Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Icebreaker Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportJan 21, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and
Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Icebreaker
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated January 21, 2026
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL34391
SUMMARY
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and
Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Icebreaker
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
RL34391
January 21, 2026
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
The size of the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker fleet and Coast Guard programs for building new
polar icebreakers have been oversight matters for Congress for many years. A 2023 Coast Guard
fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight to nine polar icebreakers,
including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers, to perform the Coast Guard’s polar
(i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in coming years. The Coast Guard’s operational polar icebreaker fleet currently consists
of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and two medium polar icebreakers, Healy and Storis. Polar Star entered service in
1976 and is now well beyond its originally intended 30-year service life. Healy entered service in 2000. Storis was built in
2012 to serve as a commercial Arctic oil-exploration support ship. It was purchased by the Coast Guard in 2024 and
converted into a Coast Guard medium polar icebreaker. It entered service with the Coast Guard in 2025 and was renamed
Storis.
To recapitalize and expand its polar icebreaking fleet, the Coast Guard is procuring new heavy polar icebreakers called Polar
Security Cutters (PSCs) and new medium polar icebreakers called Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs). Polar Star is to be retired
when new PSCs enter service. ASCs will be smaller and individually less expensive to procure than PSCs. The Coast Guard
initiated the PSC program in its FY2013 budget submission. In April 2019, the Coast Guard awarded a contract for designing
and building up to three PSCs to Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard that was then owned by Singapore
Technologies (ST) Engineering. In November 2022, ST Engineering sold Halter Marine to Louisiana-based Bollinger
Shipyards. The former Halter Marine is now called Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding. Subsequent to the April 2019 contract
award, the PSC program fell years behind schedule, in large part due to the time needed to complete the design of the ship.
The first PSC was originally projected to be delivered in 2024 but is now projected to be delivered no earlier than 2030.
Much of the delay in the delivery date occurred prior to Bollinger’s November 2022 purchase of Halter.
On December 26, 2025, the Coast Guard awarded contracts for the construction of up to six ASCs. Rauma Marine
Constructions Oy (RMC) of Rauma, Finland, was awarded a contract to build up two ASCs, with the first to be delivered in
2028. Bollinger Shipyards was awarded a contract to build up to four ASCs at the firm’s shipyard in Houma, LA, with the
first to be delivered in 2029. RMC, Bollinger, Seaspan Shipyards of North Vancouver, Canada, and ship design and
engineering firm Aker Arctic Technology Oy of Helsinki, Finland, partnered to compete for the contracts. RMC and
Bollinger will build the ASCs to a design based on the Multi-Purpose Icebreaker (MPI), an icebreaker design developed by
Seaspan and Aker Arctic.
Prior to the FY2025 reconciliation act (H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21 of July 4, 2025, also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, or
OBBBA), the PSC program had received a total of about $1.7 billion in procurement funding. The FY2025 reconciliation act
provided an additional $4.3 billion in procurement funding for PSC program and $3.5 billion in procurement funding for the
ASC program. The combination of Healy, Storis, up to three PSCs, and up to six ASCs would produce a future polar
icebreaking fleet of up to 11 ships, including up to three heavy polar icebreakers (the three PSCs) and up to eight medium
polar icebreakers (Healy, Storis, and six ASCs).
Issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreakers include the risk of cost growth, schedule delay, or technical
problems in the PSC and ASC programs; Coast Guard intentions regarding the procurement of a fourth or fifth PSC, so as to
meet the stated requirement (following the retirement of Polar Star) for a total of four or five heavy polar icebreakers; the
total number of ASCs that will eventually be built, given the two existing medium polar icebreakers (Healy and Storis) and
the stated requirement for a total of four or five medium polar icebreakers; whether required numbers of polar icebreakers
would increase, and if so, by how many ships, if Greenland were to become part of the United States; and whether the
building some ASCs in Finland should serve as a model for building ships for the U.S. Navy in foreign shipyards.
The Coast Guard also operates Great Lakes icebreakers that are much smaller than the Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers. The
Coast Guard’s FY2024 budget initiated a program for procuring a new Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) that would have
capabilities similar to those of Mackinaw, the Coast Guard’s sole existing heavy GLIB. The Coast Guard estimates the total
procurement cost of the ship at about $350 million.
Congressional Research Service
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Missions of Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers .............................................................................. 1
Statutory Duties and Missions ............................................................................................ 1
Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking) ........................................................................... 2
Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations ...................................................................................... 2
Required Numbers of Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers .............................................................. 3
Trilateral Polar Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) ..................................................... 4
Current Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers ..................................................................................... 5
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 5
Heavy Polar Icebreaker Polar Star ..................................................................................... 5
Medium Polar Icebreakers Healy and Storis....................................................................... 5
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Procurement Programs .............................................................. 7
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program ................................................................................. 7
Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Program ............................................................................. 13
Total Number of Polar Icebreakers Existing or Under Contract ............................................. 17
Coast Guard Great Lakes Icebreakers ..................................................................................... 17
Current Fleet ..................................................................................................................... 17
New Great Lakes Icebreaker (GLIB) ................................................................................ 19
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 21
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 21
Discussions of Selected Issues ................................................................................................ 21
Program-Execution Risk ................................................................................................... 22
Potential Impact of Greenland Annexation on Required Numbers of Icebreakers ........... 26
Use of Foreign Shipyards for Building U.S. Navy Ships ................................................. 27
Figures
Figure 1. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC ................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Model of Halter Marine Design for PSC ....................................................................... 10
Figure 3. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC ................................................................. 10
Figure 4. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC ..................................................................11
Figure 5. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC ..................................................................11
Figure 6. Rendering of Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) ................................................................... 15
Figure 7. Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw ................................................................................. 18
Figure A-1. Polar Star and Polar Sea ........................................................................................... 28
Figure A-2. Polar Star ................................................................................................................... 29
Figure A-3. Polar Sea .................................................................................................................... 30
Figure A-4. Healy .......................................................................................................................... 31
Figure A-5. Storis .......................................................................................................................... 32
Figure A-6. Storis .......................................................................................................................... 33
Figure B-1. Rendering of 2019 SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II ....................................... 38
Congressional Research Service
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure B-2. Rendering of 2024 Design for PolarStern II .............................................................. 39
Tables
Table 1. Procurement Funding for PSC Program .......................................................................... 12
Table 2. Total Number of Polar Icebreakers Existing or Under Contract ...................................... 17
Table A-1. Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers .................................................................................... 35
Table C-1. Major Polar Icebreakers as of April 4, 2022 ................................................................ 42
Appendixes
Appendix A. Current U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers ........................................................... 28
Appendix B. Design of PSC .......................................................................................................... 36
Appendix C. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar Icebreakers .......................................................... 41
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 61
Congressional Research Service
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Coast Guard’s Polar
Security Cutter (PSC) and Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) icebreaker programs. It also provides
background information on the Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) program.
Issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreakers include
•
•
•
•
•
program-execution risk (i.e., the risk of cost growth, schedule delay, or technical
problems) in the PSC and ASC programs;
Coast Guard intentions regarding the procurement of a fourth or fifth PSC, so as
to meet the Coast Guard’s stated requirement (following the retirement of the
Coast Guard’s existing heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star) for having a total of
four or five heavy polar icebreakers;
the total number of ASCs that will eventually be built, given the Coast Guard’s
two existing medium polar icebreakers (Healy and Storis) and the Coast Guard’s
stated requirement for having a total of four or five medium polar icebreakers;
whether required numbers of polar icebreakers would increase, and if so, by how
many ships, if Greenland were to become part of the United States; and
whether the building some ASCs in Finland should serve as a model for building
ships for the U.S. Navy in foreign shipyards.
Separate CRS reports cover acquisition of Coast Guard general-purpose cutters1 and Coast Guard
waterways commerce cutters (WCCs).2 Another CRS report provides an overview of various
issues relating to the Arctic.3
Background
Missions of Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
Statutory Duties and Missions
The permanent statute that sets forth the Coast Guard’s primary duties—14 U.S.C. §102—states
that among other things, the Coast Guard shall (emphasis added) “develop, establish, maintain,
and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation,
icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the
high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and “pursuant to
international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on,
under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.”4
1 CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 CRS In Focus IF11672, Coast Guard Waterways Commerce Cutter (WCC) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
4 14 U.S.C. §102(4) and §102(5), respectively. This statute was previously 14 U.S.C. §2; it was renumbered as 14
U.S.C. §102 by Section 103 of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 140/P.L. 115-282 of
December 4, 2018). (Title I of P.L. 115-282, consisting of Sections 101-124, specified a general reorganization of Title
14.)
Congressional Research Service
1
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
In addition, Section 888(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005/P.L. 107-296 of
November 25, 2002)—the law that established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
transferred the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to DHS—sets forth 11
specific missions for the Coast Guard (often referred to as the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory
missions), including the mission of “ice operations.”5
Multiple Missions (Not Just Icebreaking)
The Coast Guard’s polar icebreakers do not simply break ice—they are multimission cutters6 that
conduct a variety of other operations that are conducted in lower-latitude waters by the Coast
Guard’s general-purpose cutters. U.S. polar ice operations conducted in large part by the Coast
Guard’s polar icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions.7 The roles of U.S.
polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
conducting and supporting scientific research in the Arctic and Antarctic;
defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence
in U.S. territorial waters in the region;
defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including economic interests in
waters that are within the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound for the United States;
and
conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as search and rescue, law
enforcement, and protection of marine resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S.
territorial waters north of Alaska.8
Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations
The Coast Guard’s large icebreakers are called polar icebreakers rather than Arctic icebreakers
because they perform missions in both the Arctic and Antarctic. Operations to support National
Science Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for a significant
portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.
Supporting NSF research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an annual mission, called
Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and resupply
McMurdo Station, the large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo
Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard stated in 2018 that Polar Star, the Coast
Guard’s only operational heavy polar icebreaker, “spends the [northern hemisphere] winter [i.e.,
the southern hemisphere summer] breaking ice near Antarctica in order to refuel and resupply
McMurdo Station. When the mission is complete, the Polar Star returns to dry dock [in Seattle]
5 The 11 missions set forth in Section 888(a) are marine safety; search and rescue; aids to navigation; living marine
resources (fisheries law enforcement); marine environmental protection; ice operations; ports, waterways and coastal
security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; other law enforcement.
6 Cutters are commissioned Coast Guard vessels greater than 65 feet in length.
7 For a list of the 11 missions, see footnote 5. The two statutory missions not supported by polar ice operations are
illegal drug interdiction and undocumented migrant interdiction. (Department of Homeland Security, Polar Icebreaking
Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 10.)
8 This passage, beginning with “The roles of ... ,” originated in an earlier iteration of this CRS report and was later
transferred by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with minor changes to GAO, Coast Guard[:]Efforts to
Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication About Agency Planning Efforts Would Be
Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 2010, p. 53.
Congressional Research Service
2
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
in order to complete critical maintenance and prepare it for the next ODF mission. Once out of
dry dock, it’s back to Antarctica, and the cycle repeats itself.”9 In terms of the maximum
thickness of the ice to be broken, the annual McMurdo resupply mission generally poses the
greatest icebreaking challenge for U.S. polar icebreakers, though Arctic ice can frequently pose
its own significant icebreaking challenges for U.S. polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard’s medium
polar icebreaker Healy spends most of its operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research
activities and performing other operations.
Although polar ice is diminishing due to climate change, observers generally expect that this
development will not eliminate the need for U.S. polar icebreakers, and in some respects might
increase mission demands for them. Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still
significant ice-covered areas in the polar regions, and diminishment of polar ice could lead in
coming years to increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship operations, as well
as increased exploration for oil and other resources, in the Arctic—activities that could require
increased levels of support from polar icebreakers, particularly since waters described as “ice
free” can actually still have some amount of ice.10 The Coast Guard’s Arctic strategic outlook
document, released in April 2019, states
In order to prosecute its missions in the Arctic, the Coast Guard must fully understand and
operate freely in this vast and unforgiving environment. Effective capability requires
sufficient heavy icebreaking vessels, reliable high-latitude communications, and
comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness. In order to respond to crises in the Arctic,
our Nation must also muster adequate personnel, aviation, and logistics resources in the
region. The Coast Guard is the sole provider and operator of the U.S. polar capable fleet
but currently does not have the capability or capacity to assure access in the high latitudes.
Closing the gap requires persistent investment in capabilities and capacity for polar
operations, including the Polar Security Cutter.11
Required Numbers of Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
A 2023 Coast Guard fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight to
nine polar icebreakers, including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium
polar icebreakers, to perform the Coast Guard’s polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in
coming years.12 Prior to this new fleet mix analysis, the Coast Guard had stated that it would need
9 NyxoLyno Cangemi, “Coast Guard Icebreaker Crew Completes Second Arctic Mission; U.S. Interests in Arctic
Domain Depends [sic] on Fleet Recapitalization,” DVIDS (Defense Visual Information Distribution System), October
19, 2018.
10 For more on changes in the Arctic due to diminishment of Arctic ice, see CRS Report R41153, Changes in the
Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
11 United States Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 6.
12 Source: spoken testimony of Coast Guard officials, as reflected in CQ hearing transcripts, of
•
Admiral Linda L. Fagan, then-Commandant of the Coast Guard, at an April 18, 2023, hearing on the Coast
Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, for the total figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers;
•
Admiral Steven D. Poulin, then-Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, at a June 21, 2023, hearing before the
same subcommittee on the on the Coast Guard’s emerging challenges and statutory needs, again for the total
figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers; and
•
Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, then-Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, at a November 29, 2023,
hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee on how U.S. Arctic strategy impacts homeland
security, for both the total figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers and how that total includes four to five
heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers.
Congressional Research Service
3
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
at least six polar icebreakers, including three heavy polar icebreakers. For additional background
information on required numbers of U.S. polar icebreakers, see Appendix C.
Trilateral Polar Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact)
On July 11, 2024, the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Finland announced a trilateral
partnership on polar icebreakers, called the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact), to
implement a “collaborative effort to continue building best-in-class Arctic and polar icebreakers
and other Arctic and polar capabilities in each of our respective countries by sharing expertise,
information, and capabilities.”13 On November 13, 2024, officials from the three ICE Pact
governments signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for implementing the ICE Pact.14
On October 9, 2025, the United States and Finland signed an MOU for procuring up to 11 ASCs
for the U.S. Coast Guard, including up to four to be built in Finland and up to seven to be built in
the United States.15 Under the MOU,
•
•
up to six of the ASCs are to be built by an industry partnership consisting of
Bollinger Shipyards of Lockport, LA; shipbuilder Rauma Marine Constructions
Oy (RMC) of Rauma, Finland; Seaspan Shipyards of North Vancouver, Canada;
and ship design and engineering firm Aker Arctic Technology Oy of Helsinki,
Finland, with up to two of the ships to be built by RMC in Finland and up to four
of the ships to be built by Bollinger in the United States; and
up to five ASCs reportedly are to be built by Canadian shipbuilder Davie of
Lauzon, Quebec, Canada, with up to two of the ships to be built at Helsinki
Shipyard, a shipyard in Helsinki, Finland, owned by Davie, and up to three to be
built at the Davie-owned Gulf Copper shipyard in Galveston, TX.16
13 White House, “Joint Statement on ICE Pact,” July 11, 2024. See also Justin Katz, “ICE Pact: Why the US Had to
Recruit Help in Race with Russia, China for Arctic Icebreakers,” Breaking Defense, August 16, 2024; Rana Foroohar,
“The New Maritime Statecraft,” Financial Times, August 12, 2024; Katy Buda, Gregory Sanders, and Cynthia Cook,
“Recruiting Friends for the Polar Icebreaker Express: Viewing the ICE Pact Through Broader Defense Industrial
Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1, 2024; Cal Biesecker, “Following ICE Pact,
Canadian Shipbuilder Seeking to Partner in U.S.,” Defense Daily, July 29, 2024; Howard Altman, “Allied Pact Aims to
Close Yawning Icebreaker Gap with Adversaries,” The War Zone, July 12, 2024; Eric Bazail-Eimil, Lee Hudson, and
Kyle Duggan, “US, Canada and Finland to Challenge Russia and China in the Arctic,” Politico Pro, July 11, 2024;
Laura Dhillon Kane and Josh Wingrove, “US, Finland, Canada Forge Icebreaker Ship Pact to Counter Russia, China in
Arctic,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2024; Lee Ferran, “US Teams with Canada, Finland on Polar Icebreakers to Chill
Russian, Chinese Power Up North” Breaking Defense, July 11, 2024; Michael Martina, “US, Canada, Finland Launch
Effort to Build Ice-Breaking Ships as China and Russia Cooperate in Arctic,” Reuters, July 11, 2024; Patrick Tucker,
“US Agrees to Build Icebreakers with Canada, Finland,” Defense One, July 11, 2024.
14 Department of Homeland Security, “United States, Canada, and Finland Sign MOU to Build Arctic and Polar
Icebreakers,” press release dated November 13, 2024. See also Cal Biesecker, “U.S., Canada And Finland Formalize
Effort On Polar Icebreaker Development And Production,” Defense Daily, November 13, 2024; Justin Katz, “US,
Canada, Finland Ink Joint MOU, Latest Step in High North-Focused ICE Pact,” Breaking Defense, November 13,
2024; Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “U.S. Signs Icebreaker Pact with Finland, Canada,” USNI News, November 13, 2024.
15 Finnish Government, “Finland and USA Deepen Icebreaker Cooperation,” October 10, 2025; White House, “Fact
Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Authorizes Construction of Arctic Security Cutters,” October 9, 2025.
16 Nick Blenkey, “Bollinger-led Team Picked to Build six Arctic Security Cutters,” Marine Log, October 10, 2025;
Bollinger, “White House Selects Bollinger-Led International Team to Build Six U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Security
Cutters,” news release dated October 9, 2025; Steve Holland, Anne Kauranen, Jeff Mason, and Gram Slattery, “Trump
and Finland’s Stubb Approve Deal tor Icebreaker Ships,” Reuters, October 9, 2025; Justin Katz, “White House, Finland
Sign Deal for Four Icebreakers,” Breaking Defense, October 9, 2025; Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Trumps Inks Deal for
American and Finnish Yards to Deliver First Arctic Security Cutters by 2028,” USNI News, October 9 (updated
October 10), 2025; Maritime Executive, “U.S. and Finland Reach $6 Billion Deal to Build Up to 11 Icebreakers,”
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
4
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
On November 18, 2025, the United States, Finland, and Canada signed a joint statement of intent
reaffirming their collaboration under the October 2025 ICE Pact MOU.17
Current Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
Overview
The Coast Guard’s operational polar icebreaker fleet currently consists of three ships: one heavy
polar icebreaker, Polar Star (Figure A-1 and Figure A-3 in Appendix A), and two medium polar
icebreakers, Healy (Figure A-4 in Appendix A) and Storis (Figure A-5 and Figure A-6 in
Appendix A). A second Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea—a sister ship of Polar
Star—suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then.
Heavy Polar Icebreaker Polar Star
Polar Star entered service in 1976 and is now well beyond its originally intended 30-year service
life.18 The Coast Guard in recent years has invested millions of dollars to overhaul, repair, and
extend the service life of the ship, but as a result of its advancing age, the ship’s material
condition has nevertheless become increasingly fragile, if not precarious. During its annual
deployments to McMurdo Station in Antarctica, shipboard equipment frequently breaks, and
shipboard fires have occurred.19 Replacements for many of the ship’s components are no longer
commercially available. To help keep Polar Star operational, the Coast Guard has used the nonoperational Polar Sea as a source of replacement parts.
Medium Polar Icebreakers Healy and Storis
Healy entered service in 2000. In February 2023, the Coast Guard issued a Request for
Information (RFI) from companies interested in conducting a service life extension project
(SLEP) for Healy that would begin in December 2025.20 Responses to the RFI were due by
March 16, 2023.21 A December 19, 2024, GAO report on Coast Guard acquisition of polar ships
Maritime Executive, October 9, 2025; Seapower Staff, “White House Selects Bollinger-Led International Team to
Build Six U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutters,” Seapower, October 10, 2025; Peter Rybski, “First Look at the
USA-Finland Icebreaker Deal,” Sixty Degrees North, October 11, 2025, which provides many details. See also Peter
Rybski, “Exclusive First Look at Davie/Helsinki Shipyard’s Arctic Security Cutter Design,” Sixty Degrees North,
August 21, 2025.
17 See, for example, U.S. Naval Institute Staff, “U.S., Canada and Finland Statement of Intent on the Icebreaker
Collaboration Effort Pact,” USNI News, November 19, 2025, which includes the text of the joint statement of intent;
“Canada Signs Joint Statement of Intent with Finland and United States to Advance Icebreaker Collaboration Effort,”
Associated Press, November 18, 2025.
18 The non-operational Polar Sea entered service in 1977 and is similarly well beyond its originally intended 30-year
service life.
19 See, for example, Richard Read, “Meet the Neglected 43-Year-Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial
Complex,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “The Only Working US Heavy Icebreaker Catches
Fire Returning from Antarctica,” Arctic Today, March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, “Fire Breaks Out on Coast Guard’s
Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2019.
20 The project is envisaged as being accomplished through five annual work periods, each beginning in December of a
given year and ending in April of the following year, with the first period beginning in December 2025 and ending in
April 2026, and the fifth period beginning in December 2029 and ending in April 2030.
21 See “Healy Service Life Extension Project (SLEP),” accessed November 19, 2024, at https://sam.gov/opp/
63af5d5f7b9e492dbdc6b106210f5716/view.
Congressional Research Service
5
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
states that the Coast Guard plans to conduct service life extension work on Healy in 2027-2031 at
an estimated cost of $97 million, with the aim of extending the ship’s life to at least 2035.22
On December 11, 2024, the Coast Guard purchased Aiviq, a U.S.-registered commercial ship that
was built in 2012 to serve as an Arctic oil-exploration support ship and that has an icebreaking
capability sufficient for the ship to serve as a Coast Guard medium polar icebreaker. The Coast
Guard purchased Aiviq for $125.0 million from Offshore Service Vessels of Cut Off, LA, a
subsidiary of Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Cut Off, LA, a firm that operates more than 200
ships.23
The Coast Guard purchased Aiviq with $125.0 million in funding that the FY2024 Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March
23, 2024) provided for purchasing an existing commercially available polar icebreaker and
modifying it into a Coast Guard polar icebreaker.24 In addition to its acquisition cost, the Coast
Guard reportedly expects to spend $25 million modifying the ship before it enters service.25
The Coast Guard completed acceptance of Aiviq on December 20, 2024, and renamed it Storis in
honor of a previous Coast Guard cutter of that name.26 On August 14, 2024, the Coast Guard
announced that it plans to homeport the ship in Juneau, AK.27 The ship was commissioned into
service with the Coast Guard on August 10, 2025. The Coast Guard reportedly aims to have it
operating from its Alaska home port starting the summer of 2026.28 The Coast Guard states that
22 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Further Cost and Affordability Analysis of Polar
Fleet Needed, GAO-25-106822, Q&A Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives, December 19, 2024, pp. 5-6.
23
For more on ECO, see the firm’s website at https://chouest.com/.
24 Prior to 2021, the Coast Guard plans did not include the acquisition of a commercially available polar icebreaker.
The Coast Guard’s FY2022 UPL, dated June 29, 2021, however, included a $150.0 million item for the lease or
purchase of a commercially available vessel to provide polar icebreaking capability until the future delivery of PSCs.
(U.S. Coast Guard, FY 2022 Unfunded Priorities List, Report to Congress, June 29, 2021, p. 3.) The following year, the
Coast Guard as part of its proposed FY2023 budget requested $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase
of a commercially available polar icebreaker. Congress, in acting on the Coast Guard’s proposed FY2023 budget,
denied the request. The Coast Guard once again requested the $125.0 million as part of its proposed FY2024 budget,
and the FY2024 DHS Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024) approved the
request.
25 Malte Humpert, “Icebreaker ‘Aiviq’ to Join U.S. Coast Guard Before End of Year to Bolster Arctic Presence,”
gCaptain, November 14, 2024.
26 U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Storis Departs on Maiden Voyage,” press release dated June 4, 2025. The press release
states: “This is the second vessel in Coast Guard history to bear the name Storis. The original Storis, known as the
“Galloping Ghost of the Alaskan Coast,” had a storied history conducting 64 years of icebreaking operations in Alaska
and the Arctic before being decommissioned in 2007.”
27 U.S. Coast Guard, “U.S. Coast Guard Announces Juneau Homeporting for Future Icebreaker,” press release, August
14, 2024. See also Maritime Executive, “U.S. Coast Guard Closes In on Purchase of Icebreaker Aiviq,” Maritime
Executive, August 14, 2024; Heather Mongilio, “Coast Guard Names Juneau as Home Port for New Icebreaker,” USNI
News, August 15, 2024; James Brooks, “Coast Guard Confirms Plans to Buy Polar Icebreaker, Station It in Juneau,”
Alaska Beacon, August 17, 2024. The Coast Guard states: “Storis will be commissioned this August in Juneau, Alaska,
which will eventually be the vessel’s permanent homeport. Until the necessary shore infrastructure improvements are
completed in Juneau, Storis will be temporarily berthed in Seattle, Washington, with the Service’s two other polar
icebreakers.” (U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Storis Departs on Maiden Voyage,” press release dated June 4, 2025.)
28 See, for example, Edward Lundquist, “Aiviq Becomes USCGC Storis, to Be Based in Juneau,” Marine News,
February 2025; Malte Humpert, “Icebreaker ‘Storis’ Officially Joins U.S. Coast Guard Fleet,” gCaptain, January 6,
2025; Patricia Kime, “Coast Guard’s Newest Icebreaker to Honor Storis, the Historic Cutter Known for 6 Decades of
Service,” Military.com, December 9, 2024; Cal Biesecker, “Coast Guard Awards $125 Million To Offshore Service
Vessels For Commercial Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, November 26, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
6
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
acquisition of a commercially available polar icebreaker does not affect the acquisition of
the PSCs, and the vessel will not be included in the PSC program of record…. The future
Storis will provide near-term operational presence and support national security as a
bridging strategy until the full complement of PSCs is delivered.29
For additional background information on current U.S. polar icebreakers, see Appendix A.
Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Procurement Programs
To recapitalize and expand its polar icebreaking fleet, the Coast Guard is planning to acquire new
heavy polar icebreakers called Polar Security Cutters (PSCs) and new medium polar icebreakers
called Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs).
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) Program
Overview
The PSC program was initiated in the Coast Guard’s FY2013 budget submission. The first PSC is
under construction; the Coast Guard expects the ship to be delivered no earlier than 2030.
Program Name and Name of First Ship
The PSC program was previously known as the polar icebreaker (PIB) program. Changing the
program’s name to the PSC program is intended to call attention to the fact that the Coast Guard’s
polar icebreakers perform a variety of missions relating to national security, not just
icebreaking.30 Although it is now called the PSC program, observers as a matter of convenience
might refer to it as the heavy polar icebreaker program. On February 24, 2022, the Coast Guard
announced that the first PSC will be named Polar Sentinel and that the Coast Guard has candidate
names in mind for the second and third PSCs.31
Home Port
On June 17, 2019, the Coast Guard announced that it intends to homeport PSCs at Seattle, WA,
where Polar Star and Healy are homeported.32
Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO)
The PSC program is managed by a Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office (IPO). A key
aim in establishing the IPO was to permit the Navy to share its ship-procurement best practices
with the Coast Guard so as to help the Coast Guard reduce the time and cost needed to design and
procure the PSCs.
29 U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Accepts Ownership of Commercially Available Polar Icebreaker,” news release
dated December 30, 2024.
30 See, for example, Ben Werner and Sam LaGrone, “Coast Guard Renames New Icebreaker Program ‘Polar Security
Cutter,’” USNI News, September 27, 2018. See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “With Funding In Peril, Coast Guard
Pushes Icebreaker as ‘Polar Security Cutter,’” Breaking Defense, October 29, 2018.
31 See, for example, Richard R. Burgess, “Commandant Names Future Polar Security Cutter ‘Polar Sentinel,’”
Seapower, February 24, 2022.
32 See, for example, Ben Werner, “Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter Will Be Homeported in Seattle,” USNI News,
June 17, 2019; Navy Times Staff, “Coast Guard Picks Homeport for New Icebreaker Fleet,” Navy Times, June 17,
2019.
Congressional Research Service
7
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Procurement Cost
The Coast Guard as of March 2025 estimated the total procurement cost of the first PSC at $2,397
million (i.e., about $2.4 billion).33
April 2019 Contract Award
On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy IPO for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million
fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first
PSC to Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard that was then owned by Singapore
Technologies (ST) Engineering. Halter Marine was the leader of one of three industry teams that
competed for the DD&C contract; the other two bidders reportedly were Bollinger Shipyards of
Lockport, LA, and a partnership between Philly Shipyard of Philadelphia and
Fincantieri/Marinette Marine, of Marinette, WI.34 The DD&C contract includes options for
building the second and third PSCs. If both of these options are exercised, the total value of the
contract (excluding the March 2025 contract modification discussed below) would increase to
$1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion).35 On December 29, 2021, the Coast Guard exercised a
$552.7 million fixed price incentive option to its contract with Halter Marine Inc. for the second
PSC.36
The above figures of $745.9 million, $552.7 million, and $1,942.8 million cover only the
shipbuilder’s portion of the PSCs’ total procurement cost as estimated in 2019; they do not
include the cost of government-furnished equipment (or GFE, meaning equipment that the
government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship), postdelivery costs, costs for Navy-specific equipment, or government program-management costs.
They also do not include the March 2025 contract modification discussed below.
In March 2025, the Coast Guard reportedly awarded Bollinger a contract modification for an
additional $951.6 million for the first PSC.37
Change in Contractor
In November 2022, ST Engineering sold Halter Marine to Louisiana-based Bollinger Shipyards.
The former Halter Marine is now called Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding.38 The shipyard’s
former name of Halter Marine occurs in the remainder of this report in connection with
33 Source: U.S. Coast Guard email to CRS of May 21, 2025.
34 “Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019.
35 See Naval Sea Systems Command, “Polar Security Cutter Contract Awarded to Recapitalize Nation’s Arctic
Capabilities,” April 23, 2019; Department of Defense, “Contracts for April 23, 2019” (Release No. CR-076-19); Sam
LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard Icebreaker,” USNI News, April 23, 2019; Maria Armental,
“U.S. Orders First Heavy Icebreaking Vessel in Decades, as Rivals Expand Arctic Presence,” Wall Street Journal,
April 23, 2019; “Mississippi Shipyard Gets $746M Contract for Icebreaker,” Associated Press, April 23, 2019.
36 U.S. Coast Guard, “Polar Security Cutter Integrated Program Office Exercises Option for Second Cutter,” U.S. Coast
Guard, December 30, 2021; Department of Defense, “Contracts for December 29, 2021.”
37 See, for example, Sam LaGrone, “Bollinger Awarded $951.6M for Modification for First Polar Security Cutter,”
USNI News, March 27, 2025; Maritime Executive, “US Awards $951M in Contract Modifications for Polar Cutter
Program,” Maritime Executive, March 26, 2025; Cal Biesecker, “Coast Guard Awards $952 Million Contract Mod To
Bollinger To Complete First Polar Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 25, 2025.
38 See, for example, Sam LaGrone, “Bollinger Closes $15M Acquisition of Halter Marine, New Name: ‘Bollinger
Mississippi Shipbuilding,’” USNI News, November 14, 2022; Cal Biesecker, “Bollinger Completes Acquisition of
Halter Marine,” Defense Daily, November 14, 2022; Justin Katz, “Why a Small Shipyard Merger Could Signal Bigger
Problems for the US Military,” Breaking Defense, November 14, 2022; Sam LaGrone, “Updated: Bollinger to Buy
Halter Marine Shipyard, Oversee Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter Program,” USNI News, November 6, 2022.
Congressional Research Service
8
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
developments prior to November 2022. As a result of this shipyard purchase, the program’s
contractor changed from Halter to Bollinger.
Lead Ship Delivery Date
Subsequent to the April 2019 contract award, the PSC program fell years behind schedule, in
large part due to the time needed to complete the design of the ship. The first PSC was originally
projected to be delivered in 2024, but as noted above, is now projected to be delivered no earlier
than 2030. Much of the delay in the delivery date occurred prior to Bollinger’s November 2022
purchase of Halter. The second and third PSCs reportedly are expected to be delivered in 2032
and 2034, respectively.39
Ship Design
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 show renderings and a photograph of a
model of the design for the PSC. An April 25, 2019, press report states that “the Coast Guard and
Navy said VT Halter Marine’s winning design for the new PSC ‘meets or exceeds all threshold
requirements’ in the ship specification” for the PSC program.40 For additional information
regarding the design of the PSC, see Appendix B.
Figure 1. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC
Source: Illustration accompanying Sam LaGrone, “UPDATED: VT Halter Marine to Build New Coast Guard
Icebreaker,” USNI News, April 23, 2019, updated April 24, 2019. The caption to the illustration states, “An
artist’s rendering of VT Halter Marine’s winning bid for the U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter. VT Halter
Marine image used with permission.”
39 Cal Biesecker, “Coast Guard Approved For Full Production Of First Polar Security Cutter,” Defense Daily, May 1,
2025.
40 Rich Abott, “Polar Icebreaker Winner Meets Threshold Requirements, Has Incentives for Early Delivery,” Defense
Daily, April 25, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
9
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure 2. Model of Halter Marine Design for PSC
(Photograph of model displayed at 2021 trade show)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Peter Ong, “USGC’s Polar Security Cutters to Receive
Mark 38 Mod 4 Guns,” Naval News, April 21, 2022. The article credits the photograph to Naval News at the Sea
Air Space exposition 2021.
Figure 3. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC
Source: Illustration posted by Robert A. Socha, Senior Vice President, Halter Marine, accessed May 6, 2019, at
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6526621529113976832.
Congressional Research Service
10
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure 4. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC
Source: Technology Associates, Inc. (cropped version of rendering posted at http://www.navalarchitects.us/
pictures.html, accessed November 19, 2024). A similar image was included in Halter Marine press release, “VT
Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, accessed November 19, 2024, at
https://web.archive.org/web/20190513165621/http://www.vthm.com/public/files/20190507.pdf.
Figure 5. Rendering of Halter Marine Design for PSC
Source: Photograph accompanying Connie Lee, “New Coast Guard Icebreaker Remains on Tight Schedule,”
National Defense, May 21, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Technology Associated, Inc.
Congressional Research Service
11
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Procurement Funding Through FY2024
As shown in Table 1, the PSC program received a total of about $1,731.8 million in procurement
funding through FY2024. This total reflects a rescission of $150.0 million in unobligated prioryear funding in the Coast Guard’s Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) account
that was made by Section 543(10) of the FY2024 DHS Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R.
2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024). The Coast Guard applied the rescission to the PSC
program’s FY2021 PC&I account appropriation, reducing it from the originally enacted figure of
$555.0 million to the figure shown in Table 1 of $405.0 million.
As also shown in Table 1, the PSC program received an additional $4.3 billion in procurement
funding in the FY2025 reconciliation act (H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21 of July 4, 2025, also known as the
One Big Beautiful Bill Act, or OBBBA).
Table 1. Procurement Funding for PSC Program
(In millions of dollars)
Appropriated
Fiscal year
Coast Guard
funding
Navy funding
Total funding
Requested by
Coast Guard
for that year
FY13
7.609
7.609
8.0
FY14
2.0
2.0
2.0
FY15
0.0
0.0
6.0
FY16
36.0
36.0
4.0
FY17
25.0
150.0
175.0
147.6
FY18
19.0
150.0
169.0
19.0
FY19
675.0
675.0
750.0
FY20
135.0
135.0
35.0
FY21
405.0
405.0
405.0
FY22
80.0
80.0
170.0
FY23
47.2
47.2
167.2
FY24
0
0
170.0
4,300.0
4,300.0
0
6,031.809
n/a
FY25 reconciliation act
Total
5,731.809
300.0
Source: U.S. Coast Guard and Navy budget data. Figures reflect post-enactment adjustments due to
reprogramming actions or recissions.
Notes: Coast Guard procurement funding shown in the table was provided through the PC&I account. (Prior to
FY2019, the PC&I account was called the Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements [AC&I] account.) Navy
procurement funding shown in the table was provided through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
account (i.e., the Navy’s shipbuilding account). All procurement funding requested over the years for the PSC
program has been requested by the Coast Guard for the Coast Guard’s AC&I/PC&I account. The Navy
procurement funding provided in FY2017 and FY2018 was not requested by the Administration and was added
by Congress in marking up the Navy’s proposed FY2017 and FY2018 shipbuilding budgets. The FY2016 figure of
$36.0 million includes $30.0 million that was added after enactment through a reprogramming action, as noted in
the Coast Guard’s FY2018 budget submission. Section 543(10) of the FY2024 DHS Appropriations Act (Division
C of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024) rescinded $150.0 million in unobligated prior-year funding for the
Coast Guard’s Procurement, Construction, and Improvements (PC&I) account. The Coast Guard applied the
Congressional Research Service
12
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
rescission to the PSC program’s FY2021 PC&I account appropriation, reducing it from the originally enacted
figure of $555.0 million to the figure shown in the table of $405.0 million. The FY2025 reconciliation act, also
known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), is H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21 of July 4, 2025.
Service Life Extension for Polar Star
The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least the
second PSC.41 The Coast Guard estimated the cost of Polar Star’s service life extension work at
$75 million, a sum that was funded at a rate of $15 million per year for five years, with the final
$15 million increment being provided in FY2023. The funding was included in the vessels
portion of the Coast Guard’s PC&I account, in a line item called “Polar Sustainment” that is
separate from the line items for the PSC and CAPI programs.
Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Program
Overview
As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard refers to its planned new medium polar icebreakers as
Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs).
April 2025 Request for Information (RFI)
On April 11, 2025, the Coast Guard released a Request for Information (RFI) for ASCs.
Responses to the RFI were due by April 25, 2025. The posting for the RFI states
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is conducting market research to assess the current
capabilities of the U.S. and international maritime industrial base to support Arctic Security
Cutter (ASC) acquisition efforts. Specifically, the USCG is seeking to increase their
understanding of existing icebreaking capable vessels or vessel designs that are ready for
construction or already in production.
The USCG is also interested in proven execution and build strategies and the ability of
global shipyards to support the construction and subsequent launch of an icebreakingcapable vessel within 36-months of a contract award.42
An RFI document attached to the posting states the following (including the table of vessel
preliminary capability parameters):43
41 In February 2020, for example, the Coast Guard testified that
The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing heavy and medium
icebreaking capability while proceeding with recapitalization.... Maintenance of POLAR STAR
will be critical to sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are delivered. Robust planning
efforts for a service life extension project on POLAR STAR are already underway and initial work
for this project will begin in 2020, with phased industrial work occurring annually from 2021
through 2023. The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel’s service life until delivery
of at least the second new PSC.
(Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, on “Arctic Security
Issues,” before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation & Maritime
Security, February 5, 2020, p. 9.)
42 “Request for Information—Arctic Security Cutter (ASC): Icebreaking Capable Vessels or Vessel Designs that are
Ready for Construction,” SAM.gov, accessed April 16, 2025, at https://sam.gov/opp/
ee911f0016fd4bb0b98d589cfcfc3dca/view.
43 U.S. Coast Guard, Request For Information (RFI), Arctic Security Cutter (ASC): Icebreaking Capable Vessels or
Vessel Designs that are Ready for Construction, p. 1. (Document attached to ASC RFI posted at SAM.gov, accessed
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
13
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
The purpose of this RFI is to increase the USCG’s understanding of the current status and
capability of both the U.S. and broader international maritime industrial base as it pertains
to existing icebreaking capable vessels or vessel designs that are ready for construction or
already in production.
Specifically, the USCG seeks to understand what existing vessels or production ready
vessel designs satisfy or closely satisfy the below preliminary capability parameters.
Additionally, the USCG would like to gain insight on recently proven execution and build
strategies as well as the current capability and availability of global shipyards that could
support the construction and subsequent launch of an existing icebreaking capable vessel
design within THIRTY-SIX (36) months of a contract award date.
Regarding the figure of 36 months in the above-quoted passage, an April 3, 2025, blog entry
states that building icebreakers
shouldn’t be that hard. European shipyards, especially those located in Finland, routinely
design and build these specialized ships for a variety of purposes….
I recently wrote about Davie—the Canadian shipbuilder—and their plan to build their own
design polar icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard. According to a press report, 30% of
the ship will be built in Helsinki. Before the contract was awarded, Davie was advertising
that they could build this design in Helsinki in only 36 months.
How can the Finns do that? Often, U.S. Coast Guard Admirals and officials state before
Congress that Finland doesn’t build the kind of icebreakers they’re talking about. This PC2
[class] icebreaker [i.e., heavy polar icebreaker in U.S. parlance]—for the Canadian Coast
Guard—seems to be exactly that kind of icebreaker.44
December 2025 Contract Awards
On December 26, 2025, the Coast Guard awarded contracts for the construction of up to six
ASCs. Rauma Marine Constructions Oy (RMC) of Rauma, Finland, was awarded a contract to
build up two ASCs, with the first to be delivered in 2028. Bollinger Shipyards was awarded a
contract to build up to four ASCs at the firm’s shipyard in Houma, LA, with the first to be
delivered in 2029. RMC, Bollinger, Seaspan Shipyards of North Vancouver, Canada, and ship
design and engineering firm Aker Arctic Technology Oy of Helsinki, Finland, partnered to
April 16, 2025, at https://sam.gov/opp/ee911f0016fd4bb0b98d589cfcfc3dca/view.) See also Nick Blenkey, “USCG
Issues RFI for Icebreaking Arctic Security Cutter,” Marine Log, April 15, 2025; Justin Katz, “Coast Guard Seeks Info
on Medium Icebreaker Options from US, International Industry,” Breaking Defense, April 15, 2025; John Grady,
“Coast Guard Asking U.S., Foreign Yards for Arctic Security Cutter Pitches,” USNI News, April 16, 2025.
44 Peter Rybski, “How to Build an Icebreaker in Three Years,” Arctic Today, April 3, 2025.
Congressional Research Service
14
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
compete for the contracts. RMC and Bollinger will build the ASCs to a design based on the
Multi-Purpose Icebreaker (MPI) (Figure 6), an icebreaker design developed by Seaspan and Aker
Arctic.45
Figure 6. Rendering of Arctic Security Cutter (ASC)
Source: Rendering accompanying Nick Blenkey, “USCG Awards Bollinger and Finland’s RMC Contracts for Up
to Six Arctic Security Cutter Icebreakers,” Marine Log, December 29, 2025. A caption to the rendering credits
the rendering to Seaspan Shipyards.
Laws Relating to Building Ships in Foreign Shipyards
Some observers have suggested that a U.S. law known as the Jones Act prevents the U.S. Coast
Guard from buying or operating a foreign-built polar icebreaker. The Jones Act, however, does
not prevent the U.S. Coast Guard from buying or operating a foreign-built polar icebreaker, as the
operations of Coast Guard polar icebreakers do not fall under the Jones Act.46
45 See U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Awards Contracts to Build Arctic Security Cutters,” press release dated
December 26, 2025. See also “Seaspan Inks Deal with Bollinger, Rauma for U.S. Coast Guard ASC Program,” press
release dated January 7, 2025; Malte Humpert, “U.S. Signs Contracts With Foreign and Domestic Builders to Finally
Launch Long-Delayed Icebreaker Fleet Overhaul,” High North News, January 5, 2025; Nick Blenkey, “USCG Awards
Bollinger and Finland’s RMC Contracts for Up to Six Arctic Security Cutter Icebreakers,” Marine Log, December 29,
2025; Gary Warner, “Coast Guard Issues Contract to Build Icebreakers in Louisiana and Finland,” Stars and Stripes,
December 29, 2025.
46 The Jones Act (Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, P.L. 66-261) applies to vessels transporting
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
15
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Two other laws, however, are of note in connection with the idea of building a U.S. Coast Guard
polar icebreaker in a foreign shipyard. One is 14 U.S.C. §1151, which was added to the U.S. Code
by Section 26(a) of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1988 (H.R. 2342/P.L. 100-448 of
September 28, 1988). The provision states,
§1151. Restriction on acquisition, procurement, or construction of vessels in foreign
shipyards
(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), the Commandant may not lease,
charter, or otherwise procure a vessel which contains a major component of the hull or
superstructure constructed in a foreign shipyard.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may authorize exceptions to the prohibition in
subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in the national security interest of
the United States to do so.
(2) NOTICE.—The President shall transmit notice to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate of any such determination made by the President under
paragraph (1), and no contract may be awarded pursuant to the exception authorized until
the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date the notice of such determination is
received by such committees of Congress.
(3) JUSTIFICATION.—The notice required under paragraph (2) shall include a written
explanation of the national security interest and a detailed summary of market research
demonstrating the lack of availability of United States shipyards to meet the Coast Guard
requirements consistent with national security interest.47
The other is 10 U.S.C. §8679, which was added to the U.S. Code by Section 824(b) of the
FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 2401/P.L. 103-160 of November 30,
1993). The provision states,
§8679. Construction of vessels in foreign shipyards: prohibition
“merchandise” from one U.S. point to another U.S. point. It requires that such transportation be performed in U.S.-built
vessels owned by U.S. citizens and registered in the United States; U.S. registration, in turn, requires that crew
members be U.S. citizens. Merchandise is defined to include “merchandise owned by the U.S. Government, a State, or
a subdivision of a State; and valueless material” (46 U.S.C. §55102). Merchandise is further defined at 19 U.S.C.
§1401(c) to mean “goods, wares, and chattels of every description.” It is the waterborne transportation of merchandise
domestically that triggers the Jones Act. A vessel wishing to engage in such transportation would apply to the U.S.
Coast Guard for a “coastwise endorsement.” Thus, an icebreaker strictly performing the task it is designed for and not
transporting cargo from one U.S. point to another would not be subject to the Jones Act.
The federal agency in charge of deciding what kind of maritime activity must comply with the Jones Act, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), has confirmed that icebreaking is not one of those activities. In a 2006 ruling, which
appears to be its most recent ruling on the subject, CPB informed Alcoa, Inc., that it could use foreign-built and
foreign-flagged vessels for icebreaking on the Hudson River in New York State. CBP reasoned that the transporting of
equipment, supplies, and materials used on or from the vessel in effecting its service is not coastwise trade, provided
that these articles are necessary for the accomplishment of the vessel’s mission and are usually carried aboard the
vessel as a matter of course. The 2006 ruling cited earlier rulings in 1974, 1985, and 2000 as precedent.
For more on the Jones Act, see CRS Report R45725, Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory
Background, by John Frittelli.
47 This is the text of 14 U.S.C. §1151 as amended by Section 7213(a) of the FY2026 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) (S. 1071/P.L. 119-60 of December 18, 2025).
Congressional Research Service
16
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
(a) Prohibition.-Except as provided in subsection (b), no vessel to be constructed for any
of the armed forces,48 and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such
vessel, may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.
(b) Presidential Waiver for National Security Interest.-(1) The President may authorize
exceptions to the prohibition in subsection (a) when the President determines that it is in
the national security interest of the United States to do so.
(2) The President shall transmit notice to Congress of any such determination, and no
contract may be made pursuant to the exception authorized until the end of the 30-day
period beginning on the date on which the notice of the determination is received by
Congress.
(c) Exception for Inflatable Boats.-An inflatable boat or a rigid inflatable boat, as defined
by the Secretary of the Navy, is not a vessel for the purpose of the restriction in subsection
(a).
As shown above, 14 U.S.C. §1151 and 10 U.S.C. §8679 both include a presidential waiver or
exception for the national security interest. On October 8, President Trump exercised the waiver
and exception for the national security interest for these two statutes.49
Total Number of Polar Icebreakers Existing or Under Contract
As shown in Table 2, the combination of Healy, Storis, up to three PSCs, and up to six ASCs
would produce a future polar icebreaking fleet of up to 11 ships, including up to three heavy polar
icebreakers (the three PSCs) and up to eight medium polar icebreakers (Healy, Storis, six ASCs).
Table 2. Total Number of Polar Icebreakers Existing or Under Contract
Coast Guard
stated
requirement
Existing
Under
contract
Total
existing
or under
contract
Heavy polar icebreakers
4 or 5
1 (Polar Star)
Up to 3 (PSCs)
Up to 4
Medium polar icebreakers
4 or 5
2 (Healy and Storis)
Up to 6 (ASCs)
Up to 8
Subtotal above
8 or 9
3
Up to 9
Up to 12
TOTAL following retirement of Polar Star
8 or 9
2
Up to 9
Up to 11
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Coast Guard data.
Coast Guard Great Lakes Icebreakers
Current Fleet
The Coast Guard’s current Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) fleet consists of nine cutters:
•
one heavy icebreaker—Mackinaw (WLBB-30), a 240-foot ship displacing 3,500
tons (Figure 7);
48 14 U.S.C. §101, which establishes the Coast Guard, states the following: “The Coast Guard, established January 28,
1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times.”
49 White House, “Construction of Arctic Security Cutters, Presidential Memoranda, October 8, 2025, accessed January
21, 2025, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/10/construction-of-arctic-security-cutters/.
Congressional Research Service
17
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
•
•
six 140-foot Bay-class icebreaking tugs displacing 662 tons each; and
two 225-foot Juniper-class seagoing buoy tenders displacing about 2,000 tons
each that have a light icebreaking capability.50
Figure 7. Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw
Source: Cropped version of photograph at U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Assets, 240-foot Great Lakes
Class,” accessed April 15, 2025, at https://www.uscg.mil/Assets/Display/Article/1822555/240-foot-great-lakesclass/.
Although Mackinaw is referred to as a heavy icebreaker, the word heavy in this instance is being
used in the context of Great Lakes icebreaking—Mackinaw is much larger and has more
icebreaking capability than the eight other Great Lakes icebreaking ships listed above.51
Mackinaw would not, however, qualify as a heavy polar icebreaker, as it is much smaller and has
much less icebreaking capability than a heavy polar icebreaker.52
50 Source: U.S. Coast Guard, “Ninth Coast Guard District,” accessed November 19, 2024, at
https://www.atlanticarea.uscg.mil/Atlantic-Area/Units/District-9/Ninth-District-Units/. A total of 10 cutters are
assigned to the Ninth District, which is responsible for the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence Seaway, and parts of the
surrounding states. The 10th cutter assigned to the Ninth District is a 100-foot inland buoy tender whose primary
missions do not include icebreaking.
51 At continuous speeds of 3 knots, Mackinaw can break ice up to 32 inches thick, the 140-foot icebreaking tugs can
break ice up to 22 inches thick, and the 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders can break ice up to 14 inches thick.
52 As discussed earlier in this report, the Coast Guard’s two heavy polar icebreakers—the operational Polar Star and
the nonoperational Polar Sea—are 399 feet long and displace about 13,200 tons each. Polar Star can break ice up to
six feet (72 inches) thick at a continuous speed of 3 knots. The Coast Guard states that Mackinaw is equivalent to the
Canadian Coast Guard ship Samuel Risley, a Great Lakes-homeported icebreaker and buoy tender that Canada
classifies as a light icebreaker in a comparison conducted across its entire icebreaking fleet, including its Arctic
icebreakers. (U.S. Coast Guard, Great Lakes Icebreaking Mission Analysis, Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress,
August 30, 2016, p. 5.)
Congressional Research Service
18
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
New Great Lakes Icebreaker (GLIB)
Overview
Since at least 2009, some Members of Congress have expressed interest in bolstering the Coast
Guard’s Great Lakes icebreaking fleet by procuring a second icebreaker with capabilities
generally similar to those of Mackinaw.53 Prior to October 2021, the Coast Guard generally stated
that it did not view the procurement of additional GLIBs as an urgent near-term acquisition need,
given the capabilities of the current Great Lakes icebreaking fleet, the relatively young age of
Mackinaw (which entered service in 2006), service life extension work being done on the icebreaking tugs that is designed to add 15 years to their service lives, and Canada’s own Great
Lakes icebreaking capabilities.54 In October 2021, then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral
Karl Schultz expressed support for procuring an additional heavy GLIB as part of a budget
reconciliation bill.55
The Coast Guard’s FY2024 budget initiated a program for procuring a new GLIB that would have
capabilities similar to those of Mackinaw. The ship’s total acquisition cost, the Coast Guard
estimates, might be roughly $350 million, depending in part on the exact design that is developed
for the ship.56 (In January 2024, the Government Accountability Office [GAO] reported that the
Coast Guard’s 2022 Mission Need Statement for domestic icebreaking estimated the procurement
cost of a heavy domestic icebreaker at $216.3 million as of 2020.57)
53 See, for example, H.R. 1747 of the 111th Cong., the Great Lakes Icebreaker Replacement Act, which was introduced
on March 26, 2009, reported by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on April 21, 2009 (H.Rept. 11181), and agreed to by the House by voice vote on April 27, 2009. A similar bill, S. 1024, was introduced in the Senate
on May 12, 2009.
54 A 2016 Coast Guard report to Congress on the Great Lakes icebreaking mission, for example, stated the following:
The current mix of heavy and medium [Great Lakes] icebreakers is capable of managing priorities
and requests for icebreaking in Tier 1 and 2 waterways. When a severe ice season stresses Coast
Guard asset capabilities, the existing agreement and partnership with Canada fills the capability gap
and brings in extra heavy-icebreaking resources to manage the ice.... [T]he 2014 and 2015 ice
seasons were a 20-year anomaly, consuming almost twice as many cutter resource hours as in any
other year since 2005.
The Coast Guard cannot reliably predict the economic impact of maintaining a single heavy Great
Lakes icebreaker. Additionally, given the extreme conditions when ice coverage exceeds 90
percent, it is not clear that shipping delays would be significantly mitigated by an increase in
icebreaking capability. Delays can be associated with several factors such as slow transit speeds,
availability of pilots, and simultaneous and competing demand signals for icebreaking services
across the Great Lakes.
(U.S. Coast Guard, Great Lakes Icebreaking Mission Analysis, Fiscal Year 2016 Report to
Congress, August 30, 2016, p. 11. The report was required by S.Rept. 114-68 of June 18, 2015, the
Senate Appropriations Committee’s report on S. 1619, the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill, 2016 (see page 75).)
55 Admiral Schultz expressed support for procuring an additional heavy Great Lakes icebreaker as part of a budget
reconciliation bill as part of his testimony at an October 19, 2021, hearing on Coast Guard oversight before the Oceans,
Fisheries, Climate Change, and Manufacturing subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee.
56 Source: Coast Guard email to CRS, May 1, 2024.
57 GAO, Coast Guard: Improved Reporting on Domestic Icebreaking Performance Could Clarify Resource Needs and
Tradeoffs, GAO-24-106619, January 16, 2024, Table 1 on page 8. In a footnote to the table, GAO states that “the actual
costs [for items shown in the table] are likely to be higher than reported because the estimates do not include other
costs, such as shore infrastructure costs at port locations that the Coast Guard has not yet determined.”
Congressional Research Service
19
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
March 1, 2024, Hearing
On March 1, 2024, the Oceans, Fisheries, Climate Change, and Manufacturing subcommittee of
the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee held a field hearing in Green Bay,
WI, on the importance of Great Lakes icebreaking to the regional economy.58 At this hearing,
Admiral Linda Fagan, Commandant of the Coast Guard, testified:
The Coast Guard recently completed a Fleet Mix Analysis which recommended a future
fleet of in-kind capacity to replace [the Coast Guard’s] current [Great Lakes icebreaking]
fleet. The results showed a need for another heavy domestic icebreaker to meet future
service needs across the Great Lakes. The ability to achieve continued success in this
mission and reliably facilitate navigation within the MTS [marine transportation system]
year-round requires sustainment and modernization of the Coast Guard’s domestic
icebreaking fleet, and I am committed to developing the next system of icebreaking assets.
Consistent with Congressional direction, we are focused on acquiring a second heavy
domestic icebreaker, at least as capable as CGC [Coast Guard cutter] Mackinaw. We
established a Great Lakes Icebreaking Program Management Office to analyze
requirements for the next generation of domestic icebreaking capability and have
completed pre-acquisition activities, readying the Service to advance upon receipt of an
appropriation. The FY 2024 President’s Budget requests $55 million to fund initial
acquisition activities and prepare for the purchase of long lead time materials for a second
heavy domestic icebreaker. I look forward to continuing to work with Congress to support
this acquisition.59
January 2024 GAO Report
A January 16, 2024, GAO report on U.S. domestic icebreaking performance stated
The Coast Guard conducts domestic icebreaking operations in three of its nine districts—
the Great Lakes, New England, and the Mid-Atlantic.
In the Great Lakes, 55 percent of the regional economy is dependent on key shipping
channels, according to the Coast Guard. In 2020, industries shipped 100 million tons of
iron ore, limestone, coal, and other commodities through the Great Lakes, according to
data from the Army Corps of Engineers Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center. Some
industry stakeholders who rely on these shipping channels have raised questions about
whether the Coast Guard has adequate icebreaking resources available to facilitate
commerce.
Section 11212 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2023 [H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022] includes a provision for GAO to
review Coast Guard icebreaking operations in the Great Lakes and examine proposed
performance standards for the Coast Guard’s Great Lakes icebreaking program. This report
discusses the associations between ice coverage on the Great Lakes and effects on certain
economic indicators, the Coast Guard’s icebreaking resource needs, and the potential
effects of the proposed standards on the Coast Guard’s icebreaking efforts.
Key Takeaways
•
Great Lakes vessel-based commerce declines during the winter, primarily due to lock
closures and weather conditions. We found that the amount of ice coverage on the
58 For details on this hearing, see https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/3/importance-of-great-lakes-icebreaking-to-
the-regional-economy.
59 Testimony of Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on “The Importance of Great Lakes
Icebreaking to the Regional Economy” before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries[,] Climate Change, and Manufacturing, March 1, 2024, p. 4.
Congressional Research Service
20
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Great Lakes was generally not associated with selected economic indicators we
examined, such as regional unemployment rates and unfilled orders for steel
production. Industries may mitigate the effects of delays caused by ice coverage, such
as stockpiling iron ore inventory to maintain steel production throughout the winter.
•
The Coast Guard identified heavy icebreaking capability gaps and its reliance on an
aging fleet as risks to its ability to conduct its domestic icebreaking mission. As a
result, the Coast Guard anticipates needing at least $3 billion in lifecycle costs to
replace and acquire new vessels for domestic icebreaking.
•
The proposed standards for the Coast Guard’s domestic icebreaking program will
largely not have an operational impact. The proposed standards may lead to
improvements in data collection and reporting, which could help the Coast Guard
better communicate its resource needs and tradeoffs. However, the data collection
efforts may increase operating costs and information sharing needs with industry,
according to the Coast Guard.
•
We recommend that the Coast Guard, using data it already collects, report more
complete information on its icebreaking performance to better articulate its resource
needs and tradeoffs.60
Issues for Congress
Overview
Issues for Congress regarding Coast Guard polar icebreakers include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
program-execution risk (i.e., the risk of cost growth, schedule delay, or technical
problems) in the PSC and ASC programs;
Coast Guard intentions regarding the procurement of a fourth or fifth PSC, so as
to meet the stated requirement (following the retirement of Polar Star) for a total
of four or five heavy polar icebreakers;
the total number of ASCs that will eventually be built, given the two existing
medium polar icebreakers (Healy and Storis) and the stated requirement for a
total of four or five medium polar icebreakers;
whether required numbers of polar icebreakers would increase, and if so, by how
many ships, if Greenland were to become part of the United States; and
whether the building some ASCs in Finland should serve as a model for building
ships for the U.S. Navy in foreign shipyards.
Discussions of Selected Issues
The following sections provide additional discussion of some of the above issues.
60 GAO, Coast Guard: Improved Reporting on Domestic Icebreaking Performance Could Clarify Resource Needs and
Tradeoffs, GAO-24-106619, January 16, 2024, pp. 1-2.
Congressional Research Service
21
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Program-Execution Risk
February 2025 GAO Report
Regarding program-execution risk in the PSC program, a February 2025 GAO report assessing
DHS acquisition programs states the following regarding the PSC program:
Key Findings
• Cost and Schedule. The program indicated in November 2023 that it would breach its
cost and schedule goals. It planned to rebaseline those goals by seeking approval from DHS
in December 2024. As of November 2024, the cost estimate is expected to grow by over
20 percent above the previous baseline of $3.3 billion but is not yet completed. Program
officials stated that they plan to seek approval for the new baseline before completing
ongoing contract negotiations with the shipbuilder.
• Design and Construction. Design immaturity continues to delay the start of construction,
which the program originally planned for 2021. With 81 percent of functional design
complete more than 5 years after the award of the detail design contract, the Coast Guard
has not yet met its standard of 95 percent completion before starting construction. As of
November 2024, the Coast Guard reported authorizing six of the 85 total sections of the
ship to help inform full production, but none are finished….
Program History and Acquisition Strategy
The Coast Guard established its initial acquisition program baseline for the PSC program
in 2018 and has revised it twice, once in 2021 to reflect higher costs and a delayed schedule
and in 2022 due to schedule delays related to COVID-19…. We previously made
recommendations to help the program maintain its cost and schedule baselines. For
example: (1) To implement recommendations we made in 2018, the program conducted a
technology readiness assessment, reevaluated its cost estimate, and identified and mitigated
schedule risks (GAO-18-600), and (2) In 2023, we made a priority recommendation to
DHS to ensure design is mature prior to authorizing lead ship construction. DHS concurred
with the recommendation. As of August 2024, this recommendation remains open (GAO23-105949).
Cost and Schedule Status
In November 2023, the program notified DHS that it would breach its cost and schedule
goals. As of November 2024, the program is planning to update its acquisition program
baseline by the end of 2024. The program’s notional schedule as of November 2023
indicates the lead PSC will be delivered in late 2029—a delay of over 5 years since initial
plans. The program had planned to complete its cost estimate by September 2024 but still
had not done so by November 2024. However, when the program declared the cost breach,
it reported costs had exceeded at least 20 percent of the previous goal of $3.3 billion.
Program officials said that the cost and schedule increases are attributable to several factors
including the lack of U.S. shipbuilding expertise for designing and constructing heavy
polar icebreakers, the complexity of and changes to the design, and the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic on the program’s planned activities.
In October 2023, the shipyard requested restructuring of the contract’s detail design and
construction line items because it determined it could not meet the original contract terms.
In April 2024, the Coast Guard made several modifications to the contract, including
changing the line item for advance planning, engineering, and design for the lead ship from
a fixed-price incentive to a firm-fixed-price contract type. Program officials do not have
an anticipated completion date for contract restructuring as negotiations are ongoing.
However, officials said that they plan to finalize the updated acquisition program baseline
Congressional Research Service
22
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
before negotiations are completed, which introduces uncertainty with the forthcoming cost
and schedule goals.
Design and Construction
Design immaturity continues to be a top program risk, even though program officials said
they entered the critical design review in September 2024. As of September 2024, and after
more than 5 years of work since the contract was awarded, functional design is
approximately 81 percent complete. As a result, it is unlikely that the design will be mature
enough to start construction on the lead PSC by the end of 2024. Program officials said
they aim to have 95 percent of the functional design complete to start construction by that
time, which is inconsistent with ship design leading practices we previously identified.
To address slower than expected design progress, program officials said that the shipyard
brought on additional engineering personnel to accelerate design maturity. Program
officials said that the shipyard demonstrated completion of significant design work as of
the September 2024 critical design review. Further, they said that the Coast Guard will
seek approval from DHS to begin lead ship construction in December 2024.
In July 2023, the Coast Guard reported authorizing production of the first of 85 total
sections for the ship, an incremental approach to production. As of July 2024, the first
section is over half complete. As of November 2024, the shipyard has since begun
production on six total sections to build workforce capability, test new processes and
equipment, and reduce production risk while design matures.
Coast Guard officials stated that the program conducted cybersecurity assessments in 2023
and 2024 and deemed the results as classified.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
In this assessment, we included information for key events as of November 2024 to the
extent it was provided by the Coast Guard.61
December 2024 GAO Report
A December 19, 2024, GAO report on Coast Guard acquisition of polar ships states,
Key Takeaways
• The Coast Guard is considering multiple efforts to expand its polar icebreaker fleet from
the current two to either eight or nine. However, it has yet to determine the mix of medium
and heavy polar icebreakers, known as Arctic Security Cutters and Polar Security Cutters,
respectively, or the associated costs that are a part of its long-term strategy.
• To address near-term gaps, the Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of its two
operational polar icebreakers. It also plans to purchase and convert a commercially
available polar icebreaker (CAPI), something it has never done before. But it lacks
information on the full cost to do so.
• We recommend that the Coast Guard develop a detailed cost estimate for the CAPI and
that it develop an analysis of the cost and sequencing for the planned polar icebreaker fleet
expansion within the context of its larger acquisition portfolio and priorities. DHS did not
concur with the first recommendation and did concur with the second….
61 Government Accountability Office, DHS Annual Assessment[;} Improved Guidance on Revised Acquisition Goals
Would Enhance Transparency, GAO-25-107317, February 2025, pp. 66-67.
Congressional Research Service
23
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
What are some open questions that remain for the Coast Guard to answer as it plans
its future polar icebreaker fleet?
The Coast Guard faces many questions as it expands its polar icebreaking fleet in the
coming decades. However, it has already started planning this expansion without a
complete understanding of how to achieve its goals. It will gain information to answer
some questions as the planning progresses for a potential Arctic Security Cutter program.
But other answers are external to that effort and have potential implications for other
programs, such as any expansion of the Polar Security Cutter program to build more than
three cutters. Some open questions that remain for the Coast Guard related to the polar
icebreaker fleet expansion are listed below (see fig. 4).
Congressional Research Service
24
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
… With so many questions unanswered, the Coast Guard has yet to make a business case
to adequately support committing resources to expanding its polar fleet to its desired state
of eight to nine polar icebreakers. As we have previously found, high levels of uncertainty
set up programs for poor outcomes. In this case, any poor outcomes would be compounded
because multiple programs are involved. Moving forward without better understanding the
commitments, costs, and affordability may bind the Coast Guard to a portfolio that cannot
be executed.
Congressional Research Service
25
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Conclusions
The Coast Guard is working to increase its presence in the Arctic region and expand the
polar icebreaking fleet. Polar icebreaker programs take over a decade to deliver a
capability, so the Coast Guard is trying to add an existing commercial icebreaker to its fleet
sooner by purchasing and converting it within 2 years. But it does not understand the likely
cost of this effort, such as the full cost of converting a commercially available polar
icebreaker or what modifications it will need to make. The Coast Guard has prepared a
rough estimate, which is not sufficient to inform a budget request, and lacks updated
information now that a specific polar icebreaker has been identified. To meet its time frame
of 2 years, it plans to purchase the icebreaker and figure out the detailed cost estimate for
any modifications later.
The Coast Guard is already beset by affordability challenges in its portfolio of major
acquisition programs within a constrained budget environment to support the missions it
performs. However, it has not yet shown how it could achieve its goal to enlarge the polar
fleet to eight or nine polar icebreakers.
It is not too late for the Coast Guard to get more information since it has yet to make
financial commitments outside of the first three Polar Security Cutters. As the Coast Guard
moves forward, it could develop more detailed cost estimates and determine if it can afford
its plans within the context of its larger acquisition portfolio. Doing so could help the Coast
Guard take a step in the right direction to determine what it can afford and when, among
its many acquisition priorities. Finally, these plans will demonstrate whether the necessary
resources will be there when the Coast Guard is ready to move forward or what trade-offs
it can make to better position itself to fill its capability gaps.62
Potential Impact of Greenland Annexation on Required Numbers of
Icebreakers
If Greenland were to become a part of the United States, requirements for U.S. polar icebreakers
could increase due to a need for performing icebreaking and other U.S. Coast Guard missions in
waters surrounding Greenland. Baffin Bay, which separates Greenland from Canada’s Baffin
Island, forms part of the Northwest Passage linking the North Atlantic to the North Pacific via the
Canadian archipelago, the north coast of Alaska, and the Bering Strait. As discussed in a CRS
report on Arctic issues, under a May 2011 agreement among the eight Arctic states on cooperation
on aeronautical and maritime search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic, Denmark currently has
primary responsibility for conducting SAR operations in coastal waters surrounding Greenland.63
If Greenland were to become part of the United States, primary responsibility for conducting
SAR operations in these waters could shift to the United States.
62 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Further Cost and Affordability Analysis of Polar
Fleet Needed, GAO-25-106822, Q&A Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives, December 19, 2024, pp. 1, 11-13.
63 CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service
26
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Use of Foreign Shipyards for Building U.S. Navy Ships
As discussed in two CRS reports on Navy shipbuilding programs,64 President Trump,65 some
other U.S. officials,66 and other observers67 have suggested or advocated using foreign
shipyards—particularly shipyards in South Korea and/or Japan—to build ships for the U.S. Navy,
at least as a stop-gap measure until U.S. shipbuilding capacity constraints can be alleviated. Other
observers oppose proposals for using foreign shipyards to build ships for the U.S. Navy.68
Supporters of building ships for the Navy in foreign shipyards could argue that building some of
the Coast Guard’s ASCs in shipyards in Finland can serve as a model for building some ships for
the Navy in foreign shipyards. Opponents of building ships for the Navy in foreign shipyards
could argue that building some of the Coast Guard’s ASCs in shipyards in Finland should be
viewed as a one-time exception to a longstanding pattern of using only U.S. shipyards to build
ships for the U.S. armed services.
64 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) and FF(X) Class Frigate Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
65 See, for example, Rich Abott, “DoD Advisor Confirms Potential To Build Navy Warships Outside U.S. Akin To ICE
Pact,” Defense Daily, December 11, 2025; Howard Altman, “Trump Considering Buying Foreign Ships To Make Up
Gap With China,” The War Zone, April 11, 2025; Song Sang-ho, “Trump Says U.S. May Buy ‘Top-Of-The-Line’
Ships from ‘Close’ Countries,” Yonhap, April 11, 2025; Oh Sam-Gwon, “Korean Shipbuilders Gear Up as Trump
Suggests U.S. May Buy Warships,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 11, 2025; Tom Sharpe, “Trump Plans to Rebuild the
US Navy in Korean Shipyards. We Already Know This Works Well,” Telegraph (UK), January 9, 2025; Morgan
Phillips, “Trump Threatens to Tap Allies for Military Shipbuilding if US Can't Produce,” Fox News, January 7, 2025;
Joe Gould, “Trump Hints Pentagon Could Lean on Allies to Build Warships,” Politico Pro, January 6, 2025.
66 See, for example, Daryl Caudle, “Winning the Long Game: Sustaining Sea Power as Our Enduring Advantage,”
Defense News, December 18, 2025, in which the author—the Chief of Naval Operations—states (emphasis added):
“Until American [ship]yards fully recover from workforce shortages, supply chain fragility and lack of automation, we
are exploring responsible cooperation with allied shipbuilders in places like South Korea and Japan to bridge near-term
gaps in maintenance, repair and production.” See also “U.S. Navy Looks to Korean and Japanese Shipyards to Address
Submarine and Destroyer Delays,” Army Recognition, November 26, 2025; Kim Hyun-soo, “Arms Agency, U.S. Navy
Discuss Cooperation on Naval Shipbuilding, MRO,” Yonhap, August 8, 2025.
67 See, for example, Jennifer Hlad, “Can Partner Nations Help Solve the Navy’s Shipbuilding Woes?” Defense One,
November 24, 2025; Maritime Executive, “South Korean Yards Want to Build U.S. Navy Ships in Korea,” Maritime
Executive, November 16, 2025; Jihoon Yu, “ROK–U.S. Shipbuilding Cooperation Matters for Maritime Power,” Real
Clear World, December 17, 2025; Juliana Liu, “South Korea Is the Answer to America’s Naval Problem,” Bloomberg,
December 4, 2025; Brad Lendon, Gawon Bae, Yoonjung Seo, Mike Valerio, and Charlie Miller, “US Navy
Shipbuilding Is ‘a Mess.’ South Korean companies Think They Can Help Fix It,” CNN, updated October 20, 2025;
William Hawkins, “Trade Is Not What Matters Most,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2025; Namyeon Kwon,
“Don’t Miss the Boat: Considerations for U.S.-South Korea Maritime Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), June 12, 2025; Steve Forbes, “Making Our Navy Supreme Again,” Forbes, May 27,
2025; Arjun Akwei and Jinwan Park, “Trump Wants More Ships? Korea Stands Ready to Help Build Them,” The Hill,
May 8, 2025; Miyeon Oh and Michael Cecire, “Why the United States, South Korea, and Japan Must Cooperate on
Shipbuilding,” RAND, May 6, 2025; “South Korea Offers to Build Five Aegis Destroyers per Year to Help the US
Counter China at Sea,” Army Recognition, April 11, 2025; Fatima Bahtić, “Facing New Realities amid Rising Costs:
Could Future US Navy Warships Be Built at Foreign Shipyards?” NavalToday.com, February 17, 2025; Peter Suciu,
“The 21st Century U.S. Navy Might Be Built in South Korea,” National Interest, January 9, 2025; Brian T. Di Mascio,
“Foreign Shipyards Can Help the U.S. Navy Build Its Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2024; Douglas
Robb, “Japan, South Korea and the US Should Mirror AUKUS for Destroyers,” Defense News, October 5, 2023; Brad
Lendon, “These May Be the World’s Best Warships. And They’re Not American,” CNN, June 3, 2023.
68 See, for example, Rebecca Grant, “6 Reasons to Say ‘No Thanks’ to Building U.S. Navy Warships in South Korea,”
Real Clear Defense, July 30, 2025; Matthew Paxton, “Outsourcing the US Shipyard Industrial Base Will Outsource
American Sovereignty,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2024; Shipbuilders Council of America, “‘We Stand Ready’ Ad
Campaign Shows American Shipbuilders Can Deliver the Fleet of the Future,” undated, accessed January 4, 2026.
Congressional Research Service
27
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Appendix A. Current U.S. Coast Guard Polar
Icebreakers
This appendix provides additional background information on current U.S. Coast Guard polar
icebreakers
Polar Icebreakers
Heavy Polar Icebreaker Polar Star
The heavy polar icebreakers Polar Star (WAGB-10) and Polar Sea (WAGB-11)69 (Figure A-1,
Figure A-2, and Figure A-3) are sister ships built to the same general design. Polar Star is
operational; Polar Sea suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational
since then.
Figure A-1. Polar Star and Polar Sea
(Side by side in McMurdo Sound, Antarctica)
Source: Coast Guard photograph that was accessed on November 19, 2024, at https://web.archive.org/web/
20080917122344/http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcpolarsea/history.asp. The photograph accompanies Kyung M.
Song, “Senate Passes Cantwell Measure to Postpone Scrapping of Polar Sea Icebreaker,” Seattle Times, September
22, 2012, accessed November 19, 2024, at https://web.archive.org/web/20121116160404/http://
69 The designation WAGB means Coast Guard icebreaker. More specifically, W means Coast Guard ship, A means
auxiliary, G means miscellaneous purpose, and B means icebreaker.
Congressional Research Service
28
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/09/22/senate-passes-cantwell-measure-to-postpone-scrapping-ofpolar-sea-icebreaker/.
Figure A-2. Polar Star
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, “U.S. Coast
Guard’s Polar Star Cuts through Ice with help of NSWCPD,” January 23, 2024, accessed April 17, 2024, at
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Media/News/Article-View/Article/3653655/us-coast-guards-polar-star-cuts-throughice-with-help-of-nswcpd/. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to “U.S. Navy photo by Senior
Chief Mass Communication Specialist RJ Stratchko.”
The two ships were procured in the 1970s as replacements for earlier U.S. icebreakers. They were
designed for 30-year service lives, and were built by Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a
division of Lockheed that also built ships for the U.S. Navy, but which exited the shipbuilding
business in the late 1980s.
The ships are 399 feet long and displace about 13,200 tons. They are among the world’s most
powerful nonnuclear-powered icebreakers, with a capability to break through ice up to 6 feet
thick at a speed of 3 knots. Because of their icebreaking capability, they are referred to (in U.S.
parlance) as heavy polar icebreakers. In addition to a crew of 134, each ship can embark a
scientific research staff of 32 people.
Polar Star was commissioned into service in 1976, and consequently is well beyond its originally
intended 30-year service life. Due to worn-out electric motors and other problems, the Coast
Guard placed the ship in caretaker status on July 1, 2006.70 Congress in FY2009 and FY2010
provided funding to repair Polar Star and return it to service for 7 to 10 years. The repair work
70 Source for July 1, 2006, date: U.S. Coast Guard email to CRS on February 22, 2008. The Coast Guard’s official term
for caretaker status is “In Commission, Special.”
Congressional Research Service
29
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
was completed at a reported cost of about $57 million, and the ship was reactivated on December
14, 2012.71
Figure A-3. Polar Sea
Source: Coast Guard photograph that was accessed April 17, 2025, at https://web.archive.org/web/
20160229010100/http://www.uscg.mil/pacarea/cgcpolarsea/img/PSEApics/FullShip2.jpg. The photograph
accompanies Associated Press, “Reprieve for Seattle-Based Icebreaker Polar Sea,” KOMO News, June 15, 2012,
accessed April 17, 2025, at https://komonews.com/news/local/reprieve-for-seattle-based-icebreaker-polar-sea.
Although the Coast Guard in recent years has invested millions of dollars to overhaul, repair, and
extend the service life of Polar Star, the ship’s material condition, as a result of its advancing age,
has nevertheless become increasingly fragile, if not precarious. During its annual deployments to
McMurdo Station in Antarctica, shipboard equipment frequently breaks, and shipboard fires
sometimes occur.72 Replacements for many of the ship’s components are no longer commercially
available. To help keep Polar Star operational, the Coast Guard has used Polar Sea as a source of
replacement parts.
Polar Sea was commissioned into service in 1977, and consequently is also well beyond its
originally intended 30-year service life. In 2006, the Coast Guard completed a rehabilitation
project that extended the ship’s expected service life to 2014. On June 25, 2010, however, the
Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an engine casualty, and the ship was
unavailable for operation after that.73 The Coast Guard placed Polar Sea in commissioned,
inactive status on October 14, 2011. The Coast Guard transferred certain major equipment from
71 See, for example, Kyung M. Song, “Icebreaker Polar Star Gets $57 Million Overhaul,” Seattle Times, December 14,
2012.
72 See, for example, Richard Read, “Meet the Neglected 43-Year-Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial
Complex,” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, “The Only Working US Heavy Icebreaker Catches
Fire Returning from Antarctica,” Arctic Today, March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, “Fire Breaks Out on Coast Guard’s
Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,” Defense Daily, March 1, 2019.
73 “Icebreaker POLAR SEA Sidelined by Engine Troubles,” Coast Guard Compass (Official Blog of the U.S. Coast
Guard), June 25, 2010. See also “USCG Cancels Polar Icebreaker’s Fall Deployment,” DefenseNews.com, June 25,
2010; Andrew C. Revkin, “America’s Heavy Icebreakers Are Both Broken Down,” Dot Earth (New York Times blog),
June 25, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
30
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Polar Sea to Polar Star to facilitate Polar Star’s return to service,74 and, as mentioned above, has
since used Polar Sea as a source of repair parts for Polar Star.
Medium Polar Icebreaker Healy
Healy (WAGB-20) (Figure A-4) was funded in the early 1990s as a complement to Polar Star
and Polar Sea, and was commissioned into service on August 21, 2000.
Figure A-4. Healy
Source: Coast Guard photograph accessed November 19, 2024, at https://www.history.uscg.mil/US-CoastGuard-Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002136680/.
The procurement of Healy was funded largely (about 89%) through the Navy’s shipbuilding
account (i.e., the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN account).75 The ship was built by
74 Source: October 17, 2011, email to CRS from Coast Guard Congressional Affairs office. Section 222 of the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 (H.R. 2838/P.L. 112-213 of December 20, 2012) prohibited the Coast
Guard from removing any part of Polar Sea and from transferring, relinquishing ownership of, dismantling, or
recycling the ship until it submitted a business case analysis of the options for and costs of reactivating the ship and
extending its service life to at least September 30, 2022, so as to maintain U.S. polar icebreaking capabilities and fulfill
the Coast Guard’s high latitude mission needs, as identified in the Coast Guard’s July 2010 High Latitude Study. The
business case analysis was submitted to Congress with a cover date of November 7, 2013. For more on the High
Latitude Study, see Appendix C.
75 The somewhat complicated funding history for the ship is as follows: The Coast Guard’s proposed FY1990 budget
requested $244 million for the acquisition of an icebreaker. The FY1990 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3072/P.L.
101-165 of November 21, 1989) provided $329 million for the ship in the SCN account. (See pages 77 and 78 of
H.Rept. 101-345 of November 13, 1989.) This figure was then reduced by $4.2 million by a sequester carried out under
the Balanced Budget And Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
(H.J.Res. 372/P.L. 99-177 of December 12, 1985). Another $50 million was rescinded by the Dire Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation Administration,
and Other Urgent Needs, and Transfers, and Reducing Funds Budgeted for Military Spending Act of 1990 (H.R.
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
31
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Avondale Industries, a shipyard located near New Orleans, LA, that built numerous Coast Guard
and Navy ships, and which eventually became part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). HII
subsequently wound down shipbuilding activities at Avondale, and the facility no longer builds
ships.
Although it is referred to (in U.S. parlance) as a medium polar icebreaker, Healy is actually larger
than Polar Star and Polar Sea—it is 420 feet long and displaces about 16,000 tons. Compared to
Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy has less icebreaking capability (which is why it is referred to as
a medium polar icebreaker rather than a heavy polar icebreaker), but more capability for
supporting scientific research. The ship can break through ice up to 4½ feet thick at a speed of 3
knots, and embark a scientific research staff of 35 (with room for another 15 surge personnel and
2 visitors). The ship is used primarily for supporting scientific research and conducting other
operations in the Arctic.
Medium Polar Icebreaker Storis (Former Aiviq)
The 360-foot Arctic oil-exploration support ship Aiviq (Figure A-5 and Figure A-6) was built in
2012 to be used by the Royal Dutch Shell oil company in an oil exploration and drilling effort in
Arctic waters off Alaska.
Figure A-5. Storis
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Storis Departs on Maiden
Voyage,” press release dated June 4, 2025. The article credits the photograph to Edison Chouest Offshore.
4404/P.L. 101-302 of May 25, 1990). An additional $59 million for the ship was then appropriated in the FY1992 DOD
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2521/P.L. 102-172 of November 26, 1991). Also, an additional $40.4 million in procurement
funding for the ship was provided through a series of annual appropriations in the Coast Guard’s Acquisition,
Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) account (as it was known prior to FY2019) from FY1988 through FY2001.
The resulting net funding for the ship was thus $374.2 million, of which $333.8 million, or 89.2%, was DOD funding,
and $40.4 million, or 10.8%, was Coast Guard procurement funding. (Source: Undated Coast Guard information paper
provided to CRS by Coast Guard legislative liaison office, March 3, 2016.)
Congressional Research Service
32
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure A-6. Storis
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying U.S. Coast Guard, “USCGC Storis Departs on Maiden
Voyage,” press release dated June 4, 2025. The article credits the photograph to Edison Chouest Offshore.
The ship was owned by Edison Chouest Offshore (ECO) of Cut Off, LA, a firm that operates
more than 200 ships.76 It was used primarily for towing and laying anchors for drilling rigs but
was also equipped for responding to oil spills. The Coast Guard purchased Aiviq under the
Commercially Available Polar Icebreaker (CAPI) program, modified the ship to become a Coast
Guard medium polar icebreaker, and renamed the ship Storis (WAGB-21), in honor of a previous
Coast Guard cutter of that name.
A December 19, 2024, GAO report on Coast Guard acquisition of polar ships states that the ship
is not configured like a traditional Coast Guard polar icebreaker. For example, the Aiviq’s
flight deck is mounted on the front of the icebreaker and not on the back like with other
current or planned Coast Guard polar icebreakers and there is no aircraft hangar.
The Coast Guard is acquiring and modifying the CAPI in two phases separated by a few
years. The first phase will include inspecting and purchasing the polar icebreaker, making
modifications to ensure it can operate in the Arctic, getting needed certifications, painting
it in Coast Guard colors, and placing a commissioned officer in command. The goal of this
phase is to reach initial operational capability to begin Arctic operations within 18 to 24
months after receiving the funding, or by the end of March 2026. The second phase will
entail yet-to-be determined ship modifications to achieve full operational capability 7 years
after the initial operational capability is achieved, or by the end of fiscal year 2033,
according to the Coast Guard’s April 2024 notional schedule. After operating the
icebreaker a few years, the Coast Guard’s acquisition strategy shows that it will achieve
full operational capability after iterative modifications to the ship over the course of up to
5 years. The Coast Guard has yet to determine the extent of these modifications but they
may include consideration of structural work like reconfiguring the helicopter pad and, in
76 For more on ECO, see the firm’s website at https://chouest.com/.
Congressional Research Service
33
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
conjunction with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration requirements, add
scientific capabilities.77
A January 23, 2025, article about the ship states
The icebreaker Aiviq is a gas guzzler with a troubled history. The ship was built to operate
in the Arctic, but it has a type of propulsion system susceptible to failure in ice. Its waste
and discharge systems weren’t designed to meet polar code, its helicopter pad is in the
wrong place to launch rescue operations and its rear deck is easily swamped by big
waves….
The United States urgently needs new icebreakers in an era when climate change is
bringing increased traffic to the Arctic, including military patrols near U.S. waters by
Russia and China. That the first of the revamped U.S. fleet is a secondhand vessel a top
Coast Guard admiral once said “may, at best, marginally meet our requirements” is a sign
of how long the country has tried and failed to build new ones….
The U.S. Coast Guard’s problem with the Aiviq, retired officers told ProPublica, was the
ship’s design. Originally built for oil operations, it had a low, wet deck and a helipad near
its bow, where it would be ill suited for launching rescue operations. Its direct-drive
propulsion system was both less efficient and more likely to get jammed up in ice than the
diesel-electric systems the Coast Guard used….
Former Coast Guard icebreaker captains were reluctant to criticize the purchase of the
Aiviq when contacted by ProPublica, in part because it has taken impossibly long for the
service to build the new heavy icebreakers it says it needs.
“Is the Coast Guard getting the Aiviq a bad thing? No,” said Rear Adm. Jeff Garrett, a
former captain of the Healy icebreaker. But “is it the ideal resource? No.”…
Lawson Brigham78 said he had questions about the Aiviq “since it’s our tax dollars at
work,” but he granted that “it’s bringing some capability into the Coast Guard at a time
when we’re awaiting whenever the shipbuilder can get the first ship out, which is still
unknown.”
[Former Coast Guard Commandant Paul] Zukunft, who retired in 2018, stands by his past
opposition to the Aiviq.
“I remain unconvinced,” he wrote in response to questions from ProPublica, that it “meets
the operational requirements and design of a polar icebreaker that have been thoroughly
documented by the Coast Guard.” By acquiring the Aiviq, “the Coast Guard runs the risk
that those requirements can be compromised.”
In a statement, the Coast Guard described the purchase of the Aiviq as a “bridging strategy”
and said the ship “will be capable of projecting U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic and
conducting select Coast Guard missions.”
The fuel vents that flooded during the [2012] Kulluk accident79 have since been raised, a
Chouest engineer has testified. The Coast Guard did not respond to questions about the
Aiviq’s fuel consumption or whether its waste systems will comply with polar code. It did
not say whether its helicopter deck will be moved aft for safer search-and-rescue
77 Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Further Cost and Affordability Analysis of Polar
Fleet Needed, GAO-25-106822, Q&A Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives, December 19, 2024, pp. 6-7.
78 Brigham is identified earlier in the article as “a former Coast Guard heavy icebreaker commander who has a
doctorate from Cambridge University and has researched polar shipping since the 1980s.”
79 This is a reference to an accident, discussed earlier in the article, that occurred when Aiviq was attempting to tow a
polar drill rig named Kulluk.
Congressional Research Service
34
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
operations. It confirmed that there will be no changes to the propulsion system. “Initial
modifications to the vessel will be minimal,” the statement reads.80
Summary of Above Ships
Table A-1 summarizes the above ships.
Table A-1. Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
Polar Star
(operational) and
Polar Sea
(nonoperational)
Healy
Storis
(former
Aiviq)
Entered service
1976 (Polar Star)
1977 (Polar Sea)
2000
Built in
2012
Length (feet)
399
420
361
Beam (feet)
83.5
82
80
Draft (feet)
31
29.25
28.25
Displacement (tons)
13,200
16,000
n/a
Icebreaking capability (ice thickness
in feet) at 3 knots or other speed
6 feet
4.5 feet
n/a
Icebreaking capability using back and
ram (ice thickness in feet)
21 feet
8 feet
n/a
-60o Fahrenheit
-50o Fahrenheit
n/a
Crew
155a
85b
About 60
Additional scientific staff
32
35c
Operating temperature
Sources: Prepared by CRS using data from U.S. Coast Guard, National Research Council, National Science
Foundation, DHS Office of Inspector General, and (for Palmer) additional online reference sources.
Notes: n/a is not available.
a. Includes 24 officers, 20 chief petty officers, 102 enlisted, and 9 in the aviation detachment.
b. Includes 19 officers, 12 chief petty officers, and 54 enlisted.
c. In addition to 85 crew members and 35 scientists, the ship can accommodate another 15 surge personnel
and 2 visitors.
d. Plus 9 more in a berthing van.
80 McKenzie Funk, “This Icebreaker Has Design Problems and a History of Failure. It’s America’s Latest Military
Vessel,” ProPublica, January 23, 2025.
Congressional Research Service
35
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Appendix B. Design of PSC
This appendix presents additional background information on the design of the PSC.
The horsepower generated by the propulsion plant in the PSC’s design—more than 45,200,
according to a May 7, 2019, press release from Halter Marine81—is roughly one-quarter less than
the 60,000 shaft horsepower of the propulsion plant in the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker,
Polar Star. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 3, however, the PSC’s design includes a centerline
shafted propeller flanked by two azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded propulsors—an arrangement
that, along with other modern icebreaker hull design features, is expected to give the design a
capability for breaking ice comparable to that of Polar Star.
The PSC’s design is considerably larger than the Coast Guard’s current polar icebreakers. As
shown in Table A-1, the Coast Guard’s largest polar icebreaker, Healy, is 420 feet long and has a
full load displacement of 16,000 tons. The 460-foot design for the PSC is 40 feet longer than
Healy, and its 22,900-ton displacement is about 43% greater than Healy’s.
A May 8, 2019, press report states the following:
“We picked the most modern icebreaker that was on the market, soon to be productionlevel design that roughly met the Coast Guard’s requirements, and we took it and modified
it,” [Ron] Baczkowski [the shipyard’s chief executive] said.
“It has a contoured shape. The shape of the hull does the icebreaking. Instead of being a
mass breaking ice, this actually slices the ice. The shape of the hull pushed the broken ice
aside, so it doesn’t interfere with your propulsion systems, with your instrumentation that’s
on the other side of the ship.”
The design of the cutter is optimized for seakeeping to support the long voyage from its
homeport in Washington State to as far away as the Antarctic, he said.
“It’s an optimum design between icebreaking and seakeeping.”
“With the propulsors, with one fixed and two steerable, we were able to optimize the
seakeeping capability so when you’re going on long transits from Washington to Antarctica
the crew is not beat to a pulp or heavily fatigued because of the stability characteristics in
open water.”82
Parent Design Approach
The PSC program is using the parent design approach, meaning that the design of the PSC is
based on an existing icebreaker design. Bidders for the PSC program were required to show a
parent design on which their proposed design was based. A key aim in using the parent design
approach is to reduce cost, schedule, and technical risk in the PSC program. A May 7, 2019, press
release from Halter Marine about its design for the PSC stated the following:
VT Halter Marine is teamed with Technology Associates, Inc. [TAI] as the ship designer
and, for over two years, has participated in the U.S. Coast Guard’s Heavy Polar Icebreaker
Industry Study. The ship design is an evolution from the mature “Polar Stern II” [German
icebreaker] currently in design and construction; the team has worked rigorously to
demonstrate its maturity and reliability. During the study, TAI incrementally adjusted the
design and conducted a series of five ship model tank tests to optimize the design. The
81 Halter Marine press release, “VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, updated
May 29, accessed April 17, 2025, at https://web.archive.org/web/20201028114950/http://vthm.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/Press-Release_USCG-PSC_Singapore-Exchange-FINAL_updatedMay29.pdf.
82 Sam LaGrone, “VT Halter Marine Details Coast Guard Icebreaker Bid,” USNI News, May 8, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
36
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
vessels are 460 feet in length with a beam of 88 feet overall, a full load displacement of
approximately 22,900 long tons at delivery. The propulsion will be diesel electric at over
45,200 horse power and readily capable of breaking ice between six to eight feet thick. The
vessel will accommodate 186 personnel comfortably for an extended endurance of 90 days.
In addition to TAI, VT Halter Marine has teamed with ABB/Trident Marine for its Azipod
propulsion system,83 Raytheon for command and control systems integration, Caterpillar
for the main engines, Jamestown Metal Marine for joiner package, and Bronswerk for the
HVAC system. The program is scheduled to bring an additional 900 skilled craftsman and
staff to the Mississippi-based shipyard.84
The German icebreaker design referred to in Halter Marine’s press release is a design that was
developed for Polar Stern II (also spelled Polarstern II) (Figure B-1),85 a ship that is to be built
as the replacement for Polarstern, Germany’s current polar research and supply icebreaker.86
A May 9, 2019, press report states that the original design for Polarstern II was developed by
Germany’s Ship Design & Consult (SDC), a firm based in Hamburg, Germany, and that
VT Halter’s teammates on the PSC include ship designer Technology Associates, Inc.
(TAI), which has been involved in the design for over two years and has made “a lot of
modifications” in a number of areas to meet Coast Guard requirements, [Ronald
Baczkowski, president and CEO of VT Halter Marine] said. The team went through six
design spirals to refine the design and the major modifications include changes in the hull
form to enhance the ship’s icebreaking capabilities and keep the ice clear from the
propulsors and sensors, habitability improvements for comfort particularly in open water,
easier access to different areas of the ship, and maintenance and endurance capabilities….
Raytheon [RTN] is the integrator for C5I capabilities87 on the ship and the main engines
will be supplied by Caterpillar [CAT]. Switzerland-based ABB and Netherlands-based
Trident are supplying the Azipod propulsion system, Florida-based Jamestown Metal
Marine is supplying the joiner package, and Netherlands-based Bronswerk the heating,
ventilation and cooling system.88
83 ABB is ASEA Brown Boveri, a multinational corporation headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, that is, among other
things, a leading maker of electric-drive propulsion systems for ships. (ASEA is an acronym for Allmänna Svenska
Elektriska Aktiebolaget [i.e., General Swedish Electrical Limited Company], which merged with Brown, Boveri & Cie
[BBC] in 1988 to create ABB.) Azipod is ABB’s term for its azimuthing (i.e., swiveling) podded propulsors.
84 Halter Marine press release, “VT Halter Marine Awarded the USCG Polar Security Cutter,” May 7, 2019, updated
May 29, accessed April 17, 2025, at https://web.archive.org/web/20201028114950/http://vthm.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/Press-Release_USCG-PSC_Singapore-Exchange-FINAL_updatedMay29.pdf. The original (May 7)
version of the press release stated that the design’s full load displacement at delivery would be approximately 33,000
tons. Halter Marine updated the press release on May 29 to provide a corrected figure of 22,900 tons for the design’s
full load displacement.
85 Polarstern is the German word for Polar Star—coincidentally, the same name as the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational
heavy polar icebreaker.
86 For more on Polarstern II, see Alfred-Wegener-Institut (AWI), “The New Polarstern: Contract for New German
Research Icebreaker Awarded,” press release dated December 19, 2024.
87 C5I stands for command, control, communications, computers, collaboration, and intelligence.
88 Calvin Biesecker, “Long-Lead Funding in FY ‘20 for Second Polar Security Cutter Would Help with Planning,
Shipbuilder Says,” Defense Daily, May 9, 2019. Abbreviations for firm names in brackets as in original.
Congressional Research Service
37
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure B-1. Rendering of 2019 SDC Concept Design for Polarstern II
Source: Cropped version of SDC Ship Design & Consult GmbH, design SDC2187, 133m Research Vessel,
accessed November 19, 2024, at http://www.shipdesign.de/html/index.php?navi=3&navi2=80&navi3=115. The
image is enlarged at http://www.shipdesign.de/html/detail.php?id=396.
As shown in Figure B-2, the design for Polarstern II as of December 2024 appears to have
evolved in certain respects from the 2019 design shown in Figure B-1.89
As noted earlier, much of the delay in the delivery date of the first PSC occurred prior to
Bollinger’s November 2022 purchase of Halter. A principal cause of the delay was the time
needed to achieve design maturity (i.e., to complete the detail design of the ship). The parent
design strategy used for the PSC program was intended by the Coast Guard and Navy to reduce
the PSC’s design time. The expected reduction in design time does not appear have been realized.
The time needed to mature the PSC design suggests that the parent design used for the PSC
program—the design for the new German polar icebreaker Polar Stern II—might now more
closely resemble a parent design in name only (PDINO).90 In this regard, the PSC program
appears somewhat similar to the Navy’s Constellation (FFG-62) class frigate program, which the
Navy initiated as a program that would use a parent design, but which observers might now
characterize as having moved over time toward a PDINO situation.91
89 See also Chuck Hill, “‘Elomatic awarded Polarstern 2 icebreaker design contract’—Marine Log / A Little Late for
the Polar Security Cutter,” Chuck Hill’s CG Blog, February 19, 2025.
90 The phrase parent design in name only (with the resulting acronym PDINO) is only one possible shorthand way of
referring to the situation. One possible way to pronounce the acronym PDINO would be pa-DEE-no.
91 For more on the FFG-62 program, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. On the issue of the FFG-62’s parent design strategy, the
report states
An April 2, 2024, press report states: “At one point the Constellation design shared about 85
percent commonality with the original [Italian-French] FREMM [Fregata Europea Multi-Missione
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
38
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Figure B-2. Rendering of 2024 Design for PolarStern II
Source: Cropped version of rendering accompanying Alfred-Wegener-Institut (AWI), “The New Polarstern:
Contract for New German Research Icebreaker Awarded,” press release dated December 19, 2024. The caption
to the rendering credits it to “RV Polarstern New Construction 3D View in Ice (Photo: Alfred-WegenerInstitut/thyssenkrupp Marine Systems).”
Limited numbers of available naval architects and design engineers within the United States also
appear to have contributed to delays in maturing the PSC design. A January 22, 2024, press report
states (emphasis added), “Rear Adm. Chad Jacoby, the assistant commandant of the Coast Guard
for acquisition, said this month workforce challenges—specifically, needing more highly trained
welders and design engineers—are contributing to delays on the Polar Security Cutter program
at Bollinger Mississippi, formerly VT Halter Marine.92
Some observers have questioned the value of using parent designs in military shipbuilding
programs. A 2015 journal article, for example, states
The U.S. Navy has experimented with many approaches to design and build its ships. Using
an existing design as the “parent” design, also referred to as “modified-repeat” design, is
on its face an attractive option. Many acquisition executives, program managers and some
ship design engineers believe that a design based on a parent has fewer technical risks than
a new “clean sheet of paper” design and therefore the time and cost to design and build it
will be reduced. They assume early in the ship acquisition program that “the design is
mature” and because of that fewer problems will be encountered in completing the design
and savings will thus be accrued. Yet, a number of naval ships based on a parent design
have in fact experienced unanticipated cost and schedule growth during construction as
well as technical problems during their in-service life. The authors will examine some of
parent] design, but the alterations [incorporated into the FFG-62 design] have brought that
commonality down to under 15 percent, a person familiar with the changes told USNI News.” If the
FFG-62 design shares less than 15% commonality with the FREMM design, then some observers
might characterize the FFG-62 program as having moved over time toward what might be termed a
parent design in name only (PDINO) design approach.
92 Megan Eckstein, “Coast Guard Ship Programs Facing Delays amid National Worker Shortage,” Defense News,
January 22, 2024.
Congressional Research Service
39
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
these ship designs which were based on an existing design and/or prototypes and highlight
the fallacies of such beliefs and assumptions.93
93 Robert G. Keane Jr. and Barry F. Tibbitts, “The Fallacy of Using a Parent Design: ‘The Design Is Mature,’”
Transactions (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers [SNAME]), 2015, No. 1 (January): 91-104, with
additional discussion from the authors and other commentators on pages 105-122. The quoted passage appears at the
start of the article, on page 91, where it forms part of an abstract or summary for the article.
Congressional Research Service
40
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Appendix C. Required Numbers of U.S. Polar
Icebreakers
This appendix provides additional background information on required numbers of U.S. polar
icebreakers.
2023 Coast Guard Fleet Mix Analysis
As discussed earlier in this report, the Coast Guard testified in April, June, and November 2023
that a new Coast Guard fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight
to nine polar icebreakers, including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium
polar icebreakers, to perform the Coast Guard’s polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in
coming years.94 Prior to this new fleet mix analysis, the Coast Guard had stated that it would need
at least six polar icebreakers, including three heavy polar icebreakers.
Polar Icebreakers Operated by Other Countries as of 2022
In discussions of U.S. polar icebreakers, observers sometimes note the sizes of polar icebreaking
fleets operated by other countries. Table C-1 shows a 2022 Coast Guard summary of major polar
icebreakers around the world. Some observers highlight the difference between the number of
U.S. polar icebreakers and the much larger number of Russian polar icebreakers, and characterize
the situation as an “icebreaker gap.”95 Other observers question the relevance of that comparison
and characterization.96 In considering the number of Russian polar icebreakers, factors that may
94 Spoken testimony, as reflected in CQ hearing transcripts, of
•
Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant of the Coast Guard, at an April 18, 2023, hearing on the Coast
Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, for the total figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers;
•
Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, at a June 21, 2023, hearing before the
same subcommittee on the on the Coast Guard’s emerging challenges and statutory needs, again for the total
figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers; and
•
Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, at a November 29, 2023,
hearing before the House Homeland Security Committee on how U.S. Arctic strategy impacts homeland
security, for both the total figure of eight to nine polar icebreakers and how that total includes four to five
heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers.
95 See, for example, Juliana Wheeler, “How Icebreakers Are Becoming the Litmus Test for the U.S. Arctic Strategy,”
Arctic Today, November 13, 2024; James Stavridis, “Putin Is Crushing the Arctic Ice While the US Is Barely Afloat,”
Bloomberg, July 13, 2024; Mike Glenn, “U.S. Icebreaker Gap with Russia a Growing Concern as Arctic ‘Cold War’
Heats Up,” Washington Times, September 23, 2021; Lin A. Mortensgaard and Kristian Søby Kristensen, “The
‘Icebreaker-Gap’—How US Icebreakers Are Assigned New, Symbolic Roles as Part of an Escalating Military
Competition in the Arctic,” Safe Seas, January 5, 2021; Christopher Woody, “As US Tries to Close ‘Icebreaker Gap’
with Russia, Its Only Working Icebreaker Is Making a Rare Trip North,” Business Insider, November 9, 2020; Peter
Kikkert, Gaps and Bridges: The Case for American Polar Icebreakers, North American Arctic Defence and Security
Network, August 12, 2020, 5 pp.; Marc Lanteigne, “So What Is the ‘Icebreaker Gap’ Anyway?” Over the Circle,
March 3, 2019; Charlie Gao, “The ‘Icebreaker Gap’: How Russia Is Planning to Build More Icebreakers to Project
Power in the Arctic,” National Interest, August 19, 2018; Dermot Cole, “The US Is Finally Picking Up the Pace to
Build a Modern Heavy Icebreaker,” Arctic Today, April 21, 2018; Craig H. Allen Sr., “Addressing the US Icebreaker
Shortage,” Pacific Maritime, December 2017: 30-33; Adam Lemon and Brian Slattery, “Standoff in the Arctic: Closing
the Icebreaker Gap,” Newsweek, August 14, 2016; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Will the US Coast Guard Close the ‘Icebreaker
Gap’?” Diplomat, January 14, 2016; Jen Judson, “The Icebreaker Gap,” Politico, September 1, 2015.
96 See, for example, Peter Rybski, “The Challenge of Counting Icebreakers, The Numerical Gap Is Far Less Important
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
41
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
be considered include the length of Russia’s Arctic coastline and Russia’s use of maritime
transportation along its Arctic coastline to support numerous Russian Arctic communities.
(Russia’s Arctic population is roughly 2 million.97) Countries with interests in the polar regions
have differing requirements for polar icebreakers, depending on the nature and extent of their
polar interests and activities. (The term icebreaker gap is also sometimes used to refer to a
potential gap in time between the end of Polar Star’s service life and the entry into service of the
first PSC, or to discuss options, such as leasing existing icebreakers, for bolstering U.S. polar
icebreaking capability prior to the entry into service of the first PSC.98)
Table C-1. Major Polar Icebreakers as of April 4, 2022
Government owned or operated
PC1, PC2,
or equiv.
6
[+2 unavailable]
Russia
Canada
Finland
United States
PC3, PC4,
or equiv.
22
PC5, PC6,
or equiv.
8
2
7
2 (Healy
and Storis
[former
Aiviq])
4
1
10
2
1 (Polar Star)
[+1
nonoperational
(Polar Sea)]
Sweden
China
Denmark
Norway
Estonia
France
United Kingdom
Japan
Australia
Italy
Latvia
South Korea
South Africa
Argentina
Chile
1
Privately owned and operated
PC1, PC2,
or equiv.
PC3, PC4,
or equiv.
9
PC5, PC6,
or equiv.
6
2 (Sikuliaq
and Palmer)
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total
51
[+2 unavailable]
12
9
5
[+1
nonoperational]
4
4
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
than the Gap between Required and Actual Capabilities,” Sixty Degrees North, October 27, 2025; Keith Johnson, “The
Arctic Great Game Won’t Be Won in U.S. Shipyards, The High North Is an Arena of Great-Power Competition, but
Russia Is the one with Something to Lose,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2024; Robert D. English, “Why an Arctic
Arms Race Would Be a Mistake,” Arctic Today, June 18, 2020; Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean
America Is Losing in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 28, 2019; Chuck Hill, “Horrors, It’s the Icebreaker Gap
(cringe),” Chuck Hill’s CG Blog, December 21, 2017; Jeremy Hsu, “U.S. Icebreaker Fleet Is Overdue for an Upgrade,”
Scientific American, June 1, 2017; Andreas Kuersten, “Icebreakers and U.S. Power: Separating Fact from Fiction,” War
on the Rocks, October 11, 2016; Andreas Kuersten, “The Dangerous Myth of an ‘Icebreaker Gap,’” Defense One,
September 6, 2016; Andrew C. Revkin, “The U.S. Icebreaker Gap Is About Arctic Needs, Not About Chasing Russia,”
New York Times (Dot Earth New York Times Blog), September 1, 2015.
97 For additional discussion, see the “Background” section of CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background
and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
98 See, for example, Liz Ruskin, “Trump Administration May Hire Private Ship to Fill Arctic ‘Icebreaker Gap’ by
Year’s End,” Alaska Public Media, December 14, 2020; GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions[:] Polar Icebreaker Program
Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600, September 2018, summary page; Norton A.
Schwartz and James G. Stavridis, “A Quick Fix for the U.S. ‘Icebreaker Gap,’” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2016.
Congressional Research Service
42
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Government owned or operated
PC1, PC2,
or equiv.
PC3, PC4,
or equiv.
PC5, PC6,
or equiv.
Privately owned and operated
PC1, PC2,
or equiv.
Germany
PC3, PC4,
or equiv.
PC5, PC6,
or equiv.
1
Total
1
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Coast Guard graphic of homeports of major polar icebreakers,
updated April 4, 2022; provided to CRS by U.S. Coast Guard on August 11, 2022. (An earlier version of the
graphic, reflecting data as of May 1, 2017, was posted at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/
20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907 as of September 21, 2022.) The
U.S. Coast Guard states that the vessels shown in the graphic “were selected and organized based on IACS Polar
Class notation [see note below], or best equivalent based on publicly available estimates. All vessels included are
believed to be capable of independent Arctic or Antarctic operations.” The Coast Guard graphic includes the
two unavailable Russian government-owned or -operated PC1 or PC2 icebreakers shown above, but it does not
include the U.S. nonoperational PC1 or PC2 icebreaker Polar Sea, which was added by CRS.
Notes: PC1 through PC6 are IACS (International Association of Classification Societies) classifications for polarclass ships. PC1 through PC5 are ships capable of year-round operation in all polar waters (PC1); moderate
multiyear ice conditions (PC2); second-year ice, which may include multiyear ice inclusions (PC3); thick first-year
ice, which may include old ice inclusions (PC4); or medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions
(PC5). PC6 are ships capable of summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice, which may include old ice
inclusions. (An additional category not shown in the table, PC7, are ships capable of summer/autumn operation
in thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions.) Source: Requirements concerning Polar Class,
International Association of Classification Societies, undated, including Revision 4 of December 2019, Table 1,
entitled Polar Class descriptions, p. I1-2.
June 9, 2020, Presidential Memorandum
On June 9, 2020, President Trump issued a memorandum entitled “Memorandum on
Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions,” which states
To help protect our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, and to retain a
strong Arctic security presence alongside our allies and partners, the United States requires
a ready, capable, and available fleet of polar security icebreakers that is operationally tested
and fully deployable by Fiscal Year 2029. Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct
the following:
Section 1. Fleet Acquisition Program. The United States will develop and execute a polar
security icebreaking fleet acquisition program that supports our national interests in the
Arctic and Antarctic regions.
(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), shall lead a review of requirements for a polar security
icebreaking fleet acquisition program to acquire and employ a suitable fleet of polar
security icebreakers, and associated assets and resources, capable of ensuring a persistent
United States presence in the Arctic and Antarctic regions in support of national interests
and in furtherance of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, as
appropriate. Separately, the review shall include the ability to provide a persistent United
States presence in the Antarctic region, as appropriate, in accordance with the Antarctic
Treaty System. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB, in executing
this direction, shall ensure that the United States Coast Guard’s (USCG) Offshore Patrol
Cutter acquisition program is not adversely impacted.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Secretary of the
Navy, and the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, shall conduct a study of the comparative
operational and fiscal benefits and risks of a polar security icebreaking fleet mix that
Congressional Research Service
43
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
consists of at least three heavy polar-class security cutters (PSC) that are appropriately
outfitted to meet the objectives of this memorandum. This study shall be submitted to the
President, through the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, within 60 days from the date of this memorandum and at a minimum shall
include:
(i) Use cases in the Arctic that span the full range of national and economic security
missions (including the facilitation of resource exploration and exploitation and undersea
cable laying and maintenance) that may be executed by a class of medium PSCs, as well
as analysis of how these use cases differ with respect to the anticipated use of heavy PSCs
for these same activities. These use cases shall identify the optimal number and type of
polar security icebreakers for ensuring a persistent presence in both the Arctic and, as
appropriate, the Antarctic regions;
(ii) An assessment of expanded operational capabilities, with estimated associated costs,
for both heavy and medium PSCs not yet contracted for, specifically including the
maximum use of any such PSC with respect to its ability to support national security
objectives through the use of the following: unmanned aviation, surface, and undersea
systems; space systems; sensors and other systems to achieve and maintain maritime
domain awareness; command and control systems; secure communications and data
transfer systems; and intelligence-collection systems. This assessment shall also evaluate
defensive armament adequate to defend against threats by near-peer competitors and the
potential for nuclear-powered propulsion;
(iii) Based on the determined fleet size and composition, an identification and assessment
of at least two optimal United States basing locations and at least two international basing
locations. The basing location assessment shall include the costs, benefits, risks, and
challenges related to infrastructure, crewing, and logistics and maintenance support for
PSCs at these locations. In addition, this assessment shall account for potential burdensharing opportunities for basing with the Department of Defense and allies and partners, as
appropriate; and
(iv) In anticipation of the USCGC POLAR STAR’s operational degradation from Fiscal
Years 2022-2029, an analysis to identify executable options, with associated costs, to
bridge the gap of available vessels as early as Fiscal Year 2022 until the new PSCs required
to meet the objectives of this memorandum are operational, including identifying
executable, priced leasing options, both foreign and domestic. This analysis shall
specifically include operational risk associated with using a leased vessel as compared to a
purchased vessel to conduct specified missions set forth in this memorandum.
(c) In the interest of securing a fully capable polar security icebreaking fleet that is capable
of providing a persistent presence in the Arctic and Antarctic regions at the lowest possible
cost, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security in
identifying viable polar security icebreaker leasing options, provided by partner nations, as
a near- to mid-term (Fiscal Years 2022-2029) bridging strategy to mitigate future
operational degradation of the USCGC POLAR STAR. Leasing options shall contemplate
capabilities that allow for access to the Arctic and Antarctic regions to, as appropriate,
conduct national and economic security missions, in addition to marine scientific research
in the Arctic, and conduct research in Antarctica in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty
System. Further, and in advance of any bid solicitation for future polar security icebreaker
acquisitions, the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland
Security to identify partner nations with proven foreign shipbuilding capability and
expertise in icebreaker construction.
(d) The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate with the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Homeland Security to continue to provide technical and programmatic support to the
USCG integrated program office for the acquisition, outfitting, and operations of all classes
of PSCs.
Congressional Research Service
44
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
Sec. 2. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair
or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof;
or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or
legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to
the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.99
A September 10, 2020, press report states
The White House dropped a surprise directive in June calling for a new strategy in the High
North, a move applauded by Arctic watchers who've been waiting for an administration to
make the issue a priority….
Yet a month after the report was due to the White House, it’s not clear when, or if, anyone
will see it.
The report, which was to include new designs for a fleet of possibly nuclear-powered
icebreakers, has been submitted to the National Security Council. Yet an NSC
spokesperson did not respond to a query on the timing of a release, and would only say the
report is “under review.”100
A December 3, 2020, press report states
The Coast Guard and its partners are assessing options for additional polar icebreaking
capacity in the next decade beyond current plans pursuant to a directive from the Trump
administration, Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Karl Schultz said on Thursday [December
3].
The Coast Guard’s current polar strategy calls for six new icebreakers, at least three of
them heavy, and one immediately, and now “The good news is there’s been a conversation
beyond the 6-3-1 strategy,” Schultz said during a virtual address hosted by the Navy
League. “The president and his team have pressed us here since this past summer pulling
together the energy of five cabinet level officials and OMB [Office of management and
Budget] about saying, ‘Hey, what does more capacity for high-latitude work between now
and 2029 look like?’”…
The Coast Guard hasn’t looked favorably in the past on leasing options for ice breakers, at
least not as a permanent solution to its polar requirements. But Schultz said leasing could
fill near-term gaps.
“We clearly don’t want to be looking at leasing options as a replacement for the
procurement of ships that are going to serve us for decades to come, but there might be
some bridging strategies and some leasing options,” he said. “So, we’re working really
99 White House, “Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions,” June 9,
2020. For press reports about the memorandum, see, for example, David B. Larter, Joe Gould, and Aaron Mehta,
“Trump Memo Demands New Fleet of Arctic Icebreakers Be Ready by 2029,” Defense News, June 9, 2020; Paul
McLeary, “White House Orders New Icebreaker Strategy For Coast Guard,” Breaking Defense, June 9, 2020; Cal
Biesecker, “Trump Wants Review of Polar Security Cutter Needs in Arctic, Antarctic,” Defense Daily, June 9, 2020.
100 Sarah Cammarata, “Trump’s Arctic Plan Stuck in the Ice,” Politico Pro, September 10, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
45
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
hard on that, answering some deliverables over to the White House and hope we can keep
some momentum.”
A Coast Guard spokesman told Defense Daily following Schultz’s speech that the service
and the Navy “have formed a joint working group to assess available foreign and domestic
vessels that would meet short-term mission needs in the Arctic. The Coast Guard is
continuing to evaluate all options and provide detailed analysis of icebreaker capacity,
lease options, and long-term strategies to protect vital economic and national security
interests in the Polar Regions.”101
A December 16, 2020, press report stated
The White House National Security Adviser and the Navy may be on the verge of agreeing
to move forward shortly with a plan to lease medium polar icebreakers to fill a near-term
gap in the Coast Guard’s icebreaking needs, Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan (R) said last week.
Sullivan, during a Dec. 8 hearing that he chaired that morning on the Coast Guard’s
capabilities in the Arctic, said he spoke earlier that day with White House National Security
Adviser Robert O’Brien, who told him that the U.S. is looking at leasing polar icebreakers
from Finland.
“My understanding is the White House National Security Adviser [and] possibly the Navy
with regard to some of their funding, are looking at moving forward on leases soon,
hopefully as early as the end of this month,” Sullivan told Adm. Charles Ray, vice
commandant of the Coast Guard.
Ray replied that discussions on leasing are part of a presidential directive issued in June,
noting that a joint Coast Guard and Navy group are looking into this.
Later during the hearing, in response to a question from Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) about
potentially buying polar icebreakers from NATO allies or friendly Arctic nations, Ray said
the “The bridging strategy that makes the most sense to the Coast Guard at this point is this
potential to lease one of these icebreakers.”
Ray pointed out to Sullivan that the potential leasing strategy is not in place of the Coast
Guard eventually acquiring new polar icebreakers.
A Coast Guard spokesman on Wednesday told Defense Daily that the exact number if
icebreakers that would be leased hasn’t been determined and “depends on individual vessel
availability and capabilities, crew availability, funding, and other factors.” He also said the
options only included medium icebreakers because no heavy icebreakers are currently
available that meet the service’s minimum requirements.…
The Coast Guard spokesman said a bridging strategy is being examined because the first
PSC won’t begin operations until 2027. Any leased vessels, which potentially could be
domestic or foreign flagged, would operate in the Arctic “to project U.S. sovereignty;
protect vital economic and national security interests; and conduct maritime domain
awareness, search and rescue, and other Coast Guard missions,” he wrote in an email
response to questions.…
Ray said that a key shortfall of leasing commercial polar icebreakers is they aren’t built to
military specifications, highlighting communications, damage control and
compartmentalization in case of an incident.
“They’re a different cat,” Ray said. “We would have to do some work to them. It’s not just,
take one off the shelf. If it was, we probably would have done that a long time ago. So,
there will be some work required to make these for the Coast Guard. But with that said, it
101 Cal Biesecker, “Coast Guard, Partners Assessing Options for More Polar Icebreaking Capacity,” Defense Daily,
December 3, 2020.
Congressional Research Service
46
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
is the commandant’s position and our position we will certainly consider this and work to
see what makes sense to bridge this gap.”102
Coast Guard Statements Prior to 2023 Fleet Mix Analysis
Prior to the Coast Guard’s 2023 fleet mix analysis, Coast Guard officials tended to refer to a total
Coast Guard requirement for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers. For example, in the
October 25, 2016, summary of an RFI that the Coast Guard released the next day to receive
industry feedback on its notional polar icebreaker acquisition approach and schedule, the Coast
Guard states that “the United States Coast Guard has a need for three Heavy Polar Icebreakers
and three Medium Polar Icebreakers with the priority being Heavy Polar Icebreakers.”103 A
requirement for three heavy and three medium polar icebreakers was often abbreviated as 3+3.
Short of a 3+3 requirement, Coast Guard officials sometimes stated that, as a bare minimum
number of heavy polar icebreakers, the Coast Guard needs two such ships. For example, at a
November 17, 2015, hearing before the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats subcommittee
and the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-Vice
Admiral Charles Michel, the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated during the discussion
portion of the hearing that the “Coast Guard needs at least two heavy icebreakers to provide yearround assured access and self-rescueability in the polar regions.”104 Similarly, at a June 14, 2016,
hearing before the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Admiral Michel testified that “our commandant
also testified that we need self-rescue capability for our heavy icebreaker and that includes the
existing Polar Star that we have out there now. So that means at least two [ships], [and] the High
Latitude study says three heavy polar icebreakers is what the Coast Guard’s requirement is. So
that’s kind of where we’re talking about for heavy icebreakers.”105 (The High Latitude Study is
discussed later in this appendix.)
July 2017 National Academies (NASEM) Report
A July 2017 report on the acquisition and operation of polar icebreakers by the National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) that was directed by Congress in
Section 604 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 4188/P.L. 114-120 of February
8, 2016) concluded the following:
INTRODUCTION
The United States has strategic national interests in the polar regions. In the Arctic, the
nation must protect its citizens, natural resources, and economic interests; assure
sovereignty, defense readiness, and maritime mobility; and engage in discovery and
research. In the Antarctic, the United States must maintain an active presence that includes
access to its research stations for the peaceful conduct of science and the ability to
participate in inspections as specified in the Antarctic Treaty. The committee’s charge...
was to advise the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on an assessment of
the costs incurred by the federal government in carrying out polar icebreaking missions
and on options that could minimize lifecycle costs. The committee’s consensus findings
102 Cal Biesecker, “Senator Says Decision Could Come Soon to Lease Icebreakers for Coast Guard,” Defense Daily,
December 16, 2020. See also Liz Ruskin, “Trump Administration May Hire Private Ship to Fill Arctic ‘Icebreaker
Gap’ by Year’s End,” Alaska Public Radio, December 14, 2020.
103
Summary of RFI, October 25, 2016, page 2.
104 Transcript of hearing.
105 Transcript of hearing.
Congressional Research Service
47
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
and recommendations are presented below. Unless otherwise specified, all estimated costs
and prices for the future U.S. icebreakers are expressed in 2019 dollars, since that is the
year in which the contracts are scheduled to be made. Supporting material is found in the
appendices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Finding: The United States has insufficient assets to protect its interests, implement
U.S. policy, execute its laws, and meet its obligations in the Arctic and Antarctic
because it lacks adequate icebreaking capability.
For more than 30 years, studies have emphasized the need for U.S. icebreakers to maintain
presence, sovereignty, leadership, and research capacity—but the nation has failed to
respond.... The strong warming and related environmental changes occurring in both the
Arctic and the Antarctic have made this failure more critical. In the Arctic, changing sea
ice conditions will create greater navigation hazards for much of the year, and expanding
human industrial and economic activity will magnify the need for national presence in the
region. In the Antarctic, sea ice trends have varied greatly from year to year, but the annual
requirements for access into McMurdo Station have not changed. The nation is ill-equipped
to protect its interests and maintain leadership in these regions and has fallen behind other
Arctic nations, which have mobilized to expand their access to ice-covered regions. The
United States now has the opportunity to move forward and acquire the capability to fulfill
these needs....
2. Recommendation: The United States Congress should fund the construction of four
polar icebreakers of common design that would be owned and operated by the United
States Coast Guard (USCG).
The current Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission Need Statement (DHS
2013) contemplates a combination of medium and heavy icebreakers. The committee’s
recommendation is for a single class of polar icebreaker with heavy icebreaking capability.
Proceeding with a single class means that only one design will be needed, which will
provide cost savings. The committee has found that the fourth heavy icebreaker could be
built for a lower cost than the lead ship of a medium icebreaker class....
The DHS Mission Need Statement contemplated a total fleet of “potentially” up to six ships
of two classes—three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Details appear in the High
Latitude Mission Analysis Report. The Mission Need Statement indicated that to fulfill its
statutory missions, USCG required three heavy and three medium icebreakers; each vessel
would have a single crew and would homeport in Seattle. The committee’s analysis
indicated that four heavy icebreakers will meet the statutory mission needs gap identified
by DHS for the lowest cost. Three of the ships would allow continuous presence in the
Arctic, and one would service the Antarctic.
As noted in the High Latitude Report, USCG’s employment standard is 185 days away
from home port (DAFHP) for a single crew. Three heavy icebreakers in the Arctic provide
555 DAFHP, sufficient for continuous presence. In addition, the medium icebreaker USCG
Cutter Healy’s design service life runs through 2030. If greater capacity is required, USCG
could consider operating three ships with four crews, which would provide 740 DAFHP.
The use of multiple crews in the Arctic could require fewer ships while providing a
comparable number of DAFHP. For example, two ships (instead of the recommended
three) operating in the Arctic with multiple crews could provide a similar number of annual
operating days at a lower cost, but such an arrangement may not permit simultaneous
operations in both polar regions and may not provide adequate redundancy in capability.
More important, an arrangement under which fewer boats are operated more often would
require more major maintenance during shorter time in port, often at increasing cost. In
addition, if further military presence is desired in the Arctic, USCG could consider icestrengthening the ninth national security cutter.
Congressional Research Service
48
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
One heavy icebreaker servicing the Antarctic provides for the McMurdo breakout and
international treaty verification. The availability of the vessel could be extended by
homeporting in the Southern Hemisphere. If the single vessel dedicated to the Antarctic is
rendered inoperable, USCG could redirect an icebreaker from the Arctic, or it could rely
on support from other nations. The committee considers both options to be viable and
believes it difficult to justify a standby (fifth) vessel for the Antarctic mission when the
total acquisition and lifetime operating costs of a single icebreaker are projected to exceed
$1.6 billion. Once the four new icebreakers are operational, USCG can reasonably be
expected to plan for more distant time horizons. USCG could assess the performance of
the early ships once they are operational and determine whether additional capacity is
needed.
USCG is the only agency of the U.S. government that is simultaneously a military service,
a law enforcement agency, a marine safety and rescue agency, and an environmental
protection agency. All of these roles are required in the mission need statement for a polar
icebreaker. USCG, in contrast to a civilian company, has the authorities, mandates, and
competencies to conduct the missions contemplated for the polar icebreakers. Having one
agency with a multimission capability performing the range of services needed would be
more efficient than potentially duplicating effort by splitting polar icebreaker operations
among other agencies.
The requirement for national presence is best accomplished with a military vessel. In
addition, USCG is fully interoperable with the U.S. Navy and the nation’s North Atlantic
Treaty Organization partners. USCG is already mandated to operate the nation’s domestic
and polar icebreakers. Continuing to focus this expertise in one agency remains the logical
approach....
Government ownership of new polar icebreakers would be less costly than the use of lease
financing (see Appendix C). The government has a lower borrowing cost than any U.S.based leasing firm or lessor. In addition, the lessor would use higher-cost equity (on which
it would expect to make a profit) to cover a portion of the lease financing. The committee’s
analysis shows that direct purchase by the government would cost, at a minimum, 19
percent less than leasing on a net present value basis (after tax). There is also the risk of
the lessor going bankrupt and compromising the availability of the polar icebreaker to
USCG. For its analysis, the committee not only relied on its extensive experience with
leveraged lease financing but also reviewed available Government Accountability Office
reports and Office of Management and Budget rules, examined commercial leasing
economics and current interest rates, and validated its analysis by consulting an outside
expert on the issue....
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.