back, and leg pain, he was released that night apparently

without treatment. (See id.). Moreover, Mr. Lawrence offered no evidence of injury

in his Section 1983 lawsuit against the officers. See Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp.,

313 F. App’x at 748. In that case, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

the officers, finding that they did not use excessive force “when they removed [Mr.]

Lawrence after he ‘us[ed] his body to block the entrance to the door.’ ” Id.

When asked by this Court whether the conduct leading to his arrest and

conviction was befitting an officer of the court, Mr. Lawrence equivocated. (See Hr’g

Tr. at 18, ECF No. 4, PageID.72). His selective memory concerning the facts relating

to his arrest and conviction – easily offering exculpatory information, while

struggling to recall basic facts concerning his offense conduct – further undermines

his credibility with the Court.

Given that he was put on notice that his 2002

conviction for obstructing officers was the basis for the Court’s initial scrutiny of his

Petition for Admission (see Chief Judge Jonker Letter of Oct. 6, 2017, ECF No. 1-3,

PageID.10), Mr. Lawrence’s statement that he was unprepared to discuss the facts

relating to this conviction (see Hr’g Tr. at 15, PageID.69) is perplexing.

The undersigned panel, having had the opportunity to observe Mr. Lawrence’s

demeanor during the December 13, 2017, hearing, along with the inconsistencies

between his account and the facts of the case, find that he has not demonstrated the

level of candor the Court expects from those admitted to practice in the Western

District of Michigan. The Court recognizes that Mr. Lawrence’s conviction is some

fifteen years old. But his lack of candor and his equivocation regarding his culpability

belie his assertions that he is not the same man who was convicted of interfering with

the police. (Hr’g Tr. at 26, PageID.80).

Mr. Lawrence’s Extra-Judicial Actions Against State Bar Officials

By his own admission, Mr. Lawrence has publically disparaged State Bar

officials, and, in some instances, he has attempted to cause them financial harm. He

began a website (statebarwatch) shortly after withdrawing his first application for

bar admission, which he used to publicize derogatory information about State Bar

officials, including accusations of plagiarism, making false statements in courts of

law, improper use of a state-run website, and drunk driving. See Compl. ¶ 21(1), (2),

(5), and (6), Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF No. 1, PageID.36-37. None

of these allegations was relevant to Mr. Lawrence’s application to practice law; nor

did any serve a legitimate purpose in his litigation against the State Bar officials.

There are only two plausible interpretations concerning the purpose of Mr.

Lawrence’s vexatious public attacks on these officials:

to punish, through

embarrassment and ridicule; and to extort a favorable decision on his next bar

application.

Mr. Lawrence also admitted to picketing the law office of the then president of

the Board of Law Examiners, using a sign that was plainly intended to discourage

clients from retaining the Board member’s legal services. (See Hr’g Tr. at 20-22, ECF

No. 4, PageID.74-76); see also Compl. ¶ 21(7), Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv134, ECF No. 1, PageID.37 (The sign stated: “I do not recommend attorney [ ].”). Mr.

Lawrence’s responses to the Court’s queries regarding his motivation for picketing

the law office of this attorney was an exercise in sophistry:

And so your efforts in this regard were intended to deny him

clients, to interfere with his ability to practice law.

That’s not my testimony today.

Well, what was the purpose of your picketing with that sign?

The purpose was to voice my dissatisfaction with the way in which

this individual processed my application. He doesn’t have – the

Board of Law Examiners really doesn’t have an office you can

picket. It’s a little tiny office inside the Supreme Court building.

So, you know, going to his office was the only place I could really

go to where there was, I would, I would have any effect.

...

What was written on your sign would be interpreted as an effort

to keep clients away, not to express dissatisfaction with how the

Board of Law Examiners were handling your application; would

you agree?

Well, you can interpret it that way but he didn’t recommend –

How else would you interpret [it]?

He didn’t recommend me and I don’t recommend him. . . .

(Hr’g Tr. at 21-22, ECF No. 4, PageID.75-76). Mr. Lawrence again equivocated when

asked whether his conduct was consistent with what is expected from an officer of the

court.

(See id. at 22-23, PageID.76-77).

But, when pressed by the Court, Mr.

Lawrence conceded that his conduct demonstrated “less than good judgment.” (Id. at

25-26, PageID.79-80).

Mr. Lawrence’s efforts to discredit members of the Character and Fitness

Committee who recommended against his admission to practice law were plainly

vexatious, if not vindictive. He contacted the law school at which one member worked

with the stated intention of derogating the character of that member before the

student body.

He wrote a letter to another committee member’s employer that

included unsubstantiated accusations that the member had used his “political beliefs”

against him and that she had engaged in “a cruel and unfair manipulation of [his

hearing] testimony.” Board Op. at 11, Lawrence v. Berry, Case No. 5:06-cv-134, ECF

No. 1-2, PageID.13.

Notwithstanding his own attorney’s assessment that Mr.

Lawrence’s actions “were ‘grievously wrong’ and that he found them ‘personally

reprehensible,’ ” Id. at 18, PageID.20, Mr. Lawrence continued to maintain that his

actions were justified. Id. at 15-18, PageID.17-20.

The Board of Law Examiners correctly concluded that Mr. Lawrence’s actions

against the committee members “appear to have been calculated to cause financial

harm or embarrassment to [them].” Id. at 19, PageID.21. The Court also agrees with

the Board’s stated concern that, “[i]nstead of working solely within the appellate

process, [Mr. Lawrence] chose to attack the individuals involved in the process.” Id.

at 18, PageID.20).

Apparently, Mr. Lawrence was unwilling or unable to learn the lesson the

Board of Law Examiners attempted to teach him. Within days of receiving the

Board’s 2006 decision, Mr. Lawrence sent a letter to the Michigan Civil Rights

Commission, accusing one of the Board members of racism. In his hearing before this

Court, Mr. Lawrence stated that he took these actions to generate “standing and

ripeness” so he could file a lawsuit. (Hr’g Tr. at 27, ECF No. 4, PageID.81 see also id.

at 28, PageID.82 (“[The actions] . . . allow[ed] me to claim that I had engaged in

criticism of Michigan licensing officials and this criticism would be the basis of future

character rejections.”)).18

It appears that there has been few, if any, bar officials who, having crossed his

path, have escaped Mr. Lawrence’s personal attacks. It is equally clear, that Mr.

Lawrence is willing to make unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct against those

whose decisions he dislikes. This is contrary to the professional conduct expected of

those admitted to practice in this Court.

Curiously, while Mr. Lawrence advised the Court during his December 13, 2017,

hearing that he took a number of provocative actions against State Bar officials

purposely to generate lawsuits, he claimed in a previous pleading that he took down

his website, statebarwatch, “because his rights were chilled to such an extent that

[he] was afraid to further engage in criticism of . . . the [Board] and the State Bar of

Michigan.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 22, Lawrence v. Raubinger, Case No. 1:10-cv-467, ECF

No. 19, PageID.202 (W.D. Mich.).

Mr. Lawrence apparently believes that he can say and do anything he wants,

as long as he wraps himself in the First Amendment. (See Hr’g Tr. at 23, ECF No. 4,

PageID.77) (“I believe that before someone is denied character and fitness a

determination needs to be made whether the conduct is constitutionally protected,

and if it is, the matter ends.”). The relevant issue here is not whether he or any other

lawyer enjoys a First Amendment right to freedom of speech – of course he does. The

Court is not concerned with his views about the process of obtaining a license to

practice law in the State of Michigan, nor his views about any of the officials involved

in that process. The Court is concerned, however, with the manner in which he

addressed his grievances with those officials.

Mr. Lawrence has a tendency to attack decision makers whose decisions he

does not like, both with respect to the State Bar and the Judiciary. He has continued

that pattern with his recent spurious allegations against this Court’s Chief Judge,

who simply asked for additional information relevant to this application for

admission.

Mr. Lawrence also inaccurately and unfairly characterized Judge

Maloney’s recent handling of a case Mr. Lawrence has pending in this Court. (See

Mtn. Recon. at 3-4, ECF No. 3, PageID.24-25).

In response to the Court’s question as to why it should conclude that he has

sufficiently good judgment to be admitted to practice in light of all his prior

misconduct, Mr. Lawrence stated: “What I can tell you is I am not the same person.

I have grown older and wiser and slower, and I’ve developed an appreciation for

respect and an appreciation for resolving things amicably without turning it into a

big deal.” (Hr’g Tr. at 45, PageID.99). But his actions speak louder than his words.

His assurances of being a changed man are simply not credible.

Mr. Lawrence has a long history of engaging in inappropriate and

unprofessional conduct that reflects, at the very least, very poor judgment. He has

not yet demonstrated that he fully understands the error of his ways; much less has

he shown a true commitment to change them. Accordingly, the Court “is not satisfied

that he possesses good private and professional character.” In re G.L.S., 745 F.2d

856, 859 (4th Cir. 1984). Nor is he “qualified to be entrusted with professional

matters and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and officer of the

Court.” W.D. MICH. LCIVR 83.1(c)(ii).

Conclusion and Order

Inasmuch as there is no basis to find that the Chief Judge deviated from the

District’s Local Rules, and given that Ms. Mankin has no information relevant to his

application for admission, Mr. Lawrence’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 3) is

DENIED.

Further, and for the reasons stated herein, his Petition for Admission to

practice before the Western District of Michigan (ECF No. 1-2) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Lawrence is prohibited from reapplying for admission to this Court for a period of three years.

Dated: February 2, 2018

/s/Janet T. Neff

JANET T. NEFF

United States District Judge

Dated: February 2, 2018

/s/Scott W. Dales

SCOTT W. DALES

Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

Dated: February 2, 2018

/s/Phillip J. Green

PHILLIP J. GREEN

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.