Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

Congressional research reportJan 9, 2012

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Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement:

Background, Issues, and Options for Congress

(name redacted)

Specialist in Naval Affairs

January 9, 2012

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RL34476

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement

Summary

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of an 11th and final

San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. The ship had received $184.0 million in prior-year

advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested the

remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4

million.

The Navy’s FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for the procurement of a new class of

amphibious ship called the LSD(X) starting in FY2017. Some observers have suggested using the

LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X). Navy officials do not stress this option and instead

appear more interested in developing an all-new design for the LSD(X). If a decision were made

to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), then procuring a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014

or FY2015 would help keep the LPD-17 production line open until the procurement of the first

LSD(X) in FY2017, which in turn might help reduce LSD(X) production costs.

Issues for Congress in 2011 included whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed

funding request for the 11th LPD-17, whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17

design as the basis for the design of the LSD(X), and—particularly if the LPD-17 design is used

as the basis for the LSD(X)—whether to fund the procurement of a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or

FY2015.

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Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Background...................................................................................................................................... 1

Amphibious Ships in General.................................................................................................... 1

Roles and Missions of Amphibious Ships........................................................................... 1

Amphibious Lift Goal ......................................................................................................... 2

Current and Projected Force of Amphibious Ships ............................................................. 3

LPD-17 Program ....................................................................................................................... 3

Program Origin.................................................................................................................... 3

Construction Shipyards ....................................................................................................... 4

Procurement History ........................................................................................................... 4

Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Construction Problems .............................................. 5

Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X) ....................................................... 5

FY2012 Funding Request.................................................................................................... 5

Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 5

Legislative Activity For FY2012 ..................................................................................................... 7

FY2012 Funding Request.......................................................................................................... 7

FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81) .................................... 7

House................................................................................................................................... 7

Senate (S. 1867) .................................................................................................................. 8

Senate (S. 1253) .................................................................................................................. 8

Conference .......................................................................................................................... 8

FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74).......................................................................... 8

Conference .......................................................................................................................... 8

FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)......................................................................... 8

House................................................................................................................................... 8

Senate .................................................................................................................................. 9

Conference .......................................................................................................................... 9

Figures

Figure 1. LPD-17 Class Amphibious Ship....................................................................................... 4

Tables

Table 1. Projected Number of Amphibious Ships, FY2012-FY2041 .............................................. 3

Table 2. LPD-17 Procurement, FY1996-FY2012............................................................................ 5

Table A-1. Amphibious Lift Goals Since 1980.............................................................................. 10

Table A-2. MEB AE Lift Elements ................................................................................................ 12

Table A-3. Ships Required for Various Potential Lift Goals.......................................................... 13

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Appendixes

Appendix A. Additional Information on Amphibious Lift Goal.................................................... 10

Appendix B. May 25, 2011, Navy Testimony on LPD-17 Program.............................................. 15

Appendix C. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems ................................................... 18

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 59

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Introduction

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the San Antonio (LPD17) class amphibious ship program. The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for

the procurement of an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship.

Issues for Congress in 2011 included whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed

funding request for the 11th LPD-17, whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17

design as the basis for the design of the LSD(X) class of amphibious ships that the Navy wants to

begin procuring in FY2017, and—particularly if the LPD-17 design is used as the basis for the

LSD(X)—whether to fund the procurement of a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015. Congress’s

decisions on these issues can affect, among other things, Navy and Marine Corps funding

requirements and capabilities, and the shipbuilding industrial base.

Background

Amphibious Ships in General1

Roles and Missions of Amphibious Ships

The primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) U.S. Marines and their

equipment and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct expeditionary

operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships are designed to support Marine

landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in permissive or

benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage spaces and their

ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and supplies from ship

to shore without need for port facilities,2 amphibious ships are potentially useful for a range of

non-combat and combat operations.3

Navy amphibious ships can be divided into two main groups—the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships,

designated LHA and LHD, which look like medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still sizeable)

amphibious ships designated LSD or LPD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.

U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be

translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault. LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well

deck. LSD can be translated as landing ship, well deck. LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well

deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, all these ships have well decks.

The LHAs and LHDs have large flight decks and hangar decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and

VTOL fixed-wing aircraft, while the LSDs and LPDs have much smaller flight decks and hangar decks for embarking

and operating smaller numbers of helicopters. The LHAs and LHDs, as bigger ships, in general can individually

embark more Marines and equipment than the LSDs and LPDs.

Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat

equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing

(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is a large,

garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the

ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)

Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarianassistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such

as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist

(continued...)

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On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are

forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas. Forward-deployed U.S. Navy amphibious

ships are often organized into three-ship formations called amphibious ready groups (ARGs).4 On

average, two or perhaps three ARGs might be forward-deployed at any given time. Amphibious

ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis to certain lower-threat

operating areas, particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign

countries or for responding to smaller-scale contingencies.

Amphibious Lift Goal

Although the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet, first presented to Congress in February 2006, called

for a 31-ship amphibious force that includes 10 LPD-17s, Navy and Marine Corps officials

subsequently agreed that a 33-ship amphibious force that includes 11 LPD-17s would be needed

to minimally meet the Marine Corps’ goal of having an amphibious ship force with enough

combined capacity to lift the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades

(MEBs). A 33-ship force would include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB, plus three additional

ships to account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given

time.

Marine Corps and Navy officials also agree that a 38-ship amphibious force would more fully

meet the Marine Corps’ 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Such a force would include 17

amphibious ships for each MEB, plus four additional ships to account for 10% to 15% of the

amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time. Although a 38-ship force would more

fully meet the Marine Corps’ lift requirement, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to accept

the operational risks associated with having a 33-ship force rather than a 38-ship force.

For further discussion of the amphibious lift goal, see Appendix A.

(...continued)

foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritimesecurity operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and largerscale ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining

forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.

Although the Marines have not conducted a large-scale amphibious assault against opposing military forces since the

Korean War, Marine Corps officials state that there have been about 85 U.S. amphibious operations of other kinds

between 1990 and April 2008. (Source for the figure of about 85 amphibious operations between 1990 and April 2008:

Marine Corps briefing to CRS on April 25, 2008.) In addition, presenting the potential for conducting an amphibious

landing can generate tactical benefits, even if the landing is not carried out. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for

example, the potential for conducting an amphibious landing by a force of about 17,000 Marines embarked on

amphibious ships in the Persian Gulf tied down several Iraqi divisions in coastal-defense positions. Those Iraqi

divisions’ positions were not available for use against U.S.-coalition ground forces moving north from Saudi Arabia.

(See CRS Report 91-421, Persian Gulf War: Defense Policy Implications for Congress, coordinated by Ronald

O’Rourke, p. 41. [May 15, 1991; out of print and available directly from the report coordinator.])

An ARG notionally includes three amphibious ships—one LHA or LHD, one LSD, and one LPD. These three

amphibious ships, which are referred to as an amphibious ready group (ARG), together can embark a Marine

expeditionary unit (MEU) consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their aircraft, their landing craft, their combat equipment,

and about 15 days worth of supplies. ARGs can operate in conjunction with carrier strike groups (CSGs) to form larger

naval task forces.

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Current and Projected Force of Amphibious Ships

As of the end of FY2011, the Navy’s amphibious force included the following 28 ships:

•

8 Wasp (LHD-1) class ships, each displacing about 40,500 tons;

•

1 Tarawa (LHA-1) class ship, displacing about 40,000 tons;

•

5 San Antonio (LPD-17) class ships, each displacing about 26,000 tons;

•

2 Austin (LPD-4) class ships, each displacing about 17,000 tons; and

•

12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships, each displacing

about 16,000 tons.

Table 1 shows the projected total number of amphibious ships under the Navy’s 30-year

(FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan.

Table 1. Projected Number of Amphibious Ships, FY2012-FY2041

Under Navy’s 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan

Number

of ships

Number

of ships

Number

of ships

2012

2022

2032

2013

2023

2033

2014

2024

2034

2015

2025

2035

2016

2026

2036

2017

2027

2037

2018

2028

2038

2019

2029

2039

2020

2030

2040

2021

2031

2041

Source: Navy FY2012 30-year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, provided by Navy to CRS and the

Congressional Budget office (CBO) on May 24, 2011.

LPD-17 Program

Program Origin

The Navy initiated the LPD-17 program in the 1990s to provide replacement ships for the Navy’s

aging Austin (LPD-4) class amphibious ships, which entered service between 1965 and 1971, and

three other, older classes of amphibious ships that have already been removed from Navy service.

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Figure 1. LPD-17 Class Amphibious Ship

Source: Navy file photo accessed at http://www.navy.mil/management/photodb/photos/050429-O-0000X001.jpg on April 20, 2011.

Construction Shipyards

LPD-17s have been built primarily by the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, LA, and the

Ingalls shipyard near Pascagoula, MS, that form part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII).5 HII

was previously owned by Northrop Grumman, during which time it was called Northrop

Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).

Procurement History

As shown in Table 2, the first LPD-17 was procured in FY1996, and a total of 11 were procured

through FY2012. As of the end of FY2011, the first five had entered service.

Portions of LPD-17s are built at a fabrication facility at Gulfport, MS, that is also owned by Northrop. Northrop

subcontracted portions of some early LPD-17s to a shipyard in Texas operated by Signal International

(http://www.signalint.com), and more recently subcontracted portions of LPD-24 (i.e., the eighth LPD-17) to General

Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard of Bath, ME. Parts of LPD-24 are also being built at Newport News

Shipbuilding, of Newport News, VA, another yard owned by HII. (See Peter Frost, “Labor Market, Schedule Forces

Outsourcing of Work,” Newport News Daily Press, April 1, 2008; Holbrook Mohr, “Northrop Gets LPD Help From

General Dynamics,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2008; and Geoff Fein, “Northrop Grumman Awards Bath Iron Works

Construction Work On LPD-24,” Defense Daily, April 2, 2008.)

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Table 2. LPD-17 Procurement, FY1996-FY2012

Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Construction Problems

The LPD-17 program has experienced considerable cost growth, schedule delays, and

construction problems, particularly on the earlier ships in the program. The first ship in the

program experienced cost growth of about 70%, and later ships in the program were substantially

more expensive to build than originally estimated. The design and construction of the first ship

were delayed by about two years. Delays in building the first ships were a primary reason for the

FY2001-FY2002 hiatus in LPD-17 procurement shown in Table 2. The first and second ships

were delivered to the Navy in incomplete form, and numerous construction problems were

identified on the first two ships. There have been recurrent reports of construction problems on

in-service LPD-17s. The Navy has been working to overcome these problems and is reporting

success in these efforts. For additional details, see Appendix B and Appendix C.

Option of Using LPD-17 Design as Basis for LSD(X)

The Navy’s FY2012 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for the procurement of a new class of

amphibious ship called the LSD(X) starting in FY2017. LSD(X)s are to replace the Navy’s 12

aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships. Some observers have

suggested using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X). Navy officials do not stress this

option and instead appear more interested in developing an all-new design for the LSD(X). If a

decision were made to use the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X), then procuring a 12th

LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015 would help keep the LPD-17 production line open until the

procurement of the first LSD(X) in FY2017, which in turn might help reduce LSD(X) production

costs.

FY2012 Funding Request

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of an 11th and final

San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. The ship had received $184.0 million in prior-year

advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested the

remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4

million.

Issues for Congress

Issues for Congress for 2011 included

•

whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s proposed funding request for

the 11th LPD-17;

•

whether to encourage or direct the Navy to use the LPD-17 design as the basis

for the design of the LSD(X); and

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•

whether to fund the procurement of a 12th LPD-17 in FY2014 or FY2015,

particularly if the LPD-17 design is used as the basis for the LSD(X).

Supporters of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) could argue that doing so

could substantially reduce LSD(X) design costs by avoiding the need for creating an all-new

design for the LSD(X), and help constrain LSD(X) production costs and risks by taking

advantage of the LPD-17 production learning curve, particularly if a 12th LPD-17 were procured

in FY2014 or FY2015 so as to keep the LPD-17 production line open until the scheduled start of

LSD(X) production in FY2017. An amphibious force with 12 LPD-17s and 10 LSD(X)s, they

could argue, would be able to meet the 2.0 MEB (AE) amphibious lift goal as well as would an

amphibious force with 11 LPD-17s and 11 LSD(X)s. An LSD(X) based on the LPD-17 design,

they could argue, could have its features optimized so that a force with 12 LPD-17s and 10

LSD(X)s would meet the goal. The production-cost and production-risk advantages of taking

advantage of the existing LPD-17 production learning curve, they could argue, outweigh the

potential cost-reduction advantages of staging a competition between shipyards for the right to

build LSD(X)s.

Skeptics of using the LPD-17 design as the basis for the LSD(X) could argue that it is too early to

know whether an LPD-17-based LSD(X) would be a good approach, because operational

requirements for the LSD(X) have not yet been determined. They could argue that an LPD-17based LSD(X) could be bigger and more expensive to procure and operate than what the Navy

needs, and that while a brand-new LSD(X) design would likely have higher design costs than an

LPD-17-based design, an all-new LSD(X) design might be smaller and less expensive to procure

and operate than an LPD-17-based design, eventually offsetting its higher initial design cost.

They could argue that an all-new LSD(X) design could more comprehensively incorporate newer

technologies, including technologies for reducing crew size, than could an LPD-17 based design.

They could also argue that competition is an important mechanism for restraining shipbuilding

costs, and that it would be easier for the Navy to stage an effective competition between

shipbuilders for the right to build an all-new LSD(X) design than an LPD-17-based design,

because no shipbuilder would have a significant cost advantage going into the bidding for an allnew LSD(X) design by virtue of having previously built LPD-17s.

At a May 6, 2010, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee of

the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred between Senator Kay

Hagan and Sean Stackley, the Navy’s acquisition executive (i.e., the Assistant Secretary of the

Navy [Research, Development and Acquisition]):

SENATOR HAGAN:

The 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the 11th and the final of the San Antonio

class landing platform dock amphibious ship in 2012.

In 2017, the 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for the start of procurement of a replacement for

aging landing ship dock amphibious ships.

Secretary Stackley, or all of you, can the LPD 17 design be used for the basis of the LSD

replacement? And would the procurement of a 12th LPD 17 in 2014 or 2015 support keeping

the production line open while transitioning to the start of the LSD replacement?

STACKLEY:

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Yes, ma’am. Let me—let me start that. In general terms, the Navy would look for reuse of

design and common hull forms to improve affordability of any new program.

The timing for the LSD(X), I mentioned in my opening remarks is ahead of need.6 The LSD

41 and 49 class do not exit the service until the mid-2020s. We look at concerns with the

industrial base, so we have pulled that replacement program as early as we can without

pushing some other requirement out that’s, frankly, more urgent on a schedule basis.

So we have the LSD(X) just outside of the FYDP. And this year and next year we are going

through the definition of the requirements to determine exactly what is the lift fingerprint

that the replacement ship has to provide, and does that, in fact, line up with an LPD 17 hull

form?

If it turns out that the LPD 17 is more capability than what the LSD(X) is, then we have to

do the affordability and trades review to balance off what’s the cost of a new start versus the

cost of re-use. And affordability and capability requirements and schedules are all going to

be brought to the table in that—in that review and, frankly, that debate.7

Legislative Activity For FY2012

FY2012 Funding Request

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of an 11th and final

San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship. The ship had received $184.0 million in prior-year

advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requested the

remaining $1,847.4 million needed to complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost of $2,031.4

million.

FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81)

House

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-78 of May 17, 2011) on H.R.

1540, recommended approval of the Navy’s request for FY2012 procurement funding for the

LPD-17 program (page 346). The report states:

The committee received testimony that the Marine Corps’ requirement for amphibious ships

is 38 ships, but that the number of ships that are absolutely necessary with acceptable risk is

33. The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to continue pursuing a minimum of

33 amphibious ships. (Page 34)

Stackley here is stating that, given the ages of the LSD-41/49 class ships, the currently scheduled procurement date of

FY2017 for the first LSD(X) is years earlier than what would be nominally be needed to provide a timely replacement

for the first of the retiring LSD-41/49 class ships.

Source: Transcript of hearing.

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Senate (S. 1867)

S. 1867, an original measure reported by Senator Levin on November 15, 2011, without written

report, in effect superseded S. 1253 (see below). S. 1867 recommended approval of the Navy’s

request for FY2012 procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. (See Section 4101 of the bill.

In the printed version of the bill, the relevant table within this section appears on page 611.)

Senate (S. 1253)

S. 1253 was, in effect, superseded by S. 1867 (see above). S. 1253 as reported by the Senate

Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26 of June 22, 2011) recommended approval of the

Navy’s request for FY2012 procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. (See Section 4101 of

the bill as reported by the committee. In the printed version of the bill as reported by the

committee, the relevant table within this section appears on page 606.)

Conference

The conference report (H.Rept. 112-329 of December 12, 2011) on H.R. 1540/P.L. 112-81 of

December 31, 2011, recommended reducing by $10 million the Navy’s request for FY2012

procurement funding for the LPD-17 program, with the reduction being for “Excess ECO

[engineering change order] funding” (page 812).

FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related

Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74)

Conference

In final action, H.R. 2055 became a consolidated appropriations vehicle incorporating nine

appropriations bills, including the FY2012 DOD appropriations bill, which was incorporated as

Division A. The conference report (H.Rept. 112-331 of December 15, 2011) on H.R. 2055/P.L.

112-74 of December 23, 2011, reduced by $10 million the Navy’s request for FY2012

procurement funding for the LPD-17 program, with the reduction being for “Excess ECO

[engineering change order] funding” (page 629).

FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219)

House

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-110 of June 16, 2011) on H.R.

2219, recommended reducing by $14 million the Navy’s FY2012 request for procurement

funding for the LPD-17 program, with the reduction being for “Excess ECO [engineering change

order] funding.” (Pages 153-154)

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Senate

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-77 of September 15, 2011) on

H.R. 2219, recommended approving the Navy’s FY2012 request for procurement funding for the

LPD-17 program (page 120).

Regarding another amphibious shipbuilding program, the committee’s report stated:

LHA 8 Amphibious Assault Ship.—The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $26,702,000

for LHA 8 amphibious assault ship preliminary design efforts. The Committee is aware that

the Department of the Navy plans to reintroduce a well deck and optimize the aviation

capability of LHA 8, which is planned for procurement in fiscal year 2016. Considering

growing fiscal pressure on the national defense budget and increasing amphibious assault

ship demands from combatant commanders for contingency operations, theater security

cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and conventional deterrence missions, the Committee

believes it is essential that LHA 8 be introduced in the most cost effective manner.

Therefore, the Committee directs the Department of the Navy to fully fund advance planning

and design of LHA 8 and work with industry to identify affordability and producibility

strategies that will lead to more efficient construction of a large deck amphibious assault ship

to best meet combatant commander needs. (Pages 189-190)

Conference

For the conference report on the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act, see the above discussion of

H.R. 2055/P.L. 112-74.

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Appendix A. Additional Information on

Amphibious Lift Goal

This appendix presents additional background information on the amphibious lift goal.8

Expressed in Terms of MEBs

The Marine Corps’ goal for amphibious lift is to have a force of amphibious ships with enough

combined lift capacity to simultaneously land the assault echelons (AEs) of two Marine

Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), or 2.0 MEB AEs for short. This goal, Marine Corps officials

state, reflects responsibilities assigned to Marine Corps forces in U.S. regional war plans.

A MEB is a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) of 14,484 Marines and their equipment and

supplies. The AE of a MEB is the initial part of the MEB to go ashore. The remaining part that

goes ashore later is called the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE). Marine Corps doctrine calls for

the AE to go ashore from amphibious ships, and for the AFOE to go ashore from less-survivable

sealift (i.e., cargo-type) ships controlled by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The AE of a

MEB includes 10,055 of the MEB’s Marines, plus equipment and supplies for these 10,055

Marines.

The amphibious lift goal as approved by the Secretary of Defense has changed numerous times

since the Korean War, reflecting changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances. One such

change occurred in 1991, as the Cold War was ending.9 The most recent change occurred in 2006,

when the goal was reduced from 2.5 MEB AEs to 2.0 MEB AEs. Table A-1 shows amphibious

lift goals since 1980.

Table A-1. Amphibious Lift Goals Since 1980

Year

1980

1981

1982

1991

2006

Goal

1.15 MEFsb

1 MEF AE + 1 MEB

1 MEF AE + 1 MEB AE

2.5 MEB AEs

2.0 MEB AEs

Troopsa

66,252

53,240

46,810

33,793

23,016

Sources: For list of amphibious lift goals prior to 2006: Matthew T. Robinson, Integrated Amphibious Operations

Update Study, (DoN Liftt 2+)—A Short History of the Amphibious Lift Requirement, Center for Naval Analyses,

Alexandria (VA), CRM D0005882.A3/Final, July 2002, p. 2 (Table 2). For troop levels associated with each lift

goal: Marine Corps data provided to CRS on May 2, 2008.

Troop totals shown include a Navy Support Element (NSE) consisting of Navy units that help to move the

Marines’ equipment and supplies from ship to shore. In the case of the 2006 goal for 2.0 MEB AEs, the total

of 23,016 troops includes an NSE of 2,906 Navy personnel.

MEF stands for Marine Expeditionary Force—a Marine air-ground task force with more than twice as many

troops as a MEB.

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is based on a briefing from Marine Corps officials to CRS on

April 25, 2008, and on Marine Corps point papers provided to CRS in association with this briefing.

Key events marking the end of the Cold War include fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disintegration

of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

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In discussions of the current 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift goal, the “AE” part is often dropped for

convenience, even though the current requirement still relates to MEB AEs rather than complete

MEBs.

Marine Corps officials state that the 2006 reduction in the amphibious lift goal to 2.0 MEB AEs is

acceptable because the Navy and Marine Corps also plan to field a new squadron of 14 nextgeneration maritime prepositioning force ships called the Maritime Prepositioning Force of the

Future, or MPF(F). The planned 14-ship MPF(F) squadron, which is to include three modified

LHA/LHD-type ships and 11 sealift (i.e., cargo-transport) ships, is to have a capability for putting

an additional MEB ashore. Unlike the amphibious ship force, the MPF(F) squadron is not

intended as assault shipping—the sealift ships in the MPF(F) squadron have less survivability and

self-defense capability than the Navy’s amphibious ships, and are therefore considered unsuitable

for use in forcible-entry operations. MPF(F) ships, however, are in general less expensive to

procure than amphibious ships, and they are designed to remain prepositioned at sea in a theater

of interest for long periods of time before returning the port for maintenance. Together, the

Navy’s amphibious ship force and the MPF(F) squadron are to provide a total of 3.0 MEB AEs of

lift, or 30,165 troops.

Translated into Numbers of Amphibious Ships

The Marine Corps states the 2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift goal translates into a requirement for a

force of 33 amphibious ships, including

•

11 LHAs/LHDs,

•

11 LSD-41/49 class ships, and

•

11 LPD-17s.

In explaining how the requirement for 2.0 MEB AEs translates into this 33-ship requirement, the

Marine Corps states the following:

•

Given the lift capabilities of the Navy’s current amphibious ships, each MEB AE

would require 19 operational amphibious ships to lift: 6 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD41/49s, and 6 LPD-17s.

•

To arrive at a more fiscally constrained goal, the Marine Corps reduced the above

19-ship total to 17 operational ships: 5 LHAs/LHDs, 7 LSD-41/49s, and 5 LPD17s. This 17-ship force requires about 11% of the MEB AE’s vehicles to be

shifted to the AFOE, which creates a degree of operational risk. This 17-ship

force was presented to Navy officials in mid-2007.

•

To arrive at a still-more fiscally constrained goal, Navy and Marine Corps

officials in mid-2007 agreed to reduce the 17-ship total to 15 operational ships—

5 of each kind. This 15-ship force requires about 20% of the MEB AE’s vehicles

and about 12% of its cargo to be shifted to the AFOE, which creates an additional

degree of operational risk.

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The Marine Corps testified in April 2008 that:

Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare ships.... However, given current fiscal

constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to assume a degree of operational risk

by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using only fifteen ships per MEB.... 10

Table A-2 shows the five elements of the amphibious lift footprint, and how limiting each MEB

AE to 17 or 15 operational ships results in some of the MEB AE’s vehicles and cargo being

shifted to the AFOE.

Table A-2. MEB AE Lift Elements

% of lift element

shifted to AFOE

Operational ships per MEB AE

19 ships

(full MEB

AE)

17 ships

(somewhat

fiscally

constrained)

15 ships

(more fiscally

constrained)

Troop berthing

10,055

—

Vehicle storage space

(square feet)

352,340

312,601

281,694

11.3%

20.1%

Cargo storage (cubic

feet)

553,009

486,638

—

12.0%

VTOL aircraft

operating spots

254

—

LCAC operating

spots

—

Lift element

with 17

ships per

MEB AE

with 15

ships per

MEB AE

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Marine Corps data provided by telephone to CRS on April 29, 2008.

Notes: VTOL means vertical takeoff and landing. LCAC means air-cushioned landing craft.

Using 15 operational ships per MEB AE, providing lift for 2.0 MEB AEs would require 30

operational ships: 10 LHAs/LHDs, 10 LSD-41/49s, and 10 LPD-17s. The Marine Corps states

that, in light of ship maintenance requirements, maintaining a force of 30 operational ships (i.e.,

ships not in maintenance) would require having an additional 15% in total inventory, meaning a

total of 34.5 ships (11.5 of each kind) for 2.0 MEB AEs. The figure of 34.5 ships, the Marine

Corps states, was then rounded down to 33 ships (11 of each kind).11

Table A-3 shows the total number of amphibious ships that the Marine Corps states would be

needed to lift 2.0 MEBs (the current goal), 2.5 MEBs (the goal from 1991 to 2006), and 3.0

MEBs (the broader current goal currently being met through a combination of amphibious and

MPF[F] ships), using 15, 17, or 19 operational ships per MEB AE, and including an additional

Statement of Lieutenant General James F. Amos, Deputy Commandant of the marine Corps (Combat Development

and Integration), Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower, Concerning Shipbuilding

and Force Structure on April 08, 2008, pp. 6-7. Italics as in the original.

As shown in Appendix A, the Marine Corps alternatively has stated that in light of ship maintenance requirements,

maintaining a force of 30 operational ships would require having an additional 10% in total inventory, meaning a total

of 33 ships (11 of each kind).

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allowance to account for ships in maintenance. The first column shows the current 33-ship

requirement for 2.0 MEB AEs using 15 operational ships per MEB.

Table A-3. Ships Required for Various Potential Lift Goals

(including allowance for ships in overhaul)

2.0 MEB AEs

2.5 MEB AEs

3.0 MEB AEs

Operational ships per MEB AEa

LHA/LHDa

LSD-41/49a

LPD-17a

Totala

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Marine Corps data provided to CRS on May 1, 2008.

Required numbers of ships shown include additional allowance to account for ships in maintenance, so as to

support 15, 17, or 19 operational ships per MEB AE.

Table A-3 shows a total of 37 amphibious ships would be needed to meet the 2.0 MEB AE using

17 amphibious ships per MEB. In April 2009 testimony to Congress, the Navy revised this figure

to 38 ships, including 17 ships for each MEB plus four (rather than three) additional ships to

account for 10% to 15% of the amphibious ship force being in overhaul at any given time.12

Marine Corps Testimony in 2008

Regarding the amphibious lift goal, the Marine Corps testified in April 2008 as follows:

Shipbuilding Requirements

Based on strategic guidance, in the last several years the Navy and Marine Corps have

accepted risk in our Nation’s forcible entry capacity, and reduced amphibious lift from 3.0

MEB assault echelon (AE) to 2.0 MEB AE. In the budgetary arena, the value of amphibious

ships is too often assessed exclusively in terms of forcible entry—discounting their

demonstrated usefulness across the range of operations and the clear imperative for Marines

embarked aboard amphibious ships to meet Phase 0 demands. The ability to transition

between those two strategic goalposts, and to respond to every mission-tasking in between,

will rely on a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team and the amphibious ships that facilitate our

bond. The Navy and Marine Corps have worked diligently to determine the minimum

number of amphibious ships necessary to satisfy the Nation’s needs.

The Marine Corps’ contribution to the Nation’s forcible entry requirement is a single,

simultaneously-employed two MEB assault capability—as part of a seabased MEF.

Although not a part of the MEF AE, a third reinforcing MEB is required and will be

provided through MPF(F) shipping. Each MEB AE requires seventeen amphibious warfare

ships—resulting in an overall ship requirement for thirty-four amphibious warfare ships.

Statement of Vice Admiral Bernard J. McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities

and Resources, and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs), before the

Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee [hearing] on Shipbuilding, April 1, 2009, p. 7. See

also McCullough’s spoken testimony at the hearing.

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However, given current fiscal constraints, the Navy and Marine Corps have agreed to

assume a degree of operational risk by limiting the assault echelon of each MEB by using

only fifteen ships per MEB—in other words, a Battle Force that provides thirty “operationally

available” amphibious warfare ships.

Amphibious Ships

In that thirty-ship Battle Force, ten aviation-capable big deck ships (LHA / LHD / LHA(R)),

ten LPD 17 class ships, and ten LSD class ships are required to accommodate the MAGTF

[Marine Air-Ground Task Force] capabilities. In order to meet a thirty-ship availability

rate—based on a CNO-approved maintenance factor of ten percent—a minimum of eleven

ships of each of the current types of amphibious ships are required—for a total of thirty-three

ships. The CNO has concurred with this requirement for thirty-three amphibious warfare

ships, which provide the “backbone” of our maritime capability—giving us the ability to

meet the demands of harsh environments across the spectrum of conflict.

The LPD 17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents the Department of the

Navy’s commitment to a modern expeditionary power projection fleet enabling our naval

force to operate across the spectrum of warfare. The LPD 17 class replaces four classes of

older ships—LKA, LST, LSD 36, LPD 4—and will have a forty-year expected service life. It

is imperative that eleven of these ships be built to meet the minimum of ten necessary for the

2.0 MEB AE amphibious lift requirement. Procurement of the tenth and eleventh LPDs

remains a priority.13

Statement of Lieutenant General James F. Amos, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps (Combat Development

and Integration), before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower, Concerning Shipbuilding

and Force Structure, April 8, 2008, pp. 6-7. Italics as in the original.

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Appendix B. May 25, 2011, Navy Testimony on LPD17 Program

This appendix presents an excerpt on the LPD-17 program from the Navy’s prepared statement

for a May 25, 2011, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee

of the Senate Armed Services Committee. For further discussion of LPD-17 class construction

problems, see Appendix C. The text of the excerpt is as follows:

The SAN ANTONIO Class LPD (LPD 17) has a 40-year expected service life and serves as

the replacement for four classes of older ships: the LKA, LST, LSD 36, and the LPD 4.

Lessons learned from the effort to resolve material reliability concerns identified in the early

ships of the class are being applied to ships currently under construction. Quality continues

to improve with each ship delivered as the Navy continues to work closely with the

shipbuilder to address cost, schedule, and performance issues. Five ships have been

delivered, and four more ships are under construction. The construction contract for the 10th

ship was recently awarded and the eleventh and final LPD is planned for procurement in FY

2012.

Ships of the class have deployed seven times including two ships that are currently on

deployment. USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) has deployed once (2008), USS NEW

ORLEANS LPD 18 has completed two successful overseas deployments (2009 and 2010).

USS MESA VERDE (LPD 19) has also completed two successful overseas deployments.

Today, LPD 19 is again deployed overseas; and USS GREEN BAY (LPD 20) is in the

middle of her first overseas deployment. LPD 18 and USS NEW YORK (LPD 21) are fully

operational, conducting local operations in their homeport areas. LPD 17 is completing her

major post- deployment repair availability prior to next sea trials.

In February of this year, LPD 21 successfully passed an inspection by the Navy’s Board of

Inspection and Survey (INSURV) to support the Final Contract Trials. The President of

INSURV remarked that LPD 21 was the best LPD 17 Class ship they had seen and that

lessons learned from the first ships of the class were clearly being implemented.

The Navy and Industry have made significant progress in correcting early class design and

construction issues on the LPD 17 Class. Early ships of the LPD 17 Class were delivered to

the Navy with pipe welding quality, engine alignment problems, inadequate lube oil

cleanliness and bearing wear which led to unplanned engine repairs and overhauls. These

material issues, combined with an optimized sized crew and a reliance on computer-based

vice classroom training, led to decreased reliability and operational availability of the class.

The above issues, as well as inadequate initial reliability of the ships computer network and

some of the engine and ship control systems led the Navy and DoD independent operational

testing organizations to rate the ships as not operationally suitable during the initial

operational testing conducted in 2007-2008. Follow-on Test and Evaluation (FOT&E),

which commenced in July 2010 and runs through FY 2012, is being conducted by the Navy’s

Commander, Operational Test & Evaluation Force and the Marine Corps Operational Test

and Evaluation Activity to confirm adequate corrective actions have been taken.

Over the last couple of years, the shipbuilder (Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB),

now Huntington Ingalls Industries, (HII)) has implemented several initiatives to address the

quality issues associated with ship construction and delivery.

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The shipbuilder significantly revised their welding, quality and production processes to

improve quality and ensure consistency across all of their shipbuilding facilities. Their

workforce was re-trained and re-certified to the updated process. The Navy and HII have

improved the oil flushing procedures to get all the contaminants out of the ship’s lube oil

system and improvements to the lube oil filters and strainers have been developed to better

remove any contaminants that might be introduced through normal operation of the engines.

These more stringent flushing procedures are being used on all ships in the class and the

improved filters and strainers are planned for installation on all ships in the class.

Additionally, the shipyard has taken several steps to ensure pipe sections are maintained in a

clean condition from fabrication in the pipe shop to installation on the ship including a new

cleaning process in the pipe shop and improved pipe capping procedures to prevent

contaminants from entering the pipe during shipping and installation onboard the ship. The

Navy has also significantly improved its lube oil sampling and analysis process. This process

has been incorporated into the ship construction process. The shipbuilder is responsible for

the overall quality of the ship. To manage quality, the shipbuilder utilizes a Quality

Management System (QMS) comprising of Quality Control (ensuring the correct product

requirements, manufacturing processes, etc.) and Quality Assurance (focused on end product

quality and conformance).

The Ship Wide Area Network (SWAN) design, which was based upon 1990’s Asynchronous

Transfer Mode (ATM) technology, experienced multiple failures resulting in failover

monitoring, maintainability, and supportability issues. The ATM-based SWAN is being

replaced by current Gigabit Ethernet technology hardware and software. Today, this “Gig-E”

SWAN is installed on LPD 17, 18 and 21 with no reported failures to date. LPD 19 and 20

will receive this upgrade in FY 2012; and the baseline for LPD 22 and follow ships has been

updated to include the Gig-E SWAN. Initial system reliability issues with the engine

controls, ship controls, and interior communications systems have been addressed through

major software upgrades to each system, as well as the replacement of critical obsolete parts

with more rugged, current technology hardware.

Government oversight by the Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast (SSGC) has

been revamped with an increase in overall SSGC manning by 21 percent from 2005 through

the end of 2010, including an intensive focus on critical waterfront Quality Assurance (QA)

billets. All Government QA weld inspectors were required to undergo re-training and recertification in critical process areas, and QA oversight was increased across all phases of

production. Within the last 18 months, the QA organization has been restructured to include

more surveillance of in process work and compliance with formal ship construction

procedures. A revamped training program has been implemented, providing an “apprentice

to subject matter expert” career roadmap for QA specialists. SSGC has implemented a

process of “critical process pulse audits” to ensure HII maintains production quality across

the critical shipbuilding areas of structure, pipe, electrical, and coatings. Navy critical

process metrics have been aligned with the shipbuilder to better assess performance trends

leading to earlier identification of issues when they arise.

In addition, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) sent teams of QA

experts to assess SSGC ability to provide QA oversight and HII’s production quality in

Spring 2009, July 2010 and January 2011. The NAVSEA audits confirmed initial

improvement by both SSGC and HII. The focus going forward, and a key element of the

critical process pulse audits, is ensuring sustainment of that performance.

The Navy is also strengthening the LPD 17 Class crew training by establishing more

traditional shore-based schoolhouses for critical systems that will result in a blended

philosophy of classroom, on-ship, and computer-based training rather than solely relying on

the previously emphasized computer-based shipboard training.

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The Ship Manning Document (SMD) was recently approved, increasing the LPD 17 Class

crew size to 381 from the original “optimized” manning level of 360.

The LPD 17 Class System Sustainability Strike Team, made up of personnel from the Fleet,

the Navy regional maintenance centers, the shipbuilder, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, the

class planning yard, and the Navy Warfare Centers was established in FY 2009. The Strike

Team has focused resources on developing and prioritizing correction plans addressing

system design, production/quality, operations and maintenance issues identified in recent

test/evaluation reports, as well as those discovered during normal shipboard operations.

Lessons learned from this effort are being incorporated in the ship construction process.

Quality and reliability problems seen on the early ships of the class are being systematically

addressed by the shipbuilder and the Navy. Additionally, the Fleet has recognized the need

for additional manning for each ship and training for the crews, which is being implemented.

The above-listed corrections and improvements are already being realized in the later ships

of the class, as evidenced by LPD 21’s recent success during Final Contract Trials. The Navy

recently discovered quality problems with repairs on various ships during Fleet maintenance

availabilities. We are addressing these issues by providing additional government oversight

to ensure strict compliance with all required maintenance and repair specifications and

holding the contractor accountable to provide quality.14

Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and

Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Captain William J.

Galilnis, Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) Gulf Coast, before the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Senate

Armed Services Committee on Navy Shipbuilding, May 25, 2011, pp. 9-11.

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Appendix C. LPD-17 Cost Growth and

Construction Problems

This appendix, along with Appendix B, provides details on cost growth and construction

problems in the LPD-17 program.

Cost Growth

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) testified in July 2007 that the first LPD-17 experienced

cost growth of about 70% and is, on a per-ton basis, the most expensive amphibious ship ever

built for the Navy.15 When LPD-17 procurement began, follow-on ships in the class were

estimated to cost roughly $750 million each. Estimated procurement costs for the follow-on ships

subsequently grew to figures between about $1,200 million and about $1,500 million. The Navy

estimates the procurement cost of the 11th ship at $2,040.6 million.

A relatively small portion of the cost growth in the program since its inception is attributable to

the decision to reduce the program’s sustaining procurement rate from two ships per year to one

ship per year. Most of the program’s cost growth is attributable to other causes.16

Construction Problems17

Developments in 2005-2007

The first LPD-17, which was procured in FY1996, encountered a roughly two-year delay in

design and construction. It was presented to the Navy for acceptance in late June 2005. A Navy

CBO Testimony, Statement of J. Michael Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security, and Eric J. Labs, Senior

Analyst, [on] The Navy’s 2008 Shipbuilding Plan and Key Ship Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and

Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 24, 2007, pp. 13 and 20.

CBO reiterated in March 2008 testimony and a June 2008 report that the first LPD-17 is, on a per-ton basis, the most

expensive amphibious ship ever built for the Navy. (See CBO Testimony, Statement of Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst,

[on] Current and Projected Navy Shipbuilding Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2008, p. 27; and Congressional

Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, June 9, 2008, p. 31.

RAND estimates that halving a shipbuilding program’s annual procurement rate typically increases unit procurement

cost by about 10%. (Mark V Arena, et al, Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the

Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs Over the Past Several Decades. RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2006. p. 45. (National

Defense Research Institute, MG-484-NAVY). The December 2006 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) summary table,

available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/2006-DEC-SST.pdf, states that in then-year dollars, changes in the

LPD-17 program’s production schedule (including the reduction in annual procurement rate) account for $768.1million

in increased costs for the program, or about 11.2% of the increased costs caused by all factors. The other factors

leading to increased costs were economic errors (meaning errors in projected rates of inflation), which account for

$361.7 million; estimating errors, which account for $4,648.8 million; and “other,” which accounts for $1,093.4

million. The LPD-17 program’s total cost was also reduced by $4,037.8 million because of the reduction in program

quantity from an originally planned total of 12 ships to the currently planned total of 9 ships. The resulting net change

in the program’s estimated cost is an increase of $2,832.2 million.

For an article surveying construction problems on the lead ship in the class, and Navy efforts to fix these problems,

see Corinne Reilly, “Shipshape? The San Antonio, Finally, Almost Is There,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 27,

2011.

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inspection of the ship conducted June 27-July 1, 2005, found numerous construction

deficiencies.18

The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-17 with about 1.1 million hours of construction work

remaining to be done on the ship. This equated to about 8.7% of the total hours needed to build

the ship, and (with material costs included) about 7% of the total cost to build the ship.

The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-18 with about 400,000 hours of construction work remaining

to be done on the ship. This equated to about 3.3% of the total hours needed to build the ship.

The Navy accepted delivery of LPD-19 with about 45,000 hours of construction work remaining

to be done on the ship. This equated to about 0.4% of the total hours needed to build the ship.

The Navy stated that it accepted LPD-17 in incomplete condition for four reasons:

•

It permitted the fleet to begin sooner the process of evaluating LPD-17 through

operational use so as to identify problems with the LPD-17 class design that need

to be fixed in follow-on LPD-17s.

•

It avoided further delays in giving the LPD-17’s crew an opportunity to conduct

post-delivery tests and trial events that are intended to identify construction (as

opposed to class design) problems with LPD-17 itself.

•

It permitted LPD-17 to leave the shipyard sooner and thereby mitigated schedule

and cost impacts on other ships being built at the shipyard (other LPD-17s, LHD8, and DDG-51s) that would have resulted from having LPD-17 remain in the

shipyard longer.

•

It reduced the cost of the remaining construction work to be done on LPD-17

because the work in question could be performed by repair shipyards that charge

lower rates for their work than the construction shipyard.

Of the approximately $160 million in post-delivery work performed on LPD-17, $108 million

was for the 1.1 million hours of construction work remaining to complete the ship. (The rest was

for post-shakedown and other work that normally occurs after a ship is completed and delivered

to the Navy.) This $160 million in work was funded through the post-delivery part of the

outfitting/post-delivery (OF/PD) line item in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)

account. Because OF/DP costs are not included in ship end cost, the reported end cost of LPD-17

will understate the ship’s actual construction cost by $108 million.

The Navy planned to fund post-delivery construction work on LPD-18 and LPD-19 through the

completion of prior-year shipbuilding line item in the SCN account—a line item that is included

in ship end cost.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified in July 2007 that:

Associated Press, “Shipbuilder: Navy Will Accept New Vessel,” NavyTimes.com, July 21, 2005; Christopher J.

Castelli, “Naval Inspection Report Finds Numerous Problems With LPD-17,” Inside the Navy, July 18, 2005; Dale

Eisman and Jack Dorsey, “Problems On New Ship A Bad Sign, Analyst Warns,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 14,

2005; Nathan Hodge, “Navy Inspectors Flag ‘Poor Construction’ On LPD-17,” Defense Daily, July 14, 2005. A copy

of the Navy’s inspection report, dated July 5, 2005, is posted online at http://www.coltoncompany.com/

newsandcomment/comment/lpd17insurv.htm.

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The Navy moved forward with ambitious schedules for constructing LPD 17 and [the

Littoral Combat Ship] despite significant challenges in stabilizing the designs for these ships.

As a result, construction work has been performed out of sequence and significant rework

has been required, disrupting the optimal construction sequence and application of lessons

learned for follow-on vessels in these programs.

In the LPD 17 program, the Navy’s reliance on an immature design tool led to problems that

affected all aspects of the lead ship’s design. Without a stable design, work was often

delayed from early in the building cycle to later, during integration of the hull. Shipbuilders

stated that doing the work at this stage could cost up to five times the original cost. The lead

ship in the LPD class was delivered to the warfighter incomplete and with numerous

mechanical failures, resulting in a lower than promised level of capability. These problems

continue today—2 years after the Navy accepted delivery of LPD 17. Recent sea trials of the

ship revealed problems with LPD 17’s steering system, reverse osmosis units, shipwide area

computing network, and electrical system, among other deficiencies. Navy inspectors noted

that 138 of 943 ship spaces remained unfinished and identified a number of safety concerns

related to personnel, equipment, ammunition, navigation, and flight activities. To date, the

Navy has invested over $1.75 billion constructing LPD 17.19

LPD-17 was commissioned into service on January 14, 2006. In April 2007, it was reported that

the first LPD-17 had thousands of construction deficiencies.20 In late June and early July 2007, it

was reported that Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter had sent a letter to the chairman and chief

executive officer of Northrop Grumman, Ronald Sugar, dated June 22, 2007, expressing deep

concerns about NGSS’s performance, particularly in connection with the LPD-17 program.

According to these news reports, Winter’s letter contained the following statements among others,

although not necessarily in the order shown below:

•

“I am deeply concerned about Northrop Grumman Ship Systems’ (NGSS) ability

to recover in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, particularly in regard to

construction of LPD 17 Class vessels.”

•

“I am equally concerned about NGSS’ ability to construct and deliver ships that

conform to the quality standards maintained by the Navy and that adhere to the

cost and schedule commitments agreed upon at the outset by both NGSS and the

Navy.”

•

“... even prior to Katrina [NGSS’s performance] was marginal, resulting in

significant cost overruns that forces the Navy to take delivery of the LPD-17 with

numerous outstanding deficiencies.... ”

•

“NGSS’ inefficiency and mismanagement of LPD 17 put the Navy in an

untenable position.”

Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy

Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team,

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of

Representatives, July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 10.

See, for example, Louis Hansen, “New Navy Ship San Antonio Found To Be Rife With Flaws,” Norfolk VirginianPilot, April 14, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “Thousands of Problems Found On New Amphibious Ship,”

DefenseNews.com, April 23, 2007.

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•

“By taking delivery of ships with serious quality problems, the Fleet has suffered

unacceptable delays in obtaining deployable assets. Twenty-three months after

commissioning of LPD 17, the Navy still does not have a mission-capable ship.”

•

“These delays create further problems as work must be completed or redone by

other shipyards that are not as familiar with the ship’s design.”

•

“The Navy also took delivery of LPD-18 (USS New Orleans) in an incomplete

fashion, albeit more complete than LPD-17.”

•

“... persistent shortcomings at the NGSS yards are troubling and causing me not

only grave concern about the LPD program, but also the LHA and DDG-1000

programs.”

•

“The Navy does not wish to find itself in the same situation [with other ships

that] it faces with LPD 17 & 18.”

•

“It is imperative that NGSS deliver future ships devoid of significant quality

problems and that it meet its cost and schedule obligations.”

•

One press report stated: “‘Continued, focused management’ is necessary to

successfully deliver the remainder of the class, according to Winter.”

•

“[Navy acquisition executive] Dr. [Delores] Etter will be closely monitoring

metrics with NGSS and the acquisition team as we move forward.”21

Sugar reportedly sent a reply letter to Winter dated June 29, 2007. According to one press report,

Sugar stated in the letter: “I share your concern regarding the need to fully recover and improve

our shipyards, and produce completed LPD 17 class vessels of the highest quality with increasing

efficiency.... Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop has much work to do to meet the needs

of the U.S. Navy.”22 Another press report stated:

Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC) has “much more work to do” to improve its performance

on Navy ships, but problems with a $13.6-billion amphibious ship program were not solely

the contractor’s making, Chief Executive Ron Sugar said in a June 29 letter.

“The original acquisition strategy was changed after contract award, there was funding

instability, limited early funding for critical vendor information, and the ‘integrated’

Navy/contractor design team produced constant design churn and thousands of design

changes,” Sugar wrote, responding to a tersely worded letter from Navy Secretary Donald

Winter.

Northrop “certainly had performance problems,” but the unprecedented effects of Hurricane

Katrina, which severely damaged Northrop’s three shipyards in the Gulf region in August

2005, “only served to greatly exacerbate the situation....”

Sources for these reported passages from the June 22 letter: Louis Hansen, “Navy Ship $840 Million Over Budget

And Still Unfinished,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, June 30, 2007; Tony Capaccio, “Northrop Grumman Criticized For

‘Mismanagement’ By U.S. Navy, Bloomberg News, July 2, 2007; Geoff Fein, “Navy To Monitor Work At Northrop

Grumman Gulf Coast Shipyards, Official Says,” Defense Daily, July 5, 2007; Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy

Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2007. InsideDefense.com on July 9, 2007, posted on the subscribersonly portion of its website a copy of what it says is the June 22 letter.

Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Furious Over LPD-17,” DefenseNews.com, July 9, 2007.

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Sugar said he shared Winter’s concerns and vowed that Northrop would invest, train and

manage its operations to produce Navy ships of the highest quality with increasing

efficiency. “Irrespective of Hurricane Katrina, Northrop has much more work to do to meet

the needs of the U.S. Navy.”

“We are not happy with this history,” Sugar added in the letter obtained by Reuters, “but we

are incorporating the lessons from this experience into our operational plans going forward

for new ships in the design, planning and production stages.”

He noted that Navy recently praised Northrop’s work on a destroyer that was damaged by

Hurricane Katrina, and termed it “one of the best ships ever delivered.”

Sugar said Northrop officials had given the Navy a list of efforts under way to improve

training, quality, processes, productivity and facilities at the Gulf Coast shipyards. He

promised “substantial investment,” but gave no details.

He said Northrop was aggressively reworking schedules for delivery of all ships affected by

the hurricane. “We know we must do our part,” Sugar said.23

After working to overcome construction problems, Navy officials in late 2007 stated that they

were “cautiously optimistic” that the LPD-17 construction effort is stabilizing. A December 24,

2007, press report stated:

As the Navy gears up for the first deployment of the new San Antonio-class amphibious

transport dock slated for next year, a senior service shipbuilding official is “cautiously

optimistic” the once-beleaguered program is on track....

On Dec. 15, the Navy commissioned the third ship, the Mesa Verde, in Panama City, Fla. It

was the first ship in the class to be delivered without significant problems.

The San Antonio class faced difficulties beginning in late 1998, when the initial construction

contract was awarded to Avondale Industries in New Orleans. Avondale beat out Litton

Ingalls Shipbuilding primarily because it planned to use a new computer program to design

the ships—the first time a Navy ship was designed entirety using computer tools. But the

computer systems didn’t work, the Navy kept making design changes, costs escalated and

major delays ensued.

Litton Ingalls bought Avondale in 1999, its owners mistakenly thinking they could fix the

program, and in late 2000 the shipyards were acquired by Northrop Grumman.

Meanwhile, a succession of service program managers and acquisition executives struggled

to hold down the design changes and manage costs, which have more than doubled from the

$750 million per ship the Navy forecast in the late 1990s.

All those problems and more affected the first two ships of the class. The San Antonio was

delivered, incomplete, in mid-2005. The Navy accepted the ship knowing it had numerous

construction defects, many of which would need to be fixed at extra costs after the shipyard’s

obligation period ended. The next ship, the New Orleans, was delivered in December 2007,

also with incomplete spaces. To make things more challenging, Hurricane Katrina had

wreaked havoc on the New Orleans-based Avondale shipyard in 2005.

Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Northrop Says Katrina Exacerbated Ship Problems,” Reuters, July 10, 2007.

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Nevertheless, construction on the Mesa Verde, the third new ship, went more smoothly. The

Mesa Verde was built at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss....

The Mesa Verde “sets a new standard for the LPD class as far as being a complete ship,”

Capt. Beth Dexter, the Navy’s supervisor of shipbuilding in Pascagoula, told Military Times

in September. “My Navy team is proud to present it.”

Robert Work, a naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in

Washington, said it looks like the LPD 17 program is pulling away from its “checkered

past.” He said it appears the program is “getting back on track” and that it will be exciting to

see the first ship as it enters the fleet.

American shipbuilders have historically had difficulties with lead ships, he said....

Stiller told Navy Times that after Hurricane Katrina the Navy re-established new milestones

to measure the new ships’ progress. So far, each ship under construction is meeting these

marks, she said.

“I believe we are turning the corner,” Stiller said. In 2008, she said, she hopes the service and

industry will be able to “not just meet but beat” these milestones.24

Developments in 2008

In August 2008, it was reported that the maiden deployment of LPD-17 was delayed by two days

due to problems with a hydraulic system that controls the stern gate used to gain access to the

ship’s well deck.25

In August 2008, it was also reported that:

Just under two years after the amphibious transport dock New Orleans [LPD-18] was

delivered incomplete, the amphib still can’t perform the central mission for which it was

designed: Carrying Marines, their gear and their vehicles into battle, according to a recent

report by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, or InSurv.

The San Diego-based New Orleans was “degraded” in its “ability to conduct sustained

combat operations,” and has a slew of other problems, according to the inspection, conducted

Aug. 11-15. The report, obtained by Navy Times, paints the picture of a ship not only

troubled by the same technical problems as its older sibling, the first-in-class gator San

Antonio, but also with many of its own.

“The ship cannot support embarked troops, cargo or landing craft,” the report said. Navy

engineers found “serious materials deficiencies in the well deck and vehicle stowage areas”;

the well deck’s ventilation fans didn’t work; the vehicle ramps were inoperative; and

berthing for Marines and the ships’ crew was found to be unsatisfactory.

Zachary M. Peterson, “Troubled Amphib Program Appears On Track,” NavyTimes.com, December 24, 2007. See

also Dan Taylor, “Contract Awarded For Ninth LPD-17 As NGC Addresses Concerns,” Inside the Navy, January 7,

2008; and Christopher P. Cavas, “Third Time Could Be the Charm for LPD Program,” Defense News, September 10,

2007.

Andrew Scutro, “Mechanical Failure Keeps Troubled Amphib At Pier,” NavyTimes.com, August 26, 2008; Matthew

Jones, “Troubled Ship’s Departure Is Delayed By Gate Problem,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, August 27, 2008; Dan

Taylor, “After Delayed Start, Questions Abound on LPD-17s First Deployment,” September 1, 2008.

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Moreover, the ship’s propulsion system was unreliable, causing a 10-hour delay before it

could put to sea for its final contract trials. Much of its communications equipment didn’t

work. And when the ship tried to test its Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, both of them

fired just one missile at their targets and then lost power, forcing crews to reset their

computer systems.

The New Orleans InSurv arrived just as the Norfolk, Va.-based San Antonio [LPD-17] is

preparing to make its maiden deployment this week. That ship was delivered three years ago,

also incomplete. Like the San Antonio, the New Orleans’ electrical system had ship-wide

problems, according to Navy inspectors: “Significant electrical and electronic cable plant

installation deficiencies exist,” Navy inspectors wrote, including “dead-ended cables, cables

improperly bundled and banded, cables exceeding nesting capacity, inadequate packing of

cables at watertight penetrations.”

The findings make for a total of three ships with widespread electrical problems that were

built at Northrop Grumman’s shipyards along the Gulf Coast: the first two San Antonios and

the amphibious assault ship Makin Island [LHD-8]. Northrop Grumman announced earlier

this year that it had to delay the delivery of the Makin Island by six months to fix its wiring

problems. The company agreed to bear the roughly $360 million cost.

Margaret Mitchell-Jones, a spokeswoman for Northrop Grumman, said the company did not

comment on ships it has already delivered to the Navy, but in a written statement Tuesday,

she said the San Antonio class was constantly improving:

“While we don’t comment on the capabilities of commissioned ships, we can say that with

each LPD, we continue to make significant improvements in all areas and this includes the

electrical systems. The latest LPD, Green Bay, will be delivered this week to the U.S. Navy

and, from a material and systems standpoint, was more complete than any other LPD at

acceptance trials. This is a testament to the benefits of series ship production and our ability

to come down the learning curve resulting in greater efficiencies.”26

In September 2008, it was reported that:

After facing a bevy of negative survey results for the first two LPD-17-class ships, the Navy

appears to be headed in the right direction, moving away from incomplete work and into

serial production, a Navy official said.

Earlier this year, the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) came under fire for a poor showing by the

Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey (InSurv). Last year, the USS San Antonio (LPD-17),

the lead ship of the new class of ambitious ships, suffered numerous issues with its InSurv

report.

The Navy took delivery of both the San Antonio and the New Orleans with a significant

amount of work left to complete.

About three years ago, the Navy was facing challenges with the construction schedule for

LPD-17.

Philip Ewing, “InSurv: LPD 18’s Ability Degraded,” NavyTimes.com, August 30, 2008. See also Philip Ewing and

Andrew Scutro, “U.S. Navy Inspectors Pan 2nd LPD-17 Ship,” Defense News, September 1, 2008: 1, 8; “More Issues

For LPD Program,” Defense Daily, September 2, 2008; and Steve Liewer, “Troubles In Port, At Sea Weigh Down

Navy Ship,” San Diego Union-Trubune, October 1, 2008: 1.

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Eventually, the Navy was forced to take delivery of the ship early because they had no

money to complete the work, Allison Stiller, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy ships,

told Defense Daily in a recent interview.

“With LPD-18, we knew we were going to be in a similar situation financially ... that we

were going to have to take delivery with a lot less incomplete,” she said, although not nearly

to the extent of LPD-17.

As the Navy and Northrop Grumman [NOC] Ship Systems began work on the USS Mesa

Verde (LPD-19), they began to believe that this ship, too, would have to be delivered

incomplete.

But the combined effort of the shipyard and the Navy helped deliver a completed ship, she

added.

LPD-19 wrapped up her shock trials, and the Navy is now compiling the date from the tests,

Stiller added.

“We saw what we expected to see. There were no surprises from the shock trial,” she said.

The USS Green Bay (LPD-20) was just delivered, and the follow-on ships are looking good,

Stiller noted.

Stiller acknowledges there were concerns about delivering finished LPDs. Until the Mesa

Verde, Northrop Grumman had not delivered a completed LPD.

“Certainly there are still challenges in getting the ship delivered, but we are in serial

production,” she said. “The yard is working hard at it. The ships are delivering. [We are]

seeing reduced trial cards on everyone of them. That’s the trend you want to see. It’s good

news to get into serial production, no doubt about it.”27

In October 2008, it was reported that:

The U.S. Navy’s third and fourth San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks show a

distinct improvement over the troubled first two ships in the class, inspectors have found.

According to reports by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey, the third ship, Mesa

Verde [LPD-19], was much more complete than its earlier siblings when it was accepted by

the Navy Sept. 27, 2007.

And in their report on the fourth ship, Green Bay [LPD-20], inspectors included something

never seen before in an inspection report (referred to as an InSurv) about an LPD 17-class

ship—a compliment.

“Green Bay was found to be a highly capable and well built ship,” they wrote. “The main

spaces fit, finish and cleanliness were [satisfactory.]” To be sure, each InSurv still found

many problems aboard each ship, and it concluded Mesa Verde was “degraded in its ability

to conduct sustained combat operations,” as was New Orleans. Overall, however, the two

inspections seemed to reinforce statements by the Navy and shipbuilder Northrop Grumman

that the San Antonio class is gradually improving after its initial misfires, according to a

veteran skipper who examined the documents.

Geoff Fein, “Navy Seeing Improvements In LHD, LPD-Class Ships, Official Says,” Defense Daily, September 23,

2008: 1-2. Ellipsis and brackets as in original.

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The reports showed that overall build quality on Mesa Verde and Green Bay was much

improved over San Antonio and New Orleans, and neither amphib seemed to have

experienced as many problems with shipwide networks or electrical systems as the first two.

Neither new ship had major problems with their propulsion systems, as the first two did.

Other major problems from the San Antonio and New Orleans—including incomplete

berthing spaces, broken gear in the galleys and medical spaces, and nonfunctioning

weapons—didn’t reoccur in Mesa Verde or Green Bay. Meanwhile, years of work have

helped transform San Antonio from one of the Navy’s most infamous ships into a fully

functional member of the fleet, the ship’s captain said.

In a conference call with reporters Oct. 6, Cmdr. Kurt Kastner said San Antonio has had no

major problems since it sailed in August from Norfolk as part of the Iwo Jima Expeditionary

Strike Group.28

In November 2008, it was reported that:

The troubled amphibious transport dock San Antonio—in the middle of its first

deployment—has been forced to undergo two weeks of maintenance in Bahrain due to leaks

in its lube oil piping system, Navy officials said.

“They had a scheduled port visit,” said Lt. Nate Christensen, spokesman for 5th Fleet in

Bahrain. “They’re in port for two weeks for a maintenance availability on some lube oil

deficiencies. It’s related to the diesel generators.”

Pat Dolan, a spokeswoman at Naval Sea Systems Command, confirmed that the problem

involved leaks in the system.

The yard period began earlier this week, although the exact day was unavailable.29

It was also reported in November 2008 that:

The leaks were discovered while the ship was conducting maritime security operations in the

Persian Gulf, according to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command spokesman Lt. Nathan

Christensen....

The leaks were first discovered Oct. 9 and a second incident on Oct. 17 prompted the need

for a thorough inspection, Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon told ITN [Inside

the Navy] Nov. 6.

“We are confident this issue is limited to LPD-17 only,” Doss said.30

Later in November 2008, it was reported that:

Experts who have examined the photos of major oil leaks aboard the amphibious transport

dock San Antonio are calling the workmanship on the new amphib “sloppy,” “unacceptable”

Philip Ewing, “For LPDs, 3rd And 4th Time’s The Charm,” Defense News, October 13, 2008: 3. See also Andrew

Scutro, “Photos Show Extent of Oil Leaks on LPD 17,” NavyTimes.com, November 12, 2008.

Andrew Scutro, “San Antonio Laid Up in Bahrain,” NavyTimes.com, November 6, 2008.

Zachary M. Peterson, “First-Of-Class LPD-17 Pierside in Bahrain For Unexpected Repairs,” Inside the Navy,

November 10, 2008. See also Mark Thompson, “The Navy’s Floating Fiasco,” Time, November 12, 2008.

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and “criminal.” One former chief engineer said any other CHENG [Chief of Engineering] in

the Navy would be “thankful this wasn’t their ship.”

But it is someone’s ship, and despite the finger-pointing, experts say the Navy has a serious

problem on its hands....

“The secretary has been briefed on the issue and has been getting periodic extended updates

about the progress of the repairs,” said Capt. Beci Brenton, spokeswoman for Navy Secretary

Donald Winter.

While the brass is watching and the shipbuilder defends its work and promises to make fixes,

one question remains: How was this allowed to happen? And are other problems lurking?

“I’m fuming”

Margaret Mitchell-Jones, spokeswoman for shipbuilder Northrop Grumman, defended the

contractor’s performance and said the company is taking “corrective actions.”

“The quality of our work is something we take very seriously, and we have a rigorous

program in place that includes inspecting and evaluating our work to ensure it adheres to the

Navy’s requirements,” she said in a statement. “When issues arise, we aggressively address

them in an immediate and methodical way. Upon hearing there may be a problem with lube

oil leaks on LPD 17, we immediately responded with technical staff to assist in the Navy’s

efforts and began our own in-house critique.”

She added that “we are proactively conducting a comprehensive review of our procedures,

processes and policies surrounding the LPD-class ships currently under construction at our

Gulf Coast shipyards. This effort includes the implementation of short-term corrective

actions until, aligned with our customer, we fully determine the cause and need for any longterm corrective actions to ensure conformance and reinforce the commitment to quality we

have in our work. We have invited and welcomed Navy participation throughout our own

internal review process.”

On Capitol Hill, lawmakers also are taking notice. Josh Holly, a spokesman for the

Republican side of the House Armed Services Committee, said members “continue to follow

[San Antonio’s] challenges. The seapower subcommittee is aware of the most recent issues,

although the Navy has not briefed us yet.”

Rep. Joe Sestak, D-Pa., a former vice admiral, said after viewing the photos: “It looks like

more of a systemic problem from when it was built.”

“The ones who suffer are the bluejackets,” said Sestak, a member of the House Armed

Services Committee and former top warfare requirements and programs officer for the Navy.

Naval analyst and author Norman Polmar put it more bluntly.

“It’s criminal. It’s criminal that the Navy accepted this ship,” he said. “And this is two and a

half years after the Navy accepted the ship. It’s bad enough that it was delivered this way.”

Polmar said he thinks the San Antonio should be towed back to the shipyard.

“As a taxpayer and as a naval analyst,” he said, “I’m fuming.”...

Who’s to blame?

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Those familiar with the situation do not blame the crew or Navy engineers for the problem,

comparing it with the discovery of a flaw in your car’s chassis during a road trip: You may

have topped off the oil and filled the gas tank before you left, they say, but you can’t be

expected to examine work completed long ago, when the car was built at the auto plant.

Even those responsible for ensuring the material condition of the fleet—the ultracritical

Board of Inspection and Survey—do so under certain assumptions, one Navy source said.

“Even InSurv wouldn’t have found faulty welds,” the Navy source said.

Cmdr. Jensin Sommer, a spokeswoman for 2nd Fleet, said her command “certifies units for

deployment and for integrated training with carrier and expeditionary strike groups so

they’re ready for integrated operations.”

“That’s a different type of readiness than material condition,” she added.

Pat Dolan, spokeswoman for Naval Sea Systems Command, said naval engineers declined a

request to explain the damage because they refused to comment on photos that had not been

officially released.

The photos were posted on a blog and later authenticated by Dolan.

She did say that when the ship pulled into Bahrain, it was greeted by a crew of more than 30

engineers, pipefitters and welders flown to Bahrain from the U.S.

As of Nov. 13, there were no initial cost estimates and no available progress reports. “We’re

still looking at mid- to late November for the repairs to be completed,” Dolan said.

She added that engineers are conducting a “root-cause analysis” and the repair and ship

crews are fixing the flaws, noting “some that require replacing whole sections of pipe.”

Earlier, Dolan said the oil leaks had not posed a danger to sailors working near them.