The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): The Supreme Court Denies Expert Fees in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy

Order Code RS22465

June 30, 2006

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

The Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (IDEA): The Supreme Court Denies

Expert Fees in Arlington Central School

District v. Murphy

name redacted

Legislative Attorney

American Law Division

Summary

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides federal funding

for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt

of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE). It also

contains detailed due process procedures, including a provision for attorneys’ fees. The

Supreme Court has examined various issues under IDEA,1 and in Arlington Central

School District v. Murphy held, in a decision authored by Justice Alito, that parents who

prevail in a suit against a school district may not recover expert witness fees.

Background

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)2 is both a grants statute and

a civil rights statute. It provides federal funding for the education of children with

disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a

free appropriate public education (FAPE). The statute also contains detailed due process

provisions to ensure the provision of FAPE. Originally enacted in 1975, the Act

responded to increased awareness of the need to educate children with disabilities, and

to judicial decisions requiring that states provide an education for children with

disabilities if they provided an education for children without disabilities.3 The attorneys’

1

For an examination of these decisions, see CRS Report RL33444, The Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Supreme Court Decisions, by (name redacted).

2

20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.

3

For a more detailed discussion of the congressional intent behind the enactment of P.L. 94142, see CRS Report 95-669, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Congressional

Intent, by (name redacted). IDEA has undergone several reauthorizations, including the most

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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fees provisions were added in 1986 by the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, P.L.

99-372.4

Majority Opinion

Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion in Arlington Central School District v.

Murphy, holding that IDEA does not authorize prevailing parents to recover fees they

have paid to experts.5 His opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices

Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Ginsberg wrote a separate opinion concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by

Justices Stevens and Souter.

The majority opinion first observed that the holding was “guided by the fact that

Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause.”6 This was seen as

significant because if Congress attaches conditions to a state’s acceptance of funds, the

conditions must be unambiguous and provide clear notice. The majority noted that IDEA

must be viewed from the perspective of a state official deciding whether IDEA funds, and

the obligation attached, should be accepted. “In other words, we must ask whether IDEA

furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in this case.”7

To determine whether there is such “clear notice,” Justice Alito then examined

IDEA’s statutory language, which states in relevant part: “in any action or proceeding

brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’

fees as part of the costs — (I) to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a

disability....”8 Although the parents had argued that the term “costs” would include the

costs of experts, Justice Alito found this argument “flawed” because the term “costs” is

a term of art that generally does not include expert fees.9

3

(...continued)

recent one that resulted in P.L. 108-446. For a discussion of this reauthorization, see CRS Report

RL32716, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made

by P.L. 108-446, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

4

Although the original act contained no specific provision for attorneys’ fees, prevailing parties

used section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794a, or section 1988 of the Civil

Rights Attorneys’ Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988, to seek fees. However, the Supreme Court

in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), held that the only remedies for prevailing parties

under IDEA were those contained in that statute. Congress enacted the Handicapped Children’s

Protection Act in response to the Court’s decision. For a discussion of the current provisions

relating to attorneys’ fees, see CRS Report RS22055, The Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (IDEA): Attorneys’ Fees Provisions in P.L. 108-446, by (name redacted).

5

548 U.S. __ (2006), 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006).

6

Id. Slip op. at 3.

7

Id. Slip op. at 4.

8

20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B).

9

548 U.S. __ (2006), 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006). Slip op. at 5.

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The parents had argued that the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986,

which added attorneys’ fees provisions to IDEA, supported their argument that expert fees

were covered because it contained a provision requiring the General Accounting Office

(GAO)10 to collect data, including data for consultants. This argument was also found to

be unconvincing, because the language directing the collection of data for consultants

required the collection of the number of hours spent, not the amount of fees awarded.

Justice Alito concluded that the language of IDEA “overwhelmingly support(s) the

conclusion that prevailing parents may not recover the costs of experts or consultants” and

that “the terms of IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed to attach

such a condition to a State’s receipt of IDEA funds.”11

The majority also rejected the final two arguments made by the parents: (1) that

allowing expert fees supports the overarching goal of IDEA to provide a free appropriate

public education (FAPE) to all children with disabilities and (2) that the legislative history

of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act supports allowing expert fees. Justice Alito

found that the goals of FAPE and of safeguarding the rights of parents were “too general

to provide much support for respondents’ reading of the terms of the IDEA. The IDEA

obviously does not seek to promote these goals at the expense of all other considerations,

including fiscal considerations.”12

The conference committee report for P.L. 99-372 stated:

The conferees intend that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” include

reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test

or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the parent or

guardian’s case in the action or proceeding...13

Justice Alito found that this legislative history to be unconvincing and “simply not

enough.”14 He concluded that

Under these circumstances, where everything other than the legislative history

overwhelmingly suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legislative history

is simply not enough. In a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the

Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly told regarding the

conditions that go along with the acceptance of those funds. Here, in the face of the

unambiguous text of the IDEA and the reasoning in Crawford Fitting and Casey, we

10

The General Accounting Office was renamed the Government Accountability Office by P.L.

108-271.

11

548 U.S.__ (2006). Slip op. at 8. The majority found further support for this conclusion in its

analysis of Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 437 (1987), and West Virginia

University Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).

12

548 U.S. __ (2006), 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006). Slip op. at 11.

13

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5.

14

548 U.S. __ (2006), 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006). Slip op. at 12.

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cannot say that the legislative history on which respondents rely is sufficient to

provide the requisite fair notice.15

Justice Ginsburg’s Concurrence

Justice Ginsburg concurred in part with the majority opinion and concurred in the

judgment of the Court. However, she took issue with the majority’s reliance on the “clear

notice” requirement for conditions placed on the receipt of federal funds. Justice

Ginsburg distinguished the situation presented in Pennhurst State School and Hospital

v. Halderman,16 where the Court found that clear notice was required, from that in

Arlington Central School District. The situation in Pennhurst was described as imposing

a new programmatic obligation on the states, whereas that in Arlington Central School

District was in a “lower key” and did not concern IDEA’s education programs but the

remedies available against a school district. Justice Ginsburg also emphasized that IDEA

was enacted not only under the Spending Clause, but also under section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the majority

opinion stating that “[t]here are two strong reasons for interpreting the statutory phrase

to include the award of expert fees. First, that is what Congress said it intended by the

phrase. Second, that interpretation furthers the IDEA’s statutorily defined purposes.”17

Justice Breyer examined the legislative history of the Handicapped Children’s Protection

Act, especially emphasizing the language in the conference report stating that the

conferees intended to cover the fees of expert witnesses.18 The dissent noted that every

spending detail in a spending clause statute need not be spelled out and concluded that

...our ultimate judicial goal is to interpret language in light of the statute’s purpose.

Only by seeking that purpose can we avoid the substitution of judicial for legislative

will. Only by reading language in its light can we maintain the democratic link

between voters, legislators, statutes, and ultimate implementation, upon which the

legitimacy of our constitutional system rests.19

Second, Justice Breyer found that IDEA’s basic purpose, as illuminated by the FAPE

and due process requirements, supported interpreting the provision’s language to include

expert costs. He emphasized the importance of keeping the goals of a program as a means

of assessing language, noting that to do otherwise “is to risk a set of judicial

15

Id.

16

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

17

548 U.S. __ (2006). 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006). Justice Breyer’s dissent at 2.

18

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5, quoted supra.

19

548 U.S. __ (2006). 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5162 (June 26, 2006). Justice Breyer’s dissent at 17.

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interpretations that can prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objectives

or that may well reduce a program in its details to incoherence.”20

In conclusion, the dissent emphasized the importance of legislative history,

observing that “[b]y disregarding a clear statement in a legislative report adopted without

opposition in both Houses of Congress, the majority has reached a result no Member of

Congress expected or overtly desired.”21 The lack of weight given to the overarching

purpose of IDEA was described as undercutting the statute’s purpose of providing a free

and appropriate public education for all children with disabilities.

20

Id. at 11.

21

Id. at 17.

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