The Department of Defense, Science and Technology Program: An Analysis, FY1998-FY2007

Congressional research reportSep 12, 2008

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Every year Congress appropriates billions of dollars for the Science and Technology Program of

the Department of Defense. Besides deciding on how much money to appropriate, Congress must

also decide on how best to allocate those resources. Over the last ten years, the Science and

Technology program has grown to historic levels in inflation-adjusted dollars. However, the

funding increases appear to have peaked. In light of growing federal budget deficits, Congress

may re-examine its investments in DOD’s S&T program. Before doing that, it might be helpful to

understand how the budget increases of the last ten years have been allocated. That is the purpose

of this report.

Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DOD) Science

and Technology (S&T) program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8 billion. The cumulative increase,

in constant FY2009 dollars, was $22.5 billion.

The increase was distributed broadly across the S&T program. In constant dollars, the S&T

budget of all departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and all defense agencies increased (except

that of the Missile Defense Agency). While there was some variation in the distribution, no single

department, agency, budget activity or program predominated.

Of the three budget activities that make up the S&T program—basic research, applied research,

and advanced technology development—basic research increased the least. The increase in basic

research varied widely between departments and agencies. Army, Navy, and Air Force advanced

technology development, and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) applied

research received the highest increases.

Considering individual program elements, the Army’s Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive

Technology advanced technology development program received the single largest increase in

constant dollars ($1.7 billion FY2009 dollars). The mission area that attracted the greatest

increases was countering weapons of mass destruction. Four of the eleven S&T program elements

that received the highest increases were related to this mission.

This report will not be updated.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

What Constitutes Defense Science and Technology ................................................................. 1

Funding Trends in DOD S&T ................................................................................................... 1

Congressional Support for Increased S&T Funding ................................................................. 3

Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 3

Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 4

Results....................................................................................................................................... 5

For DOD S&T as a Whole.................................................................................................. 5

By Department/Agency ...................................................................................................... 6

By Budget Activity ............................................................................................................. 7

By Department/Agency and Budget Activity ..................................................................... 8

By Individual PE................................................................................................................. 9

Review of Major Findings............................................................................................................. 12

Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 12

Figure 1. S&T Budget Profile, FY1962-FY2007 ............................................................................ 2

Figure 2. S&T Funding Requests vs. Appropriations vs. Actual Total

Obligational Authority.................................................................................................................. 3

Figure 3. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline ........................................................................... 6

Figure 4. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by Department/Agencies,

Cumulative FY1998-FY2007....................................................................................................... 7

Figure 5. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by Budget Activity,

Cumulative FY1998-FY2007....................................................................................................... 8

Table 1. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by Department/Agencies and

Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007............................................................................ 9

Table 2. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by Department/Agencies and

Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007............................................................................ 9

Table 3. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their Baseline Funding the

Most............................................................................................................................................ 10

Table 4. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their Baseline

by the Greatest Percentage ..........................................................................................................11

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Appendix. ...................................................................................................................................... 14

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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 14

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Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DOD) Science

and Technology (S&T) Program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8 billion. In constant FY2009

dollars, the cumulative increase was $22.5 billion. The purpose of this report is to aid

Congressional oversight of DOD’s S&T program by analyzing this budget increase by department

and agency, by budget activity, and by program element. Specifically, the report examines

whether the budget increase benefitted all programs or focused on certain priority areas. In a

period of higher budget deficits, as sustaining current levels of military spending becomes more

of a fiscal challenge, and as the nation continues to position itself to engage effectively in a

changing strategic environment, policymakers may scrutinize the allocation of S&T resources

more closely.

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This report focuses on DOD’s base Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program

(RDT&E).1 As indicated by its name, this program funds activities that range from fundamental

research in the basic sciences to the design, development, and testing of complex weapon systems

ready for the field. The DOD divides this range of effort into seven budget activities, designated

6.1 through 6.7 (see Appendix). Activities 6.1 through 6.3 (basic research, applied research, and

advanced technology development) constitute what is called the Science and Technology (S&T)

program. Budget activities 6.4 and 6.5 focus on the development of specific new weapon systems

or components (e.g., the Joint Strike Fighter or missile defense systems).2 Budget activity 6.6

provides management support, including support for test and evaluation facilities. Budget activity

6.7 supports system improvements in existing operational systems.

The S&T program is often referred to as DOD’s “seed corn” because it supports the development

of a science and technology base upon which tomorrow’s high performance military systems will

be built. The payoff from S&T investments is rarely immediate. The value of the knowledge

tends to be unpredictable and hard to measure. The operational capabilities that are developed

take time to be incorporated into fielded systems. Nevertheless, adequate support for S&T

activities is seen by many in Congress and the defense community as imperative to maintaining

U.S. military capabilities and superiority.

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Figure 1 shows the DOD S&T budget from FY1962 (when the budget activity designations 6.16.7 were first being adopted) through FY2007. During the 1960s and early 1970s, budgets for

S&T remained relatively flat in current dollars, with inflation eroding their real values in constant

The base RDT&E program is funded by Title IV of the annual defense appropriations legislation. Additional RDT&E

funds are also found in other parts of the DOD’s appropriation, including some RDT&E funding specifically in support

of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). GWOT funds are requested and appropriated separately from the base program.

This report only considers the Title IV base funding.

Some analysts include select activities within budget activity 6.4 as part of the S&T program. This report considered

only programs in the 6.1 through 6.3 budget activities.

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dollars. Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing through much of the 1980s, S&T budgets

increased in both current and constant dollars.

Figure 1. S&T Budget Profile, FY1962-FY2007

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

1962

1968

1974

1980

current $

1986

1992

1998

2004

constant 2009 $

CRS analysis of DOD data provided by Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Plans and

Programs and R-1 documents, FY2000-FY2009.

Source:

At the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, the Cold War began to wind down, but budget deficits

of the federal government continued to grow. Funding for S&T became more erratic before

essentially leveling off in constant dollars.

By the end of the 1990s, sustaining adequate support for S&T in a time of declining military

spending became a particular concern. Congress initially sought to increase S&T funding by 2%

per year after inflation,3 but achieved limited success toward this goal. During the 2000 election,

the Bush presidential campaign advocated a general increase in military research and

development as part of its proposal to increase military spending. As part of the 2001 Quadrennial

Review, the DOD established a goal of stabilizing its base S&T funding at 3% of DOD’s overall

funding.4 Congress embraced this goal.5 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,

overall defense budgets began to rise quickly. Although not always achieving the 3% goal, S&T

funding rose to historic levels, in both current and constant dollars.

§214, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, P.L. 105-261.

Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. September 30, 2001. p. 41.

Conference report accompanying H.R. 4546, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. H.Rept. 107772. p. 460.

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Figure 2 shows the role Congressional appropriations played in the general increase in S&T

funding from FY1998 to FY2007. DOD began seeking increases to the S&T budget beginning in

FY2002. However, Congress appropriated more than DOD requested throughout this time period.

Figure 2. S&T Funding Requests vs. Appropriations vs. Actual Total

Obligational Authority

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

1998

2000

Request

Actual TOA

2002

2004

2006

Appropriation

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 data and conference reports accompanying appropriations bills.

Note: The appropriations data used in this graph are those identified in Title IV of DOD’s appropriation bills. It

does not include general reductions that are often called for in the General Provisions title of those bills. The

“actual TOA” data recorded take these general reductions, and other modifications to the original

appropriations, into account, as explained further below.

Source:

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This report focuses on the growth in the base S&T budgets between FY1998 and FY2007. This

period of time is interesting to policymakers for several reasons. It includes the transition in

FY2000 to a period of significant and historic growth in the S&T budget. It includes a change in

Administration, as well as the historic strategic transition from the post-Cold War era to the Waron-Terror era. Picking FY1998 as the baseline year is somewhat arbitrary, but because S&T

funding for the three years prior to FY1998 was relatively stable, it would appear to represent a

valid starting point. Also, declines in overall defense spending, beginning in FY1986, bottomed

out in FY1998, representing the end of the post-Cold War draw-down. The period of analysis

ends in FY2007, the latest budget year for which “actual” S&T funding data exist (see below).

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The analysis in this report is based on data from two primary DOD sources: the DOD R-1

document, and the RDT&E descriptive summaries of the departments and agencies.

The R-1 is an annual budget document released by the DOD Comptroller that summarizes all the

Program Elements (PEs) that make up the base Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

(RDT&E) program. Program Elements are the building blocks of DOD’s budget. In the case of

the base RDT&E program, each PE represents an aggregation of research activities in a particular

area. These areas could be related to a discipline (e.g. materials science), or mission (e.g.

electronic warfare), or subsystem (e.g. propulsion technologies). Every RDT&E dollar is

associated with one, and only one, PE. The R-1 document lists all of these PEs, broken out by

department and agency and by budget activity (6.1-6.7). In the FY2009 RDT&E budget request,

there were 712 PEs, of which 157 were considered to be in the S&T program.

The RDT&E descriptive summaries are released each year by the departments or agencies,

usually a few days after the official release of the DOD budget. They provide a written

description of each PE and include, among other information, goals and objectives and past and

anticipated accomplishments. In many cases, a PE may be divided into one or more projects. This

report does not examine projects below the PE level.

The funding amounts identified in these documents are total obligational authority (TOA). TOA is

a DOD financial measure. In any given budget request, TOA equals budget authority (BA), which

is what Congress grants in its appropriations bills (i.e. the authority to incur legally binding

obligations). It expresses the value of the direct program. If changes are made to appropriations

granted by Congress, because of general reductions, rescissions, lapsing unobligated funds,

transfers of unobligated funds, re-appropriations, etc., these changes are accounted for differently

when modifying the TOA and budget authority figures for prior years.6 The R-1 and the RDT&E

descriptive summaries list the current year’s budget request, an estimated TOA for the immediate

prior year (which may include rescissions proposed in the current year’s budget), and the actual

TOA for two years prior (by which time most modifications to the initial appropriation’s Budget

Authority will have been made). The analysis in this report used actual TOA for FY1998 through

FY2007, as shown in the R-1 documents for FY2000 through FY2009. It includes all S&T PEs

listed in the R-1 documents for those years.

The TOA data were recorded in current dollars. These data were converted to constant FY2009

dollars using TOA deflators for RDT&E taken from the DOD’s National Defense Budget

Estimates for FY2009. Unless stated otherwise, from here on in this report, all data is given in

FY2009 dollars.

The basic analysis compared the cumulative actual funding, from FY1998 through FY2007, in

constant FY2009 dollars with what the cumulative funding would have been if the FY1998

amount had risen only with inflation. This comparison was done by department and agency, by

budget activity, and by individual PE. The comparisons were calculated both in dollars and as

percentages. Percentage changes take into account the size of the program. Changes in low cost

For more discussion of how TOA and BA differ, refer to the National Defense Budget Estimates, FY2009, Office of

the Undersecretary (Comptroller), March 2008, p. 1. Known as the Green Book, see http://www.defenselink.mil/

comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/fy2009_greenbook.pdf.

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programs, when measured in absolute dollars, may conceal the relative importance of the change

as might be revealed when looking at the change in terms of percentages. On the other hand,

initial changes in low cost programs could lead to relatively large percentage changes at first, and

perhaps overstate the importance of those changes. The analysis takes this issue into

consideration.

The methodology used in this analysis has a couple limitations. One problem is how to account

for PEs that were initiated after FY1998. In these cases, the FY1998 baseline funding is zero.

That does not present a problem when analyzing in terms of dollars, but it makes the percentage

comparison meaningless. One could use the first year the PE was established to determine a

truncated baseline for calculating the percentage increase or decrease. This, however, would not

allow for a direct comparison with PEs that were in existence in FY1998. Therefore, the analysis

of percentage changes in individual PEs is restricted to PEs that were in existence in FY1998 and

does not include PEs established after that time.

Another limitation is that some PEs were reorganized during the course of the 10 year period. In

some cases, PEs were terminated and their projects distributed to new or existing PEs. While it is

possible in some of these cases to analyze the data for these PEs in the aggregate, in other cases it

is difficult to compare the new PEs to the old PEs.7 These situations were handled on a case by

case basis, based on the judgment of the author.8

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Figure 3 compares actual funding (in FY2009 dollars) with the FY1998 baseline. Baseline

funding, in constant FY2009 dollars, was $9.6 billion dollars per year. Actual funding rose to

$14.3 billion in FY2005 (in FY2009 dollars), before declining to $13.4 billion in FY2007 (in

FY2009 dollars).9 In total, actual funding exceeded baseline funding by $22.5 billion (in FY2009

dollars), as represented by the area above the baseline line in Figure 3.

For example, in its FY2002 budget request, the Navy reorganized nearly half its PEs. Projects from old PEs were

distributed among a number of new PEs, making tracking those activities difficult across the analysis’s time span. As a

result, a number of Navy PEs do not lend themselves to this analysis. To a lesser extent, in FY2002, some Air Force

PEs were reorganized to align with the newly restructured Air Force Research Laboratory organization, and again in

FY2003 to reflect recommendations from the Space Commission to segregate space-related research from the more

generic aerospace activities. Some of these changes were later reversed.

For example, in FY2005, in response to Congressional direction, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

split a number of PEs in two. In this case, where the integrity of the original PE was more or less preserved in the two

new PEs, the analysis treated the three (i.e the old baseline PE and the two new ones) as a single PE.

Note, in current dollars S&T funding peaked in FY2006. In constant FY2009 dollars, it peaked in FY2005.

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. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline

Figure 3

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

1998

2000

2002

Actual TOA

2004

2006

FY98 Baseline

Source: CRS analysis of DOD R-1 data, FY2000-FY2009.

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Figure 4 shows how this extra $22.5 billion was distributed among the DOD departments and

defense agencies.10 The Army received the largest dollar increase—$6.6 billion. Defense

agencies, as a whole, increased the least—$5.2 billion.11 In percentage terms, the three

departments fared about equally. The Army’s S&T funding increased 34% above its baseline,

the Navy’s 32%, and the Air Force’s 36%. However, the defense agencies, as a whole, increased

only 11%.

Defense agencies that support S&T include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA), the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, the Special Operations Command (SOC), the Defense

Logistics Agency, and the DOD Human Resources Activity.

Of the individual defense agencies, DARPA’s actual S&T budget exceeded its baseline by the highest amount ($2.5

billion). The MDA’s actual S&T budget fell short of its baseline by $2.3 billion. S&T accounts for a very small share

of MDA’s RDT&E program.

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. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by Department/Agencies,

Cumulative FY1998-FY2007

Figure 4

Air Force

$5,384

Navy

$5,343

Source:

Defense

Agencies

$5,172

Army

$6,566

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents, FY2000-FY2009.

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When characterizing the additional $22.5 billion in terms of budget activity (Figure 5), $2.3

billion went to basic research (budget activity 6.1), $10.0 billion went to applied research (budget

activity 6.2), and $10.1 billion went to advanced technology development (budget activity 6.3).

There has been much concern among some analysts and policymakers about maintaining

adequate basic research (6.1). In absolute dollars, basic research increased noticeably less than

6.2 or 6.3 funding. However, basic research activity tends to be less costly.12 In percentage terms,

the additional 6.1 funds were about an 18% increase above the baseline, while the additional 6.2

and 6.3 funds were respectively 27% and 21% above the baseline.

It is not unusual in DOD, other agencies, or the private sector, for basic research budgets to be lower in absolute

dollars than applied research or advanced technology development budgets. One reason for these differences is the cost

of performing each type of activity. Basic research may involve theoretical work or laboratory experiments involving

small volumes of materials. Advanced development may involve the construction and integration of large hardware and

software, tested in specialized test beds.

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Figure 5. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline by Budget Activity,

Cumulative FY1998-FY2007

6.3

$10,132

6.1

$2,314

6.2

$10,019

Source:

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents, FY2000-FY2009.

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Table 1 provides a breakdown of the $22.5 billion by both department/agencies and budget

activity. Table 2 gives the same breakdown in percentage terms. While the defense agencies’ 6.2

funding accounted for the single largest increase in funding in absolute dollars, the percentage

increase was not as large as those of the departments. The largest increases, on a percentage basis,

were in the departments’ 6.3 funding. The 6.3 programs of the defense agencies, as a whole,

received a noticeably lower percentage increase in funding.13

There were some significant differences in the funding gains in basic research among the

department and agencies. The Army and the Air Force basic research increased 39% and 31%,

while the Navy’s increased 14% and the basic research across all defense agencies increased

only 3%.14

This is due in a large part to net declines in MDA’s and DARPA’s 6.3 activities.

While the percentage increase in Navy 6.1 funding is lower than the other departments, it maintains the highest 6.1

budget of the three department. The relatively small increase in the Defense Agencies’ 6.1 funding is due in a large part

to the transfer of the University Research Initiative from OSD to the departments.

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T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by Department/Agencies and

Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007

Table 1. S&

(in millions of FY2009 dollars)

Budget Activity

Army

Navy

Air Force

Defense

Agencies

Total

DOD

6.1

6.2

6.3

Total S&T

$857

$2,152

$3,557

$6,566

$600

$1,970

$2,772

$5,342

$721

$2,178

$2,486

$5,385

$137

$3,719

$1,317

$5,173

$2,315

$10,019

$10,132

$22,466

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents, FY2000-FY2009.

Note: Numbers in Table may not agree with Figures above, due to rounding.

Source:

Table 2. S&T Funding Above FY1998 Baseline, by Department/Agencies and

Budget Activity, Cumulative FY1998-FY2007

(as a percentage of FY1998 baseline funding)

Budget Activity

6.1

6.2

6.3

S&T Total

Source:

Army

Navy

Air Force

Defense

Agencies

DOD

Total

39%

26%

42%

34%

14%

34%

43%

32%

31%

32%

43%

36%

24%

11%

18%

27%

21%

23%

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents, FY2000-FY2009.

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Of the 101 PEs, from all departments and agencies, that were in existence in FY1998 and were

continuously funded throughout the 10-year period of the analysis, 74 exceeded their baseline. As

noted above, all PEs that were established after FY1998 show an increase above their baseline,

even if funding did not keep up with inflation after their initial establishment. Also as noted

above, some PEs were eliminated during the 10 year period. The 101 PEs referred to above do

not include either the newly created PEs or the baseline programs that were eliminated. The size

and distribution of the increases and decreases above and below baseline funding for individual

PEs appear to be distributed more or less evenly throughout the range. A complete breakdown by

PE is beyond the scope of this report.

Table 3 shows the five PEs whose actual funding exceeded their baseline funding by the greatest

amount, as measured in absolute constant FY2009 dollars.15 Table 4 below shows the five PEs

For those interested, the five PEs which experienced the greatest decline in actual funding when compared to their

baselines were: Missile Defense Agency 6.3 Support Technology (PE0603173C, -$1,330 million); DARPA 6.2

Advanced Electronics (PE0603739E, -$900,589 million); Army 6.3 Aviation (PE0603003A, -$350,349); Army 6.2

Environmental Quality (PE0602720A, -$272,971); and, Air Force 6.3 Spacecraft (PE0603401F, -$227,426). All of

these figures are in FY2009 dollars. All of these were in existence throughout the 10 year period, although the Missile

Defense Agency PE changed PE number in FY2002. A more detailed discussion of these PEs is beyond the scope of

this report.

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whose actual funding exceeded their baseline by the greatest percentages. Table 3 considers and

includes PEs that were established after FY1998. Table 4 does not.

Table 3. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their Baseline

Funding the Most

(in millions FY2009 dollars)

Budget Activity,

Dept./Agency

PE Number

PE Name

6.3, Army

0603005A

6.3, DARPA

0603285E

0603286E

0603287E

0602712E

0602715E

0602716E

0603801F

0602715BR

0602716BR

0602717BR

Combat Vehicle and Automotive Advanced

Technology

Advanced Aerospace Systems

Space Programs and Technology

Materials and Electronics

Materials and Biological

Electronics

Special Programs

WMD Related Technologies

WMD Defeat Technology

Strategic Defense Technologies

6.2, DARPA

6.3, Air Force

6.2, DTRA

Source:

Exceeded

Baseline by

$1,736

$1,730

$1,514

$1,445

$913

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents, and department/agency descriptive summaries, FY2000-FY2009.

The Combat Vehicle and Automotive Advanced Technology PE is one of a number of PEs that

support the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS). The Army has described the FCS as its top

priority S&T effort. Funding for this PE rose from $48 million in FY1998 (in FY2009 dollars),

prior to the beginning of the FCS effort, to $353 million in FY2003 (in FY2009 dollars), when

funding peaked. Funding in FY2007 was $210 million (in FY2009 dollars). As noted below, this

PE also experienced one of the larger percentage increases.

The Advanced Aerospace Systems PE was established FY2000. Funding increased substantially

in FY2002 and again in FY2003 as DARPA expanded work on unmanned combat air vehicles

(UCAVs) and the Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture, a program to develop and

demonstrate the ability to perform autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration of

satellites. Congress directed DARPA to split the PE into two separate PEs, Advanced Aerospace

Systems and Space Programs and Technology, beginning in FY2005. For this analysis, the three

PEs were considered as one. Funding for these activities began at $23 million in FY2000 (in

FY2009 dollars) and peaked in FY2004 at $343 million (in FY2009 dollars). Funding for the two

new PEs totaled $292 million in FY2007 (in FY2009 dollars).

The Materials and Electronics PE represented a core DARPA program for many years. In

FY1998, funding for the PE was $267 million (in FY2009 dollars). In FY2005, Congress split

this PE into two. The Materials and Biological Technology PE and the Electronics PE, together,

received $554 million in FY2005 (in FY2009 dollars). In FY2007, the two PE received $507

million (in FY2009 dollars). The PE experienced its largest single-year increase in FY2002, due

to increased funding for the materials processing project and the establishment of the Beyond

Silicon project.

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The Air Force’s Special Programs PE was established in FY2003. While funding for the PE

appears in the R-1 document, the activities it supports are classified and are not included in the

descriptive summaries. Initially funded at $105 million in FY2003, it jumped to $408 million in

FY2004 (both in FY2009 dollars). Funding in FY2007 was $312 million (in FY2009 dollars).

DTRA’s 6.2 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Related Technologies PE has undergone a

couple of name changes, but has continued to focus on two primary topics: counter-proliferation

and sustainment. The former deals with preparing for and supporting the military and civil

response to WMD events. The latter includes maintaining the viability and credibility of U.S.

deterrent forces. Projects within these two areas include modeling, simulation, and testing of

WMD effects and environments and the subsequent impact on the ability of U.S. forces to

respond under such conditions. The PE also includes the development of vulnerability assessment

tools and technologies to improve survivability of U.S. weapon systems and capabilities and

those of our allies. It also supports targeting operations of U.S. deterrent forces. In FY2003,

Congress directed that the PE be split into two new PEs: WMD Defeat Technology and Strategic

Defense Technologies. The original PE received $255 million in FY1998 (in FY2009 dollars) and

peaked in FY2002 at $458 million (in FY2009 dollars). The two new PEs received $338 million

in FY2007 (in FY2009 dollars).

It is interesting to note that the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (both its 6.2 and 6.3

activities) and DARPA’s 6.2 Biological Warfare Defense program were three of the next 6 PEs

that received high increases. This, along with the increases allocated to DTRA’s WMD Related

Technologies PE, may reveal a slight emphasis on efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.

. Five Individual Program Elements Which Exceeded Their Baseline

by the Greatest Percentage

Table 4

Budget Activity,

Dept./Agency

PE Number

PE Name

6.2, Army

6.3, Army

6.3, Air Force

0602783A

0603005A

0603654A

0603710A

0603211F

Computer and Software Technology

Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology

Line of Sight (LOS)

Night Vision

Aerospace Technologies

Source:

Exceeded

Baseline by

484%

358%

343%

209%

152%

CRS analysis of DOD R-1 documents and department/agencies descriptive summaries, FY2000-FY2009.

The Army’s 6.2 Computer and Software Technology PE exceeded its baseline funding by nearly

five times. However, this is largely because its FY1998 funding was reduced to $824 thousand (in

FY2009 dollars) from approximately $2.8 million (in FY2009 dollars) the previous year. The

descriptive summary for that year indicated a change in the PE’s priorities. Funding jumped back

up to $4.7 million in FY1999 (in FY2009 dollars). In FY2007 the PE received $6.9 million (in

FY2009 dollars). FY1998 appears to have been a transitional year for the PE.

The Army’s 6.3 Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology PE is discussed above.

In FY1998, the Army’s 6.3 PE Line of Sight (Anti-tank) PE became an Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration program. The PE focused on adapting previously developed

technology into an air-mobile configuration to support early entry of U.S. forces into a theater of

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action. Funding increased from $5.9 million in FY1998 to $85 million in FY2002, then declined

to $9.7 million (all in FY2009 dollars) in FY2004. The PE was not funded after FY2004.

Funding for the Army’s 6.3 Night Vision PE grew steadily from $22.1 million in FY1998 to

$111.7 million in FY2005 before dropping to $77.0 million in FY2007 (all in FY2009 dollars).

Called Aerospace Structures until FY2002, the Air Force’s Aerospace Technologies

Development/Demonstration PE develops and integrates a wide range of technologies to enhance

the performance, cost of operations, and life of current and future aerospace vehicles. The PE was

funded at $12.0 million in FY1998 and grew steadily until it peaked at $50.5 million in FY2004.

It received $47.4 million in FY2007 (all in FY2009 dollars).

Except for the Army’s Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology program, these

PEs contributed little to the overall increase in S&T funding and their relatively high increases in

percentage terms are mainly due to their relatively low funding levels. However, the Army’s

Night Vision program and the Air Force’s Aerospace Technologies Development/Demonstration

program did experience steady increases that indicate they were areas of sustained interest during

this time period.

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•

The increase in S&T funding over the 10 years from FY1998 to FY2007 was

distributed broadly across the S&T program.

•

Each department (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the defense agencies as a

whole shared roughly equally in dollar terms. In percentage terms, the defense

agencies’ increase, taken as a whole, was noticeably less.

•

Although the total increase in S&T funding, in dollar terms, was distributed

between departments in roughly equal shares, the increases were distributed

variably across their budget activities. Applied research (budget activity 6.3) of

each of the departments increased the most and by roughly the same amount

when taken as a percentage. Across all of DOD, basic research increased the least

in dollar terms, although in percentage terms this varied considerably between

departments and agencies.

•

Of the PEs that were in existence throughout the 10-year period, 73% exceeded

their baseline funding. The increases varied from PE to PE, but the PEs that

increased the most represented a relatively small share of the total increase.

•

It is difficult to discern any clear “winners” over these 10 years in terms of

particular mission, disciplines, or sub-systems. A possible exception may be a

growing emphasis on countering weapons of mass destruction. This could reflect

a shift away from traditional force-on-force conflict toward a more

unconventional post-Cold War threat.

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Congress has three basic approaches to consider when funding S&T going forward—continue

increasing S&T funding, reduce S&T funding, or keep S&T funding flat in inflation-adjusted

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dollars. Within each option, Congress may also decide to adjust the allocation of resources or

keep it more or less the same. For example, the Director of Defense Engineering and Research

has advocated more basic research. In an expanding program, Congress may be able to

accommodate an increase in basic research (or elsewhere within the S&T program) without

having to make other major allocation adjustments. However, in a flat or declining budget,

growth in a particular department, agency, program, or budget activity would have to be

accompanied by decreases somewhere else. Any such decrease could come from those programs

that experienced the greatest increases over the last ten years, arguing that the past growth has

been sufficient to meet perceived needs. If, however, these areas of past growth are deemed to

require yet more growth, decreases would have to come from elsewhere within the program. In

this situation, the relatively few programs that have already experienced decreases could be

further reduced, indicating their lower priority. However, any such further reductions could render

the program inefficient in trying to meet its goals. Alternatively, decreases could be spread evenly

over all other programs, reducing the impact on any particular program areas.

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Budget Activity/Name

6.1

Basic Research

6.2

Applied Research

6.3

Advanced Technology Development

6.4

Advanced Component Development

and Prototypes

6.5

System Development and

Demonstration

6.6

RDT&E Management Support

6.7

Operational System Development

Definitions

Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of

fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without specific

applications towards processes or products in mind.

Systematic expansion and application of knowledge to develop useful

materials, devices, and systems or methods...directed toward general nonsystem specific military needs.

Development of subsystems and components and efforts to integrate

subsystems and components into system prototypes for field experiments

and/or tests in simulated environments.

[Evaluation of] integrated technologies...or prototype systems in a high fidelity

and realistic operating environment....Emphasis is on proving component and

subsystem maturity prior to integration in major and complex systems.

[These activities are taken in the initial phases of an decision to acquire a

specific system to meet a certified military need.]

Mature system development, integration, and demonstration, including

engineering and manufacturing development. Prototype performance is near

or at operational levels. These activities must be successfully completed

before the acquisition program can progress to live fire testing and initial

operational testing and evaluation of production representative articles.

Efforts to sustain and/or modernize the installations or operations of general

research, development, test, and evaluation. Includes test ranges, maintenance

and support of laboratories, maintenance and operation of test aircraft and

ships, and studies and analysis of the research, development, test, and

evaluation program.

Efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or anticipate production

funding in the current or subsequent fiscal year.

Excerpted from DOD Financial Management Regulation. 7000.14-R. Volume 2B, Chapter 5. For a full

explanation of these activities, see http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/02b/02b_05.pdf.

Source:

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(name redacted)

Specialist in Science and Technology Policy

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov

, 7-....

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