Intelligence Identities Protection Act

Congressional research reportApr 10, 2013

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RS21636

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Intelligence Identities Protection Act

Summary

Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers

could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants focused attention on

whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability. This

report summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA; P.L. 97-200), enacted by

Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that exposes covert U.S.

intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. Sections 421-426, and provides

criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information

identifying a covert agent, where those making such a disclosure know that the information

disclosed identifies the covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative

measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States. The

act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity

according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders

without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they

participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents

and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.

The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial

application for offenders who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, includes reporting

requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. Prosecutions are

rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents.

Although some officials have expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger

the lives of persons who provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to

embassy officials, no prosecutions appear to have occurred related to those disclosures. There

was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of CIA

interrogators. The 111th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with access to

classified information (P.L. 111-259).

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Contents

Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act........................................................................................ 2

Prohibitions................................................................................................................................ 3

First Amendment Implications .................................................................................................. 5

Reporting Requirements ............................................................................................................ 6

Relevant Cases ................................................................................................................................. 6

Contacts

Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 8

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................... 8

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oncern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several

newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants

focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give

rise to criminal liability. This report provides background and summarizes the Intelligence

Identities Protection Act (IIPA; P.L. 97-200), enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the

unauthorized disclosure of information that identifies U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as

amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. Sections 421-426, and provides criminal penalties in certain

circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a “covert agent”

by a person who knows that the information identifies a covert agent as such and that the United

States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence

relationship to the United States.

The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial

application of the law if the offender is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, includes

reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act.

Prosecutions under this act have been rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the

exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have expressed concern that the

WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who provided information to assist

U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials,1 no prosecutions appear to have

resulted. There was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of

With respect to the Afghan documents, see Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Meet

the Press, August 1, 2010, transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38487969/ns/meet_the_presstranscripts/; Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Found Cost of Leaks Was Limited, NY TIMES, October 17, 2010 (quoting letter

from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to Senator Levin from Secretary Gates stating that the release of Afghan

informants’ names could have “potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences”). The documents relating to

the Iraq war have reportedly been redacted to withhold the names of informants. See Anna Mulrine, Wikileaks Iraq

Documents not as Damaging as Pentagon Feared—Yet, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, October 25, 2010. After the

release of classified State Department cables began in November 2010, State Department officials likewise predicted

that lives would be jeopardized. Tony Capaccio, Pentagon Alerts House, Senate Panels to New Classified WikiLeaks

Release, BLOOMBERG, November 24, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-24/pentagon-warns-housesenate-defense-panels-of-more-wikileaks-documents.html (quoting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs

Elizabeth King). Secretary of State Clinton explained that

Relations between governments aren’t the only concern created by the publication of this material.

U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others

outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on

trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official

misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that

person’s identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.

Remarks to the Press on the Release of Confidential Documents, November 29, 2010, available at

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/152078.htm. Although the cables were reportedly being released in

redacted form to protect identities as deemed necessary by the newspapers, the State Department warned human rights

activists, foreign government officials and businesspeople who were identified in the diplomatic cables that they may

be at risk. See Mark Landler and Scott Shane, U.S. Sends Warning to People Named in Cable Leaks, N.Y. TIMES,

January 6, 2011.

CRS is not aware of any information to suggest that the WikiLeaks disclosures or publication of leaked information by

newspapers has resulted in the exposure of any covert agents as defined by this statute. For background related to the

WikiLeaks disclosures and information about other criminal prohibitions that may be implicated, see CRS Report

RL33502, Protection of National Security Information, by (name redacted).

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CIA interrogators.2 The 111th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with

access to classified information (P.L. 111-259).3

Background

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act was enacted into law as an amendment to the National

Security Act of 1947 in response to concerns of members of the House and Senate Intelligence

Committees and others in Congress “about the systematic effort by a small group of Americans,

including some former intelligence agency employees, to disclose the names of covert

intelligence agents.”4 The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report also discussed the efforts of Philip

Agee, Lewis Wolf, and others to identify and disclose U.S. intelligence officers as part of “a

systematic effort to destroy the ability of [U.S.] intelligence agencies to operate clandestinely,”

and their apparent repercussions.5 Such disclosures preceded and may have contributed to

circumstances resulting in the death or attempted assassination of some Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) officers, expulsion of others from a foreign country following charges of spying,

and impairment of relations with foreign intelligence sources. Two of Agee’s books revealed over

1,000 names of alleged CIA officers. Wolf was co-editor of the “Covert Action Information

Bulletin,” a publication which contained a section entitled “Naming Names.” Wolf claimed to

have revealed the names of over 2,000 CIA officers. He also provided addresses, phone numbers,

license tag numbers, and colors of the automobiles of some alleged intelligence agents.6 These

disclosures set the stage for the consideration and passage of the Intelligence Identities

Protection Act.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act provides criminal penalties for the intentional,

unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a covert agent with knowledge that the

information identifies a covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative

measures to conceal the covert agent’s foreign intelligence relationship to the United States.

Covert agents include officers and employees of a U.S. intelligence agency7 (including military

See Charlie Savage, Former C.I.A. Operative Pleads Guilty in Leak of Colleague’s Name, N.Y. TIMES, October 23,

2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/us/former-cia-officer-pleads-guilty-in-leak-case.html.

Section 363 of P.L. 111-259, The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010, also amended the IIPA to require as

part of the annual report on its use an assessment “of the need, if any, for modification of this title for the purpose of

improving legal protections for covert agents.”

S.Rept. 97-201, at 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145. In this report, the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed the

legislative history of S. 391 and the companion bill, H.R. 4, and their predecessors beginning with proposals in the 94th

and 95th Congresses. The Congress passed H.R. 4, in lieu of the Senate bill, after amending the House bill to encompass

much of the language of the Senate bill.

S.Rept. 97-201, at 1-7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 145-51. S.Rept. 97-201, 7-10, reprinted in 1982

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 151-54. See also, H.R. 4, The Intelligence Identities Protection Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on

Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Intelligence Identities

Protection Act of 1981—S. 391: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

S.Rept. 97-201, at 7-10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 151-54.

“Intelligence agency” is defined to mean “the Central Intelligence Agency, a foreign intelligence component of the

Department of Defense, or the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal

(continued...)

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officers assigned to an intelligence agency) whose identities as such are classified and who are

serving (or have served within the last five years) outside the United States; as well as a U.S.

citizen residing abroad (or working for certain FBI components within the United States) or a

foreign national anywhere, who acts as an informant,8 agent, or source to an intelligence agency,

and whose relationship with the U.S. government is classified.9 The act prescribes punishments

for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity according to the level of

access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders without authorized access to

classified information are subject to punishment only if they participated in a pattern of activity

designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents and have reason to believe that

such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.

Prohibitions

The criminal provisions of the act are contained in 50 U.S.C. Section 421, which defines three

offenses according to the offender’s means of acquiring the information at issue:

§ 421. Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers,

agents, informants, and sources.

(a) Disclosure of information by persons having or having had access to classified

information that identifies covert agent

Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a

covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any

individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information

disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative

measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States, shall

be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.

(b) Disclosure of information by persons who learn identify of covert agents as result of

having access to classified information

Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity

of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to

any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information

disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative

measures to conceal such covert agent’s intelligence relationship to the United States, shall

be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

and expose covert agents

(...continued)

Bureau of Investigation.” 50 U.S.C. §426(5).

“Informant” is defined to mean “any individual who furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a

confidential relationship protecting the identity of such individual from public disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. §426(6).

50 U.S.C. §426(4). In the case of a foreign national, the statute specifies that both “past or present” intelligence roles

are covered, whereas U.S. citizens are included in the definition only if they are currently acting in an intelligence

capacity. The full statutory language is set forth infra at footnote 13.

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Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents

and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign

intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an

individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified

information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the

United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual’s classified

intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not

more than three years, or both.

Each of these offenses is a felony. The applicable maximum fine is $250,000, unless any

pecuniary gain or loss resulted from the offense, in which case the fine may be set at twice the

amount of loss or gain.10 A sentence under Section 421 is to be served consecutively with respect

to any other prison sentence.11

The offenses set forth in 50 U.S.C. Section 421 (a), (b), and (c) share some elements in common:

(1) intentional disclosure12 of the identity of a covert agent13 (2) to someone not authorized to

receive classified information, (3) knowing that the information disclosed identifies that agent,

and (4) knowing further that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the

agent’s intelligence relationship with the United States.

Subsections 421(a) and (b) contemplate offenses where the perpetrator has or has had authorized

access to classified information, while subsection 421(c) has no similar requirement. Subsection

421(a) applies to an offender who has or previously had access to classified information that

identifies a covert agent. Subsection 421(b) applies to an offender who learns the identity of a

covert agent as a result of having authorized access to classified information in general. In

contrast to these provisions, subsection 421(c) does not require that the perpetrator ever had

authorized access to classified information. Rather, it applies if the perpetrator discloses the

identity of any covert agent (1) in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and

expose covert agents, (2) with reason to believe that these activities would impair or impede U.S.

18 U.S.C. §3571.

50 U.S.C. §421(d).

50 U.S.C. §426 (3) defines “disclose” to mean “to communicate, provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish,

or otherwise make available.”

50 U.S.C. §426(4) defines “covert agent” to mean

(A) a present or retired officer or employee of an intelligence agency or a present or retired member

of the armed forces assigned to duty with an intelligence agency—

(i) whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information, and

(ii) who is serving outside the United States or has within the last five years served outside the

United States; or

(B) a United States citizen whose intelligence relationship to the United States is classified

information, and—

(i) who resides and acts outside the United States as an agent of, or informant or source of

operational assistance to, an intelligence agency, or

(ii) who is at the time of the disclosure acting as an agent of, or informant to, the foreign

counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation; or

to the United States is classified information and who is a present or former agent of, or a present or

former informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.

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foreign intelligence activities.14 Subsection 426(10) defines a “pattern of activities” as involving

“a series of acts with a common purpose or objective.”

Section 424 establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction for offenses committed overseas only where

the offender is a U.S. citizen or a permanent resident alien.

Under 50 U.S.C. Section 422, it is a defense to a prosecution under 50 U.S.C. Section 421 that,

prior to the commission of the offense, the United States publicly acknowledged or revealed the

intelligence relationship to the United States of the covert agent involved. In addition, this

provision precludes prosecution of anyone other than the person who made the disclosure of the

identity of a covert agent for a Section 421 offense on the grounds of misprision of felony, aiding

and abetting, or conspiracy, unless the elements of subsection 421(c) are satisfied. This would

appear to preclude the prosecution of a recipient of covered information, whether solicited or not,

who publishes the information but has not engaged in a prohibited “pattern of activities” intended

to disclose the names of covert agents. It is not an offense for a person to transmit information

directly to either the House or Senate intelligence committees, nor for a covert agent to disclose

his or her own identity. Under Section 425, the act is not to be construed to permit the

withholding of information from Congress or a committee of the House or Senate.

First Amendment Implications

During Congress’s consideration of the measure, much attention was focused on subsection

421(c) and the First Amendment implications if it were employed to prosecute a journalist or

anyone else who might publish the identities of covert agents learned from public sources or

through other lawful activity.15 The Senate Judiciary and the Conference Committee addressed

these concerns at length. Both concluded that the language of the measure would pass

constitutional muster.16 The Conference Committee characterized the goal of the provision as

follows:

The record indicates that the harm this bill seeks to prevent is most likely to result from

disclosure of covert agents’ identities in such a course designed, first, to make an effort at

identifying covert agents and, second, to expose such agents publicly. The gratuitous listing

of agents’ names in certain publications goes far beyond information that might contribute to

informed public debate on foreign policy or foreign intelligence activities. That effort to

identify U.S. intelligence officers and agents in countries throughout the world and to expose

their identities repeatedly ... serves no legitimate purpose. It does not alert to abuses; it does

not further civil liberties; it does not enlighten public debate; and it does not contribute one

iota to the goal of an educated and informed electorate. Instead, it reflects a total disregard

for the consequences that may jeopardize the lives and safety of individuals and damage the

ability of the United States to safeguard the national defense and conduct an effective foreign

policy....

“Foreign intelligence activities” is not defined. It is unclear whether counterintelligence and counterterrorism

activities are included, although counterintelligence and counterterrorism components of the FBI (but not the

Department of Defense) qualify as intelligence agencies whose agents’ identities are protected.

H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 6-8; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 170-72.

S.Rept. 97-201, at 14-18; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 158-62; H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 7-10; reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 171-75.

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The standard adopted in section [421(c)] applies criminal penalties only in very limited

circumstances to deter those who make it their business to ferret out and publish the

identities of agents. At the same time, it does not affect the First Amendment rights of those

who disclose the identities of agents as an integral part of another enterprise such as news

media reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic studies of U.S. government

policies and programs, or a private organization’s enforcement of its internal rules.17

The Conference Committee distinguished between the main purpose of a person engaged in “the

business of ‘naming names,’” whose intent is to identify and expose covert agents, and side

effects of one’s conduct that one “anticipates but allows to occur.” “Those who republish previous

disclosures and critics of U.S. intelligence would all stand beyond the reach of the law if they did

not engage in a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents.”18 Despite

these assurances, some commentators have questioned the constitutional sufficiency of subsection

421(c) on First Amendment grounds, finding it overbroad, and questioning the absence of a

specific intent requirement instead of the “reason to believe” standard.19 The courts have yet to

consider the issue.

Reporting Requirements

Section 423 requires the President, after receiving information from the Director of Intelligence,

to report to the House and Senate intelligence committees annually on measures to protect covert

agents, and other relevant information. Such reports are exempt from any publication or

disclosure requirement.

Relevant Cases

To date, there have been no reported cases interpreting the statute, but it did result in two

convictions pursuant to guilty pleas. In 1985, Sharon Scranage, a former CIA clerk, pleaded

guilty20 for providing classified information regarding U.S. intelligence operations in Ghana to a

Ghanaian agent with whom she was romantically involved.21 She was initially sentenced to five

years in prison, but a federal judge reduced her sentence to two years in light of the relatively

lenient treatment received by the Ghanaian agent, who was sentenced to 20 years after pleading

no contest to espionage but was soon thereafter returned to Ghana as part of a spy exchange.22

In 2012, a former CIA officer pleaded guilty to one count of violating the IIPA for having given

the names of two covert agents to two journalists. 23 The defendant, John Kiriakou, was initially

H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 7-8; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 171-72.

H. Conf. Rep. 97-580, at 9-10; reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 173-74.

See Note: The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1983); Note:

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Section 601(c), 49

BROOKLYN L. REV. 479 (1983).

See Richard B. Schmitt, Rare Statute Figures in Rove Case, LA TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A15 (reporting 1985

conviction of Sharon Scranage, a clerk for the CIA in Ghana, for disclosing identities of covert agents).

Stephen Engelberg, C.I.A. Clerk and Ghanaian Charged in Espionage Case, NY TIMES, July 12, 1985, at A13.

Spying Sentence Reduced, NY TIMES, April 11, 1986, at A15.

Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, “Former CIA Officer John Kirakou Pleads Guilty to

Disclosing Classified Information About CIA Officer,” October 23, 2012, available at http://www.fbi.gov/

(continued...)

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charged under the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 793, as well, but these charges were dropped

as part of the plea agreement. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison.24 The disclosures came to

light after defense counsel for certain high-value detainees at the U.S. Naval Station in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed classified papers in connection with military commission trials that

included photographs of the agents.25 Investigators concluded that the detainees’ defense team

had not violated any statute.

Other spies whose crimes are known to have resulted in the deaths of covert agents were charged

with more serious offenses under the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 794, but not under the

Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Aldrich Ames, whose activities resulted in the executions of

10 Soviet sources to the FBI and CIA,26 pleaded guilty to espionage and was sentenced to life

imprisonment. Robert Hanssen, whose work as an FBI “mole” for the Soviet and later Russian

security services resulted in the deaths of at least three covert agents,27 pleaded guilty in 2001 to

multiple counts of espionage and likewise received a life sentence.

In 2003, the Department of Justice opened an investigation to determine whether a violation of

the Intelligence Identities Protection Act had occurred after syndicated columnist Robert Novak

published the name of CIA officer Valerie Plame.28 No charges under Section 421 were pursued;29

however, the existence of the provision and its possible breach were held to overcome any

privilege on the part of reporters to refuse to disclose their source to a grand jury.30 I. Lewis

Libby, then Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, was convicted of obstruction of justice,

perjury, and making a false statement to federal investigators in connection with the incident, and

was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, two years’ probation, and a $250,000 fine. President

George W. Bush commuted the prison portion of the sentence after Mr. Libby was denied release

on bond pending his appeal.31

In a related case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit interpreted the statute as neither

providing for nor precluding a remedy for a covert agent whose identity is disclosed by a

(...continued)

washingtondc/press-releases/2012/former-cia-officer-john-kirakou-pleads-guilty-to-disclosing-classified-informationabout-cia-officer.

Justin Jouvenal, Former CIA officer John Kiriakou is sentenced to 30 months in prison for leaks, WASH. POST,

January 25, 2013.

Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, “Former CIA Officer John Kiriakou Charged with Disclosing Covert

Officer’s Identity,” January 23, 2012, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/January/12-ag-083.html.

Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence, S.Prt. 103-90 at 53

(1994).

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring,

Detecting, and Investigating Espionage Activities of Robert Hanssen (Unclassified Executive Summary) 9 (2003),

available at http://files.findlaw.com/docviewer/viewer_news.html#http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hanssen/

hanssen81403rpt.pdf.

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (recounting background of the

investigation into the leak of Valerie Plame’s identity as an officer of the CIA).

It has been speculated that a Section 421 offense was not charged because Ms. Plame was not a “covert agent” within

the meaning of the act or that the government officials who revealed her identity to reporters did not know that her

status as a CIA officer was classified. See William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of

Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1490-1501 (2007).

Id., cert. denied 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).

See The President’s Statement, NY TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A15. Mr. Libby later dropped his appeal. Philip Shenon,

Libby Drops His Appeal In Leak Case, NY TIMES, December 11, 2007 at A27.

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government employee, but as counseling against the creation of a Bivens32 remedy for such an

agent because permitting a lawsuit “would inevitably require an inquiry into ‘classified

information that may undermine ongoing covert operations.’”33

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Legislative Attorney

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this report was prepared by Legislative Attorney Elizabeth Bazan.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, (1971) (creating a private right

of action for a violation of constitutional rights by agents of the government).

Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 2825 (2009).

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