India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations
Congressional research reportAug 31, 2007
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India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations
-name redactedAnalyst in Asian Trade and Finance
-name redactedSpecialist in South Asian Affairs
August 31, 2007
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL34161
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations
Summary
After decades of strained political relations, the U.S. and Indian governments are currently
pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on numerous overlapping interests, shared values, and
improved economic and trade relations. India is in the midst of a rapid economic expansion, and
many U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market and a candidate for foreign investment.
For its part, the current Indian government sees itself continuing the economic reforms started in
1991, aimed at transforming a quasi-socialist economy into a more open, market-oriented
economy. However, the U.S. government is concerned that India’s economic reforms are
progressing too slowly and unevenly.
Bilateral merchandise trade has grown from $6 billion in 1990 to $33 billion in 2006. Although
India was only the 21st largest export market for the United States in 2006, the United States has
become India’s leading trading partner, mostly due to the growth in India’s exports to the United
States. However, recent increases in trade with China have made it a close second to the United
States. In 2006, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India totaled $13 billion. In 2006, India’s
gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 9.2%, a growth rate second only to China among Asian
nations. India’s economic growth has also brought about the emergence of a sizeable “middle
class” and the largest number of billionaires in Asia, but the country’s mostly rural population
remains comparatively poor and largely isolated from the benefits of growth. In addition, there is
growing concern that the economy is “overheated,” as evidenced by rising rates of inflation.
Moreover, despite several years of strong growth, investment in infrastructure is lagging, creating
a potential bottleneck for long-term economic expansion. Finally, attempts at additional economic
reforms aimed at resolving these and other economic problems are constrained by India’s political
dynamics.
Despite the significant liberalization of India’s trade and foreign investment policies, there remain
a number of bilateral and multilateral trade issues between the United States and India. The
United States seeks greater market access to India’s agricultural market and key service sectors
for its exports and for foreign direct investment. The United States is also concerned about
“outsourcing,” and would also like to see improvements in India’s intellectual property rights
protection. India, for its part, calls for the lowering of perceived U.S. barriers to agricultural and
service imports, as well as an expansion of the H-1B visa program.
Many of the more prominent Indo-U.S. trade issues may have indirect implications for Congress.
The growth of India’s services exports to the United States has contributed to congressional
consideration of possible legislation to provide greater assistance to displaced U.S. workers. Also,
India’s growing demand for crude oil has raised the possibility of boosting bilateral energy
cooperation. Finally, the passage of the Hyde Act in 2006 (P.L. 109-401) has led to the
negotiations of a bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation (“123”) agreement, which cannot go into
effect without congressional approval. For a broader review, see CRS Report RL33529, IndiaU.S. Relations, by (name redacted). This report will be updated as warranted.
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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
India’s Political and Economic Climate .......................................................................................2
Overview ..............................................................................................................................2
Brief Political Economic History of India ..............................................................................4
Current Political Climate for Economic Reform ..........................................................................6
Key Political Figures and Institutions ....................................................................................7
Major Political Parties and Coalitions....................................................................................8
The UPA and the Indian National Congress .....................................................................8
The NDA and the Bharatiya Janata Party.........................................................................9
The Left Front and the CPI-M ....................................................................................... 10
Regional Factors and Variations .......................................................................................... 11
The West....................................................................................................................... 11
The North ..................................................................................................................... 11
The South ..................................................................................................................... 11
The East........................................................................................................................ 12
Maoist Insurgency............................................................................................................... 12
India’s Current Economic Condition ......................................................................................... 13
Sectoral Shift to Services .................................................................................................... 13
Declining Poverty, Emerging Middle Class ......................................................................... 14
Rapid Growth in Trade........................................................................................................ 15
Balance of Trade ........................................................................................................... 16
Top Merchandise Exports.............................................................................................. 16
Top Merchandise Imports.............................................................................................. 18
Trade in Services........................................................................................................... 18
Risk of Overheating? .......................................................................................................... 20
India’s Current Economic and Trade Policies............................................................................. 21
Economic Policies of the UPA Government......................................................................... 22
UPA Budgets................................................................................................................. 22
Privatization.................................................................................................................. 23
Labor Reforms .............................................................................................................. 24
Infrastructural Development.......................................................................................... 24
Special Economic Zones ............................................................................................... 25
India’s Trade Policies .......................................................................................................... 26
Tariff Rates and Enforcement ........................................................................................ 27
Import Restrictions........................................................................................................ 27
U.S. Trade Barrier Assessment ...................................................................................... 28
India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations ................................................................................. 28
Trends in Merchandise Trade .............................................................................................. 28
India’s Merchandise Trade with the United States.......................................................... 28
U.S. Merchandise Trade with India ............................................................................... 30
Top Traded Commodities .............................................................................................. 32
Emerging Competition from China................................................................................ 33
Trade in Services................................................................................................................. 34
Foreign Direct Investment................................................................................................... 35
Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Relations ........................................................................... 37
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Bilateral Agreements and Relations ............................................................................... 37
World Trade Organization and Other Multilateral Relations........................................... 40
Key Economic and Trade Issues ................................................................................................ 42
Agricultural Goods.............................................................................................................. 42
Clothing and Textiles .......................................................................................................... 44
Dual-Use Technology and Military Trade ............................................................................ 47
Foreign Direct Investment................................................................................................... 49
Intellectual Property Rights ................................................................................................. 50
Jewelry ............................................................................................................................... 51
Oil ...................................................................................................................................... 52
Trade in Information Technology and Other Services .......................................................... 52
H-1B Visas ................................................................................................................... 53
Implications for the 110th Congress ........................................................................................... 54
Energy Cooperation ............................................................................................................ 54
Immigration ........................................................................................................................ 54
The Farm Bill ..................................................................................................................... 55
Foreign Direct Investment................................................................................................... 55
Outsourcing and Displaced Workers.................................................................................... 55
Figures
Figure 1. India’s Nominal Gross Domestic Product, 2002-2007................................................. 13
Figure 2. Growth in India’s Merchandise and Service Trade, 1990-2005.................................... 15
Figure 3. India’s Trade and Current Account Balance ................................................................ 16
Figure 4. Growth in India’s Services Exports, 1990-2005 .......................................................... 19
Figure 5. Growth in India’s Services Imports, 1990-2005 .......................................................... 20
Figure 6. India’s Merchandise Trade with the United States, 1958-2006 .................................... 29
Figure 7. U.S. Share of India’s Merchandise Trade, 1958-2006.................................................. 30
Figure 8. U.S. Merchandise Trade with India, 1958-2006(U.S. $ Billions) ................................. 31
Figure 9. India’s Share of U.S. Merchandise Trade, 1958-2006.................................................. 32
Figure 10. India’s Trade with the United States and China, 2000-2006....................................... 34
Figure 11. Growth in U.S. Investments in India, 1990-2005....................................................... 36
Figure 12. U.S. Textiles and Clothing Imports from India, 2000-2006 ....................................... 45
Figure 13. Exchange Rate: Indian Rupees per U.S. Dollar, 2005-2007....................................... 46
Figure 14. Map of India............................................................................................................. 56
Tables
Table 1. Sectoral Breakdown of India’s GDP............................................................................. 14
Table 2. India’s Top 10 Merchandise Exports, 2000 and 2006.................................................... 17
Table 3. India’s Top 10 Merchandise Imports, 2000 and 2006.................................................... 18
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Table 4. Top Five Traded Commodities: U.S.-Indian Bilateral Merchandise Trade, 2006 ........... 32
Table 5. Indo-U.S. Trade in Services, 2000-2005....................................................................... 35
Table 6. Trade in Agricultural Goods: India and the United States, 2006 .................................... 43
Table 7. U.S. Trade Balance with India, 2000-2006 ................................................................... 45
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 57
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Introduction
Economic and trade relations between the United States and India have experienced a number of
ups and downs since India’s independence in 1947. During much of the 1950s and early 1960s,
the United States was a leading trading partner for India, providing the nation with about a third
of its imports. However, those economic ties quickly subsided when India fostered closer ties
with the Soviet Union following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. For the next 40 years, political
and economic relations between India and the United States were rather cool.
Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a “strategic partnership” based on
numerous shared values and improved economic and trade relations.1 India is in the midst of a
rapid economic expansion, and many U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market and a
candidate for foreign investment. For its part, the current Indian government sees itself continuing
the economic reforms started in 1991, aimed at transforming a quasi-socialist economy into a
more open, market-oriented economy. However, the U.S. government is concerned that India’s
economic reforms are progressing too slowly and unevenly.
According to official U.S. trade statistics, bilateral merchandise trade with India has grown from
under $10 billion in 1996 to nearly $31 billion in 2006—a trebling in a decade. In 1996, India
was the 32nd largest market for U.S. exports and the 25th largest source of imports. By 2006, India
had risen to be 21st biggest export market for the United States and the 18th biggest supplier of
imports. The United States’ total trade with India in 2006 exceeded that with Israel, Nigeria, and
Thailand.
Both governments appear to be committed to improving trade relations. On March 2, 2006,
President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh endorsed the goal of
doubling bilateral trade in three years.2 On December 18, 2006, President Bush signed into law
H.R. 5682, the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of
2006 (P.L. 109-401), signaling an intent to waive restrictions on civil nuclear cooperation with
India.
Despite the growth in bilateral trade and the improvement in trade relations, there are still a
number of economic and trade issues between India and the United States. Both nations seek
greater market access to the other’s domestic markets, as well as the lowering of perceived trade
barriers. In addition, both India and the United States would like to see changes in the other
nation’s legal and regulatory policies to help protect and promote exports and foreign direct
investment. Moreover, there are significant differences in the stances of the two countries in
various multilateral trade fora, including the current Doha Round of negotiations.
For Congress, resolution of some of the key economic and trade issues may involve alterations in
current federal law. In particular, changes in laws pertaining to agricultural goods,
pharmaceuticals, nuclear and dual-use technology, and immigration may be considered as part of
an effort to foster closer trade relations with India. Plus, Congress may consider heightened
oversight of U.S.-India trade relations.
1
For a broader discussion of the bilateral relationship, see CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, by (name re
dacted).
2
“U.S.-India Joint Statement.” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 2, 2006.
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This report provides a summary of India’s current political climate (with a focus on its effects on
the nation’s economic and trade policies), its economic condition and policies, the recent trends in
bilateral trade and foreign direct investment, and key economic and trade issues between India
and the United States. Where suitable, the report also compares India to China to provide a
different perspective on U.S. relations with both nations.
India’s Political and Economic Climate
Overview
India is the world’s most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative
government and the rule of law. With a robust and working democratic system, India is a federal
republic where the bulk of executive power rests with the prime minister and his or her cabinet
(the Indian president is a ceremonial chief of state with limited executive powers). As a nationstate, India presents a vast mosaic of hundreds of different ethnic groups, religious sects, and
social castes. Most of India’s prime ministers have come from the country’s Hindi-speaking
northern regions and all but two have been upper-caste Hindus.
Larger than Alaska, Texas, and California combined, India is a land of great demographic,
geographic, and climatological variety. From stark deserts in the west to thick jungles in the
northeast, the towering Himalaya mountains of the north to the vast tableland of the Deccan
Plateau of the south, and with the fertile Indo-Gangetic plain between, India dominates the Asian
Subcontinent and shares long borders with its six other continental states. About one-third of the
population lives in urban areas; an overwhelming majority of the remainder is engaged in the
agricultural sector. Most of India’s people inhabit either the alluvial soil of the Indo-Gangetic
plain across the north, or the eastern and western coasts of the southern Deccan Peninsula. About
290 million Indians live in the densely-populated northern states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar;
another 100 million live in the western state of Maharashtra. These three states account for more
than one-third of the country’s total population.
The 543-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is the locus of national political power, with directly
elected representatives from each of the country’s 28 states and 7 union territories. A smaller
upper house, the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), may review, but not veto, most legislation, and
has no power over the prime minister or the cabinet. Although India’s political stage is crowded
with numerous regional and caste-based parties, recent years have seen an increasingly dyadic
battle between two major parties that vie for smaller allies in a system that now requires
coalitional politics. No party has won a national election outright since 1984.
India has one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world. India’s real gross
domestic product (GDP) rose by 9.2% in 2006—a growth rate second only to China among Asian
nations. The strong GDP performance in 2006 capped five years of rapid economic expansion,
transforming India into the third largest economy in Asia (after Japan and China). Its recent
economic success is generally attributed to a combination of internal and external factors.
Internally, a series of economic reforms (begun when the current prime minister was finance
minister) have stimulated solid growth of India’s manufacturing and service sectors. Externally, a
relatively strong global economy, combined with India’s trade and investment liberalization
policies, have stimulated increased trade and investment flows to and from India.
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Despite the recent growth, India’s economy confronts several challenges to its future prosperity.
First, although the nation’s manufacturing and services sectors have grown rapidly, there has been
relatively little job creation. Second, its agricultural sector has experienced relatively slow growth
for many years. With more than half of Indian households still reliant on agriculture for their
income, the standard of living for much of the country’s population remains relatively low. There
are indications that most of the Indian populace remains untouched by and thus unimpressed with
the country’s widely touted economic boom.3
Third, the standard of living of India’s rural and urban poor is being threatened by an emerging
economic challenge—inflationary pressures. After seven years of modest inflation at or below 4%
per year, inflation in 2006 was nearly 7% and has risen to about 8% in the first part of 2007.4
India’s poor have been especially hard hit by major increases in the cost of food in recent years.
In the longer run, India faces three additional barriers to economic growth—lack of infrastructure,
bureaucratic obstacles, and environmental degradation. India’s economy is already hindered by its
inadequate transportation system and electricity shortage. Similarly, India’s complex and
entrenched bureaucracy frequently creates a barrier to implementing new economic policies and
programs. At the same time, its large population and recent rise in industrial output are putting
more and more pressure on India’s environment, exacerbating existing problems in providing its
people with clean, potable water, as well as clean air.
Even with the continued strength of the economy and the Singh government’s attempt to balance
its economic policies, many analysts see India facing a number of economic challenges and
believe there are still several important economic reforms that India should make to increase the
benefits generated by its restructured economy. In particular, critics of the current economic
policies point to the unequal distribution of the benefits of the economic reforms, noting that the
rapid economic growth has not brought a corresponding reduction in poverty in India, particularly
in rural areas. For some, the solution is to press forward more aggressively with the economic
reforms by greater liberalization of India’s domestic economic and international trade policies.
For others, the solution is reverse elements of the reform and refocus agriculture and India’s rural
population.
In March 2007, Prime Minister Singh addressed a roundtable hosted by the Economist magazine.
In his remarks, Prime Minister Singh provided a fairly comprehensive overview of his
administration’s view of the current status of the Indian economy, arguing that India’s economy
will probably continue its rapid growth for another decade or more.5 However, Singh also pointed
out India’s need for additional reforms, including changes to its banking and financial system, its
labor markets, and its “public service delivery mechanisms.” In light of India’s past and planned
reforms, he stated, “I find it surprising when I continue to hear complaints about our economy
still being a relatively inward-looking economy.”
The Bush Administration seems to hold a different view of India’s economic conditions,
maintaining that the Singh government ought to push forward more actively with its economic
3
See, for example, Somini Sengupta, “Economic Boom Fails to Generate Optimism in India,” New York Times, August
16, 2007.
4
Data based on price indices released by India’s Labour Bureau.
5
“Prime Minster’s Address at ‘The Economist’ Round Table on India,” The Economist, March 13, 2007.
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reforms. In September 2006, U.S. Ambassador to India, David Mulford, said to an audience in
New Delhi:
Today’s business environment in India is more favorable to trade and investment. But there
are signs of a pause in the reform process in recent months. Privatizations have stopped, and
political reality suggests that reform of other key sectors and policies of central interest to
investors will take longer than envisioned. It is important to bear in mind there are serious
economic costs to any loss of momentum on the reform front.... The solution to attracting
much greater private sector investment in energy and infrastructure development is a blend
of policies that includes better governance, market sensitive regulatory regimes, continued
liberalization of the financial sector that enables foreign and domestic private capital to
finance major projects, and the timely resolution of investor-state disputes.6
One U.S. trade official opined that it is only through meaningful reforms in India’s vast and
poorly performing agricultural sector that the country’s true economic potential can be realized.
This, he says, will require rural infrastructural improvements, land reform, and changes that will
allow foreign direct investment in the farm sector.7
Brief Political Economic History of India
A review of India’s economic and trade policies over the last 60 years reveals a pattern of
conceptual economic theory moderated by pragmatic political and economic considerations.
Major shifts in economic policy were typically initiated with significant changes and then
followed by a period of gradual adjustments.
Following its independence in 1947, the government of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the
Indian National Congress Party (INC) adopted an economic policy emphasizing rapid
industrialization, import substitution, and relatively high levels of government participation in
economic production. Monopolies were granted to state enterprises in a number of industries
considered of economic or strategic importance. Private companies in other industries were often
subject to licensing requirements and legally constrained in their size of operation. The
agricultural sector was a key focus of the First Five Year Plan, with the implementation of various
subsidy programs, food price controls, and restrictions on the transport of agricultural crops.
Labor laws provided workers with protection from managerial misconduct, but also significantly
reduced labor mobility. Both exports and imports were controlled by licenses and tariffs. Foreign
direct investment was also severely restricted both by industry and size.
Successive Indian governments, still headed by Prime Minister Nehru, remained relatively true to
these policies for both its First and Second Five Year Plans (1951-56 and 1956-61) with
moderately successful results. Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 3.6% for the First Five
Year Plan, and 2.5% for the Second Five Year Plan. Agricultural production rose 44% and
manufacturing output increased 144%. However, the economic policies were also leading to
growing merchandise trade and current account deficits that were depleting India’s foreign
reserves.
6
See http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/72175.htm.
Authors’ interview with Ambassador Douglas Hartwick, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for South and
Southwest Asia, Washington, DC, May 24, 2007.
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For the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66), Prime Minister Nehru and the INC made an adjustment
in its economic policies, shifting focus away from “rapid industrialization” over to a program of
“self sustained growth.” At the same time, India’s trade policy shifted from “import substitution”
to “efficient substitution of imports,” which in effect opened up new trade opportunities for goods
considered crucial to economic growth and development. This adjusted economic policy
remained in effect until the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan in 1990.
In 1990 and 1991, India was struck by a number of political and economic shocks. On the
political side, the INC refused to form a coalition government following a poor showing in the
elections of 1989. The next largest party, the Janata Dal, was able to form a coalition government,
headed by Prime Minister V.P. Singh, but it proved unstable and collapsed in December 1990.
During the election campaign of 1991, ex-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, and
P.V. Narasimha Rao was selected as the new leader for the INC. Following the INC’s success in
the 1991 elections, Rao became prime minister.
During the political tumult of 1990 and 1991, the combined effects of rise in oil prices
(precipitated by Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf) and the demise of the Soviet Union,
a major trading partner and a key source of foreign aid, led to a rapid devaluation of the rupee, a
depletion of India’s international reserves, and fears of an impending severe recession. In
response, Prime Minister Rao made a major and controversial change in economic policies
designed to restore faith in the rupee, replenish the nation’s international reserves, and stimulate
economic growth. These reforms were overseen by his finance minister, Manmohan Singh.
The initial round of reforms included several elements. First, efforts were made to reduce India’s
perpetual fiscal deficits at both the federal and state levels. Second, the number of sectors
reserved solely for the public sector were reduced from 18 industries to just three—military
aircraft and warships, nuclear energy generation, and railway transport. Third, India liberalized
international trade by reducing import tariffs, eliminating import restrictions, and opening up
India to foreign direct investment. Fourth, India liberalized its financial markets, by dismantling
its interest rate controls, reducing government regulations and permitting greater competition.
Following the initial round of economic reforms, India’s real GDP growth rate accelerated from
around 3-4% per year in the 1980s to 5-7% during the early 1990s. However, toward the end of
the decade, India’s economic growth began to slow. Some analysts attributed the economic
slowdown to a failure of the federal government to continue and to complete the economic
reforms initiated at the beginning of the decade. Other analysts argued that economic problems
generated by the reforms were creating structural barriers to continued growth.
The ensuing debate over the merits of the 1991 reforms contributed to a second period of gradual
economic reform in the second half of the 1990s and into the current decade. Since 1991, India
has made a number of significant changes in the structure of its economy, including:
•
The termination of state monopolies for all but three industries;
•
The elimination of the “License Raj”—prior to the reforms, there was a rather
elaborate system of licenses and regulations governing the establishment of a
business in India, making it a very timely and expensive process to start a new
concern;
•
The abolition of import licenses for most commodities;
•
A major reduction in average and peak tariff rates for imports;
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•
A reduction in domestic price controls for key consumer goods; and
•
A restructuring of many of the nation’s various subsidy programs.
However, some analysts argue that many Indians are skeptical about economic reforms in
general, thus posing a “marketing” problem for the government in a democratic system. Some
suggest that even segments of the private sector oppose reform efforts.8 Still, representatives of
the Indian business community insist that all of New Delhi’s progress in economic reform has
been voluntary and is not made under external pressure, and that the general path of liberalization
will continue to be followed regardless of what party or coalition is in power.9
Current Political Climate for Economic Reform
New Delhi’s current ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition was seated in May 2004,
when the INC, long associated with the Nehru-Gandhi families, won 145 of the Lok Sabha’s 543
seats and built a ruling coalition with the support of 14 smaller parties. The election unseated a
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which
had been in power under Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee since 1998. Some analysts saw in the
election results a rejection of the BJP’s neo-liberal economic reform program. 10 INC President
Sonia Gandhi surprised supporters and opponents alike by declining to assume the office of prime
minister, instead nominating her lieutenant, Manmohan Singh, a former finance minister.
The May 2004 poll results were notable for the best-ever national showing of a leftist alliance—
commonly known as the Left Front—led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M).
Although this Left Front is not part of the UPA coalition, it provides crucial parliamentary support
from the outside and was described as being “militant” in its opposition to the BJP’s privatization
efforts. The CPI-M seated the third largest number of parliamentarians in 2004 (43), but its vote
bank is almost wholly limited to the states of West Bengal and Kerala.
Immediately following the election, investor fears that a coalition government including
communists might curtail or halt India’s economic reform and liberalization process apparently
led to huge losses in the country’s stock markets. Market recovery began when INC leaders
quickly offered assurances that the new government would be “pro-growth, pro-savings, and proinvestment.”11 Indian industrial leaders also sought to assure foreign investors that Left Front
members are not “Cuba-style communists,” but could be expected to support the UPA reform
agenda. The Chief Minister of West Bengal, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, a CPI-M member, has
himself actively sought corporate investment in his state. 12 However, since coming to power, the
8
Pranab Bardhan, “Why is Reform Unpopular?,” Outlook (Delhi), October 6, 2006; V. Jayanth, “Why Economic
Reforms Are Unpopular,” Hindu (Chennai), January 21, 2006; N. Chandra Mohan, “The Anti-Reform Mindset,”
Outlook (Delhi), November 10, 2005.
9
Authors’ interview with Confederation of Indian Industry staff, Washington, DC, May 24, 2007.
10
See, for example, C.P. Chandrasekhar, “The Verdict and the Way Ahead,” Frontline (Chennai), June 18, 2004. See
also CRS Report RL32465, India’s 2004 National Elections, by (name redacted).
11
“Communists to Call Shots in India’s New Government,” Agence France Presse, May 14, 2004; Myles Neligan,
“India Election Takes Economic Toll,” BBC News, May 17, 2004; “No More Bear Hugs, Warns Congress,” Business
Standard (Bombay), May 18, 2004.
12
Edward Luce, “Communists Set to Back Delhi’s Reformist Budget,” Financial Times (London), June 17, 2004;
“India Inc Homes in on Red Citadel,” Indian Express (Delhi), May 21, 2004.
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Congress-led coalition has slowed certain aspects of its economic reform program, including
suspending major disinvestment and special economic zone initiatives. These moves are widely
viewed as gestures to the Left Front.13
While there are indications that both Prime Minister Singh and party chief Gandhi remain fairly
popular figures in India, February 2007 state elections in Punjab and Uttaranchal saw INC
candidates decisively defeated by the main opposition BJP and its allies, causing some pundits to
suggest that national economic policies and rising inflation may be damaging the ruling
coalition’s standing. Some analysts saw the “neoliberal policies” of the UPA as harming its
electoral position.14 In June, eight regional parties formally launched a new “Third Front” that
might emerge as a national alternative to the UPA and NDA. Well-known Tamil Nadu leader
Jayalalithaa is likely to lead.15 August 2007 political wrangling between the UPA and its Left
Front allies over planned U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation (the leftists oppose the plan) has
added to political instability in New Delhi and led some to foresee early national polls if Singh’s
coalition loses Left Front support.16
Key Political Figures and Institutions
Several governmental figures and trade-related institutions wield influence over India’s economic
policies. The following is a selected listing of key economic players in the current government:
13
14
•
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, INC member and widely-respected Oxfordeducated economist who, as finance minister from 1991-1995, was the architect
of a comprehensive set of national economic reforms;
•
INC President Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow of former Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, while not formally a member of the central government, oversaw
the UPA’s 2004 poll victory and wields considerable influence over the
coalition’s policy making;
•
Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, a Harvard-educated lawyer
from the southern state of Tamil Nadu (and member a regional affiliate of the
INC) who served as finance minister in the late1990s, is considered to be a
highly-competent, pro-market fiscal manager;
•
Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath, an INC stalwart from the eastcentral Madhya Pradesh state, has launched major trade policy initiatives and is a
key interlocutor for the U.S. government;
•
Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia, a widelyrespected, Oxford-educated economist who works directly under Prime Minister
Singh and has close ties to Washington;
Pramit Mitra, “India’s Economic Millstone,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 22, 2005.
Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “Mid-Term Challenges,” Frontline (Chennai), March 23, 2007.
15
The new front includes such regional powerhouses as the Telugu Desam of Andhra Pradesh, the AIADMK of Tamil
Nadu, and the Samajwadi of Uttar Pradesh.
16
Sanjoy Mamunder, “Is the Indian Government Going to Last?,” BBC News, August 20, 2007.
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•
Oil Minister Murli Deora, INC member and former mayor of Mumbai who was
appointed in 2006, by some accounts due to pressures for a more pro-business,
pro-U.S. oil minister;
•
Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde, an INC stalwart and former Chief
Minister of Maharashtra;
•
CPI-M General Secretary Prakash Karat, a vocal critic of many economic
reforms and of India’s warming relations with the United States, is the most
notable leader of the UPA-supporting Left Front;
•
BJP President Rajnath Singh, a Hindu nationalist from the Uttar Pradesh state
who served in the government of former Prime Minister Vajpayee, is seen as a
new-generation leader for India’s main opposition party and has been critical of
the UPA for slowing the process of economic reform;
•
The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), a
nationwide grouping of corporations, chambers of commerce, and business
associations that claims to speak directly or indirectly for more than 250,000
Indian business units; and
•
The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), a nongovernmental industry
group with a membership of more than 6,300 private and public sector
organizations that employs advisory and consultative processes aimed at
improving India’s business climate.
Major Political Parties and Coalitions
For many years, political power in India was monopolized by the Indian National Congress.
However, starting in the 1970s, INC dominance was challenged by the emergence of other,
increasingly influential political parties. In 1977, nearly 30 years after independence, the Janata
Dal Party’s Morarji Desai became India’s first-ever non-INC prime minister. Later, in the 1980s,
political party fragmentation in India led to an era of coalition governments, variously led by the
INC, the Janata Dal, or the BJP. As noted above, no party has won a national election outright
since 1984.
India’s political landscape offers no clear division between proponents and opponents of
economic reform. Prime Minister Nehru and the INC oversaw decades of centralized economic
planning—and today the UPA coalition relies on leftist forces that strongly oppose liberalizing
policies—yet it was also later INC governments that launched India’s major reform and
liberalization programs. At the same time, the main opposition BJP accelerated “second
generation” economic reforms during its time in power from 1998 to 2004, even as the BJP is
home to some Hindu nationalist and “swadeshi” (self-reliance) forces that maintain a deep
scepticism of neo-liberal economic systems.
The UPA and the Indian National Congress
Generally perceived as being a center-left coalition, the UPA is an alliance among the INC and 14
smaller regional parties, including the Bihar-based Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of Tamil Nadu. INC members hold about two-thirds of the
coalition’s 219 Lok Sabha seats, as well as all of the four major cabinet posts (External Affairs,
Defense, Home, and Commerce). In forming a government, the UPA coalition created a
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“Common Minimum Program,” a document providing the basic principles of governance that
would guide the UPA, along with a policy framework for specific issue-areas.17 Left Front
support for the UPA—which is necessary for the coalition to maintain majority status in the
Parliament—has been predicated on government strategies that were seen as compatible with the
provisions of the Common Minimum Program.
In addition to taking credit for India’s dramatic economic growth during the 1990s and criticizing
the BJP for “mismanaging” the economy in general and reform efforts specifically, the INC’s
economic agenda for the 2004 elections, entitled “An Expanding Economy, A Just Society,”
called for achieving up to 10% annual GDP growth, while also seeking a shift of emphasis from a
rapid rate of growth to “a specific pattern of growth” that would benefit all segments of the
population, with ambitious (and far from realized) promises to “abolish” an array of societal ills,
including hunger, unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. A major aspect of this proposed effort
would involve creating “a congenial atmosphere” for both domestic and foreign investment. The
INC also blamed the BJP-led government for abject failure in the agricultural sector (which
employs more than two-thirds of India’s workforce), vowing major public investments in rural
infrastructure.18
The NDA and the Bharatiya Janata Party
The right-leaning NDA, which held power in New Delhi from 1998-2004, is dominated by the
BJP, which holds nearly three-quarters of the alliance’s 189 Lok Sabha seats (12 smaller regional
parties hold the remainder). The surprise emergence of the BJP as a national political force in the
early 1990s gave voice to a repudiation not only of the Nehru-INC secular version of Indian
nationalism, but also of its concepts of state-directed economic planning. Instead, the BJP called
for major liberalization efforts, including abolition of India’s complex system of permits and
licenses, as well as a selling off of most public sector enterprises. Many early BJP economic
policy recommendations were, in fact, adopted by Prime Minister Rao’s INC government in the
early 1990s.
However, the BJP subsequently moderated some of its liberalization policies, and also had to deal
with tensions between Hindu nationalism and the entry into India of major multinational
corporations, which some feared would lead to an erosion of “Hindu culture.” This led to
measured support for trade protectionism and what the party called “calibrated globalization.”19
While also asserting a goal of “complete eradication of poverty and unemployment,” the BJP’s
2004 economic agenda was more enthusiastic about unfettered continuation of economic reform
efforts and did not place the same degree of emphasis on “social justice” as did the INC. The
NDA’s premier statement in 2004 promised an energetic continuation of economic reforms across
a multitude of sectors.20 BJP leaders subsequently have been critical of the INC-led government
for significantly slowing the reform process, sometimes accusing the UPA of buckling under
pressure from leftist parties. Moreover, the BJP has been critical of the way in which the Singh
government has entered into an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States,
claiming that provisions of such an agreement will constrain India’s nuclear weapons program.
17
See the UPA’s May 2004 Common Minimum Program at http://pmindia.nic.in/cmp.pdf.
Congress Party 2004 Economic Agenda at http://aicc.org.in/economic_agenda.php.
19
Craig Baxter, op. cit, p. 113-114; “More Globalization,” Indian Express (Delhi), January 30, 2004.
20
BJP 2004 Economic Agenda at http://bjp.org/Press/mar_3104a.htm; NDA 2004 Agenda at http://www.bjp.org/Press/
NDA%20Agenda.htm.
18
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Organized resistance to proposed economic reforms has come from Hindu nationalist groups that
were influential under the BJP government from 1998 to 2004. As a “sister organization” to the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—a leading Hindu nationalist organization—the Swadeshi Jagaran
Manch (SJM) has taken the lead in efforts to forward the swadeshi (self-reliance) cause.
According to the SJM, “The Western notion of a global market does not fit into the swadeshi
approach,” nor does the “Western notion of individual freedom, which fragments and
compartmentalizes family, economy, culture, and social values....” Such anti-globalization
policies continue to enjoy limited, but still substantial backing among Indians. The swadeshi
lobby did, however, welcome the UPA’s Common Minimum Program document in 2004.21
The Left Front and the CPI-M
Long-time and bitter rivals of the INC, India’s major communist parties now provide outside
support to the INC-led ruling coalition as part of their mutual efforts to keep the BJP from power.
The current Left Front alliance is dominated by the CPI-M and, secondarily, the Communist Party
of India, which combine to account for about 85% of its 60 Lok Sabha seats. During the 1950s—
and in correspondence with growing Soviet support for the new Indian state—India’s various
communist groups resolved to abjure revolutionary ideology and work within the parliamentary
system. These parties, however, remain proponents of government-directed economic and
industrial development, moderate land reform programs, and strong labor protection laws.
Initially and still nominally opposed to the essence of New Delhi’s reform and liberalization
efforts since 1991, communist party leaders in their stronghold of West Bengal have continuously
sought both domestic and international investments in their state, thus demonstrating a
willingness to compromise in some areas of economic policy. Still, such leaders maintain an
intensive focus on caste-based and poverty issues, styling themselves as the champions of
minority groups and farmers, along with a deep-seated scepticism about the intentions and goals
of U.S. and Western political, military, and economic interests in India.
On economic policy, the Left Front has taken firm stands against raising limits of foreign direct
investment, against government efforts to privatize public sector enterprises, and against the
government’s initial plans to launch hundreds of Special Economic Zones in India. Along with its
considerable influence at the national level, the Left Front wields administrative power in the
states of Kerala and West Bengal, where important trade unions have caused disruption in the
course of major strikes and protests over inflation and unemployment.22
Since 2004, the Left Front has accused the UPA government of “serious violations” of the
Common Minimum Program, including its planned disinvestment from a major public sector
undertaking (PSU) in the summer of 2006. Communist parties characterize such moves as “antiworking class, neoliberal” policies being pushed by the UPA coalition. Moreover, these parties
view New Delhi’s apparent pro-U.S. foreign policy tilt as accentuating such neoliberal
initiatives.23 It is the Left Front’s opposition to “alliance” with the United States that is at the root
of its vehement opposition to planned U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation.
21
Swadeshi Jagaran Manch at http://www.swadeshi.org; “Swadeshi Sings Cong Praise,” Telegraph (Calcutta), June 2,
2004.
22
“Strike Shuts Down Indian States,” BBC News, December 14, 2006.
23
Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “Challenging Neoliberalism,” Frontline (Chennai), June 30, 2006.
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Regional Factors and Variations24
India’s political and economic situation is complicated by sharp regional contrasts in its economy.
While some cities and states are relatively prosperous and modern, many others are seriously
underdeveloped with significant poverty. These regional disparities not only have substantive
impact on economic policies, they also influence the nation’s politics. What follows is a brief
summary of India’s major geographic regions. (See Figure 14, “Map of India.”)
The West
Western India is a relatively prosperous region of the country. The state of Maharashtra, home to
Mumbai (formerly Bombay)—a megacity, the world’s third most populous and India’s business
and entertainment capital—is among the most urbanized of states, with some 42% of its citizens
living in cities, more than half of these in slums. Despite an abundance of urban poor, the state
ranks relatively high in measures of health, education, and infrastructure, and Mumbai itself has
some of the world’s highest real estate prices. Further to the west, the state of Gujarat has a
particularly productive agricultural sector and is said to be the region’s most lucrative investment
environment, with social and infrastructure measures nearing those of Maharashtra. Other
western states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh rank in the middle-range on such measures. In
the southwest, the small state of Goa—a former Portuguese colony—has the country’s highest per
capita income.
The North
The Delhi National Capital Territory is another Indian megacity. It is also the most affluent of
India’s administrative districts, with a per capita income double the national average. In fact,
along with Delhi, the medium-sized northern states of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Haryana
form India’s most prosperous region, as well as its largest market for many products and services.
However, immediately to the east, Uttar Pradesh is the most populous and among the poorest of
Indian states, consistently ranking low in development measures. Further to the north and isolated
by mountainous terrain is the Jammu and Kashmir state, which has been suffering the effects of a
religious-based insurgency since 1989. Still, “J&K” has relatively low poverty rates.
The South
Much of the recent global attention on India has focused on its fast-growing states of Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh, which (along with Delhi) have been at the forefront of the country’s widelytouted software and information technology boom. Their respective capital cities—Bangalore and
Hyderabad—have earned fame as emerging hubs for high-technology research and services, as
well as for business process outsourcing (BPO) centers which serve many of the world’s largest
corporations. Other major southern states are Kerala, known for its social infrastructure and a
91% literacy rate, and Tamil Nadu, with its major commercial and industrial capital of Chennai
(formerly Madras), said by some to be India’s best-governed state. Despite the massive
infrastructural and environmental problems caused by the rapid growth of its cities, India’s
southern region has been dubbed the country’s most livable by India Today magazine.
24
Much of the state-specific information in the regional overviews comes from “The State of the States,” India Today
(Delhi), September 11, 2006.
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The East
The numerous states of India’s east and northeast face historical and geographical disadvantages
that include inaccessibility and several ongoing armed insurgencies. This region thus continues to
be India’s least developed and its infrastructure remains quite poor. Bihar, India’s poorest state,
consistently ranks at or near the bottom of most development indices, and Orissa, Jharkhand, and
Chhattisgarh are similarly challenged. West Bengal, with the megacity and former British
colonial capital of Calcutta (now officially called Kolkata) is eastern India’s fastest-growing and
most important commercial and industrial center, even as jute and tea represent major cash crops.
A stronghold of India’s communist parties, West Bengal was also the site of major and lethal
March 2007 protests against the establishment of a new special economic zone (SEZ). The
“Seven Sisters”—smaller northeastern states connected to the rest of India by a 20-mile-wide
“Chicken Neck”—are relatively sparsely populated and are distinguished by considerable
religious and ethnic diversity. One result has been armed tribal and separatist conflicts, some of
which pre-date Indian independence, that present major obstacles to economic development.
Maoist Insurgency
India suffers from an increasingly lethal and disruptive conflict with “Naxalites”—Maoist
insurgents ostensibly engaged in violent struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribals. As
many as 20,000 armed rebels, active mainly in inland areas of southern, eastern, and central India,
claim to be battling oppression and exploitation in order to create a classless society. Their
opponents call them terrorists and extortionists. The groups get their name from Naxalbari, a West
Bengal village and site of a militant peasant uprising in 1967. In 2006, Prime Minister Singh
identified a worsening Maoist insurgency as “the single biggest internal security challenge” ever
faced by India, saying it threatened India’s democracy and “way of life.” The U.S. State
Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 warned that actions of the Maoist insurgents
“grew in sophistication and lethality” during 2006.25 Naxalites now operate in about half of
India’s 28 states; Andhra Pradesh and, more recently, Chhattisgarh have been particularly hard hit
(Naxalites were behind a 2003 landmine attack that nearly killed the chief minster of Andhra
Pradesh). Related violence caused more than 700 deaths in 2006, including nearly 300 civilians,
and has not waned in 2007.
The insurgents are seen to have a detrimental effect on economic development in some regions of
India. During his first visit to Hyderabad in 2005, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford
reportedly said that he and potential U.S. investors had been concerned about Maoist violence in
Andhra Pradesh, but received “good answers” about the investment climate from area business
leaders.26 Still, Maoist attacks on roads, railways, and other infrastructure targets can retard
development in affected areas, and the rebels are most active in those Indian states that contain
the great bulk of the country’s coal supplies, raising a further threat to energy security.27
25
“A Specter Haunting India,” Economist (London), August 17, 2006; Department of State report at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm.
26
“Indo-US Ties at All-Time High: Mulford,” Economic Times (Delhi), January 29, 2005.
27
Mark Sappenfield, “In Heart of India, A Little-Known Civil War,” Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 2007.
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India’s Current Economic Condition
Over the last five years, India has been one of Asia’s fastest growing economies. Figure 1 shows
India’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) for the years 2002 to 2007. In nominal terms,
India’s GDP grew from 24.5 trillion rupees in 2002 to 40.3 trillion rupees in 2006—an increase of
64% in four years—and is projected to reach 45.6 trillion rupees in 2007. When converted into
“real” GDP using a purchasing power parity conversion,28 India’s GDP rose from $3.2 trillion in
2002 to $4.4 trillion in 2006, and is projected to increase to $4.7 trillion in 2007.
Figure 1. India’s Nominal Gross Domestic Product, 2002-2007
50,000
45,000
40,000
Billion Rupees
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007 (proj.)
Nominal GDP
Source: Global Insight
Sectoral Shift to Services
Much of India’s economic growth has been the result of the expansion of its manufacturing and
service sectors. Table 1 provides a sectoral breakdown of India’s real GDP for fiscal years 1996,
2001, and 2006.29 Although the value of all three sectors increased, growth in the services sector
exceeded that of the manufacturing sector, and the manufacturing sector grew faster than the
agricultural sector. As a result, the portion of GDP contributed by the agricultural sector fell, the
share of the manufacturing sector declined slightly, and the contribution of the services sector
rose.
28
Purchasing power parity converts one currency into another by using an exchange rate designed to equalize the
relative purchasing power of the two currencies relative to a defined set of commodities. The simplest and best known
“purchasing power parity” conversions is The Economist’s “Big Mac Index” that compares currencies based on the
relative prices for a Big Mac in different nations.
29
India reports its official economic data using its fiscal year, which runs April-March.
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The dominance of the services sector in India’s GDP hides the continued importance of
agriculture to the Indian population. An estimated 71% of India’s population in 2006 lived in rural
areas, with over half of those people living in villages of less than 5,000 people.30 While there has
been growth in non-agricultural employment in India, about two-thirds of India’s male population
in 2004 continued to work primarily in agricultural activities.31
Table 1. Sectoral Breakdown of India’s GDP
FY1996
FY2001
FY2006
Agriculture
28.0%
23.9%
19.7%
Manufacturing
28.1%
27.2%
26.2%
Services
43.9%
48.9%
54.1%
Source: Ministry of Statistics, India
Another worrying aspect of the recent restructuring of India’s economy has been a surprising lack
of job creation. In other nations, when the economy exhibited rapid economic growth, along with
a shift from agriculture to manufacturing to services, there was a corresponding rise in
manufacturing and service employment. However, in India’s case, the level of job creation has
been low. According to a recent International Monetary Fund country study of India,
“employment in the organized sector has remained roughly unchanged at about 27 million over
the past decade and a half.”32
Some analysts attribute this to the nature of the manufacturing and services that dominate India’s
economic growth, claiming that they are typically higher-skilled, professional jobs in contrast to
the low-skill work generated in nations that previously experienced rapid economic growth.
Others point to India’s restrictive labor laws as being a major barrier to job creation.
Declining Poverty, Emerging Middle Class
The living conditions for much of India’s rural population have improved, but conditions for
many remain quite meager. As of 2002, only 27% of India’s rural households had access to tap
water; over half relied on tube wells or hand pumps for water. Nearly half of India’s rural
household do not have electricity for lighting, and less than 10% possess a telephone, either
landline or cell phone. One government study found that 77% of Indians—more than 830 million
people—live on less than 20 rupees (about 50 cents) per day.33 The U.N. Development Program
ranked India 126th out of 177 countries on its 2006 human development index (between Namibia
and Cambodia), up from 127th in 2005.
30
Selected Socioeconomic Statistics India 2006, p. 14.
31
“Employment and Unemployment Situation in India, 2004-05,” National Sample Survey Organization, India,
September 29, 2006.
32
IMF Country Report No. 07/63, p. 26. The “organized sector” refers to non-government salaried or wage
employment in the following sectors: agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing;
utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade; tourism; transportation, storage, and communications; and various
services.
33
“Nearly 80% of India Lives on Half Dollar a Day,” Reuters, August 8, 2007.
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At the other end of the income scale, India has a substantial number of wealthy people and a large
and growing urban middle class. A byproduct of India’s growth is the emergence of a relatively
prosperous and substantial middle class. India has long had a small wealthy sub-population in
both its urban centers and rural communities. In a notable indicator of its growing wealth, India in
2007 beat out Japan as the home of the most billionaires in Asia, with 36.34 However, its middle
class was comparatively small in number. According to one estimate, India’s middle class in the
mid-1980s constituted less than 10% of the population.35 Since the implementation of economic
reforms, India’s middle class has grown in size and affluence. Current estimates vary, but most
studies indicate that less than 20% of India’s households are in the middle class.36
Rapid Growth in Trade
The sectoral shift of India’s domestic economy is partially driven by the rapid growth in the
nation’s trade in goods and services. Figure 2 shows the increase in both merchandise and service
trade from 1990 to 2005. Between 1990 and 1999, India’s total merchandise trade doubled in
value and its trade in services trebled in value. Since 1999, India’s international trade growth has
accelerated. Between 1999 and 2005, India’s total merchandise trade and imports of services
nearly tripled in value, and its exports of services quadrupled in value.
Figure 2. Growth in India’s Merchandise and Service Trade, 1990-2005
140
120
US$ Billion
100
80
60
40
20
Merchandise Trade
Exports
Imports
Services Trade
Exports
Imports
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Source: World Trade Organization
34
“India Leads Asia Billionaire Club,” BBC News, March 9, 2007.
Das, Gurcharan, “India’s Growing Middle Class,” The Globalist, November 5, 2001.
36
Ibid.
35
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Balance of Trade
The overall growth of international trade has also created a potential economic problem—a
growing trade and current account deficit (see Figure 3). From fiscal year (FY) 1997 to 2004,
India’s merchandise trade balance—exports minus imports—generally ran a deficit of less than
$20 billion. However, since FY2004, India’s merchandise trade deficit has grown from $13.7
billion to a projected $63.7 billion in FY2007. Along with this rise in India’s balance of trade
deficit, its current account balance has gone from a surplus of $14.1 billion in FY2004 to an
estimated deficit of $14.1 billion in FY2007.
Figure 3. India’s Trade and Current Account Balance
(U.S. $ Billions)
20
0
-20
-40
-60
Balance of Trade
FY07
FY06
FY05
FY04
FY03
FY02
FY01
FY00
FY99
FY98
FY97
-80
Current Account Balance
Source: International Monetary Fund
Top Merchandise Exports
The recent rise in India’s merchandise exports has been led by the production of oil, ores, metals,
motor vehicles, and machinery (see Table 2).37 In 2006, oil displaced jewelry as India’s top
exported commodity. Nearly three-quarters of India’s oil exports in 2006 were high-speed diesel
and other fuels. Also, India’s exports of ores, slag, and ash increased from less than $500 million
in 2000 to almost $4.6 billion in 2006, when more than four-fifths of the value came from exports
of iron ore, and more than 86% of these iron ore exports went to China.
37
Merchandise trade data is reported according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of
tariff nomenclature, an internationally standardized system of names and numbers for classifying traded products
developed and maintained by the World Customs Organization (WCO). Both India and the United States utilize the HS
code.
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Table 2. India’s Top 10 Merchandise Exports, 2000 and 2006
(U.S. $ millions)
HS
Chapter
Description
2000
2006
Percent
Change
71
Jewelry
7,827.5
16,203.4
107.0%
27
Oil
1,410.7
10,479.6
642.9%
62
Non-Knit Clothing
3,744.7
5,061.2
35.2%
29
Organic Chemicals
1,615.3
4,450.8
175.5%
26
Ores, Slag and Ash
451.6
4,348.4
862.9%
72
Iron And Steel
1,175.0
4,151.6
253.3%
84
Machinery
1,221.0
4,066.0
233.0%
87
Motor Vehicles & Parts
851.6
3,204.2
276.2%
61
Knit Clothing
1,724.8
3,016.8
74.9%
73
Articles of Iron or Steel
909.6
2,749.8
202.3%
42,299.4
121,259.3
186.7%
Total Exports
Source: Global Trade Atlas
The buildup in India’s exports of motor vehicles and parts has several elements. Nearly a third of
the exports—$1.257 billion in 2006—are automotive parts, with the United States as the largest
export market, purchasing almost $340 million. The second segment of India’s chapter 87 exports
are automobiles, worth $1.501 billion in 2006, and shipped principally to Europe. In addition,
India also exported a large amount of motorcycles—nearly $319 million worth in 2006.38
Another notable aspect of India’s recent export growth is the relatively poor performance of its
past leading exports—jewelry and clothing. In 2000, India’s top four exports were jewelry (HS
Chapter 71), non-knit clothing (HS chapter 62), cotton cloth and yarn (HS Chapter 52), and knit
clothing (HS Chapter 61). By 2006, non-knit clothing had slid to third place and knit clothing had
dropped to ninth, despite the expiration of the quotas under WTO Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing on January 1, 2005.39
Despite the rise and fall of other commodities, jewelry remained India’s top export in 2006.
Within jewelry, India continues to be primarily an exporter of diamonds. In 2006, two-thirds of
India’s jewelry exports were cut, unmounted diamonds. India’s top markets for its diamonds
were, in order: Hong Kong ($3.2 billion), the United States ($2.5 billion), Belgium ($1.4 billion),
and the United Arab Emirates ($1.2 billion).
38
The top five destinations for India’s motorcycle exports in 2006 were, in order: Sri Lanka, Colombia, Bangladesh,
Nepal, and the Philippines.
39
For details on clothing and textile trade after the expiration of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, see
CRS Report RL34106, U.S. Clothing and Textile Trade with China and the World: Trends Since the End of Quotas, by
(name redacted).
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Top Merchandise Imports
In contrast to exports, India’s top 10
Are India and China Export Rivals?
merchandise imports remained relatively
Given their similarities, one might expect China and India
stable between 2000 and 2006 (see Table 3).
to be direct competitors in the global commodity
Oil was and remains India’s top import, and
markets. However, their respective official export data
over three-quarters of its oil imports are crude
provides only modest support for this idea.
oil. Jewelry remains India’s second biggest
India and China share only one category—non-knit
import, consisting of nearly equal amounts of
clothing—among their top five exports. Expanding the
gold and diamonds to be used by India’s
comparison to their top 10 exports, three more
categories are added—machinery, knit clothing, and
jewelry manufacturing industry. The next two
articles of iron and steel—which are India’s seventh,
top import categories—machinery and
ninth, and tenth largest exports, respectively.
electrical machinery—incorporate both
consumer goods (televisions, telephones, and
computers) and intermediate goods (hard disc drives and integrated circuits). Finally, the fastest
growing import category among the top ten, iron and steel, was more than 90% copper imports.
Table 3. India’s Top 10 Merchandise Imports, 2000 and 2006
(U.S. $ millions)
HS
Chapter
Description
2000
2006
Percent
Change
27
Oil
17,535.0
45,880.0
161.6%
71
Jewelry
9,953.3
23,462.7
135.7%
84
Machinery
4,195.1
12,839.8
206.1%
85
Electrical Machinery
2,679.4
11,051.4
312.5%
72
Iron and Steel
1,000.4
5,318.3
431.6%
29
Organic Chemicals
1,594.2
5,112.1
220.7%
90
Laboratory and Medical Equipment
939.1
2,565.1
173.2%
39
Plastics
675.8
2,427.5
259.2%
15
Edible Oils
1,380.6
2,343.3
69.7%
28
Inorganic Chemicals
1,148.7
2,126.12
85.1%
Total Imports
50,577.5
172,876.3
241.8%
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
Trade in Services
The rapid rise in India’s merchandise trade has been outdone by even faster growth in trade in
services. The value of India’s services exports increased 250% between 2000 and 2005, while the
value of its services imports increased 176%. In 2005, the total value of India’s services trade was
$108.3 billion, or nearly half the size of its total merchandise trade. India’s services trade surplus
in 2005 was $3.9 billion.
Figure 4 shows the sharp increase in India’s services exports from 1990 to 2005. Although both
transportation and travel services experienced strong growth over this time period, much of the
rapid expansion in services exports occurred in other service sectors. Over the 15 years in
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question, India’s services exports increased from $4.6 billion in 1990 to $56.1 billion in 2005—
more than a 12-fold increase in size.
Figure 4. Growth in India’s Services Exports, 1990-2005
60
US$ Billions
50
40
30
20
10
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
0
Transportation Services
Travel Services
Other Commercial Services
Source: World Trade Organization
Figure 5 presents the growth in India’s services imports between 1990 and 2005. The sectoral
composition of growth for services imports is similar to that of exports—transportation services
and travel services both increased, but the greatest growth was in the import of other commercial
services. Between 1990 and 2005, the value of India’s services imports grew almost nine-fold,
from $5.9 billion in 1990 to $52.2 billion in 2005.
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Figure 5. Growth in India’s Services Imports, 1990-2005
60
US$ Billions
50
40
30
20
10
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
0
Transportation Services
Travel Services
Other Commercial Services
Source: World Trade Organization
Risk of Overheating?
The structural changes in India’s economy, the decline in poverty, the emerging middle class and
the rapid growth in foreign trade are all seen as stoking the engines of economic growth in India.
In fact, there is rising concern that India’s economy may be growing too fast, raising fears of that
its recent success may soon be followed by a sharp economic downturn.
Commentators often point to India’s rising rate of inflation as evidence that its economy is
growing too fast. After several years of very modest inflation—about 4% per year—the consumer
price index (CPI) in India topped 7% in 2006 and remained high in the first half of 2007. In May
2007, the CPI for industrial workers was up 6.6% over the previous month, and the CPI for
agricultural workers was up 8.2%.40 The official government target is to bring inflation down to
4.0-4.5% in 2007, but some analysts project that the consumer price index will stay above 6%.
While Reserve Bank of India (RBI) increased interest rates and raised reserve requirements to
dampening inflationary pressures in 2006 and 2007, the efforts apparently have not significantly
slowed economic growth. The United Nations Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the
Pacific project India’s economy would grow by 9.0% in 2007, down only 0.2% from its 2006
growth rate.41 In 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected India’s GDP would grow
by 8.4% in 2007 and 7.8% in 2008.42 IMF recommendations on how to reduce the risk of the
40
Ministry of Statistics, Government of India.
41
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Survey of Asia and
the Pacific 2007, April 2007, p. 4.
42
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2007, chapter 1, p. 2.
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economy overheating focus on lowering the public debt (currently about 80% of GDP),
continuing to reduce the general government deficit, and promoting greater job growth. 43
Where the anti-inflationary efforts of the RBI may have affected the economy is India’s exports.44
According to some economists, the higher interest rates have contributed to a significant
appreciation of the rupee against the U.S. dollar and the Euro. The stronger rupee, these analysts
maintain, is making India’s exports less competitive. As will be discussed later in this report, the
strength of the rupee is supposedly hitting India’s jewelry and clothing exports especially hard.
India’s Current Economic and Trade Policies
The UPA coalition came into office promising sustained economic growth “in a manner that
generates employment.” It set out to enact guaranteed employment (for minimum 100-day
periods), and major public investment in social programs and in the agricultural and rural sectors.
The UPA also vowed to give a high priority to the development of physical infrastructure such as
roads, ports, power, railways, water supply, sewage treatment, and sanitation, even offering
“explicit” subsidies to bring private sector participation in this area. Economic reforms were to be
continued, but with a “human face”:
The UPA reiterates its abiding commitment to economic reforms with a human face, that
stimulates growth, investment, and employment. Further reforms are needed and will be
carried out in agriculture, industry, and services. The UPA’s economic reforms will be
oriented primarily to spreading and deepening rural prosperity, to significantly improving the
quality of public systems and delivery of public services, to bringing about a visible and
tangible difference in the quality of life of ordinary citizens of our country.45
The UPA economic priorities were largely welcomed by analysts calling for India to “get over its
obsession” with GDP growth and FDI so as to better attend to the needs of common citizens,
especially those in the rural, agricultural economies. These observers warn that a single-minded
focus on economic expansion facilitates significant damage to the environment and to human
health, as well as encouraging corruption. 46
The UPA economic program also addresses many of the economic challenges listed in a July
2006 World Bank report. According to the World Bank, India’s most pressing economic issues
are:
•
improving the delivery of core public services such as healthcare, education, and
power and water supply for all India’s citizens;
•
making growth more inclusive by diminishing existing disparities, accelerating
agricultural growth, improving the job market, and helping lagging states grow
faster;
43
“Booming India at Risk of Overheating,” IMF Survey, April 11, 2007, p.s 96-97.
For more details on the impact of appreciating rupee and India’s exports, see “The Rising,” by Shankkar Aiyar, India
Today, June 4, 2007.
45
See the UPA’s May 2004 Common Minimum Program at http://pmindia.nic.in/cmp.pdf.
46
See, for example, Prashant Bhushan, “Get Over the GDP-FDI Obsession,” Outlook (Delhi), January 5, 2006.
44
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•
sustaining growth by addressing its fiscal and trade deficits, and pushing ahead
with reforms that facilitate growth; and
•
addressing HIV/AIDS before the epidemic spreads to the general public.47
Economic Policies of the UPA Government
Prime Minister Singh took office in 2004 insisting that development would be a central priority of
the UPA government, with reforms aimed at reducing poverty and increasing employment. He
also emphasized that privatization was not part of UPA ideology and that major public sector
concerns would not be sold off. The appointment of Harvard-educated lawyer and economic
reformer Palaniappan Chidambaram to head the Finance Ministry, and a UPA Common Minimum
Program emphasizing economic growth and increased investment, were welcomed by most
business interests, even if the pace of privatization and labor reform efforts was expected to slow.
In brief, from the start, the Singh government has attempted to walk a tightrope of economic
policies designed to maintain its informal coalition government. Any sharp shift, either to the left
or the right, might bring about sufficient political opposition from coalition members to
destabilize the government. As a result, economic policies over the last three years have been
characterized as being modest in scope and uneven in implementation. Eighteen months after
taking power, for example, the UPA government was coming under fire for not pushing through a
single major economic reform initiative.48
Many analysts have attributed the government’s sidelining of reform initiatives to the influence of
the Left Front, yet resistance to economic reform may run deep among a broader spectrum of
ordinary Indians, many of whom are distrustful of the motives of an oftentimes corrupt political
class.49 This pattern of fitful gradualism is demonstrable by reviewing the key areas where the
Singh government has attempted to make substantive changes in the Indian economy.
UPA Budgets
Because India’s government continues to be a major economic force even after the economic
reforms of the 1990s, the federal budget is an important indicator of government priorities. In
FY2006/2007, the federal expenditures were 11.2% of GDP, and the fiscal deficit was 3.8% of
GDP. By comparison, U.S. government expenditures for FY2006/2007 were 19.9% of GDP, and
the fiscal deficit was 1.3% of GDP.50
The UPA’s first budget, released in July 2004, generally was lauded by Indian industrial groups as
“progressive and forward-looking.”51 Subsequent budgets were similarly greeted by business
47
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/DPR_overview.pdf.
48
Clay Chandler, “India’s Bumpy Ride,” Fortune, October 31, 2005; N. Chandra Mohan, “The Anti-Reform Mindset,”
Outlook (Delhi), November 10, 2005.
49
Anjana Pasricha, “India’s Communist Parties Slow Pace of Economic Reform,” VOA News, June 18, 2006; Pranab
Bardhan, “Why Is Reform Unpopular?,” Outlook (Delhi), October 6, 2006.
50
Congressional Budget Office figures.
51
“Reformers Take Control,” Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), June 3, 2004; “CII Applauds UPA’s
Maiden Budget,” Confederation of Indian Industry Press Release, New Delhi, July 8, 2004.
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interests, even as the prime minister and finance minister were seen to be tempering some of their
more reformist instincts with heavy social and anti-poverty spending. 52
India’s federal budget for FY2007/2008 is an apparent response to the criticisms of economic
reforms from both ends of the political spectrum. In part, the budget continues the past program
of liberalization, while also giving greater attention to the agricultural sector and efforts to
provide more assistance to India’s poor. Such efforts are still viewed by the Left Front as being
insufficient; this faction accuses the Singh government of prioritizing expenditure reduction over
services for the poor. Meanwhile, opposition BJP leaders have criticized UPA budgets for slowing
or even abandoning economic reform programs.53
One of the more difficult components of the government’s budget is its efforts on poverty
reduction. In August 2005, the lower house of India’s Parliament passed a $9 billion jobs bill
promising guaranteed work for up to 25 million of India’s poorer citizens. Some critics called the
initiative the kind of “socialism” that diverts scarce resources to efforts that have failed in the
past, with most funding being lost to administrative costs and corruption. Yet the World Bank
supported the policy, predicting it would help sustain growth.54 Having rebuffed the previous
critics, in February 2006 the Singh government formally launched the country’s most ambitious
anti-poverty initiative that would provide guaranteed jobs for one member of each of India’s 60
million rural households.
Another chronic budgetary problem is balancing needs with resources. As described below, India
has seriously underinvested in infrastructure for decades. However, a culture of tax evasion limits
funds for public services. One report has only 30 million Indians paying any taxes and only 15%
of federal government revenue coming from tax collection.55
Privatization
India continues to retain remnants of its pre-reform “democratic socialist” economy. Three
strategic sectors of the economy—railroads, nuclear power, and military aircraft and warships—
remain state monopolies and closed to the private sector. However, the Singh government is
continuing the privatization policies of its predecessor, but at a more gradual pace. Within the
government, the Department of Disinvestment of the Ministry of Finance oversees India’s
privatization program.
The privatization slowdown has not proven to be acceptable to elements of the UPA coalition. In
July 2006, Prime Minister Singh announced that all government disinvestment decisions would
be put on hold following opposition from the DMK party, a powerful Tamil Nadu-based member
of the ruling coalition. The move was criticized by industrial groups. Barely a month later, the
Singh government announced that it was abandoning plans to sell more than a dozen state-owned
companies in what many analysts saw as a gesture to the Left Front parties which support the
52
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, “Leftward Shift in Indian Economy,” BBC News, February 28, 2005; Paranjoy Guha
Thakurta, “India’s ‘Left-of-Center’ Budget,” BBC News, February 28, 2007.
53
“Budget a Victim of Fiscal Fundamentalism: CPI-M,” Indo-Asian News Service, February 28, 2007; “Budget Weak
on Reforms: Sinha,” Statesman (Delhi), March 5, 2006.
54
Anuj Chopra, “India Moves to Spread Wealth,” Christian Science Monitor, August 25, 2005; Paul Watson, “India
Moves Toward Guaranteed Jobs Program for Rural Poor,” Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2005.
55
Sunil Jagtiani, “For Indians, the Tax Man Rarely Cometh,” Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2006.
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ruling coalition in New Delhi.56 However, the government appeared to be renewing its efforts in
2007 with a February decision to join a disinvestment process involving three publicly-owned
power companies.57
Labor Reforms
Domestic business interests and potential foreign investors complain that India’s labor laws are
biased against employers and often prevent them from making high-risk investments. A culture of
strict government oversight of the labor market is illustrated by the existence of 47 national laws
and nearly 180 state-level laws meant to monitor its functioning. Work stoppages cause millions
of lost human-days of labor each year and the country’s courts are clogged by hundreds of
thousands of pending labor disputes. 58
In February 2005, Prime Minister Singh unveiled a blueprint for labor sector reforms. Singh later
admitted that Indian labor laws were “rigid,” reportedly saying, “We cannot move straightforward
to the Western or the American model of hire and fire, quite frankly. I don’t see that there is today
a climate of opinion which will go to that extreme.”59 More than two years after it was
announced, and despite the prime minister’s efforts to create a working consensus on the issue,
the reform initiative has been effectively stalled by the UPA’s Left Front allies.60
Infrastructural Development
The urgent need for extensive investment in India’s infrastructure is rarely questioned. The
premiere report of the U.S.-India CEO Forum from March 2006 identified India’s poor
infrastructure as one of two key impediments to increased bilateral trade and investment relations
(the other being India’s dense bureaucracy).61 At a 2005 Economic Summit in New Delhi,
Finance Minister Chidambaram acknowledged the problem, telling an audience of international
business leaders and policy makers that India needs major investments in infrastructure such as
roads, ports, and electricity generation. He asserted that a more liberal policy on bringing in
foreign capital would be a key to this endeavor.62 Electricity shortages are especially acute and
are widely believed to be seriously hindering the country’s economic potential.63 Reports indicate
that massive flooding in Mumbai in the summer of 2005 further exposed what was called India’s
economic “Achilles heel” (poor infrastructure). Another representative story describes the “utter
chaos” common at New Delhi’s international airport and the deterrent effect this can have on
foreign visitors.64
56
Saritha Rai, “In a Blow to Reform Plans, India Halts Privitizations,” New York Times, August 17, 2005.
Jo Johnson, “Delhi’s U-Turn on Privatization Criticized,” Financial Times (London), July 7, 2006; “Disinvestment
Back on Track,” Hindu (Chennai), February 9, 2007.
58
Rajesh Mahapatra, “India May Look Into Labor Law Changes,” Associated Press, July 6, 2006; Kaushik Basu, “Why
India’s Labor Laws Are a Problem,” BBC News, May 15, 2006” “India: Need for Labor Reforms,” World Bank Press
Release, February 26, 2007.
59
“Indian PM: Coalition Pressure Limiting Govt Reforms,” Dow Jones International News, August 25, 2005.
60
Henry Chu, “Rising Food Prices Hit Indians in Wallet, Politicians at Polls,” Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2007.
61
See http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/USIndia.pdf.
62
Rajesh Mahapatra, “Finance Minister: India Must Be More Open,” Associated Press, November 27, 2005.
63
Somini Sengupta, “Electricity Crisis Hobbles an India Eager to Ascend,” New York Times, May 21, 2007.
64
Rajat Bhattavharya, “Can India Make Its Great Economic Leap Forward?,” Reuters, August 4, 2005; Muneeza
(continued...)
57
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The Singh government is attempting to address decades of underinvestment in infrastructure, but
financing problems continue to hinder this effort. New Delhi estimates that the country will need
up to $350 billion in infrastructure investment over the next five years. Some of this funding may
come from India’s record-high pool of foreign exchange reserves, and Indian officials hope that
as much as one-quarter will come from foreign investors. Further reform in India’s financial
sector may be key to raising capital for infrastructure projects.65 In FY2007/2008, the central
government plans to spend more than $46 billion on infrastructure development. 66 According to
the Indian Planning Commission’s Committee on Infrastructure (created in August 2004), current
initiatives include a 15-year, multi-billion-dollar project to widen and pave 40,000 miles of
national highways; a $5 billion plan to build a dedicated freight railway; extensive renovation of
276 seaports, including bringing 12 major ports up to “world-class standards”; the modernization
and expansion of the New Delhi and Mumbai airports (which were privatized in 2006), along
with other major airports such as those in Kolkata and Chennai; further expansion of
telecommunication networks; and large-scale investment in new power plants.67 Some of these
efforts are not without their opposition from well-entrenched stakeholders, however. 68
Special Economic Zones
One of the more controversial elements of India’s recent economic reforms are the special
economic zones (SEZs) across the country. Modeled in part after China’s SEZs, the goal was to
develop new industrial areas near India’s rural population to create alternatives to agricultural
employment. Firms operating in the SEZs are expected to be net foreign exchange earners.
Investment may come from public or private companies; foreign companies may also operate in
the SEZs. There are a number of tax, tariff, and regulatory incentives offered to companies that
operate in the SEZs. At the time of this writing, a total of 234 SEZs have been approved by the
Indian government.
The most controversial aspect of the SEZ policy is the acquisition of land. Indian law grants the
Indian states the power of eminent domain over land, with relatively little recourse for the land
owner to appeal the compensation for appropriated land. In some cases, the land acquired for the
SEZs was take from local farmers, rather than from fallow areas. Some farmers have complained
about their displacement from the land, which they viewed as a source of economic stability and
their primary store of wealth.
(...continued)
Naqvi, “Winter Chaos at New Delhi Airport Highlights India’s Infrastructure Woes,” Associated Press, January 3,
2007. A 2005 business magazine feature article called India “the global economy’s idiot savant” due to its ability to
produce hundreds of thousands of well-educated engineers each year while still possessing a “chronically abysmal
infrastructure” (Clay Chandler, “India’s Bumpy Ride,” Fortune, October 31, 2005).
65
Authors’ interview with Indian trade official, Washington, DC, May 25, 2007.
66
“Poor Infrastructure Hurting India’s Growth - Fin Min,” Dow Jones International News, May 8, 2007; Ben Klayman,
“India Infrastructure May Need $80 Bln Foreign Funds,” Reuters, October 27, 2006; “India Boosts Infrastructure to
Attract Foreign Investment,” Today (Singapore), March 1, 2007.
67
See http://infrastructure.gov.in. See also Surojit Gupta, “India Picks Up Infrastructure Pace, More Needed Analysts,” Reuters, November 13, 2006.
68
For example, recent efforts to clear slums in Mumbai and Bangalore were met with energetic and oftentimes
successful resistance movements (John Larkin and Eric Bellman, “In India, the Path to Growth Hits Roadblock:
Slums,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2006).
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The SEZ policy has elicited energetic opposition from interest groups representing the political
left and right, alike. Some critics says that building SEZs on fertile agricultural land will
impoverish farmers without adequate compensation. Even INC chief Sonia Gandhi openly
opposed exposing farmers to “unscrupulous developers.” Other opponents, including India’s
finance minister, warn that the government will be denied billions of dollars in tax revenues lost
due to special concessions offered to participating firms. In October 2006, the Left Front parties
demanded extensive curbs on the SEZ initiative. 69
There have been a number of violent protests and deaths associated with the establishment of
SEZs in India. In January 2007, at least seven people were killed during protests about the
establishment of an SEZ in Nandigram, West Bengal. Reports implicate the local police and
supporters of the ruling CPI-M Party in the deaths. Then, on March 14, at least 11 more protesters
were killed in Nandigram, again during demonstrations against the SEZ. As a result of the
continued protests and violence, the SEZ policy has been put on hold by Prime Minister Singh.
India’s Trade Policies
India’s trade policies have generally been coordinated with its overall economic policies. Prior to
the economic reforms of the 1990s, India utilized a fairly comprehensive import licensing system
to control the import of goods. The import of a number of products was banned and over 1,400
products faced quantitative restrictions.
With the advent of the economic reforms, India started a gradual process of transforming its
import control mechanisms from quantitative restrictions to a tariff-based system that favored the
import of some types of products, but deterred the import of other types of products. In some
cases, tariff rates were significantly raised when the import restrictions were lifted. A side effect
of the change in trade policy was the rising importance of import tariffs for India’s federal budget.
In fiscal year 1996/97, tariffs provided one third of India’s gross tax revenue.70
Over the last few years, India has been simplifying its import policies by lowering tariffs,
reducing the variation in tariff rates, and eliminating import licensing requirements. The stated
goal is to reduce tariffs towards levels found among Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) members.71
However, while India has been lowering its various import barriers, it has become a leading
nation in the filing of antidumping measures with the WTO. Following the passage of the 1995
amendment to its 1975 Customs Act, which established India’s antidumping and countervailing
duty procedures, India began filing a large number of antidumping notifications. Between 1995
and 2001, India made 250 such notifications. As of June 30, 2006, India had 174 antidumping
measures in force on products from 30 different WTO members, including 11 measures on U.S.
products.72
69
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, “Economic Zone Plans Polarize India,” BBC News, October 2, 2006; Jo Johnson, “Left
Demands Put India’s SEZs in Doubt,” Financial Times (London), October 19, 2006.
70
“Trade Policy Review - India,” WTO Trade Policy Review Body, May 22, 2002, p. 31.
71
Ibid, p. 25.
72
“Semi-Annual Report under Article 16.4 of the Agreement - India,” WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices,
November 27, 2006.
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Tariff Rates and Enforcement
India’s tariff system has long had a reputation of being complex and opaque. Besides having a
comparatively high average tariff rate, India also had a more dispersed range of tariff rates, even
among similar types of products.73 Moreover, India had many exemptions or exceptions to the
standard “most favored nation” (MFN) tariff rate, making it difficult for foreign companies to
determine the correct tariff rate for their exports. Finally, there were frequent reports of uneven
enforcement of existing tariff laws, as well as claims of arbitrary evaluation of imported goods.
Most of these perceived problems with India’s tariff system have improved with the lowering of
its average tariff rate and the simplification of its tariff schedule. In fiscal year 1991/92, just
before the start of its economic reforms, India’s average tariff rate was almost 130%.74 According
to the WTO, in fiscal year 1997/98, India’s average tariff rate was 35.3%, with a peak rate of
260%, but by fiscal year 2001/2002, the average rate had declined to 32.3%, with a peak rate of
210%.75 By 2005, India’s average tariff rate was down to 19.5%.76
Along with the lowering of tariff rates, India also reduced the number of different tariff rates it
charged. For fiscal year 2006/07, the tariff rate became 30% for most agricultural goods and
12.5% for most non-agricultural goods. However, the peak tariff rates for agricultural goods is
100% and for non-agricultural goods is 182%.
Two product categories that remain exceptions to India’s tariff reduction and simplification are
textiles and clothing. Prior to the elimination of import licenses for textile and clothing imports in
April 2001, India introduced specific duties for a range of fabrics and apparel. These duties
generally involved the imposition of the higher of two tariffs—one calculated on a percentage
basis; the other calculated by a fixed amount per kilogram or square meter. According to one
estimate, depending on the unit price of the imported textile or garment, the implicit tariff rate
could be as high as 63%.77 In fiscal year 2006/07, many products in HS chapters 50 to 63 still
face this two-track duty system.
Import Restrictions
Although most of India’s import restrictions have been lifted, there remain a small set of goods
that are either prohibited, controlled or monitored. Import bans are either due to existing
international obligations (for example, the international ban on trade in ivory) or on health and
safety concerns. In March 2007, India banned the import of live poultry, pigs, and pig meat
products from countries with bird flu outbreaks.78 India also controls the import of some products
by means of stringent regulations.79 Finally, India regulates imports by means of monitoring
73
For this report, the average tariff rate is the simple, unweighted average of the tariff rates.
“India & Bangladesh: Bilateral Trade,” The World Bank, December 2006, p. 10.
75
“Trade Policy Review - India,” WTO Trade Policy Review Body, May 22, 2002, p. 31.
76
“2007 Trade Policy Agenda and 2006 Annual Report,” Chapter II - World Trade Organization, p. 7.
77
“India & Bangladesh: Bilateral Trade,” The World Bank, December 2006, p. 13.
78
“Government Bans Live Poultry from Bird Flu-hit Nations,” Reuters (India), March 13, 2007.
79
For example imported second-hand automobiles must meet the following conditions: 1. Be no more than three years
old; 2. Comply with India’s Motor Vehicle Act of 1988; 3. Have right-hand controls and steering; 4. Register speed in
kilometers per hour; 5. Be certified “road-worthy” for at least five years after import; and 6. pass an safety and
emissions inspection. Even when the vehicle is approved for import, it can only enter via specific ports.
74
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import flows. Among these items are: milk products, fruits, nuts, coffee, tea, spices, cereals,
oilseeds, edible oils, alcoholic products, silk, and toys.
U.S. Trade Barrier Assessment
In its 2007 report on foreign trade barriers, the United States expressed concern about several
other aspects of India’s trade policy beyond its tariff rates and import restrictions.80 According to
the report, India provides trade-distorting subsidies for di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) fertilizer.
Also, the report is critical of Indian Customs for the “extensive documentation” it requires, as
well as its apparent application of “discretionary customs valuation criteria to import
transactions.” In addition, the United States is concerned about India’s standards and certification
requirements, especially as they pertain to sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In some cases,
the United States believes that the scientific basis of the standards is questionable; in other cases,
it sees the certification requirement as forming a non-tariff trade barrier.
India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations
Economic and trade relations between the United States and India have been problematic in the
past, but are currently considered comparatively cordial. U.S. policymakers often identify in the
Indian political system shared core values, and this has facilitated increasingly friendly relations
between the U.S. and Indian governments. In addition, the trade and investment reforms
implemented by India over the last 15 years have generally fostered improved trade relations.
Indian officials opine that the two national economies present “complimentary business interests
rather than a standard developed-developing relationship.”81 However, the improvement in trade
relations has been punctuated by episodic problems, generally based on political—rather than
economic—differences of opinion. A major divergence came on May 13, 1998, when the United
States imposed trade sanctions on India in response to its nuclear weapons tests.
Trends in Merchandise Trade
Regardless of which nation’s trade statistics are considered, the value of merchandise trade
between India and the United States has picked up dramatically over the last 20 years. In 1986,
according to U.S. trade statistics, the total value of bilateral trade with India was $4.0 billion. By
2006, the total value of bilateral trade had risen to $31.9 billion—nearly an eight-fold increase.
However, despite the rapid growth in the value of trade, the relative importance of the other
nation to its total trade declined markedly in the late 1960s—a decline from which it has not
recovered.
India’s Merchandise Trade with the United States
Figure 6 shows the value of India’s exports to and imports from the United States from 1958 to
2006, according to data reported by the Indian government to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The graph shows that both India’s exports to and imports from the United States were
80
81
U.S. Trade Representative, “2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” March 31, 2007.
Authors’ interview with Indian trade official, Washington, DC, May 25, 2007.
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relatively low in value and subject to fluctuations from 1958 to about 20 years ago. However,
since the mid-1980s, U.S. imports from India have steadily increased in value while India’s
exports to the United States have shot up dramatically.
Despite the recent strong growth in trade flows in both directions, the relative importance of the
U.S. for India’s imports has actually declined over the last 40 years, while its share of India’s
exports has rebounded (see Figure 7). In the mid-1960s, nearly one-fifth of India’s exports went
to the United States, and the United States supplied India with over one-third of its imports. In
1981, the United States had declined in importance, purchasing just over 11% of India’s exports
and supplying less than 10% of its imports. In 2006, the United States purchased 17.4% of India’s
exports—almost the same percentage as in 1961—but only provided India with 5.9% of its
imports. As a result, the United States was India’s largest export market in 2006, and its third
largest source of imports.
Figure 6. India’s Merchandise Trade with the United States, 1958-2006
(U.S. $ Billions)
25
20
15
10
5
India's Exports to U.S.
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1967
1964
1961
1958
0
India's Imports from U.S.
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.
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Figure 7. U.S. Share of India’s Merchandise Trade, 1958-2006
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
U.S. Share of India's Exports
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1967
1964
1961
1958
0%
U.S. Share of India's Imports
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.
U.S. Merchandise Trade with India
An examination of U.S. statistics for bilateral trade with India reveals a similar pattern as India’s
data. Figure 8 shows official U.S. trade statistics for the same time period as Figure 6. In value
terms, U.S. exports to India and India’s exports to the United States are comparatively low in
value and flat until the mid-1980s. After a significant increase in the 1980s, U.S. imports from
India rise rapidly starting in the early 1990s. U.S. exports to India also pick up in value starting in
the early 1990s, but not at the same pace as imports from India.
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Figure 8. U.S. Merchandise Trade with India, 1958-2006(U.S. $ Billions)
25
20
15
10
5
U.S. Exports to India
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1967
1964
1961
1958
0
U.S. Imports from India
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.
The role of India in U.S. merchandise trade flows has undergone a similar, but less dramatic,
change as was seen for the importance of the United States for India’s trade (see Figure 9). In the
mid-1960s, India provided the United States with about 3% of its imports and purchased about
1.5% of its exports. Both of these percentages slid to under 1% in the 1970s. Since then, India’s
importance as a supplier of U.S. imports has risen slightly and slowly to 1.2% while India’s share
of U.S. exports has increased modestly to 1.0% after falling to 0.4% in the early 1990s. As a
result, India was the 21st largest export market for the United States in 2006 and its 18th largest
supplier of imports.
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Figure 9. India’s Share of U.S. Merchandise Trade, 1958-2006
4%
3%
2%
1%
India's Share of U.S. Exports
2006
2003
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
1979
1976
1973
1970
1967
1964
1961
1958
0%
India's Share of U.S. Imports
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, International Monetary Fund, various years.
Top Traded Commodities
There are some differences between official U.S. and Indian trade data on what the top traded
commodities are between the two countries. In some cases, the difference is only in the value and
ranking of the leading traded goods. However, in other cases, there are significant differences in
the value of goods exchanged, leading to differences in the top traded items. Table 4 lists the top
five commodities imported and exported according to U.S. and India trade statistics in 2006.
Table 4.Top Five Traded Commodities: U.S.-Indian Bilateral Merchandise Trade, 2006
(U.S. $ Billions)
Rank
Exports (HS Code)
Imports (HS Code)
U.S. Data
First
Machinery (84)
1.671
Jewelry (71)
5.866
Second
Aircraft (88)
1.623
Woven Apparel (62)
2.079
Third
Electrical Machinery (85)
1.091
Electrical Machinery (85)
1.245
Fourth
Jewelry (71)
0.924
Knitted Apparel (61)
1.163
Fifth
Optical & Medical Equipment (90)
0.688
Misc. Textile Articles (63)
1.105
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Rank
Exports (HS Code)
Imports (HS Code)
Indian Data
First
Jewelry (71)
4.760
Machinery (84)
1.814
Second
Woven Apparel (62)
1.839
Electrical Machinery (85)
1.254
Third
Knitted Apparel (61)
1.098
Optical & Medical Instruments (90)
0.764
Fourth
Misc. Textile Articles (63)
1.014
Fertilizers (31)
0.685
Fifth
Machinery (84)
0.940
Aircraft (88)
0.625
Source: Global Trade Atlas; HS chapter numbers in parentheses.
The United States and India agree that the top U.S. exports to India in 2006 included machinery,
electrical machinery, optical & medical instruments, and aircraft, but disagree on the value of
those exports and their relative ranking. Similarly, both nations report that the top Indian exports
to the United States in 2006 included jewelry, woven apparel, knitted apparel, and miscellaneous
textile articles. There are differences between the two countries over the last commodity in their
respective top five exports to each other. U.S. data indicates that missing commodity category for
top five exports to India is jewelry, but Indian data says it is fertilizer. Similarly, Indian trade
authorities list machinery as its fifth largest export to the United States, but U.S. trade figures
place electrical machinery as the country’s third largest import from India.
Emerging Competition from China
While there are minor differences in the trade figures for bilateral U.S.-India merchandise trade,
both nations recognize that China is a rising competitor to the United States.82 According to
India’s trade statistics, China became India’s leading source of imports in 2004, displacing the
United States (see Figure 10). In 2000, U.S. exports to India were worth nearly $2.9 billion—
nearly twice the value of China’s exports to India. By 2004, China’s exports to India totaled $6.0
billion, and U.S. exports to India were $5.7 billion. In 2006, U.S. exports to India totaled $9.9
billion, but China’s exports to India had risen to $15.6 billion.
The United States remains India’s leading trading partner on the strength of India’s exports to the
United States. The value of such exports more than doubled from $9.3 billion in 2000 to $18.7
billion in 2005. Over the same time period, India’s exports to China increased from $0.7 billion to
$7.8 billion—a more than 10-fold increase. As a result, India’s total trade with the United States
rose from $12.2 billion in 2000 to $28.6 billion in 2006, while its total trade with China jumped
from $2.2 billion to $23.3 billion.
82
For example, the U.S. International Trade Commission published a report in September 2006, “U.S.-China
Competition in the Indian Market,” by William Greene, Office of Economics Working Paper No. 2006-09-A.
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Figure 10. India’s Trade with the United States and China, 2000-2006
20
US$ Billions
15
10
5
0
2000
Imports from U.S.
2001
2002
Imports from China
2003
2004
Exports to U.S.
2005
2006
Exports to China
Source: Global Trade Atlas.
To summarize, from both the U.S. and Indian perspective, there has been a recent rapid increase
in bilateral merchandise trade flows, with India’s exports to the United States our performing U.S.
exports to India. However, despite the rise in the value of bilateral trade, the relative importance
of the other country to the nation’s external trade volume has remained small and is well below
levels seen in the decade immediately following India’s independence. Also, over the last five
years, India’s trade with China has grown more rapidly than trade with the United States. As a
result, China has already surpassed the United States as India’s leading source of imports, and
may soon become India’s largest trading partner.
Trade in Services
According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, bilateral trade in services in 2005 totaled
just over $10 billion—about one-third the size of the nation’s merchandise trade with India (see
Table 5). However, many analysts believe that bilateral trade in services has greater potential for
rapid growth in the near future than merchandise trade. As a result, there is increased interest in
service trade relations between the United States and India, including a proposal for a U.S.-India
free trade agreement in services.83
In contrast to merchandise trade, bilateral service trade was nearly balanced in 2005, after a
period of service trade surpluses for the United States. Between 2000 and 2005, bilateral services
83
“U.S.-India Free Trade Agreement in Services: An Analysis of Issues for Discussion,” by Dr. Jayanta Roy with
Pritam Banerjee, Confederation of Indian Industry, July 2004.
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trade increased 130%, compared to 90% growth in bilateral merchandise trade over the same five
year span.
Table 5. Indo-U.S.Trade in Services, 2000-2005
(US$ Billions)
Year
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
Total Trade
Trade
Balance
2000
2.539
1.898
4.437
640
2001
3.003
1.815
4.818
1.189
2002
3.255
1.809
5.064
1.445
2003
3.760
1.972
5.732
1.788
2004
4.461
2.889
7.350
1.572
2005
5.193
5.018
10.211
174
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Trade in transportation services is a major component of the bilateral trade. In 2005, the United
States exported about $1.5 billion worth of transportation services to India, and imported a nearly
identical amount of such services from India. India and the United States also exchanged a large
amount of professional services, with U.S. exports worth $462 million in 2005 and imports of
$597 million.
Foreign Direct Investment
The recent growth in U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI) in India parallels the growth in
bilateral trade. After steady, modest growth during the 1990s, U.S. investments in India rose
dramatically between 2001 and 2005, according to official U.S. data (see Figure 11). Between
1990 and 2000, U.S. investments in India rose from $372 million to $2.4 billion—an increase of
over $2 billion over 10 years. Over the next five years, U.S. FDI in India increased by over $6
billion to $8.5 billion. Over the 15 year period, the total value of U.S. FDI in India increased 22fold.
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Figure 11. Growth in U.S. Investments in India, 1990-2005
10
US$ Billions
8
6
4
2
TOTAL
Manufacturing
Wholesale
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Financial
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
Despite the rapid growth in U.S. investments in India, the nation remains a relatively small
destination for overseas U.S. investors. As of 2005, less than one-half of one percent of U.S.
direct investment overseas was located in India. U.S. investments in India are about half the size
of its investments in China, less than a quarter of the size of U.S. investments in Hong Kong, and
nearly a sixth the size of U.S. investments in Singapore. Overall, India ranked 31st in 2005 for
locations for overseas U.S. direct investments.
If the United States views India as a growing, but comparatively minor market for its overseas
investments, the United States is an important source of foreign direct investment for India.
According to India, the United States had $4.913 billion in investments in India as of December
2005, making the United States the second biggest investor in India and representing 16.1% of all
foreign direct investment in India.84
There are, however, forces that may increase the importance of India for U.S. companies looking
for overseas investment opportunities. With multinational firms anticipating increased labor costs
and a growing labor shortage in China, India’s large, educated, English-speaking young
workforce may become more appealing. Nearly two-thirds of the recent FDI in India went into
the manufacturing rather than services sector.85
Meanwhile, Indian companies have in recent years been buying up overseas firms. An example of
Indian company actively involved in overseas FDI is the Tata Group. In 2000, the Tata Group
bought Britain’s Tetley Tea brand. In June 2006, a Tata subsidiary purchased Eight O’Clock
84
The largest source of FDI in India in 2005 was Mauritius.
Keith Bradsher, “A Younger India is Flexing Its Industrial Brawn,” New York Times, September 1, 2006; Mark
Sappenfield, “India’s Economy, Now With Muscle,” Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 2006.
85
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Coffee for $220 million, which has a majority share in the U.S. branded whole bean coffee
market. 86 Then, in January 2007, Tata Steel took over Corus, a European steel company, for over
$11 billion. 87 According to an IMF report, India’s overseas acquisitions for the first nine months
of 2006 totaled over $7.2 billion.88
Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Relations
Bilateral Agreements and Relations
India and the United States have not signed either a bilateral trade agreement or bilateral
investment treaty. Their bilateral trade relations are principally governed by the terms of their
memberships in multilateral organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). There are, however, four specific bilateral relationships that
have affected or will likely affect trade relations between India and the United States.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation89
India’s status as a non-signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has kept it
from accessing most nuclear-related materials and fuels on the international market for more than
three decades. New Delhi’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” spurred the U.S.-led creation of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—an international export control regime for nuclear-related
trade—and the U.S. government further tightened its own export laws with the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978. In a major policy shift, the July 2005 U.S.-India Joint Statement
asserted that, “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the
same benefits and advantages as other such states,” and President Bush vowed to work on
achieving “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India.”90 As a reversal of three decades of
U.S. nonproliferation policy, such proposed cooperation stirred controversy and required changes
in both U.S. law and in NSG guidelines. India reciprocally agreed to take its own steps, including
moving 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors into permanent international oversight by the year 2014 and
placing all future civilian reactors under permanent safeguards.
After many months of deliberation and multiple hearings involving Administration and nongovernmental experts, the 109th Congress passed enabling legislation near the end of its term.
President Bush signed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006 (or “Hyde Act”) into law in December 2006 (P.L. 109-401). The final
bill language made significant procedural changes to the Administration’s original legislative
proposal, changes that sought to retain congressional oversight of the negotiation process, in part
by requiring the Administration to gain future congressional approval of a completed peaceful
nuclear cooperation agreement with India (this is often referred to as a “123 Agreement,” as it is
86
Anjana Pasricha, “India Companies Expand Overseas,” VOA News, April 2, 2006; “India’s Tata Coffee to Buy US
Firm for $220 Mln,” Reuters, June 25, 2006.
87
Alam Srinivas, “Corus Takeover: Who is Ratan Tata?” BBC News, January 31, 2007.
88
“IMF Country Report No. 07/63,” February 2007, p. 9.
89
See also CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
90
See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html.
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negotiated under the conditions set forth in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act). Congressional
conferees also provided a 30-page explanatory statement (H.Rept. 109-721).
U.S. proponents of the civil nuclear initiative with India assert that, in addition to bringing India
“into the nonproliferation mainstream,” it has the potential to reduce pressures on global energy
markets, reduce carbon emissions/greenhouse gases, and benefit progress of the broader U.S.India “global partnership.”91 India seeks access to U.S. nuclear technology as part of a national
program to improve its energy infrastructure. U.S. business interests are eager benefit through the
export to India of nuclear reactors, fuel, and support services. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
which, along with the U.S.-India Business Council, lobbied vigorously in favor of President
Bush’s initiative, speculated that civil nuclear cooperation with India could generate contracts for
American businesses worth up to $100 billion, as well as generate up to 27,000 new American
jobs each year for a decade. 92 However, foreign companies such as Russia’s Atomstroyexport and
France’s Areva may be better poised to take advantage of the Indian market. Moreover, U.S.
nuclear suppliers will likely balk at entering the Indian market in the absence of nuclear liability
protection, which New Delhi does not offer at present.
In 2007, U.S.-India negotiations toward finalizing a 123 Agreement proved contentious, as New
Delhi expressed significant dissatisfaction with some aspects of U.S. conditions (these included
provisions to end civil nuclear cooperation in the event that India tests a nuclear device, and an
absence of assurances of uninterrupted fuel supplies or prior authorization for India’s
reprocessing of spent fuel). Influential political elements in India—including the Left Front, the
main opposition BJP, and members of the nuclear scientific community—voiced strong
disapproval of the proposed deal, and these domestic political pressures constrained the space in
which Indian leaders were able to maneuver on the issue. However, in July, the United States and
India announced having concluded negotiations 123 Agreement, calling it a “historic milestone”
in the bilateral strategic partnership. New Delhi appeared to have been successful in negotiating
reprocessing rights, assured fuel supplies, and no automatic termination if it conducts further
nuclear weapons test. Indeed, subsequent reports suggested that U.S. negotiators had made
considerable concessions to Indian demands and that the agreement could face resistance from
some in Congress if its legal stipulations are seen to deviate from those found in the Hyde Act
(the 123 Agreement can become operative only through a Joint Resolution of Approval from
Congress).93 Civil nuclear cooperation with India cannot commence until the NSG allows for
such cooperation, and until New Delhi concludes its own safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
91
See “U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/scp/2006/62904.htm; Condoleezza Rice, “Our Opportunity With India,” Washington Post, March 13, 2006.
92
See Sridhar Krishnaswami, “‘Indo-US N-deal a Historic Opportunity,’” India Abroad, March 22, 2006, at
http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/22ndeal.htm.
93
Somini Sengupta , “In Its Nuclear Deal With India, Washington Appears to Make More Concessions,” New York
Times, July 28, 2007; Carol Giacomo, “India Nuclear Deal Said Complies With US Law,” Reuters, July 25, 2007; “US
Congress to Scrutinize Nuclear Pact With India,” Agence France Presse, August 3, 2007. A July letter to President
Bush signed by 23 Members of the House stressed the need for any civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India to
conform to “the legal boundaries set by Congress.” The letter noted that the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with
the sole authority to regulate foreign commerce, and it expressed ongoing concerns about “India’s deepening militaryto-military relationship with Iran ... [which] places congressional approval of the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation
in jeopardy.”
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Verified End User Program
In March 2006, President Bush pledged to create a verified end user (VEU) program with India.
Also known as the “Trusted Customer” program, the VEU program would facilitate the licensefree sale of otherwise controlled U.S. exports to approved Indian end users. As described by U.S.
Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez in a February speech, the VEU program would provide
qualified Indian companies “access to U.S. technology products in a faster, more efficient, and
more transparent manner.”94 According to Secretary Gutierrez, the VEU Program will be
operational in a “few months.”
The United States is pressing India to strengthen its export control systems and meet the
standards specified in the Wassenaar Arrangement95 and the Australia Group.96 While India’s
strengthening of its export controls is not a precondition for the VEU program, the United States
has indicated that it will exclude certain chemicals and Wassenaar items from the program if India
does not tighten its export controls. 97
U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
India is a beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program, which
“provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing
countries.”98 In 2006, India received GSP preferential treatment for $5.7 billion of its exports to
the United States, of which $2.4 billion, or 42%, was jewelry or jewelry-related products (HTS
chapter 71).
Some in the 109th Congress discussed discontinuing India’s inclusion in the GSP Program, in part
due to India’s stance on the Doha Round of negotiations. In May 2006, the then-Senate Finance
Committee Chairman questioned the renewal of the GSP Program, pointing to India and Brazil as
“two of the countries most responsible for holding up the Doha negotiations.”99 In September
2006, the then-Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman called for U.S. Trade Representative
Susan Schwab to consider revising the GSP Program to exclude advanced developing countries
such as Brazil and India.100 However, no action was taken by the Bush Administration to remove
India from the GSP Program.
94
“U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez Remarks to the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group,”
Department of Commerce, February 22, 2007.
95
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral agreement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and
related dual-use goods and military technology. For more details, see CRS Report RS20517, Military Technology and
Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement, by (name redacted). The United States is a
participant in the Wassenaar Arrangement; India is not.
96
The Australia Group is “an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to
minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation.” For more information, see the
Group’s web page: http://www.australiagroup.net/. The United States is a participant in the Group; India is not.
97
“U.S., India to Haggle over Export Control Changes at HTCG Meeting,” World Trade Online, February 23, 2007.
98
For more details about the GSP Program, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences:
Background and Renewal Debate, by (name redacted).
99
Statement of Senator Charles Grassley at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on the Nomination of Susan Schwab
to be United States Trade Representative, May 16, 2006.
100
Letter from Senator Saxby Chambliss to U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, September 19, 2006.
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U.S.-India Economic Dialogue
During the Indian prime minister’s July 2005 visit to Washington, D.C., he and President Bush
agreed to revitalize the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue. The Economic Dialogue has four main
fora—the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum, the Financial and Economic Forum, the Environmental
Dialogue, and the Commercial Dialogue. At the July 2005 session, India and the United States
agreed to three new initiatives under the Economic Dialogue—the Information and
Communications Technology Working Group, the CEO Forum, and the U.S.-India Agricultural
Knowledge Initiative—and reconstituted the High Technology Cooperation Group. The objective
of the Economic Dialogue is to seek ways to resolve outstanding economic and trade issues,
develop administrative capacity, and provide technical assistance. In general, meetings of the
Economic Dialogue or its constituent groups consist of government officials from both nations, as
well representatives of the Indian and U.S. private sectors.101
World Trade Organization and Other Multilateral Relations
In addition to their direct bilateral relations, India and the United States interact on economic and
trade issues in several multilateral fora. Both countries are members of the WTO, IMF, the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other topical multilateral organizations. 102 In
other multilateral organizations, one nation may be a member, but the other nation may have
informal ties to the group or interest in its activities. For example, while the United States is a
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and India is not, there are indications
that India would be interested in joining APEC when its current moratorium on new members
ends. Similarly, India is a member of the East Asian Summit (EAS)103 and the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),104 but United States is not. While the United
States has a rather ambivalent attitude about the EAS, it and has applied for observer status with
SAARC.
Doha Round Negotiations105
Current discussions among WTO members regarding the Doha Round have placed the United
States and India on opposing sides of key issues. When a half-year long suspension in
negotiations ended earlier this year, India and the United States were joined by the European
Union and Brazil to form a core group seeking to resolve the outstanding issues. The key
outstanding issues for the Doha Round center around trade in agricultural goods, non-agricultural
101
See http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/62493.htm.
These topical multilateral organizations include the International Labor Organization, the World Health
Organization and similar groups.
103
The current members of the East Asia Summit are the 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea.
104
The current members of SAARC are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka.
105
For additional information about the Doha Round negotiations see CRS Report RL33144, WTO Doha Round: The
Agricultural Negotiations, by (name redacted) and (name redacted); CRS Report RL32060,
World Trade
Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33085, Trade in
Services: The Doha Development Agenda Negotiations and U.S. Goals, by (name redacted); and CRS Report
RL33634, The World Trade Organization: The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Negotiations, by (name r
edacted).
102
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market access (or NAMA), trade in services, and trade remedies. At present, differences on trade
in agricultural goods are foremost among the four remaining issues, and is generally viewed as
the lynchpin for the successful completion of the Doha Round. It is generally understood that
resolution of all the outstanding issues must occur for a successful outcome to the Doha Round,
in part because the four key issues are to varying degrees linked to one another.
India’s Commerce Minister, Kamal Nath, has blamed U.S. intransigence for the Doha Round’s
collapse. In November 2006, during a visit to New Delhi to discuss trade issues with top Indian
leaders, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns urged India to match “ambitious” U.S. offers
and “lead the way toward unlocking the Doha negotiations by offering real market access.”106
Indian officials later rejoined the negotiations, but, in June 2007, claimed the talks had
“collapsed” due to lack of convergence among the major actors. Trade Representative Schwab
later expressed U.S. surprise at how “rigid and inflexible” India (and Brazil) were during the June
negotiations and she suggested that “some countries ... really don’t want a Doha round
outcome.”107
Proposed Regional Free Trade Agreements
During the suspension of the Doha Round negotiations, interest in alternative means of trade
promotion and investment liberalization grew. In Asia, one of the more popular alternatives
discussed was the formation of a regional free trade agreement. At the 2006 APEC meetings in
Vietnam, the United States proposed the creation of a Free Trade Association of the Asia-Pacific,
or FTAAP.108 As envisioned by the United States, the FTAAP would include the current APEC
members only, thereby excluding India.
At the second meeting of the East Asian Summit, held in conjunction with the January 2006
ASEAN Summit held in Cebu, Philippines, one of main agenda items was a proposal to form a
pan-Asian free trade association that would include current ASEAN members plus Australia,
China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and possibly Russia. The United States, which was not invited
to the summit, was not being considered for membership in the pan-Asian FTA because it is not
an Asian nation. India had already expressed its support for the idea of a pan-Asia FTA before the
summit took place.109 The United States opposes the idea, preferring its FTAAP model of an
Asian FTA.
Asian Development Bank110
The United States and India are both members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—one as a
developed country and a contributor of funds; the other as a developing country and a recipient of
funds. According to the most recent ADB Annual Report, India received $567.2 million in
106
“India Blames U.S. for Failure of WTO Talks,” Hindu (Chennai), July 26, 2006; Secretary Johanns at
http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr112106b.html.
107
“U.S. Says Doha Risks Being Delayed for Several Years,” Reuters, July 5, 2007.
108
For more about the FTAAP proposal, see CRS Report RL31038, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and
the 2007 Meetings in Sydney, Australia, by (name redacted).
109
“Manmohan Singh Sells his Vision of Pan-Asian FTA,” by C. Chitti Pantulu, Daily News & Analysis (India), May
5, 2006.
110
For more information about the Asian Development Bank, see CRS Report RS21437, The Asian Development Bank,
by (name redacted).
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assistance in 2005, including $440.3 million in loans, $100 million in “special funds” (primarily
tsunami relief support), and $20.6 million in equity and guarantees. 111 Outside of the tsunami
relief assistance, most of the ADB’s 2005 support in India went to infrastructure development
projects. Since joining the ADB in 1966, India has received nearly $15 billion in ADB assistance.
The United States has pledged to contribute $461 million to the ADB’s Asian Development Fund
between 2005 and 2008. However, Congress set the U.S. support for the ADB for FY2006 and
FY2007 at $99 million. For FY2008, the Bush Administration has requested $133.85 million:
$115.25 million for its annual contribution and $18.6 million to pay a portion of its arrears.
One important issue of note emerging from the ADB is a proposal to create an Asian Currency
Unit (ACU), to be overseen by the ADB. The ACU is envisioned as a unit of account, determined
by a weighted average of regional currencies, to be used by financial market participants for
regional settlement of payments and invoicing of trade transactions. According to the ADB, over
time the ACU may be transformed into a regional currency, much like the Euro.
India has expressed a desire to be part of the ACU, but Finance Minister Chidambaram has
admitted the “Asian Currency Unit is not going to happen overnight.”112 India is also aware of
resistance among the ASEAN nations to include India in the ACU. The United States has
expressed misgivings about the ACU proposal in general, raising concerns about “mission
creep.”113
Key Economic and Trade Issues
Besides the general multilateral and bilateral economic and trade issues described above, there are
several sectoral or topical issues of significance between India and the United States. Some of
these issues interplay with more general issues, such as the Doha Round negotiations or the
bilateral trade balance. What follows is a brief summary of each of these issues, arranged in
alphabetical order.
Agricultural Goods
In India and the United States, there is interest in improving market access to each other’s
markets in anticipation of greater trade in agricultural goods. In 2006, the United States exported
over $300 million in agricultural goods (including over $42 million in prepared foods) to India,
and imported $1.3 billion in agricultural goods from India (see Table 6).
111
Asian Development Bank, Annual Report of the Bank 2005.
“India to be Part of Asia’s Common Currency,” Time of India, May 7, 2006.
113
Rick Carew, “Asian Development Bank’s Future At Crossroads,” Dow Jones Newswires, May 8, 2006.
112
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Table 6.Trade in Agricultural Goods: India and the United States, 2006
(US$ Millions)
U.S. Exports to
India
U.S. Imports from
India
Agricultural Goods - Total
300.0
1,327.1
Animals & Animal Products
6.6
327.9
Vegetable Products
232.0
754.4
Animal & Vegetable Oils & Fats
18.1
43.8
Prepared Foods
42.6
200.7
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission.
U.S. exports of live animals and animal products are hindered by Indian import restrictions and
cultural norms. Cattle and beef imports are subject to import controls because of the risk of “mad
cow” and “hoof in mouth” disease, as well as the Hindi and Buddhist prohibitions of eating beef
and Muslim prohibitions of eating pork. Similarly, on March 14, 2007, India stopped the import
of poultry, poultry products, pigs, and pork products from countries infected with avian influenza
to protect the public health. 114 Other U.S. products—such as coffee, tea and most grains115—are
effectively kept out of India by tariff rates as high as 100%. A July 2007 Indian government
reported determined that U.S. wheat was unfit to be imported into India due to the presence of
pervasive weeds.116
On March 6, 2007, the United States requested WTO dispute settlement consultations with India
over the customs duties it imposes on imports of wine and distilled spirits, claiming that charges
for “additional duty” and “extra additional duty” increased the imposed tariff rate to 150% to
550%.117 The European Union (EU) also requested consultations over the same issue. India has
committed to the WTO to bind its tariff on wine and spirits to no more than 150%.
On March 30, 2007, Indian Trade Minister Kamal Nath said that India knew its import duties on
wine and alcohol were “high” and that “this situation would be corrected.”118 However, at an
April 10 meeting of WTO Dispute Settlement Board, India blocked the first attempt by the
European Union to request the creation of a dispute settlement panel to address India’s import
regime for wine and alcohol. The dispute panel was approved at a subsequent meeting of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Board on April 24, 2007.
The United States has also expressed concern about India’s application of its sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations on certain U.S. exports.119 The United States questions some of
the scientific basis for India’s SPS regulations. It also believes that some of the SPS standards are
114
“India bans live poultry imports amid bird flu scare,” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2007.
Barley, oats, buckwheat, and canary seed may be imported duty free; the tariff on wheat is 100%. Most other grains
face tariff rates between 60% and 80%.
116
“US Wheat Not Fit to Be Imported,” Times of India (Delhi), July 16, 2007.
117
“United States Files WTO Case Against India Challenging Excessive Duties on U.S. Wine and Spirits,” press
release, U.S. Trade Representative, March 6, 2007.
118
“India to ‘Correct’ Import Duty on Wine, Spirits,” Reuters, March 30, 2007.
119
The 2006 Foreign Trade Barriers report specifically mentions almonds, apples, bovine semen, dairy products,
pulses, poultry, pet food and forest products as affected exports.
115
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not in accord with internationally recognized standards. Plus, the United States has indicated that
India has failed to notify other nations of changes in SPS regulations in a timely fashion. In
particular, the U.S. Trade Representative has objected to India’s proposed import and labeling
requirements for genetically modified foods.120
For its part, India has also indicated dissatisfaction with U.S. SPS regulations with regards to the
treatment of Indian agricultural goods. For example, one long-standing source of tension between
the two nations is a 17-year old ban on the import Indian mangoes into the continental United
States. The mango ban was a subject of discussion during President Bush’s trip to India in March
2006, during which President Bush promised to have the ban lifted. On March 12, 2007, when the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) issued a
final rule allowing, under certain conditions, the import of mangoes from India.121 However,
according to India’s Commerce Department, the estimated cost of compliance with the new rule
is about $3 per mango, rendering the Indian mango uncompetitive.122
Other than issues of threats to public health and unfair SPS rules, India’s concern about
agricultural imports from the United States also includes the U.S. farm subsidy program. 123 India,
along with a number of other nations, views the current U.S. farm support program as a form of
trade-distorting export subsidy and is calling on the United States to significantly reduce the
annual limit on farm assistance. India has rejected the proposed U.S. limit of $22 billion as
insufficient, pointing out that the actual level of support in 2006—$19 billion—was already
below the U.S. offer. India, the United States, Brazil, and the European Union are actively
discussing the agricultural support programs as part of the reinvigorated Doha Round
negotiations.
Clothing and Textiles
Trade in clothing and textiles is a major issue in U.S. relations with India for two key reasons.
First, as shown in Table 4, clothing and textiles are among the top five India exports to the United
States. Second, following the termination of the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(ATC) on January 1, 2005, most experts predicted that the global manufacturing of clothing and
textiles would restructure, and that China and India would emerge as major production sites. By
implication, it was expected that U.S. clothing and textile imports from India (and China) would
jump beginning in 2005, as production shifted from other nations to India (and China). As a
result, the termination of the ATC might cause a spike in the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India.
The U.S. trade data on textile and clothing imports from India appear to support the predictions
for clothing, but not textiles (see Figure 12). Clothing imports, which had been increasing by
about 10% per year for the previous three years, rose by over 30%, or more than $1 billion, in
2005, and then returned to the previous growth rate. By contrast, textile imports from India did
not spike in either 2005 or 2006, but grew at a rate similar to the previous three years.
120
“USTR to Oppose India’s Proposed GMO Import Regulations,” Inside Trade, July 7, 2006.
“USDA to Allow Mango Imports from India,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, March 13, 2007. The ruling
stipulates that the mangoes must be irradiated in an APHIS-certified facility and be accompanied by a phytosanitary
certificate.
122
Amiti Sen, “Uncle Sam to Miss Indian Mangoes Again,” Economic Times (India), March 6, 2007.
123
For more information about the U.S. farm support program and the Doha Round, see CRS Report RL33144, WTO
Doha Round: The Agricultural Negotiations, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
121
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Figure 12. U.S.Textiles and Clothing Imports from India, 2000-2006
$5
40%
30%
$4
US$ Billions
20%
$3
10%
$2
0%
$1
-10%
$0
-20%
2000
Textiles
2001
Clothing
2002
2003
2004
YoY Growth - Textile
2005
2006
YoY Growth - Clothing
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission
The sharp increase in clothing imports from India did not, however, translate into an unusual rise
in the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India (see Table 7). According to U.S. trade figures, the
nation’s bilateral trade deficit with India grew in a rather uneven pattern between 2000 and 2006.
The increase in the trade deficit between 2004 and 2005 was large—over $1.5 billion—but not
that much larger than the year before or the increase between 2001 and 2002.
Table 7. U.S.Trade Balance with India, 2000-2006
Year
U.S. Trade Balance with India
(U.S. $ Billions)
Year-on Year Growth
2000
-7.381
2001
-6.527
11.6%
2002
-8.352
28.0%
2003
-8.766
5.0%
2004
-10.342
18.0%
2005
-11.917
15.2%
2006
-11.735
-1.5%
Source: WTO Direction of Trade Yearbooks.
While the debate over the impact of the termination of the ATC on global trade patterns
continues, another factor—the relative value of key currencies—appears to be influencing the
global clothing and textile market. For India, the dramatic strengthening of the rupee against the
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U.S. dollar (see Figure 13) has apparently hurt the nation’s clothing and textile exports to the
United States.
Figure 13. Exchange Rate: Indian Rupees per U.S. Dollar, 2005-2007
50
45
40
35
4/1/2007
1/1/2007
10/1/2006
7/1/2006
4/1/2006
1/1/2006
10/1/2005
7/1/2005
4/1/2005
1/1/2005
30
Source: http://www.oanda.com.
Between July 1, 2006, and March 1, 2007, the value of the Indian rupee gained 4% against the
U.S. dollar, as the exchange rate declined from 46.126 rupees per U.S. dollar to 44.287 rupees per
U.S. dollar. However, over the next two months, the strengthening of the rupee accelerated, so
that by the middle of July, the exchange rate stood at 40.423 rupees per dollar—or an appreciation
of 9.1% in less than four months.
According to some market observers, the appreciation of the rupee has reversed two years of
growth of clothing and textile exports to the United States. Official U.S. trade statistics for the
first six months of 2007 show a 1.5% year-on-year decline in the value of textile imports from
India and a 0.6% year-on-year decline in the value of clothing imports.124 D.K. Nair, secretarygeneral of the Confederation of Indian Textile Industry, said that the slowdown in U.S. demand
along with the strengthening of the rupee are causing serious harm to India’s clothing and textile
industry.125
The more recent appreciation of the rupee is making it even more difficult for India to remain
competitive. At another forum, Nair stated,
124
U.S. trade data from U.S. International Trade Commission; textiles include HTS chapters 50-60; clothing includes
chapters 61-63.
125
“Textiles, Jewellery May Drag Exports,” The Financial Times (India), April 16, 2007.
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Supply side problems like unworkable labor laws that restrict the garment industry to SMEs
[small and medium enterprises], high transaction costs that render exports uncompetitive and
infrastructure weaknesses have been infusing production inefficiencies into the textile and
clothing industry. What is new is perhaps the steep appreciation of the rupee during the last
few months, and particularly during the last couple of weeks.126
Dual-Use Technology and Military Trade
The forthcoming Verified End Users (VEU) Program is perceived as portending a period of
greater trade in dual-use technology and military equipment between the United States and India.
Because the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 (P.L. 96-72,) expired in August 2001,
exports of dual-use technology to India are currently restricted or controlled by International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (P.L. 95-223).127 Munitions and military equipment
are controlled by the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 94-329).128
India is seen as a large and promising market for U.S. exporters of military equipment and dualuse technology. From 1998 to 2005, India was the leading arms purchaser among less
industrialized countries, signing arms transfer agreements worth $20.7 billion. Most of these
agreements were made with Russia, upon which India has long relied for its procurement of
military equipment. India’s future defense procurement budget could total as much as $35 billion
over the next two decades.129 Officials from both the U.S. and Indian governments assert that
greater defense trade should be an important aspect of future bilateral relations.130
As a result of New Delhi’s increased defense expenditures, the issue of U.S. arms sales to India
has taken a higher profile in recent years. In 2002, the Pentagon negotiated a sale to India of 12
counter-battery (or “Firefinder”) radars sets worth a total of $190 million, the largest such
bilateral arms deal to date. In 2006, New Delhi approved a $44 million plan to purchase the USS
Trenton, a decommissioned American amphibious transport dock. The ship, the second largest in
the Indian navy, set sail for India as the INS Jalashva in June 2007 carrying six surplus Sikorsky
helicopters purchased for another $39 million. In May 2007, the Pentagon notified Congress of
the possible sale to India of six C-130J Hercules transport aircraft (manufactured by Marylandbased Lockheed Martin) which, along with associated equipment and services, could be worth
more than $1 billion.131 The Pentagon reports military sales agreements with India worth $336
million in FY2002-FY2006.
American defense firms eagerly pursue new and expanded business ties with India, lobbying most
recently at India’s biennial air show in Bangalore in February 2007, where 52 U.S. companies
126
“Re Hurts: Textile Exports to US Dip after Long Time,” by K.G. Narendranath, Economic Times (India), April 12,
2007.
127
For this report, dual-use technology refers to products that have both military and civilian applications, including but
not limited to nuclear technology.
128
For more information about the Export Administration Act, see CRS Report RL31832, The Export Administration
Act: Evolution, Provisions, and Debate, by (name redacted).
129
See CRS Report RL33696, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005, by (name redac
ted), p. 16; “India’s Defense Imports to Touch $35 Bn by 2026: Antony,” India PR Wire, January 8, 2007.
130
Nicholas Burns, “‘Heady Times’ for India and the U.S.,” Washington Post, April 29, 2007; authors’ interview with
Indian trade official, Washington, DC, May 25, 2007.
131
See http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/India_07-33.pdf.
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exhibited their wares and sought deals. According to U.S. Ambassador to India Mulford, there is a
widespread expectation in the United States that U.S. companies should get “favorable treatment”
following American gestures to India, even as he denied there was any “negotiated quid pro quo”
related to planned bilateral civil nuclear cooperation. Still, some top Indian officials express
concern that the United States is a “fickle” partner that may not always be relied upon to provide
the reciprocity, sensitivity, and high-technology transfers sought by New Delhi. 132
Nevertheless, the Indian government reportedly possesses an extensive list of desired U.S.-made
weapons, including PAC-3 anti-missile systems, electronic warfare systems, and possibly even
combat aircraft. The 2005 unveiling of the Bush Administration’s “new strategy for South Asia”
included assertions that the United States welcomed Indian requests for information on the
possible purchase of F-16 or F/A-18 multi-role fighters, and indicated that Washington is “ready
to discuss the sale of transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early
warning, and missile defense.” India is expected in 2007 to issue a tender for the purchase of 126
new fighter jets in a deal that could be worth up to $10 billion. Lockheed Martin and Illinoisbased Boeing are competing with aircraft built in Russia, France, and Sweden.
The enthusiasm of U.S. defense companies themselves is somewhat dampened by India’s Offset
Policy for defense procurements. Introduced in 2005, the Offset Policy requires that foreign
defense contracts worth more than 3 billion rupees (about $74 million) include an offset purchase,
investment, or transfer of technology worth at least 30% of the total contract. The direct
purchases may include goods or services from India’s defense industry, and the investments
should be made in either India’s defense industry or organizations conducting defense research
and development. Some U.S. companies object to India’s Offset Policy and have lobbied for its
termination.
Trade in dual-use technology with India is subject to the provisions of the IEPPA. As a result,
U.S. companies wishing to export dual-use products to India must secure an export license from
the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). In addition, some exports
to India (including certain computers) are subject to post-shipment verification to ensure that the
products are not being re-exported to other restricted locations. Finally, the BIS maintains a list of
entities to which the export of dual-use technology is generally prohibited. At the time of this
writing, the list includes four Indian entities and/or their subordinates.133
At a February 2007 meeting of the U.S.-India High Technology Working Group, there was
extensive discussion of the possibility of removing some or all of the Indian companies from the
BIS entities list, as well as eliminating or alleviating the restrictions on dual-use technology trade
with India. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Chris Padilla appeared to
signal a willingness to consider a relaxation of export restrictions during the HTCG meeting,
saying, “There may be some remainders of Cold War-type treatment that we may be able to
address and clean up in our regulations.”134
132
Rajesh Mahapatra, “U.S. Ambassador Says Nuke Deal Does Not Oblige India to Buy American Jets,” Associated
Press, February 2, 2006; “Defense Firms Seek Sales in India,” Chicago Tribune, December 21, 2006.
133
The Indian entities are Bharat Dynamics Limited, three subordinates of Defense Research and Development
Organization (DRDO), selected subentities of the Department of Atomic Energy, and four subordinate of the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO).
134
“U.S., India to Haggle over Export Controls Changes at HTCG Meeting,” World Trade Online, February 23, 2007.
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However, there are some indications that the United States would like to see India tighten its
export control regime before relaxing its exports controls on India. While emphasizing that tighter
export controls were not a precondition to the implementation of the proposed VEU program,
Assistant Secretary Padilla implied that the scope of VEU program might be constrained by the
status of India’s export controls.135
Foreign Direct Investment
Although current levels of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) are relatively low when compared
to China, there is strong private interest in the Indian market for U.S. companies in certain
industries. Annual FDI to India from all countries rose from about $100 million in 1990 to nearly
$6 billion for 2005, then nearly doubled in one year to more than $11 billion in 2006. About onethird of these investments was made by U.S. firms; in recent years, the major U.S.-based
companies Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, and IBM announced plans for multi-billion-dollar
investments in India. However, current Indian law restricts foreign ownership in many industries
to varying degrees, making FDI less attractive to many U.S. companies.
At present, India strictly prohibits FDI in four industries: retail trade (except single-brand outlets);
atomic energy; lottery business; and gambling and betting. For other sectors of interest to U.S.
companies—including broadcasting, pharmaceuticals, banking, financial services, insurance,
defense production, mining, oil and natural gas, and telecommunications—FDI limits range from
26% to 100% of total equity, both across and within sectors. In addition, depending on the sector
and the size of the FDI, the investment may be subject to administrative approval. 136
In late 2006, India announced it is considering new legislation on FDI.137 The so-called FDI
Promotion Act would cover all aspects of FDI, including entry conditions, dispute settlement,
incentive programs, approval procedures. The Indian government is also considering a proposal
to create uniform FDI limits within each sector, as well as raise some of the current FDI limits.138
Prospects for these two proposals are uncertain. However, New Delhi did increase the FDI limit
for the telecommunications industry from 49% to 74% in March 2007.139
Especially closely watched are opportunities for investment in India’s potentially vast retail
sector. Foreign involvement in his sector is a sensitive issue for Indians; in March 2005,
Commerce Minister Nath said, “We are very clear that if at all FDI is permitted into retail trade it
should lead to incremental economic benefits and not substitute ongoing activities. There is no
question of replacing or displacing what we have: it must add to economic activity.”140 New Delhi
subsequently commissioned a report on FDI in the retail sector and, in January 2006, Nath
announced new regulations that allow foreign investors to own up to 51% of retail outlets selling
only single-brand goods. India has a particularly large number of small merchant shops—perhaps
135
“U.S. to Press India for Tighter Export Controls to Facilitate VEU Program,” World Trade Online, February 21,
2007.
136
See India’s FDI policy at http://dipp.nic.in/publications/fdi_policy_2006.pdf. FDI statistics available at
http://dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_fdi_index.htm.
137
G. Ganapathy Subramaniam, “New FDI Law Under Consideration,” The Economic Times (India), November 28,
2006.
138
Bipin Chandranv “Uniform Sectoral FDI Unlikely,” Financial Express (India), March 15, 2007.
139
“Government Raises FDI Limit in Telecom to 74%,” Times of India, (Delhi), March 22, 2007.
140
Sheela Reddy, “‘Chillies: Just an Allegation’” (interview), Outlook (Delhi), March 7, 2005.
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the highest per capita number worldwide—meaning that tens of millions of citizens could be
adversely impacted by the appearance in India of “big-box” retailers.141
Intellectual Prop
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.