The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress
Congressional research reportDec 9, 2008
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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign
Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and
Options for Congress
(name redacted), Coordinator
Specialist in International Security Affairs
December 9, 2008
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL34639
The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign
populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in
general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources
because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international
needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its
mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes:
responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities,
and strengthening foreign governments’ ability to deal with internal and international threats
through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD
foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s
capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian
emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military
training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with
foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such
activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional
development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD
training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to
enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time.
Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense
analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in
preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of
extensive international and interagency “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in
foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in
many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be
“best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.” Nevertheless, although
reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD officials believe that the U.S. military
must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian
forces.
In the second session of the 110th Congress, Members have faced several choices regarding the
DOD role in foreign assistance. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to make
permanent two controversial DOD authorities. It has also proposed legislation to enable U.S.
government civilian personnel to perform some of the tasks currently carried out by the U.S.
military, as well as to form a civilian reserve corps for that purpose. Congress may also consider
options to improve DOD coordination with civilian agencies on foreign assistance activities.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview: DOD’s Evolving Response to Perceived Needs ........................................................... 3
Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs ......................................................................... 5
Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding Since the 1980s.............. 5
Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance ........................................................ 6
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military Training and
Operations ........................................................................................................................ 6
New DOD Health Programs ................................................................................................ 7
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander’s Emergency Response
Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq........................................................................... 7
Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance ...................................................... 8
Building Military Capacity and Capabilities ............................................................................. 9
Evolution of Military Assistance Authority....................................................................... 10
Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security Force Capacity ............... 14
Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and International Threats ................... 15
Historical Precedents and Current Activities..................................................................... 15
Perspectives on State-Building.......................................................................................... 16
Major Issues and Options for Congress ......................................................................................... 18
What Are the Effects of DOD Activities on U.S. Foreign Relations and Foreign
Policy Goals?........................................................................................................................ 18
Summary of Benefits......................................................................................................... 18
Summary of Critiques ....................................................................................................... 19
Relative Costs.................................................................................................................... 21
Can Current DOD and State Department Coordination Be Improved?................................... 21
Congress’s Role in Specifying Interagency Coordination ................................................ 22
Interagency Coordination in Practice ................................................................................ 23
Current Initiatives to Improve Interagency Coordination ................................................. 24
Further Considerations and Options .................................................................................. 25
Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance Activities Be
Enhanced? ............................................................................................................................ 26
DOD Manpower and Budget Advantages ......................................................................... 27
Possible Options to Enhance U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities .............................. 28
Need to Examine Other Civilian Capabilities ................................................................... 29
Tables
Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded
Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to Foreign Assistance Activities Referenced Above ............. 31
Table A-1. Section 401 Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action: Costs, Number of
Projects, and Number of Countries, by Fiscal Year .................................................................... 40
Table A-2. Geographical Distribution of Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
Activities: Number of Countries, by Region and Fiscal Year ..................................................... 41
Table B-1. DOD Funding for Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs, by Fiscal Year,
FY2000-FY2009 ......................................................................................................................... 44
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Table B-2. PEPFAR Funding Transfers to DOD Global HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs,
FY2004 through FY2008............................................................................................................ 44
Table C-1. DOD Humanitarian Mine Action Funds Expended, by Fiscal Year, FY2000FY2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 48
Table C-2. Countries Assisted with DOD HMA Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2000FY2007 ....................................................................................................................................... 48
Table F-1. Timeline of Major Congressional Authorities and Executive Directives Related
to CN .......................................................................................................................................... 56
Table F-2. DOD CN Funding by U.S. Combatant Command, FY2005 and FY2006 .................. 58
Table F-3. Top 10 DOD CN Assistance Recipients, FY2005 and FY2006 .................................. 58
Table I-1. GPOI Funding, by Fiscal Year, FY2005-FY2009 ......................................................... 73
Appendixes
Appendix A. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, Including Civic Action .................... 33
Appendix B. DOD Global Health Programs.................................................................................. 42
Appendix C. Department of Defense Humanitarian Mine Action Program .................................. 46
Appendix D. Foreign Military Sales and Financing Program ....................................................... 49
Appendix E. International Military Education and Training Program........................................... 52
Appendix F. Counternarcotics ....................................................................................................... 55
Appendix G. Foreign Anti-Terrorism and Counterterrorism Train and Equip Assistance
and Education Programs ............................................................................................................. 62
Appendix H. Foreign Military Capacity Building Section 1206 Authority ................................... 67
Appendix I. Global Peace Operations Initiative Train and Equip Program ................................... 72
Appendix J. The Department of Defense in Nonproliferation: The Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program ..................................................................................................................... 75
Appendix K. DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction and State-Building ......... 80
Appendix L. Foreign Security Assistance Initiatives for Afghanistan and Iraq............................. 86
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 93
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 93
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Introduction1
Among the foreign policy questions that the 111th Congress will face is one that has surfaced
repeatedly for over 60 years and has resurfaced during the previous Congress: what is the
appropriate role for the Department of Defense (DOD) in foreign assistance? DOD has long
played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of
DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute
unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and
organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has shaped the
DOD role through a wide variety of authorities contained in the Foreign Relations and Intercourse
(Title 22 U.S. Code) and Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual
legislation. To some analysts, the DOD role has been in effect a product of Congress’s willingness
to fund defense rather than foreign affairs budgets. In some instances, the activities in which
DOD participates serve an institutional purpose for the U.S. military, providing U.S. soldiers and
sailors with opportunities for military training, for cultivating military-to-military contacts, and
for gathering information on foreign countries where they may someday be called to operate.
The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded roughly as serving three purposes:
•
Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. Since at least the 19th century,
U.S. military forces have provided urgent assistance to foreign populations in
time of disasters, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, U.S. military
forces have also provided aid in humanitarian crises such as famines and forced
population movements. DOD aids foreign populations under authorities to
conduct humanitarian assistance in a variety of other circumstances, including as
an adjunct to military training and exercises with and as part of military
operations.
•
Building foreign military capacity and capabilities. DOD provides military
equipment, weapons, training, and other assistance to build up the military
capacity and capabilities of friendly foreign countries. Such support is provided
to augment military capacity to perform counternarcotics, counterterrorism,
internal defense, border defense, and other missions, and as part of post-conflict
state-building. The origins of current programs date to the early years after World
War II, when the United States sought to help rebuild Europe.
•
Strengthening foreign governments. Besides building foreign military capacity,
DOD plays a role in U.S. efforts to help foreign governments secure their
territories against internal and international threats with a variety of non-military
tools. These include state-building efforts, such as strengthening police forces,
1
The introduction and overview were prepared by (name reda cted), Specialist in International Security Affairs. These
sections draw on the appendices at the end of the report by several CRS analysts from the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division. Contributors to the report include (name redacted) (retired), Specialist in National Defense; (name reda
cted), Specialist in International Security; (name redacted), Specialist in International Security; (name redacted),
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy; (name redacted), Analyst in Global
Health; John Rollins, Specialist in
Terrorism and National Security; (name redacted), Sp
ecialist in Global Health; Liana Sun Wyler, Analyst in
International Crime and Narcotics; (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affair
s; and (name redacted), Specialist in
Nuclear Weapons Policy.
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and bolstering the legitimacy of foreign governments by undertaking small-scale
economic, health, and social projects (and in the case of conflict zones, political
projects), generally in areas outside capital cities. Although such efforts were
carried out sporadically as early as the 19th century, the post-World War II U.S.
occupations in Germany and Japan are regarded as state-building models. More
recently, DOD support for border protection and nuclear non-proliferation
initiatives strengthens foreign governments by curbing international threats.
During the past few years, Congress has provided DOD with new, non-combat authorities to
prosecute the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to conduct counterterrorism2 activities elsewhere.
Congress granted these authorities in response not only to the immediate needs of U.S. military
operations in conflict zones, but also to the Bush Administration’s efforts, in the wake of the
terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), to redirect and reshape U.S.
government capabilities in a new strategic environment. As a result, some analysts believe that
DOD is playing too large a role in assisting foreign populations, militaries, and governments.
Critics view this role as potentially detrimental to U.S. foreign policy, citing a perceived lack of
strategic coordination between DOD and the State Department (and other agencies where
applicable), a failure to ensure that DOD programs are sustainable, and a militarization of the
United States’ image abroad. These analysts call for greater clarity and reforms in defining
DOD’s foreign assistance role and responsibilities.3 This report provides Congress with historical
context and current information and perspectives regarding DOD’s role and responsibilities in a
range of foreign assistance activities.
In an overview and appendices, this report provides background information on and discusses
issues related to the DOD’s role in providing U.S. foreign assistance and undertaking foreign
assistance-type activities. Topics include the types of assistance DOD provides, the authorities
under which DOD conducts its programs, and coordination and cooperation mechanisms between
DOD and other agencies. The report begins with a brief introduction to the three areas in which
DOD plays a role in foreign assistance and to Congress’s part in authorizing that role. Next, the
report briefly discusses the general evolution of DOD’s role and the Department of State’s current
perception of that role based on current national security needs. The report then provides an
overview of the evolution of the DOD role and current activities in the three areas cited above,
with a snapshot of the varying perspectives on the DOD roles in these areas. Finally, the report
discusses issues that Congress may wish to consider. The appendices provide more detailed
2
The term counterterrorism in this report refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
Several recent reports reflect these perceptions. Two of these are congressional reports: U.S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations. Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign. Washington, D.C.,
December 2006 (hereafter referred to as 2006 SFRC Report) and U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report on the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 to accompany H.R. 1585,H.Rept. 110-447, Section 952, December 6,
2007. Two were produced by Washington, D.C.-based think tanks: Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, Final Report of the Task Force on NonTraditional Security Assistance, CSIS Report, December 2007 (hereafter referred to as CSIS Task Force Final Report
2007); and Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DOD’s
Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper no. 131, November 2007 (hereafter referred to as The
Pentagon and Global Development). Another was produced by an international organization: Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development, The United States: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer
Review, 2006, p. 15, (hereafter referred to as the DAC Peer Review 2006). Another was produced by a group of nongovernmental organizations: George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, Ready, Aim,
Foreign Policy, a joint publication of the Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education
Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2008.
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information on the current and most significant foreign assistance programs in which DOD plays
a role.
This report refers to a Department of Defense role in foreign assistance rather than a U.S. military
role because DOD may use either military troops or civilian contractors, or both, to implement
programs. The term U.S. military is used only for activities in which U.S. troops are used
exclusively.
Overview: DOD’s Evolving Response to
Perceived Needs
DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time.
During the years in which the United States’ primary national security threats were posed by other
States, there were differing perspectives within DOD on the use of the military in non-combat
roles. With the fall of the Soviet Union, these differences sharpened. Within the past few years,
the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a
post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and
preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international (and
interagency) “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities.
The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) is the first key document that
reflects the evolution of DOD thinking as it grapples with the implications of 9/11 for U.S.
national security and U.S. defense policy.4 The assertion of top U.S. defense officials and military
leaders that DOD needs “new and more flexible” authorities to operate in the current strategic
environment forms the rationale for DOD’s request for new authorities,5 especially to advance a
new “Partnership Strategy.”6
As outlined in the 2006 QDR, the Partnership Strategy is one of DOD’s key tools for the United
States’ “long war” against a new threat—that is, the decentralized networks of “violent extremists
who use terrorism as their weapon of choice,” who “will likely attempt to use” weapons of mass
destruction “in their conflict with free people everywhere.”7 Countering such networks, as well as
the rogue powers that may sponsor them, will require “long-duration, complex operations
4
U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February 6, 2006. (Hereafter referred to as 2006
QDR.) The QDR is a congressionally mandated report (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 118) produced every four years that
delineates a national defense strategy consistent with the President’s most recent National Security Strategy, based on
the perceived threats to U.S. interests, and defines the necessary force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget, and other elements to carry out that defense strategy. The 2002 National Security Strategy, the most recent
before the 2006 QDR, sets forth eight tasks for the U.S. government, among them four which directly involve DOD:
(1) “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends”; (2) “work
with others to defuse regional conflicts”; (3) “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with
weapons of mass destruction”; and (4) “transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and
opportunities of the twenty-first century.” pp. 1-2.
5
Ibid., p. 83. The full quote states: “The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for
counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, ‘military diplomacy’ and complex interagency coalition operations
are essential—but in many cases require new and more flexible authorities from the Congress.”
6
2006 QDR, op. cit. The previous QDR, although published in late September 2001, was written and cleared before the
9/11 attacks.
7
Ibid., p. v.
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involving the U.S. military, other government agencies and international partners,” which are
waged simultaneously in multiple countries.8 To do so will also require that the United States
“assist others in developing the wherewithal to protect their own populations and police their own
territories, as well as to project and sustain forces to promote collective security.”9
In the 2006 QDR, as elsewhere, DOD maintains that developing the foreign “wherewithal” to
enhance domestic and collective security requires a “whole of government” approach. Through
the November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, entitled the Directive on Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, defense leaders mandated
that DOD “be prepared to conduct and support” civilian agencies in conducting SSTR operations,
but also indicated doubt that civilian agencies will create the needed capabilities to carry out
state-building tasks. Thus, while DOD acknowledges that state-building tasks may be “best
performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals,” it also sees a need to develop
its own capability to perform “all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians
cannot do so.”10 As reflected in the 2006 QDR, DOD is placing a new emphasis on the utility of
non-combat foreign assistance activities and expects to continue to play an important, if not a
proportionately expanding, role in U.S. foreign assistance in the developing world.
DOD subsequently reiterated these points. In October 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
referred to this new perception of the DOD role: “And until our government decides to plus up
our civilian agencies like the Agency for International Development [USAID], Army soldiers can
expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting good
governance. All these so-called ‘nontraditional’ capabilities have moved into the mainstream of
military thinking, planning, and strategy—where they must stay.”11 This theme was once again
repeated in the June 2008 National Defense Strategy, which found that U.S. forces had “stepped
up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development, and governance” and that the “U.S.
Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities,” while noting that “this is
no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.”12
In a report to Congress in mid-2007, the State Department had argued in favor of new permanent
DOD authorities. It viewed such authorities, including several mentioned below, as a means “to
provide a flexible, timely, and effective whole-of-government approach to today’s security
environment that is well coordinated in the interagency [coordination process] both in
8
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 20.
10
The November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, the Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Hereafter referred to as DOD Directive 3000.05.) This directive discusses
state-building tasks as part of stability operations. It is the first DOD document to designate stability operations as “a
core U.S. military mission.” The state-building tasks it specifically lists are helping to rebuild indigenous institutions,
including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems; reviving or building the private sector, and
developing representative governmental institutions. This directive may be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/html/300005.htm; last accessed July 22, 2008. For more on this topic, CRS Report RL33557,
Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by (name redacted).
11
U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the Association of the United
States Army, Washington, D.C., October 10. 2007. Accessed through http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches; last
accessed July 22, 2008.
12
U.S. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy, June 2008, p. 17. In the same paragraph, this document
stated: “Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and to relieve stress on
the men and women of the armed forces. Having permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could
also make it less likely that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”
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Washington at the policy level and in the field at the operational level, and with appropriate,
relevant oversight by Congress.”13
The following sections discuss DOD’s traditional and current responsibilities in disaster
assistance and humanitarian activities, assistance to foreign militaries, and assistance in other
state-building areas. They also discuss recent proposals for enhanced authorities as spelled out in
the QDR and related legislation submitted to Congress.
Responding to Humanitarian and Basic Needs
DOD engagement in U.S. government disaster relief and humanitarian assistance activities is
longstanding, with U.S. military forces playing an important role in U.S. disaster assistance since
at least the 19th century.14 DOD also plays a role in other humanitarian emergency situations, such
as providing aid and protection for relief workers in cases of famine or forced population
movements. More routine humanitarian assistance activities and civic action programs abroad
date back at least to the turn of the 20th century; these usually take place in the context of U.S.
training exercises or military operations.
Evolution of Humanitarian Programs, Authorities, and Funding Since the
1980s
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress provided specific DOD authorities for humanitarian aid as
the Reagan Administration’s civilian leadership sought means to support its allies in conflicts in
Central America and Afghanistan. During that period, Congress provided specific authority to
DOD to (1) provide nonlethal excess property and supplies from the DOD stocks when requested
by the State Department and for distribution by the State Department; (2) provide space-available
military transportation for private donors to send supplies and food to needy foreign populations;
and (3) carry out civic assistance programs that involve small-scale construction, reconstruction,
and maintenance projects, and provide limited medical attention to rural populations. (See
Appendix A and Appendix C.)
Since then, Congress has somewhat modified and expanded DOD disaster response and
humanitarian programs, incorporating aid to mitigate environmental disasters and demining
training, and has introduced separate health programs. (See Appendix A, Appendix B, and
Appendix C.) Thus, DOD disaster and humanitarian aid now encompasses a broader range of
potential assistance than the basic humanitarian relief of food and emergency supplies provided
by non-governmental organizations. In 1994, Congress established the Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) DOD budget account to fund many of these programs.15
13
U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.
Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. July 3, 2007. Hereafter referred to as the Section 1206(f) 2006
NDAA Report. This report is available through the Department of State website: http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/spec/
90867.htm; last accessed July 22, 2008.
14
Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007), p. 63.
15
Section 1411, P.L. 103-337, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1995. The account was
first authorized at $86 million. It was established to cover activities under 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404 (newly established
by that bill), 2547, and 2551.
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Disaster Relief and Related Humanitarian Assistance
The DOD role in providing disaster relief to foreign populations when natural and manmade
disasters strike serves both foreign affairs and military needs. The lead authority for disaster
response is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DOD participation is
conducted on the direction of the President or at the request of the State Department, through the
appropriate U.S. ambassador. Nevertheless, DOD is often the first U.S. agency to respond to
foreign disasters and other humanitarian crises because of its readily deployable resources. DOD
international emergency responses allow the United States to contribute effectively in alleviating
suffering abroad and enhancing the country’s international image, as well as the U.S. domestic
and foreign image of the U.S. military. (See Appendix A.) Such activities are also undertaken for
strategic or foreign policy reasons. A famous post-World War II example of such motivation was
the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift, when U.S. Air Force and [British] Royal Air Force flights of relief
supplies to Soviet-blockaded West Berlin demonstrated a U.S. and U.K. commitment to a
strategically important area.
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance in the Context of Military Training and
Operations
Humanitarian and civic assistance programs, as currently conducted, usually take place in the
context of training exercises and military operations. In that context, they are carried out as much
for the U.S. military to gain situational awareness and the support of local populations as to
alleviate suffering. When provided under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 401), the primary
purpose of the program must be to train U.S. armed forces. In addition, the assistance must not
duplicate any other assistance, and it must meet the security interests of both the United States
and the host country. Section 401 authority has been often used for training exercises for the
National Guard, and for military reserve personnel and active duty personnel in certain
specialties, especially medical personnel. U.S. Special Operations Forces also conduct
humanitarian assistance activities as an adjunct to military training exercises with foreign
militaries and as an integral part of stability and counterinsurgency operations. The Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises with friendly foreign militaries are conducted
under 10 U.S.C. 2011, primarily for the benefit of training the Special Operations Forces, but
humanitarian assistance programs such as medical and veterinary visits may be added to cultivate
goodwill among local populations and as part of the training for foreign troops.
U.S. humanitarian and civic assistance activities also can be an integral part of military
operations. During the Korean and Vietnam conflict eras, military civic action programs that
included medical assistance were an integral part of military efforts. Now, in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations, teams of U.S. Special Operations Forces work together with
foreign militaries on small-scale humanitarian and civic action projects. The primary purposes of
humanitarian and civic assistance in such operations are to extend the reach of the national
government, enhance its legitimacy among local populations, and cultivate relationships and trust
that may lead to information sharing on terrorists’ locations and planned activities.16
16
Authors’ interview with DOD officials, January 2008.
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New DOD Health Programs
Recently, Congress has added new health programs to the humanitarian assistance portfolio of the
U.S. military. Beginning in FY2000, Congress has provided funds through the Defense Health
Program to educate foreign military forces in HIV prevention activities in conjunction with U.S.
military training exercises and humanitarian assistance activities in Africa. Subsequently, other
DOD health programs have been added. (See Appendix B.)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Commander’s Emergency Response
Program Funds in Afghanistan and Iraq
Congress provides special funding and authorities for programs with a humanitarian assistance
component in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. The DOD-lead Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and State Department-led units in Iraq, for which DOD provides
security, are central to U.S. efforts to promote host government authority and stability to areas
outside the capitals in those countries. These integrated civilian and military teams count
humanitarian assistance among their tools to provide stability in difficult areas, extend the reach
of the central government, strengthen local governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and stimulate
local economies. In addition, commanders on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq use
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which Congress appropriates, to
respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.17 (See Appendix K)
Funding Accounts
For many years, prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, funding for DOD disaster response
and humanitarian assistance projects was appropriated annually in the Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) Account. This account covers disaster response and a
variety of other humanitarian assistance programs codified under six Title 10 authorities.18
17
CERP was created in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. It initially used Iraqi funds for use in that
country. Subsequently, Congress has provided CERP funding for use in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress first provided
up to $180 million for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, P.L. 108-106, Section 1110,
November 6, 2003. (Hereafter referred to as the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.) Congress
subsequently provided additional funds: up to $854 million in FY2005, up to $500 million each for FY2006 and
FY2007, and up to $500 million thus far for FY2008. (See the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Yar 2005, P.L.
108-375, Section 1201, as amended by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-12, Section 1006; the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163,
Section 1202; and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-161, Section 606(a)). The Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417), Section 1214, reset the FY2008 authorization
at $1.7 billion and set the FY2009 authorization at $1.5 billion. Note that the spelling for the first word in the name of
this program is not consistent; it is sometimes spelled Commanders’. This report uses the spelling first used in
legislation.
18
These are 10 U.S.C. 401, 402, 404, 407, 2557, and 2561 (previously 2551). Section 401 authorizes DOD to carry out
humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in conjunction with military operations. Section 402,
popularly referred to as the Denton Amendment, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to transport, without charge,
humanitarian supplies (as well as supplies that respond to serious threats to the environment if other transport is not
available) that have been provided by a non-governmental source to any country on a space available basis. Section 404
authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide international disaster assistance to prevent the loss
of lives or serious harm to the environment. Section 407 provides authority for humanitarian demining assistance.
Section 2557 authorizes providing nonlethal excess DOD supplies for humanitarian relief. Section 2561 provides
additional authority for the transport of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide, as well as
(continued...)
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Congress gradually increased appropriations for OHDACA from $49.7 million in FY2002 to
$63.204 million in FY2007.19 These funds were available for one fiscal year. For FY2008,
Congress appropriated $40 million in that account specifically for disaster relief and response, to
be available for two fiscal years (i.e., through FY2009), and an additional $63.3 million to be
available for those purposes for three fiscal years (i.e., through FY2010). For FY2009, Congress
provided the Administration with the requested $83.273 million in OHDACA funding.20
For FY2009, the Bush Administration sought monies for humanitarian purposes under a
longstanding DOD account, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), that provides
funds to combatant commanders for a variety of purposes. In its FY2009 budget request, the Bush
Administration asked for $100 million for the CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. Over the past decade at least, Congress has
appropriated $25 million in annual DOD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts
in FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations legislation, but, through FY2007 at least, the
CCIF does not appear to have been used extensively for humanitarian projects.21 For FY2009,
Congress appropriated $50 million for that account.22
Perspectives on Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. officials state that DOD has instructed military commanders to look more broadly than in the
past at humanitarian assistance, employing it as a component of U.S. security cooperation with
foreign nations.23 Guidance to U.S. combatant commanders has stated that DOD regards
humanitarian assistance as “foremost a tool for achieving U.S. security objectives,” which can
also serve several “complementary security goals.”24 The “complementary” goals cited are
“improving DOD visibility, access, influence, interoperability, and coalition-building with
military and civilian host nation counterparts; building/reinforcing security and stability in a host
nation or region; generating positive public relations and goodwill for DOD that will enhance our
ability to shape the regional security environment; bolstering host nation capacity to respond to
(...continued)
authority to transport supplies to respond to or mitigate serious harm to the environment.
19
The amounts in the intervening years were $58.4 million for FY2003, $59.0 million for each FY2004 and FY2005,
and $61.546 million for FY2006. Figures from annual DOD appropriations acts.
20
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417.
21
U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p.103.
When codified in 1991 (Title 10 U.S.C. Section 166a), the CCIF (then known as the CINC Initiative Fund), provided
funds for exercises and military education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil
assistance.” A 2006 amendment changed “civil assistance” to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority category, “particularly in a foreign
country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency operation.” (John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007,
P.L. 109-364, Section 902.) To this point, this fund may not have been used for extensively for humanitarian programs.
In response to a Congressional Research Service request for information in 2007, DOD stated that just under $1 million
had been used for humanitarian purposes from FY2005 through FY2007. (Information provided by the Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of November 7, 2007.)
22
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriation Act, 2009, P.L. 110-329.
23
Authors’ interview with DOD officials, December 2006.
24
Joint message from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict (SO/LIC) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), providing policy and program management
direction for FY2005 OHDACA planning and execution. Section 3 (General Guidance) A and B.
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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance
disasters ... and promoting specific operational readiness skills of US military personnel.”25 The
2006 QDR places humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations under the rubric of
“humanitarian and early preventive measures” and claims that the use of such measures can
“prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.”26
State Department officials welcome the U.S. military’s ability to deliver disaster and
humanitarian relief assistance in a timely fashion. They also tend to favor routine humanitarian
assistance and civic action projects, albeit as a matter of necessity, because such projects allow
the U.S. government to provide supplies and medical services to needy populations, and to
construct schools and clinics in underserved areas, where funds are not otherwise available. These
projects can create goodwill and personal contact for the United States, often in areas where U.S.
diplomats would otherwise not venture.
DOD and U.S. military personnel attitudes toward disaster response and humanitarian relief vary.
Attitudes tend to be favorable for immediate disaster response and for training exercises,
particularly for National Guard and Reserve troops. Attitudes become ambivalent when U.S.
military personnel are used for prolonged periods for humanitarian assistance in conventional
operations.
Over the years, observers have raised a variety of concerns regarding humanitarian and civic
assistance in non-emergency situations. Analysts have long faulted such assistance for sometimes
being short-sighted and producing ill will when projects are not well selected.27 In the 1990s,
Congress scrutinized U.S. humanitarian and civic action activities in Central America.28 Critics
continue to view some projects as ill-conceived and at odds with sound development policy; for
instance, schools built in areas where there are no teachers to staff them undermine the credibility
of the United States and the host nation government, or assistance that, albeit inadvertently,
benefits one ethnic group over another exacerbates ongoing conflicts.29 (See Appendix A.) The
Bush Administration has recently created new coordination mechanisms that may address such
concerns. (See the section on DOD interaction with other agencies, below.)
Building Military Capacity and Capabilities
Since the early years after World War II, U.S. military assistance programs to train and equip
foreign military forces have been an important component of U.S. foreign assistance, and DOD
has played a major role in those programs. Even though the major train and equip efforts are
conducted under State Department programs, DOD has long been responsible for carrying out
most of the work involved in building foreign military capacity and capabilities. Sizable military
assistance programs put in place soon after World War II served the primary purpose of bolstering
the defense capabilities of major allies against the Soviet Union, but in subsequent years, military
25
Ibid., Section 3B.
2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 12.
27
See especially John W. DePauw, “Understanding Civic Action,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of
Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, pp. 1-7. This
book presents critical views of civic action from a sympathetic perspective.
28
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Role of the
DOD in Humanitarian Assistance, hearing , 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 19, 1994, H.A.S.C. No. 103-49 (Washington:
GPO, 1995).
29
The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit.
26
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assistance programs also began increasingly to serve political and diplomatic, as well as military,
ends. For the past several decades, military assistance—carried out through the State
Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training
(IMET) programs—has become an important tool of bilateral relations, intended to strengthen
and cement relations with foreign governments, reward allies, and cultivate new partners. A
recently added State Department program to train and equip foreign peacekeepers and a DOD
program to train and equip foreign military forces for both counterterrorism missions and stability
operations reflect the intention to develop capable international partners in quelling conflict and
curbing terrorism. For many years, DOD training of foreign military forces was carried out by
Special Operations Forces, but now DOD officials describe it as a key mission for the U.S.
military as a whole.30
Evolution of Military Assistance Authority
The Mutual Defense Assistance Act (MDAA) of 1949 was the legal forerunner to all major postWorld War II military assistance programs. Congress passed the MDAA to provide weapons and
military equipment to the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to a
number of other countries.31 The MDAA’s successors, the Military Security Act (MSA) of 1951
and the MSA of 1954,32 were the major vehicles for U.S. foreign assistance until the enactment of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which stands today as current law. The MSA of 1951 created
the Mutual Security Agency in the Executive Office of the President. The MSA Director was
responsible for the “continuous supervision, general direction, and coordination of all foreign
aid—military, economic, and technical assistance.”33 Thus, during the early part of the 1950s,
DOD administered the military assistance programs under the White House’s policy direction and
guidance.34 Congress subsequently moved responsibility for non-military aid to the State
Department, whose officials were charged with coordinating with DOD regarding military aid.35
As described by the forerunner of the Congressional Research Service in 1959, the purpose of the
State Department coordination of military aid (identified as “an important instrument of U.S.
foreign policy”) with other forms of aid was “to help achieve the basic policy goals decided upon
by the President with the advice of the National Security Council” (NSC).36
30
Secretary of Defense Gates’ October 2007 speech, op. cit.
The MDAA (P.L. 81-329, 63 Stat. 714) authorized military aid to the original NATO nations (Canada and 10
European nations) and to Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, the Philippines, and Taiwan. CRS Report 85-91 F, An Overview
of United States Military Assistance Programs, by (name redacted). This archived report is available from the
author.
32
P.L. 82-165 (65 Stat. 373) and P.L. 83-665 (68 Stat. 832).
33
The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration and
Related Information, February 27, 1959, pp. 139-140. Hereafter referred to as “U.S. Foreign Aid.”
34
With the creation of a Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953 to administer economic aid and technical
assistance, the Secretary of Defense was also subject to coordination with and supervision by the FOA Director, who
reported directly to the President. Congress divested the FOA director of responsibility for supervising military aid in
1954. U.S. Foreign Aid, ibid., pp. 141-142.
35
In 1955, Congress established the International Cooperation Administration within the State Department, among
whose functions was coordinating nonmilitary aid with DOD-administered military aid. Congress moved coordination
responsibility to a higher level, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, when it created that post in 1958.
U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 142.
36
U.S. Foreign Aid, op. cit., p. 130.
31
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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance
Origins of State Department Programs and Oversight
As economic and development assistance became the U.S. government’s preferred tool for
countering Soviet influence in the developing world, Congress entrusted the State Department
with the leadership role for foreign assistance, including military assistance, when it passed the
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.37 Since then, with the exception of the period inclusive of
the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the major foreign military assistance
programs—the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program,
and the International Military Education Training (IMET) program—have been carried out under
State Department oversight and guidance.38 These programs are implemented, however, by a
DOD agency: the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the DOD Under
Secretary for Policy, and its predecessor.39 (See Appendix D and Appendix E.) In 2005,
Congress created a third State Department train and equip program, the Global Peace Operations
Initiative (GPOI), to provide training in peacekeeping skills and related equipment to foreign
militaries. (See Appendix I.)
DOD Education and Training Programs
In addition to the major programs to build foreign military capacity under State Department
authority, Congress authorizes and funds DOD to conduct a wide variety of smaller military-tomilitary education and training programs. These offer foreign military personnel the opportunity
to attend U.S. military education and training programs, in addition to those funded under IMET,
as well as conferences and meetings. They also provide the U.S. military with important
opportunities to cultivate relations with foreign military officers. Congress generally requires all
such activities to be conducted with the approval of the Secretary of State.40 Combatant
37
As now stated in the FAA of 1961, as amended, Section 622(c) (22 U.S.C. 2382) states that the Secretary of State,
under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of
economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training
program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and
abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” The original, 1961 language of Section
622(c) stated that the section applied to “assistance programs authorized by this Act....” A 1976 amendment deleted this
limitation. (International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 94-329, Section 543(b)(2)(B)). The
Arms Export Control Act, which as of 1968 authorizes the FMS/FMF program, similarly mandates that the Secretary of
State, under the direction of the President, be responsible for “the continuous supervision and general direction of sales,
leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this chapter....” (P.L. 90-629, as amended, Chapter 1, Section
2(b), 22 U.S.C. 2752.)
38
Foreign Military Financing, as well as Foreign Miltary Sales, are carried out under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), as amended (P.L. 90-629). Section 2(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2752) states that nothing contained in the Act
“shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.” Section 2(b) states that the
Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general
direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports under this Act....”
39
The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) became the DSCA in 1999. In 2000, DOD Directive 5105.65
expanded the responsibilities originally carried out by the DSAA. Among other tasks, DSCA helps develop, coordinate,
and implement security and cooperation assistance plans and programs, including FMS, FMF, IMET, humanitarian
assistance, humanitarian civic action, mine action training, and other programs. More information is available on its
website, at http://www.dsca.osd.mil; last accessed July 22, 2008.
40
Numerous DOD educational institutions offer education and training to foreign students. The military service schools
offer such opportunities, as do the DOD regional centers for security studies (i.e., the George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies [the last three of
which are at the National Defense University]). The Political-Military Bureau at the State Department publishes an
(continued...)
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The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance
commanders may also use up to $5 million from the CCIF in any fiscal year “to provide military
education and training (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses) to
military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries....”41
DOD Counternarcotics Train and Equip Support
Under Title 10 U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 124), DOD is the lead U.S. government agency on the
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal narcotics into the United States,
but it falls under the oversight of the Secretary of State, who is charged with coordinating
counternarcotics assistance (22 U.S.C. 2291). Since the 1990s, DOD has provided training and
related support to foreign militaries and law enforcement authorities for counternarcotics
purposes under authorities that Congress extends regularly in annual defense authorization
legislation. (See Appendix F.) Under “Section 1004” authority, first established in 1990 to enable
DOD to support counterdrug agencies and currently extended through FY2011,42 DOD may
provide training and other support to improve foreign counternarcotics capabilities at the request
of any U.S. federal department or agency, or of any U.S. state, local, or foreign law enforcement
agency. Under “Section 1033” authority, first established in 1997 and currently extended through
FY2009,43 DOD may provide patrol, boats, vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment to designated
foreign governments and maintain and repair those items. Originally provided for Colombia and
Peru, this authority now covers 16 more countries. Human rights concerns have figured
prominently in congressional consideration of the DOD role in counternarcotics programs.
Largely in response to such concerns, in 1998, Congress placed a restriction in the DOD
appropriations bill prohibiting U.S. training of foreign military units for which credible evidence
exists of gross violations of human rights.44 This restriction has been extended annually but is less
restrictive than the provision in foreign operations appropriations, first enacted in 1997 and
codified in 2007, which prohibits the use of State Department funds for any assistance to military
units for which credible evidence is found of gross violations of human rights.45
(...continued)
annual report entitled Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, as required by the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 656 (22 U.S.C. 2416). The State Department publishes the
unclassified portions of the report on its website.
41
10 U.S.C. 166a(e)(C).
42
NDAA for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-510, Section 1004 (10 U.S.C. 374 note); last extended and amended by the
Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009, P.L. 110-417, Section 1024.
43
NDAA for Fiscal Year 1998, P.L. 105-85, Section 1033, last amended and extended through legislation including the
FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 1022.
44
Department of Defense Appropriations, 1999, P.L. 105-262, Section 8130 and restated in annual defense
appropriations acts thereafter, most recently in, DOD Appropriations, 2008 (P.L. 110-116, Section 8062). The latest
version of the “Leahy Amendment” states that none of the funds made available by the Act “may be used to support
any training program involving a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has
received credible information from the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.” The Secretary of Defense may waive this provision if he
determines that “such a waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.” The earlier version forbid the use of funds
“if a member of” a potential recipient unit had committed such a violation.
45
The comprehensive version of the human rights provision popularly known as the Leahy Amendment (i.e., the ban
on any foreign operations assistance to foreign security forces for which credible evidence was found of gross
violations of human rights) was first enacted as Section 570 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (P.L. 105-118), and in annual foreign operations appropriations thereafter. Earlier
versions of this restriction had applied to specific countries, programs, or funding accounts; e.g., such a restriction was
placed on counternarcotics assistance in the section on the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control
(continued...)
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DOD “Section 1206” Military Capacity Building Authority for Counterterrorism
and Stability Operations
In 2005, Congress provided DOD with authority and funds for a major DOD-run train and equip
program. Established by Section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 as a temporary “pilot
program,” this “Foreign Military Capacity Building” authority allows DOD to transfer funds to
train and equip foreign militaries to enable those forces to better conduct counterterrorism
operations or to “participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United
States Armed Forces” participate.46 Currently in effect through FY2008, this “Section 1206”
authority has provided up to $200 million in FY2006, and up to $300 million in FY2007 and
FY2008 to meet needs that emerged after the planning cycle for the regular budget submission. In
the Duncan Hunter NDAA for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 1206, Congress increased funding
authority to $350 million, extended the authority through FY2011, and broadened the scope of
authority to include building the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to
conduct counterterrorism operations. Section 1206 authority is subject to strict conditionality. The
original FY2006 legislation required a presidential initiative to initiate a program; in FY2007, this
was changed to permit the Secretary of Defense to authorize a program with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State. Although the legislation does not require the Secretary of State’s
“approval,” DOD and the State Department currently interpret “concurrence” to mean
“approval.”47 (See Appendix H.)
DOD Desire for Permanent Foreign Military and Police Capacity Building
Authority
In 2007, Congress denied a DOD request to significantly expand Section 1206 authority to train
and equip foreign military forces, substantially increase the funding, and make it permanent. In
May 2007, DOD had proposed legislation for “Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign
Military and Other Security Forces” that would provide a new, permanent DOD authority to
spend (or to transfer to the Department of State or other federal agency) up to $750 million per
year to train and equip foreign military and security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations
or to participate in or support military and stability operations. There would be no requirement, as
in Section 1206, that training for military and stability operations be tied to operations in which
the U.S. military participated. The extension would permit DOD to train and equip gendarmerie,
constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast
guard, border protection, and counterterrorism forces. Rejecting the strict conditionality of
(...continued)
account, P.L. 104-208, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997. Section 651 of Division J, P.L.
110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, codifies this restriction at Section 620J (22 U.S.C. 2378d) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This provides that no assistance shall be furnished under the Foreign
Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act “to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary
of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights.” An exception is made if
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to Congress that the government of a country “is taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.”
46
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109-163, Conference Report H.Rept. 109-360,p. 801, and the FY2007 John
Warner NDAA Conference Report H.Rept. 109-702, p. 833.
47
A DOD FY2009 budget document states that under the “dual-key” approval system developed for Section 1206
programs, U.S. embassies and the military combatant commands are encouraged to jointly formulate programs and the
responsible embassy and command “must approve each program explicitly in writing.” U.S. Department of Defense,
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Summary Justification, February 4, 2008, p. 103.
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Section 1206, DOD proposed that the Secretary of State be permitted to waive any restrictions
that might apply. In 2007, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) expressed skepticism
regarding an extension of the program “in the absence of ... an established record of success.”48
In its FY2009 budget request, the Bush Administration asked Congress to codify an expanded
version of Section 1206 that would increase the annual authorization to $750 million and include
a broad array of security forces in addition to military forces. The House version of the bill would
extend current authority through FY2010 (Section 1206, H.R. 5658, the Duncan Hunter NDAA
for FY2009). The Senate version of the NDAA for FY2009 (Section 1204, S. 3001) would extend
Section 1206 authority through FY2011, increasing the annual authorization to $400 million. It
would also authorize the use of funds for security forces whose primary mission is
counterterrorism, subject to the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C. 2420. (See the section
below on civilian capabilities for substantive objections to such authority.)
Perspectives on Building Foreign Military and Other Security Force Capacity
DOD views training for foreign military and other security forces as an expanding area, and seeks
expanded authorities for DOD programs. The 2006 QDR calls for DOD to “improve and increase
IMET-like opportunities targeted at shaping relationships and developing future foreign
leaders.”49 More specifically, it recommends the expansion of DOD and State Department
authorities “to train and equip foreign security forces best suited to internal counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency operations,” noting that these “may be non-military law enforcement or other
security forces....”50 In late 2007, Secretary of Defense Gates identified “the standing up and
mentoring of indigenous army and police” as “a key mission for the military as a whole.”51
In the post-9/11 environment, some defense analysts have urged policy makers to develop more
expeditious mechanisms for the United States to provide military training and military support.
DOD officials argue that the routine planning processes through the traditional State Department
“train and equip” authorities are too cumbersome and time-consuming, reflecting political rather
than operational military needs, with the planning, budgeting, and implementation cycle taking
two to three years. On the other hand, some Members of Congress have faulted Section 1206 for
lacking enough added value to justify making permanent a major train and equip program outside
the State Department’s authority. In a December 2006 report, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee stated its concern that the program was used largely to fund areas where the U.S.
48
In its report on the NDAA for FY2008, HASC stated that it had provided DOD with the limited Section 1206
authority over the past two years, despite the State Department’s historical responsibility for foreign military capacity
building, because of DOD’s expression of “strong interest” in the program. Congress, however, according to HASC,
“has clearly and strongly discouraged further legislative proposals to expand or make permanent DOD’s ‘train and
equip’ authorities in the absence of this required report and an established track record of success.” U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, report of the
Committee of Armed Services on H.R. 1585 together with additional views, 110th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 110-146,
part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2007), p. 401. Hereafter referred to as HASC.Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA.
49
2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 91.
50
2006 QDR, op. cit., p. 90.
51
He suggested that this is in contrast to the past, when only Special Operations Forces focused on training missions,
but the inclusion of “police”—historically the province of other agencies—may be telling. See U.S. Department of
Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, the “Landon Lecture” delivered at Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas, November 26, 2007. Accessed through http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches; last accessed July 22,
2008.
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military sought to enhance military-to-military relations rather than to meet emerging needs.52
The committee recommended that all security assistance, including that administered under
Section 1206, be placed under State Department control.
Similarly, in line with a 2006 QDR recommendation53 and the desire for more flexibility in
providing assistance to allies and friendly states, DOD has also sought broader reimbursement
authority for coalition support forces and expanded logistics support to other States “partnering”
with the United States. Congress has been more responsive to these requests. (See Appendix L.)
Strengthening Foreign Governments Against Internal and
International Threats
DOD has supported foreign governments’ efforts to counter internal and international threats with
assistance that goes beyond help to foreign military forces. In many situations, and currently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, DOD has played a significant, if not a leading, role in tasks related to
nation-building or state-building. Such tasks include helping establish or strengthen rule of law
capabilities (police, judicial, and prison institutions and facilities), reinforcing the administrative
capacity of central governments, strengthening local governments in rural areas, and bolstering
national economies. Such state-building support is now widely perceived as a means to deter or
control internal and international threats. Although U.S. military personnel carry out this role
most often in combat situations, where the presence of untrained, unarmed civilians may be a
liability, they may also carry out this role because of a shortage of trained civilian personnel.
Because the circumstances have varied greatly, such assistance has usually been carried out under
a mix of authorities and programs.
Historical Precedents and Current Activities
The most notable example of U.S. military involvement in state-building occurred in the postWorld War II military occupations of Germany and Japan, although there are earlier examples,
such as the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines around the turn of the 20th century. In the
1990s, DOD personnel provided such assistance in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations as
part of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Sometimes DOD provides such
assistance to foreign governments as part of military counterterrorism, internal defense, and
counterinsurgency efforts. Special operations forces teams carry out a variety of state-building
activities, to strengthen local leaders and defuse ethnic and other rivalries, as part of their civic
assistance projects. Congress also provides DOD with authority to train and otherwise assist
foreign law enforcement officials to perform counternarcotics operations, although there is no
standard source for determining the degree to which DOD provides such support.
52
2006 SFRC Report, op. cit. “Section 1206 assistance, with the exception of Lebanon and Pakistan, is not addressing
threats to the United States that are so immediate that ... [they] cannot be included in normal budget processes. The
Secretary of State should insist that all security assistance, including Section 1206 funding, be included under his/her
authority in the new process for rationalizing and prioritizing foreign assistance.” p. 3.
53
2006 QDR, op. cit. The recommendation is to expand DOD authority to provide logistics support, supplies and
services to allies and coalition partners, without reimbursement if necessary, to enable them to participate in operations
with U.S. armed forces. Two related recommendations are to “Establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to fund,
and, as appropriate, stockpile routine defense articles such as helmets, body armor and night vision devices for use by
coalition partners” and to “Expand Department authority to lease or lend equipment to allies and coalition partners for
use in military operations in which they are participating with U.S. forces.” pp. 89-90.
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Activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
In Iraq and Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) carry out state-building
political and economic activities, in addition to civic assistance and humanitarian activities.
Although no data are available on the extent to which state-building activities are directed or
conducted by U.S. military personnel, soldiers are involved, particularly when there are not
enough civilian members of a PRT.
U.S. military field commanders Iraq and Afghanistan carry out reconstruction projects with CERP
funds, with each major subordinate commander authorized to approve grants up to $500,000.
Originally intended to help military commanders establish stability in hostile areas, CERP has
now become a main source of funding for infrastructure development.54 (See Appendix K on
DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan Economic Reconstruction.) Congress has thus far denied
Administration requests to extend CERP funding authority for DOD use on a worldwide basis.55
In Iraq, DOD’s large role in infrastructure reconstruction has been unusual. While the State
Department and USAID were tapped to manage early economic assistance programs in Iraq,
DOD was called on in 2004 to carry out the largest infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, DOD’s
own Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) also was initially found insufficient to manage the task, and
DOD contracted the job directly with private companies. ACE was subsequently tapped for a
management role. Although the State Department assumed responsibility in 2005 for setting
priorities for most aid programs, DOD developed, and Congress funded, a DOD program to
rehabilitate some 200 Iraqi firms that had been state-owned under the Hussein regime, without
either State Department or USAID input. (See Appendix K.)
Perspectives on State-Building
Much of DOD’s state-building activities have thus far been carried out within the context of
military operations. For many years, DOD and U.S. military leaders rejected a nation-building
role, arguing that it was not appropriate for U.S. military forces and detracted from combat
readiness. As defense analysts and military personnel began to perceive state-building as essential
to the success of peacekeeping and related operations, attitudes began to shift about the
desirability of the U.S. military role in state-building. In 2005, DOD Directive 3000.05 identified
state-building as key to the success of stability operations and stated that “U.S. military forces
shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians
cannot do so.”56
Critics find DOD state-building activities marred by a lack of both strategic planning and
application of economic development “best practices,” by the absence of civilian input and
integration with civilian efforts, and by insufficient oversight. Some critics, however, recognize
that the context in which some of these activities are undertaken can justify their ad hoc nature,
54
Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 07-015, October 18, 2007, pp. 23-34. Hereafter referred to as SIGIR Review of
PRT Effectiveness.
55
The HASC, in its report on the FY2008 NDAA, stated that current DOD authority for humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance under Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 20 and 10 U.S.C. 2561 can be used by field commanders
without bureaucratic obstacles. HASC Report 110-146 on the FY2008 NDAA, op. cit., p. 399.
56
DOD Directive 3000.05, op. cit., p. 2.
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short-term objectives, and lack of civilian expertise, and note that DOD has made efforts to
improve soldiers’ ability to carry out such tasks.57 Concerns focus on the extension of statebuilding activities to non-conflict situations; for example, extending CERP authority worldwide,
as requested by the Administration, without more State Department control, or activities of
combatant commands, especially AFRICOM, might lead to perceptions that the United States is
“militarizing” its foreign policy.
Defense experts implicitly acknowledged a factual basis for at least some criticisms of its statebuilding role by expressly stating in 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05 that civilians would be better
suited to accomplish political, social, and economic tasks in many circumstances. Nevertheless,
DOD officials regard the United States as faced with a strategic imperative to undertake such
activities in the new global environment, and the U.S. military as charged with performing them
where civilians cannot. DOD officials are currently grappling with the many issues and tradeoffs
involved in better preparing military forces to carry out a wide variety of political, social, and
economic tasks for stabilization and reconstruction, as well as other activities, alone or in
conjunction with civilian personnel, in the absence of civilian personnel.58 An important part of
this task for DOD, the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies is to determine and
prioritize an appropriate civil-military division of labor in non-combat areas.
With DOD’s renewed request in 2008 to expand Section 1206 to allow training of foreign police
and related security forces (including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, and
infrastructure) in addition to military forces, Congress is faced with a sensitive issue. Since at
least the 1970s, Congress has been concerned with the possible human rights implications of U.S.
assistance to foreign police forces in general, and DOD assistance in particular.59 Nevertheless,
many analysts argue that many more foreign police personnel are needed, especially gendarmes
trained in both police and military skills, for post-conflict operations,60 and some might prefer
that DOD provide personnel to fill that training gap, especially in major post-conflict zones.
57
For example, see 2006 CSIS Task Force Report, op. cit., pp. 12-20.
A May 2006 DOD memo on implementing the 2006 QDR strategy states that DOD “must be prepared to grow a new
team of leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and
tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures, working with local networks, operating alongside or
within United Nations organizations, and working alongside non-governmental organizations to further US and partner
interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quite influence—rather than through military force alone. To
support this effort, new approaches to education assignments and career incentives, as well as new authorities are
needed.” Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum on Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity
(BCP) Execution Roadmap (unclassified), May 22, 2006. p. 6.
59
Congress has limited the assistance that U.S. government agencies can provide to foreign police forces since the
1970s, when such assistance was provided to police forces that were perceived of as violating human rights. Over the
years, Congress has loosened restrictions by adding statutory exceptions to the codified prohibition on police training
(Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, 22 U.S.C. 2420) for certain situations and providing exceptions for assistance to certain
countries and situations elsewhere in law. Currently, the U.S. government provides assistance through the State
Department and the Justice Department to foreign police forces in many countries. In addition, as mentioned above,
since the 1990s, Congress has authorized DOD to provide training and other assistance to police forces and other law
enforcement officials for counternarcotics purposes.
60
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published several works pointing to this gap. Recent publications
include one on building U.S. police capacity to fill the gap, while another discusses the work of an Italian school to
train constabulary police. See Robert M. Perito, “U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations,” USIP Special Report
191, August 2007, and Michael Dziedzic and Colonel Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of
the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIPeace Briefing,
June 2006. Both last accessed through http://www.usip.org, July 22, 2008.
58
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Major Issues and Options for Congress
What Are the Effects of DOD Activities on U.S. Foreign Relations
and Foreign Policy Goals?
DOD is involved in a broad range of foreign assistance activities. U.S. military personnel deploy
as first responders to foreign disasters and provide humanitarian relief and basic needs assistance
in other urgent situations. U.S. military personnel also provide medical and veterinary assistance
and civic support (such as the construction or repair of small educational and medical facilities)
as a routine part of their training and as part of military operations. U.S. troops routinely train
foreign military forces and are authorized to train police forces for counternarcotics missions.
Recently, in the context of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, they have
provided humanitarian assistance and taken on state-building tasks related to political and
economic development. For the past several years, DOD has worked to enhance its own
capabilities to carry out state-building and to draw on civilian advice. It has also urged Congress
to enhance the capabilities of civilian agencies to form partnerships with DOD in those activities.
DOD stresses a national security imperative for its activities in the foreign assistance area. Critics,
however, most often judge DOD involvement in foreign assistance activities in terms of its effect
on foreign relations and foreign policy goals. The following sections recapitulate the perceived
benefits and liabilities of that involvement.
Summary of Benefits
The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several
ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into
extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of
the United States as an humanitarian actor.61 Especially in conflict situations, military forces can
provide needed security, intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, command and control and
communications capabilities, and maritime support.62 Humanitarian assistance also provides a
means to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. For U.S.
diplomacy, military training and other security assistance can be a potent tool to cultivate or
cement relations with foreign governments.
U.S. military personnel view humanitarian assistance and military training and education and
other opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development.
Such opportunities help soldiers enhance their skills to operate in a variety of foreign
61
While the military can move quickly once authorized to deploy, one author points out that “The decision-making
processes that activate them [i.e., military personnel] may reduce their respective advantage.” Larry Minear and
Philippe Guillot, Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1966, p. 151. Hereafter referred to as Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda.
62
This list of benefits is taken from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee, (OECD/DAC) Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operations, Civilian and
Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict: Comparative Advantages and
Costs, Paris: OECD, 1998, pp. 12-15. (Hereafter cited as OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs.) This
document also lists a military advantage providing a response to a possible future use of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons (p. 15).
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environments and establish contacts with foreign military personnel that may serve them in future
operations. Since 9/11, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have
been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations under
the aegis of the United Nations and regional organizations and to participate with the United
States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Summary of Critiques
Observers have advanced several critiques of the DOD role. These deal with the effects on
humanitarian activities of non-governmental organizations; the implications for foreign policy
objectives, including counterterrorism, economic development, and state-building and democracy
promotion; and the relative effectiveness of civilian versus military personnel.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that carry out humanitarian missions hold mixed views
on DOD humanitarian assistance activities. They generally do not criticize the use of the U.S.
military in first response disaster relief operations. Some are critical, however, of the use of U.S.
military forces in a broad range of “humanitarian and basic needs” activities in conflict areas.
Although military forces can provide needed security in unstable environments, in some
situations, military involvement in humanitarian assistance can be problematic. Especially when
military personnel are directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance and other
humanitarian acts, military assistance can be viewed as jeopardizing the lives and work of NGO
personnel by stigmatizing them as participants in a military effort. These criticisms were
provoked by the U.S. military’s humanitarian role in Afghanistan, where non-governmental
humanitarian aid workers felt their neutrality was compromised by soldiers in civilian dress who
distributed humanitarian aid as part of military operations. Since then, DOD has made an effort to
engage non-governmental aid workers and to develop means to work together. While some
humanitarian relief NGOs now welcome the security that military forces can provide in hostile
areas, others still feel that their lives are endangered by the proximity of soldiers engaged in
humanitarian activities. In areas without U.S. military involvement, local populations may also
take the use of military personnel for such activities as a prelude to military action or
intervention.63
The use of military forces may also impede the advancement of foreign policy goals. For
instance, the December 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, Embassies as
Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, viewed the use of DOD personnel for
counterterrorism programs as an obstacle: “In Latin America, especially, military and intelligence
efforts are viewed with suspicion, making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a
counterterrorism agenda.”64 As pointed out in Appendix F on counternarcotics cooperation,
Mexico has resisted counternarcotics assistance that would involve the U.S. military. One analyst
claims that “African publics and governments have already begun to complain that U.S.
engagement is increasingly military.”65
63
2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., states that there is evidence that some host country nationals question “the increasingly
military component of America’s profile overseas. In Uganda, a military civil affairs team went to the northern part of
the country to help local communities build wells, erect schools and carry out other small development projects to help
mitigate the consequences of a long-running regional conflict. Local NGOs questioned whether the military was there
to take sides in the conflict.” p. 12.
64
2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 12.
65
Gerald Loftus, “Speaking Out: Expeditionary Sidekicks? The Military-Diplomatic Dynamic,” Foreign Service
(continued...)
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In the area of economic development, some analysts question whether the U.S. military objectives
in carrying out small-scale infrastructure projects in conjunction with exercises and operations
respond to short-term exigencies rather than abiding by development “best practices” to
accomplish long-term structural reforms.66 In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, some analysts
point out that “some normal development practices will inevitably take a back seat to operational
realities.”67 In the case of humanitarian and civic action activities in non-conflict areas, however,
a lack of integration with long-term development plans can raise expectations of economic
growth and development that cannot be fulfilled with the limited resources available.
The use of U.S. military personnel in state-building activities may convey mixed signals in
activities where the objective is to promote democracy and enhance civilian control. While the
use of U.S. military forces is seen as appropriate in state-building efforts that involve the training
of foreign militaries, some analysts believe that it may undermine that objective when used in
other state-building activities by reinforcing stereotypes in underdeveloped nations—such as that
military forces are more competent than civilians—or legitimize the use of military forces for
civilian governmental responsibilities. Further, some analysts believe that DOD has failed to
strengthen institutional mechanisms for civilian control in its dealings with foreign militaries.68
The lack of expertise within the military to carry out coherent plans for economic and political
development in foreign nations is also considered problematic. While the placement of USAID
officers within combatant commands may alleviate some of the worst problems, some analysts
believe that their presence may not be sufficient to ensure that best practices are routinely
applied.69
Civilians are cited as enjoying an overall advantage in many humanitarian and state-building
tasks. Military forces are, however, recognized as possessing a decided advantage in some
humanitarian mission tasks, such as providing security and air support, particularly in hostile
situations. Despite that military advantage, however, one study judged civilian personnel more
effective in carrying out a wide range of humanitarian tasks in conflict situations. These tasks are
acquiring the supplies necessary for humanitarian assistance operations, assessing and utilizing
local resources, interacting with the local population, providing the most suitable medical
response, managing refugee camps, and providing water and sanitation.70 Another study judged
that although most multinational military personnel assisting with the Rwanda crisis in 1994 were
“skilled in their own areas, [they] had no unique competence in such matters as refugee camp
construction, community health and disease control, or shelter management. Moreover, their
(...continued)
Journal, December 2007, p. 16. (Hereafter referred to as “Expeditionary Sidekicks?”)
66
The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit., p. 13.
67
Ibid.
68
The Pentagon and Global Development, op. cit. According to this report: “While the Pentagon conducts training
programs to promote professionalism and civilian control of ... foreign militaries, it gives relatively less attention to
broader security sector report (SSR)—including the effort to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and
ministries are accountable to democratically-elected governments.” pp. 14-15.
69
Among the findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff delegation that compiled the 2006 SFRC report
was “that country teams in embassies with USAID presence are far more capable of ensuring sufficient review of
military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID,
affecting both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in
susceptible regions of the world.” p. 9.
70
OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
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security preoccupations—for example, the prohibition against U.S. forces from leaving the Kigali
airport, the reluctance of the Japanese to work in refugee camps—also circumscribed what the
troops themselves were able to achieve.”71
Relative Costs
There is a widespread presumption that using military forces for many humanitarian missions,
military support, and state-building activities costs more than using civilian personnel for the
same tasks, but analysts note the absence of reliable studies on relative costs. One 1998 study on
the use of international military forces for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations judged
that the use of the military is “generally more costly than civilian means” and “will far exceed the
costs of providing the aid itself.” The study attributed the greater costs to the military emphasis
on making its activities “fail-safe” rather than cost-effective, building into its procedures
“safeguards, redundancies, and limitations that often do not exist with civilian means.... Civilian
and commercial means are, in general, leaner and less redundant.”72 The study cautioned,
however, that its general conclusions were “presented as hypotheses.”73
Relative costs can vary according to the circumstances. For instance, according to the 1998 study
cited above, when “military assets are already deployed (either for humanitarian assistance or for
peacekeeping), the marginal cost of using these personnel and resources will be low. In these
areas, then, the military can be a cost-effective means of delivering and supporting humanitarian
assistance.”74 A variety of other factors can influence relative costs. The military’s economies of
scale and shared costs may reduce the price tag on the use of military forces; on the other hand,
the degree of force protection in the field and the amount of equipment with which the military
deploys can raise costs.
For some analysts, cost considerations are beside the point, as there are certain situations where
military forces are indispensable and certain places where few civilians will go. Decisions on the
most appropriate division of labor between military and civilian personnel are better made on the
basis of comparative advantage in each situation.
Can Current DOD and State Department Coordination Be
Improved?
A key to ensuring that DOD plays an effective role in foreign assistance may be improving
interagency coordination in planning and implementing such activities. DOD and the State
Department recently have created new coordination mechanisms, but some analysts believe the
imbalance between DOD and State Department resources may be a continuing problem,
especially for activities that take place in the context of military operations.
71
Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, op. cit., p. 150.
OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., p. 16.
73
OECD/DAC Comparative Advantages and Costs, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
74
Ibid.
72
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Congress’s Role in Specifying Interagency Coordination 75
In approving legislation governing the DOD role in foreign assistance, Congress can mandate the
type and degree of interaction between DOD and civilian agencies. It can maintain or strengthen
the leadership role that the State Department has traditionally had in foreign assistance activities.
Or it can respond to the concerns of some defense officials and analysts that DOD lacks
appropriate authority and flexibility to carry out foreign assistance activities expeditiously, and
enhance the DOD role.
Since at least the early 1960s, Congress has made the Secretary of State the lead U.S. government
official regarding oversight of foreign assistance, including military assistance, and assigned U.S.
Ambassadors or other officials carrying out the responsibilities of a chief of a United States
diplomatic mission a lead role in coordinating military assistance with foreign policy. Section 622
of the 1961 FAA (22 U.S.C. 2382), entitled Coordination with Foreign Policy, contains these
provisions.
Section 622(c) of the original version of the 1961 FAA provided that the Secretary of State “shall
be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs
authorized by this Act, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military
assistance program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best
served thereby.” (Section 622(c).)
In 1976, Congress amended that provision,76 deleting the limitation that made it applicable solely
to programs in the 1961 FAA, as amended. Section 622(c) now charges the Secretary of State
with responsibility for “the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance,
military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to
determining whether there shall be military assistance (including civic action) or a military
education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs
are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is
best served thereby.” The 1961 FAA, as amended, does not define military assistance or civic
action. It does, however, define “military education and training.”77
The Chief of Mission’s responsibility was contained in Section 622(b). Under that provision, the
Ambassador (or other responsible official) exercises leadership, under procedures prescribed by
the President, over ensuring coordination regarding foreign assistance programs among U.S.
government representatives in each country. Section 622(b) specifically ties this role to military
assistance. The original language reads: “The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure
that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated
with political and economic considerations, and that his comments shall accompany such
75
This section was prepared in conjunction with (name redacted), Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, CRS.
This amendment was contained in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, P.L. 94-329,
Section 543(b)(2)(B).
77
Section 644(n) defines military education and training to include “formal or informal instruction of foreign students
in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, contractors
(including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information
publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, and military advice to foreign military units and forces.”
76
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recommendations if he so desires.” Congress later amended this language to specify that civic
action and military education and training programs were covered by this section.78
Section 623 (22 U.S.C. 2383) charges the Secretary of Defense with several responsibilities
regarding the provision of military equipment, as well as “the supervision of the training of
foreign military and related civilian personnel.”
Through legislation, Congress often has required that the Department of State approve an activity.
Some of the temporary authorities for Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, require the concurrence
(i.e., the approval) of the Secretary of State. Under pre-9/11 legislation, DOD needs to secure the
concurrence of the Secretary of State for programs regarding the educational programs, capacity
building, and logistic support for allies. Other Title 10 U.S. Code programs under DOD authority
require the Secretary of Defense to secure the approval of the Secretary of State for military to
military contacts and the approval of both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for
certain counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities (i.e., support for law enforcement officials
outside the United States).
In other cases, however, Congress had mandated that DOD coordinate or consult with the State
Department and other relevant agencies. DOD must develop certain counternarcotics and
counterterrorism activities in consultation with the Secretary of State. DOD and State Department
officials report that whatever the statutory language, these departments now develop a consensus
about foreign assistance-type activities before proceeding.79
Interagency Coordination in Practice
Despite these legislative mandates, the actual degree and type of interagency coordination and
consultation appear to have varied greatly over time, and from program to program. There are
established mechanisms for coordinating projects, but at least in the past there have been
occasions when they appear to have broken down. Factors identified as causing interagency
coordination to lull or lapse include individual personalities, a lack of State Department personnel
to perform coordinating tasks, a blurred division of labor, and the routinization of tasks. (See
Appendix G, Appendix J, and Appendix K.)
For many years, much of the formal coordination has been carried out by the DOD Defense
Security Cooperation Agency for established programs. The DSCA receives project proposals
from combatant commanders. In many cases, these proposals require the approval of the U.S.
ambassador in the country in which programs will be conducted, although ambassadorial
approval is not required for regional programs or in war zones. DSCA then coordinates the
approval process in Washington, D.C., as required by statute or policy guidance, for both State
Department programs (i.e., security assistance, IMET, and GPOI) and DOD humanitarian
assistance and other programs. The DSCA Security Affairs Officers (SAOs) located at U.S.
embassies worldwide bear a large part of the responsibility for implementing these programs.
78
Section 302(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-583) inserted civic action; Section 106(b) of the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) inserted military education and
training.
79
Authors’ interviews with DOD and State Department officials in November and December 2007.
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Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates the
Department’s position on military assistance. The bureau is also the lead State Department office
for interagency coordination. It coordinates the interagency response (State Department, USAID,
DOD, and NSC) to requests by foreign governments for humanitarian demining and other
humanitarian assistance. It also coordinates the State Department response to plans for military
exercises in politically sensitive areas, as required by National Security Presidential
Determination 42. In addition, it coordinates the vetting of foreign forces that receive
counternarcotics training and that participate in JCETs.80
Current Initiatives to Improve Interagency Coordination
Over the past few years, DOD and the civilian agencies have created new mechanisms for
planning and coordinating DOD foreign assistance activities. These include new arrangements in
combatant commands, as well as new offices in USAID and the State Department.
•
DOD has created new interagency groups or new posts for civilian agency
representatives in its institutions, particularly at four geographical combatant
commands that plan and carry out combat operations and non-combat activities
in their “areas of responsibility.”81 Regional combatant commands host a “Joint
Interagency Coordinating Group” (JIACG) composed of military personnel from
all services and civilian personnel from a variety of agencies that act as an
advisory body to the combatant command.
•
Combatant commands also are beginning to integrate personnel from civilian
agencies in greater numbers. The U.S. Southern Command reportedly has already
incorporated civilians into its structure, as has the Special Operations
Command.82 The newly planned Africa Command (currently being created to
handle all of Africa, which is now split between EUCOM and CENTCOM) will
also incorporate a significant number of diplomats and development experts.83
•
In 2005, USAID established a new USAID Office of the Military Advisor, which
provides USAID officials to the regional combatant commands, as well as the
Special Operations Command, where they help plan for and oversee all foreign
assistance activities.
80
Authors’ interviews with DOD officials, December 2007. The Federation of American Scientists, which compiles
available public information on presidential directives, lists NSPD 42 under the title On Significant Military Exercise
Briefs (SMEB), dated January 26, 2005. No other information is listed.
81
These commands are comprised of personnel from all four branches of the U.S. military services that are responsible
for carrying out assigned missions, including combat and non-combat operations and activities. (Current combatant
commands are the U.S. European Command [EUCOM], the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], the U.S. Southern
Command [SOUTHCOM], and the U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM].)
82
As of early 2008, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) included seven people from U.S. civilian agencies:
three from the Department of State, one from USAID, one from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, one from the
Department of Energy, and one from the Department of Transportation. (E-mail correspondence from SOCOM,
February 1, 2008.)
83
For more information on AFRICOM, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the
Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch. Based on interviews by the author of that report, early plans called
for up to a quarter of AFRICOM personnel to be non-DOD civilians, to date, according to her June 19, 2008 interview,
less than 10 non-DOD civilians are on board. According to a recent Foreign Service Journal article, diplomats and
development experts would comprise up to a third of AFRICOM headquarters personnel. Also see Expeditionary
Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.
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•
Within the State Department, the Director of Foreign Assistance has instituted
new interagency groups to plan and vet DOD foreign assistance activities.
Further Considerations and Options
Despite the increasing number of mechanisms for civil-military coordination on DOD foreign
assistance activities, some analysts are concerned that the State Department lead has eroded, and
that the new DOD mechanisms provide an inappropriate subordinate role for the State
Department.84 This can be a disadvantage in planning for, implementing, and overseeing these
activities, even when the State Department’s approval is required. The answer for some is to
increase the DOD role in such activities in general, while others argue for increasing the State
Department and USAID ability to plan, oversee, and coordinate activities. One often-mentioned
factor impeding the latter option is the lack of adequate numbers of State Department and USAID
personnel at U.S. embassies and in Washington, D.C. A recent CSIS report details
recommendations to increase civilian staff for counterterrorism, post-conflict, and humanitarian
operations.85 An MIT study recommends establishing a permanent interagency group under the
National Security Council, co-chaired by the Office of Management and Budget, to oversee
security assistance program integration.86 A third option would be for Congress to reinforce the
role of U.S. ambassadors as the top U.S. government official in all countries by requiring that
U.S. ambassadors approve all foreign assistance-type activities of all U.S. military personnel or
DOD contractors operating in their countries, regardless of the statutory authorities under which
they operate. A fourth possibility for enhancing State Department control, in the view of some
analysts, would be to create new regional mechanisms for State Department coordination, both
among embassies and with the U.S. military.
One of DOD’s primary advantages in planning and carrying out foreign assistance activities is its
regional organization, with four geographic combatant commands. Some analysts believe that this
regional focus combined with a regional field presence allows for better foreign assistance
planning, compared with the State Department’s traditional bilateral focus, with foreign
assistance planning in each country initiated and overseen by U.S. ambassadors reporting to the
Department’s Washington, D.C.-based regional bureaus. The DOD regional arrangement may
also place some DOD foreign assistance activities beyond the purview of U.S. ambassadors, as
regional DOD activities may not necessarily be cleared with ambassadors and ambassadors lack
sufficient civilian staff to manage all military activities.87 Congress could provide funding for the
84
Expeditionary Sidekicks?, op. cit., p. 15.
CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007, op. cit., pp. 33-43.
86
The oversight role of this new interagency group would be to ensure “the integration of security assistance policies
and programs into the broader national security strategy,” resolve disagreements between DOD and the State
Department regarding policies and programs, and provide overarching policy guidance. Cindy Williams and Gordon
Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security
Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008, pp. 72-73.
87
At least in the past, there have been reports that Special Operations Forces have not informed ambassadors of SOF
activities in their countries, and given the classified nature of many SOF activities, it is not clear whether this is still
true. (See CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), June 26, 1999, p. 5.) Although in early 2007 the GAO noted coordination for
Section 1206 activities had improved over time, the GAO reported at that time that poor coordination was more
common for regional programs. See, for instance, GAO 07-416R, Section 1206 Security Assistance Programs:
Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation, February 28, 2007, p. 24, and 2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p.
13.
85
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State Department to hold regular meetings of regional ambassadors and other senior interagency
personnel for discussions of regional issues together with regional combatant commanders and
other military personnel, along the lines of the counterterrorism Regional Strategic Initiative.88
More ambitiously, it could locate abroad the regional Assistant Secretaries or special offices of
regional bureaus to provide a venue for such meetings and for daily coordination with the
combatant commands, or provide another means for regional coordination. As part of its
oversight role, Congress might also urge the executive branch to take steps to ensure that
ambassadors exercise greater control over activities in their countries.89
Some defense officials, on the other hand, argue for greater DOD autonomy in planning and
carrying out foreign assistance activities in order to expedite urgent operations. In addition to the
new DOD authorities requested in recent years—especially a permanent Title 10 U.S. Code train
and equip authority and a permanent fund for field commanders to carry out humanitarian
assistance activities—some analysts have argued for other changes that would accomplish those
ends. Among the options posited by one analyst are several that could be the subject of
congressional action: (1) increase the budgets and discretionary spending authority of the
geographic combatant commands to meet emerging political-military needs; (2) expand Section
1206 authority to include state-building activities and activities to develop “future capacity for
employment on operations as a U.S. partner”; and (3) expand the scope and authorities of the
JIACG by enabling the JIACG to coordinate combatant commands’ security cooperation
activities, thus facilitating “proactive conflict-prevention tasks” and empowering JIACG
members “to make decisions and coordinate regional interagency security cooperation
activities.”90
Should Civilian Capabilities to Carry Out Foreign Assistance
Activities Be Enhanced?
Many consider DOD to have a marked advantage in planning and carrying out a variety of
activities in the foreign assistance area because of the greater number of personnel and its large
budget. This resource advantage sometimes has created friction between State Department and
DOD officials over the use of DOD resources. As DOD begins to implement its “Partnership
Strategy,” its resource advantages are once again highlighted. DOD officials have made clear,
however, that they believe that Congress should provide the State Department and USAID with
the resources to build their capacity to carry out foreign assistance duties. In a July 2008 speech,
Secretary of Defense Gates urged the United States “to harness ‘the full strength of America,’” by
88
Under the RSI, senior interagency personnel, including ambassadors, regional assistant secretaries and personnel
from combatant commands, in eight geographical regions meet on a regional basis twice a year to deliberate
counterterrorism strategic responses. The 2006 SFRC report recommended that the Secretary of State “regularize and
expand the Department’s Regional Strategic Initiative ...” and that meetings should be held “at the most senior level
possible, with ambassadors themselves actively engaged and involved.” op. cit., p. 4.
89
The 2006 SFRC Report suggests regularizing the presence of military personnel in foreign countries by “specifically
placing them under the ambassador’s authority....” National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 of June 2, 1982,
“Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and their Overseas Posts,” requires Chief of Mission approval for any proposed
change in in the size, composition, or mandate staff under Chief of Mission authority. (This directive is accessible
through http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd38.htm, last accessed July 22, 2008.) The 2006 SFRC Report noted that
DOD objected to that suggestion because some of the military personnel present in embassies are serving under a
regional combatant command. op. cit., p. 11.
90
Thomas P. Galvin, “Extending the Phase Zero Campaign Mindset,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 45, 2nd quarter,
2007, pp. 49-50.
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strengthening these civilian agencies. “It has become clear,” he said, “that America’s civilian
institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded
for far too long—relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the
responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.”91
DOD Manpower and Budget Advantages
In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and
execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more
manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime,
there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out
activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual
embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department
personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through
diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a
new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel
(the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include
much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill
about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the
needed expertise to fill them.
Congress also grants considerable funding to DOD to carry out foreign assistance-type activities.
For example, Congress funded DOD’s OHDACA appropriation at roughly $60 million a year for
FY2005-FY2007 and provided for FY2008 a total of $103.3 million, of which part is multiple
year money. These sums represent more funding than the State Department provides annually to
many individual countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance. In addition, these amounts are but a
small part of the actual cost of the activities undertaken under OHDACA authorities. OHDACA
funding does not cover the total cost of an activity, but only its incremental cost (i.e., the amount
above the normal peacetime cost of a soldier). In terms of historical spending, Congress’s
FY2009 OHDACA authorization for $83.3 million in is about the same, in nominal terms, as the
$86 million (current dollars) that Congress authorized for OHDACA when the account was
created in 1994. However, in constant terms, OHDACA funding has shrunk, as the initial
OHDACA authorization would be $131 million in FY2009 dollars.
Some analysts believe that Congress has given DOD an advantage by increasing DOD allocations
for foreign assistance-type activities, because such funds are more easily included in the defense
budget than in the foreign assistance budget.92 In particular, these funds include the CERP for
Afghanistan and Iraq, and an increase in discretionary money in the CCIF, which can be used for
a variety of purposes in addition to humanitarian relief.
91
U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the U.S. Global Leadership
Campaign, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008. Accessed through http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches; last accessed
July 22, 2008. Secretary Gates also stated that while he could not “pretend to know the right dollar amount—I know
it’s a good deal more than the one percent of the federal budget than it is right now” and, given that “the budgets we are
talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase of these capabilities is well
within reach—as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.”
92
The CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007 finds a “continued neglect of critical non-military components of national
power and influence” and views the use of DOD for non-traditional security assistance as “defaulting to reliance on the
military.” p. IX.
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Although DOD enjoys greater resources, these resources do not necessarily provide DOD with
the needed competence and expertise to carry out foreign assistance activities. For instance, for
many years, some defense analysts have stated that the U.S. military civil affairs speciality does
not have an adequate number of personnel to carry out the wide variety of state-building tasks
needed; with a recent increase in the number of civil affairs personnel, one analyst’s concern now
focuses on whether civil affairs personnel are properly organized, trained, educated, and provided
the resources to fulfill their mission.93 In some U.S. embassies, U.S. civilian personnel
interviewed criticized some military personnel as “poorly trained in information gathering” and
“rarely” possessing regional or linguistic expertise.94 DOD Directive 3000.05 points to a need to
develop personnel qualified to engage in state-building and economic reconstruction activities.
DOD is still deliberating whether to devote funding and time to develop a cadre with the
necessary range of expertise to plan and carry out such activities on its own.95 DOD Directive
3000.05 points out that civilians are often better suited to carry out such tasks.
Possible Options to Enhance U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities
DOD officials join many other analysts in urging Congress to augment the ability of civilian
federal agencies to carry out the state-building and economic measures that will prevent and deter
conflicts, stabilize nations in transitions from conflict, and foster economic recovery and
democratic institutions during the post-conflict period.96 For many analysts, one indication of the
urgency of increasing the number of federal civilian personnel to perform such tasks was the State
Department’s inability to supply when needed more than 100 specialized, skilled personnel to
staff the PRTs in Iraq, which DOD had to staff temporarily until the State Department could
locate contractors. Many analysts also cite a need for a significant number of USAID permanent
staff. They note that USAID permanent staff now number approximately 2,000, down from some
15,000 during the Vietnam war, and that most USAID work is currently carried out by
contractors.
93
Colonel Christopher Holshek, “The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power,” in Alexander
Woodcock, George Rose, and David Davis, eds., The Cornwallis Group XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions,
Clementsport, Nova Scotia, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007, p. 127. In this work, written in 2006,
Col. Holshek stated that Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are “hard pressed to support both the burgeoning CMO [Civil
Military Operations] mission and CAO [Civil Affairs Operations] support to interagency nation-building.” He states
that Civil Affairs personnel’s “traditional comparative advantage” in language and cultural knowledge, as well as
nation-building functional specialist proficiency, has eroded over time, although he notes recent initiatives may work to
reverse some of the problem. His current concerns were stated in an e-mail of April 1, 2008.
94
2006 SFRC Report, op. cit., p. 11. The report states that “Rotational tours of only six months limit expertise acquired
on-the-job. In several countries, embassy officials say that the time required to bring military personnel up to speed,
monitor their activities, and prevent them from doing damage is not compensated for by contributions they make to the
embassy team.” Ibid.
95
For more information, see CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized Units?
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
96
A May 22, 2006 DOD memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military
departments, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and many other DOD officials
called for DOD to develop plans to support State Department efforts to obtain resources for S/CRS operations and to
establish a Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund, as well as to support USAID and other civilian
agencies efforts to obtain resources to deploy civilian experts to security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction
(SSTR) operations. Memorandum on the Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution
Roadmap, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England.
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DOD has strongly supported the development of the State Department Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to plan and coordinate such preventive, transitional,
and post-conflict activities.97 Under authority provided by Congress, DOD has transferred funds
during FY2006 and FY2007 to S/CRS for such activities. Nevertheless, some analysts have
criticized S/CRS for failing to fully perform its assigned functions. Some fault a lack of top-level
State Department commitment to its mission and bureaucratic infighting within the State
Department. Others judge that Congress has not provided the State Department with the level of
funding necessary to adequately staff and otherwise provide for this office’s operations.98
In February 2008, the Bush Administration presented Congress with a $248.6 million request to
fund a Civilian Stabilization Initiative that would strengthen U.S. civilian capabilities to respond
to unanticipated conflict in foreign countries. The initiative’s centerpiece would be a civilian
response corps consisting of civilian federal government employees from several departments
(250 members of an active response corps and 2,000 members of a standby response corps) and a
reserve component of 2,000 citizens from outside the federal government. This corps would
include people with a wide variety of state-building and economic reconstruction capabilities.
Congress appropriated $50 million in seed money for the corps in supplemental State Department
appropriations for 2007.99 Congress provided authority to establish a civilian reserve corps in the
Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), Title XVI, Reconstruction and Stabilization
Civilian Management.
An area of particular interest to DOD is an increase in U.S. government capacity to train and
equip foreign military and police forces. Some argue that DOD needs to increase its own training
capacity—even if DOD remains in a supporting role. Others argue that Congress should provide
the funds and personnel needed to increase the State Department’s ability to train and equip such
forces worldwide and in the event of future challenges on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq. (See
Appendix L.)
Need to Examine Other Civilian Capabilities
Current debate in Congress has centered on the development of U.S. government civilian
capabilities. Nevertheless, some analysts urge further examination of the uses and relationships of
private sector civilian personnel to DOD missions. While DOD has attempted over the years to
improve its ability to work in the field with non-profit NGOS, including publishing guidelines
jointly with InterAction and the U.S. Institute of Peace in July 2007,100 some analysts suggest that
97
Soon after S/CRS was created, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard B. Myers, in testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC), cited the creation of S/CRS as “an important step” in helping “post-conflict
nations achieve peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.” “In the future, provided this office is given
appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is
applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations.” U.S. Congress. Senate Armed Services
Committee, Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senate
Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 17, 2005, 109th Cong. 1st sess., p. 31. Accessible through the SASC
website http://www.armed-services.senate.gov; last accessed July 22, 2008.
98
For more information on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions:
Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and
Reconstruction Capabilities, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), (hereafter referred to as CRS Report
RL32862).
99
This funding was appropriated by Section 3810, P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina
Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations, 2007. For more information, see CRS Report RL32862, ibid.
100
Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in
(continued...)
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further improvements are necessary. Some also point to a need to reexamine the potential role of
for-profit contractor personnel in augmenting or replacing U.S. military forces in humanitarian
and state-building activities.
(...continued)
Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments, issued July 7, 2007 by the U.S. Institute of Peace, InterAction, and DOD.
See http://www.usip.org/pubs/guidelines.html; last accessed July 22, 2008.
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Table 1. Congressional Action on Selected DOD-Requested New or Expanded Authorities for FY2009 Relevant to Foreign
Assistance Activities Referenced Above
Proposal for the FY2009 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA)
House Action on the
FY2009 NDAA
(H.R. 5658)
Senate Action on the FY2009 NDAA
(S. 3001)
Conference Action on the
FY2009 NDAA
(P.L. 110-417)
Building the Partnership Capacity of Foreign
Miltary and Other Security Forces. Make
permanent the Section 1206 train and equip authority
of the FY2006 NDAA (as amended by the John
Warner FY2007 NDAA). Increase authorized funding
from $300 million to $750 million. Expand specified
purposes to (1) allow assistance to non-military
security forces, (2) to train foreign forces to
participate in or to support military and stability
operations that are consistent with U.S. security
interests, and (3) to build the capacity of security
foreces in a country where U.S. forces are deployed in
large-scale stability operations.
Section 1206 would extend
current authority through
FY2010.
Section 1204 would extend authority through
FY2011 and would increase the annual
authorization to $400 million. It would authorize
the use of funds for security forces whose
primary mission is counterterrorism, subject to
the police training restrictions of 22 U.S.C. 2420
(Section 660 of the 1961 FAA, as amended.)
Section 1206 extends authority
through FY2011, increases the
authorized amount to $350
million, and expands the scope
of authority to include building
the capacity of a foreign
country’s maritime security
forces.
Making Permanent and Global the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
for Urgent Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Needs in the Field. Codify CERP authority at 10
U.S.C. Chapter 20. Authorize the use of annually
appropriated CERP funds for the CERP program in
Iraq and a similar program in Afghanistan, and for a
similar program to assist the people of a developing
country where United States forces are operating.
Authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive any
provision of law not contained in this authority.
Provide for DOD and the Department of State to
jointly develop procedures for the exercise of this
authority in order to provide for “expeditious
coordination” between DOD and the State
Department.
No similar provision.
In lieu of the Administration proposal, S. 3001
would authorize $75 million for the Combatant
Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), 10 U.S.C.
166a. (Senate Rept. 110-335, accompanying S.
3001.) In its FY2009 DOD budget request, the
Administration requested $100 million in the
CCIF specifically to meet unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs.
No similar provision.
Support for Special Operations to Combat
Terrorism. Expand, and indefinitely extend,
authority for Special Operations Forces to support
foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals
when such recipients are facilitating or acting in
support of operations conducted by U.S. Special
Section 1208 would codify this
authority at 10 U.S.C. 127e,
raise the spending limit to $35
million, and require the
Secretary of Defense to notify
the congressional defense
Section 1203 would extend this authority
through FY2011, raise the limit on annual funding
to $35 million, and add a requirement for the
concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission.
Section 1208 extends this
authority through FY2013 and
increases the authorized
funding limit to $35 million.
CRS-31
Proposal for the FY2009 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA)
Operations Forces. [ Section 1208 of the Ronald W.
Reagan NDAA for FY2005 (P.L. 108-375) as amended
by Section 1202 of the FY2008 NDAA (P.L. 110-181).]
Increase authorized funding limit from $25 million to
$35 million, and require the concurrence of the
relevant Chief of Mission.
CRS-32
House Action on the
FY2009 NDAA
(H.R. 5658)
committees within 48 hours of
the use of such an authority.
Senate Action on the FY2009 NDAA
(S. 3001)
Conference Action on the
FY2009 NDAA
(P.L. 110-417)
The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance
Appendix A. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian
Assistance, Including Civic Action101
DOD Roles and Responsibility
Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance have long been considered traditional, albeit
secondary, DOD roles. DOD is one of the three principal U.S. government departments that
provides disaster and other humanitarian assistance overseas.102 DOD humanitarian relief in
disasters and other emergency and recovery situations is often carried out in coordination with or
under the direction of U.S. government civilian agencies. The U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes the lead in disaster
assistance; the State Department takes the lead in assisting refugees.
DOD humanitarian assistance also takes place in the context of military operations, some of
which are conducted solely for humanitarian purposes and others in which humanitarian activities
are carried out as a strategic supplement to combat operations or military training exercises. In
many situations, DOD also cooperates and coordinates with international organizations, such as
the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a wide variety
of non-governmental organizations.
The following sections discuss DOD authorities for and the specific DOD role in humanitarian
assistance. There is a particular emphasis on DOD humanitarian assistance and related civic
action under 10 U.S.C. 401. As used by the U.S. government, the term “humanitarian assistance”
is vague, and the types of assistance provided under that rubric are broader than the humanitarian
assistance provided by non-governmental relief agencies.
DOD Disaster and Other Humanitarian Emergency Relief and
Recovery Assistance: Activities and Authorities
DOD is often the first U.S. government agency to respond in cases of natural or manmade
disasters, providing the initial organizational effort for further action by civilian agencies. The
DOD role is most often carried out under the President’s broad authority to provide emergency
assistance for foreign disasters, rather than Title 10 U.S. Code authority to provide disaster
101
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in International Security Affairs, and (name redacted), Specialist in
Humanitarian Policy. Also see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian
Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). This appendix remains the same as in the
original edition of this report; information is current as of August 25, 2008.
102
The USAID and the Department of State provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance through four main
programs: USAID’s International Disaster and Famine Assistance; the State Department’s, Migration and Refugee
Assistance and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance; and P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid. In addition, although not
the focus of this report, other parts of the U.S. government that support humanitarian assistance include the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Department of Health and Human
Services (HSS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These agencies contribute technical
assistance to the OFDA as needed in response to humanitarian emergencies.
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relief.103 DOD provides assistance in coordination with the Administrator of the USAID, who is
charged with responsibility for coordinating U.S. government and private sector foreign
assistance in cases of disaster.
DOD provides assistance in humanitarian emergencies and recovery efforts under several Title 10
U.S. Code authorities added in the 1980s and 1990s. DOD provides transportation and or/funding
for humanitarian assistance under 10 U.S.C. 2561 and 402, and humanitarian demining assistance
under 10 U.S.C. 407. (The latter is covered separately in Appendix C.)
•
10 U.S.C. 2561—added in 1992 (with its original section number of 2551) and
last amended in 2003—is DOD’s primary authority to transport humanitarian
supplies. It allows DOD to use appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance
“for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other
humanitarian purposes worldwide.” The Secretary of State determines that this
provision should be used and requests DOD to respond with specific assistance
such as helicopter transport, provision of temporary water supplies, or road and
bridge repair. If possible, military personnel join the USAID OFDA assessment
team to help determine the type of aid DOD can provide. Under this provision,
DOD generally limits its activities to those that stabilize the emergency situation,
such as road or bridge repair, but generally does not undertake projects that
include rebuilding. The law requires an annual report to Congress on the use of
funds. Donated goods can also be shipped on commercial vessels using Section
2561 funds.
•
10 U.S.C. 402—the “Denton Amendment”104 added in 1987 and last amended in
2003—authorizes shipment of privately donated humanitarian goods, including
privately donated disaster assistance, on U.S. military aircraft and ships on a
space-available basis. The donated goods must be certified as appropriate for the
disaster or other situation by USAID’s OFDA and can be bumped from the
transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported.
•
10 U.S.C. 2557—added in 1985 and last amended in 2001—authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to make nonlethal excess DOD supplies available for
humanitarian relief.
DOD also provides substantial emergency humanitarian relief assistance in a wide variety of
other circumstances. Sometimes in cooperation with and under the authorities of other agencies,
DOD provides humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter and supplies, medical evacuation,
103
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et. seq.), as amended, authorizes the United
States to participate in disaster relief efforts and gives the President great flexibility to respond to disasters with a wide
range of government-funded humanitarian assistance. It allows the President to provide disaster assistance,
“notwithstanding any other provision of this or any other Act” that would otherwise prohibit or restrict aid and gives
the President the flexibility to decide what specific type of aid to provide. (Sections 491-493; 22 U.S.C. 2292-2292b.)
The decision as to what assistance is considered humanitarian is often made on a case-by-case basis. 10 U.S.C. 404
provides DOD with authority to conduct disaster assistance but, according to DOD lawyers, is generally not used
because of conditions that inhibit a flexible response. For further information, see CRS Report RL33769, International
Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
104
Named after former Senator Jeremiah Denton.
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refugee assistance, logistical and operational support, and rehabilitation services. DOD supplies
can be provided for humanitarian relief under presidential authority.105
DOD Humanitarian Assistance in the Context of Military
Operations and Military Exercises: Activities and Authorities
In addition to its emergency relief and recovery efforts, DOD conducts humanitarian activities in
the context of military operations and training exercises. The specific purpose of some military
operations is to provide humanitarian relief. Examples of this from the early 1990s are Operation
Provide Comfort to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish population in northern Iraq,
and Operation Provide Relief, to deliver humanitarian supplies to Somalis, as well as the followon Operation Provide Hope, to assist and protect humanitarian workers in Somalia. Currently,
DOD provides humanitarian assistance as part of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(See Appendix K.)
Special Operations Forces (SOF) carry out humanitarian activities as part of their operations, as
well as part of their training exercises with foreign forces under 10 U.S.C. 2011, according to the
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Section 2011 authorizes the SOCOM
commander and the regional combatant commanders to spend money and to deploy SOF teams to
train with foreign military forces if the primary purpose is to train U.S. SOF. Recent authoritative
published information is not available on an unclassified basis.106
In 2006, Congress provided DOD with new authority for small-scale humanitarian relief and
reconstruction assistance by clarifying and expanding the existing Combatant Commanders
Initiative Fund (CCIF). When first authorized in 1991 (10 U.S.C. 166a), the CCIF (then known as
the Commanders-in-Chief or CINC Initiative Fund), provided funds for exercises and military
education and training of foreign personnel, and for “humanitarian and civil assistance.” A 2006
amendment changed civil assistance to “civic assistance, to include urgent and unanticipated
humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” and made the latter a priority category,
105
The President has the authority to draw down defense equipment and direct military personnel to respond to
disasters. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2318) allows the draw down of
defense equipment and services to a limit of $100 million in any fiscal year if the President determines that an
unforeseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international
organization, and the requirement cannot be met under any other provision. Before this provision can be used, the
President must notify the Speaker of the House, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations
Committees of both chambers, in writing by issuing a presidential notification. This request is handled by the
Department of State and the National Security Council. Section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, also provides a special drawdown authority for up to $200 million in defense articles and services for
international disaster relief and migration and refugee act assistance (in addition to counternarcotics assistance).
106
Section 2011 authority was codified in 1991 by the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-190, Section
1052), and amended in 1998 by the Strom Thurmond NDAA for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261, Section 1062) to
require prior approval of the Secretary of Defense for exercises under this section. Section 2011 requires an annual
report to Congress, but only the report covering FY1997 was unclassified. In 1999, a controversy developed over
allegations that JCET training missions—then costing some $15.2 million for exercises in over 100 countries—were
conducted with foreign militaries accused of human rights violations. See CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), and U.S.
General Accounting Office, Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training, GAO/NSIAD-99-173,
July 1999.
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“particularly in a foreign country where the armed forces are engaged in a contingency
operation.”107
To this point, it appears that the CCIF has not been used extensively to fund humanitarian
assistance. In response to a Congressional Research Service request in 2007, DOD stated that just
under $1 million had been used for humanitarian purposes from FY2005 through FY2007.108 In
its FY2009 DOD budget request, the Administration is requesting $100 million in CCIF funds for
urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction.109
Section 401 Humanitarian and Civic Action Activities, Conditions, and
Coordination
Section 401, added to Title 10 U.S. Code in 1986110 and amended several times, authorizes the
U.S. military to perform specific humanitarian and civic action assistance projects. These projects
are (1) medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural
or are underserved, and related education, training, and technical assistance; (2) construction of
rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation
facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
Section 401 establishes several conditions for the projects. They must serve the basic economic
and social needs of the people in the recipient country, and must complement, not duplicate, other
U.S. social or economic assistance. They cannot benefit any individual, group, or organization
engaged in military or paramilitary activity. They must promote the security interests of the
United States and the host nation, and contribute to the operational readiness skills of
participating members of the U.S. armed forces. Moreover, they must be provided in the context
of authorized military operations, exercises, and training deployments.
Section 401 activities are largely carried out under the aegis of the combatant commands as part
of authorized military overseas operations, readiness exercises, and training deployments. The
statute stipulates that the Secretary of State “must specifically approve” providing humanitarian
and civic assistance. In addition, DOD instructions regulating this section require prior approval
107
FY2007 John Warner NDAA, P.L. 109-364, Section 902. Over the past decade at least, Congress has appropriated
$25 million in annual DOD appropriation bills for the CCIF, and additional amounts in FY2005-FY2007 supplemental
appropriations legislation. Three FY2005-FY2007 supplemental appropriations bills provided $25 million each in
CCIF funds for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (i.e., Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13, hereafter referred
to as FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terrorism, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, P.L. 109-234; and the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act, 2007, P.L. 110-28.
108
Information provided by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, e-mail correspondence of
November 7, 2007. The DOD Joint Staff surveyed the combatant commands at CRS’s request and found that CCIF
funds used for these purposes in the last three fiscal years had been limited: the U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) used just over $900,000 for medical and veterinary assistance in Haiti in FY2005 and $90,000 to help
fund the travel of medical personnel in conjunction with the USNS Comfort’s calls in 12 South and Central American
nations. The USNS Comfort is a medical ship that serves U.S. military personnel that also provides medical services to
foreign populations when training abroad with foreign medical personnel.
109
DOD Summary Budget Justification, op. cit., p.13.
110
Added by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1987, P.L. 99-661, Section 333. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, P.L. 109163, Section 1201, amended the section to include surgical care and a provision for related education, training, and
technical assistance.
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from the Department of State, USAID, and any other relevant civilian agencies for all Section
401 activities.111
As spelled out in the FY2007 Section 401 report to Congress,112 a host nation government
proposes a project, which the U.S. embassy then endorses and forwards to the combatant
commanders for consideration. Combatant commanders file annual proposal lists and proposals to
meet emergency requirements with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which
coordinates an interagency review to ensure compliance with U.S. policy and relevant legislation.
This review involves representatives from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
the DOD General Counsel’s office, the Department of State, and USAID. The project must be
approved by the U.S. ambassador to the country where the activity will occur and by the
Secretary of State.113
Section 401 Origins and Evolution
DOD has long carried out abroad a wide variety of small-scale humanitarian programs, often in
the context of military civic action (MCA) programs that also involve construction and
reconstruction projects. Experts trace the Army’s experience with MCA to 18th- and 19th-century
engineering and medical activities in the United States and abroad. “By the time of World War II,
a propensity toward military civic action was already part of the fabric of the U.S. soldier,”
according to one study, which then identifies the MCA program in Korea after the Korean War as
the “first sustained and concerted U.S. military civic action plan.”114 This program set forth a
dominant model in military civic action aimed at small-scale construction and reconstruction
projects, in which U.S. military forces assist, but host nation troops do most of the work. MCA
gained prestige as part of the U.S. military occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the 20th
century and was later endorsed by President John F. Kennedy, who viewed it as an appropriate
nation-building tool.115 Although military assistance had been carried out as part of security
assistance programs prior to the 1960s, in 1965, Congress responded to concerns about its role in
international development by placing the first restrictions on the use of such projects “to prevent
overlap” with USAID when that agency was established in 1961 and legislating interagency
111
The drafting of regulations for 10 U.S.C. 401 was mandated by P.L. 103-160, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994. In
response, DOD issued Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with
Military Operations, October 6, 1994, and Instruction Number 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian
and Civic Assistance (HCA) program, January 27, 1995. Instruction section E(1)(d) states that before the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy issues final approval of Unified Combatant Commanders’ annual HCA activity plans,
the Under Secretary shall “obtain the approval of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development
(AID), and other Government Agencies, as appropriate.”
112
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and
Humanitarian Mine Action Programs, Fiscal Year 2007, February 2008, p. 2. Section 401 requires that DOD provide
an annual report, due March 1, to the four armed services and foreign affairs committees regarding the activities
undertaken under that authority during the previous fiscal year.
113
In practice, adherence to this procedure has varied. For instance, U.S. officials sometimes suggest possible activities
to host nation government officials for their proposal.
114
John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds., “The Role of the Total Army in Military Civic Action and Humanitarian
Assistance: A Synopsis,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990, p. 10. Hereafter referred to as The Role of the Total
Army. The $22 million MCA program in Korea after the Korean War (through 1962) emphasized schools, hospitals,
civic buildings, land reclamation, and improvement of public health and transportation facilities, according to this
source.
115
Ibid.
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coordination that would involve USAID.116 MCA became controversial during the 1960s, when,
because of its linkage with counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Congress became reluctant to fund
it.117 Nevertheless, Congress did fund some MCA projects abroad after Vietnam that were not
linked to counterinsurgency campaigns, in particular an Africa program in the 1980s. That
program was funded at almost $5 million in FY1985, but funding dropped to just under $2
million by FY1989.118
During the 1980s, controversy over MCA in Central America, where the United States was
supporting the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency campaign, led Congress to authorize
specific activities through a new statute. When Congress added Section 401 to Title 10 U.S. Code
in 1986, it set parameters for humanitarian and civic assistance activities in foreign nations by
specifying activities and establishing conditions, but it also provided DOD with greater flexibility
by granting Title 10 authority for such assistance. Previously, at least some MCA, in particular the
Africa program, was carried out under authorities that put the State Department in the lead,
according to one source.119
The number of countries in which these activities have occurred has remained fairly constant,
while the regional balance has shifted somewhat. A comparison of FY1995 and FY2006, two
years where humanitarian and civic action activities took place in 43 countries under Section 401
authority, shows that the number of Western Hemisphere, Middle East/Arab, and Asia/Pacific
recipient countries decreased, while the number of countries in Africa and Greater Europe grew.
Two new African countries and four new European locations were selected for Section 401
activities. In FY2007, when the number of countries rose to 46, three new countries from Europe
and the former Soviet Union were selected.
The greatest change has been the substantial increase in the number of projects. From the early
1990s to FY2007, the number of projects multiplied almost eightfold. From FY2005 through
FY2007, the number more than doubled, from 197 to 480. Section 401 costs over the past 14
years for which data are consecutively available (FY1993-FY2006) has ranged from a low of
$4.7 million in FY1998 to a high of $11.03 million in FY2007. Costs have risen over the past two
fiscal years, but not at the same pace as the number of projects, that is, from $7.67 million in
116
“The Role of the Total Army,” op. cit., p. 11. The requirement for interagency coordination on civic action was
added by Section 302 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1965 (P.L. 89-171) which amended the FAA of 1961. In
addition, Section 201 of the 1965 FAA amended 1961 in an attempt to both codify under the FAA and limit the use of
civic action. This provision, now codified as Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22,
U.S.C. 2302) authorizes the U.S. government to provide assistance to “foreign military forces in less developed
friendly countries ... to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social
development of such friendly countries.” Section 201of the 1965 FAA also expressed the sense of Congress that “such
foreign military forces should not be maintained or established solely for civic action activities and that such civic
action activities not significantly detract from the capability of the military forces to perform their military missions
and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort.”
117
Captain Craig L. Smith. “Military Civic Action,” in The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance
Management. Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 1985, p. 85.
118
Ken H. Butts, “The Africa Civic Action Program,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military
Civic Action, John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, eds. and co-authors (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990), p. 30. Hereafter referred to as The Africa Civic Action Program.
119
The Africa Civic Action Program, op. cit., p. 28. In 1965, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to
include civic action as one of the types of assistance for which the Secretary of State is charged with providing
“continuous supervision and general direction....” (P.L. 87-195, Section 622(c), as amended by P.L. 89-171 Section
302.)
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FY2005 to $11.03 million in FY2007. (These data are taken from the tables at the end of this
appendix, which are compiled from the Section 401 annual reports.)
Issues
DOD humanitarian assistance often draws praise when provided in emergency relief situations,
such as natural and manmade disasters, as it is the most fl
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