Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportApr 2, 2009

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on

March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and

destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists.

Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of

helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and

foster economic development.

In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of

the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek

management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on

January 1, 2009, which confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a

new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the

agreement a “watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding

down.” U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the

focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations,

including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and

governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina,

President Obama delivered a speech addressing “how the war in Iraq will end,” in which he

announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of

the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism

operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel.

The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including

some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors,

who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance,

and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan

Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially

more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is

likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the

operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the insurgency; and at the strategic level,

in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide

good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people.

Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the

111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq

and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of

the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more

traditional bilateral relationship.

This report is intended to provide background and analysis of current developments and options,

and will be updated as events warrant.

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Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1

Background ............................................................................................................................... 1

Revised U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership................................................................................... 3

Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement................................................. 3

Security Agreement Provisions........................................................................................... 3

Drawdown and Transition ......................................................................................................... 4

Current Strategic and Operational Dynamics............................................................................ 8

Current Strategic Dynamics: Tests and “Spoilers” ............................................................ 8

Current Operational Dynamics: Transitions ....................................................................... 9

Diminishing U.S. Leverage................................................................................................11

Future Strategic Considerations ...............................................................................................11

Clarifying and Updating U.S. Interests and Strategic Objectives ......................................11

Applying Strategic Leverage ............................................................................................ 12

Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Relationship with Iraq........................................................... 13

Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq................................................ 13

Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the Force........................... 14

Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination ........................................................ 15

Future Operational Considerations.......................................................................................... 16

How Much Help Is Enough?............................................................................................. 16

Further Troop Drawdowns................................................................................................ 17

Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission ....................................................... 18

Transition Teams......................................................................................................... 18

Unit Partnering ........................................................................................................... 19

Capacity-Building....................................................................................................... 19

ISF Training and Advising Under Transition.............................................................. 20

Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint .................................................................................. 20

Coordination on Operations under the Security Agreement ............................................. 21

Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities......................................................................... 24

Role of Contractors ........................................................................................................... 25

Equipment......................................................................................................................... 26

Options Available to Congress ................................................................................................ 27

Structure and Aim of the Report ............................................................................................. 28

Decision to Go to War in Iraq........................................................................................................ 28

Antecedents in the 1990s ........................................................................................................ 29

Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations............................................... 29

Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein................................................................................................ 30

War Planning ................................................................................................................................. 31

Strategic Objectives................................................................................................................. 31

Military Objectives.................................................................................................................. 32

Planning for Major Combat .................................................................................................... 32

Post-War Planning................................................................................................................... 35

Inter-Agency Post-War Planning ...................................................................................... 36

Military Post-War Planning .............................................................................................. 38

Organizational Decisions .................................................................................................. 39

Major Combat Operations ............................................................................................................. 40

Early Infiltration...................................................................................................................... 40

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The Launch.............................................................................................................................. 40

The Ground Campaign............................................................................................................ 41

Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat...................................................................................... 43

End of Major Combat.............................................................................................................. 44

Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization ................................................................................ 45

Legal Basis for Coalition Presence ......................................................................................... 45

Formal Occupation............................................................................................................ 45

Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force............................................................................ 45

Security Agreement........................................................................................................... 47

Coalition Command Relationships.......................................................................................... 47

Post-Major Combat: The Force ..................................................................................................... 48

Structure and Footprint............................................................................................................ 48

U.S. Forces in Iraq .................................................................................................................. 49

Coalition Partner Forces.......................................................................................................... 51

Post-Major Combat: Security Situation......................................................................................... 52

Major Sources and Forms of Violence .................................................................................... 52

Sunni Extremism............................................................................................................... 52

Shi’a Extremism ............................................................................................................... 54

Nature of Sectarian Violence ............................................................................................ 57

Criminality ........................................................................................................................ 57

Other Security Challenges....................................................................................................... 57

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) ....................................................................................... 58

Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) ............................................................................................... 58

Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations................................................................. 60

Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict............................................................................. 60

Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation ............................................................ 61

Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II)..................................................................................... 63

Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar............................................................................................... 65

“Clear, Hold, Build”................................................................................................................ 67

Operation Together Forward ................................................................................................... 68

New Way Forward .................................................................................................................. 69

“New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case ........................................... 69

Surge Forces...................................................................................................................... 70

Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case .................................................................... 71

Surge Operations in 2007.................................................................................................. 73

Baghdad Security Plan................................................................................................ 73

“Phoenix” Series of Corps-Level Operations ............................................................. 74

Military Operations in 2008.............................................................................................. 75

The Fight Against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Elements in the North ............................. 75

The Fight Against Shi’a Extremists in the South........................................................ 77

Counter-IED Efforts.......................................................................................................... 80

Special Operations Forces................................................................................................. 81

Air Power.......................................................................................................................... 81

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ............................................................................................................ 83

Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces ........................................................................... 83

ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation .............................................................. 84

Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq ................... 85

ISF Training: Theory of the Case............................................................................................ 86

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ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities .................................................. 87

ISF Training: Transition Teams............................................................................................... 88

Interior Ministry Transition Teams ................................................................................... 89

Defense Ministry Transition Teams .................................................................................. 90

ISF Training: Unit Partnering.................................................................................................. 92

Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers ....................................................................................... 93

Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results ......................................................................... 94

Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole ...................................................................................... 95

Iraqi Army......................................................................................................................... 98

Iraqi Air Force................................................................................................................. 102

Iraqi Navy ....................................................................................................................... 104

Iraqi Special Operations Forces ...................................................................................... 104

Iraqi Police Service......................................................................................................... 105

Iraqi National Police ....................................................................................................... 107

Department of Border Enforcement................................................................................ 108

Oil Police ........................................................................................................................ 109

Ministry of the Interior.....................................................................................................110

Ministry of Defense .........................................................................................................111

Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation” ...............................................................................................112

Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected....................................................................................113

“Awakening” Movements ......................................................................................................114

Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar...........................................................115

Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North .........................................................116

Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South .........................................................116

Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) .......................................................................117

Composition of the “Sons of Iraq”...................................................................................117

Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement .........................................................................118

The “Sons of Iraq” System ..............................................................................................118

Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force........................................... 120

Iraqi Government and Other Views of the “Sons of Iraq” .............................................. 120

“Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs.............................................................. 121

GoI Assumption of Responsibility for the SoIs .............................................................. 123

Detainee Operations .............................................................................................................. 124

Accountability................................................................................................................. 124

“COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program.................................................................... 125

Detainee Releases ........................................................................................................... 125

Civil/Military Partnership in Governance and Economics......................................................... 127

Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background .................................................................... 127

Provincial Reconstruction Teams.......................................................................................... 128

Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units................................................................... 130

Military Role in Governance and Economics ....................................................................... 132

Governance ..................................................................................................................... 132

Economics....................................................................................................................... 134

Assessing Security Trends........................................................................................................... 136

Security Situation by the Metrics .......................................................................................... 136

Overall Attacks ............................................................................................................... 136

Iraqi Civilian Deaths ....................................................................................................... 137

Weapons Caches ............................................................................................................. 137

High-Profile Attacks ....................................................................................................... 138

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Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)............................................................................ 138

Explaining the Security Gains............................................................................................... 139

Additional CRS Reports .............................................................................................................. 140

Figure 1.Map of Iraq ................................................................................................................... 141

Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of October 31, 2008 .................................................................. 93

Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 142

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In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of

the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek

management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement that went into effect on

January 1, which confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the US-led coalition military operation in Iraq—and in USIraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the Agreement a “watershed, a

firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.”1 U.S. military

commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military

efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building.

On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech

addressing “how the war in Iraq will end,” in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat

forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and

advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism, and providing force protection for

U.S. personnel.2

The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including

some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq as of March 2009, in addition to civilian experts and

U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of

security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S.

Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in

Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish,

U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue.3 The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still

faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering threads of the insurgency;

and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving

its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for

the Iraqi people.

Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the

111th Congress, include identifying which U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq

and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of

the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more

traditional bilateral relationship.

OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the George W. Bush

Administration, was to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime, including destroying its ability to use

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27,

2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337.

President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February

27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/.

See David Ignatius, “A Farewell Warning on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 18, 2009; and Secretary of Defense

Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337.

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weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term

objective included helping Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”4 In October 2002,

Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security

of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant

United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”5

After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more

open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a

system of governance, and foster economic development. Over time, challenges to the emerging

Iraqi leadership from homegrown insurgents and some foreign fighters mounted. Sectarian

violence grew, catalyzed by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.

In January 2007, in an attempt to reverse the escalation of violence, President Bush announced a

new strategic approach, the “New Way Forward,” including a “surge” of additional U.S. forces,

together with additional civilian experts. The troop surge included five Army brigade combat

teams (BCTs), a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine battalions. More

importantly, most observers agree, Ambassador Crocker and the Commanding General of MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General David Petraeus, institutionalized counterinsurgency

approaches across the force and the U.S. effort as a whole. Those approaches emphasized

population security, empowering the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through close partnership, and

building GoI capacity to govern and foster economic development in order to capitalize on

security gains.

Over the course of the surge, observers generally agreed, security conditions on the ground

improved markedly. In August 2008, GEN Petraeus agreed that there had been “significant

progress” but argued that it was “still not self-sustaining.” “We’re not celebrating,” he

commented, and there are “no victory dances in the end zone.”6

Practitioners and observers have identified a number of factors that may have contributed to the

security improvements, including the additional surge forces; new and institutionalized counterinsurgency approaches concerning population security and reconciliation; the application of highend technological capabilities by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and closer integration between

SOF and conventional forces; the accumulated experience of U.S. leaders at all levels after

multiple tours in Iraq; the growing numbers and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces; the

ground-up rejection of violence and support for the coalition by many Sunni Arabs; and the

ceasefire declared by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the abandonment of violence by many of

his followers.

While conventional, force-on-force wars tend to end with the unequivocal defeat of one party, the

parameters for “mission success” in counter-insurgency efforts like OIF tend to be less definitive

See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that included a 48-hour ultimatum

to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html.

See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res. 114, Section 3(a), signed

into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L. 107-243). The Senate vote was 77-23, and the House vote 296-133.

Rod Nordland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus, Newsweek, August 21, 2008. On

September 16, 2008, GEN Petraeus relinquished command of MNF-I to Army General Raymond Odierno, a former

Commanding General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operational-level command under MNF-I whose area

of responsibility includes all of Iraq. On October 31, 2008, GEN Petraeus assumed command of U.S. Central

Command, to which MNF-I reports.

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and more subject to qualitative interpretation. OIF appears poised to end with policy decisions by

the U.S. and/or Iraqi governments, rather than with a decisive military victory on the battlefield.

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On November 17, 2008, U.S. and Iraqi officials signed two key new agreements, designed to

define the terms of their future partnership at the strategic and operational levels. On November

27, the Iraqi parliament voted its support for the two agreements, and on December 4, the Iraqi

Presidency Council approved them.7

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The first document was the broad Strategic Framework Agreement, designed to provide a basis

for future cooperation in multiple fields including diplomacy, culture, economics and energy,

health and the environment, information technology, and law enforcement. This Agreement was

based broadly on a declaration of principles, signed by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister

Nouri al-Maliki, on November 27, 2007.8

The second document, the Security Agreement, was similar to a status of forces agreement

(SOFA). It was the product of a contentious negotiations process that began in spring 2008. It

elaborated the terms of the bilateral security partnership at the operational level, and provided the

legal basis for the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. When approving the two agreements, the Iraqi

parliament made the Security Agreement subject to a popular referendum, scheduled to be held

by July 2009. The Agreement went into effect on January 1, 2009, at the expiration of the United

Nations mandate that had provided the legal basis for the presence of the multi-national force in

Iraq.9

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The Security Agreement underscored both Iraqi sovereignty and the “temporary” nature of the

U.S. military presence, and it imposed a number of constraints on the presence and operations of

U.S. forces. It provided for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and towns

by June 30, 2009, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011.10

This language was a stricter version of earlier drafts that reportedly had provided for time

“horizons” or target dates.

In the United States, the Bush Administration carried out “consultations” with key Members of Congress on the

operationally-focused draft agreement. The Administration’s stated position was that the document was not a treaty and

therefore did not require formal congressional approval.

The formal title of the document is “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and

Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq,” and it is available at the White House

website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SFA.pdf. See also the “Declaration of Principles for a LongTerm Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America,”

November 26, 2007, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html.

The document, formally entitled, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the

Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence

in Iraq,” is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf. The current UN resolution, UN

Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007), December 18, 2007, is available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/

GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?OpenElement.

“SOFA,” Article 24, para.1,2.

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The Security Agreement stipulated that the United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea or air as a

“launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.”11 The Strategic Framework

Agreement, which echoed this language, also provided that the United States shall not seek a

“permanent military presence” in Iraq. The negotiations process reportedly considered various

formulations regarding external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty. The agreed language, in the Security

Agreement, required bilateral consultations in case of such a threat, but made no other actions

compulsory.12

The Security Agreement required that U.S. forces coordinate all military operations with Iraqi

authorities.13 It tightly constrained the role of U.S. forces in detaining Iraqis and mandated the

transfer of current detainees to Iraqi custody. 14 It also granted Iraq some legal jurisdiction over

U.S. servicemembers and defense civilians – specifically, in cases of “grave, premeditated

felonies” committed off base and “outside duty status.”15 As senior officials on the ground have

underscored, the Security Agreement acknowledged that many of its provisions would require

further interpretation. To that end, it established a committee structure to provide implementation

guidance.16

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On February 27, 2009, at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, President Obama announced “a

new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility.”17 The setting

for the speech quietly echoed its theme of transition. U.S. Marines entered Iraq at the start of OIF

and helped lead both major combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Recently, senior

Marine Corps officials have argued that significantly increasing the Marine deployment to

Afghanistan will require drawing down in Iraq—“during calendar year 2010.”18

The President’s policy calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by August 31, 2010.

That decision marked the culmination of a comprehensive strategic review of Iraq war efforts that

“SOFA,” Article 27, para.3. See also strategic framework agreement, Section 1, para.4.

See “SOFA” Article 27, para 1: “In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq that would

violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its

elected institutions, and upon request by the Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic

deliberations and as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic,

economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat.”

“SOFA,” Article 4, para.2.

“SOFA,” Article 22.

“SOFA,” Article 12, para.1.

The “SOFA” mandates the formation of a Joint Ministerial Committee tasked to address interpretation and

implementation of the agreement. That body is tasked to appoint a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee

(JMOCC) to oversee military operations. It is also tasked to appoint a separate Joint Committee—which may in turn

appoint Subcommittees—to oversee issues outside the competence of the JMOCC. See “SOFA” Article 23.

President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February

27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/.

The “2010” timeline is attributed to senior logistics official at U.S. Central Command Terry Moores, in Chelsea J.

Carter, “Road Map out of Iraq Takes Shape,” Seattle Times, March 2, 2009. Commandant of the Marine Corps General

James Conway stated in a January 2009 speech, before President Obama’s Afghanistan troop increase announcement:

“My belief is that by the middle of the year, you’ll see a significant number of Marines in Afghanistan. Those must of

necessity come from Iraq.” See Otto Kreisher, “Marine Commandant Expects Troop Surge in Afghanistan,” National

Journal, January 15, 2009.

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President Obama ordered on his first full day in office. Military commanders were reportedly

asked to review alternative 16-month, 19-month, and 23-month timeline options for the

withdrawal of U.S. combat forces. The announced withdrawal timeline will mark 18 months

from the time of the announcement, and approximately 19 months from the Inauguration—

slightly longer than the 16-month timeline suggested by then-Senator Obama during the

presidential campaign.

According to the new policy, after August 2010, the U.S. forces’ focus in Iraq will shift to a threepronged mission: training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi security forces (ISF); conducting

targeted counter-terrorism operations; and providing force protection for both civilian and

military personnel. That so-called “transitional force” will initially included between 35,000 and

50,000 troops. All remaining U.S. forces are expected to be withdrawn by the end of 2011, in

accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement.

At the time of the announcement, there were approximately 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq,

including 14 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) or equivalents, as well as a significantly larger

number of support forces.19 On March 8, 2009, Administration officials announced that 12,000

U.S. troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by September 2009.20 Administration

officials have suggested that between 10 and 12 BCTs would remain on the ground at the time of

Iraq’s national elections tentatively planned for the end of 2009.

The key components of the “transitional force” are expected to be “Advise and Assist Brigades”

(AABs).21 Some officials have suggested an initial target figure of six AABs but have noted that

the number could be adjusted. Officials have explained that each AAB will be built on the

chassis, or foundation, of a BCT, and it will be augmented with capabilities required for the

stability operations-focused mission in Iraq, including training and advisory capabilities and

significant enablers. Each unit is expected to prepare and train as an organic whole before

deploying. AABs are expected to work closely with U.S. civilian counterparts, including

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); those relationships, including co-location and the

degree and kind of support provided to civilian efforts, is likely to vary geographically across

Iraq.

The troop withdrawal policy does not imply that no further deployments of U.S. military units to

Iraq will take place. Some U.S. units schedule to redeploy from Iraq in the near term will be

replaced by fresh U.S. units. In addition, some units may end up serving shorter tours in Iraq than

the now-standard 12 months of “boots on the ground.”

The drawdown and transition plans are expected to include a consolidation of three key military

headquarters in Iraq: Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the overall strategic-level command

currently led by General Raymond Odierno; Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operationallevel command led since April 4, 2009, by Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby and Ft. LewisWashington-based I Corps; and Multi-National Security Transition-Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I),

led by Lieutenant General Frank Helmick. Some officials have suggested that the headquarters

consolidation is likely to take place after the Iraqi national elections, but well before the August

2010 transition. The new entity is expected to be significantly smaller in terms of personnel. The

For the purposes of rough calculation, a BCT can be said to include about 3,500 Soldiers. In Iraq, BCT headquarters

have sometimes had command of additional units, giving total BCT force sizes of up to 5,000.

Anthony Shadid, “12,000 U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq,” Washington Post, March 9, 2009.

Emily S. Rueb, “Gates Defends Iraq Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, March 2, 2009.

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consolidation would reflect not only an elimination of redundancy, but also, as one official

described it, discretely “choosing not to do some things.”22

The Obama Administration’s drawdown and transition policy was widely considered to reflect a

compromise between two broad schools of thought—advocates, respectively, of a relatively

gradual or a relatively accelerated drawdown. Many observers have suggested that the policy

splits the difference by maintaining a relatively robust force on the ground through the political

hurdles of 2009, which preparing to draw U.S. forces down relatively rapidly in 2010.

One school of thought, which included many military commanders, supported a relatively longer

timetable.23 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged, “I think that, if the commanders

had complete say in this matter, that they would have preferred that the combat mission not end

until the end of 2010.”24 One key concern was reportedly a desire to retain a robust force through

the Iraqi political hurdles of 2009 to ensure their success and their ability to serve as catalysts of

further stabilization. In December 2008, U.S. military commanders reportedly had recommended

beginning the drawdown slowly, by withdrawing two BCTs over the first six months of 2009.25

Before the President’s policy announcement, GEN Odierno, MNF-I Commanding General, stated,

“I believe that if we can get through the next year peacefully, with incidents about what they are

today or better, I think we’re getting close to enduring stability, which enables us to really

reduce.”26

Proponents of a gradual approach also argued that it is important to take every remaining

opportunity to train, advise, and mentor the Iraqi security forces (ISF). MNSTC-I Commanding

General LTG Helmick commented in February 2009 that the ISF still had “a long way to go.” He

argued that if they continue to focus on logistics—their “Achilles heel”—and there are no major

surprises from the enemy, then the ISF could have “a sustained ground capability to fight the

insurgency” by the end of 2011.27

Some military commanders were also reportedly concerned that any significant drawdown would

be complicated and would require substantial time and attention from U.S. military leadership on

the ground. They urged delaying the bulk of the drawdown until 2010, to allow MNF-I to focus

primarily on its substantive mission in 2009.

The other broad school of thought urged the adoption of a relatively accelerated timeline. Some

advocates of an accelerated timeline sought simply to end the U.S. military commitment in Iraq

as soon as reasonably possible. Other proponents of this school argued that the U.S. troop

presence in Iraq—and the antipathy that might be generated among the Iraqi population by the

presence of a de facto occupier—could be hindering further progress. Announced troop

Interviews with MNF-I officials, February, March 2009.

MNF-I officials, Interviews, February 2009.

Remarks by Secretary Gates on Meet the Press, cited in Sean Lengell, “Gates: Pullout Timeline Workable,”

Washington Times, March 2, 2009.

See Elisabeth Bummiller and Thom Shanker, “Generals Propose a Timetable for Iraq,” The New York Times,

December 18, 2008; and Elisabeth Bummiller and Thom Shanker, “Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, are Preparing

for a Faster Iraq Withdrawal,” The New York Times, January 15, 2009.

Peter Baker and Alissa J. Rubin, “Obama Seeks Accord with Military on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 29, 2009.

GEN Odierno added, “The longer we go, if we get through the elections, we get closer and closer to not being able to

backslide.”

Andrew England and Demetri Sevastopulo, “US General Stresses Need for Time,” Financial Times, February 17,

2009.

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withdrawal plans, it was argued, could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to accelerate

their own efforts to assume more responsibility and make progress toward reconciliation, and by

urging international partners to increase their constructive involvement.28 They stressed that it

would be particularly helpful to reduce the visible presence of U.S. combat forces before the rest

of the political “hurdles” Iraq faces in 2009, to reduce the risk that the U.S. presence might

become the target of politically-motivated rhetoric and opposition.29

Some accelerated timeline advocates underscored the strain that simultaneous war efforts in Iraq

and Afghanistan have placed on U.S. military forces—a strain likely to grow as the United States

increases troop deployments to Afghanistan in 2009.30 The high demand for forces for the

ongoing U.S. troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan has meant, for many servicemembers,

repeated deployments, extended deployments, and/or short “dwell times” at home between tours.

Military Departments, responsible in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, for “organizing,

manning, training and equipping” the force, and some key observers, have expressed concerns

about the stress these demands have placed, and may continue to place, on the force.31 Over time,

DOD has introduced a series of policies designed to manage that stress—for example, limiting

active duty Army deployments to 12 months for those deploying after August 1, 2008.

Some observers from each school of thought have expressed concerns about the Obama

Administration policy. At the time of the policy announcement, some Democratic Party leaders

in Congress, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi,

questioned the need for a residual force as large as 50,000 troops.32 Some gradualists, in turn,

See for example Kevin Benson, “Shift the Debate on Iraq from ‘When’ to ‘How,’” Atlanta Journal-Constitution,

August 12, 2007. Colonel Benson was the lead OIF planner for CFLCC.

For example, several days before the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki

told a political rally that he believed that the timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq “will be brought

forward,” earlier than the deadline specified in the security agreement. See Robert H. Reid, “Iraqi Leader Predicts

Faster U.S. Withdrawal,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 27, 2009.

On February 17, 2009, President Obama announced approval of DOD requests to deploy approximately 17,000

additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Those troops were scheduled to include the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(MEB), from Camp Lejeune, NC, in late spring; the 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, from Ft. Lewis, WA, in

mid-summer; and approximately 5,000 enablers. See President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on

Afghanistan,” The White House, February 17, 2009, available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/; and DOD News Releases,

“DoD Announces Afghanistan Troop Deployment,” February 17, 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12493. Two further troop increases had previously been

approved: the deployment of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, which took place in January and

February 2009; and the deployment of the combat aviation brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, who began deploying

in March 2009. On March 27, 2009, announcing the new U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama

stated that an additional 4,000 U.S. troops would deploy to Afghanistan to train and advise the Afghan National

Security Forces.

In a December 2007 assessment, retired General Barry McCaffrey advocated a reduction in the U.S. deployment to

Iraq – down to 12 BCTs by January 2009 – due to stress on the force. He commented that “The Army is starting to

unravel,” pointing to current recruiting campaigns that are bringing on board “those who should not be in uniform” due

e.g. to drug use or criminality; to the loss of mid-career officers and NCOs; and to the “stretched and under-resourced”

Reserve Component. See General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11 December

2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on

January 16, 2008.

Speaker Pelosi commented, “I don’t know what the justification is for …a presence of 50,000 troops in Iraq.” See

Emily S. Rueb, “Gates Defends Iraq Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, March 2, 2009. When the White House

provided a pre-briefing to Congressional leaders, ahead of the public announcement of the new policy, Majority Leader

Reid noted, “I am happy to listen to the Secretary of Defense, the President, but when they talk about 50,000, that’s a

(continued...)

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urged the Administration to remain flexible about the timeline in execution, cautioning that “it

cannot be carried out rigidly” and urging a readiness to “slow the pace next year if necessary.”33

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The Obama Administration announced its Iraq transition policy, and the U.S.-Iraqi Security

Agreement came into force, against a backdrop of ongoing strategic-level challenges to the

Government of Iraq, and multiple operational-level transitions in the counter-insurgency effort.

ȱȱ¢ǱȱȱȱȱȃȄȱ

Most observers agree that the GoI faces several major tests in 2009. These began with the

provincial elections held in most parts of the country on January 31, 2009, and are also scheduled

to include district-level elections in June; a national referendum on the security agreement in July;

and national-level elections at the end of the year. These events carry some risk of unrest, but,

many observers contend, should these hurdles be cleared safely and successfully, they might

serve to further catalyze the consolidation of the Iraqi state.

In addition, the GoI still faces several persistent strategic challenges – potential “spoilers” – that

could disrupt not only security conditions on the ground but also progress toward a unified and

stable Iraq.

One major challenge, increasingly prominent in 2009, is a portfolio of tensions and competing

claims in “the north,” particularly between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. The set of related issues

includes resolving the political status of the multi-ethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, together with

other “disputed territories” along the Green Line that divides the Kurdistan Regional Government

(KRG) from the rest of Iraq.34 The problems are complicated by the forced resettlement policies

of Saddam’s regime, which moved Kurds out of their homes and resettled Arabs in those areas;

and by Kurdish efforts in the post-Saddam era to reclaim those areas. Further, the KRG and GoI

continue to dispute the proper dispensation of oil revenues generated by the areas rich oil

reserves. While Kirkuk city itself has been relatively calm, coalition and Iraqi officials in Kirkuk

have noted with concern that outside players with strong vested interests, including ethnically

based Iraqi political parties, and Turkey-based supporters of Iraqi Turkmen, sometimes use

inflammatory language to stir up tensions in the city.35 Elsewhere, violence has flared—in 2008,

Iraqi security forces skirmished with KRG peshmerga forces in the restive town of Khanaquin, in

(...continued)

little higher number than I had anticipated.” See Major Garrett, “Obama Sets 2010 Timetable for Iraq Withdrawal,”

Fox News, February 26, 2009.

See Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraq’s Year of Living Dangerously,” New York Times, February

26, 2009.

In a recent interview, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, asked

about his biggest worry for the future of Iraq, stated: “If I had to choose which one keep me awake at night, it is the

disputed areas, because tension between Arabs and Kurds.” See Monte Morin and Tina Susman, “16 Killed in Suicide

Attack in Northern Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2009.

Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, and with the Governor of at Ta’amin province (of

which Kirkuk is the capital), August 2008. U.S. commanders describe a summer 2008 visit to Kirkuk by the Iraqi

Minister of Defense, who was reportedly surprised to discover, in contrast to information he had received, that there

were not “two Kurdish pesh merga divisions” in Kirkuk.

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Diyala province, on the GoI side of the Green Line.36 The year 2009 is likely to prove pivotal in

this ongoing set of debates. UNAMI is expected to present a comprehensive set of

recommendations for resolving tensions in the north, as a basis for discussion. Provincial

elections, held elsewhere on January 31, 2009, remain to be scheduled for At Ta’amin province,

which includes Kirkuk.

A second major challenge concerns how effectively Sunni Arabs, are incorporated socially,

economically, and politically into the Iraqi polity. Sunni Arabs, who are concentrated in western

and central Iraq, were a disproportionately privileged minority under Saddam’s rule but lost much

of that status after regime change. The provincial elections held on January 31, 2009, marked a

positive step, by increasing Sunni Arab political representation at the provincial level. A

particular concern is the ongoing integration of members of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) “community

watch” program. A majority of the SoIs were Sunni Arabs—including some former insurgents—

and key Shiite officials in the GoI were long wary of the SoI program. On October 1, 2008, the

GoI began assuming responsibility for the SoIs, including paying their salaries, and this transition

was expected to be completed by April 2009.

The integration of former SoIs into the Iraqi security forces and civilian jobs has proceeded very

slowly, and participants have reported serious delays in the payment of salaries. Some

practitioners and observers have expressed concerns about the possible security repercussions if

the GoI were to shut down the program, cease paying salaries, or fail to secure alternative

employment for the SoIs.37 More seriously still, SoIs have reported a “campaign of arrests”

against their members by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. In late

March 2009, the detention of a key SoI leader in Baghdad by the ISF led to localized armed

clashes, the detention of scores of SoIs, and the GoI decision to disband that SoI group.38

A third major challenge is the potential for violence in “the south,” home to a long-standing and

growing competition for power and resources between well-established Shiite political factions

backed by militias that have sometimes used violence, and also to tribal Shi’a who may be

beginning to find a public voice. Against that volatile backdrop in southern Iraq, both U.S. and

Iraqi officials remain concerned about Iranian interventions—economic, social, and sometimes

“military” in the form of the provision of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxies including Asa’ib

al-Haq and Ketaib Hezbollah.39 Tensions in the south have the potential to be exacerbated by

elections, and also by potential drives to form multi-provincial “regions” that would enjoy special

access to authorities and resources.

ȱȱ¢Ǳȱȱ

By the start of 2009, several major but uneven transitions were underway at the operational level

in Iraq. First, the substantial security improvements achieved over the course of the “surge” had

further deepened, with some fluctuations during combat operations in 2008 in specific parts of

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008, p.1.

Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August and October 2008, and February 2009.

See Ned Parker and Caesar Ahmed, “Sons of Iraq Movement Suffers Another Blow,” Los Angeles Times, March 30,

2009; and Rod Nordland, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York

Times, March 30, 2009.

Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Basra; with UK officials in Basra;

and with Iraqi officials in Najaf, Diwaniyah, Basra, 2008 and 2009.

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Iraq, and some remaining insurgent activity, particularly in north central Iraq.40 In March 2009,

the outgoing Commanding General of MNC-I, LTG Austin, characterized the overall situation

this way: “We are close to sustainable security but we’re not there yet.”41 Concerning the restive

north, LTG Austin commented that the problems in Iraq’s third-largest city Mosul, in Ninewah

province, could still “put us off track and cause violence to really reignite in a greater way.”42

East-central Diyala province, along the Iranian border, with its volatile mix of Kurds, and both

Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, also remained a potential flashpoint. Second, accordingly, the focus of

U.S. military operations shifted toward stability operations in the south and west, with greater

remaining emphasis on COIN in north-central Iraq.

Third, the operational capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to grow, reflected

in—and catalyzed by—ISF operational experiences in 2008 in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah, Mosul,

and Diyala. According to U.S. commanders, the March 2008 ISF operations in Basra, targeting

Shiite militias, were poorly planned and required a strong rescue effort by coalition forces. The

August 2008 operations in Diyala, targeting affiliates of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), were planned by

the Iraqis in advance but still required coalition forces to provide enablers and to help hold areas

once they were cleared.43

A fourth transition was a growth in 2008 in formal Government of Iraq (GoI) security

responsibility, antedating the Security Agreement, as additional provinces transitioned to

“provincial Iraqi control” (PIC). In practice, PIC arrangements varied from province to province

but as a rule gave the GoI lead security responsibility—and practice exercising that

responsibility—and mandated increased coordination of coalition operations and activities with

the GoI.44 Fifth, as the ISF’s basic capabilities improved, the coalition’s approaches to training

and partnering with the ISF evolved substantially though unevenly across Iraq. In terms of

substance, many embedded “transition teams” shifted their training focus away from basic

“move, shoot, and communicate” skills, toward more advanced skills including staff functions

and the use of enablers. In terms of organization, the use of various forms of unit-to-unit

partnering, which allows advising by example as well as by instruction, and complements the

work of transition teams, grew substantially.

Sixth, by early 2009, MNF-I was a far less “multi-national” force than in the past. By the end of

2008, most remaining coalition partner countries had brought their deployments in Iraq to a close.

Major redeployments in late 2008 included the 2,000-strong Georgian contingent; the Poles, who

had led Multi-National Division-Center South; and the South Koreans, who had led MultiNational Division-Northeast. Faced with the expiration of the UN mandate authorizing the multinational force in Iraq, several coalition partners—the United Kingdom, Australia, and Romania—

each signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GoI, providing a new legal basis for the

Interviews with MNF-I officials, August and September 2008, and February 2009, and “Security Incidents” slides,

Multi-National Forces-Iraq, January 31, 2009.

Anne Gearan, “U.S. General Says No Further Withdrawals Planned,” Washington Post, March 9, 2009.

Associated Press, “Al Qaida Stronghold of Mosul is proving a Security Nightmare,” Arizona Daily Star, March 10,

2009.

Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

Interviews with commanders serving under MNF-I, August 2008. As of December 2008, 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces

had transitioned to PIC. PIC provinces and their dates of designation included Muthanna, July 2006; Dhi Qar,

September 2006; An Najaf, December 2006; Maysan, April 2007; Irbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, May 2007; Karbala,

October 2007; Basrah, December 2007; Qadisiyah, July 2008; Anbar, September 2008; Babil, October 2008; Wasit,

October 2008.

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presence of their troops, but each of their mandates is set to expire on July 31, 2009. Seventh, the

geographical focus of U.S. forces in Iraq shifted somewhat from north to south, as U.S. forces

assumed some battlespaces in the south previously held by coalition partner forces.45 On March

31, 2009, the Multi-National Division-Center absorbed UK-led Multi-National DivisionSoutheast, to form the new Multi-National Division-South, under U.S. command, with

responsibility for nine provinces.46

Eighth and finally, as civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) grew, they

increasingly took the lead in some efforts formerly spearheaded by the U.S. military. In some

cases, including Najaf and Karbala provinces, PRTs operated without a significant nearby U.S.

forces presence. Nevertheless, the military’s extensive presence on the ground at district and local

levels, compared with the limited number of U.S. civilian experts, meant that in practice, the

military continued to play a strong “supporting” role in helping Iraqis develop civil capacity.

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Meanwhile, U.S. practitioners in Iraq, both civilian and military, have suggested that the appetite

of GoI officials to be mentored, advised, or guided by U.S. officials—and thus the leverage that

the U.S. government is able to exercise – is diminishing. In 2008, as Iraqi civilian and military

capacity and capabilities grew, and as Iraqi confidence in those capabilities increased, GoI

officials demonstrated growing assertiveness and less inclination to consult with U.S. officials

before taking action.47 That approach was manifested, for example, in the decision by Prime

Minister Nouri al Maliki to launch military operations in Basra in March 2008, and the GoI’s

unilateral decision to assume full responsibility for Sons of Iraq in fall 2008. Most practitioners

and observers expect that U.S. leverage is likely to diminish further in 2009, under the new

sovereignty regime and as the U.S. presence decreases.

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President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy charts a new strategic course but also raises

several questions about the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship. At the same time, OIF experiences as a

whole raise additional strategic questions about U.S. Government preparations to undertake

future complex contingencies.

¢ȱȱȱǯǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ

Announcing the drawdown and transition policy, President Obama stated that the goal is “an Iraq

that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant.” To that end, the President added, the United States

would:

•

Work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and

accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists;

See Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Takes Control of Basra Base,” Washington Post,” April 1, 2009.

See “MND-C, MND-SE Operating Areas Combine to Create MND-South,” MNF-I press release, April 1, 2009,

available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25981&Itemid=128.

Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008.

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•

Help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world; and

•

Forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to

the peace and security of the region.”48

Under that broad rubric, as the U.S. role in Iraq transitions, it might be useful to confirm key U.S.

national interests regarding Iraq, and the crucial strategic objectives that, at a minimum, it is

important for the United States to achieve to support those interests. Such broad objectives might

address the following elements:

•

U.S. interests in Iraq’s domestic political arrangements. Some might argue that a

democratic or broadly representative and inclusive Iraqi polity is essential as a

key to Iraq’s stability, while others might argue that the nature of Iraq’s domestic

political arrangements is much less important than simply a unified and stable

Iraq.

•

U.S. interests in Iraq’s role in the fight against global terrorist networks. Some

might argue that the most important goal is simply ensuring that Iraq does not

serve as a safe haven for terrorists. Others might stress the importance of active

intelligence-sharing by Iraq with the United States. Still others might argue that it

is in U.S. interests that Iraq couple the counter-terrorism skills it is currently

developing as part of its domestic counter-insurgency effort, with expeditionary

capabilities, so that it could participate in future regional counter-terrorist

activities.

•

U.S. interests in the regional balance of power. Some might argue that Iraq’s

strength, relative to that of its neighbors, is important. Others might simply stress

the importance of an absence of conflict—that is, as a long-stated U.S. goal puts

it, an “Iraq at peace with its neighbors.”

Furthermore, it may prove judicious to update the formulation of U.S. strategic objectives

as the U.S. mission and presence in Iraq change and results of those changes are assessed.

In his policy announcement, President Obama stressed that the situation in Iraq remains

dynamic and challenging: “But let there be no doubt – Iraq is not yet secure, and there

will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq.”49

¢ȱȱȱ

As the Iraqi appetite for accepting guidance and advice from international partners continues to

wane, U.S. policy makers may wish to reassess how the U.S. government might most effectively

apply political, economic, and security “levers” to help shape Iraq’s transformation into a stable

and prosperous state. One challenge is an apparent mismatch in Iraq between those who are most

susceptible to leverage and those making key decisions. Iraqi warfighting commanders, as a rule,

recognize the extent to which they rely on U.S. military enablers, and remain eager for a

continuation of U.S. support. At the same time, Iraqi political leaders—those who make the

President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February

27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/.

President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February

27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/.

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decisions—tend toward overconfidence in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, and a less

urgent sense of the need for close mil-to-mil partnership with the United States.

ȱȱȬȱǯǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ

Another strategic consideration concerns the kind of long-term partnership the United States

wants to have with Iraq, including the traditional panoply of diplomatic and economic as well as

security ties, and the kind of U.S. presence in Iraq that would be required to support such a

relationship. On January 27, 2009, Secretary Gates told the Senate and House Armed Services

Committees that “…we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to

come.”50 One particular challenge for both states may prove to be the cultural or psychological

adjustment from an essentially paternalistic relationship to a partnership on equal footing.

In the security field, decisions about the shape of that future partnership could suggest different

possible forms for a future U.S. presence. In theory, one option would be establishing permanent

U.S. military bases in Iraq, to support broader U.S. policy in the region, possibly on the model of

those in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Italy. Kurdish leaders have reportedly long proposed

a permanent U.S. military presence in northern Iraq. However, the “permanent basing” option

does not appear to enjoy support from the Obama Administration, Members of Congress, or from

the Government of Iraq as a whole. A presence of U.S. forces beyond December 2011 would

require revisiting and amending the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement.

Another option would be a particularly robust U.S. Office of Security Cooperation (OSC),

responsible for some combination of training, advising, and mentoring Iraqi security forces, and

helping build the capacity of Iraqi security ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC

would be responsible to both the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commanding General of

U.S. Central Command. One possible model might be the U.S. Military Training Mission to

Saudi Arabia, which operates on the basis of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the

Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and serves to train, advise, and assist the Saudi

Arabian Armed Forces.

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According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, Iraq, particularly in the south, continues to face a potential

threat from Shi’a Iraqi proxy groups trained by Iran’s Quds forces, and other forms of lethal aid

from Iran.51 In March 2009, U.S. forces reportedly shot down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle

over Iraqi territory, in eastern Diyala province.52 Meanwhile, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)

is in the process of shifting its focus somewhat from north to south in Iraq, including relocating a

Division headquarters to Basra and increasing the U.S. troop presence in southern Iraq as

coalition partner troops withdraw or draw down. According to U.S. military commanders on the

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27,

2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337. On September 10, 2008, in

testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he stated that “... we should expect to be involved in Iraq for

many years to come, although in changing and increasingly limited ways.” See Robert M. Gates, Statement before the

House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008.

Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008, and with Iraqi civilian and military

officials, August 2008.

Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Downed Iranian Drone Over Iraq,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009.

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ground, the growing U.S. footprint in southern Iraq is not likely to be lost on Iran.53 Any such

Iranian concerns might be exacerbated by the growing U.S. forces presence across Iran’s eastern

border, in Afghanistan.

It is not clear to what extent U.S. “Iran policy” factors in current and potential Iranian activities in

southern Iraq. In the context of growing potential for low-level U.S. military confrontations—

“shadow-boxing”—with Iranian proxies in southern Iraq, as the U.S. force presence in that area

grows, it may be important to consider scenarios in which tactical-level developments might

escalate into strategic-level concerns.

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How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, and equip

the force – how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities required—may depend in

part on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable those lessons are deemed to be to

potential future engagements. For example, lessons might be drawn from OIF concerning how to

most effectively train foreign security forces and to prepare U.S. forces for that mission; how

increasing the intelligence assets available to commanders on the ground affects their ability to

identify and pursue targets; how “dwell time” policies for the Active and Reserve Components

can best be implemented; and what closer operational integration between Special Operations

Forces and conventional forces might suggest about the most effective division of labor between

them.

President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy for Iraq has pressed the Army, in particular, to

address the question of how and whether to institutionalize key capabilities developed, often

through trial and error, for use during OIF. The policy calls for the deployment to Iraq, by mid2010, of Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs). According to DOD officials, AABs are to be built

on the chassis of existing BCTs and augmented as necessary with capabilities appropriate for the

new stability operations mission in Iraq.

The near-term requirement to prepare and deploy such units does not resolve a more fundamental

question – how permanent should AABs be? In theory, for potential future contingencies, the

Army could simply plan to use and adapt its standard force structure to meet new requirements as

they arise, or it could dedicate resources to establish a standing capacity of some kind.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has underscored that “…building the security capacity of other

nations through training and equipping programs has emerged as a core and enduring military

requirement,”54 suggesting the need to institutionalize such capabilities. Dr. John Nagl has

proposed one possible institutional solution – creating a permanent, standing Advisory Corps of

20,000 combat advisors, which would be organized, equipped, educated and trained to develop

host nation security forces.55

Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the planned increase in

U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, across Iran’s eastern border, may magnify the sense of uneasiness of some Iranian

leaders.

See Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington DC, July 15, 2008, available

at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262.

John Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps, Center for a New American

Security, Washington, DC, June 2007.

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Meanwhile, some officials suggest that Army leaders remain reluctant to make permanent

changes to the Army’s force structure, not least because such changes could mean assuming

increased risk in more traditional areas of warfighting. The Army has advocated, as a substitute

for “AAB,” the term Brigade Enabled for Stability Operations (BESO).56 In March 2009, the

Army announced that new BESOs would deploy from Fort Bliss, TX, to Iraq and Afghanistan

later in the year. BESOs, Army officials stressed, would not depart radically from the familiar

BCT construct—they would “remain full-spectrum capable,” and would be “…a matter of

augmentation … slight modifications to gain skill sets.”57

For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used to help frame

future discussions about the Department’s force planning construct—a shorthand description of

the major contingencies the Department must be prepared to execute simultaneously—which is

used to shape the total force. Drawing conclusions, however, is not simple. Analytical challenges

include deciding what kind of contingency OIF represents, how likely it is to be representative of

future contingencies, and which chronological “slice” of OIF requirements (given the great

variation in troop commitment and equipment over time) to use to represent the effort. Recent

DOD guidance documents—including DOD Directive 3000.07 “Irregular Warfare IW” issued on

December 1, 2008, which stated that “it is DoD policy to recognize that IW is as strategically

important as traditional warfare”; the 2008 National Defense Strategy; and the 2009 Quadrennial

Roles and Missions Review Report—all suggested a relatively strong future DOD emphasis on

capabilities required for complex contingencies like Iraq and Afghanistan.58

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A further strategic consideration concerns how lessons are drawn from OIF regarding U.S.

government coordination in complex contingencies, including decision-making, planning and

execution.59 Just as the executive branch’s responsibilities in this area are divided among different

agencies, congressional oversight responsibilities are divided among different committees of

jurisdiction, such that achieving full integration can be a challenge for both branches of

government.

One set of questions prompted by OIF experiences concerns the decision-making process about

whether to go to war and if so, how to do so. Key issues include the rigor of the inter-agency

Charmingly but surely unintentionally, the word “beso” means “kiss” in Spanish.

Kris Osborn, “New U.S. Army Unit Adds Stability-Ops Troops,” Defense News, March 10, 2009.

See Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf; and Department of Defense,

Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report , January 2009, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf

For an overview of the interagency reform debates, see CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for

National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

On the role of DOD in foreign assistance activities, including security forces training and reconstruction activities, see

CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and

Options for Congress, by (name redacted) et al. On the capabilities of U.S. government civilian agencies, see CRS

Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the

Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by (name re

dacted) and (name redacted).

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debates, the effectiveness of the provision of “best military advice” to key decision-makers, and

the thoroughness of congressional oversight in general.60

Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns balancing roles, responsibilities, resources, and

authorities among U.S. government agencies to support implementation of activities required in

complex contingencies—such as security forces training, local governance work, and economic

reconstruction.61 In security forces training, OIF experiences included several different patterns

for the distribution of responsibilities between the Departments of Defense and State. In OIF,

governance and economic reconstruction work, in turn, have been carried out by Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), by civilian U.S. government agencies operating separately from

PRTs, and by military units—not always in close conjunction with one another.62 Based in part

on OIF experiences, many observers have concluded that the capacity of U.S. Government

civilian agencies, including deployable capabilities, should be enhanced; and that the modalities

for coordinating and integrating civilian and military efforts in the field should be improved.

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The President’s drawdown and transition announcement left open a number of operational issues

that U.S. practitioners, policy makers, and Members of Congress may wish to consider.

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The Obama Administration transition policy generally calls for a diminishing U.S. government

role in Iraq, but senior U.S. civilian and military officials on the ground are likely to continue to

President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1), which describes the organization of the national security

system and replaced the George W. Bush Administration’s National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1),

includes several measures that apparently aim at instilling greater rigor. For example, the National Security Advisor is

specifically instructed to carry out key support functions for the sessions of the National Security Council (NSC) “in a

timely manner.” In turn, in supporting the sessions of the NSC Deputies Committee, the Deputy National Security

Advisor is tasked to ensure that all papers for discussion “fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the

facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of

each.” See Presidential Policy Directive-1, “Organization of the National Security System,” February 13, 2009,

available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf.

The war in Afghanistan has raised a similar set of concerns, but it has offered a different set of empirical models for

consideration. In Afghanistan, U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are almost exclusively military

organizations, led by an Air Force or Navy officer and reporting up a military chain of command. U.S. Government

civilian agencies – particularly the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S.

Department of Agriculture – have deployed experts to serve in key positions with both PRTs, and Division- and

Brigade-sized task forces, but until 2009, the number of civilian experts was small. See CRS Report R40156, War in

Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee hosted a series of

hearings about PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the potential implications for future U.S. inter-agency coordination

and organization. See House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, “Agency

Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and

Afghanistan, April 2008, available at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf. The Army’s

Center for Army Lessons Learned, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted interviews with PRT participants and

published initial observations. See “PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons

Learned, No. 07-34, September 2007. See also Rusty Barber and Sam Parker, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial

Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms: a USIP Trip Report,” United States Institute of Peace, December

2008.

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face myriad small choices about exactly how much support to provide, in various circumstances,

to their host nation partners.

During the formal occupation of Iraq, from 2003 to 2004, the coalition was responsible for all

facets of Iraqi public life. In the early post-occupation days, the coalition’s general approach was

to do everything possible to get Iraqi institutions up and running, limited primarily by resources

and personnel available to implement the efforts. As Iraqi capacity grew, the role of Iraqi civilian

and military officials and institutions shifted, to various degrees, from sharing responsibilities to

leading, with some support or back-up from the coalition.

By 2008, U.S. civilian and military officials in Iraq were seriously discussing a fundamental

question: how much U.S. help is enough? The debates addressed both the U.S. military’s

relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces, and U.S. government civilian expert assistance

provided through Provincial Reconstruction Teams and at the national level.

A number of U.S. officials, both civilian and military, argued that, in the words of one military

commander, “it’s time to take the training wheels off,” that it is okay to “let the Iraqis fail.”

Taking a step back, they argued, is not only a key to reducing the U.S. commitment over time—it

may also be the best way to reduce the risk of Iraqi dependence on U.S. help, and to encourage

Iraqis to assume more responsibility and to learn to solve problems themselves. One former

brigade commander in Iraq, from this school of thought, argued, “It’s time to let go,” and added

the observation: “The coalition has a very difficult time having the restraint and discipline to

refrain from intervening.”63

Some officials countered that, given the shrinking U.S. presence as U.S. forces draw down, and

the diminishing Iraqi appetite to be advised and mentored, it is important to facilitate the growth

of Iraqi capacity as much as possible while the window of opportunity is still open.64

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President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy prescribes the withdrawal of all U.S. combat

troops from Iraq by the end of August 2010, and the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement mandates that

all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. Further, in March 2009, the Obama

Administration announced plans to withdraw a total of 12,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by

September 2009.

Within those parameters, remaining key remaining decisions include:

•

When, before the end of August 2010, to transition the U.S. force presence in

each geographic area of Iraq from combat troops to Advise and Assist Brigades

(AABs).

Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, who led a brigade in the Mahmudiyah area south of Baghdad, quoted in Larry

Kaplow, “The Last Day of the War,” Newsweek, January 12, 2009. See also “Marine Commander Says Iraq Pullout in

16 Months ‘Doable’,” National Journal, February 24, 2009, based on an interview with Marine Major General John

Kelly at the completion of his tour as Multi-National Force-West Commanding General, who stressed that leaving too

slowly could keep the ISF from taking control.

Interviews with MNFI officials, January and February 2009.

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•

How large of a residual transition force, between roughly 35,000 and 50,000

troops, to leave in Iraq after August 31, 2010.

•

How quickly to draw down the residual force between August 2010 and the end

of 2011.

•

Whether the basic parameters of the Obama policy timeline, including the August

2010, could be adjusted, should changing circumstances on the ground appear to

make that advisable.

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Supporting the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is a critical focus of U.S. military

operations in Iraq. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes the importance of conducting

operations “by, with and through” host nation forces; and helping to build such forces when their

capacity or capabilities are not adequate. From the outset, the organization and focus of the

coalition’s efforts to train, equip, and mentor the ISF varied across the battlespace of Iraq,

depending on the conditions on the ground, the level of development of the locally based ISF, and

the availability of coalition forces for training missions. A key operational consideration, looking

ahead, is how to accomplish the ISF training mission as U.S. forces draw down and AABs are

established.

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The “standard” approach to training the ISF has been the use of embedded “transition teams” that

typically live and work with a host nation unit. One key point of variation over time has been the

size of these teams. Transition teams working with the Iraqi Army, for example, typically

included between 11 and 15 members, depending on the size of the Iraqi unit they embedded

with. In practice, however, the numbers have varied—for example, in western Anbar province,

Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), led by U.S. Marines, consistently used larger teams, with

between 30 and 40 members.65 One key development over time, in the view of U.S. commanders

on the ground and many experts, has been an overall improvement in the quality and

effectiveness of the transition teams—in part a reflection of standardization and improvements in

the training “pipelines” used by the Military Departments to produce the trainers.66

In 2008, as the basic operational capabilities of the ISF grew, the use of embedded transition

teams shifted toward higher-level ISF headquarters, including brigades and divisions. The

substantive efforts of the teams also shifted, from basic skills like patrolling to leadership and

enablers. For example, teams working with the Iraqi Army increased their focus on staff functions

and logistics, and teams working with the Iraqi Police increased the emphasis on specialized

skills like forensics. In effect, transition teams work themselves out of a job, as their host nation

partner unit improves.

Interviews with MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands including MNF-W, August 2008.

Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commands, August 2008. In the view of many experts,

one issue shaping the quality of the transition teams has been individual incentive to serve on such teams, based on the

degree to which promotion boards favorably regard such service. Some DOD officials note that the incentives, based

on personnel rules, are improving, while some practitioners note anecdotally that training missions tend not to be as

highly regarded as more traditional combat assignments.

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The U.S. military may not, in every case, have the full spectrum of skills required to staff all

types of embedded teams. While logistics experts in the U.S. military are well-placed to share

that expertise with Iraqi Army counterparts, U.S. Military Police (MPs) generally do not have the

requisite specialized policing skills and have thus relied on collaboration with civilian

International Police Advisors, who have been in short supply.

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In addition to transition teams, coalition forces throughout Iraq have made substantial use of

various forms of “unit partnering,” in which coalition maneuver units work side-by-side with

Iraqi units of equal or larger size. Commanders on the ground have stressed the value of unit

partnership, as a complement to the use of embedded teams, as an effective way to “show” rather

than just “tell” ISF unit leaders how they might most effectively organize their headquarters, lead

their troops, and manage staff functions.67 Unit partnership has not been envisaged as a

permanent arrangement – any individual unit partnership has been designed to be temporary, a

catalyst to the development of that Iraqi unit.

As conditions permitted, commanders extended unit partnering beyond the Iraqi Army to

Ministry of the Interior (MoI) forces, including the Iraqi Police and the Department of Border

Enforcement. That outreach to the MoI was initially more common in Multi-National DivisionCenter, south of Baghdad, and in Multi-National Force-West in Anbar, than in Multi-National

Division-North, which was still actively engaged in combat operations, together with ISF

counterparts, in Diyala and Ninewah provinces, in late 2008.

¢Ȭȱ

Coalition forces have also provided substantial support to the “capacity-building” of the key

security institutions of the Government of Iraq—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the

Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. This support, led by the Multi-National Security

Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), part of MNF-I, has included mentoring Iraqi senior

leaders in leadership and management skills, as well as providing technical assistance to ministry

personnel.

Coalition officials have stressed the growing importance of maximizing such capacity-building

efforts while Iraqis are still receptive to receiving such training. With appropriate leadership

skills, they argued, Iraqi senior leaders in the security sector could make substantially greater and

more effective contributions to the development of the ISF, gradually reducing the need for U.S.

advice and support. Coalition commanders have also underscored the importance of utilizing the

right U.S. and coalition personnel for the mission, including senior “mentors” with enough

leadership experience and stature to carry weight with their Iraqi counterparts.68

Interviews with MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

Interviews with MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, August 2008. For example, some argue, a U.S. Army Colonel

simply has not held high enough leadership positions within his own Department of Defense to be an appropriate

advisor to an Iraqi Minister.

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The Obama transition policy for Iraq underscores the importance of the ISF training and advisory

effort, naming it one of the three missions of the U.S. transition force from August 2010 forward.

The increasingly smaller U.S. military footprint and the reduction in senior U.S. military

leadership in Iraq could complicate that mission somewhat.

One issue may be the ability of the U.S. AABs, spaced thinly across Iraq, to continue to provide

ISF counterparts with key enablers, such as logistics; Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR); and the ability to call in close air support (CAS). On the other hand, over

time, ISF units are expected to rely increasingly on their own capabilities for such support.

A related issue may be the ability of AABs to continue the practice of providing mentorship

through close relationships with equivalent Iraqi units. For example, under MNC-I, MultiNational Divisions (MND) were often able to provide a BCT to partner full-time with an Iraqi

Army (IA) Division based in the same province; and MND Commanding Generals themselves

developed close relationships with their IA counterparts. One option, under the AAB footprint,

might be a transition from a relationship of “partnership” to one of “liaison” with less senior U.S.

officers.

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The U.S.-Iraqi security agreement requires that all U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraqi

“cities, villages, and localities” no later than the time when the ISF assume security responsibility

in the relevant province, and in any case no later than June 30, 2009. By early 2009, many U.S.

forces had already pulled out of major urban areas, consolidating at large Forward Operating

Bases (FOBs) and handing over to the ISF the responsibility to provide continual presence.69 The

Obama drawdown and transition policy, including the planned withdrawal without replacement of

12,000 U.S. troops by September 2009, might serve to accelerate this shift.

This dynamic marks a sharp departure from a basic premise of COIN in Iraq. Top U.S.

commanders in Iraq long argued that “living where we work” is what made the counterinsurgency effort a success. This phrase refers to establishing a security presence in cities and

towns, including small command outposts of U.S. forces, and Joint Security Stations that include

both U.S. and various Iraqi forces. That presence, commanders have noted, allowed ongoing

collaboration between U.S. and Iraqi forces, making those partnerships more effective, and it

facilitated frequent interaction with the local population, building trust and confidence. In 2008,

before the terms of the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement were finalized, U.S. commanders generally

favored “thinning” the ranks in cities and towns over time – that is, using a progressively lighter

but still dispersed U.S. footprint, as the ISF gradually assumed responsibility for providing the

“presence” in each area.

For example, in December 2008, Major General Mark Hertling, then-Commanding General of Multi-National

Division-North, noted that most U.S. forces in his area had already moved outside cities, with some exceptions, for

example the city of Mosul, “where they have combat outposts throughout the city because there is still a significant

fight against al Qaeda in that city.” See Major General Mark Hertling, DOD News Briefing, December 8, 2008. See

also Ernesto Londono, “U.S. Prepares to Hand Over Baghdad Base,” Washington Post, December 25, 2008. For

specific examples of FOB closures, see Richard Tomkins, “U.S. Starts to Leave Key Iraq Bases,” Washington Times,

February 23, 2009.

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Looking ahead, one option is that some U.S. forces might retain a light, distributed presence in

some urban areas, after the June 2009 deadline, in advisory capacities to the ISF. In December

2008, Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General Raymond Odierno,

noted that some U.S. forces were likely to remain inside cities and towns after June 2009, in order

to continue to train and mentor Iraqi security forces.70 In March 2009, Deputy Commanding

General of Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Brigadier General Fred Rudesheim, noted that

somewhere under 10% of U.S. troops based in Baghdad, for example training teams that work

with the Iraqi Army and National Police, might remain in the city past June 30, 2009.71 At the

end of March 2009, MNC-I Commanding General LTG Austin noted that based on joint

assessments, Iraqi officials were likely to request for a continuation of some U.S. force presence

in Mosul and Diyala, beyond the deadline.72

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The U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement required the coordination of all U.S. military operations—

including ground operations, air operations, and detainee operations—with Iraqi authorities. The

Agreement required the establishment of a committee structure to elaborate more detailed

implementing instructions; by February 2009, such a structure of committees and subcommittees, including Iraqi and U.S. civilian and military participation, was in place and

functioning. 73

In a December 2008 letter to the force, regarding the new Agreement, GEN Odierno noted that

the new environment would “require a subtle shift in how we plan, coordinate, and execute

missions throughout Iraq,” and that new rules of engagement would be issued.74 In early 2009,

MNF-I officials noted that the Security Agreement was the fundamental theme of current U.S.

efforts in Iraq.75 The premise for future U.S. operations, according to MNC-I, is to “figure out

how to get it done through Iraqis.”76 A key issue is the further impact that the Security Agreement

will have on U.S. operations.

Sudarsan Raghavan and Qais Mizher, “Troops Will Remain in Iraqi Cities After June, Odierno Says,” Washington

Post, December 14, 2008; and Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Generals Propose a Timetable for Iraq,” New

York Times, December 18, 2008.

Brigadier General Fred Rudesheim, MNC-I Operational Update, March 15, 2009, transcript available at

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25810&Itemid=131.

Jane Arraf, “U.S. General: American Forces May Not Leave Key Iraqi Cities,” Christian Science Monitor, March

27, 2009.

Interview with MNF-I official, February 2009; and MNF-I, slide “U.S. and Iraqi Security Agreement,” February

2009. Broad oversight is provided by the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), co-chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister,

and the U.S. Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General. Underneath that body, the Joint Military Operations

Coordination Committee (JMOCC), co-chaired by the Iraqi Minister of Defense and the MNF-I Commanding General,

includes sub-sections, under U.S.-Iraqi co-chairmanship: Temporary Committee for Iraqi Handover; Military

Operations, Training and Logistical Support; Vehicle, Vessel and Aircraft Movement; Transfer of Security

Responsibility to the Provinces. Also underneath the JMC, the Joint Committee, co-chaired by the Iraqi Minister of the

Interior and the US Ambassador and MNF-I Commander, includes sub-sections, under U.S.-Iraqi co-chairmanship:

Detainee Affairs, Agreed Upon Facilities and Areas, Claims, Point of Entry, Imports and Exports, Jurisdiction,

Frequency Management, and Surveillance and Control of Airspace.

GEN Raymond Odierno, letter dated December 4 2008, available at https://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/

CGs_Messages/cg_letter_on_the_security_agreement.pdf.

Interview with MNF-I official, February 2009, Washington DC.

Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008. The counterinsurgency guidance issued by GEN Odierno on

(continued...)

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In practice, according to commanders on the ground, before the Security Agreement went into

effect, the vast majority of U.S. operations were already closely coordinated with the GoI.

Further, most of those operations were already “combined” with Iraqi forces. These transitions

had been facilitated by the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process, in which, by decision of the

GoI in consultation with MNF-I, lead security responsibility for a given province was transferred

to Iraqi control, based on assessments of security conditions and local ISF capabilities. Before

the Security Agreement went into effect, 13 of 18 provinces had transitioned to PIC, and PIC

arrangements generally required that U.S. operations be coordinated with the GoI. Another

common practice, before the Security Agreement, was that the GoI granted approval in advance

for U.S. forces to carry out certain categories of activities, or to take action against certain targets.

The use of warrant-based arrests—now required—was already frequently practiced in 2008.

As of early 2009, U.S. commanders on the ground, particularly those in PIC provinces, have

reported a smooth transition to operations under the Security Agreement. One U.S. BCT

commander, based in Qadisiyah province where the 8th Iraqi Army Division is headquartered,

stated: “We do all of our operations … by, with and through the Iraqi security forces. They’re all

joint. Anybody that we detain, we detain with a warrant.”77

Concerning the use of Iraqi air space, the Security Agreement stated: “Surveillance and control

over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this

Agreement”. It added a caveat: “Iraq may request from the United States forces temporary

support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.”78

The caveat is important because the capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force are still in the very early

stages of development and training. In addition, that training has focused, first of all, on skills

relevant to the ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, such as moving troops and supplies,

and providing some ISR. U.S. officials have noted that Iraqi officials and commanders on the

ground remain aware that they still lack key COIN capabilities such as sufficient ISR and CAS;

that they acknowledge that they do not yet have the ability to defend Iraqi airspace; and that they

remain eager for the support of U.S. air assets. In late 2008, U.S. officials expressed some

confidence that it would be possible to reach agreements on shared use of air space.79

The Security Agreement did not address a parallel concern related to operational coordination:

Iraqi coordination with U.S. forces concerning ISF operations. U.S. commanders on the ground

report that it is increasingly common for ISF commanders to inform U.S. forces only after they

have carried out local operations; some commanders add that these are positive developments in

terms of growing ISF capabilities and initiative.80 At the same time, it could be helpful for U.S.

forces to know in advance about significant ISF operations, for two reasons: first, the ISF might

call on U.S. forces suddenly, during such operations, to provide key enablers; second, such

operations could have an impact on U.S. force protection.

(...continued)

September 16, 2008, had already emphasized that as the ISF stand up, coalition forces will increasingly “enable from

overwatch.” See “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” September 16, 2008,

available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com-odierno_coin_guidance.pdf.

See Colonel Butch Kievenaar, Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, DOD News Briefing,

January 5, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript/aspx?trancriptid=4335.

“SOFA,” Article 9, para.4-5.

Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

Interviews with MNC-I and subordinate commands, August 2008.

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Article 22 of the Security Agreement described provisions for detainee operations. One set of

provisions placed tight constraints on the circumstances under which U.S. forces may take Iraqis

into physical custody.81 Another set of provisions, of even more concern to U.S. commanders on

the ground, specified how the cases of those detainees held by coalition forces would be further

adjudicated. The Security Agreement mandated that U.S. forces provide information about all

detainees held, and stated that Iraqi authorities would “issue arrest warrants for persons who are

wanted by them.” The agreement required U.S. forces to turn over custody of all “wanted”

detainees, and then to release all remaining detainees “in a safe and orderly manner.”82

In anticipation of a more stringent new detention regime, throughout 2008, MNF-I carried out a

detainee release program, releasing detainees to their homes and communities whenever possible.

As of late November 2008, U.S. forces held approximately 15,800 detainees in theater internment

facilities, after releasing more than 17,500 during 2008.83

Some U.S. military commanders expressed concerns about the remaining “legacy” population. In

many cases, for the detainees it held, the coalition lacked releasable evidence with legal

sufficiency in Iraqi courts. Scrupulous collection of evidence—such as photographs, diagrams,

eye-witness accounts—common in civilian law enforcement, was not always an integral part of

coalition combat operations in Iraq. Such legacy detainees could pose real security threats to the

Iraqi population, or to the coalition, commanders warned. Some coalition officials and outside

observers also expressed concerns that the GoI adjudication of legacy detainee cases, whether or

not legally sufficient evidence exists, might evince a sectarian bias—in particular, a tendency to

treat Shiite Arabs more leniently than Sunni Arabs.84

In January 2009, Iraqi and U.S. officials reached an agreement that the U.S. military would

transfer 1,500 detainees per month to Iraqi authorities. At the first such transfer, Iraqi officials

had warrants for 42 of the 1,500; they chose to keep about 70 others for further investigation; and

they planned to release the remaining persons to their home communities at a rate of about 50 per

day.85

Some detainees have expressed fears that they may face harm if they return to their home

communities, as part of the new release process; in those cases, the GoI reportedly agreed to help

them resettle elsewhere.86 In March 2009, it was reported that six recently released detainees

were abducted and killed by local police officers, in an apparent act of retaliation.87 Some local

Iraqi officials, in turn, have expressed concerns that some released detainees may return to

“No detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of

members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi decision issued in

accordance with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4.” If U.S. forces do detain Iraqis, “such persons much be handed

over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours.” “SOFA,” Article 22, para.1-2.

“SOFA,” Article 22, para.4.

MNF-I press release, November 30, 2008.

Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

Interview, MNF-I official, February 2009.

Interview, MNF-I official, February 2009; and see Tom A. Peter, “U.S. to Hand Its Captives to Iraqi Courts,”

Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 2009.

See Rod Nordland, “With Local Control, New Troubles in Iraq,” New York Times, March 16, 2008. The article cites

the released detainees’ tribal leader, Salah Rasheed al-Goud, as saying that local police from the town of Haditha, in

Anbar province, hunted the men down, handcuffed them, and shot them.

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violence—for example, the deputy police chief in Fallujah, Anbar province, commented, “Of

course they represent a threat.”88

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Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the balance of U.S. civilian and military roles and

responsibilities has evolved to include a larger civilian footprint and a stronger civilian role, and

integration between U.S. civilian and military efforts has increased over time. Looking ahead, as

U.S. forces draw down, a key operational issue is the most effective future balance and pattern of

U.S. civilian and military efforts in Iraq.

As a rule, the military has played the preponderant role in OIF, including in non-traditional fields

such as governance and reconstruction. As of 2008, the U.S. military remained the de facto

default option in many cases, though military officers were usually the first to note that they

lacked the requisite expertise.89 One key role of the U.S. military in Iraq throughout has been

supporting civilian-led efforts to provide Iraqis with governance mentorship, and in particular, to

build linkages among the national, regional, and local levels. As MNC-I officials noted, “Our job

at Corps is to establish the connective tissue between the center and the provinces.”90 As a rule,

while PRTs focused on governance at the provincial level, military units, with far more boots on

the ground, worked on a daily basis to foster governance at the district and local levels, and to

help link those levels to higher levels of Iraqi government.91 Through early 2009, the U.S.

military continued to provide some support for small-scale reconstruction initiatives, though

unevenly across Iraq. Some commanders continued to facilitate the reopening of small

businesses—and to use the number of reopened businesses as a metric of economic progress—

while others decided to “give back,” that is, “not spend,” their Commanders Emergency Response

Program (CERP) funds, in order to encourage Iraqis to budget and spend their own money.92

As security conditions on the ground in Iraq improved, civilian and military officials all pointed

to increased opportunities for civilian assistance initiatives, particularly capacity-building at all

levels. As one U.S. commander argued, “Embassy people should be out more every day now, like

we are.”93 Some provincial Iraqi officials, for their part, appear eager to welcome additional U.S.

civilian expertise.94

In theory, one option, as U.S. troops draw down, would be to increase the U.S. civilian effort in

Iraq in terms of personnel and resources, taking advantage of the improved security climate to

boost support for Iraqi civilian capacity-building at the national, provincial, and local levels. In

2008, some key steps were taken to amplify U.S. government civilian assistance efforts at the

provincial level, including authorization to add 66 civilian subject matter experts, in technical

fields including agriculture and business development, to work with the PRTs.95 However,

Anthony Shadid, “In Iraq, Chaos Feared as U.S. Closes Prison,” Washington Post, March 22, 2009.

Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders, August 2008. As one noted, “What you see is the U.S.

military, but we don’t have the expertise.”

Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008.

Interviews with U.S. military officials and PRT members, August 2008.

Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders and subordinate commanders, August 2008.

Interview with Multi-National Division commander, August 2008.

Interviews with the Governor of Najaf, the Governor of Basra, August 2008.

Interview with the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), U.S. Embassy, August 2008. When PRT leaders were asked

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officials at U.S. Embassy Baghdad and at the Department of State noted that it was likely that

peak PRT staffing levels in Iraq had already been reached. In 2008, the Embassy—in response to

direction from Congress—began working on “PRT strategic drawdown” plans.96

The Obama Administration’s drawdown and transition policy calls for consolidating PRT

personnel at fewer locations, and for closely integrating the work of the PRTs and the AABs. In

testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in January 2009, describing future plans,

Secretary Gates noted: “The plans that General Odierno has developed in conjunction with

Ambassador Crocker foresee that as we consolidate our forces, we would also consolidate our

PRTs … so that the two would be stationed together and our forces would be in a position to

continue to protect the civilian element.”97 Some officials have suggested that those civil-military

relationships might vary geographically, including closer integration—including co-location or

even full integration into a single staff structure—where security conditions remain unsettled, and

looser partnerships in relatively permissive areas.

Good test cases are already available, in Najaf and Karbala provinces, for the ability of PRTs to

function without a substantial co-located U.S. forces presence. In May 2008, the personnel of the

PRTs for Najaf and Karbala provinces, who had been operating from a remote base in Hillah, in

Babil province, relocated to their respective areas of operation. Najaf and Karbala were both PIC

provinces at that time, with limited U.S. military presence. In Najaf, for example, in late 2008, the

PRT, including a diverse team of civilian experts and a small U.S. military team that provided

them with movement, was based at a small Forward Operating Base (FOB), together with a U.S.

Army transition team that worked with the local Iraqi Army battalion and a small U.S. military

“mayor’s cell” that managed the installation.98 A team of private security contractors from Triple

Canopy provided static security. In early 2009, U.S. officials in both Baghdad and Washington

also pointed to Najaf as a possible model for the future.99

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Over the course of OIF, the role of contractors supporting the operation has varied in both scope

and scale. According to DOD, as of the first quarter of 2009, DOD had a total of 148,050

contractors in Iraq, including 39,262 U.S. citizens; 70,875 third-country nationals; and 37,913

host country nationals.100 A key operational issue looking ahead is the likely role of contractors

supporting U.S. operations in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down.

While some substantive requirements for contractor support may diminish, others could increase.

For example, one of the three pillars of the mission of Advise and Assist Brigades, after August

2010, is to provide force protection to U.S. government civilians. As of early 2009, that function

was performed, in many cases, by private security contractors. At the same time, requirements

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how many subject matter experts they would like to receive, they reportedly requested a total of 170.

Interviews with U.S. Embassy and Department of State officials, August and December 2008, and January 2009.

See transcript, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, House Armed Services Committee, hearing on Defense

Department Priorities, Washington, DC, January 27, 2009.

Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials at the Najaf FOB.

Communications with U.S. military officials in Baghdad, and U.S. civilian officials in Washington, DC, January

2009.

100

Department of Defense, U.S.CENTCOM Contractor Census Report, Q1 2009.

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for some specialized contractor skills—for example, training and advisory support to the ISF –

may increase as the U.S. force presence decreases.

Another factor shaping the role of contractors may be explicit U.S. policy decisions. On January

31, 2009, MNF-I Commanding General, GEN Odierno, issued a directive instructing subordinate

commanders to begin reducing their reliance on international contractors, including both U.S. and

“third-country national” contractors, by five percent per quarter. The Directive noted that

commanders should seek to replace them, where possible, with Iraqi contractors, and added, “As

we transition more responsibility and control to the government of Iraq, it’s time to make this

change.”101

A third factor shaping the role of contractors may be decisions stemming from provisions in the

U.S-Iraqi Security Agreement that mandate, “Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise

jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor employees.”102 In some

instances, concerns about legal jurisdiction have reportedly prompted efforts by U.S. government

agencies to transition key contractors to U.S. Government “term employee” status. For example,

members of Human Terrain Teams—small teams of academic social scientists who support

military units by engaging with the local population and “mapping” population characteristics and

trends—were employed as contractors by BAE Systems. But in early 2009, reportedly in

response to concerns about jurisdiction, the jobs were shifted to term appointments under the

Department of the Army.103

One of the key operational issues with great potential impact on costs is the future disposition of

U.S. military equipment as U.S. forces draw down. Several factors, in combination, are likely to

shape equipment disposition decisions:

•

Costs: In some cases, it may be more expensive to ship an item home than to

leave it behind and replace it.

•

Support to the ISF: Some U.S. military equipment and supplies may be required

by the ISF to further develop their force—or even urgently required by the ISF to

help prosecute the current COIN fight.

•

Support for the war in Afghanistan: Some equipment, no longer required in Iraq,

may be needed by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. For example, U.S. Army

engineering assets, urgently needed in Afghanistan, may be sent directly from

one theater to the other.

101

See Gordon Lubold, “A Drawdown of Contractors in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, March 4, 2009; and Karen

DeYoung, “U.S. Moves to Replace Contractors in Iraq,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009.

102

See Article 12, paragraph 2, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the

Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence

in Iraq,” available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf.

103

Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Moves to Replace Contractors in Iraq,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009.

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•

Stockpiles for future contingencies: Some equipment—particularly heavy

equipment—may remain stockpiled in the CENTCOM theater, to support

possible future contingencies, pending approval by host nations.104

•

Availability of Logistical Support: Redeploying equipment requires logistical

support in the form of heavy equipment transports (HETs), whether military or

commercial, to provide ground transportation; air assets; sea port capacity,

including Kuwait and the Iraqi port of Um Qasr; as well as diplomatic permission

from all other relevant host nations for basing, access, and/or overflight.

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A number of tools are available to Congress to help shape U.S. government policy toward Iraq,

and the execution of that policy.105 One tool is limiting or prohibiting funding for certain

activities. For example, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

2009 stated that no funding appropriated pursuant to authorizations in the Act could be used “to

establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent

stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq,” or “to exercise United States control of the oil

resources of Iraq.”106

Congress may also make some funding contingent on achievement of certain milestones. For

example, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress required that

funding under Chapter 4 of the Act, “Department of State and Foreign Operations,” be made

available for assistance to Iraq “only to the extent that the Government of Iraq matches such

assistance on a dollar-for-dollar basis.”107 More broadly, in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’

Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007, Congress

established 18 benchmarks for the performance of the Government of Iraq, and provided that

further U.S. strategy in Iraq would be conditioned on the Iraqi government’s meeting those

benchmarks.108

Another tool is holding oversight hearings, to ask Administration officials to account for the

progress to date on policy implementation. For example, on September 10, 2008, the House

Armed Services Committee invited Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen to testify at a hearing entitled “Security and Stability in

104

See Julian E. Barnes, “In Iraq Withdrawal, Equipment poses a Key Logistical Challenge,” Los Angeles Times,

March 16, 2009. The author interviewed U.S. Army Major General Kenneth Dowd, Director of Logistics J-4,

CENTCOM J4, who explained that equipment stockpiled in the region “…will be primarily the big gear, stuff like

MRAPs, tanks…so we don’t have to move and lift all this heavy stuff.”

105

On options available to the Congress, their constitutionality, and their possible impact, see CRS Report RL33837,

Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and

(name redacted). For examples of tools available to Congress in general for shaping U.S. military operations, see CRS

Report RL33803, Congressional Restrictions on U.S. Military Operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Somalia, and

Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, by (name redacted) et al.

106

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008, §1211.

This section repeated language from the FY2008 NDAA.

107

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, June 30, 2008, §1402(e).

108

See U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007,

P.L. 110-28, May 25, 2007, §1314(b)(1)(A), which lists the 18 benchmarks. In §1314(c)(1), the Act specified that no

funding appropriated for Iraq might be obligated or expended unless and until the President certified that Iraqi is

making progress on each of the benchmarks.

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Afghanistan and Iraq: Developments in U.S. Strategy and Operations and the Way Ahead.” On

September 23, 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the situation in Iraq

and Afghanistan, with Secretary Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

Congress may also shape policy by establishing reporting requirements. For example, in the

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252), Congress required the Secretary of

Defense to provide to Congress, every 90 days beginning not later than December 5, 2008, until

the end of FY2009, a “comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures for progress

toward military and political stability in Iraq.” The Act lists detailed reporting requirements in

two areas, stability and security in Iraq, and the training and performance of Iraqi security forces,

and also required an assessment of “United States military requirements, including planned force

rotations, through the end of calendar year 2009.”109

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This report is designed to support congressional consideration of future policy options for the war

in Iraq by analyzing strategies pursued and outcomes achieved to date, by characterizing current

dynamics on the ground in Iraq, and by identifying and analyzing key strategic and operational

considerations going forward. The report will be updated as events warrant. Major topics

addressed include the following:

•

Analysis of future strategic and operational considerations.

•

OIF war planning, including stated objectives, key debates in the major combat

and post-major combat planning efforts, and the impact of apparent shortcomings in the planning efforts on post-war developments.

•

Major combat operations, including both successes and challenges encountered.

•

Post-major combat military activities—combat operations, Iraqi security forces

training, and an array of “reconciliation,” governance, and economic

reconstruction efforts—including analysis of evolutions over time in strategy and

approaches.

•

Assessments of the results of strategy and operations to date.

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The Administration’s decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom had antecedents stretching back

to the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath.

109

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110-252, June 30, 2008, §9204. DOD submitted its first report

pursuant to this requirement, entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” in January 2009 (dated December

2008). DOD had previously submitted to Congress reports with this title, also known as “9010 reports,” pursuant to a

requirement in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, P.L. 109-289 §9010, as amended.

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In the 1990’s, the United States shared with other countries a concern with the Iraqi government’s

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Iraq had demonstrated a willingness to use

WMD against its neighbors during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, and against its own citizens, as it

did, for example, against Iraqi Kurds in Halabja in 1988. U.S. policy after the Gulf War supported

the United Nations-led weapons inspection regime and the economic sanctions imposed to

encourage Iraq’s compliance with that regime. Before they were withdrawn in 1998, U.N.

weapons inspectors located and destroyed sizable quantities of WMD in Iraq.

U.S. post-Gulf War policy also included containment initiatives—“no fly” zones—imposed by

the United States together with the United Kingdom and, initially, France. The northern “no fly”

zone, Operation Northern Watch was designed to protect the Iraqi Kurdish population in northern

Iraq and international humanitarian relief efforts there. Operation Southern Watch was designed

to protect the Shiite Arab population in southern Iraq.

These containment measures were periodically marked by Iraqi provocations, including troop

build-ups and attempts to shoot down allied aircraft, and by allied responses including attacks on

targets inside Iraq.110 In December 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom launched

Operation Desert Fox, whose stated purpose was to degrade Iraq’s ability to manufacture or use

WMD.

Also during the late 1990s, a policy climate more conducive to aggressive action against the Iraqi

regime began to take shape in Washington, D.C., as some policy experts began to advocate

actively fostering Iraqi resistance, in order to encourage regime change.111 In 1998, Congress

passed the Iraq Liberation Act, authorizing support to Iraqi opposition organizations.112 Some

supporters of this policy approach gained greater access, and in some cases office, under the Bush

Administration after the 2000 presidential elections.

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For many U.S. policy makers, the September 11, 2001, attacks catalyzed or heightened general

concerns that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorists. Reflecting those concerns, the first

National Security Strategy issued by the Bush Administration, in September 2002, highlighted the

policy of preemptive, or anticipatory, action, to forestall hostile acts by adversaries, “even if

uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”113

110

Overall, some 300,000 sorties were flown. In 2002 for example, Iraqi forces fired on coalition aircraft 500 times,

prompting 90 coalition air strikes against Iraqi targets. See Suzann Chapman, “The War Before the War,” Air Force

Magazine, February 2004. Chapman cites Air Force General John Jumper as noting in March 2003 that between June

2002 and March 2003, the U.S. Air Force flew about 4,000 sorties against Iraq’s air defense system, surface-to-air

missiles, and command and control.

111

See the December 1, 1997, issue of the Weekly Standard, with a series of articles, under the heading “Saddam Must

Go,” including “Overthrow Him,” by Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz.

112

The Iraq Liberation Act, P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998, authorized support to “Iraqi democratic opposition

organizations” and included provisions concerning how to identify such organizations.

113

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.15, available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf.

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Throughout 2002, the stated position of the Administration was to aggressively seek Iraqi

compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions concerning the inspections regime, while

holding out the possibility of U.N Chapter VII action if Iraq did not comply.114 In September

2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated: “The Security Council

Resolutions will be enforced ... or action will be unavoidable.” On that occasion, President Bush

also articulated a list of conditions that Iraq must meet if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action:

give up or destroy all WMD and long-range missiles; end all support to terrorism; cease

persecution of its civilian population; account for all missing Gulf War personnel and accept

liability for losses; and end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program.115

On November 8, 2002, following intensive negotiations among its “Permanent 5” members,116 the

U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1441. In it, the Council decided that Iraq remained in

“material breach” of its obligations; that the Council would afford Iraq “a final opportunity to

comply”; that failure to comply would “constitute a further material breach”; and that in that case,

Iraq would “face serious consequences.”117

This language, though strong by U.N. standards, was not considered by most observers to imply

“automaticity”—that is, that Iraqi non-compliance would automatically trigger a U.N.-authorized

response under Chapter VII.

While the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written materials, the

Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. The Administration chose not to seek

an additional U.N. Resolution explicitly authorizing military action under Chapter VII, reportedly

due to concerns that some Permanent Members of the Council were prepared to veto it.

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The Administration’s intent to take military action against Iraq was formally made public on

March 17, 2003, when President Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to

leave Iraq within 48 hours. “Their refusal to do so,” he said, would “result in military conflict.”118

114

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorizes the U.N. Security Council to “determine the existence

of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39), and should the Council consider other

specified measures inadequate, to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or

restore international peace and security” (Article 42), see Charter of the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/

aboutun/charter/.

115

President Bush’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002, New York, NY, available

at the White House website http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

116

China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States. Each of the 15 Council members has one vote.

Procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least 9 of the 15. Substantive matters require nine votes,

including concurring votes from the 5 permanent members. See http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp.

117

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 13.

118

President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/

03/20030317-7.html.

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As the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz wrote, war planning includes articulation of

both intended goals and how they will be achieved.119 In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom,

Administration goals included both short-term military objectives and longer-term strategic goals.

To meet that intent, the Administration planned—though apparently in unequal measure—for

both combat operations and the broader range of operations that would be required on “the day

after” regime removal.

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The Administration’s short-term goal for OIF was regime removal. As President Bush stated in

his March 17, 2003, Address to the Nation, “It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in

power.” In that speech, he promised Iraqis, “We will tear down the apparatus of terror ... the

tyrant will soon be gone.”120

In his March 2003 speech, President Bush declared that in the longer term, the United States

would help Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.” It would be an Iraq, as he

described it, that would not be at war with its neighbors, and that would not abuse its own

citizens.121 Those were the basic “endstate” elements typically used by war planners. The U.S.

Central Command (CENTCOM) OIF campaign plan, for example, described the strategic

objective this way: “A stable Iraq, with its territorial integrity intact and a broad-based

government that renounces WMD development and use and no longer supports terrorism or

threatens its neighbors.”122

Over time, the Administration’s longer-term strategic objectives were fine-tuned. In the

November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, the Administration stated the long-term

goal for Iraq this way: “Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well-integrated into the

international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.”123

In January 2007, at the time the “surge” was announced, the White House released an unclassified

version of the results of its late 2006 internal review of Iraq policy. That document states: “Our

strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself,

defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the war on terror.”124

119

Clausewitz made the point more forcefully: “No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so,

without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” Carl von

Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

120

President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/

03/20030317-7.html.

121

Ibid.

122

Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002 and 2003. From July 2002 to July 2004, the

author served as the Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commanding General (CG) of U.S. Army V Corps. That service

included deploying with V Corps in early 2003 to Kuwait and then Iraq. In Iraq, the author served as POLAD to the CG

of the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and then the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

123

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 30, 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/

iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf.

124

“Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review” slides, National Security Council, January 2007, available at

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In January 2009, in its regular quarterly update to the Congress, the Department of Defense

(DOD) used almost the same language, with additional words to reflect the new security

agreement: “The goal of the strategic partnership between the United States and Iraq remains a

unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the

war on terror.”125 In March 2009, in its first Iraq report issued under the Obama Administration,

DOD stated: “The United States seeks an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant; an Iraqi

Government that is just, representative, and accountable; neither a safe haven for, nor sponsor of,

terrorism; integrated into the global economy; and a long-term partner contributing to regional

peace and security.”126

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To support the stated U.S. strategic objectives, CENTCOM, as it planned military operations in

Iraq, defined the OIF military objectives this way: “destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi

regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability

and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist

networks in Iraq, gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and

free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set

conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.”127

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From a military perspective, there are theoretically many different possible ways to remove a

regime—using different capabilities, in different combinations, over different timelines. The 1991

Gulf War, for example, had highlighted the initial use of air power in targeting key regime

infrastructure. The more recent war in Afghanistan had showcased a joint effort, as Special

Operations Forces on the ground called in air strikes on key targets. Key debates in OIF major

combat planning concerned the size of the force, the timelines for action, and the synchronization

of ground and air power.

According to participants, throughout the planning process, Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld played an active role, consistently urging the use of a streamlined force and a quick

timeline.128 Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly came into office with a vision of defense

transformation, both operational and institutional.129 A basic premise of that vision, captured in

the 2002 National Security Strategy, was that “... the threats and enemies we must confront have

(...continued)

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf.

125

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008, submitted in accordance with

§9204, Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, P.L.110-252.

126

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009, submitted in accordance with

§9204, Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, P.L.110-252, and also with §1508(c) of the

Department of Defense Authorization Act for 2009, P.L. 110-417, p.iii.

127

Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC and V Corps planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.

128

Interviews with planners who participated in the process, 2002 and 2003. Bob Woodward cites Secretary Rumsfeld

as saying, at a December 4, 2001, planning session, “I’m not sure that that much force is needed, given what we’ve

learned coming out of Afghanistan.” Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

129

Conversations with Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2005 and 2006.

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changed, and so must our force.”130 In general, that meant transitioning from a military

“structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies,” to a leaner and more agile force. At issue in

the OIF planning debates was not only how to fight the war in Iraq, but also—implicitly—how to

organize, man, train and equip the force for the future.

For military planners, the guidance to use a streamlined force reflected a fundamental shift away

from the Powell Doctrine, named after the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which

stressed that force, if used, should be overwhelming.131

The planning effort started early. Just before Thanksgiving, 2001, President Bush asked Secretary

Rumsfeld to develop a plan for regime removal in Iraq, and Secretary Rumsfeld immediately

gave that assignment to the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General

Tommy Franks.132

The planning effort for combat operations was initially very “close hold,” involving only a few

key leaders and small groups of trusted planners at each level. As the effort progressed, the

number of people involved grew, but key elements of the plans remained compartmentalized,

such that few people had visibility on all elements of the plans.133

The starting point for the planning effort was the existing, “on the shelf” Iraq war plan, known as

1003-98, which had been developed and then refined during the 1990’s. That plan called for a

force of between 400,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops, including three Corps (or Corps equivalents),

with a long timeline for the deployment and build-up of forces beforehand. When General Franks

briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on these plans in late November 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly

asked for a completely new version—with fewer troops and a faster deployment timeline.134

In early 2002, General Franks briefed Secretary Rumsfeld on the “Generated Start” plan. That

plan called for very early infiltration by CIA teams, to build relationships and gain intelligence,

and then the introduction of Special Operations Forces, particularly in northern Iraq and in Al

Anbar province in the west. The main conventional forces effort would begin with nearsimultaneous air and ground attacks. The force would continue to grow up to about 275,000

troops.135

130

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.29, available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/pdf.

131

The “Powell Doctrine,” generally acknowledged as the basis for the first Gulf War, was a collection of ideas, not a

written document. Other key elements included force should only be used as a last resort, when there is a clear threat;

there must be strong public support for the use of force; there must be a clear exit strategy. The Powell Doctrine

derived in part from the Weinberger Doctrine, named after former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Powell’s

one-time boss, which had been based on some Vietnam “lessons learned.”

132

Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster,

2004.

133

Information from CENTCOM and CFLCC planners, and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2002 and

2003.

134

Interviews with planners, 2002 and 2003. See also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II:

The Inside Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006; and Bob Woodward, Plan

of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

135

Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step” collection, “Compartmented

Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by

the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm.

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CENTCOM’s air component—the Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC)—

reportedly urged modifying the plan to include a 10- to 14-day air campaign at the start, to target

and hit Iraq’s missile, radar, command and control, and other leadership sites, on the model of the

Gulf War.136 But the early introduction of ground forces—rather than an extended exclusively air

campaign—was apparently intended to take Iraqi forces by surprise.137

Later in the spring of 2002, CENTCOM and subordinate planners developed an alternative plan

called “Running Start,” which addressed the possibility that the Iraqi regime might choose the

war’s start time through some provocation, such as the use of WMD. “Running start” called for a

smaller overall force and a shorter timeline. It would still begin with infiltration by CIA teams,

followed by the introduction of SOF. Air attacks would go first, and as ground forces flowed into

theater, the ground attacks could begin any time after the first 25 days of air attacks. The ground

war might begin with as few as 18,000 ground forces entering Iraq.138

In the summer of 2002, planners developed a so-called “hybrid” version of these two plans,139

which echoed key elements of the “Running Start” plan—beginning with an air campaign, and

launching the ground war while other ground forces still flowed into theater. Specifically, the plan

called for: Presidential notification 5 days in advance; 11 days to flow forces; 16 days for the air

campaign; the start of the ground campaign as ground forces continued to flow into theater; and a

total campaign that would last up to 125 days. This plan, approved for action, continued to be

known as the “5-11-16-125” plan even after the numbers of days had changed.140

By January 2003, at the CENTCOM Component Commanders Conference hosted by General

Franks in Tampa, the plans had coalesced around a modified version of “Generated Start.” They

featured a very short initial air campaign, including bombs and missiles—a couple of days, rather

than a couple of weeks. The ground campaign would begin with two three-star-led

headquarters—U.S. Army V Corps, and the I Marine Expeditionary Force—and some of their

forces crossing the line of departure from Kuwait into Iraq, while additional forces continued to

flow into theater. Meanwhile, the 4th Infantry Division would open a northern front by entering

Iraq from Turkey.

The number of forces that would start the ground campaign continued to be adjusted, generally

downward, in succeeding days. On January 29, 2003, Army commanders learned that they would

enter Iraq with just two Divisions—less than their plans to that point had reflected. At that time, V

Corps and its subordinate commands were at a training site in Grafenwoehr, Germany, rehearsing

the opening of the tactical-level ground campaign at an exercise called “Victory Scrimmage.”

136

Gordon and Trainor note that this issue was debated at the March 2002 CENTCOM Component Commanders

Conference. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story and the Invasion and

Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

137

Information from planners, 2002, 2003, and 2008.

138

Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002 and 2003. See “Top Secret Polo Step” collection, “Compartmented

Planning Effort, 15 August 2002” CENTCOM brief, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted by

the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB214/index.htm. See also Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside

Story and the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

139

“Hybrid” simply referred descriptively to the plan—it was not the formal name of a plan—although some senior

leaders later seemed to use “Hybrid” as a proper noun.

140

Interviews with planners and slide review, 2002, 2003 and 2008; “Compartmented Planning Effort”; and Gordon

and Trainor, Cobra II.

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During that exercise, commanders and staff concluded that should they be required to “secure”

cities in southern Iraq, they would have insufficient forces to do so.141

The V Corps Commander at the time, then-Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace, reflected

after the end of major combat in Iraq: “I guess that as summer [arrived] I wasn’t real comfortable

with the troop levels.”142

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Most observers agree that the Administration’s planning for “post-war” Iraq—for all the activities

and resources that would be required on “the day after,” to help bring about the strategic

objective, a “free and prosperous Iraq”—was not nearly as thorough as the planning for combat

operations.

For the U.S. military, the stakes of the post-war planning efforts were very high. In theory,

civilian agencies would have the responsibility for using political, diplomatic, and economic tools

to help achieve the desired political endstate for Iraq, while the Department of Defense and its

military forces would play only a supporting role after the end of major combat operations. But

by far the greatest number of coalition personnel on the ground in Iraq at the end of major combat

would be U.S. military forces, and the U.S. military was very likely to become the default option

for any unfilled roles and any unanticipated responsibilities.

A number of participants and observers have argued that the Administration should have sent a

larger number of U.S. troops to Iraq, to provide security in the post-major combat period.

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who served as the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) throughout the formal occupation of Iraq, leveled this criticism after departing

Iraq. Asked what he would have changed about the occupation, he replied: “The single most

important change—the one thing that would have improved the situation—would have been

having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout.”143

A logical fallacy in the number-of-troops critique is that “How many troops do you need?” is not

an especially meaningful question, unless what those troops will be expected to do is clarified. By

many accounts, the OIF post-war planning process did not provide commanders, before the start

of combat operations, with a clear picture of the extent of their assigned post-war

responsibilities.144

141

Information from V Corps leaders and staff, 2003.

William S. Wallace, Interview, Frontline, Public Broadcasting System, February 26, 2004, available at

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/Wallace.html. He quickly added, “But I was

comfortable with the degree of training of those forces that were available to us.”

143

See Robin Wright and Tom Ricks, “Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels,” Washington Post, October 5, 2004.

Ambassador Bremer’s remarks were quoted from a nominally off-the-record talk he gave at DePauw University on

September 17, 2004.

144

Information from CENTCOM, CFLCC, V Corps, and Division Commanders, 2003, 2004 and 2008, and from Office

of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2003 and 2004.

142

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A primary focus of the interagency post-war-planning debates was who would be in charge in

Iraq, on “the day after.” For the military, decisions by the Administration about who would do

what would help clarify the military’s own roles and responsibilities. Before making such

decisions—in particular, what responsibilities would be carried out by Iraqis—the Administration

cultivated Iraqi contacts.

Based on months of negotiations, in conjunction with the government of the United Kingdom, the

Administration helped sponsor a series of conferences of Iraqi oppositionists, including

expatriates and some Iraqis—notably Iraqi Kurds—who could come and go from their homes.

The events included a major conference in London in December 2002, and a follow-on event in

Salahuddin, Iraq, in February 2003.145 At these events, Iraqi oppositionists agreed on a political

statement and self-nominated a “leadership council,” but the events did not directly produce U.S.

policy decisions about post-war roles and responsibilities.146

During the same time frame, the Departments of State and Defense were locked in debate about

post-war political plans for Iraq. The State Department supported a deliberate political process,

including slowly building new political institutions, based on the rule of law, while, in the

meantime, Iraqis would serve only in advisory capacities. Through the second half of 2002, the

State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project brought together Iraqi oppositionists and experts, in a

series of working groups, to consider an array of potential post-war challenges. While a tacit goal

of the project was to identify some Iraqis who might serve in future leadership positions, it was

not designed to produce a slate of leaders-in-waiting.147 The project was also not designed to

produce formal plans. However, some of the ideas it generated did reportedly help operationallevel military planners refine their efforts, and the project might have had a greater impact had

more of its output reached the planners.148

The Department of Defense (DOD)—more specifically and accurately the Office of the Secretary

of Defense (OSD)—favored putting Iraqis in charge of Iraq, in some form, as soon as possible,

based loosely on the model of Afghanistan. A “real” Iraqi leadership with real power, some

officials believed, might find favor with the Iraqi people and with neighboring states, and might

shorten the length of the U.S. commitment in Iraq.149 As Secretary Rumsfeld reportedly told

President Bush in August 2002, “We will want to get Iraqis in charge of Iraq as soon as

possible.”150

145

Interviews with event organizers, 2002 and 2003. See Michael Howard, “Conference Delegates Vie for Political

Role in New Iraq,” The Guardian, December 16, 2002; and Judith Miller, “Ending Conference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist

on Self-Government,” The New York Times, March 3, 2003.

146

Information from Department of State and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials, 2002 and 2003.

147

Interviews with State officials responsible for the project, 2002 and 2003, and participation in some project sessions.

148

Information from CFLCC planners, 2003 and 2008.

149

Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi opposition umbrella group Iraqi National Congress, was one key figure with

whom OSD maintained contact, and some practitioners and observers have maintained that OSD sought primarily to

“crown Chalabi.” However, according to OSD officials, the “theory of the case,” that is, introducing a new Iraqi

leadership as soon as possible, was more important part of the argument than individual personalities. Information from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Department of State officials, 2002 and 2003.

150

Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p.393. Franks reports tha

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